

# Secure Automotive On-Board Protocols: A Case of Over-the-Air Firmware Updates

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**Abstract.** *The software running on electronic devices is regularly updated, these days. A vehicle consists of many such devices, but is operated in a completely different manner than consumer devices. Update operations are safety critical in the automotive domain. Thus, they demand for a very well secured process. We propose an on-board security architecture which facilitates such update processes by combining hardware and software modules. In this paper, we present a protocol to show how this security architecture is employed in order to achieve secure firmware updates for automotive control units.*


**Keywords:** Security protocols; security architectures; over the air firmware updates; software functionality

## 1 Introduction

Current research activities in vehicular on-board IT architectures basically follow two key trends: unification of network communication and centralization of functionality. Recent on-board IT architectures comprise a very heterogeneous landscape of communication network technologies, e.g., CAN, LIN, FlexRay and MOST. Internet Protocol (IP) based communication is currently being researched as a technology for unifying the interconnection of electronic control units (ECUs) in future on-board communication systems [9]. In addition, there is a shift towards multipurpose ECUs and usage of flash memory technology in the microcontrollers. Besides these trends in the design of automotive on-board IT architectures, new external communication interfaces, fixed and wireless, are becoming an integral part of on-board architectures. One key factor for this development is the integration of future e-safety applications based on V2X communications (external communications of vehicles, e.g. with other vehicles – V2V, or with the infrastructure – V2I) [13,3] which have been identified as one promising measure for increasing the efficiency and quality of operational performance of all vehicles and corresponding intelligent transportation systems.

Firmware updates are crucial for the automotive domain, in which recalls are a very costly activity and thus should be avoided where possible. The practicability of remotely updating devices has been shown by Google for their Android

telephones. With this, they have a powerful tool to react on discovered security flaws in very short time [21]. In the automotive domain, update intervals are calculated in quarters of a year and not quarters of a day right now. This paradigm is about to change and security mechanisms within the car provide the necessary building blocks. With the arising “always-connected” infrastructure, it will be possible to perform over-the-air (OTA) diagnosis and OTA firmware updates (see Fig. 1), for example. This will provide several advantages over hardwired access, such as saving time by faster firmware updates, which improves the efficiency of the system by installing firmware updates as soon as they are released by the car manufacturer. However, adding new in-vehicle services does not only facilitate novel applications, but also imposes stringent requirements on security, performance, reliability, and flexibility. As discussed in [8], in-vehicle components need not only be extremely reliable and defect free, but also resistant to the exploitation of vulnerabilities. Although on-board bus systems are not physically accessible (apart from via diagnostic interfaces), this provides only a limited degree of security for vehicles that are in wireless communication with other vehicles and devices (e.g., consumer devices connected to the vehicle).



**Fig. 1.** Over-the-Air Firmware Updates

As seen in [8,5], attacks on the in-vehicle network have serious consequences for the driver. If an attacker can install malicious firmware, he can virtually control the functionality of the vehicle and perform arbitrary actions on the in-vehicle network [18]. Furthermore, since the ECU itself is an untrusted environment, there exist challenges in how to securely perform cryptographic operations (i.e., encryption/decryption, key storage). Thus, it does not make much sense if the verifier software runs from the same flash as the software to be verified. In this paper we present a generic firmware update protocol, that can be used for both hardwired and remote wireless firmware flashing. The protocol has especially been designed with respect to the above mentioned functional and non-functional requirements. Our approach is based on hard security mech-

anisms. Hardware security measures are required in order to raise the security level of specific security services, e.g. for the storage of security credentials. We present a hardware security module design, which protects most critical parts of the architecture during firmware updates, such as secure key storage, secure operation of cryptographic algorithms, etc.

## 2 Secure On-Board Network Architecture

We believe that the combination of software and hardware based security solutions is necessary for meeting the requirements of on-board network security. However, depending on the risk level it should be analyzed for which use cases a security level using pure software security mechanisms is sufficient. Based on the security levels identified in [5], we focused on how to use hardware security services during firmware updates. Hardware security measures provided by hardware security modules (HSMs) are primarily used as root of trust for integrity measurement and responsible for performing all cryptography applications including symmetric/asymmetric encryption/decryption, symmetric integrity checking, digital signature creation/verification, and random number generation.




Fig. 2. HSM Architecture Overview

Considering the constraints of current vehicular on-board networks and the trend towards an increasing centralization of functions, a very flexible and scalable on-board HSM is required. The design of the HSM needs to consider the different available resources on sensors and actuators, ECUs and bus systems. We have decided to create three different variants of our HSM: The full, the medium and the light HSM. The simplest HSM is designed for sensors/actuators (see Fig. 1). At the ECU level, a more complex architecture can be applied (i.e., medium HSM), which for instance provides services for managing keys for the on-board system and for protecting the ECU itself. In order to satisfy the performance requirements for signing and verifying messages for V2I communications (i.e., OTA firmware updates), a very efficient asymmetric cryptographic engine is required. Thus, the full HSM architecture is applied in this case, which provides the maximum level of functionality, security, and performance. Table 1 presents security features of the different HSM variants and comparison with other existing HSM approaches. These variants offer different levels of security functionality.

The components of the HSM are divided into mandatory and optional components because, depending on the use case, different security requirements have to be fulfilled. The optional components are represented in Fig. 2 with dashed lines. Furthermore, it has been defined in compliance with the Secure Hardware Extension (SHE) specification proposed by the automotive HIS consortium [15]. All HSM modules (full to light) are able to understand and process SHE commands [4] accordingly.

**Table 1.** Components of different HSMs.

Security Features	Hardware Security Module - HSM			SHE	TPM	Smart card
	Full	Medium	Light			
<i>Boot Integrity protection</i>	Auth & Secure	Auth & Secure	Auth & Secure	Secure	Auth	None
<i>HW crypto algorithms (incl. key generation)</i>	ECDSA, ECDH, AES/MAC, WHIRLPOOL / RSA, SHA1 HMAC	RSA, SHA1, AES/ MAC	AES/ MAC	AES/ MAC	RSA, SHA1 / HMAC	ECC, RSA, AES, 3DES, MAC, SHA x..
<i>HW crypto acceleration</i>	ECC, AES, WHIRLPOOL	AES	AES	AES	None	None
<i>Internal CPU</i>	Programmable	Programmable	None	None	Preset	Programmable
<i>RNG</i>	TRNG	TRNG	PRNG w/ext. seed	PRNG w/ext. seed	TRNG	TRNG
<i>Counter</i>	16x64bit	16x64bit	None	None	4x32bit	None
<i>Internal NVM</i>	Yes	Yes	Optional	Yes	Indirect (Via SRK)	Yes
<i>Internal Clock</i>	Yes w/ext UTC Sync	Yes w/ext UTC Sync	Yes w/ext UTC Sync	No	No	No
<i>Parallel Access</i>	Multiple sessions	Multiple sessions	Multiple sessions	No	Multiple sessions	No
<i>Tamper Protection</i>	Indirect (passive, part of ASIC)	Indirect (passive, part of ASIC)	Indirect (passive, part of ASIC)	Indirect (passive, part of ASIC)	Yes (mfr.dep.)	Yes (active, up to EAL5)

There exist different approaches for integrating the HSM with the microcontroller: i) . HSM in the same chip as the CPU with a state machine and ii) . HSM in the same chip as the CPU but with a programmable secure core. In the solution we propose, a programmable CPU core is inside the same chip as the main microcontroller to perform cryptography operations (see Fig. 2). Note that when a software-based cryptography implementation is used, it can be easily modified (possibly not a highly efficient solution) but changing a state machine requires that hardware to be redesigned and is very expensive. It is necessary that the HSM be in the same chip as the application CPU and contains a microprocessor, to protect it from physical tampering.

### 3 Implementing Security Primitives

In this section we briefly review the hardware interface for the invocation of cryptographic hardware security blocks, higher-level security functionality and security management functionality (e.g., key import/export, signature, and message authentication code) that are required during OTA firmware update. More details about HSM functional calls/descriptions can be found in [6].

**Signature:** This function is used for demonstrating the authenticity and integrity of a message. A valid signature gives a recipient reason to believe that the message was created by a known sender, and that it was not altered in transit. For signature generation, a signature generation scheme  $sig(m)_{S_k}$  takes as input a key  $k$ , and message  $m$ , outputs a signature  $\hat{\sigma}$ ; we write  $sig(m)_{S_k} = \{\hat{\sigma}\}_{S_k}$ . Where  $k$  is the security parameter, outputs a pair of keys  $(S_k; V_k)$ .  $S_k$  is the signing key, which is kept secret, and  $V_k$  is the verification key which is made public. We also assume that a time stamp (UTC Time) is generated and then also covered by the signature calculation, and write  $\vec{m} = (m + Ts)$  to denote the message and a time stamp whose signature is  $\hat{\sigma}$ . For the signature verification,  $ver\_sig(\vec{m}, \hat{\sigma})_{V_k} \rightarrow \alpha$  function is defined, takes as input the signature  $\hat{\sigma}$ , the signature verification public key part  $V_k$ , and outputs the answer  $\alpha$  which is either succeed (signature is valid) or fail (signature is invalid). As a precondition, the  $V_k$  must be loaded and enabled for verification.

**Message Authentication Code – MAC:** This function is used to protect both the data integrity and the authenticity of a message, by allowing verifiers (who also possess the secret key) to detect any changes to the message content. For generating a MAC as well as the message itself, the notation  $MAC(m)_{M_k} = \{\hat{m}\}_{M_k}$  is used, so that it produces the message itself plus the cryptographic authentication code based on  $M_k$  and  $m$ . Here,  $M_k$  refers to a cryptographic key for MAC generation and  $m$  to the message to be authenticated. In the same way as for signatures, the use of the time stamp  $\vec{m} = (m + Ts)$  is covered by the MAC calculation. For the verification of a MAC, the notation  $ver\_MAC(\vec{m}, \hat{m})_{M_k}$  is used. Based on the  $M_k$ , it is verified whether  $\hat{m}$  corresponds to the message  $\vec{m}$ .

**Key Creation:** This security building block is used for the creation of a key on a hardware module, using HSM `Create_Random_Key` function. All properties of the key are determined and fixed during creation. This includes the cryptographic algorithm to be used, the use and further property use flags indicating what actions may be done with this key (i.e., sign and verify) as well as the authorization data needed for key usage. The `use_flag` parameter indicates the operations that may be performed with the key. In particular, the following flags are present:

- `sign|verify`: Key can be used to generate and/or verify digital signatures or H/MACs of any data.
- `encrypt|decrypt`: Key can be used to encrypt and/or decrypt any data.
- `secureboot`: Can be used to create/verify secure boot references.
- `keycreation`: Can be used for creation of new keys, e.g. via key derivation functions (symmetric) or DH key agreement (asymmetric).
- `securestorage`: Can be used to realize (locally bound) secure storage
- `utcsync`: Can be used for synchronizing internal tick counter to UTC.
- `transport`: Can be used to protect transports of keys (i.e., migration, swapping, move) between locations, according to individual transport flags (i.e., 0 = INT, 1 = MIG, 2 = OEM, 3 = EXT)[6].

Only the `use_flag` may explicitly be set by the creator whereas further property flags are set inherently. Once created, the key properties are unchangeable. As output, the function delivers a key handle for later usage of the key.

**Key Export:** With this function, keys stored on an HSM are transported to other HSMs or to other trusted parties. During transport, the key is encrypted ( $\epsilon(k)_{T_k}$ ) with a special transport key ( $T_k$ ) that may be symmetric or asymmetric. In addition, the authenticity of the key is protected by a key authenticity code which consists in a MAC or a signature appended to the encrypted key. The key authenticity code can be an explicit symmetric key enabled with `use_flag = verify` or an implicit symmetric key derived from a symmetric transport key or an implicit asymmetric key also enabled with `use_flag = verify`. The use of this key authenticity code is mandatory. As output, the function delivers the encrypted key together with its authentication code. As an important precondition, the specified transport key must be loaded and enabled to be used for transport. Furthermore, the transport flag of the key to be exported must be appropriately marked according to the type of module managing the transport key.

**Key Import:** This function is used for importing keys into another HSM or to other trusted parties. In this way, the function provides the counterpart to the previously described export function. The key may be imported either into the non-volatile memory or into the main memory (RAM) of the HSM. In the same manner as for `Key.Export`, the use of the key authenticity code is mandatory. As output, the function delivers a key handle to reference the key for later usage. As a precondition, the transport key must be loaded and enabled before. In addition, the authentication code verification key must be loaded if the key is protected by a signature.

**Key Master – KM:** We introduce a new functional entity, which we call the *KeyMaster*. As there exist multiple variants of the HSM, that support different cryptographic keys (symmetric/asymmetric), we had to take this into account for key distribution. The KM is a central element in the establishment of a session between entities. It holds public key ( $P_k$ ) and pre-shared keys ( $Psk$ ) of the individual ECUs, which are used as transport keys, to establish a secure session. This functional entity resides on a dedicated ECU or is integrated into another ECU. There may be more than one KM node in a vehicle for replication purposes.

**Counter:** As a further instrument to control the behavior of the HSM, the possible use of counters is introduced as an additional security building block. The concrete, central task of a counter is freshness enforcement to prevent different kinds of replay attacks. For handling these counters, the following HSM functions are provided: `Create_counter`; `Read_Counter`, `Increment_Counter`, and `Delete_Counter`. Access authorization data needs to be provided as input data, and is later necessary to create, increment or delete the counter.

## 4 Secure Firmware Update Protocol

Ensuring secure firmware updates requires authenticity, integrity, freshness, and confidentiality, as identified in [5]. The specified protocol provides means to satisfy these security requirements. The next section will now show how HSMs are used and how they interact in order to ensure firmware updates are downloaded and installed securely into the vehicle.

### 4.1 OTA Update Requirements

Before sketching the protocol, we describe some additional constraints and requirements that have to be taken into account for secure firmware updates:

**HSM in the Diagnostic Tool:** As stated in [5], there are numerous scenarios, where an attacker targets the diagnostic tool (DT). For instance, the attacker might inject bogus authority keys into the ECU, through DT, which compromises the overall security of the vehicular on-board architecture. In particular, this means that the DT stores challenges and public strings for key recovery (i.e., ECU unlock key) and is therefore responsible for the security of the subsystem. Therefore, this information needs to be stored securely on the DT-side. An additional advantage of HSM is the resistance against physical tampering of the DT. Any damage to the HSM changes the behavior and therefore prevents the extraction of secret key material.

**Bandwidth Limitations of In-vehicle Networking Technologies:** Firmware update protocols comprise two parts: a V2I part, and an intra-vehicular part, the latter involving a large number of interconnected ECUs. In the on-board bus systems used, a specific restriction lies in the limited size of data packets. For the CAN bus, for example, this means that only eight bytes of payload may be transmitted at a time. For this purpose, secure common transport protocols (S-CTP) [7], extensions of the CTP defined in [2] are applied to diagnosis jobs, where typically larger data chunks need to be transmitted.

### 4.2 Protocol Description

**Remote Diagnosis:** In the OTA firmware update scenario, a service station using a DT connects remotely to a vehicle, using V2I communication, to assess the state of the vehicle (see Fig. 1). To know which version is installed, a diagnosis of the vehicle is required to have all necessary information such as ECU type, firmware version, and date of last update. An employee of the station using the DT establishes a secure connection with the vehicle, at the ECU level, in order to determine the current state of the vehicle. To do so, DT creates a session key  $M_{sk}$  (exportable), by sending a HSM command `Create_Random_key` and specifies the set of allowed key properties such as `use_flag= sign|verify, encrypt|decrypt`. It then calls `export` the  $M_k$  using  $P_k_{ccu}$  (Public key of the central communication unit – CCU) as a transport key ( $T_k$ ) and transmits it to the vehicle. Here, the CCU is the first receiving entity in the vehicle, responsible for receiving and distributing V2X messages to the in-vehicle network.

In the vehicle, the CCU, equipped with the Full HSM and acting as a KM node, receives the connection request. The authorization for the connection is verified in the CCU. The message  $\vec{m}$  is checked for freshness, integrity and the service station is authenticated. If the check succeeds, CCU-KM imports the key into the HSM. It then exports the received  $Exported\_M_k$  with the corresponding  $P_k\_ecu$  or  $Psk$ , depending on the ECU type, and distributes it to the target ECU in order to enable end-to-end communication. This message includes all information that is necessary to deliver this message to the correct ECU. On the receiving side, ECU verifies the integrity, authenticity and authorizations of CCU/DT based on the policy as to whether DT is allowed to deliver a message or not. If this is true, and the message is fresh, ECU imports the  $M_k$  in the HSM. Once  $M_k$  key have imported, an acknowledgment is sent back to DT (see Algorithm 1). After this acknowledgment frame, the DT sends, depending on the option chosen by the employee of the service station, requests to read out diagnosis information (State/Log information) from the ECU it wants to check.

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**Algorithm 1** Remote Diagnosis
 

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**Require:** Signature verification Key  $V_k$  of DT, CCU, ECU are pre-loaded

**Ensure:** Establishing a fresh and authentic session between DT and ECU based on a symmetric session key  $M_k$ , where CCU-KM acts as a Key Master Node.

- DT  $\rightleftharpoons$  HSM:  $M_k$ -handle := *create\_random\_key* (*use\_flag* = sign| verify, encrypt| decrypt, export, *use\_authorization\_data*)  
 DAT:  $Exported\_M_k$  := *key\_export* ( $T_k$ -handle =  $\langle P_k\_ccu$ -handle  $\rangle$ , kh= $\langle M_k$ -handle  $\rangle$ )
  - 1. DT  $\rightarrow$  CCU-KM:  $\{(Exported\_M_k, Ts), \{\hat{\sigma}\}_{S_k\_dt}\}$ 
    - CCU-KM  $\rightleftharpoons$  HSM:  $M_k$ -handle := *key\_import* ( $T_k$ -handle =  $\langle S_k\_ccu$ -handle  $\rangle$ , kh= $\langle M_k$ -handle  $\rangle$ )
    - CCU-KM:  $\rightleftharpoons$  HSM:  $Exported\_M_k$  := *key\_export* ( $T_k$ -handle =  $\langle P_k\_ecu$ -handle | Psk-handle  $\rangle$ , kh= $\langle M_k$ -handle  $\rangle$ )
  - 2. CCU-KM  $\rightarrow$  ECU:  $\{(Exported\_M_k, Ts), \{\hat{\sigma}\}_{S_k\_ccu}\}$ 
    - ECU  $\rightleftharpoons$  HSM:  $M_k$ -handle := *key\_import* ( $T_k$ -handle =  $\langle S_k\_ecu$ -handle | Psk-handle  $\rangle$ , kh= $\langle M_k$ -handle  $\rangle$ )
  - 3. CCU-KM  $\leftarrow$  ECU:  $\{(ACK, Ts), \{\hat{\sigma}\}_{S_k\_ecu}\}$
  - 4. DT  $\leftarrow$  CCU-KM:  $\{(ACK, Ts), \{\hat{\sigma}\}_{S_k\_ccu}\}$
- 

**Advance Notification:** Due to legal reasons and to allow for flexible deployment, we consider that service station will send an advance notification of possible firmware updates, if the type is the expected one. This advance notification is intended to help customers plan for the effective deployment of updates, and includes information about the number of new updates being released. These updates still need to be approved for install before downloading. The customer receives this information on the vehicle human-machine interface (HMI) and can decide about possible deployment (i.e., Install, Decline, Decide later). Only updates that have the approval status Install will be downloaded to the vehicle. Disabling any ECU while vehicle is running may cause safety critical problems, depending on the function ECU is responsible for. We thus assume that additional checks will be performed by the on-board system, to ensure that the vehicle is stopped and has access to the infrastructure, before switching the ECU into the re-programming mode. Furthermore, we assume that the V2I communication is available throughout the OTA firmware update process.



**ECU Reprogramming Mode:** If the type is the expected one, the DT forces the ECU to switch from an application mode into a reprogramming mode by requesting a seed ( $Na$ ). This seed is required to calculate an ECU specific key value to unlock the ECU for reprogramming. The ECU verifies desired security properties. If it is true, ECU sends a HSM command  $SecM\_Generate(seed)$  to generate a seed. It then encrypts the seed  $\epsilon(Na)_{M_k}$  for confidentiality enforcement, compute a MAC on  $\vec{m} = (\epsilon(Na)_{M_k} + Ts)$  and transmits it to the DT. At the same time, the ECU sends a HSM command  $SecM\_ComputeKey(Na, SecM\_key)$  to compute the key on the HSM using  $Na$ . As output, the function delivers a  $SecM_{key}$  key handle, we write  $SecM_{key} = S_{mk}$ , that is used to unlock the ECU.

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**Algorithm 2** ECU Reprogramming Mode

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**Require:** DT and ECU have established a fresh and authentic connection based on a  $M_k$ . Vehicle is stopped and have access to infrastructure

**Ensure:** Authentic and confidential exchange of ECU unlock key.

1. **DT**  $\rightarrow$  **ECU**:  $\{(request\_seed, Ts), \{\hat{m}\}_{M_k}\}$   
     – **ECU**:  $\rightleftharpoons$  **HSM**::  $SecM\_Generate(seed)$
  2. **DT**  $\leftarrow$  **ECU**:  $\{(\epsilon(Na)_{M_k}, Ts), \{\hat{m}\}_{M_k}\}$   
     – **ECU**:  $\rightleftharpoons$  **HSM**::  $S_{mk} := SecM\_ComputeKey(seed, SecM\_key)$   
     – **DT**:  $\rightleftharpoons$  **HSM**::  $S_{mk} := SecM\_ComputeKey(seed, SecM\_key)$   
     – **DAT**:  $\rightleftharpoons$  **HSM**:  $Exported\_S_{mk} := key\_export(T_k\text{-handle} = \langle M_k\text{-handle} \rangle, kh = \langle S_{mk}\text{-handle} \rangle)$
  3. **DT**  $\rightarrow$  **ECU**:  $\{(Exported\_S_{mk}, Ts), \{\hat{m}\}_{M_k}\}$   
     – **ECU**:  $\rightleftharpoons$  **HSM**::  $SecM\_CompareKey(key, seed)$
  4. **DT**  $\leftarrow$  **ECU**:  $\{(ACK, Ts), \{\hat{m}\}_{M_k}\}$
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The DT verifies  $\{\hat{m}\}_{M_k}$ , decrypts the received seed ( $\epsilon^{-1}(Na)_{M_k}$ ), and computes the  $S_{mk}$  with the aid of the received seed ( $Na$ ). Once the  $S_{mk}$  key value is computed, it is exported, using  $M_k$  as a transport key, and transmitted to the target ECU. The ECU verifies the  $\{\hat{m}\}_{M_k}$  and compares the received  $S_{mk}$  key with the self-generated  $S_{mk}$ . If the two values are identical, the ECU is switched into unlock state (from application mode to the reprogramming mode) and sends an ACK message to the DT (see Algorithm 2). This message is sent after the ECU is switched into the unlock state to make sure the switch has been performed. The information whether a re-programming request has been received or not shall be stored in non-volatile memory, e.g. EEPROM. Since switching from the application to the reprogramming mode shall be done via a hardware reset, all contents of volatile memory will be lost [15]. If the comparison failed, the flashloader [15] holds the ECU in locked state. ECU reprogramming is possible only in the unlocked state.

**Firmware Encryption Key Exchange:** In this phase we are considering two possible scenarios for exchanging firmware encryption keys: i) on-line solution and ii) off-line solution. In the on-line solution: the service station has access to an online infrastructure of the manufacturer, it can request the firmware and as well as the firmware encryption key – ( $SSK$ ). The  $SSK$  is a stakeholder symmetric key pair [7], created externally, with `use_flag=decrypt`, key for stakeholder individual usage e.g., software update. Instead, in the case of off-line firmware is encrypted with the pre-installed  $SSK$ .

Considering current trends and advancements in the automotive industry, on-line solutions provide more reliability, flexibility and will eventually increase the security of the on-board network. Sharing the firmware encryption key only with specific ECUs makes an on-line solution more robust and generic compared with of-line approaches, where all vehicles share unique symmetric keys that are pre-installed in the vehicles. In addition, the existence of various security levels in the architecture [5], pleads for the specification of a validity period of the *SSK* (short term or long term keys), for an individual ECU. We suggest to use short term keys for firmware encryption. Short terms keys will expire after a short amount of time and thus, as there is no need for instant revocation if keys are compromised. This has the advantage that OEMs do not have to go through another key migration (installing new keys) process if keys are compromised. As such, the following section only details the on-line solution.

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**Algorithm 3** Firmware Encryption Key Exchange
 

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**Require:** On-line access to OEM server and PKI infrastructure

**Ensure:** Authentic and confidential firmware encryption key exchange between OEM and ECU

1. **DT**  $\rightarrow$  **OEM:**  $\{(request\_firmware\_encryption\_key, Ts), \{\hat{\sigma}\}_{S_k\_dt}\}$   
 - **OEM:**  $Exported\_SSK := key\_export(T_k\_handle = \langle P_k\_ecu\_handle | Psk\_handle \rangle,$   
 $kh = \langle SSK\_handle \rangle)$
  2. **DT**  $\leftarrow$  **OEM:**  $\{(Exported\_SSK, Ts), \{\hat{\sigma}\}_{S_k\_oem}\}$
  3. **DT**  $\rightarrow$  **ECU:**  $\{(Exported\_SSK, Ts), \{\hat{m}\}_{M_k}\}$   
 - **ECU:**  $\stackrel{\neq}{=} HSM:: SSK\_handle := key\_import(T_k\_handle = \langle S_k\_ecu\_handle | Psk\_handle \rangle,$   
 $kh = \langle SSK\_handle \rangle)$
  4. **DT**  $\leftarrow$  **ECU:**  $\{(ACK, Ts), \{\hat{m}\}_{M_k}\}$
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After successfully reprogramming access at the ECU level, the DT sends a request (*request\_firmware\_encryption\_key*) to the OEM server to get the firmware encryption key (see Algorithm 3). This request includes information about the ECU (i.e., ECU type, ECU identification number, firmware version, etc.). The OEM verifies the authenticity and integrity of the received message. If verified, OEM server retrieve the  $Pk\_ecu$  from the Public Key Infrastructure (PKI), (possibly) maintained by an individual OEM, and exports *SSK* using  $Pk\_ecu$  as a  $T_k$ . This is only feasible if the ECU is equipped with a full HSM. In the case of medium or light HSM-ECUs, the pre-shared key  $Psk$  will be used as a  $T_k$ . The OEM server exports the *SSK* and sends a signed message to the DT. As the *SSK* key blob is encrypted with the ECU key, It is not possible for the DT to retrieve the firmware encryption key. Next, the DT transmits the received firmware encryption key to the ECU. The ECU imports the *SSK* in the HSM using the *key\_import* function. The *key\_import* function provides the assurance to the ECU that the key is generated by the OEM, by verifying the authentication code send along with the encrypted key, and can only be decrypted by the specific ECU key. After importing the *SSK* in the ECU-HSM, the ECU sends an acknowledgment about the successful import of the *SSK*.

**Firmware Download:** Once the *SSK* is successfully imported into the ECU-HSM, the DT sends the received signed and encrypted firmware ( $\mathbb{F}_{rm}$ ) along with its ECU Configuration Register (ECR) reference:  $sig(\mathbb{F}_{rm}, \mathbb{E}_{cr}, Ts) \rightarrow \widehat{\sigma_{\mathbb{F}_{rm}}} \xrightarrow{enc} \in (\widehat{\sigma_{\mathbb{F}_{rm}}})_{SSK}$ , to the Random-Access Memory (RAM) of the ECU. Following the

HSM `use_flag` approach, where multiple key-properties may be set, only the OEM server can sign and encrypt the firmware, whereas the receiving ECU can decrypt and verify the received firmware, using the same key material. The encrypted firmware is downloaded block by block (logical block). Each of those blocks is divided into segments, which are a set of bytes containing a start address and a length. The start address and the length of each segment is sent to the HSM during the segment initialization. For one block, a download request is sent from the DT to the HSM. The HSM initializes the decryption service and sends an answer to the DT. The download then starts segment by segment. After sending the last firmware segment, the DT sends a `transfer_exit` message to the ECU (see Algorithm 4).

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**Algorithm 4** Firmware Download
 

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**Require:** Signed and encrypted firmware from OEM

**Ensure:** Authentic, fresh and Confidential firmware downloaded in the ECU

1. DT  $\rightarrow$  ECU:  $\left\{ \left( \epsilon(\widehat{\sigma_{\text{firm}}})_{SSK}, Ts \right), \{\widehat{m}\}_{M_k} \right\}$ 
    - ECU  $\stackrel{!}{\Leftarrow}$  HSM: `SecM.InitDecryption`( $\epsilon(\widehat{\sigma_{\text{firm}}})_{SSK}$ )
    - ECU  $\stackrel{!}{\Leftarrow}$  HSM: `SecM.Decryption`( $\epsilon^{-1}(\widehat{\sigma_{\text{firm}}})_{SSK}$ )
  2. DT  $\rightarrow$  ECU:  $\left\{ (\text{request\_transfer\_exit}, Ts), \{\widehat{m}\}_{M_k} \right\}$ 
    - ECU  $\stackrel{!}{\Leftarrow}$  HSM: `SecM.DeinitDecryption`()
  3. DT  $\leftarrow$  ECU:  $\left\{ (ACK, Ts), \{\widehat{m}\}_{M_k} \right\}$
- 

**Firmware Installation and Verification:** For an installation of the firmware, we consider the standard firmware installation procedure defined in [15], where each logical block is erased and reprogrammed. However, before the flash driver can be used to re-program an ECU, its compatibility with the underlying hardware, the calling software environment and with prior versions of the firmware has to be checked. This compatibility check is performed by means of a version information stored in the HSM monotonic counters. The HSM `Read_Counter` function is used to read out the value of a counter. The counter is referenced by a *counter\_identifier* previously increased after every authentic and successful installation of the firmware. These monotonic counters are defined to perform such a checking of its current version against the new firmware version in order to prevent the downgrading attacks meant to install older firmware.

For the verification, we defined a two step verification process: In the first step, before re-programming, the ECU verifies the signature of the firmware data. This is verified by using the pre-installed Manufacturer Verification Key *MVK*. It proves that the software was indeed released from the OEM. In the second step: we construct a tiny trusted computing base (TCB) during the installation phase. We compute an ECR trusted chain at each step of the firmware installation. The ECR reference is needed to ascertain the integrity/authenticity of the firmware data. An `Extend_ECR` function is defined to build the ECR trusted chain. This function is used for updating the ECR with a new hash value. The new value is provided as input and chained with the existing value stored in the ECR, using a hash update function. As output, the function delivers the updated ECR value.

After a successful installation of the new firmware data, software consistency check is performed. The check for software dependencies shall be done by means of a callback routine provided by the ECU supplier. This check is done after reprogramming and before setting the new ECR reference. Next, the `Compare_ECR` function is called. This comparison can only be performed after all writing procedures for the logical block have been finished. This function allows the direct comparison of the current ECR with a reference ECR value received with the firmware. It is also possible that the ECR reference may be contained inside the firmware itself. In this case the flashloader shall call a routine provided by the ECU supplier to obtain the ECR reference. If the check succeed, the `HSM_Preset_ECR` function is called. This function is used to manage references to ECR values by ECR indices in the context of a secure boot. After successfully setting the ECR value, the `HSM_Increment_Counter` function is called to increment the monotonic counter with the new value. At the last step, the actual hardware reset is executed, the flashloader deletes (i.e. overwrites) the routines for erasing and/or programming the flash memory from the ECU's RAM [15], thereby making sure those routines are not present on the ECU in application mode. After the reset, the application is started.

**Error Handling:** Each function of the HSM returns a status after its successful or unsuccessful execution. Some functions may deliver further function specific error codes. The value of the status shows the positive execution of the function or the reason for the failure. In case of a failure, the flash process must stop with an error code and the ECU enters the `locked` state.

## 5 Related Work

The past decade has seen a tremendous growth in the vehicular communication domain, yet no comprehensive security architecture solution has been defined that covers all aspects of on-board communication (data protection, secure communication, secure and tamper proof execution platform for applications). On the other hand, several projects, namely GST [10], C2C-CC [3], IEEE Wave [22] and SeVeCOM [20] have been concerned with inter-vehicular communication and have come up with security architectures for protecting V2X communications. These proposals essentially aim at communication specific security requirements in a host-based security architecture style, as attackers are assumed to be within a network where no security perimeter can be defined (ad-hoc communication). These proposals consider the car mostly as a single entity, communicating with other cars using secure protocols.

Mahmud et al. [14] present a security architecture and discuss secure firmware upload, which depends however on a number of prerequisites and assumptions (i.e., sending multiple copies to ensure firmware updates) in order to make secure firmware update. However, sending multiple copies is not realistic and imposes several constraints on the infrastructure. This proposal does not consider automotive on-board networks, where domains are traditionally separated, due to functional and non-functional requirements. Kim et al. [12] present remote pro-

gressive updates for flash-based networked embedded systems. In their solution a link-time technique is proposed which reduces the energy consumption during installation. However, no security concern is addressed in this proposal.

Nilsson et al. discuss in [16,17] provide a lightweight protocol and verification for secure firmware updates over the air (SFOTA). In the SFOTA protocol, different properties are ensured during firmware update protocol (i.e., data integrity, data confidentiality, and data freshness). However, this approach also relies on strong imposed assumptions in order to ensure the secure software upload: the authentication of the vehicle is not considered, keys are assumed to be stored securely and the authors use a single encryption key for all the ECUs in a car. Furthermore, no specific execution platform requirements are put forward by this proposal. In [18], key management issues are discussed in relation with software updates. A rekeying protocol is defined in order to distribute keys with only specific nodes in the group. It also uses a multicast approach to update the software on a group of node. Furthermore, as mentioned above, this approach also does not consider execution platform requirements. It does not discuss about computation attacks, where the attacker can learn and modify the firmware, during the installation phase or simply prevent to update the counter, for later replay attacks.

Hagai [19] presents an approach that takes hardware into account by providing a secured runtime environment with a so-called Trust Zone on an ARM processor. In contrast the solutions of [1,11] are software based. The so called *tools* and *enablers*, which are low-level and application-level security functions in [1] also cover a number of on-board automotive use-cases, while leaving the essential link to the external communication domain uncovered. The approach most closely related to our work is that of the Herstelle-Initiative Software – HIS [15]. The flashing process defined by the HIS provides a good basis for the OEMs, but the recommended protocol does not provide all the necessary security functionalities (i.e., freshness). Furthermore, this process only addresses hardwired firmware updates and does not provide any information about which key is used for firmware encryption, in a heterogeneous landscape of communication network technologies.

## 6 Conclusion

We have presented a firmware update protocol for a new security architecture to be deployed within the vehicle. We showed how a root of trust in hardware can sensibly be combined with software modules. These modules and primitives have been applied to show how firmware updates can be done securely and over-the-air, while respecting existing standards and infrastructure. In contrast to existing approaches, the protocols presented in this paper describe a complete process, which involves the service provider, the vehicle infrastructure as well as the manufacturer and the workshop. By using secure in-vehicle communication and a trusted platform model, we show how to establish a secure end-to-end link between the manufacturer, the workshop and the vehicle. Despite the fact that a trusted platform model entails certain constraints, such as the obligation to bind cryptographic keys to a given boot configuration, we showed how the

protocols we presented deal with the update of the platform reference registers during the boot phase of an ECU.

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