

## Rooted transnational publics: Integrating foreign ties and civic activism

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**Abstract** Can civic organizations be both locally rooted and globally connected? Based on a survey of 1,002 of the largest civic organizations in Hungary, we conclude that there is not a forced choice between foreign ties and domestic integration. By studying variation in types of foreign interactions and variation in types of domestic integration, our analysis goes beyond notions of footloose experts *versus* rooted cosmopolitans. Organizations differ in their rootedness according to whether they have ties to their members and constituents, whether they have ties to other organizations in the civic sector, and whether they associate with actors from outside the civic sector. Similarly, we specify different types of foreign ties. In both domains our emphasis is on the type of action involved in the tie—especially relations of accountability and partnership. By demonstrating a systematic relationship between the patterns of foreign ties and the patterns of domestic integration, we chart three emerging forms of transnational publics.

Can civic organizations be both locally rooted and globally connected? A prominent theme in the literature on social movements, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), and civic organizations more generally points to warning signs about the potential negative effects of transnationalization. According to that view, international ties come at the expense of local integration. For some authors, the sources of disintegration are located in changes in the internal structure of the organizations whereby transnationalized organizations become professionalized, bureaucratized, and commercialized, with the potential consequence of the de-radicalization of the organizations (Rucht, 1999: 218). For others, the negative effects of transnationalization result from accompanying changes in the relationship between the

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organization and its environment. The danger is that organizations with transnational links will become more oriented to their foreign contacts, partners, or donors than to their members or other domestic organizations. In that view, transnationalization uproots civil society organizations from their base in popular participation and separates the professionalized movement elite from the grassroots (Mendelson & Glenn, 2002; Bob, 2002, 2005).

Based on well-documented case studies, Mendelson and Glenn, for example, find “in nearly every case” that the externally supported civic organizations “had weak links to their own societies” (Mendelson & Glenn, 2002: 22). Citing examples of strong transnational ties resulting in “isolation and even ghettoization” of NGOs (p. 13), they argue that increased dependence on external donors removes the incentives to be responsive to domestic constituents, turns domestic NGOs against each other in their fight for scarce transnational resources, and diverts the attention of the NGOs away from the most pressing local problems (p. 14, p. 18). Similarly, Bob (2002) argues that in their fight for global attention and support local movements might feel pressed to give up their original goals. He suggests that the least participatory local movements might have the biggest competitive advantage in the fight for external support (Bob, 2002: 44).

The research findings we report here challenge the generalizability of these and other case studies. Based on a survey of 1,002 of the largest civic associations in Hungary, which allows us to examine the relationship between foreign interactions and domestic integration, we conclude that transnationalizing civil societies, such as those of East Central Europe, do not face a forced choice between foreign ties and domestic integration. Our data, moreover, allow us to go beyond previous studies by specifying variation in the patterns of foreign ties. Our analysis, as well, goes beyond notions of ‘rooted cosmopolitans’ (Tarrow, 2001, 2005; Shalini, 2003) by specifying variation in the patterns of domestic rootedness. Our findings indicate a systematic relationship between the patterns of foreign ties and the patterns of domestic integration, leading us to identify three distinctive types of transnational civic organization.

Our overarching research question lies at the core of an emerging research agenda in the field of international development that focuses on the relationship between processes of transnationalization and domestic integration. That agenda examines how the rapid transnationalization of states, economies, and civil societies involves networks spanning national boundaries and asks how these networks interact with networks in the domestic setting. Can global connectedness co-exist with local rootedness? For economists and economic sociologists of development this question is formulated as whether and how foreign direct investment is integrated in the networks of local economies (Gereffi & Fonda, 1992; Gereffi, 2004). The corresponding question for students of states and political societies is whether and how the growth of transnational ties is related to processes of association or dissociation at the level of domestic social and political alliances (Burawoy et al., 2000; Evans, 2000; O’ Riain, 2000; Streeck, 1995).

In an earlier article, we asked whether high levels of foreign investment could co-exist with the reproduction of inter-organizational ownership networks in a postsocialist economy. In a longitudinal study of the ownership structure of the largest 1,696 Hungarian firms from 1987–2001, Stark and Vedres (2006) found that massive foreign direct investment reshaped but did not disintegrate domestic networks. Cohesive networks of ‘recombinant property’ (Stark, 1996) remained robust throughout the period and, in fact, integrated foreign investment.

In another earlier paper on the transnationalization of the state (Bruszt & Stark, 2003), we asked: If adopting regulatory standards is the path to European integration, does social integration follow directly from these processes and practices? Does meeting the requirements for ‘European enlargement’ enlarge or does it restrict the scope of social actors

that are included in a development strategy? When domestic political elites are accountable, by new accounting rules, to supranational bodies, how does this shape the forms and mechanisms by which they are accountable to their citizens?

In this article, we address the relationship between domestic integration and foreign interactions in a third domain—that of civic associations. Specifically we ask whether civic organizations that are connected to transnational flows of information, resources, and partnership are more likely to be disconnected from their members, constituents, and other organizations in the civic sector. Does the reach of transnational NGOs into these organizations restrict their patterns of domestic association? In short, are global links likely to loosen local ties?

To answer these questions we focus on civic associations in Hungary. During the past decade, the societies of East Central Europe have experienced a rapid and profound economic, political, and social transformation that has restructured national institutions and re-arranged international linkages. Since 1989, the zone of civil society, once harshly suppressed under communism, experienced extraordinary growth. Where civic associations once operated in a gray zone of underground or semi-underground status, now literally tens of thousands are officially registered as associations promoting civic benefits. This institutionalization has been accompanied by an increasing transnationalization. Domestic organizations can contact, communicate, and partner with transnational NGOs, many of which established a visible presence in these societies; and they can look to foreign-based foundations and NGOs, as well as international and supranational agencies, for financial support and non-monetary resources in the form of organizational transfer of skills, knowledge, and information (Bach & Stark, 2002). Thus, at the same time that East Central Europe's fragile civic organizations were sinking their roots into the domestic society – building ties to their members and constituents as well as to other organizations – they were also building transnational ties to actors outside the country (Chilton, 1995). Are Hungarian civic associations becoming uprooted just at the moment when they might be establishing strong ties to society or are there patterns of transnationalization that can co-exist with the reproduction of domestic integration? Our task in this article is to examine the relationship between these twinned processes.

To do so we conducted a survey of 1,002 of the largest civic associations in Hungary, allowing us 1) to document the prevalence of transnational ties and to chart the varieties of transnational interaction, 2) to document the prevalence of domestic ties among the organizations and to chart variation across their distinctive forms of domestic integration, and 3) to test whether foreign interactions come at the expense of domestic integration. Most importantly, our data allow us 4) to investigate whether there are significant correlations between the distinctive patterns of foreign interactions and the distinctive patterns of domestic integration.

Our findings indicate that civic associations do not face a forced choice between transnational integration and local embeddedness. With a robust model that incorporates key control variables, we find that civic associations with transnational ties are more likely than their counterparts without such ties to have deep roots in domestic societies. Transnationalizing civic organizations are more likely to be participatory, to be embedded in networks of local civic organizations, and to be associative with other domestic organizations outside the civic domain. Our findings, moreover, suggest that posing the problem as a possible forced choice presents a false choice. Our survey data make it possible not only to identify whether an organization has transnational ties but also to identify different patterns, or varieties, of transnationalization. We demonstrate that variation in the mode of transnationalization matters: the distinctive forms of transnationalization correlate with

different patterns of domestic integration. In brief, although we do find a type of transnationalization that correlates with domestic uprooting, we also find that the richest and most encompassing pattern of domestic integration correlates with the deepest and most encompassing type of transnationalization.

Students of social movements have already demonstrated that transnational activism takes diverse forms and that these are linked in looser or in deeper ways to supportive domestic networks (Tarrow, 2005; della Porta & Tarrow, 2005).<sup>1</sup> Our contribution in this article is the development of concepts and methods that will make it possible for researchers in the field of transnational activism to identify *different types of domestic rootedness* and *different types of foreign connectedness*. By empirically testing the relations among these patterns of variation, we demonstrate that there is, indeed, a distinctive domain of transnational action where the foreign and the domestic are organizationally integrated. We identify at that intersection three forms of transnational public arenas: transnational social movements, transnational projects, and transnational developmental associations.

In the following two sections, we briefly discuss the key concepts of domestic integration and the transnationalization of the civic field respectively, providing historical context and pointing to theoretical expectations about the relations among these processes. After describing our data collection, we test the relationship between foreign interaction and forms of domestic integration. In the subsequent section, we provide a more rigorous test by distinguishing varieties of transnationalization. To interpret these findings, we develop a notion of transnational publics that span the boundaries between foreign and domestic fields.

### Domestic integration in the civic field

In the Tocquevillian tradition in which Robert Putnam is a leading contemporary proponent, a well integrated civil society is the key to its capacity to act as an agent of democratization yielding political, social, and economic inclusion (Putnam, 1993, 2002). In that tradition, integration is primarily about *connectivity* whether it is in the connections between organizations and their actively participating citizens or in the network ties among civic organizations within the sector. A civil society with such connectivity has more capacity to mobilize marginalized or excluded groups and to represent subaltern/repressed alternatives vis-à-vis the state (Skocpol, 1999, Diani & McAdam, 2003; Bermeo, 2000). Similarly, the greater the density of the ties to participating citizens/members and to other cooperating organizations the greater is the capacity to defend civic values from excessive intrusions from the two other organizational domains, the state and the market.

How organized is the civic sector in Hungary and how deeply integrated into society are its civic associations? From the televised images of hundreds of thousands of demonstrators in its public squares in 1989 and from accounts of the dedicated work of dissidents who managed to circulate *samizdat* texts through underground distribution channels, one might assume that it is obvious that Hungarian civil society was already vibrant and could only become more so after the lifting of legal restrictions on the right to association. But recent studies suggest that the context of severe economic crisis followed by an embrace of the new values of a market economy, combined with the legacies of dissident organization, should lead us to question such assumptions. In a recent study of East European civil societies, Petrova and Tarrow (2005) observe a puzzling disjuncture between a very low

<sup>1</sup> For the discussion of social movements in network terms, see especially Diani (2001) and the edited volume by Diani and McAdam (2003).

level of political participation *measured at individual level surveys* and a rapid growth and high number of civic organizations, some with demonstrated high mobilizing capacities.

The momentous political upheavals of 1989 in Eastern Europe were, in part, caused by popular movements; and the resulting legalization of free assembly did spur a rapid growth of civic organizations. As Table 1 indicates, the number of non-profit organizations in Hungary nearly doubled from 1989 to 1990. By 2003 there were more than fifty thousand registered nonprofit organizations, nearly six times as many as in 1989.

Although the number of organizations might be taken to indicate a strengthening civil society, recent studies conclude that civil societies in Eastern Europe remain weaker than in most other regions of the world (Hanley, 1999; Howard, 2003; Letki, 2003). Postsocialist citizens seem to be disillusioned with public life: turnouts at elections are low, and participation in voluntary associations is uncommon (Nelson, 1996). Numerous studies have shown that there is a declining trend in voluntary activism in established democracies as well (Putnam, 1993; Skocpol, 2003), but participation in voluntary associations in Eastern Europe is considerably below the levels of the US and Western Europe (Curtis, Grabb, & Baer, 1992; Letki, 2003). The percentage of the population holding membership in voluntary associations in Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, and Hungary (based on surveys between 1993–1994) ranges from 14.5% in Poland to 31.2% in the Czech Republic (Letki, 2003). This can be considered weak in comparison with the US (72.7%), but comparable to Spain (30.8%) or Italy (25.9%) (Curtis et al., 1992). By comparison with the post-Soviet states, however, the weakness of civil society in Eastern Europe may translate more as an unrealized potential than a hopeless disintegration. (Green, 2002; Miller, Hesli, Reisinger, 1997). The level of civic participation in post-soviet states is much below Central European countries, with only 6.2% of the population having any membership in voluntary associations in Russia, 8.7% in Ukraine, and 8.6% in Lithuania (Reisinger, Miller, and Hesli, 1995). The challenge of daily survival in a region suffering its most severe economic crisis of the twentieth century induced apathy about collective action (Palma, 1991). As economic prospects improved, the emergent, profound consumerism in the region poses an obstacle, some argue, to the formation and growth of voluntary associations (Illner, 1998).

Civil society groups and mass voluntary participation were important causes of the collapse of state socialist regimes in Eastern Europe (see especially, Ekiert & Kubik, 1998, 2001; also Ekiert, 1991; Weigle & Butterfield, 1992; Tismaneanu, 2001). However, the conditions of underground organization that allowed these groups to survive against the party-state, some believe, have contributed to the weakness and fragmentation of civil

**Table 1** The number of non-profit organizations in selected years in Hungary.

Year	Number of non-profit organizations
1932	14,365
1982	6,570
1989	8,796
1990	15,945
1992	30,363
1995	42,783
2000	47,144
2003	53,022

Source: *Nonprofit szervezetek Magyarországon 2003*. Budapest, Central Statistical Office, 2003.

society after the democratic transition (Szalai, 2002).<sup>2</sup> For the majority who were not engaged in underground oppositional networks, moreover, it was not easy to leave behind the fears of open engagement in public issues. Meanwhile, the change of the political system absorbed many intellectuals who were not compromised by earlier elite positions and who had the skills and aspirations to engage in politics. Many, perhaps most, of the key civil society actors—leading intellectuals of the *samizdat* era—found themselves in parliamentary or government positions after 1989, leaving a vacuum in the civil society field (Kennedy, 1992; Miszlivetz & Jensen, 1998).

### Three dimensions of domestic integration

To assess whether and how the Hungarian civic sector is integrated, we develop concepts distinguishing three dimensions of domestic integration. Given that recent scholarship identifies obstacles to citizen participation within civic organizations as well as obstacles to collaboration among civic organizations, we differentiate the first two dimensions along lines recognizable within the Tocquevillian tradition: participation and embeddedness.

#### Participation

In our study, we distinguish civic organizations that are participatory from those that are not. Organizations with participatory ties to their members and constituents are more rooted to local interests and more likely to represent them. We consider organizations as participatory if the ties to their members involve relations of accountability. Accountability matters because organizations that are accountable to their members, volunteers, and constituents are more likely to give expression to their values outside or alongside the conventional frames of party/parliamentary politics. In addition to providing mechanisms for articulating greater voice from below, these ties increase the likelihood that such organizations will be able to mobilize constituents in collective action.

#### Embeddedness

As a second dimension of domestic integration we identify civic organizations that have ties to other organizations in the civic sector. We consider organizations as embedded if they have ties that involve relations of accountability to other domestic civic organizations. In contrast to the downwards accountability of participation regard collaborative ties as providing for horizontal accountability. Civic associations that cooperate with other organizations are more likely to take their values into account and thus to define the public goods represented by them in a more encompassing way. Cooperation with other organizations increases opportunities to evaluate them and to be evaluated by them, perhaps along criteria that differ from those valued by members and constituents on one side and by donors on another. Moreover, connections among civic organizations can increase effectiveness by providing channels to share relevant and timely information; and they can promote innovation by more rapidly diffusing knowledge about experimentation among organizations that are cooperating rather than isolated (Bach & Stark, 2004). In this way, connections among organizations promote social learning within a community of practice.

<sup>2</sup> In Poland, for example, the monolithic social movement of Solidarity (Mason, 1989) fractured into several competing parties, trade unions, and other groups and organizations (Ost, 2005).

## Associativeness

To these two dimensions of integration we add a third. Whereas Tocqueville and Putnam highlight *density* of connections, we highlight the importance of *diversity* of connections.

In their attempts to make states and markets more inclusive, civic organizations often move beyond homogenous publics that connect actors within the same organizational field. They work together with actors from diverse institutional fields (government, business, science, mass media, education, etc.) to make more encompassing representations and to produce goods that can be seen as goods by actors from different fields subscribing to diverse metrics of evaluation.<sup>3</sup> When they do so, they engender publics associating diversity.

This dimension is not discussed in social movement research that focuses on contentious civic activism and it is also missing from the ‘purist’ civil society framework that focuses on ‘free spaces’ of action by an ‘autonomous civil society’ free from interference from the state and the market. In that frame, linkages and interlocks between civil society and the market or the state, if mentioned at all, are described as degenerations of autonomous civil society, frequently denounced as bureaucratization or commercialization (for a critique of this approach, see Emirbayer & Sheller, 1998, Kocka, 2004; Bruszt & Vedres, 2006). Terminology that designates the sector by what it is not (e.g., ‘non-governmental’ or ‘non-profit’) further accentuates the focus on connections within sectors—to the neglect of productive interactions across sectors.

Accordingly, we identify, as a third dimension of domestic integration, civic organizations that participate in projects that associate actors from diverse domains in the pursuit of defining and producing public goods. Whereas *participation* refers to relations of accountability to an organization’s members and volunteers, and while *embeddedness* refers to relations of accountability to other civic actors, *associativeness* refers to an organization’s collaborative relations with actors outside the civic domain. Specifically, we consider an organization associative if it collaborates in a project with at least two organizations belonging to different sectors. With this dimension we are alert to activities by which actors are actively making associations across differences—making alliances across groupings, integrating what had formerly been disjoined, drawing connections between interests that had not been seen as compatible, searching for new frames in which dissimilar notions of the public good can be redefined as associated.<sup>4</sup> In forging various developmental associations, civic organizations that work together with actors from other organizational domains (business, national and local government, education, church, etc.) can contribute to the formulation and implementation of more inclusive policies and programs.

### Transnationalization of the civic field

The nascent organizations of Hungary’s civic sector have developed in an economic and political context of extraordinarily rapid and far-reaching change. In the economic field, extrication from state socialism has been decisive: the planned economy and the dominance of

<sup>3</sup> See Streeck and Schmitter (1985) on “associationalism;” Sabel (1993, 1994, 1996) on “developmental associations;” and Stark and Bruszt (1998) on “deliberative associations.”

<sup>4</sup> Our concept of associating diversity, thus, differs from Putnam’s notion of “bridging ties” by going beyond the registration of the existence of connections among groups to focus on the relationality of ties among civic and non-civic actors with different content or operating logics. Restated, it is not so much the density of ties within and across groups at any scale that matters; it is the relations among them.

state ownership have been systematically dismantled. At the same time, the entrance of foreign investment has been massive and the reorientation of trade has been dramatic (Stark & Vedres, 2006). The Hungarian economy, for example, is today arguably one of the most globalized economies in the world (Greskovits & Bohle, 2001). The shift to market coordination, meanwhile, has not been accompanied simply by a reduced role of the state but actually by an increase in its regulative, administrative, and planning capacity. State capacity, moreover, becomes increasingly defined as the capacity not only to regulate but also to support or thwart specific regulations emanating from supra-national agencies, such as the EU or WTO (Bruszt & Stark, 2003). In the process of accession to the European Union, these states incorporated nearly 70,000 pages of European norms and standards. The transnationalization of the economy, thus, has been accompanied by the transnationalization of the state.

These dual processes of globalization in East Central Europe coincided with an intense period in which foreign actors moved in to aid the incipient civic societies of the region (see Siegel & Yancey, 1992; and especially, Kubik & Ekiert, 2000). More than \$81 million dollars in grants to the civil sector flowed into Hungary between 1989 and 1995 from Western foundations (Quigley, 1997); Western government agencies such as USAID and the EU Commission saw practical and ideological opportunities. US-based foundations led by the Soros, Ford, Mellon, and Mott Foundations together with the National Endowment for Democracy largely accounted for the initial influx of funds. The prospect of EU accession, however, meant that the civic sector across the region felt the pull of Brussels more keenly than Washington, and US-based support for civil society soon shifted focus toward the Balkans and Central Asia. As a result, civil society organizations in East Central Europe adopted a much more intense engagement with EU priorities in order to meet the conditions for accession, often involving ‘twinning’ with NGOs in Western Europe. At the same time NGOs in East Central Europe became increasingly institutionalized and integrated into transnational networks with NGOs active in two or more countries growing at a rate of almost 30% in the 1990s, for a total of over 37,000 by the year 2000 (Anheier, Glasius, Kaldor, 2001: 283; UNDP, 2002). From funding sources to programmatic priorities, NGOs have become increasingly (inter)dependent on transnational networks, raising the question as to whether civic organizations can be both locally rooted and globally connected.

As the studies cited in our introductory paragraphs indicate, many researchers in the social movements field are concerned that strong transnational ties are weakening the ties of civic organizations to their own societies whether through a shift of orientation towards external donors, a de-radicalizing professionalization, or both (Rucht, 1999; Bob, 2002, 2005; Mendelson & Glenn, 2002).

But not all scholars observe or expect that transnational interactions lead to domestic uprooting. Some give primary stress to the positive aspects of transnationalization. In a study of Central European environmentalist groups, for example, Hicks and Carmin (2000) found that professionalized movement elites use their skills to mediate between grassroots concerns and the agendas of external donors, linking grassroots groups with transnational organizations. Others, such as Tarrow (1998, 2001, 2005), and Keck and Sikkink (1998) point to a broader range of outcomes. Tarrow, for example, identifies cases in which transnationalization results in a dual segregation with an internationally linked set on one side and a set of isolated grassroots groups on the other (Tarrow, 1998).<sup>5</sup> But he also notes

<sup>5</sup> Tarrow makes the parallel to the economic realm explicit when, with reference to Southern women’s movements, he fears that transnationalization might result in a “split very similar to the gap between its internationally oriented export sector and its domestic economies (Tarrow 1998: 190).”



that “transnational advocacy networks can help resource-poor actors construct new *domestic* movements out of combinations of indigenous and imported material” (Tarrow 1998: 192, italics in the original). In her study of activists operating in supra-national arenas, Shalini (2003) similarly differentiates ‘footloose experts’ from ‘rooted cosmopolitans,’ and shows that the likelihood that diverse local interests will be represented by global activists in supra-national policy arenas depends on the existence of deep local roots.

The work of Tarrow (1998, 2001; della Porta & Tarrow, 2005; Petrova & Tarrow, 2005), Smith (2004, 2005; Smith & Wiest, 2005) and Keck and Sikkink (1998) presents a rich description and analysis of the various ways local, national, and transnational activism might intertwine. Although the title of Tarrow’s (2005) path breaking book, *The New Transnational Activism*, is expressed in the singular, the lesson that builds over the course of many analytically-tuned examples is that there is not one unitary form of transnational activism but several. We build on these insights.

To explore the relationship between foreign interactions and domestic integration we need to identify the relevant kinds of interactions that distinguish transnationalized/transnationalizing<sup>6</sup> organizations from those that are not. As the most elementary forms of such interactions, civic organizations can 1) *communicate with* foreign organizations such as NGOs, foundations, and supranational agencies; 2) receive *monetary donations* from foreign sources; 3) receive *non-monetary resources* such as information, skills, or know-how; 4) name a foreign counterpart as a *partner*; 5) be *directly involved* with a foreign partner in a common action; 6) *take foreign actors into account* when making their decisions and 7) *formally report to* foreign organizations.

These elementary forms provide a basic test: we can consider an organization as involved in transnational interactions if it participates in at least one of these forms. But our modeling will also move beyond this simple test to examine the empirically observed combinations of these elements with the aim of identifying distinctive varieties of transnationalization. In turning our attention to variation in the forms of transnationalization, we draw on insights by Barbara Stallings (1990) and Bela Greskovits (2002) who, in separate studies in the field of economics, convincingly demonstrate that what matters is not the presence or absence of foreign investment but the form or pattern it takes.<sup>7</sup> Similarly, we expect that attention to the varieties of transnationalization will have significant explanatory power in analyzing the field of civic action.

In developing our survey instrument and in analyzing the resulting dataset, we seek to move beyond notions of footloose experts and rooted cosmopolitans. Thus, on the terrain of domestic integration, we do not simply ask whether an organization has ties to society but we specify different types of domestic ties, different types of rootedness. Organizations

<sup>6</sup> We use the terms “transnationalized” and “transnationalizing” interchangeably. The term “transnationalized” should not imply that the action was initiated by a foreign actor. We use the terms to refer to interactions that cross national borders and do not imply that a given civic organization is itself a “transnational social movement” (see the useful definition by Tarrow, 2001: 11.) For an excellent literature review on transnationalization, see Orenstein and Schmitz (2006).

<sup>7</sup> In her study of the role of foreign capital in economic development, Stallings (1990) shows that we must be attentive to the particular ways in which transnational resources flow into the domestic economy. Distinguishing among state aid, private lending to domestic governments, private to private financial flows, and Foreign Direct Investment (FDI), she demonstrates that some forms are positively correlated with domestic economic development while others are negatively correlated. Probing variation in FDI further, Greskovits (2002) demonstrates that it is the specific pattern of FDI and not FDI per se that should be the unit of analysis. FDI has dramatically different relationships to domestic economic change depending upon whether it comes in heavy investments with high asset specificity or in the form of easy-to-recover investments.

differ in their rootedness according to whether they have ties of accountability to their members and constituents, whether they have ties of accountability to other organizations in the civic sector, and whether they are involved in projects that associate actors from diverse fields outside the civic sector. Similarly, on the terrain of foreign interactions, we do not simply ask whether an organization has ties to foreign actors but we specify different types of foreign ties and the character of their relations. The content, so to speak, of a tie of donation is not the same, for example, as a tie of communication, or of direct involvement, or of benefiting from non-monetary flows of knowledge and skill. Less structural than concepts of strong ties/weak ties or bridging ties/bonding ties, our emphasis here is on the type of action involved in the tie—especially, as we shall see, relations of accountability and partnership. Our contribution to the network analysis of civic action is to develop concepts and methods that will make it possible to analyze these relationalities as they vary across the distinct domains of foreign interaction and of domestic integration.

## Data

To test the relationship between foreign interactions and domestic integration we conducted a survey of Hungarian civic associations in 2002. Because our research design was, in part, motivated to map network ties among the organizations surveyed, we conducted our survey on a population of organizations and not a random sample. To identify the population of the largest Hungarian civic associations we used the database of the Hungarian Statistical Office to compile a list that ranked non-profit organizations by the size of their budgets. From that list we excluded organizations in the field of sports (e.g., soccer leagues) and leisure time activities (e.g., stamp collectors)<sup>8</sup> as well as foundations whose sole purpose is to support a single organization (e.g., the fund-raising arm of a museum, hospital, school, or church) since our goal was to analyze civic associations that are raising public issues and providing public goods. We employed a leading public opinion polling firm with a strong track record of empirical survey research in the non-profit field to administer our survey instrument in face-to-face interviews, typically with the elected president, chief executive officer of the organization, or their deputies. From an initial list of approximately 1,500 of the largest civic associations country-wide we were able to contact 1,002 organizations successfully.

The survey included questions about values, projects, repertoires of action, technology use, accountability, and network ties. For the three most important projects of the past two years, as well as about an organization's ongoing activities, we asked detailed questions about activities, partnerships, and resources used. The survey thus allows us to identify whether an organization has various types of ties to foreign actors as well as to assess a given organization along the three dimensions of domestic integration (participation, embeddedness, and associativeness). Appendix A and Appendix B list the variables and the corresponding survey questions used in this study.

## Testing the relationship between foreign ties and domestic integration

In this section, we test the relationship between foreign interactions and the three forms of domestic integration. In the basic cross-tabulations reported below, we count an

<sup>8</sup> Newly formed civil society organizations bore marks of the routines under state socialism. Many organizations were related to leisure and sports activities, due in large part to the legacy of the socialist party-state's selective permissiveness (Miszlivetz & Jensen, 1998).

**Table 2** Types of foreign ties and their frequencies.

	Frequency
A named partner	33.0%
Communicated with	29.8%
Providing money	28.3%
Providing non-money resources	25.9%
Directly involved	23.4%
Reported to	15.4%
Taken into account	11.0%
External tie (positive answer to any of the seven listed types)	54.4 %

organization as involved in foreign ties if it reports at least one of seven elementary forms of external interactions (see Appendix A for operationalization). Table 2 below shows the frequencies of the types of external ties in our population of civic associations. As we see, almost 55% of the civic associations in our population of the largest organizations answered positively to at least one of the seven elements.

Along the first dimension of domestic integration we count a civic organization as participatory if it takes into account its member, volunteers, or activists when making decisions, has formal obligations to report to them, or involves volunteers in its activities. As Table 3 indicates, more than 57% of the Hungarian civic organizations are participatory according to this measure. Civic associations that have foreign ties, however, are significantly more likely to be participatory than those organizations that do not engage in any type of external interactions.

Along the second dimension we count a civic organization (CO) as embedded if it takes into account other domestic COs when making decisions or if it formally reports to at least one other domestic civic organization. Recall that, within the Tocquevillian/Putnamian framework, the density of inter-organizational cooperation is an important measure of the cohesion and hence capacity of civil society. Table 4 reports that the overall embeddedness of the Hungarian civic association sector is very low. Three-quarters (75.2%) of the civic associations in our population of large organizations rarely or never take into account or report to other COs within the sector. The embeddedness of civic organizations that are involved in external interactions, however, is much higher. Organizations that have foreign ties are nearly twice as likely to be intra-sectorally embedded as those that have no ties to organizations outside of Hungary. Conversely, whereas more than two-thirds of the embedded civic organizations belong to the transnationalized part of Hungarian civil society, the COs that are not involved in external interactions are largely isolated from other domestic civic organizations.

**Table 3** Foreign ties and participatory integration.

		Participatory integration		
		Yes	No	Total
Foreign ties	Yes	341 (62.6)	204 (37.4)	545 (100.0)
	No	234 (51.2)	223 (48.8)	457 (100.0)
	Total	575 (57.4)	427 (42.6)	1002 (100.0)

Row percentages are in parentheses.

**Table 4** Foreign ties and embedded integration.

		Embedded integration		
		Yes	No	Total
Foreign ties	Yes	174 (31.9)	371 (68.1)	545 (100.0)
	No	74 (16.2)	383 (83.8)	457 (100.0)
	Total	248 (24.8)	754 (75.2)	1002 (100.0)

Row percentages are in parentheses.

Along our third dimension of domestic integration we count a civic organization as associative if it had collaborative ties in its projects with at least two domestic organizations of differing types including: other civic organizations, local and national governments and agencies, business firms, research or scientific institutes, churches, political parties, and the mass media. Organizations that report no partners, only one partner, or more than one partner but all of the same type of organization are not counted as associating diversity. In Table 5 we report still a third significantly positive correlation between foreign interactions and domestic integration.

Although more than a half (56.7%) of the Hungarian COs are associative in their projects, the transnationalized COs are much more likely to participate in forms of collaboration that involve association across diverse domains. Whereas more than two-thirds of the transnationalized civic organizations are associative, less than half of the COs without external ties are involved in projects associating diversity. Conversely, such associative projects are twice as likely to be undertaken by transnationalized COs than by those that do not interact externally. To test this relationship further, we constructed a more demanding definition of associativeness by counting as associating diversity only those civic organizations that have more than two diverse types of actors in their projects. When doing so, the correlations (not reported in Table 5) between transnational interactions and associating diversity become even stronger: 72.1% of these 'aggressively' associative domestic COs are those that have some type of foreign tie.

These basic cross-tabulations show a consistent pattern: civic organizations with foreign ties are significantly more likely to be participatory, embedded, and associative than COs that are not involved in any form of external interactions. Instead of uprooting, disembedding, or disassociating, transnationalization goes hand in hand with domestic integration.

To test the consistent positive statistical association between external interactions and various forms of domestic integration, we use logistic regression models. We can expect geographic location, the size of budget, and the sector of activity to be correlated with both the forms of domestic integration and transnational ties in ways that produce an apparent but artificial relationship between domestic integration and transnationalization.

**Table 5** Foreign ties and associative integration.

		Associative integration		
		Yes	No	Total
Foreign ties	Yes	379 (69.5)	166 (30.5)	545 (100.0)
	No	189 (41.4)	268 (58.6)	457 (100.0)
	Total	568 (56.7)	434 (43.3)	1002 (100.0)

Row percentages are in parentheses.

Organizations located in the capital, Budapest, might have better chances to recruit activists. These organizations—due to their advantageous location—might also have a better chance to meet and collaborate with other civil society organizations and to involve partners from diverse fields. Organizations in Budapest might have more opportunity to meet representatives of foreign organizations. By introducing geographic location as a control variable, one might reasonably expect the association between transnationalization and domestic integration to disappear.

Size of budget might also be another factor behind both domestic integration and foreign interaction. Organizations with bigger budgets can provide more opportunities for participation, and can be more attractive to project partners. A bigger budget allows organizations to maintain communication technologies (afford phone bills, subscribe to a broadband internet connection) necessary to keep in touch with foreign partners. Again, by controlling for budget, we might expect the original statistical association to disappear.

It is also reasonable, finally, to expect that the chances of becoming domestically integrated and transnationally connected vary by the topical field of activity. For example, environmental and human rights organizations are more likely to involve activists and volunteers than are cultural, religious, or developmental organizations. At the same time, transnational ties are probably denser in the environmental and human rights fields than in social services or trade unions. Controlling for topical field might leave the relationship between foreign ties and domestic integration insignificant.

The results of logistic regression models (presented in Appendix C) show that the statistical association between all three forms of domestic integration and having a transnational tie stays significant after introducing these controls. While each of the three control variables is significant in at least one model, the positive statistical association between transnationalization and all the forms of domestic integration remains robust.

### Varieties of transnationalization

To this point we have demonstrated a positive correlation between external interaction and domestic integration. Moreover, for each of the three forms of domestic integration, this positive correlation is robust even when controlling for location, size of budget, and fields within the civic sector. In those cross-tabulations, we used a simple definition—the presence of at least one kind of transnational tie—for a simple test of the relationship. In this section, we develop a more elaborated test by first identifying discrete varieties of transnationalization and then analyzing how these characteristic varieties are correlated with the three forms of domestic integration.

As noted earlier, studies by Stallings and Greskovits suggest that, in addition to studying the presence or absence of transnational interactions, we should also explore variation in types of transnationalization. Given that our survey allowed us to distinguish seven basic types of foreign ties, there are several avenues available to build from these elementary forms to distinguish varieties of transnationalization. We could, for example, construct an index, giving each organization a score for the sum of the types of ties reported. Alternatively, we could probe discrete combinations of elements. Combinatorics seems a more appropriate way to identify the varieties of transnationalization. But rather than starting with *a priori* combinations or with their mathematical permutations (in any case an extraordinary number), our method is unabashedly inductive: we identify varieties of transnationalization by examining the empirically observable combinations of the seven elements. To do so we use the Ward (1963) hierarchical clustering algorithm.

As Table 6 indicates, we can identify varieties of transnationalization based on distinctive combinations of the elementary forms of ties to foreign organizations. Organizations in the first cluster have no foreign ties of any kind. These were the organizations against which we compared the transnationalized organizations in our baseline cross-tabulations. The organizations in Clusters 2, 3, and 4 do have transnational ties, but in each case they tend to be predominantly of one type. All of the organizations of the variety we label *only communication* responded in our survey that they frequently communicate with foreign organizations; all in the *donation* category received grants or other monetary resources from abroad; and all of the organizations of the *nominal partnership* variety named a foreign partner. But the organizations with these three types of shallow transnationalization were not statistically likely to engage in transnational ties other than those that characterize their cluster. Unlikely to be directly involved with, report to, or take into account a foreign organization, they are similarly unlikely to benefit from shared knowledge through interactions with foreign organizations. These are transnational ties that do not bind: no big engagements, no big commitments.

Knowing that we have seven elements and seven varieties of transnationalization, and extrapolating from these three clusters alone, one might expect that each of the remaining clusters would correspond neatly to a predominant element. But the empirically observed combinations reported in Table 6 indicate that the varieties of transnationalization are more complex than such a simple mapping. Organizations in Clusters 5 and 6, for example, characteristically combine naming a foreign partner, direct involvement with a foreign organization, and receiving non-monetary resources. But they are not likely to report that they take foreign organizations into account in making decisions. As varieties of transnationalization, they are further distinguished from each other as a *partnership without money* and a *partnership with money*. Organizations in the latter variety are also likely to receive grants from, as well as frequently communicate with, foreign organizations. The presence of partnership combined with the absence of external accountability (e.g., ‘report to’ or ‘taken into account’) suggests that these civic organizations are involved with foreign organizations on a project-by-project basis.

Organizations in Cluster 7 are slightly more likely than average to communicate with and name a foreign partner. But their distinctive characteristics are that they are highly likely to report to and take into account foreign organizations. Moreover, by contrast with the two partnership variants, organizations in such an *accountability relationship* are statistically unlikely to have ties in which they are directly involved with a foreign partner. Nor do they report that a foreign organization has provided them with monetary or non-monetary resources. This finding was perplexing: these civic groups respond that they are reporting to foreign organizations and taking them into account, yet they are not likely to be working together with them in a joint project nor are they benefiting from knowledge transfer or foreign donations. As we shall see in the next section, these findings become less puzzling when we examine how the varieties of transnationalization are related to forms of domestic integration.

Organizations in Cluster 8 are involved in an *encompassing collaboration* with their foreign counterparts. Statistically likely to be engaged in each of the seven elementary forms, nearly all them name a foreign partner, communicate frequently with, and receive non-monetary resources from abroad. Partnering with and accountability to foreign actors yield a variety of transnationalization in which transnational ties reach deeply into these civic organizations just as the organizations reach extensively outside their immediate environment.

The findings presented in Table 6 indicate that, in place of a unitary process of transnationalization, we can meaningfully identify distinctive variants of transnationalization. Patterned variation in the content of transnational ties means variation in the relationship

**Table 6** Varieties of transnationalization.

Varieties of transnationalization	The foreign organization is:								<i>n</i>	
	Communicated with	Providing money	A named partner	Directly involved	Providing non-money resources	Reported to	Taken into account			
1. No external tie	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	--	457
2. Only communication	100.0	0.0	39.3	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	--	61
3. Donation	31.7	100.0	20.7	14.6	0.0	7.3	0.0	1.2	--	82
4. Nominal partnership	0.0	28.3	100.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	--	46
5. Partnership without money	29.9	0.0	61.2	89.6	73.1	0.0	0.0	0.0	--	67
6. Partnership with money	54.4	87.4	58.3	84.5	99.0	23.3	0.0	1.9	--	103
7. Accountability relationship	49.3	30.1	46.6	4.1	8.2	78.1	0.0	52.1	++	73
8. Encompassing collaboration	88.5	68.1	96.5	63.7	91.2	59.3	0.0	61.1	++	113
Total	29.8	28.3	33.0	23.4	25.9	15.4	0.0	11.0	--	1002

Numbers in the cells represent the percentage of organizations within a cluster that have a given type of external tie. To indicate statistical significance, pluses and minuses represent adjusted standardized residual of the frequency of the given form of external tie. One plus means that the residual is greater than two, two plus indicates that the residual is greater than four. One minus, accordingly, indicates a residual of at least minus two, while two minuses indicate a residual less than minus four.

between civic organizations and foreign actors. Does this variation imply differences in the relationships between these civic organizations and other domestic actors? That is, how are the varieties of transnationalization correlated with the forms of domestic integration? We turn to this question in the following section.

### Emerging transnational public arenas

Our goal in this section is to identify key patterns at the intersection of the foreign and the domestic domains. To do so, we cross-tabulate the varieties of transnationalization (i.e., the clustering of organizations according to overall similarity in their profile of empirically-observed combinations of external ties shown in Table 6) with the three forms of integration (participatory, embedded, and associative). Table 7 presents these cross-tabulations and demonstrates that the varieties of transnationalization are significantly related to the forms of domestic integration. Pluses and minuses in the cells indicate the statistically significant correlations in the table.

Combinations matter. As we see, some clusters (combinations of external interactions) go hand in hand with distinctive combinations of the forms of domestic integration. Clusters 4, 5, and 6, for example, are significantly and positively correlated with cross-sectoral associativeness but not with participation and embeddedness; Cluster 7 correlates positively with participation and intra-sectoral embeddedness but not with associativeness; and Cluster 8, the most encompassing variety of transnationalization, correlates positively with all three forms of domestic integration. We elaborate our discussion of the findings for Clusters 4–8 (i.e., those with a statistically positive correlation with at least one form of domestic integration) in the next section.

Cluster 2 (*only communication*) and Cluster 3 (*donation*) are not positively correlated with any of the forms of domestic integration. Neither accountable to their foreign interlocutors nor partnering with them (recall the findings about the characteristic patterns of foreign ties for these clusters presented in Table 6), they are not likely to be domestically-integrated. Organizations that merely communicate with or receive money from foreign sources, without being accountable to them or actively partnering with them, are not likely

**Table 7** Varieties of transnationalization and patterns of civic integration.

	Forms of domestic integration		
	Participatory	Embedded	Associative
Varieties of transnationalization			
1. No transnational tie	–	--	--
2. Only communication		–	
3. Donation			
4. Nominal partnership			+
5. Partnership without money			+
6. Partnership with money			+
7. Accountability relationship	+	++	++
8. Encompassing collaboration	+	++	++

Pluses and minuses represent adjusted standardized residual of the frequency of the given form of domestic integration. One plus means that the residual is greater than two, two plus indicates that the residual is greater than four. One minus, accordingly, indicates a residual of at least minus two, while two minuses indicate a residual less than minus four.



to be oriented to the domestic terrain. Unaccountable domestically, they cooperate neither within the civic domain nor with non-civic actors. Their outward orientation is to foreign organizations with whom they simply communicate or from whom they receive donations.

Our findings that one variety of transnationalization (Cluster 2 *only communication*) is significantly but *negatively* correlated with domestic embeddedness suggest that analysts such as Mendelson and Glenn (2002) and Bob (2002, 2005) were correct to be concerned that transnationalization could accompany domestic uprooting. But this cluster accounts for only 6.1% of all the organizations in our population; and the table as a whole suggests that we should not over generalize from this specific variety of transnationalization. The least integrated civic organizations are those with no external ties: Organizations that report no foreign interactions are statistically likely to be negatively correlated with the three forms of domestic integration. If there is reason to be concerned about civic organizations without domestic roots, Table 7 suggests that we might do well to start by looking at those without foreign ties. Among the transnationalizing organizations, the shallow forms of transnationalization are the least integrated, four clusters are positively correlated with at least one form of integration, and the cluster characterized by the deepest, encompassing transnational collaboration is the cluster with an encompassing domestic integration.


In interpreting Table 7 we should be cautious not to read the direction of causation simply from the foreign to the domestic dimension. We should certainly not jump to a conclusion that strong foreign ties have caused deep integration. Instead, it might be the case, for example, that organizations that have embedded ties to other organizations in the domestic civil sector are precisely those that are more likely to reach out to civic actors in the transnational field. But rather than reading Table 7 twice—first, down the rows implying causation from the transnational domain and, second, across the columns implying the reverse direction of causality—we should be attentive to what the overall table reveals about distinctive patterns of civic life in Hungary. Restated, our intention is not to read the domestic and the foreign in terms of each other but to read both, in a sense, simultaneously in order to grasp the broad patterns produced at their various intersections. In concrete terms, we explore which types of combinations of forms of integration (e.g., participation + embeddedness) correlate with which types of empirically observed combinations of transnational interactions (clusters) for the purpose of isolating the distinctive generative principles or logics that shape the emerging arena of transnational publics.

To aid in identifying and interpreting the patterns at this intersection, Figure 1 represents the findings in Table 7 in graphic, as opposed to tabular, form. The bottom plane of the figure corresponds to the domain of domestic integration. We demarcate on that plane the already familiar participatory, embedded, and associative dimensions of domestic integration.

The top plane of Figure 1 corresponds to the domain of foreign ties as a field of two overlapping types of relations. To the left is the already familiar pattern of foreign ties characterizing Cluster 7 (accountability relationship).<sup>9</sup> To the right is the pattern of foreign ties characterizing the three varieties of transnational partnership (Cluster 4 nominal partnership, Cluster 5 partnership without money, and Cluster 6 partnership with money).<sup>10</sup> In the overlapping part of this field is the pattern of foreign ties characterizing Cluster 8,

<sup>9</sup> Recall from Table 6 that this cluster is statistically most likely to “report to” or “take into account” foreign interlocutors and is negatively and significantly correlated with receiving “non-monetary resources” or being “directly involved” with their foreign interlocutors.

<sup>10</sup> Although Cluster 6 is positively correlated with “report to” foreign interlocutors, for the most part these three clusters of foreign ties are unlikely to be involved in foreign ties of accountability. Again, see Table 6.



**Figure 1** Varieties of transnational publics.

labeled here as *accountable partnership* to denote that this pattern is a distinctive combination of relations of accountability and partnership.

The middle plane is the arena of transnational publics. This domain acts as a transboundary, the interface of domestic and foreign. On that plane are three forms of transnational organization, each supported, as it were, by its particular configuration of roots in domestic society and extensions outward in its particular configuration of foreign ties. (From each of the three forms of transnational organization, heavy lines downward correspond to the statistical findings reported in Table 7, and dotted lines outward correspond to the findings of our clustering analysis reported in Table 6.) This middle plane, not simply suspended between the domestic and the foreign but supported by its ties to society and linked by its ties to foreign actors, is properly the domain of the transnational. Precisely because the organizational forms that populate it are linked both to the foreign and the domestic, it constitutes a distinctive domain of action. As a meeting place, the social space where the foreign and the domestic meet and mix, the place where the foreign and the domestic are organized, we refer to it as the arena of transnational publics.

With John Dewey and others, our interest is not in *the* public but in (emphatically plural) *publics* (Dewey, 1954; Emirbayer & Sheller, 1998). A public assembly, a public arena, or simply ‘a public’ is not some demographic group or otherwise categorical subset of ‘the public.’ It is composed not simply of persons but also of protocols – organizing principles and orientations (Girard & Stark, 2006). It is relatively bounded, but less by geographic or

other spatial features than by principles of inclusion and exclusion (Vedres, Bruszt, & Stark, 2004). Such principles are not simply about including or excluding persons. At the organizational level, organizations can, for example, exclude themselves from taking action in certain types of public assembly. In the civil sector it is within publics that the work of assembling takes place: assembling people, to be sure, but also assembling ideas, making links among (sometimes heterogeneous) programs, and linking programs to people.

The multiple modes of transnational assembly are charted on the middle plane of Figure 1. The three forms of transnational organizing we identify are not ad hoc or arbitrary. Our findings indicate that each of the three forms has empirically distinctive relationalities.

### Transnational social movements

Our first ideal-typical public arena corresponds to Cluster 7, labeled ‘accountability relationship’ in our earlier tables based only on its characteristic combination of the seven types of foreign ties. When we consider—on our middle plane—the relationship of the distinctive combination of foreign ties to the distinctive pattern of domestic integration, we grasp this type of transnational organization as transnational social movements. Organizations of this type are highly likely to report to foreigners and to take foreigners into account and, at the same time, they are also highly likely to be participatory and embedded. That is, they are accountable in their foreign transactions as well as toward their members and with other organizations in the civic sector. Although they might name a foreign partner, they are extremely unlikely to involve a foreign partner directly in their activities. They are similarly unlikely to be involved in projects that bring together diverse kinds of domestic organizations outside the civic sector. Their orientation is decidedly within the civic domain.

That these organizations are accountable to foreigners does not imply a hierarchical relationship. In the first place, they are accountable on all sides – not only to foreigners but to their members as well as to other civic organizations – positioned in a kind of multilateral, as opposed to vertical, accountability. Moreover, these organizations seldom receive financial support from foreign sources, nor are they likely to be the recipients of the transfer of know-how and other non-monetary resources from their foreign counterparts. But why, then, do they take foreigners into account at all? The answer lies at the nexus of the foreign and domestic components. These organizations, with actively participating members, embedded in civic networks, we contend, are not engaging foreigners as supplicants but as allies in a common cause. Because they are compelled, by the logic of membership and embeddedness, to represent interests, and because they act in a transnationalizing world in which constraints and opportunities are increasingly shaped by non-domestic factors, they are motivated to seek transnational allies in order to represent local civic interests more effectively. Entering the transnational arena, they encounter other non-domestic actors who, facing similar problems and opportunities, regard these participatory and embedded civic organizations as worthy allies. Transnational social movements act together as allies not in common projects but for a common cause.

### Transnational projects

Our second ideal-typical transnational public arena corresponds to the clusters of nominal partnership, partnership without money, and partnership with money. As with the first form of transnational organization, here too, the relationality that characterizes its foreign ties also characterizes its form of domestic integration—but as the mirrored opposite of the first. It is in this public arena that organizations that partner with non-civic organizations such as

local governments, businesses, churches, and scientific and cultural institutions are also likely to partner with foreign actors. Organizations of this type engage with their transnational interlocutors as partners: they are significantly likely to name foreign organizations as partners, they list foreign organizations as collaborators in their ongoing or recent projects, and their high incidence of receiving non-monetary resources further indicates that they are actively participating in working partnerships with their foreign counterparts. Despite this high level of direct foreign involvement, these organizations are not accountable to their foreign partners: they are less likely to report to foreigners or take them into account. And neither are they likely to be accountable to their members or to other organizations in the civic domain. As Table 7 indicates, organizations of this variety are not statistically likely to be participatory or embedded. These inter-sectoral partnerships are oriented to organizations outside the civic sector such as businesses, churches, and local governments with whom they work in projects.

#### Transnational developmental associations

Our third type of transnational public corresponds to the ‘encompassing collaboration’ cluster. Examining its distinctive combination of foreign ties as well as its distinctive combination of domestic integration, we find that in each domain, it operates in relations of accountability and in relations of partnership. These organizations similarly have a dual orientation, reaching out both to the civic sector and to other organizations outside the civic sector. The most transnationalizing, these organizations are also the best positioned to do the most ambitious work of re-assembling diverse ideas and interests in a public arena. When they are organizing diverse non-civic actors, they do so while embedded in networks to other civic organizations and with participatory ties to their members.

Summarizing and restating this analysis: our findings in the Hungarian case indicate distinctive logics of assembly in which action can be organized according to relations of accountability or partnership and it can be organized intra-sectorally or inter-sectorally. By ‘intra-sectoral’ we refer to action that remains within the sector of civic associations; ‘inter-sectoral’ refers to action that occurs across the civic and the non-civic sectors. The relational logics of accountability or partnership as well as that of intra-or inter-sectoral orientation play out in action in both the foreign and the domestic planes. The permutations of such a grammar are myriad. Empirically, however, we find a more restricted set, yielding the three distinctive patterns: 1) Where we find relations of accountability in the domestic field, we also find relations of accountability in the foreign field. And when these relations of accountability are largely exclusive of partnership, we find an intra-sectoral orientation toward action that stays within the civic sector. This is the public arena of transnational social movements. 2) Where we find relations of partnership in the foreign field, we also find relations of partnership in the domestic field. And when these relations are largely exclusive of accountability, we find an inter-sectoral orientation. This is the public arena of transnational projects. 3) Where relations of accountability and relations of partnership combine as organizing logics, we observe action orientated toward both civic and non-civic sectors. This is the public arena of transnational developmental associations.

#### **Conclusion: Rethinking integration**

In important contributions to the sociology of economic development Jennifer Bair and Gary Gereffi (2003; Gereffi 2004) argue persuasively, on the basis of extensive field research

in manufacturing cities in Mexico, that sustainable growth is more likely where the subsidiaries of foreign companies are embedded in network ties within the host economy, as locals and foreigners alike recognize that business networks can be viewed as a strategic resource. Taking these studies as their point of departure, Stark and Vedres (2006) conducted a longitudinal study of network formation and foreign direct investment in Hungary. They found that high levels of foreign investment can be compatible with inter-enterprise ownership networks in a developing economy, and they identified historical processes through which significant foreign investment is involved in cohesive network structures. Thus, whereas political economy has long been preoccupied with the question of how a national economy is integrated into the global economy, a new agenda for the field of economic development asks whether and how foreign investment is integrated into the local networks of host economies.

In this concluding section we review our major findings to consider whether the revised research orientation of economic development might be extended to the study of civil society. On the basis of our survey of 1002 civic associations in Hungary, we demonstrated that civic actors do not face a necessarily forced choice between networks of global reach and those of domestic integration. Many Hungarian civic organizations, in significant numbers, do engage in transnational interactions while remaining integrated with their membership base, other civic organizations, or other non-civic organizations. In fact, the richest and most encompassing patterns of integration go hand in hand with the deepest and most encompassing patterns of transnationalization. These and related findings indicate that it would be mistaken to assume that transnationalization is necessarily accompanied by the domestic uprooting of civic organizations, whether as cause or consequence.

The new agenda in economic sociology suggests a further interpretation of our findings. Whereas the sociologists of economic development ask whether and how *foreign direct investment* is integrated into the local networks of the host economies, the counterpart question in our study asks whether and how *foreign direct involvement* can be integrated into the local networks of the host civil society. Our findings in the Hungarian case suggest that deeply integrated organizations are integrating foreign networks. The domain of transnational organization is not simply a point where foreign and domestic networks connect. These are transnational public arenas not only of the intersection but also of the integration of foreign and domestic.<sup>11</sup> At their most robust, these interfacing associations are developmental, developing their domestic society while contributing to the development of a global civic activism – not as agents of foreign NGOs but as collaborating interlocutors.

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<sup>11</sup> "In assimilative incorporation the qualities that define 'foreign' and 'different' do not change; rather, the persons who are members of foreign and different out-groups are, as it were, allowed to shed these qualities in their public lives. They can change from being 'different' and 'foreigners' to being 'normal' and 'one of us'" (Alexander 2001: 244).

## Appendix

### A. Foreign ties variables

Variable	Survey question	Coding	Frequency
The foreign organization is:			
A named partner	Did other organizations also participate in this project?	1 if foreign non-profit or international organization, otherwise 0	33.0%
Communicated with	How often does your organization communicate with foreign non-profit organizations or international organizations (such as EU, UN, World Bank)?	1 if often or always, otherwise 0	29.8%
Providing money	Did your organization apply with success for funding directly at foreign foundations or other foreign non-profit organization over the last five years?	1 if yes, otherwise 0	28.3%
Providing non-money resources	Which of the resources on this card were used in this project? Which were the resources that were supplied (partly or fully) by a foreign organization?	1 if there were any resources excluding money supplied by a foreign organization, 0 otherwise	25.9%
Directly involved	Which of the following activities were done in this project? Which were those, that were done by a foreign non-profit or civil society organization? Or in which such organizations participated?	1 if there were any foreign organizations that directly participated in actions, 0 otherwise	23.4%
Reported to	For which of the following do you have to make formal reporting?	1 if foreign non-profit or international organization, otherwise 0	15.4%
Taken into account	When your organization makes decisions, whose opinion of the following you need to take into account?	1 if foreign non-profit or international organization, otherwise 0	11.0%

### B. Domestic Integration and Control Variables

Variable	Survey question	Coding	Frequency
Domestic integration Participation	When your organization makes decisions, whose opinion of the following you need to take into account? For which of the following do you have to make formal reporting?	1 if volunteers, activists, members, or participants are taken into account or reported to, 0 otherwise	57.4%
Embeddedness	When your organization makes decisions, whose opinion of the following you need to take into account? For which of the	1 if other domestic non-profit organizations are taken into account or reported to, 0 otherwise	24.8%

## Appendix B (continued)

Variable	Survey question	Coding	Frequency
Associativeness	following do you have to make formal reporting? Did other organizations also participate in this project?	1 if there were at least two kinds of partners (excluding foreign or non-profit categories) involved in at least one of the projects of the organization, 0 otherwise	56.7%
Budapest headquarters	Location of the headquarters in official registry	1 if Budapest, 0 otherwise	57.2%
Budget	What was the budget of your organization in the last fiscal year in local currency (in thousands)?		mean = 55,110 HUF
Sector	Which of the following categories describe best your main activity?		
Art, culture, science			18.4%
Religion			7.2%
Health, social services			24.1%
Environment, human rights			5.5%
Development			7.2%
Business, professional			21.2%
Trade union			8.8%
Other sector			7.6%

## C. Logistic regression prediction of domestic integration

## Dependent variables

Independent variables	Participatory integration	Embedded integration	Associative integration
Any transnational tie	0.563**	0.988**	1.106**
Budapest	-0.380**	-0.600**	-0.051
Budget above median	-0.042	0.194	0.486**
Sector			
Sector 1: Art, culture, science	-0.409	0.674*	-0.363
Sector 2: Religion	-0.484	0.424	0.352
Sector 3: Health, social services	-0.389	1.131**	-0.248
Sector 4: Environment, human rights	-0.445	0.896**	0.835*
Sector 5: Development	-0.478	0.514	0.149
Sector 6: Business, professional	1.610**	1.080**	-0.308
Sector 7: Trade unions	2.017**	0.148	-0.497
Constant	0.112	-2.255**	-0.337
R-square <sup>a</sup>	0.242	0.246	0.275

\* $p < 0.05$ \*\* $p < 0.01$ <sup>a</sup> Nagelkerke R-square is reported

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