Representing Actions - I :
(Laws, Observations and Hypotheses)

Chitta Baral[1], *Michael Gelfond*[1] and *Alessandro Provetti*[2]

(1)
Department of Computer Science
University of Texas at El Paso
El Paso, Texas 79968 U.S.A.
{*chitta,mgelfond*} *@cs.utep.edu*
915-747-6952/5030 (voice/fax)

(2)
C.I.R.F.I.D.
Universitá di Bologna
I-40121 Bologna ITALY
provetti@cirfid.unibo.it

Abstract

We propose extensions $\mathcal{L}_0$ and $\mathcal{L}_1$ of the action description language $\mathcal{A}$ that can express both actual and hypothetical situations, observations of the truth values of fluents in these situations (as opposed to hypothetical values of fluents expressible in $\mathcal{A}$), and observations of actual occurrences of actions. The corresponding entailment relation formalizes various types of common-sense reasoning about actions and their effects not modeled by the previous approaches. We then formalize the notion of planning from the current situation using $\mathcal{L}_1$.

Introduction

To perform nontrivial reasoning an intelligent agent situated in a changing domain needs the knowledge of causal laws that describe effects of actions changing the domain, the ability to observe and record occurrences of these actions and the truth values of fluents[1] at particular moments of time. Discovery of methods of representing this kind of information in a form allowing various types of reasoning about the dynamic world and at the same time tolerant to future updates is one of the central problems of knowledge representation.

Recently, there has been several efforts towards **systematic** development of **provably correct** methods (Gelfond & Lifschitz 1992; Sandewall 1992; Lesperance *et al.* 1994) to reason about actions. Our approach is an extension of (Gelfond & Lifschitz 1992) where the authors introduced the high-level *action description language* $\mathcal{A}$ capable of expressing causal laws describing effects of actions as well as statements about values of fluents in possible states of the world.

In the last two years the syntax and semantics of $\mathcal{A}$ were expanded to allow descriptions of the effects of concurrent and non-deterministic actions as well as descriptions of global constraints expressing time

independent relations between fluents (Baral & Gelfond 1993; Kartha & Lifschitz 1994; Bornscheuer & Thielscher 1994). We also have by now a collection of sound and often complete translations from domain descriptions in these languages into disjunctive, abductive and equational logic programs (Dung 1993; Denecker & De Schreye 1993; Holldobler & Thielscher 1993; Turner 1994). This work helped to better understand the underlying ontological principles of reasoning about actions as well as advantages and limitations of general-purpose non-monotonic formalisms. It also allowed to establish equivalence of some of the previously known theories of actions seemingly based on different intuitions, languages and logics (Kartha 1993) and stimulated work on the theory and implementation of logic programming languages (Apt & Bezem 1991; Turner 1993; Lifschitz & Turner 1994).

The goal of this paper[2] is to further expand the expressive power of $\mathcal{A}$ and its dialects. In particular, we propose an extension of $\mathcal{A}$ that can express actual situations, observations of the truth values of fluents in these situations (as opposed to hypothetical values of fluents expressible in $\mathcal{A}$), and observations of actual occurrences of actions. The corresponding entailment relation formalizes various types of common-sense reasoning about actions and their effects not modeled by the previous approaches.

We use this extension of $\mathcal{A}$ to formalize planning in a changing environment. The following example (a simpler version of the London-Glasgow problem (McCarthy)) further explains our goal.

John has the knowledge that if he has a car then by doing the action drive-to-the-airport he will be at-the-airport. Similarly, if the action hit-car occurs then he will not have-a-car, if the action rent-a-car occurs then he will have-a-car, and if the action pack occurs he will have his suitcase packed. He knows that he has a car and his suitcase is unpacked and his goal is to bring his packed suitcase to the airport. His plan of

---

[1]By fluents in this paper we mean propositions whose truth values depend on time.

packing the suitcase and driving to the airport is adequate to achieve his goal. He then follows his plan and starts packing his suitcase. But after finishing packing he observes his car being hit. Following the rest of his original plan will no longer achieve his goal. Instead the plan of *first performing rent-a-car and then performing drive-to-the-airport* would be adequate.

Our language should allow elegant representation of the above story and should have a powerful mechanism to reason about the above plans. In the next sections we discuss the syntax and semantics of such a language.

Syntax of $\mathcal{L}_0$

We will start with the description of a language $\mathcal{L}_0$ capable of expressing actual observations. We will then extend $\mathcal{L}_0$ to express hypotheses.

The alphabet of $\mathcal{L}_0$ consists of three disjoint nonempty sets of symbols $\mathcal{F}$, $\mathcal{A}$ and $\mathcal{S}$, called *fluents, actions,* and *actual situations.* Elements of $\mathcal{A}$ and $\mathcal{S}$ will be denoted by (possibly indexed) letters a and s respectively. We will also assume that $\mathcal{S}$ contains two special situations s_0 and s_N called *initial* and *current* situations. The 'N' in s_N corresponds to the word 'Now'.

A *fluent literal* is a fluent possibly preceded by $\neg$. Fluent literals will be denoted by (possibly indexed) letters f and p (possibly preceded by $\neg$). $\neg\neg f$ will be equated with f.

There are two kinds of propositions in $\mathcal{L}_0$ called causal laws and facts.

An *effect law* is an expression of the form

$$a \ \textbf{causes} \ f \ \textbf{if} \ p_1, \ldots, p_n \qquad (1)$$

where a is an action, and $f, p_1, \ldots, p_n$ ($n \geq 0$) are fluent literals. $p_1, \ldots, p_n$ are called *preconditions* of (1). We will read this law as "f is guaranteed to be true after the execution of an action a in any state of the world in which $p_1 \ldots p_n$ are true". If $n = 0$, we write the effect law as $\qquad a \ \textbf{causes} \ f \quad (1a)$

An atomic *fluent fact* is an expression of the form

$$f \ \textbf{at} \ s \qquad (2)$$

where f is a fluent literal and s is a situation. (Unless otherwise stated by situations we will mean actual situations.) The intuitive reading of (2) is "f is observed to be true in situation s".

An atomic *occurrence fact* is an expression of the form

$$\alpha \ \textbf{occurs\_at} \ s \qquad (3)$$

where α is a sequence of actions, and s is a situation. It states that "the sequence α of actions was observed to have occurred in situation s". (We assume that actions in the sequence follow the next action in the sequence immediately).

An atomic *precedence fact* is an expression of the form

$$s_1 \ \textbf{precedes} \ s_2 \qquad (4)$$

where s_1 and s_2 are situations. It states that situation s_2 occurred after situation s_1.

Propositions of the type (1) express general knowledge about effects of actions and hence are referred to as *laws*. Propositions (2), (3) and (4) are called *atomic facts* or *observations*. A *fact* is a propositional combination of atomic facts.

A collection of laws and facts is called a *domain description* of $\mathcal{L}_0$. The sets of laws and facts of a domain description D will be denoted by D_l and D_f respectively. We will only consider domain descriptions whose propositions do not contain the situation constant s_N.

To see how the domain descriptions of $\mathcal{L}_0$ can be used to represent knowledge about actions let us consider the following example:

Example 1 Suppose that we are given a series of observations about "$Fred$":

(a) when the water pistol was squirted $Fred$ was seen to be *alive* and *dry*,

(b) in a later moment a shot was fired at $Fred$.

Suppose also that it is generally known that

(c) *squirting* makes $Fred$ *wet*, and

(d) *shooting* makes $Fred$ *dead*

The above information can be represented by a domain description D_1 consisting of the following propositions:

(p1) *alive* **at** s_0	(p2) *dry* **at** s_0
(p3) *squirt* **occurs_at** s_0	(p4) s_0 **precedes** s_1
(p5) *shoot* **occurs_at** s_1	(p6) *squirt* **causes** $\neg dry$
(p7) *shoot* **causes** $\neg alive$	

To complete the description of D_1 we need to define its language. For simplicity we assume that this language contains only the fluents and actions explicitly mentioned in the propositions of D_1. Unless stated otherwise the same assumption will be made in other examples throughout this paper. $\qquad \square$

Domain descriptions in $\mathcal{L}_0$ are used in conjunction with the following informal assumptions which clarify the description's meaning:

(a) Changes in the values of fluents can only be caused by execution of actions.

(b) There are no actions except those from the language of the domain description.

(c) There are no effects of actions except causal laws.

(d) No actions occur except those needed to explain the facts in the domain description.

(e) Actions do not overlap or happen simultaneously.[3]

These assumptions give a intuitive understanding of domain descriptions of $\mathcal{L}_0$.

Consider for instance domain description D_1 from Example 1. It is easy to see that D_1 together with assumption (d) implies that *squirt* is the only action which occur between s_0 and s_1 and that *shoot* is the only action which occur between s_1 and s_N. Using D_1 with the assumptions (a) - (e) we can conclude that at the moment s_1 *Fred* is *wet* but *alive* while at the moment s_N (i.e. at the end of the story) he is *wet* and *dead*. Our goal in this paper is to build a mathematical model which will help us to better understand and eventually mechanize these types of arguments. As the first step we suggest a semantics of domain descriptions of $\mathcal{L}_0$ which precisely specify the sets of acceptable conclusions which can be reached from such descriptions and assumptions (a)-(e).

Semantics of $\mathcal{L}_0$

In this section we introduce a semantics of a domain description in $\mathcal{L}_0$. We start with defining causal models of D and proceed by explaining when facts are true in these models.

A *state* is a set of fluent names. A *causal interpretation* is a partial function Ψ from sequences of actions to states such that:

(1) Empty sequence [ ] belongs to the domain of Ψ and
(2) Ψ is prefix-closed[4].

$\Psi([\ ])$ is called the initial state of Ψ. The partial function Ψ serves as interpretations of the laws of D. If α belongs to the domain of Ψ we say that α is *possible* in the initial state of Ψ.

Given a fluent f and a state σ, we say that f *holds* in σ (f is *true* in σ) if $f \in \sigma$; $\neg f$ holds in σ (f is *false* in σ) if $f \notin \sigma$. The *truth* of a propositional formula C with respect to σ is defined as usual.

To better understand the role Ψ plays in interpreting domain descriptions let us first use it to define *models* of descriptions consisting entirely of effect laws. To this goal we will attempt to carefully define effects of actions as determined by such a description D and our informal assumptions (a)-(e).

A fluent f is an (immediate) **effect** of (executing) a in σ if there is an effect law
"a **causes** f **if** $p_1, \ldots, p_n$" in D whose preconditions hold in σ. Let

---

[3]In the extended version of the paper we will allow simultaneous actions. We exclude it here for simplicity.

[4]By prefix closed we mean that for any sequence of actions α and action a, if $\alpha \circ a$ is in the domain of Ψ then so is α. (Recall that $\circ$ denotes concatenation, and $\alpha \circ a$ means the sequence of actions where a follows α).

$E_a^+(\sigma) = \{f : f \text{ is an effect of } a \text{ in } \sigma\}$,
$E_a^-(\sigma) = \{f : \neg f \text{ is an effect of } a \text{ in } \sigma\}$ and

$$Res(a, \sigma) = \sigma \cup E_a^+(\sigma) \setminus E_a^-(\sigma).$$

The following definition captures the meaning of effect laws of D.

Definition 1 A causal interpretation Ψ **satisfies** effect laws of D if for any sequence $\alpha \circ a$ from the language of D

$$\Psi(\alpha \circ a) = Res(a, \Psi(\alpha)) \text{ if } E_a^+(\Psi(\alpha)) \cap E_a^-(\Psi(\alpha)) = \emptyset$$

and undefined otherwise.
We say that Ψ is a **causal model** of D if it satisfies all the effect laws of D □

Let D be an arbitrary domain description and let a causal interpretation Ψ be a causal model of D. To interpret the observations of D we first need to define the meaning of situation constants $s_0, s_1, s_2, \ldots$ from $\mathcal{S}$. To do that we consider a mapping Σ from $\mathcal{S}$ to sequences of actions from the language of D. This mapping will be called a *situation assignment of $\mathcal{S}$* if it satisfies the following properties:

1. $\Sigma(s_0) = [\ ]$, and
2. for every $s_i \in \mathcal{S}$, $\Sigma(s_i)$ is a prefix of $\Sigma(s_N)$.

Definition 2 An *interpretation M* of $\mathcal{L}_0$ is a pair (Ψ, Σ), where Ψ is a causal model of D, Σ is a situation assignment of $\mathcal{S}$ and $\Sigma(s_N) \in$ the domain of Ψ. □

$\Sigma(s_N)$ will be called the *actual path* of M.

Now we can define truth of facts of D w.r.t. an interpretation M. Facts which are not true in M will be called *false* in M.

Definition 3 For any interpretation $M = (\Psi, \Sigma)$.

(1) (f **at** s) is *true* in M (or satisfied by M) if f is true in $\Psi(\Sigma(s))$.

(2) (α **occurs_at** s) is true in M if $\Sigma(s) \circ \alpha$ is a prefix of the actual path of M.

(3) (s_1 **precedes** s_2) is true in M if $\Sigma(s_1)$ is a proper prefix of $\Sigma(s_2)$

(4) Truth of non-atomic facts in M is defined as usual. □

A set of facts is true in interpretation M if all its members are true in M.

To complete the definition of the model we need only to formalize the assumption (d). This is done by imposing a minimality condition on the situation assignments of $\mathcal{S}$ which leads to the following

Definition 4 An interpretation $M = (\Psi, \Sigma)$ will be called a *model* of a domain description D in $\mathcal{L}_0$ if the following conditions are satisfied:

19

(1) Ψ is a causal model of D,
(2) facts of D are *true* in M, and
(3) there is no other interpretation $N = (\Psi, \Sigma')$ such that N satisfies the conditions (1) and (2) and $\Sigma'(s_N)$ is a subsequence[5] of $\Sigma(s_N)$. □

The following proposition shows that for a model (Ψ, Σ) of a domain description in $\mathcal{L}_o$, Ψ is completely determined by its initial state.

Proposition 1 Let $M_1 = (\Psi_1, \Sigma_1)$ and $M_2 = (\Psi_2, \Sigma_2)$ be two models of a domain description D in language $\mathcal{L}_0$. If $\Psi_1([\ ]) = \Psi_2([\ ])$ then $\Psi_1 = \Psi_2$. □

Corollary 1 Let D be a domain description in language $\mathcal{L}_0$. If for all models of D, $\Psi([\ ])$ is uniquely defined then Ψ is also uniquely defined. □

A domain description D is said to be *consistent* if it has a model.

Definition 5 A domain description D entails a fact p (written as $D \models p$) iff p is *true* in all models of D. □

Definition 6 A domain description D is said to define a unique actual path if for any two situations s_1 and s_2 that are explicitly mentioned in D, $D \models s_1$ precedes s_2 or $D \models s_2$ precedes s_1. □

Lemma 1 Let D be a domain description that defines a unique actual path, and the only atomic fluent facts which occur in propositions of D are of the form f at s_0. Then situation assignments of all models of D coincide on s_N and on all the situations explicitly mentioned in D. □

Examples

In this section we illustrate by way of examples how domain descriptions are used to represent information and how the above notion of entailment captures informal arguments based on the information from these descriptions and the informal assumptions (a) - (e). We start with Example 1 from Section .

Proposition 2 Consider the domain description D_1 from Example 1. We have

$D_1 \models ((\neg dry \wedge \neg alive)$ at $s_N)$, and
$D_1 \models ((\neg dry \wedge alive)$ at $s_1)$ □

Example 2 (Reasoning by cases) Let us consider a modification of Example 1 where there is a precondition of being loaded for the shoot action to be deadly and where there are two guns at least one of which is initially loaded.

$$
\left.
\begin{array}{l}
(q1)\ alive\ \text{at}\ s_0 \\
(q2)\ loaded_1\ \text{at}\ s_0 \vee loaded_2\ \text{at}\ s_0 \\
(q3)\ [shoot_1, shoot_2]\ \textbf{occurs\_at}\ s_0 \\
(q4)\ shoot_1\ \textbf{causes}\ \neg alive\ \textbf{if}\ loaded_1 \\
(q5)\ shoot_2\ \textbf{causes}\ \neg alive\ \textbf{if}\ loaded_2
\end{array}
\right\} D_2
$$

---

[5]Given a sequence $X = x_1, \ldots, x_m$, another sequence $Z = z_1, \ldots, z_n$ is a subsequence of X if there exists a strictly increasing sequence $i_1, \ldots, i_n$ of indices of X such that for all $j = 1, 2 \ldots, n$, we have $x_{i_j} = z_j$.

Proposition 3 $D_2 \models \neg alive$ at s_N.

Example 3 *[Explaining observations]* Let us now consider a modification of Example 1 where instead of (b) "In a later moment a shot was fired at *Fred*", we have

(b') In a later moment *Fred* was observed to be dead

and where we assume that our domain contains unit actions $a_1, \ldots, a_n$ different from *squirt* and *shoot*.

The resultant story can be represented by a domain description D_3 consisting of the propositions (p1)– (p4) and (p6) - (p7) of D_1 and the following proposition.

$(p5')\ \neg alive$ at s_1 □

Proposition 4 $D_3 \models [squirt, shoot]$ **occurs_at** s_0.

Domain descriptions language and hypothetical reasoning

Even though domain descriptions of $\mathcal{L}_0$ can express types of knowledge and reasoning not easily expressible in other variants of $\mathcal{A}$, they lack the ability of the latter to do hypothetical reasoning. Even the simple original version of $\mathcal{A}$ allows propositions of the form

$$f\ \textbf{after}\ a_1, \ldots, a_m \tag{5}$$

read as "Assuming that the sequence of actions $[a_1, \ldots, a_n]$ occurs starting at the initial situation, fluent f would be true in the resulting situation", which are used to query domain descriptions about possible outcomes of actions. In this section we introduce propositions of the form

$$f\ \textbf{after}\ [a_1, \ldots, a_n]\ \text{at}\ s \tag{6}$$

called *hypotheses* which slightly generalizes (5). Hypotheses are read as "Assuming that the sequence of actions $[a_1, \ldots, a_n]$ occur starting at the situation s fluent f would be true in the resulting situation".

If s in (6) is s_N then we simply write
$$f\ \textbf{after}\ [a_1, \ldots, a_n] \tag{7}$$

If n in (7) is 0, then we simply write
$$\textbf{currently}\ f \tag{8}$$

The language $\mathcal{L}_0$ when augmented with propositions of the form (6) is referred to as $\mathcal{L}_1$. Even though $\mathcal{L}_1$ extends $\mathcal{L}_0$ by allowing propositions of the form (6), domain descriptions in $\mathcal{L}_1$ are in the language of $\mathcal{L}_0$. i.e., hypotheses are not part of a domain descriptions in $\mathcal{L}_1$. Only laws and facts are part of a domain description. But, hypotheses can be entailed from a domain description in $\mathcal{L}_1$. We now define this entailment.

Let D be a domain description and $M = (\Psi, \Sigma)$ be an interpretation of D. We say that a *hypothesis* (6) *is true in interpretation* M if f is true in $\Psi(\Sigma(s) \circ [a_1, \ldots, a_n])$.

A set H of hypotheses is true in M if every hypothesis from H is true in M.

20

Definition 7 Let D be a domain description and H be a hypothesis in $\mathcal{L}_1$. We say $D \models H$ iff H is true in all models of D. $\square$

Let H_1 and H_2 be two sets of hypotheses. We say that the premise H_1 entails conclusion H_2 in D if H_2 is true in every model of D in which H_1 is true. We will denote this by $H_1 \models_D H_2$.

Proposition 5 $\emptyset \models_D H$ iff $D \models H$ $\square$

A set of hypotheses H is is *inconsistent* w.r.t. a domain description D if no model of D satisfies H.

It is important to notice that the entailment relation ($\models_D$) defined by a domain description D is *monotonic* - addition of new hypothesis to the set of hypotheses H_1 can only decrease the set of models of D satisfying it and hence can only increase the set of conclusions. Non-monotonicity occurs only when new information about the real world (i.e. new laws or new facts) are added to a reasoner's knowledge.

Example 4 Consider the following domain description D_4 consisting of (p1) and (p2):

(p1) *shoot* **causes** $\neg alive$ **if** *loaded*
(p2) *load* **causes** *loaded*

Suppose that, given the domain description D_4, a reasoner would like to know if Fred would be dead after shooting under the assumption that initially the gun is loaded. Notice that both statements are hypothetical and therefore are naturally represented as follows:

$H_1 = \{loaded$ **after** $[\ ]$ **at** $s_0\}$
$H_2 = \neg alive$ **after** $[shoot]$ **at** s_0

The question can be formulated as $H_1 \models_{D_4} H_2$? The answer is obviously *yes*.

Planning in a dynamic environment

Example 5 Consider the story about John from the introduction. It has actions *pack, drive, rent, and hit* and fluents *home, at_airport, has_car, and packed*. The effects of the actions together with some initial conditions are described by the domain description

$(f1)home$ **at** s_0 $(f2)\neg at\_airport$ **at** s_0
$(f3)has\_car$ **at** s_0 $(l1)rent$ **causes** has_car
$(l2)hit$ **causes** $\neg has\_car$
$(l3)drive$ **causes** $at\_airport$ **if** has_car $\Big\} D_5$
$(l4)drive$ **causes** $\neg home$ **if** has_car
$(l5)pack$ **causes** $packed$ **if** $home$

Suppose now that the agent John, whose initial knowledge is described by D_5 needs to bring a packed suitcase to the airport. To find a plan of actions John searches for a sequence α such that $D_5 \models (packed \wedge at\_airport)$ **after** α. It is easy to check that $s_N = s_0$ and

$D_5 \models (packed \wedge at\_airport)$ **after** $\alpha_0,$ [6]
where $\alpha_0 = [pack, drive]$. Theoretically, such an α_0 can be found by generating sequences of actions and testing them using the entailment relation of D. More sophisticated methods of course are needed for practical planning but we will not discuss them in this paper.

Satisfied with the plan John packs his suitcase. Execution of this action is reported by expanding D_5 by

(f4) *pack* **occurs_at** s_1 (f5) s_0 **precedes** s_1

We denote the resulting description by D_6. All he needs to do now is to execute $\alpha_1 = [drive]$. Suppose however, that John observes that his car being hit by a truck, i.e. D_7 is obtained from D_6 by adding the statements, (f6) *hit* **occurs_at** s_2 and (f7) s_1 **precedes** s_2

It is easy to see that $D_7 \models$ **currently** $\neg has\_car$ and hence the plan α_1 is invalidated by this new information. To revise it, John poses the query
? $D_7 \models (packed \wedge at\_airport)$ **after** α
It is again easy to check that $D_7 \models (packed \wedge at\_airport)$ **after** α_2
where $\alpha_2 = [rent, drive]$.
John goes on to execute α_2 (this time without unpleasant interruptions). $\square$

As evident from the above example, the ability to express the current situation, record facts and do hypothetical reasoning makes $\mathcal{L}_1$ appropriate for use in designing intelligent agents capable of planning in the changing environment. More formally,

Definition 8 Let D be a domain description in $\mathcal{L}_1$ and G be a set of fluent literals. A sequence α of actions is a *plan* for achieving a goal G from the current situation if $D \models f$ **after** α for every fluent literal $f \in G$. $\square$

Proposition 6 Let D be a domain description with the unique actual path and let s_k be a situation in D such that there does not exist a situation s in D such that $D \models s_k$ **precedes** s. Then for any sequence $\alpha = a \circ \beta$ of actions and any fluent f, $D \models (f$ **after** $\alpha)$ iff $D \cup \{(a$ **occurs_at** $s_k)\} \models (f$ **after** $\beta)$ $\square$

Conclusions

We proposed the extensions $\mathcal{L}_0$ and $\mathcal{L}_1$ of the action description language $\mathcal{A}$ able to express actual situations, observations of the truth values of fluents in these situations, and observations of actual occurrences of actions. Entailment relation in this language allows modeling of various types of hypothetical reasoning. This feature, together with the ability to denote current actual situation, allows to reason about the design and correctness of plans in the changing environment. In the full paper (accessible via http://cs.utep.edu/chitta/chitta.html) we present

---

[6] $a \wedge b$ **after** c is a shorthand notation for { a **after** c, b **after** c }

provenly correct implementation of limited forms of reasoning in $\mathcal{L}_1$ based on translation of domain descriptions of $\mathcal{L}_1$ into logic programs.

The work in this paper can be extended in several directions. In particular, $\mathcal{L}_1$ can be easily generalized to deal with partially defined actions, to allow concurrent and non-deterministic actions (Baral & Gelfond 1993), and global constraints (Kartha & Lifschitz 1994). Another promising direction of research is to construct planners based on $\mathcal{L}_1$ (see full paper for more on this.), particularly using extensions of logic programming and situation calculus.

Our work is obviously a continuation of the approach of formalizing actions suggested in (Gelfond & Lifschitz 1992) which is deeply rooted in situation calculus (McCarthy & Hayes 1969; Gelfond, Lifschitz, & Rabinov 1991). Our formalization, especially in its logic programming form, can be viewed as a combination of situation calculus with another prominent approach to formalizing actions - event calculus of (Kowalski & Sergot 1986). To the best of our knowledge the first paper combining the two in one formalism is (Pinto & Reiter 1993)[7]. Ideologically, their approach is similar to ours. In (Pinto & Reiter 1993) the situation calculus presented as a theory of classical logic (with some second order features) which plays the role of our action description language. Our approach seem to allow more forms of incompleteness in the representation of the domain but the investigation of the precise relationship is the subject for future work.

References

Apt, K., and Bezem, M. 1991. Acyclic programs. *New Generation Computing* 9(3,4):335–365.

Baral, C., and Gelfond, M. 1993. Representing concurrent actions in extended logic programming. In *Proc. of 13th International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence, Chambery, France*, 866–871.

Bornscheuer, S., and Thielscher, M. 1994. Representing concurrent actions and solving conflicts. In *Proc. of German Conference on AI*.

Denecker, M., and De Schreye, D. 1993. Representing incomplete knowledge in abductive logic programming. In *Proceedings of ILPS 93, Vancouver*, 147–164.

Dung, P. 1993. Representing actions in logic programming and its application in database updates. In Warren, D. S., ed., *Proc. of ICLP-93*, 222–238.

Gelfond, M., and Lifschitz, V. 1992. Representing actions in extended logic programs. In *Joint International Conference and Symposium on Logic Programming.*, 559–573.

Gelfond, M.; Lifschitz, V.; and Rabinov, A. 1991. What are the limitations of the situation calculus? In Boyer, R., ed., *Automated Reasoning: Essays in Honor of Woody Bledsoe*. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic.

Holldobler, S., and Thielscher, M. 1993. Actions and specificity. In Miller, D., ed., *Proc. of ICLP-93*, 164–180.

Kartha, G., and Lifschitz, V. 1994. Actions with indirect effects (preliminary report). In *KR 94*, 341–350.

Kartha, G. 1993. Soundness and completeness theorems for three formalizations of action. In *IJCAI 93*, 724–729.

Kowalski, R., and Sergot, M. 1986. A logic-based calculus of events. *New Generation Computing* 4:67–95.

Lesperance, Y.; Levesque, H.; Lin, F.; Marcu, D.; Reiter, R.; and Scherl, R. 1994. A logical approach to high level robot programming – a progress report. In *Working notes of the 1994 AAAI fall symposium on Control of the Physical World by Intelligent Systems (to appear), New Orleans, LA*.

Lifschitz, V., and Turner, H. 1994. Splitting a logic program. In Van Hentenryck, P., ed., *Proc. of the Eleventh Int'l Conf. on Logic Programming*, 23–38.

McCarthy, J. 1992. Overcoming an unexpected obstacle. manuscript.

McCarthy, J., and Hayes, P. 1969. Some philosophical problems from the standpoint of artificial intelligence. In Meltzer, B., and Michie, D., eds., *Machine Intelligence*, volume 4. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press. 463–502.

Pinto, J., and Reiter, R. 1993. Temporal reasoning in logic programming: A case for the situation calculus. In *Proceedings of 10th International Conference in Logic Programming, Hungary*, 203–221.

Sandewall, E. 1992. Features and fluents: A systemetic approach to the representation of knowledge about dynamical systems. Technical report, Institutionen for datavetenskap, Universitetet och Tekniska hogskolan i Linkoping, Sweeden.

Turner, H. 1993. A monotonicity theorem for extended logic programs. In Warren, D. S., ed., *Proc. of 10th International Conference on Logic Programming*, 567–585.

Turner, H. 1994. Signed logic programs. manuscript.

---

[7]See the October 94 issue of Journal of Logic and Computation for some very recent related works, particularly the one by Miller and Shanahan.