Revision of the Self-Monitoring Scale

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Snyder's (1974) Self-Monitoring Scale exhibits a stable factor structure that does not correspond to the five-component theoretical structure he presents. Sets of face-valid items that better approximate the theoretical structure are described. Correlations between these sets of items and measures of other constructs reveal that four of the five components are positively related to social anxiety. Effective social interaction is supposedly the high self-monitor's forte, and social anxiety appears to be incompatible with this. The correlational results therefore question the entire theory and indicate the need for a narrower definition of the construct. Adopting such a definition from Snyder's review article (1979), we present a 13-item Revised Self-Monitoring scale which measures only sensitivity to the expressive behavior of others and ability to modify self-presentation. A 20-item Concern for Appropriateness scale is also described. This scale measures 2 variables that are directly associated with social anxiety—cross-situational variability and attention to social comparison information. Both scales have acceptable internal consistency, and both yield 2 subscale scores as well as a total score. Prospective users of either scale are advised to treat the 3 scores separately.

The theory of self-monitoring (Snyder, 1974, 1979) presumes consistent patterns of individual differences in the extent to which people regulate their self-presentation by tailoring their actions in accordance with immediate situational cues. If there are such differences and if they can be measured accurately, our understanding of social behavior can be enhanced in important ways. For example, the behaviors of subjects who are high in self-monitoring should exhibit more cross-situational variability and should be more strongly associated with salient aspects of the proximal perceived environment than should the behaviors of low self-monitoring subjects.

Recent tests of the cross-situational variability hypothesis (Arkin, Gabrenya, Appel-

man, & Cochran, 1979; Cheek, 1982; Schneiderman, 1980, undated) and the differential predictability hypothesis (Kulik & Taylor, 1981; Santee & Maslach, 1982; Wolfe, Lennox, & Hudiburg, 1983; Zanna, Olson, & Fazio, 1980; Zuckerman & Reis, 1978), however, do not produce the expected results. When data fail to validate a construct, reexamination of the measures of the construct is in order. For self-monitoring there has been only one measure: Snyder's (1974) Self-Monitoring Scale.

In developing his scale Snyder sought to assess five hypothetical components of the construct: (A) concern for appropriateness of social behavior, (B) attention to social comparison information, (C) ability to control or modify self-presentation, (D) use of this ability in particular situations, and (E) cross-situational variability of social behavior (Snyder, 1974, p. 529).

Factor analytic studies show that the scale does not measure these components. Instead, it dependably yields three factors: Acting ability, extraversion, and other-directedness (Briggs, Cheek, & Buss, 1980; Gabrenya & Arkin, 1980; Lennox, 1982; R. Lippa, personal communication, June, 1980; M. Snyder, personal communication, June, 1980). The presence of three factors—not five, as the theory specifies—does not necessarily constitute a serious defect. As dimensions of a superordinate

construct, the components are logically related. When properly measured they should demonstrate empirical coherence by exhibiting positive intercorrelations of varying magnitudes (e.g., because component D implies component E, this pair should show a strong correlation and be difficult to separate; because B does not imply E, this pair should correlate less strongly and be more easily separated). Because some pairs of components are likely to resist efforts to pry their members apart, it is possible that the self-monitoring domain can, without serious loss of meaning, be represented by fewer than five empirical factors.

A more important consideration is the extent to which each of the observed factors corresponds to one or more of the hypothetical components. A comparison of the actual with the theoretical reveals only one plausible match—between the other-directedness factor and component B, attention to social comparison information. Neither extraversion nor acting ability have clear counterparts among the components elucidated by Snyder (1974). As other investigators (Briggs et al., 1980; Gabrenya & Arkin, 1980) have noted, there is a marked lack of congruence between the scale and the construct.

Because the scale measures variables other than those subsumed by the construct, its internal consistency is likely to be low. Data confirm this expectation: Neither Kuder-Richardson coefficients (Snyder, 1974) nor Cronbach alphas (Briggs et al., 1980; Lennox, 1982; Wolfe et al., 1983) exceed .70.

Another consequence of the mismatch between scale and construct is that the scale's factors correlate dissimilarly with measures of other variables. Briggs et al. (1980) found an r of .35 between sociability and the extraversion factor, and an r of .05 between sociability and the other-directedness factor. A greater dissimilarity is associated with their measure of shyness; it correlates $-.56$ with the extraversion factor and .37 with the other-directedness factor. Cheek and Briggs (1981) describe a similar pattern. In their data, trait anxiety correlates $-.28$ with the extraversion factor and .26 with the other-directedness factor, whereas self-confidence correlates .65 with the extraversion factor and $-.32$ with the other-directedness factor. These findings indicate that the person who scores high on the extraversion factor tends to be outgoing and socially confident,

whereas the person who scores high on the other-directedness factor tends to be anxious, shy, and lacking in confidence. It is unlikely that the same individual will score high on both factors. The scale's multidimensionality extends beyond the limits of the construct, creating a situation in which its factors compete with one another (see Siegman & Reynolds, 1982, and Tobey & Tunnell, 1981, for instances of internal competition involving the acting ability factor). Consequently, the total score on Snyder's (1974) scale tends to defy interpretation; it is impossible to determine what the scale as a whole might be measuring.

Self-monitoring is an important construct that promises social psychologists much in the way of explanatory leverage. Snyder's measure demonstrably lacks fidelity to the construct and exhibits fundamental psychometric weaknesses. The four studies reported here describe our attempt to develop a more adequate measure.

Study 1

Our first step was to examine the relevance of extraversion for self-monitoring. Although extraversion is not among Snyder's five hypothetical components of the construct, items 12, 14, 22, and 23 of Snyder's (1974) scale consistently load together to define an extraversion factor (Briggs et al., 1980; Gabrenya & Arkin, 1980; Lennox, 1982; Lippa, personal communication, June, 1980; Snyder, personal communication, June, 1980). Snyder implies that extraversion should be unrelated to self-monitoring when he lists it among variables against which his scale displays discriminant validity (Snyder, 1979, p. 92), and Snyder and Gangestad (1982) treat the two constructs as separate entities even though their measures show a significant positive relationship between self-monitoring and extraversion: for frequencies reported in their Table 2, $\chi^2(1, N = 125) = 4.18$, $p < .05$.

Briggs et al. (1980) regard extraversion as irrelevant to self-monitoring, and they conclude that Snyder's (1974) scale should not measure it. Although removal of the four extraversion items appears to be defensible in view of the factor analytic evidence, it would be more decisively justified if the four items in question could be shown to have more in common with a measure of extraversion than with the other items of Snyder's scale.

Method

Subjects. Subjects were 179 introductory psychology students at State University of New York (SUNY), College at Geneseo, who participated in partial fulfillment of a course requirement.

Procedure. Snyder's (1974) scale and the Extraversion subscale of the adult form of the Eysenck Personality Questionnaire (EPQ; Eysenck & Eysenck, 1975) were administered to all subjects, who were tested in small groups. Their responses were subjected to a principal components analysis with varimax rotation. Two components were retained; items of Snyder's scale were expected to load on one component, and EPQ Extraversion items were expected to load on the other.

Results and Discussion

Results are presented in Table 1. The factor structure matrix shows that 18 of the 21 EPQ items load above .3 on the first component, whereas the remaining three EPQ items do not load above .3 on either component. Thus, the first component is identified as the extraversion factor, and the second is identified as the self-monitoring factor. Six self-monitoring items load above .3 on the extraversion factor; of these, five fail to load above .3 on the self-monitoring factor. Not surprisingly, four of the five are items 12, 14, 22, and 23.

These findings have clear implications. First, the constructs measured by the EPQ Extraversion subscale and the Self-Monitoring Scale are, as one would expect, for the most part distinct. Second, there are five items in Snyder's (1974) scale that appear to have more in common with the extraversion construct than they do with the self-monitoring construct. Because four of these five items have been shown to define an extraversion factor in several other sets of data, their removal from the Self-Monitoring Scale is warranted.

Study 2

To remedy the Self-Monitoring Scale's inability to measure the hypothetical components of the construct, we devised five sets of items: Each set consisted only of items having face validity for a particular component. We wrote 28 items and retained 19 items from Snyder's (1974) scale (eliminating items 12, 14, 22, and 23, which measure extraversion, and items 4 and 10, which failed to load consistently on any factor in previous investigations and failed to load above .3 on the self-monitoring factor in Study 1). The resulting

Table 1

Principal Components Analysis of EPQ Extraversion and Self-Monitoring Scales

Scale/item	Component 1	Component 2
EPQ Extraversion		
1	.23	.08
5	.55	−.02
10	.58	.08
14	.52	.19
17	.35	−.18
21	−.61	−.03
25	.53	.14
29	−.24	.02
32	.41	−.14
36	.37	−.10
40	.54	−.25
42	−.50	.11
45	.69	.02
49	.19	.12
52	.45	.06
56	.39	.18
60	.40	−.05
64	.38	.18
70	.64	−.07
82	.39	.22
86	.68	.00
Snyder's Self-Monitoring Scale		
1	−.13	−.40
2	.24	−.42
3	.01	−.19
4	.03	−.18
5	.25	.11
6	.23	.45
7	−.14	.30
8	.36	.44
9	.12	−.01
10	.02	.17
11	.10	.14
12	−.60	.02
13	−.01	.55
14	−.35	.17
15	−.10	.41
16	−.09	.59
17	.07	−.45
18	.22	.36
19	−.18	.59
20	−.44	.01
21	−.26	−.41
22	−.53	.11
23	−.59	.14
24	.11	.38
25	−.22	.31

Note. EPQ = Eysenck Personality Questionnaire. Reverse scoring is used with items keyed false. For EPQ Extraversion, these are items 21, 29, and 42; for Self-Monitoring, these are items 1, 2, 3, 4, 9, 12, 14, 17, 20, 21, 22, and 23. Component 1 stands for extraversion; Component 2 stands for self-monitoring.

pool of 47 prospective items contained no less than eight and no more than eleven items intended to be specific to each component.

Method

Subjects. A call for volunteers was announced in undergraduate summer session classes in social science at SUNY Geneseo; 128 students volunteered and were tested in small groups.

Procedure. Items were arrayed so that two items specific to a given component never appeared in succession. A 6-point Likert format was used, with high scores indicating high self-monitoring: 5 = certainly, always true; 4 = generally true; 3 = somewhat true, but with exception; 2 = somewhat false, but with exception; 1 = generally false; 0 = certainly, always false (these weights were reversed for negatively worded items).

Responses were analyzed to ensure that each item yielded an approximately normal distribution, because severe departures from normality tend to distort the correlation matrix (Comrey, 1978). An arbitrary skewness criterion of .60 was set; items exceeding this in either direction were eliminated. This procedure resulted in the loss of 7 items. The remaining 40 items were subjected to a common factor analysis. Oblique rotation was used because factors were expected to be correlated.

Results and Discussion

Both the scree test of eigenvalues (Gorsuch, 1974) and hyperplane counts for rotations of three, four, five, and six factors indicated that simple structure was best reached at four factors. In the four-factor solution, 33 items loaded above .3 on at least one factor; they are displayed in Table 2, ordered according to magnitude of loading for each factor. This structure is relatively interpretable, with 47% of the loadings not exceeding ±.10. Of the 14 items lost (7 to skewness and 7 due to failure to load above .3 on any factor), 3 had been intended for component A, three for B, none for C, four for D, and five for E.

Factor 1: Cross-situational variability. All items loading on Factor 1 were intended to measure component D, use of the ability to modify one's behavior in particular situations, or component E, cross-situational variability. The failure of the D and E items to define separate factors suggests that these two hypothetical components can be reduced to a single empirical dimension. One cannot effectively tailor one's behavior to meet varying situational requirements without also exhibiting cross-situational variability.

Factor 2: Acting ability. The majority of items loading on Factor 2 were intended to measure component C, ability to modify self-presentation. The items that best define this factor refer to entertainment in the theatrical sense. Six of the acting ability items taken from Snyder's scale load above .3 on this factor.

Factor 3: Ability to modify self-presentation. Factor 3 is the most poorly defined factor in this analysis, with only two items loading above .5 and only four items loading uniquely on it. Of the four, three were intended to measure component C. An important question is thus posed: Why do these items define a factor separate from Factor 2? The answer may lie in the factor that regulating one's self-presentation in everyday life involves skills different from those required for acting in the theatrical sense. Briggs et al. (1980) suggest that Snyder relied on the life-as-theater metaphor for more than it is worth, and the observed splitting of items intended to measure component C can be interpreted as support for their view. Despite its poor definition here, Factor 3 may be dealing with the ability to modify self-presentation, in the sense required by self-monitoring theory, whereas Factor 2 may not. For closer examination of this fundamental issue, Factor 3 must be defined more adequately than present items permit.

Factor 4: Concern for appropriateness. The majority of items loading on Factor 4 were intended to measure component A, concern for appropriateness, and component B, attention to social comparison information. Failure of these two components to define separate factors is understandable when one considers how difficult it is to imagine a person who is sensitive to social appropriateness, and who at the same time tends to ignore social comparison information. To a considerable extent, this information defines appropriateness.

The Study 2 revision of the Self-Monitoring Scale seems to provide a closer approximation to the hypothetical structure of self-monitoring than Snyder's scale can. Although component A does not separate empirically from component B, and component D does not separate from component E, there is a plausible explanation for our items' inability to decompose each pair.

The split among items intended to measure component C, ability to modify self-presentation, was foreseen by other investigators (Briggs et al., 1980; Gabrenya & Arkin, 1980). It suggests that acting ability and the capacity

Table 2
Items Loading Above .3 in Factor Pattern Matrix of Study 2

	Factor			
Item	1	2	3	4
In different situations and with different people, I often act like very different persons. (E)[a]	.77	.13	−.01	.08
Although I know myself, I find that others do not know me. (D)	.75	−.09	.11	−.20
Different people tend to have different impressions about the type of person I am. (E)	.75	−.05	.02	−.01
I sometimes have the feeling that people don't know who I really am. (D)	.69	−.02	.08	−.03
I'm not always the person I appear to be. (D)[a]	.63	.07	−.09	.13
I tend to show different sides of myself to different people. (E)	.53	.16	−.11	.05
Different situations can make me behave like very different people. (E)	.53	−.05	−.21	.14
I'm pretty good at entertaining people with jokes, anecdotes, and stories. (C)	−.01	.66	−.05	−.00
I would probably make a good actor. (C)[a]	.06	.61	.05	.04
I guess I put on a show to impress or entertain people. (D)[a]	.25	.53	.20	.43
I have considered being an entertainer. (C)[a]	−.04	.52	.05	.13
I can make impromptu speeches even on topics about which I have almost no information. (C)[a]	.06	.50	−.02	.05
I have a quick wit. (C)	−.10	.46	−.10	−.11
Some of my friends consider me a show-off. (C)	.09	.45	−.04	.19
I have never been good at games like charades or improvisational acting. (C)[a,b]	.12	−.40	.31	.07
I can look anyone in the eye and tell a lie with a straight face (if for the right end). (C)[a]	.25	.36	−.05	−.08
I usually express my opinions openly, without regard to the possibility of disagreement. (A)	.08	.34	−.04	−.25
I have trouble changing my behavior to suit different people and different situations. (C)[a,b]	−.16	−.08	.68	.10
Even when it might be to my advantage, I have difficulty putting up a good front. (C)[b]	−.01	−.03	.61	.02
I rarely need the advice of my friends to choose movies, books, or music. (B)[a,b]	.09	.07	.37	−.11
I find it hard to imitate the behavior of other people. (C)[a,b]	.03	−.15	.33	.10
I usually keep up with clothing style changes by watching what others wear. (B)	−.01	−.21	−.33	.31
I try to pay attention to the reactions of others to my behavior in order to avoid being out of place. (A)	.22	−.03	−.09	.58
My behavior often depends on how I feel others wish me to behave. (A)	.30	.06	−.07	.55
It is my feeling that if everyone else in a group is behaving in a certain manner, this must be the way to behave. (B)	−.08	.11	−.08	.53
At parties I usually try to behave in a manner that makes me fit in. (A)	.00	.00	−.03	.52
Even if I am not enjoying myself, I often pretend to be having a good time. (D)[a]	.08	−.24	.28	.51
If I make a joke and someone frowns, I immediately stop making that type of joke. (A)	−.05	−.04	.11	.49
It's important to me to fit in to the group I'm with. (A)	.10	−.01	.04	.47
I actively avoid wearing clothes that are not in style. (B)	.14	.18	−.14	.38
I laugh more when I watch a comedy with others than when alone. (B)[a]	.07	.08	−.06	.37
My strategy for dealing with a social situation is to just be myself. (D)[b]	−.10	.28	.13	−.31
When I am in a social situation, I tend not to follow the crowd, but instead behave in a manner that suits my particular mood at the time. (B)[b]	.18	.31	.17	−.31

Note. Factor 1 = cross-situational variability; Factor 2 = acting ability; Factor 3 = ability to modify self-presentation; Factor 4 = concern for appropriateness. Letters in parentheses designate the component of self-monitoring that the item was intended to measure; A = concern for appropriateness, B = attention to social comparison information, C = ability to modify self-presentation, D = use of this ability in particular situations, and E = cross-situational variability.
[a] Items taken from Snyder's Self-Monitoring Scale. [b] Reverse scoring was used for these items.

to regulate one's actions during the informal give-and-take of social intercourse are two different things. Although the items used in Study 2 are capable of measuring self-reported acting ability (in the theatrical-entertainment sense; Factor 2), they yield a much less adequate measure of the social interaction skills which perhaps are more important in réal life (Factor 3).

Study 3

In Study 3, we had three main objectives. First, we sought to demonstrate that the promising factor structure found in Study 2 is in fact a stable one; to find a similar structure in a separate sample would lend credibility to our revision. Second, it was necessary to strengthen the definition of Factor 3 from Study 2. With this improved definition, comparisons between Factor 3 and Factor 2 could help to answer the question, "How relevant is the life-as-theater metaphor for self-monitoring theory?" Third, we needed to explore relationships between the self-monitoring factors and measures of three other constructs: extraversion, neuroticism, and fear of negative evaluation.

In selecting items for Study 3, we retained 28 of the 33 items listed in Table 2. The five that were excluded had marginal loadings or dual loadings in Study 2; we judged them, on the basis of both their content and where they

Table 3
Items Loading Above .3 in Factor Pattern Matrix of Study 3

Item	Factor			
	1	2	3	4
53. I sometimes have the feeling that people don't know who I really am. (D)	.82	−.12	.12	.11
46. I'm not always the person I appear to be. (D)[a]	.60	.17	−.03	.04
32. Different people tend to have different impressions about the type of person I am. (E)	.58	−.05	−.09	−.04
14. In different situations and with different people, I often act like very different persons. (E)[a]	.57	.09	−.14	.01
21. Although I know myself, I find that others do not know me. (D)	.54	−.11	−.06	.15
26. Different situations can make me behave like very different people. (E)	.53	.15	−.19	−.01
1. I tend to show different sides of myself to different people. (E)	.37	.17	−.16	.06
51. I usually keep up with clothing style changes by watching what others wear. (B)	−.23	.70	−.11	.03
49. If I am the least bit uncertain as to how to act in a social situation, I look to the behavior of others for cues. (B)	.06	.62	−.00	.08
28. I try to pay attention to the reactions of others to my behavior in order to avoid being out of place. (B)	.19	.61	−.05	.10
43. It's important to me to fit in to the group I'm with. (A)	.06	.58	−.01	−.17
36. I tend to pay attention to what others are wearing. (B)	−.12	.55	.01	.05
47. My behavior often depends on how I feel others wish me to behave. (B)	.33	.51	−.02	−.01
12. At parties I usually try to behave in a manner that makes me fit in. (A)	.06	.51	−.09	−.06
52. When I am in a social situation, I tend not to follow the crowd, but instead behave in a manner that suits my particular mood at the time. (B)[b]	−.03	−.51	.01	.01
15. When I am uncertain how to act in a social situation, I look to the behavior of others for cues. (B)[a]	.13	.47	−.06	.08
4. I actively avoid wearing clothes that are not in style. (A)	−.13	.46	−.04	−.03
35. I find that I tend to pick up slang expressions and use them as part of my own vocabulary. (B)	.10	.35	.00	−.13
40. The slightest look of disapproval in the eyes of a person with whom I am interacting is enough to make me change my approach. (A)	.23	.34	−.10	.03
2. It is my feeling that if everyone else in a group is acting in a certain manner, this must be the proper way to behave. (B)	.10	.32	−.15	−.04

Table 3 (*continued*)

Item	Factor			
	1	2	3	4
20. In social situations, I have the ability to alter my behavior if I feel that something else is called for. (C)	.06	.04	−.59	.11
45. I have trouble changing my behavior to suit different people and different situations. (C)[b]	−.03	−.12	.54	−.09
29. Once I know what the situation calls for, it's easy for me to regulate my actions accordingly. (C)	−.03	.15	−.52	.03
44. I have the ability to control the way I come across to people, depending on the impression I wish to give them. (C)	.19	.23	−.51	−.06
16. I have found that I can adjust my behavior to meet the requirements of any situation I find myself in. (C)	−.09	.03	−.49	.09
27. When I feel that the image I'm portraying isn't working, I can readily change it to something that does. (C)	.33	.12	−.49	−.10
23. Even when it might be to my advantage, I have difficulty putting up a good front. (C)[b]	−.06	.06	.43	−.02
37. I find it hard to imitate the behavior of other people. (C)[a,b]	−.11	−.07	.35	.10
41. When I'm disappointed or discouraged, this will be evident in my actions. (S)[b]	.15	.09	.07	−.57
48. I can be quite angry and not show it. (S)	.17	.03	−.00	.48
39. Even if I am not enjoying myself, I often pretend to be having a good time. (C)	.24	.07	−.05	.41
33. Even when I feel rebellious against someone in authority, I'm able to keep my mouth shut. (S)	.00	.28	.25	.39
38. I'm able to act fearlessly, even when I'm really scared. (S)	.05	.19	−.30	.37

Note. Factor 1 = cross-situational variability; Factor 2 = concern for appropriateness; Factor 3 = ability to modify self-presentation; Factor 4 = ability to suppress emotion. Letters in parentheses designate the component of self-monitoring that the item was intended to measure: A = concern for appropriateness, B = attention to social comparison information, C = ability to modify self-presentation, D = use of this ability in particular situations, E = cross-situational variability, S = suppression of emotion (S items were intended to supplement component C).
[a] Items taken from Snyder's Self-Monitoring Scale. [b] Reverse scoring was used for these items.

loaded in Study 2, to be lacking in specificity for their intended component. Nine of the items lost to skewness or to failure to load above .3 in Study 2 were reworded and tried again. Two of the items retained were also reworded.

We wrote seven new items intended to measure the aspect of component C, ability to modify self-presentation, that appeared to have the most relevance for self-monitoring in everyday life. Assuming that control of emotional expression might contribute to this ability, we also wrote nine new suppression-of-emotion items. The new and reworded items were interspersed among the 28 items retained, for a total of 53 items.

Method

Subjects. Subjects were 224 introductory psychology students at SUNY Geneseo, who participated to fulfill a course requirement. They were tested in small groups.

Procedure. Subjects completed a questionnaire con-

sisting of the self-monitoring items, the Fear of Negative Evaluation scale (Watson & Friend, 1969), and the EPQ Neuroticism and Extraversion scales, in that order. The 6-point Likert format described in Study 2 was used throughout the questionnaire.

There were 7 acting ability items among the 28 items retained from Study 2. In view of their lack of face validity as representatives of component C, and our conviction that Briggs et al.'s (1980) argument here is correct, we excluded these 7 items from the category of self-monitoring items.

Subjects' responses were slightly more skewed than they were in Study 2 data, making it necessary to relax the skewness criterion to .80. Of the 46 prospective self-monitoring items, 5 exceeded this criterion and were eliminated. The remaining 41 items were subjected to a common factor analysis with oblique rotation. Simple structure was determined from a scree test of the eigenvalues and from hyperplane counts of alternative solutions. Both methods indicated that simple structure was best reached at four factors.

Results and Discussion

Structure of the self-monitoring items. Table 3 summarizes the results. Items are ordered

according to magnitude of loading on each factor. The structure is relatively interpretable: 49% of the loadings do not exceed ±.10. Factor 1 is cross-situational variability; Factor 2 is concern for appropriateness; Factor 3 is ability to modify self-presentation; and Factor 4 is ability to suppress emotion. The first three correspond to Factors 1, 4, and 3, respectively, in Study 2. Study 3 results therefore approximate the factor structure found in Study 2.

At the item level, comparison of Table 3 with Table 2 reveals many similarities between the two sets of data. The seven items that load above .3 on Factor 1, Study 2, are the same items that load on Factor 1, Study 3. Three of the items that load on Factor 3, Study 2, also load on Factor 3, Study 3, along with five of the seven newly written items intended for component C. Ability to modify self-presentation therefore appears to be more adequately measured here than it was in Study 2. Seven of the items that load above .3 on Factor 4, Study 2, also load on Factor 2, Study 3. The close match between the two sets of results suggests that our items yield a fairly stable factor structure, at least among samples of college students.

Items designed to measure ability to suppress emotions form a factor by themselves. The failure of these items to load with the items intended to measure ability to modify self-presentation indicates that they do not contribute to the definition of component C as we had hoped they would. These five suppression-of-emotion items were therefore discarded, along with the five items lost to skewness and eight items that failed to load above .3 on any factor. Twenty-eight items remained (those loading above .3 on Factor 1, Factor 2, or Factor 3 in Table 3) that could comprise a new self-monitoring scale.

Treating each factor as a subscale, we examined these 28 items to identify those that contribute most to the internal consistency of their respective subscales and to that of the scale as a whole. Coefficient alpha was calculated for each subscale and for the scale as a whole with each item removed. This procedure isolated one item, number 37; this item tended to reduce the value of alpha for both its subscale and the total scale and was eliminated.

In Table 4, the remaining 27 items are listed by subscale and some of the psychometric properties they exhibited in Study 3 are described. Coefficient alpha is .82 for cross-situational variability, .83 for attention to social comparison information, and .77 for ability to modify self-presentation. Alpha for the total scale is .88, a value appreciably higher than the alphas reported for Snyder's Self-Monitoring Scale. Of the three subscales, ability to modify self-presentation is still the most poorly defined. Its internal consistency is slightly lower than that of the other two, and its items' average correlation with total score is .39, as opposed to .48 for cross-situational variability and .43 for attention to social comparison information.

Acting ability and ability to modify self-presentation. Seven of the items defining the acting ability factor of Study 2 were administered in Study 3 but were excluded from the common factor analysis. If they had been included, would they have defined a factor separate from ability to modify self-presentation, as they did in Study 2? To answer this question, acting ability items and ability to modify self-presentation items were entered into a principal components analysis with varimax rotation. Two components were retained; if the two sets of items actually represent distinct entities, they should load on separate components.

Results are presented in Table 5. All of the acting ability items show a much higher loading on Component 1 than on Component 2. With one exception, the ability to modify self-presentation items correlate more strongly with Component 2 than with Component 1. This array of findings is contrary to Snyder's assumption that theatrical-entertainment skills have much in common with self-presentation in everyday life.

Still, the possibility remains that acting ability might fit into the self-monitoring structure just as well as ability to modify self-presentation does, and perhaps do some useful explanatory work apart from that done by ability to modify self-presentation. The data argue against this possibility. Acting ability correlates .42 with ability to modify self-presentation. Acting ability correlates .22 and .08 with cross-situational variability and attention to social comparison information, respectively, whereas the corresponding *r*s for ability to modify self-presentation are .45 and .40, respectively. Tests of the difference between dependent *r*s (Bruning & Kintz, 1968) show that

ability to modify self-presentation is more strongly associated with both cross-situational variability, $t(221) = 3.50$, $p < .05$, and attention to social comparison information, $t(221) = 15.83$, $p < .01$, than acting ability is. Ability to modify self-presentation exceeds acting ability in terms of its congruence with the other dimensions of self-monitoring. This fact is crucial from an internal consistency standpoint, and provides some justification for our decision to exclude acting ability.

Relationships with other constructs. The intercorrelations displayed in Table 6 call attention to another possible flaw in Snyder's (1980) conceptualization. The 27 self-monitoring items correlate .52 with fear of negative evaluation. This suggests that the high self-monitor is likely to be apprehensive in many social situations. This finding clashes with Snyder's (1980) description of the high self-monitor as a confident, perspicacious, socially

facile impression manager. There is reason to believe that the data are closer to the truth than Snyder's description is: To assume, as Snyder does, that variability of behavior can be positively associated with effective social participation, one must ignore a fair amount of evidence indicating that they are negatively related (Block, 1961; Brownfain, 1952; Campus, 1974).

However, the *r*s in Table 6 also bode ill for the Study 3 version of the Self-Monitoring Scale. Cheek and Briggs (1981) discredited Snyder's (1974) scale by showing that its factors correlate dissimilarly with relevant third variables, and the present self-monitoring factors exhibit the same defect. In the coefficients of Table 6, cross-situational variability and attention to social comparison information show similar correlations with EPQ Extraversion, EPQ Neuroticism, and fear of negative evaluation, suggesting that the self-monitoring

Table 4
Means, Standard Deviations, and Correlations of Items to Subscale Score and Total Score

Variable	Item	M	SD	r with variable	r with total
Cross-situational variability	1	3.3	1.2	.51	.49
	14	2.4	1.4	.63	.49
	21	2.8	1.3	.48	.35
	26	2.6	1.3	.60	.58
	32	3.0	1.4	.51	.40
	46	2.5	1.3	.57	.60
	53	2.8	1.2	.63	.41
Concern for appropriateness	2	1.5	1.2	.37	.38
	4	2.5	1.3	.37	.29
	12	3.0	1.1	.53	.47
	15	2.9	1.2	.49	.48
	28	2.7	1.2	.61	.62
	35	3.0	1.2	.34	.30
	36	3.2	1.3	.45	.34
	40	2.6	1.1	.40	.46
	43	3.2	1.2	.51	.43
	47	2.0	1.1	.53	.59
	49	2.6	1.1	.60	.51
	51	2.6	1.2	.54	.37
	52	2.0	1.1	.48	.39
Ability to modify self-presentation	16	3.5	0.9	.39	.23
	20	3.3	0.9	.52	.39
	23	2.6	1.2	.36	.21
	27	2.1	1.2	.54	.57
	29	3.2	1.0	.52	.38
	44	3.0	1.2	.54	.57
	45	2.9	1.1	.53	.41

Note. Item numbers correspond to those in Table 3. In our version of the scale, the order of items is 20, 47, 12, 46, 44, 15, 1, 52, 2, 21, 28, 29, 35, 14, 16, 40, 27, 4, 43, 23, 26, 51, 32, 36, 49, 53, 45.

Table 5
Principal Components Analysis of Items Measuring Acting Ability and Ability to Modify Self-Presentation

Factor/item	Component 1	Component 2
Acting ability		
3. I would probably make a good actor.	.77	.24
50. I have considered being an entertainer.	.72	−.07
31. I have never been good at games like charades or improvisational acting.	.62	.15
11. I can make impromptu speeches even on topics about which I have almost no information.	.61	.12
6. I'm pretty good at entertaining people with jokes, anecdotes, and stories.	.55	−.03
19. I can look anyone in the eye and tell a lie with a straight face (if for the right end).	.53	.29
13. My close friends know I have a talent for showing off.	.53	.23
Ability to modify self-presentation		
44. I have the ability to control the way I come across to people, depending on the impression I wish to give them.	.11	.72
27. When I feel that the image I am portraying isn't working, I can readily change it to something that does.	.09	.71
45. I have trouble changing my behavior to suit different people and different situations.	.04	.70
29. Once I know what the situation calls for, it's easy for me to regulate my actions accordingly.	.04	.70
20. In social situations, I have the ability to alter my behavior if I feel that something else is called for.	.23	.61
16. I have found that I can adjust my behavior to meet the requirements of any situation I find myself in.	.22	.49
23. Even when it might be to my advantage, I have difficulty putting up a good front.	.41	.37

characteristics measured by these two subscales could easily belong to the same individual. But ability to modify self-presentation yields a pattern different from that of the other two subscales: It is significantly related to EPQ Neuroticism, whereas the other two are not, and it is not significantly related to EPQ Neuroticism or to fear of negative evaluation, whereas the other two are. The question again arises, "What does the scale as a whole measure?" Again there is no satisfactory answer.

Study 4

The foregoing attempts to revise Snyder's scale assume that his hypothetical five-com-

Table 6
Intercorrelation Matrix, Study 3

Variable	Number of items	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
1. Cross-situational variability	7	—	.42*	.45*	.77*	.24*	−.06	.35*
2. Attention to social comparison information	13			.40*	.85*	.27*	−.09	.64*
3. Ability to modify self-presentation	7				.71*	.01	.33*	.08
4. Combined self-monitoring items	27					.25*	.03	.52*
5. EPQ Neuroticism	22						−.32*	.55*
6. EPQ Extraversion	21							−.32*
7. Fear of negative evaluation	30							

* $p < .01$, two-tailed.

ponent structure of self-monitoring is complete and correct. Results of Study 3 show that a 27-item version of the scale can assess all the components, but the evidence summarized in Table 6 indicates that these 27 items should not be combined in a single, unidimensionally scored instrument. The subscales' patterns of relationships with other measures imply that ability to modify self-presentation differs enough from the other two subscales to make it unlikely that a single superordinate construct can encompass all three.

The findings of Study 3 suggest that the seven cross-situational variability items and the thirteen attention to social comparison items can perhaps be treated as a single variable. Results of a separate validation study (Wolfe, Lennox, & Hudiburg, 1982) revealed that these sets of items, scored either as one variable or two, may constitute a useful measure of long-term tendencies to conform (i.e., to avoid, during 1 year or more, behaviors that depart extremely from the quantitative norm of a reference group). In a sample of 408 college upperclassmen, cross-situational variability and attention to social comparison information, considered both singly and together, significantly moderated the strength of religiosity as a predictor of self-reported use of both marijuana and alcohol, in the direction required by self-monitoring theory for a dispositional predictor. The fact that ability to modify self-presentation did not moderate significantly was taken as another indication that this component of self-monitoring differs in important respects from the others.

Although our measures of cross-situational variability and attention to social comparison information appear to be psychometrically adequate, their correlations with measures that are associated with social anxiety (EPQ Neuroticism and fear of negative evaluation) are too high to support the conclusion that they can contribute to an empirical definition of self-monitoring. Effective social interaction is the hallmark of the high self-monitor, and social anxiety is not compatible with this. The evidence thus suggests that four of Snyder's original five hypothetical components cannot be subsumed by the construct: concern for appropriateness, attention to social comparison information, ability to modify self-presentation, and cross-situational variability of behavior.

All that remains of the construct is summarized in Snyder's (1979) description of the high self-monitor as one who "is particularly sensitive to the expression and self-presentation of relevant others" (p. 89) and who uses these cues as a guide to regulating self-presentation. Adopting this narrower definition, we assumed that two characteristics could fully represent self-monitoring: Ability to modify self-presentation, and sensitivity to the expressive behavior of others, a trait or ability we did not attempt directly to measure in Studies 2 and 3.

We devised seven items having face validity for sensitivity to expressive behavior of others. These were interspersed among the seven items of the ability to modify self-presentation subscale of Study 3, and administered along with two inventories designed to measure variables that may have relevance for the narrower definition of self-monitoring: the Self-Consciousness scale (Fenigstein, Scheier, & Buss, 1975) and the Individuation scale (Maslach, Stapp, & Santee, 1981). The Self-Consciousness scale yields scores for public self-consciousness, private self-consciousness, and social anxiety. The Individuation scale is a measure of willingness to call attention to oneself. If the 14 self-monitoring items do yield the factors expected, the variables defined by the two sets of items should not correlate positively with social anxiety, should not correlate negatively with either public self-consciousness or individuation, and should not correlate dissimilarly with any of the four external variables.

Method

Subjects were 201 introductory psychology students, who participated to fulfill a course requirement. The 6-point format described in Study 2 was used for self-monitoring and self-consciousness items; Maslach et al.'s (1981) 5-point format was used for individuation items.

Data for each self-monitoring item met a skewness criterion of .80. Responses to these items were subjected to a common factor analysis with oblique rotation. The scree test of eigenvalues indicated that a two-factor solution would yield simple structure.

Results and Discussion

Structure of the self-monitoring items. Table 7 presents the 14 items ordered according to magnitude of loading on each factor. The observed structure is interpretable (of the 28 loadings, 14 are less than .14, and 10 are less

Table 7

Factor Pattern Matrix for Items Measuring Ability to Modify Self-Presentation and Sensitivity to Expressive Behavior of Others

Factor/item	First factor	Second factor
Ability to modify self-presentation		
14. Once I know what the situation calls for, it's easy for me to regulate my actions accordingly.	.77	−.03
10. I have found that I can adjust my behavior to meet the requirements of any situation I find myself in.	.74	−.06
9. I have trouble changing my behavior to suit different people and different situations.[a]	.65	−.01
1. In social situations, I have the ability to alter my behavior if I feel that something else is called for.	.53	−.12
3. I have the ability to control the way I come across to people, depending on the impression I wish to give them.	.50	.11
7. When I feel that the image I am portraying isn't working, I can readily change to something that does.	.48	.10
12. Even when it might be to my advantage, I have difficulty putting up a good front.[a]	.32	.05
Sensitivity to expressive behavior of others		
8. I can usually tell when I've said something inappropriate by reading it in the listener's eyes.	.06	.66
5. My powers of intuition are quite good when it comes to understanding others' emotions and motives.	−.04	.59
13. If someone is lying to me, I usually know it at once from that person's manner of expression.	−.03	.49
4. In conversations, I am sensitive to even the slightest change in facial expression of the person I'm conversing with.	−.06	.49
2. I am often able to read people's true emotions correctly through their eyes.	.13	.49
6. I can usually tell when others consider a joke to be in bad taste, even though they may laugh convincingly.	.06	.40
11. I tend to be attentive to the reactions of others to my behavior.	.01	.18

[a] Reverse scoring is used for these items.

than .10) and corresponds closely to the expected structure. The seven items retained from Study 3 load above .3 on the first factor; this accounts for 24.5% of the variance in the matrix. All but one of the new items loads above .3 on the second factor, which explains 15.1% of the variance. Item 11 does not load above .3 on either factor and is eliminated from subsequent analysis. The remaining 13 items compose the Revised Self-Monitoring scale.

Relationships with other constructs. Intercorrelations are displayed in Table 8. None of the three self-monitoring variables shows a significant positive correlation with social anxiety, and none shows a significant positive correlation with either public self-consciousness or individuation. The Revised Self-Monitoring scale, therefore, appears to be free of some of the shortcomings of the 27-item version developed in Studies 2 and 3. It identifies as high self-monitors people who are neither socially anxious nor reluctant to behave in a way that will bring attention to themselves.

The two self-monitoring subscales do, however, correlate dissimilarly with two of the four external variables: Public self-consciousness, $t(198) = 2.32$, $p < .05$, and social anxiety, $t(198) = 4.00$, $p < .01$. Although these disparities are small in comparison with those discussed by Cheek and Briggs (1981), the fact that they reach significance indicates that the meaning of the Revised Self-Monitoring scale's total score is somewhat equivocal. The internal consistency of the revised scale is slightly lower than that of the 27 items described in Table 4; values of coefficient alpha are .77 for the seven items measuring ability to modify self-presentation (identical to the alpha value for these items in Study 3), .70 for the six items measuring sensitivity to expressive behavior of others, and .75 for the total scale.

Conclusions

Our attempts to remedy the psychometric deficiencies of Snyder's Self-Monitoring Scale suggest that two of the assumptions guiding his original rationale were wrong: that acting ability in the theatrical-entertainment sense has much in common with the devices people use to modify their self-presentation in everyday life, and that cross-situational variability of behavior is positively associated with effec-

Table 8
Intercorrelation Matrix, Study 4

Variable	Number of items	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
1. Ability to modify self-presentation	7	—	.22*	.84*	.07	.06	−.29*	.30*
2. Sensitivity to expressive behavior of others	6			.72*	.15	.25*	.05	.16
3. Revised Self-Monitoring scale (1 and 2)	13				.14	.17	−.18*	.30*
4. Public self-consciousness	7					.48*	.31*	−.17
5. Private self-consciousness	10						.27*	.02
6. Social anxiety	6							−.58*
7. Individuation	12							

* $p < .01$, two-tailed.

Table 9
Revised Self-Monitoring Scale

Subscale/item[a]	M	SD	r with subscale	r with total
Ability to modify self-presentation				
1. In social situations, I have the ability to alter my behavior if I feel that something else is called for.	3.7	0.9	.42	.29
3. I have the ability to control the way I come across to people, depending on the impression I wish to give them.	3.2	1.0	.46	.45
7. When I feel that the image I am portraying isn't working, I can readily change it to something that does.	2.4	1.1	.45	.41
9. I have trouble changing my behavior to suit different people and different situations.	3.1	1.2	.56	.46
10. I have found that I can adjust my behavior to meet the requirements of any situation I find myself in.	3.1	1.0	.60	.48
12. Even when it might be to my advantage, I have difficulty putting up a good front.	2.8	1.2	.30	.28
13. Once I know what the situation calls for, it's easy for me to regulate my actions accordingly.	3.0	1.0	.65	.54
Sensitivity to expressive behavior of others				
2. I am often able to read people's true emotions correctly through their eyes.	3.2	1.0	.42	.40
4. In conversations, I am sensitive to even the slightest change in the facial expression of the person I'm conversing with.	3.4	1.3	.36	.22
5. My powers of intuition are quite good when it comes to understanding others' emotions and motives.	3.7	0.9	.47	.32
6. I can usually tell when others consider a joke to be in bad taste, even though they may laugh convincingly.	3.5	1.0	.35	.31
8. I can usually tell when I've said something inappropriate by reading it in the listener's eyes.	3.8	0.8	.53	.44
11. If someone is lying to me, I usually know it at once from that person's manner of expression.	3.1	1.0	.42	.29

Note. Each item yields a score from 0 to 5; high scores indicate high self-monitoring. Items 9 and 12 require reverse scoring. In these data (Study 4; $n = 201$), coefficient alpha is .77 for ability to modify self-presentation, .70 for sensitivity to expressive behavior of others, and .75 for the total scale.
[a] Items numbers correspond to those in Table 7 for items 1 to 10 but not for items 11 to 13.

tiveness in social interaction. The five-component theoretical structure, built on a set of premises (some of which are questionable), is shown to be untenable. Four of the components, when measured with face-valid items, are positively related to social anxiety; this result conflicts with Snyder's description of the high self-monitor as being particularly

Table 10
Concern for Appropriateness Scale

Subscale/item	M	SD	r with subscale	r with total
Cross-situational variability				
1. I tend to show different sides of myself to different people.	3.3	1.2	.51	.47
4. In different situations and with different people, I often act like very different persons.	2.4	1.4	.63	.48
7. Although I know myself, I find that others do not know me.	2.8	1.3	.48	.33
10. Different situations can make me behave like very different people.	2.6	1.3	.60	.56
13. Different people tend to have different impressions about the type of person I am.	3.0	1.4	.51	.38
16. I am not always the person I appear to be.	2.5	1.3	.57	.61
19. I sometimes have the feeling that people don't know who I really am.	2.8	1.2	.63	.43
Attention to social comparison information				
2. It is my feeling that if everyone else in a group is behaving in a certain manner, this must be the proper way to behave.	1.2	2.5	.37	.36
3. I actively avoid wearing clothes that are not in style.	2.5	1.3	.37	.32
5. At parties I usually try to behave in a manner that makes me fit in.	3.0	1.1	.53	.48
6. When I am uncertain how to act in a social situation, I look to the behavior of others for cues.	2.9	1.2	.49	.49
8. I try to pay attention to the reactions of others to my behavior in order to avoid being out of place.	2.7	1.2	.61	.62
9. I find that I tend to pick up slang expressions from others and use them as part of my own vocabulary.	3.0	1.2	.34	.32
11. I tend to pay attention to what others are wearing.	3.2	1.3	.45	.37
12. The slightest look of disapproval in the eyes of a person with whom I am interacting is enough to make me change my approach.	2.6	1.1	.40	.45
14. It's important to me to fit in to the group I'm with.	3.2	1.2	.51	.46
15. My behavior often depends on how I feel others wish me to behave.	2.0	1.1	.53	.59
17. If I am the least bit uncertain as to how to act in a social situation, I look to the behavior of others for cues.	2.6	1.1	.60	.54
18. I usually keep up with clothing style changes by watching what others wear.	2.6	1.2	.54	.38
20. When in a social situation, I tend not to follow the crowd, but instead behave in a manner that suits my particular mood at the time.	2.0	1.1	.48	.42

Note. Each item yields a score from 0 to 5; high scores indicate high Concern for Appropriateness. Item 20 requires reverse scoring. In these data (Study 3; $n = 224$). Coefficient alpha is .82 for cross-situational variability, .83 for attention to social comparison information, and .86 for the total scale.

skillful in interpersonal give-and-take. One component, ability to modify self-presentation, is not directly associated with social anxiety.

In an effort to reconceptualize the self-monitoring construct much more narrowly than Snyder (1979) did, we take a two-component definition from his writings and operationalize it in the Revised Self-Monitoring scale displayed in Table 9. The revised scale is face valid and has enough internal consistency to merit further examination (Nunnally, 1978). In view of the fact that its two subscales correlate dissimilarly with some relevant third variables, prospective users should consider the subscale scores separately as well as together. The six-point response format described in Study 2 is recommended because it produces relatively stable correlation matrices throughout the studies reported here.

An instrument that may be useful as a measure of tendencies to conform, the Concern for Appropriateness scale, also emerges from these investigations. It is presented in Table 10. It assesses those components that cannot be subsumed by the self-monitoring construct because of their relationships with social anxiety: cross-situational variability and attention to social comparison information. Its two subscales correlate similarly with measures of other constructs (both in the data summarized in Table 6 and in results described by Wolfe et al., 1982) and coefficient alpha for the total scale is .86 in the Study 3 sample. These data suggest that unidimensional scoring of the Concern for Appropriateness scale is probably justifiable. Ordinary prudence, however, requires that its subscale scores should be considered both singly and combined. Again, the six-point format is recommended.

The coherence of results from Studies 2, 3, and 4 indicates that the appended measures are likely to perform dependably. If they do, then the body of work described here will constitute a sound foundation for new research on self-monitoring and related constructs.

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The Situational Humor Response Questionnaire: A Quantitative Measure of the Sense of Humor. Rod A. Martin (Psychology Department, University of Waterloo, Waterloo, Ontario, Canada N2L 3G1), Herbert M. Lefcourt.

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Empathy: A Review of Available Measures. B. Chlopan, M. McCain, J. Carbonell (Psychology Department, Florida State University, Tallahassee, Florida 32306), R. Hagen.

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A Causal Model Approach to the Symbolic Interactionist View of the Self Concept. Robert Schafer (Department of Sociology and Anthropology, Iowa State University, Ames, Iowa 50011), Patricia Keith.