

Robust Test Generation and Coverage for Hybrid Systems^{*}

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Abstract. Testing is an important tool for validation of the system design and its implementation. Model-based test generation allows to systematically ascertain whether the system meets its design requirements, particularly the safety and correctness requirements of the system. In this paper, we develop a framework for generating tests from hybrid systems models. The core idea of the framework is to develop a notion of robust test, where one nominal test can be guaranteed to yield the same qualitative behavior as a other tests that are close to it. Our approach offers three distinct advantages. 1) It allows for computing and formally quantifying the robustness of some properties, 2) it establishes a method to quantify the test coverage for every test case, and 3) the procedure is parallelizable and therefore, very scalable. We demonstrate our framework by generating tests for a navigation benchmark application.

1 Introduction

As engineering systems gain more functionality and complexity, there is a need for sound discipline in their design, development and deployment. In particular, ensuring the safety and correctness of these large and complex systems is becoming increasingly hard. In recent years, a slew of model-based design efforts have been developed to address these problems. The promise of the model-based design paradigm is to develop design models and subject them to analysis, simulation, and validation prior to their implementation. Performing analysis early in the development cycle allows one to detect and fix design problems sooner and at a lower cost. There has been a lot of work in the hybrid systems community towards analysis, validation and verification of systems developed from hybrid control models.(c.f., [1–8])¹.

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¹ This list is by no means exhaustive. However, it does capture a broad spectrum of techniques that have been developed in the community to answer the reachability and verification problems.

Testing has been used in practice to check the conformance of an implementation to its specification. Although testing cannot provide formal guarantees on correctness and reachability as is possible with verification, disciplined use of testing, coupled with coverage criteria can be a great aid to system validation.

Testing amounts to running or simulating the operation of the system for a finite period of time. It is comparable to taking a snapshot of the operation of the system. As we are interested in gaining some information about the system, testing is done repetitively with varying *testing parameters*, so as to simulate as many scenarios of operation as possible. By testing parameters, we mean the parameters that characterize the run of a test. For example, if we have an autonomous system of which we can only influence initial condition, then the testing parameter is the initial condition. If we have more degree of freedom in executing the system, for example, if we can also adjust some parameters in the system, then these can be regarded as testing parameters as well. The ultimate goal of testing is to cover the entirety of the set of testing parameters.

When the set of testing parameters is an infinite set, it is obvious that we cannot exhaustively test each of the testing parameters. However, it is possible that one testing parameter is representative of many others. A testing parameter is said to be *robust* if a slight (quantifiable) perturbation of the parameter is guaranteed to result in a test with the same qualitative properties (for example, safety and correctness). It is obvious that robustness can lead to a significant reduction in the set of testing parameters. In fact, ideally, we would like to be able to reduce an infinite set of testing parameters into a finite set, and quantify the coverage by the undergone tests. In this paper, we develop a framework where the robustness of a test can be formally quantified and computed. The framework is then applied to test a navigation benchmark problem [9].

Prior work on generating tests from hybrid systems models has mainly focused on randomized testing or monitoring to see if the implementation conforms to the model. Esposito and others [10, 11] use Rapidly exploring Random Trees (RRT) to generate test cases from hybrid systems models. The approach of van Osch [12] is to test for input-output conformance by providing inputs to the implementation and comparing its output to its model. In [13], the author presents a case-study that identifies a minimal set of test scenarios required to determine with some confidence interval if the system meets the specification by casting the test generation problem as an optimal control problem. Therefore, this approach suffers from the drawback that it is only applicable in scenarios when the optimal control problem can be solved efficiently. Other existing publications in this area include [14], where a simulation of the hybrid model to generate test suites based on a coverage criteria, and [15], where test generation from Extended Finite State Machines (EFSM) models to test a temporal logic property was introduced.

2 Problem formulation

In this paper, we consider a standard model of hybrid systems, $\mathcal{H} = (\mathcal{X}, \mathcal{L}, E, Inv, F)$, where \mathcal{X} is the continuous state space of the system, \mathcal{L} is the finite state of discrete states (locations), E is the set of transitions, $Inv : \mathcal{L} \rightarrow 2^{\mathcal{X}}$ is the invariant set of a location, and $F : \mathcal{X} \times \mathcal{L} \rightarrow \mathcal{X}$ is the vector field that defines the continuous dynamics in each location.

A transition $e \in E$ is a 4-tuple (l, l', g, r) , where $l \in \mathcal{L}$ is the origin of the transition, $l' \in \mathcal{L}$ is the target of the transition and that each location, $g \subset \partial Inv(l)$ is the guard of the transition, which is a subset of the boundary of the invariant set of location l , and $r : g \rightarrow Inv(l')$ is the reset map that resets the continuous state at the new location. We assume that the reset map r is continuous.

In this paper, we shall assume that the following statements are true. The state space is \mathbb{R}^n . The invariant sets are closed. We denote the open interior of an invariant set as $\underline{Inv}(l)$. The differential equation

$$\frac{dx}{dt} = F(x(t), l),$$

admits a unique solution for every location $l \in \mathcal{L}$, i.e. it satisfies the Lipschitz conditions. The transitions are deterministic² in the sense that the guards of all outgoing transitions from a location are disjoint. The system does not deadlock or possess Zeno behavior.

In analyzing the safety of the system, we assume that there is a subset $Unsafe \subset \mathcal{X} \times \mathcal{L}$ of unsafe states. A trajectory of the hybrid system corresponds to an unsafe execution if it intersects with the unsafe set.

Example 1 (Navigation Benchmark [9]). As a case study in this paper, we consider a slightly modified version of the navigation benchmark proposed by Fehnker and Ivancic [9]. The benchmark studies a hybrid automaton \mathcal{H} with $m \times n$ discrete locations and 4 continuous variables x_1, x_2, v_1, v_2 , which form the state vector is $x = [x_1 \ x_2 \ v_1 \ v_2]^T$. We will refer to the vectors $[x_1 \ x_2]^T$ and $[v_1 \ v_2]^T$ as the position and the velocity of the system. The structure of the hybrid automaton can be better visualised in Fig. 1. The invariant set of every (i, j) location is an 1×1 box that constraints the position of the system, while the velocity can flow unconstrained. The guards in each location are the half-spaces that point outwards from the location invariant.

Each location has affine constant dynamics with drift. In detail, in each location (i, j) of the hybrid automaton, the system evolves under the differential equation $\dot{x} = Ax - Bu(i, j)$ where the matrices A and B are

$$A = \begin{bmatrix} 0 & 0 & 1 & 0 \\ 0 & 0 & 0 & 1 \\ 0 & 0 & -1.2 & 0.1 \\ 0 & 0 & 0.1 & -1.2 \end{bmatrix} \quad \text{and} \quad B = \begin{bmatrix} 0 & 0 \\ -1.2 & 0.1 \\ 0.1 & -1.2 \end{bmatrix}$$

² We limit the discussion in this paper to deterministic guards. However, the framework presented here is also applicable to nondeterministic systems and reactive systems.




Fig. 1. A graphical representation of the benchmark hybrid automaton. The upper left box is the invariant set for the location $(1, 1)$. (a) The constant input vector in each location. (b) Sample trajectories.

and the input is $u(i, j) = [\sin(\pi C(i, j)/4) \cos(\pi C(i, j)/4)]^T$. The array C is one of the two parameters of the hybrid automaton that the user can control and it defines the number of locations in the hybrid automaton and the vector input in each discrete location. Here, we consider the following input arrays

$$C_1 = \begin{bmatrix} U & 2 & 4 \\ 4 & 3 & 4 \\ 2 & 2 & G \end{bmatrix} \quad C_2 = \begin{bmatrix} 2 & 3 & 6 \\ 3 & 3 & G \\ 2 & 2 & U \end{bmatrix} \quad C_3 = \begin{bmatrix} U & 2 & 4 \\ 2 & 2 & 4 \\ 1 & 1 & G \end{bmatrix}$$

where U denotes the unsafe set and G the goal set. The other user-input parameter is the set of initial conditions $\mathcal{X}_0 \times \mathcal{L}_0 \subseteq \mathcal{X} \times \mathcal{L}$. The requirement for \mathcal{H} is that all of its trajectories starting in $\mathcal{X}_0 \times \mathcal{L}_0$ should avoid the unsafe set and eventually reach the goal set. Sample trajectories of the system appear in 1.(b).

Example 1 describes what is a typical verification problem for hybrid systems. The goal of such verification algorithms is to prove that there cannot exist a trajectory that would falsify the hybrid automaton assumptions, i.e. safety and reachability. In this paper, we try to answer a different problem in an attempt to overcome the theoretical and practical difficulties of exhaustive verification. Here, the goal is not complete coverage of the set of initial conditions, but the computation of a (possibly) quick estimate of which part of the initial conditions is safe and/or unsafe for a bounded horizon using only a small number of tests. One of the most important aspects of such a testing methodology is that it should be completely transparent to the user with few or none at all parameters to tune.

Problem 1 (Testing the benchmark example). Given the benchmark example as above \mathcal{H} with a set of initial conditions $\mathcal{X}_0 \times \mathcal{L}_0$, a bounded horizon $\tau > 0$ and an unsafe *Unsafe* and/or *Goal* set, develop a strategy for picking test points to cover the set of initial conditions.

As mentioned in the previous section, we want to be able to cover the whole set of initial conditions with finitely many test points. Obviously, this requires the

construction of robust neighborhoods around the test points, such that a single test point can be used to represent its entire robust neighborhood, as it has the same qualitative properties. By qualitative properties, we mean the sequence of locations that are visited and the safety property.

3 Robust testing for hybrid systems

In this section we discuss the computation of robust neighborhood of initial condition. First, we are going to review the idea of bisimulation function for dynamical systems [16]. The concept of bisimulation function introduced in the above mentioned references is more general than what we are going to review here, since we are going to consider systems without input.

Consider a bisimulation function between a dynamical system

$$\Sigma : \frac{dx}{dt} = F(x), \quad x \in \mathcal{X} \quad (1)$$

and itself. Such a function $\phi : \mathcal{X} \times \mathcal{X} \rightarrow \mathbb{R}_+$ satisfies the following requirements

$$\phi(x_1, x_2) \geq 0, \quad (2)$$

$$\frac{\partial \phi(x_1, x_2)}{\partial x_1} f(x_1) + \frac{\partial \phi(x_1, x_2)}{\partial x_2} f(x_2) \leq 0, \quad (3)$$

for every $x_1, x_2 \in \mathcal{X}$.

Denote the continuous flow of the dynamical system Σ as $\xi : \mathbb{R}_+ \times \mathcal{X} \rightarrow \mathcal{X}$, that is, $\xi(t, x_0)$ satisfies the differential equation

$$\frac{\partial \xi(t, x_0)}{\partial t} = f(\xi(t, x_0)), \quad \xi(0, x_0) = x_0. \quad (4)$$

The bisimulation function is nonincreasing with respect to the flow.

Remark 1. It is obvious that the zero function is a bisimulation function for any dynamical systems. In the subsequent discussion, we exclude this trivial function.

Proposition 1. [16] *For any $x_1^0, x_2^0 \in \mathcal{X}$, the bisimulation function evaluated along the flows of the initial conditions x_1^0 and x_2^0 is nonincreasing, i.e.*

$$\phi(\xi(t_1, x_1^0), \xi(t_1, x_2^0)) \geq \phi(\xi(t_2, x_1^0), \xi(t_2, x_2^0)), \quad (5)$$

for any $t_2 \geq t_1 \geq 0$.

We denote the ε -neighborhood of $x \in \mathcal{X}$ with respect to a bisimulation function ϕ as $B_\phi(x, \varepsilon)$.

$$B_\phi(x, \varepsilon) = \{y \in \mathcal{X} \mid \phi(x, y) \leq \varepsilon\}.$$

The following corollary is a direct consequence of Proposition 1.

Corollary 1. For any $x, y \in \mathcal{X}$, if $y \in B_\phi(x, \varepsilon)$ for some $\varepsilon > 0$, then

$$\xi(t, y) \in B_\phi(\xi(t, x), \varepsilon), \quad (6)$$

for every $t \geq 0$.

Thus, the ε -neighborhood defined by the bisimulation function ϕ is invariant with respect to the flow of the dynamical system. If we define the (directed) metric $d_\phi(x(\cdot), y(\cdot))$ between state trajectories of the system Σ with respect to the bisimulation function ϕ as

$$d_\phi(x(\cdot), y(\cdot)) := \sup_{t \geq 0} \phi(x(t), y(t)),$$

then the corollary above is equivalent to

$$d_\phi(\xi(\cdot, x), \xi(\cdot, y)) \leq \phi(x, y), \quad (7)$$

for any $x, y \in \mathcal{X}$.

Hereafter we shall assume that bisimulation functions are symmetric, that is,

$$\phi(x, y) = \phi(y, x). \quad (8)$$

A bisimulation function that is symmetric and forms a metric on the space \mathcal{X} is called a *contraction map*. Such functions are used in contraction analysis in relation to the stability of the system [17, 18].

In the case that the dynamics is affine,

$$\begin{aligned} F(x) &= Ax + b, \\ x &\in \mathbb{R}^n, A \in \mathbb{R}^{n \times n}, b \in \mathbb{R}^{n \times 1}, \end{aligned}$$

we can propose that the bisimulation function assumes the form

$$\phi(x_1, x_2) = (x_1 - x_2)^T M (x_1 - x_2),$$

where M is a positive semidefinite matrix. Thus, the bisimulation function defines a Euclidian metric in a (linearly) transformed space. It can be shown that such a bisimulation function exists if and only if the system is stable.

In the following, we are going to construct robust testing neighborhoods using the level sets of a bisimulation function. For that, we need a few definitions.

Definition 1. For any location $l \in \mathcal{L}$ we define the set of outgoing transitions from l as $Out(l)$. For any transition $e = (l, l', g, r) \in Out(l)$, we define the active part of the guard g , $g^{act} \subset g$ that can be reached from inside $Inv(l)$, i.e. we exclude from g the points where the vector field $F(\cdot, l)$ points inward. Similarly, we define $Unsafe^{act}$ as the portion of the boundary of the unsafe set that is reachable from the safe portion of the state space.

See Fig. 2 for an illustration of the definition of active guard, and of the proposition below.




Fig. 2. An illustration for Definition 1 and Proposition 2. The line on the left is a guard g_2 . Its part with lighter shade, g_2^{act} is the active part, where the vector field points outward. The guard g_1 is active everywhere, as the vector field there points outward. The boundary of the unsafe set in this picture is active, as the vector field point into the unsafe set.

Proposition 2. Let $x_0 \in Inv(l)$ for some location $l \in \mathcal{L}$, and that the state trajectory $\xi(t, x_0)$ lies entirely in $Inv(l) \setminus Unsafe$ for $t \leq \tau$. Suppose that $Out(l) = \{e_1, e_2, \dots, e_n\}$ and g_i is the guard of e_i , $i = 1, \dots, n$. Let τ be the time when the state trajectory hits g_1 , which is the guard of a transition e_1 . Suppose that we have a bisimulation function ϕ for the continuous dynamics in location l . We also suppose that there is a positive time lag $\varepsilon > 0$ such that

$$\xi(\tau + \varepsilon, x_0) \notin Inv(l).$$

We define

$$\begin{aligned} d_{out} &:= \inf_{y \in g_1} \phi(\xi(\tau + \varepsilon, x_0), y), \\ d_i &:= \inf_{0 \leq t \leq \tau + \varepsilon} \inf_{y \in g_i^{act}} \phi(\xi(t, x_0), y), i = 2, 3, \dots, n, \\ d_{unsafe} &:= \inf_{0 \leq t \leq \tau + \varepsilon} \inf_{y \in Inv(l) \cap Unsafe^{act}} \phi(\xi(t, x_0), y), \\ d_{min} &:= \min\{d_{out}, d_{unsafe}, d_2, d_3, \dots, d_n\}, \\ \hat{\varepsilon} &:= \inf\{\delta > 0 \mid B_\phi(\xi(\tau - \delta, x_0), d_{min}) \subset \underline{Inv}(l)\}. \end{aligned}$$

The following statement holds. For any $x'_0 \in B_\phi(x_0, d_{min}) \cap Inv(l)$, the state trajectory $\xi(t, x'_0)$ exits $Inv(l)$ through transition e_1 at time $t \in [\tau - \hat{\varepsilon}, \tau + \varepsilon]$ and is safe at least until it exits location l .

Proposition 2 provides us with a way to compute a neighborhood around the initial state x_0 , consisting of initial states that have the same qualitative behavior as x_0 . Namely, they lead to a trajectory that exits the location l by

performing the same transition, and is safe at least until it performs the transition. In addition to that, we also obtain a timing guarantee, in the form of a time interval where the transition is guaranteed to occur, if the initial state is varied within the computed neighborhood. The next step is to design algorithm that uses Proposition 2 repetitively to deal with testing trajectories with multiple transitions.

Given a hybrid system $\mathcal{H} = (\mathcal{X}, \mathcal{L}, E, Inv, F)$. We denote the continuous flow at every location $l \in L$ as $\xi_l(\cdot, \cdot)$, and we assume that we have a bisimulation function for the dynamics in location $l \in L$, which is $\phi_l(\cdot, \cdot)$. A testing trajectory is a sequence $(x_i, l_i, e_i, \tau_i)_{i=0, \dots, N}$ such that:

- $l_i \in L, x_i \in Inv(l_i), e_i \in Out(l_i), \tau_i > 0$, for every $i \in \{0, 1, \dots, N\}$,
- If we define $e_i = (l_i, l_{i+1}, g_i, r_i)$, then $\xi_{l_i}(\tau_i, x_i) \in g_i, x_{i+1} = r_i(\xi_{l_i}(\tau_i, x_i)), \xi_{l_i}(t, x_i) \in \underline{Inv}(l_i)$ for all $t \in [0, \tau_i)$, for every $i \in \{0, 1, \dots, N-1\}$,

We define $T := \sum_{i=0}^{N-1} \tau_i$, which is the time where the trajectory enter the final state. The length of the test is $T + \tau_N$. Given a testing trajectory, the algorithm for constructing a robust tube around a nominal trajectory is given as follows.

Algorithm 1 *The following are the steps:*

1. Define the avoided set as the union of the unsafe set and active parts of all the outgoing guards from l_N , i.e.³

$$D_N := Unsafe^{act} \cup_{g \in Out(l_N)} g^{act}. \quad (9)$$

2. Compute (or obtain a lower bound on)

$$d_{\min}^N := \inf_{t \leq \tau_N} \inf_{y \in D_N} \phi_{l_N}(\xi_{l_N}(t, x_N), y). \quad (10)$$

3. Define the allowed guard

$$A_{N-1} := r_{N-1}^{-1}(r_{N-1}(g_{N-1}) \cap B_{\phi_{l_N}}(x_N, d_{\min}^N)). \quad (11)$$

This is the set of states on the guard of the transition between l_{N-1} and l_N that is reset into the d_{\min}^N -neighborhood of x_N (with respect to the bisimulation function ϕ_{l_N}).

4. Define the avoided set

$$D_{N-1} := (Unsafe^{act} \cup_{g \in Out(l_{N-1})} g^{act}) \setminus A_{N-1}. \quad (12)$$

5. Pick a time lag $\varepsilon_{N-1} > 0$ such that

$$\xi_{l_{N-1}}(\tau_{N-1} + \varepsilon_{N-1}, x_{N-1}) \notin Inv(l_{N-1}).$$

We present an algorithm for picking a good time lag later in this paper.

³ Notice that for simplicity, we abuse the notation and associate the transition with its guard.

6. Compute (or obtain a lower bound on)

$$d_{\min}^{N-1} := \min \left(\inf_{y \in g_{N-1}} \phi_{l_{N-1}}(\xi_{l_{N-1}}(\tau_{N-1} + \varepsilon_{N-1}, x_{N-1}), y), \right. \\ \left. \inf_{t \leq \tau_{N-1} + \varepsilon_{N-1}} \inf_{y \in D_{N-1}} \phi_{l_{N-1}}(\xi_{l_{N-1}}(t, x_{N-1}), y) \right).$$

7. Define

$$\hat{\varepsilon}_{N-1} := \inf \{ \delta > 0 \mid B_{\phi_{N-1}}(\xi_{l_{N-1}}(\tau_{N-1} - \delta, x_{N-1}), d_{\min}^{N-1}) \subset \underline{Inv}(l_{N-1}) \}.$$

8. Repeat steps 3 - 7 to obtain $A_i, D_i, \varepsilon_i, d_{\min}^i, \hat{\varepsilon}_i, i = 0, 1, \dots, N-2$.

The result of this iteration have the following property.

Theorem 2. Given a testing trajectory of a hybrid system $(x_i, l_i, e_i, \tau_i)_{i=0, \dots, N}$, let $d_{\min}^0, \varepsilon_i, \hat{\varepsilon}_i, i = 0, 1, \dots, N-1$ be obtained from the iteration in Algorithm 1. Define

$$\varepsilon := \sum_{i=0}^{N-1} \varepsilon_i, \quad \hat{\varepsilon} := \sum_{i=0}^{N-1} \hat{\varepsilon}_i.$$

Any testing trajectory that starts in $B_{l_0}(x_0, d_{\min}^0)$ has the following properties.

(i) It follows the same sequence of locations, $(l_i)_{i=0, \dots, N}$ and it enters the final location l_N at $t \in [T - \hat{\varepsilon}, T + \varepsilon]$,

(ii) The trajectory is safe at least until τ_N time unit after it enters l_N .

An essential part of Algorithm 1 is the generation of the time lags ε_i (see Step 5). First of all, notice that a small ε_i is more desirable than a larger one. This is because ε_i is a measure in the slackness in the timing when the trajectories in the tube hit the desired guard (see Theorem 2). The idea is to construct ε_i as small as possible, but large enough so that by introducing this time lag, we are sure that all the trajectories in the constructed tube hit the desired guard within the time interval $[\tau_i, \tau_i + \varepsilon_i]$. In order to do this, we can replace Steps 5 and 6 in Algorithm 1 with the following steps.

Step 5'. Compute

$$\hat{d}_{\min}^{N-1} := \inf_{t \leq \tau_{N-1}} \inf_{y \in D_{N-1}} \phi_{l_{N-1}}(\xi_{l_{N-1}}(t, x_{N-1}), y).$$

Step 5''. Compute

$$\varepsilon_{N-1} = \min \left(\inf \left\{ e \mid \inf_{y \in g_{N-1}} \phi_{l_{N-1}}(\xi_{l_{N-1}}(\tau_{N-1} + e, x_{N-1}), y) \geq \hat{d}_{\min}^{N-1}, \right. \right. \\ \left. \left. \xi_{l_{N-1}}(\tau_{N-1} + e, x_{N-1}) \notin \underline{Inv}(l_{N-1}) \right\}, \varepsilon_{\max} \right).$$

Step 6'. If $\varepsilon_{N-1} < \varepsilon_{\max}$ then $d_{\min}^{N-1} = \hat{d}_{\min}^{N-1}$, otherwise

$$d_{\min}^{N-1} = \sup_{0 \leq e \leq \varepsilon_{\max}} \inf_{y \in g_{N-1}} \phi_{l_{N-1}}(\xi_{l_{N-1}}(\tau_{N-1} + e, x_{N-1}), y).$$

In Step 5' we compute the largest level set that fits within the allowed set. In Step 5'', we want to find the minimum time lag such that the computed level set lies entirely beyond the desired guard (and hence outside of the invariant set $Inv(l_{N-1})$). See Fig. 2 for an illustration. Because such time lag might not exist, or is too large, we can establish a maximum allowed value for the time lag, ε_{\max} . If such time lag is found and is smaller than ε_{\max} , then this value is used. If it is not found, then we compute the largest level set that can be fit outside of the invariant set. This is done in Step 6'.

4 Test generation and coverage strategies

In the benchmark problem that we are working on, our goal is to cover the given set of initial states with robust neighborhood. In the previous section, we have presented an algorithm for computing the robust neighborhood around a given initial state. What needs to be done next, is to select subsequent initial states from the given set, so as to (eventually) cover the whole set and/or to provide a quantitative measure of coverage based on the executed tests. The strategy for selecting the test points is called the *test generation*.

An important issue in test generation is the notion of coverage, which qualifies the number and type of tests generated. There are a number of coverage criteria based on the test requirement, which can be categorized into two classes: initial state coverage and structural coverage. The first type of coverage criteria is concerned with covering the set of initial states and then characterize each test case that has been generated. The second class of coverage criteria is concerned with analyzing the structural coverage of a test case, such as mode coverage, transition coverage, and sequence coverage. This notion of coverage can capture more system requirements than just the initial states. The main challenge here is how to generate tests so as to meet a particular coverage criteria. In this paper, we only consider the coverage of the initial state space and leave the prospect of using our approach to analyze structural coverage as future work.

There are a number of strategies for initial state coverage:

Randomized Strategy: The first strategy we present to explore the set of initial states is to pick a point randomly. A formal analysis might be intractable, or hard, in case the state space is high dimensional and nonlinear. Consequently, a randomized strategy would be an attractive option to exploring the state space and checking for properties such as system safety.

Greedy Strategy: Under this strategy, we first pick a point and run the testing algorithm on it. Then, we subtract the computed robust ball around the initial point from the state space and pick the center of the maximum ball that can be fit into the remainder space as the next test point.

Tessellation-based Strategy: Picking points at random may not ensure uniform coverage. One possible strategy to ensure uniform coverage is to use tessellation of the initial state space based on an appropriate metric.

Maximal Dispersal-based Strategy: Picking points so as to maximize the dispersion of the points [19]. This strategy involves the generation of Voronoi

diagram in the set of initial states. The goal is to pick the points incrementally so as to maximize the radius of a nonoverlapping ball that can be inserted in the set. The method that we use in analyzing the benchmark problem (see the following section) is based on this strategy.

5 Numerical Results and Discussion

In this section, we present some numerical results using our prototype MATLAB implementation of the robust testing algorithm. The experimental results will help us discuss the strengths and weaknesses of our approach.

One of the advantages of using robust testing methodologies is that we can obtain an estimate of the degree of coverage of initial conditions that we have achieved. Theoretically, this can be done by computing the volume of the intersection of the robustness ellipsoid \mathcal{E} with the polytope that defines the set of initial conditions \mathcal{X}_0 . Nonetheless, this is not feasible computation-wise when the robustness ellipsoid \mathcal{E} is not contained inside the set of initial conditions. Therefore, we compute the maximum ellipsoid that fits inside the intersection of \mathcal{E} and \mathcal{X}_0 . This can lead to a significant under-approximation of the actual covered space (see Example 3).

The following testing problem provides some insight on the principles behind our testing algorithm. The planar choice of initial conditions help us visualize the coverage of initial conditions, since the same is not possible when testing a 4D set of initial conditions.

Example 2. The first case that we consider is testing the navigation benchmark for array C_1 for the set of initial conditions $\mathcal{X}_0 = [1, 2] \times [1, 2] \times \{-0.2\} \times \{0\}$ with $\mathcal{L}_0 = \{(2, 2)\}$ (*green* region in Fig. 3). Here instead of using the Maximal Dispersal-based Strategy, we create a grid of 25 points which serve as initial conditions for each simulation. The resulting simulations appear in Fig. 3.(a). The *red* ellipsoids centered at the initial conditions denote the projections of the 4D ellipsoids on the position plane $x_1 - x_2$. In Fig. 3.(b), we present the covered space of initial conditions after 25 simulations. Here, the ellipsoids are the intersection of the corresponding 4D ellipsoids with the position plane. The *red* and *blue* ellipsoids denote covered initial conditions whose corresponding trajectories followed different discrete paths. Note that there exists a clear partition of \mathcal{X}_0 into two subsets of initial conditions that initiate trajectories that traverse different discrete paths. In this case, our proposed under-approximation algorithm for coverage computed 48% of covered initial conditions.

The next example indicates that thin sets of initial conditions and robustness of the system with respect to the specifications (unsafe and/or goal set) make the testing problem easy.

Example 3. Consider again C_1 , but now with the following set of initial conditions $\mathcal{X}_0 = [2.2, 2.8] \times [1.2, 1.8] \times \{-0.2\} \times \{0\}$ with $\mathcal{L}_0 = \{(2, 3)\}$. This set of initial conditions has been verified to be safe with respect to the unsafe set in [9].




Fig. 3. Result after 25 simulations for the problem instance of Example 2.




Fig. 4. Result after 9 simulations for the problem instance of Example 3.

Using the testing algorithm we can cover the set of initial conditions with only 9 simulations (Fig. 4.(a)). In Fig. 4.(a) the ellipsoids represent the intersection of the corresponding 4D ellipsoids with the position plane, while in Fig. 4.(b) we present the under-approximation of the aforementioned ellipsoids with ellipsoids that fit inside \mathcal{X}_0 . Numerically, we compute a coverage estimate of 72%.

The previous example also shows that even though by visual inspection we can verify that we have tested all the set of initial conditions, numerically we do not have an accurate way to quantify that. Next, we show the main strength of the testing framework, i.e. easy detection of robustly unsafe systems.

Example 4. Consider the map C_2 with initial conditions $\mathcal{X}_0 = [0, 1] \times [2, 3] \times [-1, 1] \times [-11]$ and $\mathcal{L}_0 = \{(1, 1)\}$. This was proven to be unsafe with just 10 simulations (see Fig. 5). Notice the complicated hybrid dynamics.

Finally, we apply our framework to a more demanding example.

Example 5. Here, we use map C_3 with initial conditions $\mathcal{X}_0 = [0.1, 0.1] \times [0.1, 0.1] \times [-0.1, 0.5] \times [-0.05, 0.25]$ and $\mathcal{L}_0 = \{(3, 1)\}$. This example was proven to be safe in [20] using the verification toolbox PHAVer [7]. Our testing algorithm was able to cover 7% of the initial conditions after 300 simulations.

On-going research goes into better estimating the covered set of initial conditions. Finally, one of the main advantages of our robust testing framework is




Fig. 5. The testing framework can potentially detect the unsafety of the system with just one test. Legend: *green* - initial conditions, *red* - unsafe set, *cyan* - goal set.

that it can be effectively parallelized by simply assigning a different simulation trace to each CPU.

6 Concluding remarks

In this paper, we present an algorithm for test generation for hybrid systems. The algorithm is based on a computational method for robust testing. We implement the algorithm to verify a navigation benchmark problem [9]. One advantage of our algorithm, compared to some other tools, is that we do not need to tune any parameters beforehand.

As future research agenda, we have identified a number of potential directions. For example, we would like to develop a framework for robust testing of linear temporal logic properties [21], or develop a probabilistic notion of robust testing by using the idea of stochastic bisimulation function [22]. The algorithm that we present in this paper is also able to provide a timing guarantee for the occurrence of the transitions. Although, this feature is not exploited in the example we present in this paper, it can potentially be applied in automatic translation of hybrid automata into timed automata. Such a translation is useful, for example in verification and observer design for hybrid systems [23].

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Appendix

Proof of Proposition 2. See Fig. 2 for an illustration. By construction of d_{\min} , we can infer that for any $0 \leq t \leq \tau + \varepsilon$,

$$\begin{aligned} B_\phi(\xi(t, x_0), d_{\min}) \cap g_i^{act} &= \emptyset, i = 2, 3, \dots, n, \\ B_\phi(\xi(t, x_0), d_{\min}) \cap Unsafe^{act} \cap Inv(l) &= \emptyset. \end{aligned}$$

We then invoke Corollary 1 and infer that any state trajectory originating in $B_\phi(x_0, d_{\min})$ will not be unsafe nor touch the active guards g_i^{act} , $i = 2, 3, \dots, n$, within the time interval $[0, \tau + \varepsilon]$. We also know that the neighborhood $B_\phi(\xi(\tau + \varepsilon, x_0), d_{\min})$ lies entirely outside of $Inv(l)$, beyond g_1 . This implies that any trajectory starting in $B_\phi(x_0, d_{\min}) \cap Inv(l)$ crosses g_1 before $t = \tau + \varepsilon$. Finally, since the neighborhood $B_\phi(\xi(t, x_0), d_{\min})$ does not touch any active guard, for $t \in [0, \tau - \hat{\varepsilon}]$, we also know that the trajectories will not touch any active guard before time $t = \tau - \hat{\varepsilon}$.

Proof of Theorem 2. The proof relies on repeated application of Proposition 2. Using the proposition once, we can establish that any testing trajectory that starts in $B_{l_0}(x_0, d_{\min}^0)$ has the following properties.

- (i) The first transition is from l_0 to l_1 and it takes place at $t \in [\tau_0 - \hat{\varepsilon}_0, \tau_0 + \varepsilon_0]$,
- (ii) The trajectory is safe in $t \in [0, \tau_0 + \varepsilon_0]$,

In addition to that, by applying Corollary 1 we also know that

- (iii) The transition happen when the portion of the guard in A_0 is hit⁴,
- (iv) After the transition, the continuous state is reset into $B_{\phi_{l_1}}(x_1, d_{\min}^1)$.

By repeatedly applying the reasoning above, we can conclude that the trajectory will reached l_N at $t \in [T - \hat{\varepsilon}, T + \varepsilon]$ and that it is safe at least until that time. However, since we know that the original testing trajectory is safe at least until τ_N time units after it enters the final location l_N , we can apply Corollary 1 and conclude that the same safety property applies for any trajectory in the location l_N that starts within $B_{\phi_{l_N}}(x_N, d_{\min}^N)$.

⁴ This is because we can exclude the possibility that the trajectory hits the guard outside of A_0 in $t \in [0, \tau_0 + \varepsilon_0]$.