


# Secret Key Agreement: General Capacity and Second-Order Asymptotics

Masahito Hayashi   Himanshu Tyagi   Shun Watanabe



# Two party secret key agreement

Maurer 93, Ahlswede-Csiszár 93




A random variable  $K$  constitutes an  $(\epsilon, \delta)$ -SK if:

$$\begin{aligned} \mathbb{P}(K_x = K_y = K) &\geq 1 - \epsilon && : \text{recoverability} \\ \frac{1}{2} \|\mathbb{P}_{K\mathbf{F}} - \mathbb{P}_{\text{unif}}\mathbb{P}_{\mathbf{F}}\| &\leq \delta && : \text{security} \end{aligned}$$

# Two party secret key agreement

Maurer 93, Ahlswede-Csiszár 93




A random variable  $K$  constitutes an  $(\epsilon, \delta)$ -SK if:

$$\begin{aligned} P(K_x = K_y = K) &\geq 1 - \epsilon && : \text{recoverability} \\ \frac{1}{2} \|P_{K\mathbf{F}} - P_{\text{unif}}P_{\mathbf{F}}\| &\leq \delta && : \text{security} \end{aligned}$$

# Two party secret key agreement

Maurer 93, Ahlswede-Csiszár 93



A random variable  $K$  constitutes an  $(\epsilon, \delta)$ -SK if:

$$\begin{aligned} P(K_x = K_y = K) &\geq 1 - \epsilon && : \text{recoverability} \\ \frac{1}{2} \|P_{K\mathbf{F}} - P_{\text{unif}}P_{\mathbf{F}}\| &\leq \delta && : \text{security} \end{aligned}$$

What is the maximum length  $S(X, Y)$  of a SK that can be generated?

# Where do we stand?

Maurer 93, Ahlswede-Csiszár 93

$S(X^n, Y^n) = nI(X \wedge Y) + o(n)$  (Secret key capacity)

Csiszár-Narayan 04

Secret key capacity for multiple terminals

Renner-Wolf 03, 05

Single-shot bounds on  $S(X, Y)$

# Where do we stand?

Maurer 93, Ahlswede-Csiszár 93

$S(X^n, Y^n) = nI(X \wedge Y) + o(n)$  (Secret key capacity)

Csiszár-Narayan 04

Secret key capacity for multiple terminals

Renner-Wolf 03, 05

Single-shot bounds on  $S(X, Y)$

Typical construction:  $X$  sends a compressed version of itself to  $Y$ , and the  $K$  is *extracted* from shared  $X$  using a 2-universal hash family

# Where do we stand?

Maurer 93, Ahlswede-Csiszár 93

$S(X^n, Y^n) = nI(X \wedge Y) + o(n)$  (Secret key capacity)

Csiszár-Narayan 04

Secret key capacity for multiple terminals

Renner-Wolf 03, 05

Single-shot bounds on  $S(X, Y)$

Typical construction:  $X$  sends a compressed version of itself to  $Y$ , and the  $K$  is *extracted* from shared  $X$  using a 2-universal hash family

Converse??

# Where do we stand?

Maurer 93, Ahlswede-Csiszár 93 Fano's inequality

$S(X^n, Y^n) = nI(X \wedge Y) + o(n)$  (Secret key capacity)

Csiszár-Narayan 04 Fano's inequality

Secret key capacity for multiple terminals

Renner-Wolf 03, 05  $\sim$  *Potential function method*

Single-shot bounds on  $S(X, Y)$

Typical construction:  $X$  sends a compressed version of itself to  $Y$ , and the  $K$  is *extracted* from shared  $X$  using a 2-universal hash family

Converse??



## Converse: Conditional independence testing bound

The source of our rekindled excitement about this problem:

Theorem ( Tyagi-Watanabe 2014)

*Given  $\epsilon, \delta \geq 0$  with  $\epsilon + \delta < 1$  and  $0 < \eta < 1 - \epsilon - \delta$ . It holds that*

$$S_{\epsilon, \delta}(X, Y) \leq -\log \beta_{\epsilon + \delta + \eta}(P_{XY}, P_X P_Y) + 2 \log(1/\eta)$$

## Converse: Conditional independence testing bound

The source of our rekindled excitement about this problem:

### Theorem ( Tyagi-Watanabe 2014)

Given  $\epsilon, \delta \geq 0$  with  $\epsilon + \delta < 1$  and  $0 < \eta < 1 - \epsilon - \delta$ . It holds that

$$S_{\epsilon, \delta}(X, Y) \leq -\log \beta_{\epsilon + \delta + \eta}(P_{XY}, P_X P_Y) + 2 \log(1/\eta)$$

$$\beta_{\epsilon}(P, Q) \triangleq \inf_{T: P[T] \geq 1 - \epsilon} Q[T],$$

where

$$P[T] = \sum_v P(v) T(0|v) \quad Q[T] = \sum_v Q(v) T(0|v)$$

## Converse: Conditional independence testing bound

The source of our rekindled excitement about this problem:

### Theorem ( Tyagi-Watanabe 2014)

Given  $\epsilon, \delta \geq 0$  with  $\epsilon + \delta < 1$  and  $0 < \eta < 1 - \epsilon - \delta$ . It holds that

$$S_{\epsilon, \delta}(X, Y) \leq -\log \beta_{\epsilon + \delta + \eta}(P_{XY}, P_X P_Y) + 2 \log(1/\eta)$$

$$\beta_{\epsilon}(P, Q) \triangleq \inf_{T: P[T] \geq 1 - \epsilon} Q[T],$$

where

$$P[T] = \sum_v P(v) T(0|v) \quad Q[T] = \sum_v Q(v) T(0|v)$$

In the spirit of *meta-converse* of Polyanskiy, Poor, and Verdu

# Single-shot achievability?

Recall the two steps of SK agreement:

## **Step 1 (aka Information reconciliation).**

Slepian-Wolf code to send  $X$  to  $Y$

## **Step 2 (aka Randomness extraction or privacy amplification).**

“Random function”  $K$  to extract uniform random bits from  $X$  as  $K(X)$

**Example.** For  $(X, Y) \equiv (X^n, Y^n)$

Rate of communication in step 1 =  $H(X | Y) = H(X) - I(X \wedge Y)$

Rate of randomness extraction in step 2 =  $H(X)$

The difference is the secret key capacity

# Single-shot achievability?

Recall the two steps of SK agreement:

## **Step 1 (aka Information reconciliation).**

Slepian-Wolf code to send  $X$  to  $Y$

## **Step 2 (aka Randomness extraction or privacy amplification).**

“Random function”  $K$  to extract uniform random bits from  $X$  as  $K(X)$

**Example.** For  $(X, Y) \equiv (X^n, Y^n)$

Rate of communication in step 1 =  $H(X | Y) = H(X) - I(X \wedge Y)$

Rate of randomness extraction in step 2 =  $H(X)$

The difference is the secret key capacity

Are we done?

# Single-shot achievability?

Recall the two steps of SK agreement:

## Step 1 (aka Information reconciliation).

Slepian-Wolf code to send  $X$  to  $Y$

## Step 2 (aka Randomness extraction or privacy amplification).

“Random function”  $K$  to extract uniform random bits from  $X$  as  $K(X)$

**Example.** For  $(X, Y) \equiv (X^n, Y^n)$

Rate of communication in step 1 =  $H(X | Y) = H(X) - I(X \wedge Y)$

Rate of randomness extraction in step 2 =  $H(X)$

The difference is the secret key capacity

Are we done? Not quite. Let's take a careful look

## Step 1: Slepian-Wolf theorem

Miyake Kanaya 95, Han 03

### Lemma (Slepian-Wolf coding)

*There exists a code  $(e, d)$  of size  $M$  with encoder  $e : \mathcal{X} \rightarrow \{1, \dots, M\}$ , and a decoder  $d : \{1, \dots, M\} \times \mathcal{Y} \rightarrow \mathcal{X}$ , such that*

$$\begin{aligned} & P_{XY}(\{(x, y) \mid x \neq d(e(x), y)\}) \\ & \leq P_{XY}(\{(x, y) \mid -\log P_{X|Y}(x \mid y) \geq \log M - \gamma\}) + 2^{-\gamma}. \end{aligned}$$

## Step 1: Slepian-Wolf theorem

Miyake Kanaya 95, Han 03

### Lemma (Slepian-Wolf coding)

*There exists a code  $(e, d)$  of size  $M$  with encoder  $e : \mathcal{X} \rightarrow \{1, \dots, M\}$ , and a decoder  $d : \{1, \dots, M\} \times \mathcal{Y} \rightarrow \mathcal{X}$ , such that*

$$\begin{aligned} & P_{XY}(\{(x, y) \mid x \neq d(e(x), y)\}) \\ & \leq P_{XY}(\{(x, y) \mid -\log P_{X|Y}(x \mid y) \geq \log M - \gamma\}) + 2^{-\gamma}. \end{aligned}$$

$$-\log P_{X|Y} = -\log P_X - \log(P_{Y|X}/P_Y)$$

Compare with

$$H(X|Y) = H(X) - I(X \wedge Y)$$

The second term is a proxy for the mutual information



## Step 1: Slepian-Wolf theorem

Miyake Kanaya 95, Han 03

### Lemma (Slepian-Wolf coding)

*There exists a code  $(e, d)$  of size  $M$  with encoder  $e : \mathcal{X} \rightarrow \{1, \dots, M\}$ , and a decoder  $d : \{1, \dots, M\} \times \mathcal{Y} \rightarrow \mathcal{X}$ , such that*

$$\begin{aligned} & P_{XY} (\{(x, y) \mid x \neq d(e(x), y)\}) \\ & \leq P_{XY} (\{(x, y) \mid \geq \log M - \gamma\}) + 2^{-\gamma}. \end{aligned}$$

$$-\log P_{X|Y} = -\log P_X - \log(P_{Y|X}/P_Y)$$

Compare with

$$H(X|Y) = H(X) - I(X \wedge Y)$$

The second term is a proxy for the mutual information

Communication rate needed is approximately equal to

(large probability upper bound on  $-\log P_X - \log(P_{Y|X}/P_Y)$ )

## Step 2: Leftover hash lemma

Lesson from the step 1: Communication rate is approximately

(large probability upper bound on  $-\log P_X) - \log(P_{Y|X}/P_Y)$

---

Recall that the *min entropy* of  $X$  is given by

$$H_{\min}(P_X) = -\log \max_x P_X(x)$$

Impagliazzo et. al. 89, Bennett et. al. 95, Renner-Wolf 05

### Lemma (Leftover hash)

*There exists a function  $K$  of  $X$  taking values in  $\mathcal{K}$  such that*

$$\|P_{KZ} - P_{\text{unif}}P_Z\| \leq \sqrt{|\mathcal{K}||\mathcal{Z}|2^{-H_{\min}(P_X)}}$$

## Step 2: Leftover hash lemma

Lesson from the step 1: Communication rate is approximately

(large probability upper bound on  $-\log P_X) - \log(P_{Y|X}/P_Y)$

---

Recall that the *min entropy* of  $X$  is given by

$$H_{\min}(P_X) = -\log \max_x P_X(x)$$

Impagliazzo et. al. 89, Bennett et. al. 95, Renner-Wolf 05

### Lemma (Leftover hash)

*There exists a function  $K$  of  $X$  taking values in  $\mathcal{K}$  such that*

$$\|P_{KZ} - P_{\text{unif}}P_Z\| \leq \sqrt{|\mathcal{K}||\mathcal{Z}|2^{-H_{\min}(P_X)}}$$

Randomness can be extracted at a rate approximately equal to

(large probability lower bound on  $-\log P_X$ )

## Step 2: Leftover hash lemma

Lesson from the step 1: Communication rate is approximately  
(large probability upper bound on  $-\log P_X) - \log(P_{Y|X}/P_Y)$ )


Recall

Information Spectrum of  $X$

Impag


Lem

There



Randomness can be extracted at a rate approximately equal to  
(large probability lower bound on  $-\log P_X$ )

# Spectrum slicing



Slice the spectrum of  $X$  into  $L$  bins of length  $\Delta$  and send the bin number to  $Y$

# Single-shot achievability

## Theorem

For every  $\gamma > 0$  and  $0 \leq \lambda \leq \lambda_{\min}$ , there exists an  $(\epsilon, \delta)$ -SK  $K$  taking values in  $\mathcal{K}$  with

$$\begin{aligned} \epsilon \leq & \mathbb{P} \left( \log \frac{P_{XY}(X, Y)}{P_X(X) P_Y(Y)} \leq \lambda + \gamma + \Delta \right) \\ & + \mathbb{P}(-\log P_X(X) \notin (\lambda_{\min}, \lambda_{\max})) + \frac{1}{L} \end{aligned}$$

$$\delta \leq \frac{1}{2} \sqrt{|\mathcal{K}| 2^{-(\lambda - 2 \log L)}}$$

## Secret key capacity for general sources

Consider a sequence of sources  $(X_n, Y_n)$

The **SK capacity**  $C$  is defined as

$$C \triangleq \sup_{\epsilon_n, \delta_n} \liminf_{n \rightarrow \infty} \frac{1}{n} S_{\epsilon_n, \delta_n} (X_n, Y_n)$$

where the sup is over all  $\epsilon_n, \delta_n \geq 0$  such that

$$\lim_{n \rightarrow \infty} \epsilon_n + \delta_n = 0$$

# Secret key capacity for general sources

Consider a sequence of sources  $(X_n, Y_n)$

The **SK capacity**  $C$  is defined as

$$C \triangleq \sup_{\epsilon_n, \delta_n} \liminf_{n \rightarrow \infty} \frac{1}{n} S_{\epsilon_n, \delta_n} (X_n, Y_n)$$

where the sup is over all  $\epsilon_n, \delta_n \geq 0$  such that

$$\lim_{n \rightarrow \infty} \epsilon_n + \delta_n = 0$$

The **inf-mutual information rate**  $\underline{I}(\mathbf{X} \wedge \mathbf{Y})$  is defined as

$$\underline{I}(\mathbf{X} \wedge \mathbf{Y}) \triangleq \sup \left\{ \alpha \mid \lim_{n \rightarrow \infty} P(Z_n < \alpha) = 0 \right\}$$

where

$$Z_n = \frac{1}{n} \log \frac{P_{X_n Y_n} (X_n, Y_n)}{P_{X_n} (X_n) P_{Y_n} (Y_n)}$$



## General capacity

### Theorem (Secret key capacity)

*The SK capacity  $C$  for a sequence of sources  $\{X_n, Y_n\}_{n=1}^{\infty}$  is given by*

$$C = \underline{I}(\mathbf{X} \wedge \mathbf{Y})$$

# General capacity

## Theorem (Secret key capacity)

The SK capacity  $C$  for a sequence of sources  $\{X_n, Y_n\}_{n=1}^{\infty}$  is given by

$$C = \underline{I}(\mathbf{X} \wedge \mathbf{Y})$$

**Converse.** Follows from our *conditional independence testing bound* with:

## Lemma (Verdú)

For every  $\epsilon_n$  such that

$$\lim_{n \rightarrow \infty} \epsilon_n = 0$$

it holds that

$$\liminf_n -\frac{1}{n} \log \beta_{\epsilon_n} (\mathbb{P}_{X_n Y_n}, \mathbb{P}_{X_n} \mathbb{P}_{Y_n}) \leq \underline{I}(\mathbf{X} \wedge \mathbf{Y})$$

# General capacity

## Theorem (Secret key capacity)

The SK capacity  $C$  for a sequence of sources  $\{X_n, Y_n\}_{n=1}^{\infty}$  is given by

$$C = \underline{I}(\mathbf{X} \wedge \mathbf{Y})$$

**Achievability.** Use the single-shot construction with

$$\lambda_{\max} = n (\overline{H}(\mathbf{X}) + \Delta)$$

$$\lambda_{\min} = n (\underline{H}(\mathbf{X}) - \Delta)$$

$$\lambda = n (\underline{I}(\mathbf{X} \wedge \mathbf{Y}) - \Delta)$$

## Towards characterizing finite-blocklength performance

We identify the second term in the asymptotic expansion of  $S(X^n, Y^n)$ :

### Theorem (Second order asymptotics)

For every  $0 < \epsilon < 1$  and IID RVs  $X^n, Y^n$ , we have

$$S_\epsilon(X^n, Y^n) = nI(X \wedge Y) - \sqrt{nV}Q^{-1}(\epsilon) + o(\sqrt{n})$$

The quantity  $V$  is given by

$$V = \text{Var} \left[ \log \frac{P_{XY}(X, Y)}{P_X(X)P_Y(Y)} \right]$$

## Towards characterizing finite-blocklength performance

We identify the second term in the asymptotic expansion of  $S(X^n, Y^n)$ :

### Theorem (Second order asymptotics)

For every  $0 < \epsilon < 1$  and IID RVs  $X^n, Y^n$ , we have

$$S_\epsilon(X^n, Y^n) = nI(X \wedge Y) - \sqrt{nV}Q^{-1}(\epsilon) + o(\sqrt{n})$$

The quantity  $V$  is given by

$$V = \text{Var} \left[ \log \frac{P_{XY}(X, Y)}{P_X(X)P_Y(Y)} \right]$$

Proof relies on the use of Berry-Esseen theorem as in Polyanskiy-Poor-Verdu 10

## Towards characterizing finite-blocklength performance

We identify the second term in the asymptotic expansion of  $S(X^n, Y^n)$ :

### Theorem (Second order asymptotics)

For every  $0 < \epsilon < 1$  and IID RVs  $X^n, Y^n$ , we have

$$S_\epsilon(X^n, Y^n) = nI(X \wedge Y) - \sqrt{nV}Q^{-1}(\epsilon) + o(\sqrt{n})$$

The quantity  $V$  is given by

$$V = \text{Var} \left[ \log \frac{P_{XY}(X, Y)}{P_X(X)P_Y(Y)} \right]$$

Proof relies on the use of Berry-Esseen theorem as in Polyanskiy-Poor-Verdu 10

What about  $S_{\epsilon, \delta}(X^n, Y^n)$ ?

## Looking ahead ...

What if the eavesdropper has side information  $Z$ ?

Best known converse bound on SK capacity due to [Gohari-Ananthram 08](#)

Recently we obtained a one-shot version of this bound

[Tyagi and Watanabe](#), *Converses for Secret Key Agreement and Secure Computing*, preprint arXiv:1404.5715, 2014 - [arxiv.org](#)

Also, we have a single-shot achievability scheme that is asymptotically tight when  $X, Y, Z$  form a Markov chain