

Security, Development and the Australian Security Discourse about Failed States

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This paper discusses Mark Duffield's theory of the merging of development and security. It introduces failed states as a key linkage between these concepts. To subject the theory to a partial empirical test, the use of the term 'failed state' in Australian security discourse vis-à-vis three countries in the South Pacific is presented. Evidence from these cases supports the notion that security and development are indeed coming together. This threatens to strip development policy of its meaning, subordinating it to security concerns.

Introduction

In many Western countries, policy makers increasingly perceive failed and failing states as sources of threat. State failure is no longer being understood as a problem of underdevelopment but as a security issue meriting an altogether different kind of policy response. This has shaped the security discourse in policy circles worldwide in such a way that smaller powers have begun to adapt and develop political strategies which incorporate the new security thinking in sometimes surprising ways.

This paper argues that this shift in security discourse is part of a larger trend. Mark Duffield has laid out the case that the formerly separate spheres of development and security are gradually merging in the post-Cold War world. Failed states represent a theoretical nexus connecting these two fields. Therefore, recent shifts in the discourse surrounding failed states can be taken as an indication of deeper changes in the way development and security policy are conceptualised by policy makers. This paper aims to shed some light on the relationship between development and security. Since a global-level theory like Duffield's is difficult to subject to conclusive empirical testing, the present study should be taken as one piece of evidence in favour of the conclusion that global norms are indeed shifting.

To this end, case studies of Australian bilateral relations with the Solomon Islands, Papua New Guinea and East Timor are conducted to see how the term 'failed state' is employed in political discourse, and how developing countries have reacted to this

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charge. This paper will not address the degree to which these countries could be considered ‘failed’ or ‘failing’. This is irrelevant to the question at hand because the political use of the label ‘failed state’ remains the same whether or not it is analytically justified.

The paper begins with a review of Duffield’s theory. It then goes on to discuss the role of failed states in the new development–security landscape, introducing the concept of ‘securitisation’. Thereafter, three case studies are presented that investigate the use of ‘failed state’ as a term in political discourse during interstate negotiations. The paper concludes by outlining several implications that can be drawn from the case studies.

The Merging of Development and Security

In his 2001 monograph *Global Governance and the New Wars*, Mark Duffield advances the argument that the fields of development and security are in the process of merging. Wars and conflicts play a greater role in how development is understood, and underdevelopment has been added to the list of security concerns. In developed countries, the traditional fear of interstate war has subsided to be replaced by ‘the fear of underdevelopment as a source of conflict, criminalised activity and international instability’ (Duffield 2001, 7)

As a result of this merging, developed nations now pursue the imposition of what Duffield calls ‘liberal peace’ (2001, 10), ie the actualisation of political stability and free markets in developing countries. The policies in pursuit of liberal peace follow the goal of conflict prevention. They are based on an agenda of social transformation: ‘The aim of liberal peace is to transform the dysfunctional and war-affected societies that it encounters on its borders into cooperative, representative and, especially, stable entities’ (Duffield 2001, 11).

The roots of this shift in public policy can be traced, on the one hand, to developmental debates in the 1970s and 1980s which found their clearest expression in the Brandt Report (Independent Commission on International Development Issues 1980), as well as, on the other hand, to the end of the Cold War and the resulting redefinition of security. The new security agenda (McDougall 2004) substantially expanded the scope of threats, from refugee flows, the drug trade, and human trafficking to terrorism, WMD (weapons of mass destruction) proliferation and regional conflicts. This was accompanied by the realisation that security could no longer be guaranteed through military force alone. The initial failure of the international interventions in Somalia and Bosnia provided a clear example that prompted a rethinking of traditional peacekeeping concepts and, on a larger scale, the role of the armed forces in guaranteeing security.

Sadly, Duffield devotes little attention to the figure of the state which, in my view, overlooks the importance of the subject. In political theory, the state is the irreplaceable agent for guaranteeing security for its citizens, and while its role in enabling development is more ambivalent, it is still seen as the necessary provider of public services. Implicitly in Duffield’s monograph, the state represents the theoretical bridge linking security and development. This linkage, however, remains unexplored.

Taking up Duffield’s model, it is easy to see that the failure of the state to uphold security is closely connected to its failure in promoting development. At the heart of this approach lies a ‘performance-based’ understanding of statehood and political

stability. At its most basic, this understanding holds that if the state is sufficiently able to provide public goods, then its citizens will imbue the state with legitimacy which, in turn, enables the state to guarantee security. Similarly, failure to provide services (or an economic crisis) precipitates a crisis of legitimacy which leads to civil strife (Lipset 1959, 77–83).

State Failure in the New Security Agenda

For states that are unable to provide services and security to their citizens, the term ‘failed state’ (or ‘fragile state’) has become commonplace. In a classic definition by William Zartman, the concept of state failure (or ‘state collapse’, as he put it) ‘refers to a situation where the structure, authority (legitimate power), law, and political order have fallen apart and must be reconstituted in some form, old or new’ (1995, 1). Since then, failed states have become objects of intense scrutiny. Increased political attention has led to a substantial expansion of scholarship (see, for example, Rotberg 2003; Fukuyama 2004; Milliken 2003). Much of this interest is spurred by the generalised assumption that failed states represent safe havens for terrorists. However, it should be noted that, despite great efforts, the empirical evidence for this assertion is, at best, ambiguous.

Failed states represent the paradigmatic example of Duffield’s ‘performance-based’ view of statehood, since they are unable to promote development, offer basic services, or uphold a decent level of security. These states are the manifestations of those ‘dysfunctional and war-affected societies’ (Duffield 2001, 11) that developed nations have come to dread. To borrow another phrase from security studies, failed states have become ‘securitised’ in global security discourse.

The concept of securitisation represents a constructivist approach to security studies (Buzan, Waever and de Wilde 1998). It is based on the premise that it is meaningless to tie security to a specific referent object or to axiomatically restrict the issues to which ‘security’ could be applied. Instead of approaching security as a quality of a given object, it is being conceptualised as a manner of discourse. As Ole Waever puts it, ‘[t]hreats and security are not objective matters, security is a way to frame and handle an issue’ (1996, 108).

This approach is based on speech act theory which divides what is said in communication from what the act of speaking is meant to achieve (Austin 1962). A discourse of securitisation frames issues as ‘existential threats to a referent object by a securitizing actor who thereby generates endorsement of emergency measures beyond rules that would otherwise apply’ (Buzan, Waever and de Wilde 1998, 5). Actors try to present an issue as an immediate and serious threat to a certain object’s survival. If such a ‘securitising move’ is accepted by the audience, the issue is no longer subject to the normal political process but instead becomes an urgent matter of survival. The securitising agent demands emergency powers (either for himself or for a competent authority, such as the state) that go beyond previously established boundaries.

To be considered successful, an attempt at securitisation has to fulfil three criteria: firstly, an issue must be cast as an existential threat; secondly, emergency action must be undertaken; and, thirdly, it must have ‘effects on interunit relations’ (Buzan, Waever and de Wilde 1998, 26), which on an international level encompasses the totality of interstate relations, ie modes of interaction between states. Buzan, Waever and de Wilde accept that ‘the possibility for successful securitization will

vary dramatically with the position held by the actor' (Buzan, Waever and de Wilde 1998, 31). Therefore, to study a process of securitisation, it becomes imperative to ask: who has the power to securitise? And how do other states react to it?

In developed countries, the securitisation of failed states began shortly after 11 September 2001. While state failure had been seen as a problem and a possible danger to national interests, it had never been construed as a challenge to national security (Lambach 2004). The failed state as an issue of international security was conceived only after the terrorists' links to the failed state of Afghanistan were revealed. From this point on, the securitisation of state failure has continued apace. For example, the 2002 US *National Security Strategy* claims that 'America is now threatened less by conquering states than [it is] by failing ones' (*National Security Strategy* 2002, 1). Similarly, the European Union's 2003 Security Strategy names state failure as one of five key threats to European security. These (and similar) statements represent clear securitising moves that have led to emergency action in Afghanistan and elsewhere. Moreover, they are beginning to affect inter-state relations.

In developing countries, the inequality inherent within global security discourse is felt acutely. For the most part, the developed countries set the agenda and define the issues while developing countries have to go along (Thakur 2004). However, resistance to this one-sidedness in global discourse is slowly mounting among policy makers, academics and activists in developing nations.

One of the earliest reactions to the new kind of discourse was an essay written by Martin Khor, Director of the Malaysia-based Third World Network. Therein, he recounted a discussion with a senior official of an international organisation about US foreign policy:

In the new theory of failed states, the 'international community', or a set of countries, or even a single country, can intervene in another country, including to change its government, if that country is a failed state. [...] The 'failed states' would include countries such as Iran, Egypt and Nigeria, which are unable to provide jobs, education and development for their own people. Since this lack of development could spawn discontent and violence that would spill over to other countries, through terrorist acts, then other countries have the right to act against the 'failed states' to prevent the terrorism that could otherwise harm the other countries. (Khor 2002)

For Khor, the failed states discourse is nothing more than a rhetorical ploy to allow powerful countries, and in particular the United States, to justify military intervention in poor countries.

Lately, this line of criticism has been echoed by policy makers. The most outspoken attack on the structure of global security discourse came from South African Deputy Foreign Minister Sue van der Merwe, at a 2004 meeting of the Non-aligned Movement. Demanding that the United Nations remain the pre-eminent authority in world affairs, she said:

There is a growing tendency on the part of countries of the North to mount global 'campaigns' against threats that are perceived and defined in the North but allegedly originate or are based in the countries of the South. [...] This is done without the prior acknowledgment of the contributions of developing countries to both the definition and also the condemnation of these threats. (AFP 2004)

Van der Merwe's reaction can be taken as evidence that inter-unit relations have begun to be affected by the changes in security discourse. According to the three criteria of securitisation, this process has reached, or is nearing, completion.

The Australian Discourse about Failed States

For several reasons, the failed states discourse among Australian policy makers represents an interesting case study of more general shifts in international security discourse. Firstly, the Australian discourse is emblematic of the international discourse while still retaining several distinctive national features. In fact, political circumstances made the discursive shift in Australia even more pronounced than it was in other countries. Secondly, the Australian mode of discourse has already begun to affect policy and regional relations. And, thirdly, the reactions of several developing countries in the South Pacific to this shift in discourse allow an insight into the structure of the regional security discourse. To illustrate these three points, this paper will first describe Australian political discourse in relation to three developing countries in the region, namely the Solomon Islands, Papua New Guinea (PNG), and East Timor.

Australia, the Solomon Islands and State Failure

The case of the Solomon Islands is of special importance because the evolution of Australian policy towards this country in early 2003 was paralleled by (and in fact necessitated) a shift in the government's discourse about failed states in general. In contrast to other developed countries like the United Kingdom, the United States, or Germany, the Australian government did not hurry to securitise failed states after 11 September. In fact, no government official made any securitising move between September 2001 and March 2003, although by then the connection of state failure and terror had become a regular feature in international security discourse. If the phrase was mentioned at all, it was portrayed as a developmental and humanitarian issue (Downer 2002). But by June 2003, the Australian government had started its campaign of securitising failed states. How did this shift come about?

It can be seen that the official rhetoric changed in parallel with the government's (stated) policy towards the Solomon Islands. The country had been embroiled, on and off, in internal conflict since 1999. Successive Solomon Islands governments had asked Australia to send armed assistance in order to provide security (Dinnen 2002). The Australian government, however, refused to intervene, choosing instead to sponsor peace talks. By late 2002 the situation in the Solomon Islands had deteriorated substantially and in April 2003 Prime Minister Allan Kemakeza issued another call for help (Amnesty International 2004, 8). This time, Australia agreed to field an intervention force.

There is no single reason for this reversal of earlier policy and others have discussed this question thoroughly, so there is no need to go into detail here (for that, see McDougall 2004; Kabutaulaka 2004). While Australia had taken part in regional multilateral interventions in the region previously (eg by dispatching civilian and military observers to Bougainville in 1997), the Solomon Islands intervention differed in quantity and quality from these earlier efforts. Accordingly, the government sought to conduct the intervention in the most politically safe way to do so, putting together a multinational security force with other South Pacific states and asking

for a formal invitation by the Solomon Islands government and parliament. Within a relatively short time, the Regional Assistance Mission to the Solomon Islands (RAMSI) had made great progress in restoring order and disarming militants so that, by late 2005, the domestic situation in the Solomon Islands has been stabilised.

In the face of the deployment of Australian policemen and troops, the government needed a way to 'sell' this new policy to the public. To this end, it took up international security discourse and presented the Solomon Islands as a country on the brink of failure. An influential report by the Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI) played an important role in this endeavour. The report, titled *Our Failing Neighbour*, provided the strategic rationale and political rhetoric to justify the Solomon Islands intervention (ASPI 2003). It warned of the dangers that a failed state in Australia's immediate neighbourhood would precipitate. The report may even have contributed to the April 2003 request by the Kemakeza government itself: in draft stage, it was circulated in Honiara to elicit official commentary from government officials and this might have given the Solomon Islands government a hint as to the evolution of Australian security thinking, prompting it to renew its plea for assistance. As another indication of the report's importance, it is noteworthy that Australian Foreign Minister Alexander Downer's first securitising move in relation to failed states took place at the official launch of the report in June 2003 (Downer 2003a).

After that, Downer made further securitising moves. These followed a two-part strategy: firstly, Downer has connected 'failed states' (in general) to terrorism, and, secondly, he repeatedly referred to the Solomon Islands as being 'dangerously close to state failure' (Downer 2003c). He made it clear that he considered the failure of the Solomon Islands to be a threat to Australian security, specifically the potential of the country to serve as a haven for 'money launderers, drug traffickers, people traffickers, possibly even terrorists. It's an environment which can be exploited by those types of people' (Downer 2003b). With Downer, the application of the 'failed state' label followed (and still follows) a clear pattern. From mid-2003 onwards, he was using the term exclusively in reference to the Solomon Islands, with one telling exception—during the April 2004 debate about the duration of the deployment of Australian troops to Iraq, he explained that Iraq would become a failed state and a haven for terrorists in the event of a troop withdrawal (Downer 2004).

Similar practices show up in statements by the Prime Minister, John Howard. He, too, was visibly reluctant to speak of any specific countries beyond the Solomon Islands as even potentially failing states (Howard 2003a, b). These examples show that the Australian government is aware of the political connotations inherent in the label 'failed state' and that it does not use the phrase indiscriminately. Instead, its application is being restricted to the countries where the government is willing to intervene.

Developing countries in the South Pacific view this new kind of security language with suspicion. To these countries, terms like 'failed state' or 'arc of instability' have taken on a much more sinister meaning, raising the spectre of foreign military intervention (Hegarty 2004). Public diplomacy in the region has been changed irrevocably—when the charge of state failure is levelled against a state, that state's government cannot afford to sit idly by. South Pacific states have reacted differently to these changes. In the following sections I will describe two examples which show the radically different ways in which states have adapted to the new

regional order. Whereas PNG, anxious to assert its sovereignty, angrily rejected the label, East Timor has tried to turn the tables and use the discourse for its own ends.

Papua New Guinea: Rejecting the Label

Since its independence in 1975, relations between PNG and Australia have been a sensitive issue. Australia was keen not to appear overbearing to its former colony while PNG was anxious to safeguard its independence. Under these circumstances, it is hardly surprising that PNG policy makers are very much worried about ulterior motives behind Australia's shift in policy and discourse.

Since early 2003, there have been a number of instances when Australian officials, journalists, or analysts have come close to labelling PNG a failed state. Every time, PNG political elites have harshly rejected this notion. Most of these instances have been in connection with the negotiations about the Enhanced Cooperation Program (ECP), but there have been exchanges outside of this issue, for example after the publication of a report by the Sydney-based Centre for Independent Studies (CIS) that warned of an impending collapse of the state in PNG and urged the Australian government to intervene there (Windybank and Manning 2003; *Post-Courier* 13 March 2003, 31 March 2003), as well as after an ambiguous statement by Prime Minister Howard in June 2003 (Howard 2003a; Somare 2003a). Separate reports by the CIS and ASPI in 2004, arguing for a more active Australian commitment in PNG, elicited further condemnation by the PNG government (Hughes 2004; ASPI 2004; Rheeney 2004; Forbes 2004).

The ECP negotiations were a departure from earlier bilateral development aid relations and thus provided ample room for verbal posturing and mutual mistrust. The ECP was designed to improve Australia's standing aid relationship with its northern neighbour. In Australian eyes, the allocation of aid funds in PNG suffered from bad governance and corruption and did little to contribute to development.

In September 2003, Australia first advanced the proposal of a more active Australian involvement in the allocation of its aid to the PNG government, threatening cuts if misuse of aid were not curtailed. On 11 December 2003, despite initial resistance in Port Moresby, an agreement was reached. Under the ECP, Australia would send up to 230 police officers and 64 civil servants to work in the PNG police and bureaucracy to increase standards of work, help root out corruption and supervise the allocation of aid funds. It should be noted that, in contrast to RAMSI, the police officers would have been deployed in cooperation with the PNG government and alongside their local counterparts, instead of working independently. The ECP was scheduled to run over a five-year course at a total cost of AU\$800 m.

However, implementation of the program was delayed because agreement could not be reached on the sticky issue of whether the Australian police officers should have legal immunity during their deployment to PNG, as the Australian government demanded. In March 2004, negotiations were on the verge of breaking down. Nevertheless, in June 2004, another agreement was reached and the immunity request was granted. This provision, however, was struck down as unconstitutional by the PNG Supreme Court in May 2005, derailing the process once more. Immediately, the 154 Australian police officers already deployed were withdrawn, effectively suspending a key part of the ECP. Some 40 Australian officials continue to work in government agencies in Port Moresby, and further talks are scheduled between the two governments to come up with a new legal framework.

The ups and downs of the negotiation process were mirrored by the ebb and flow of verbal hostilities, threats, accusations and defences, during which the ‘failed state’ motive was invoked several times. For example, in the early stages, when there was still palpable resistance in PNG towards his proposed new initiative, Foreign Minister Downer linked Australian interests in PNG stability and the importance of its development aid with worries about a possible failure of the state:

[I]f we had Papua New Guinea collapse on our doorstep it would have enormous implications for the stability of our own country. [...] In the case of Papua New Guinea, I’m not saying it’s on the threshold of [state failure], but if we withdrew all of our aid I think it could. (Downer 2003d; see also Somare 2003b)

In comparison, his assessment of the state of PNG was much less gloomy after the initial agreement had been struck in late 2003 (Downer 2003f). In the same vein, Prime Minister Howard assumed a very assertive posture in March 2004 when negotiations were on the verge of breaking down, comparing PNG to the Solomon Islands and warning of the ‘big implications’ (Howard 2004) that state failure there would have for Australia.

Reactions to these statements were predictably defensive among PNG political elites. Ministers and bureaucrats expressed varying shades of distrust of Australian motives behind the ECP, with many seeing it as an instrument of neo-colonialism even though the general public, exasperated by endemic corruption and widespread lawlessness, supported the measure (Gomez 2004; *Post-Courier* 1 March 2004).

What is striking about the Australian discourse is the carefully modulated way in which the government would talk about PNG, sometimes strongly disavowing the idea of the state’s failure, sometimes going so far as to hint at the possibility itself. Occasionally, this was done by way of comparison to the Solomon Islands (eg in December 2003 and March 2004). The latter episode provides an especially clear illustration: when the ECP negotiations were in danger of breaking down over the immunity impasse, Prime Minister Howard said PNG was ‘in a very fragile state’ (Howard 2004). If one looks at this statement in the context of RAMSI and the great care with which the government is employing the label ‘failed state’, the worries this elicited on the PNG side seem much more understandable.

East Timor: Turning the Tables

In general, relations between Australia and East Timor have been friendly, not least because of Australian assistance in securing East Timor’s independence between 1999 and 2002. However, the relationship has been soured by the question of the sharing of revenues from maritime oil fields that both countries lay claim to. While this would usually be a matter of adjudication under international law, Australia has withdrawn from the relevant tribunals, instead opting for bilateral negotiations with East Timor. However, the subject matter is very complicated, not least because it involves several different oil fields, for some of which the two countries have already reached agreements regarding revenue sharing, if not sovereignty. Because the issue has still not been resolved conclusively, bilateral tensions have been building up since negotiations began in 2002. The intransigence of both countries can easily be understood when one considers that annual revenues of several billion Australian dollars are at stake.

For a while, the dispute was handled largely through quiet diplomacy. Even though tensions were already visible in early 2002 when the royalty-sharing agreement for the Bayu Undan field was negotiated, both parties tried to keep their disagreements out of public view. By 2004, however, there was still little progress in the negotiations about any of the other fields, not least because Australia refused to hold more than two meetings per year on the issue. On 19 April 2004, representatives of both governments met in Dili to talk about establishing a permanent maritime boundary. Before the meeting, Xanana Gusmao, president of East Timor, said in a newspaper interview that the dispute robbed East Timor of vital funds and claimed that without these resources, East Timor was destined to become a failed state: 'Without all this we will be another Haiti, another Liberia, another Solomon Islands, and we do not want that' (Fickling 2004). The same day, the charity Oxfam Community Aid Abroad published a report warning that East Timor was '[on] the brink of becoming a failed state through no fault of its own' (Oxfam Community Aid Abroad 2004, 2). Pointing out the similarities in these statements, Alexander Downer swiftly accused the East Timorese government of waging a PR campaign against Australia and arranged for East Timor's aid payments to be cut.

Verbal hostilities continued for the next several months. In May, Gusmao repeated his threat of East Timor's state failure (Hartcher 2004). Alexander Downer retorted that East Timor 'made a very big mistake thinking the best way to handle this negotiation is by trying to shame Australia, by mounting abuse on our country, accusing us of bullying, when you consider all we've done for East Timor' (Nichols 2004). After a four-month break, the talks restarted in August 2004. Under a preliminary agreement, East Timor would receive a larger share of the royalties from the Greater Sunrise field than previously agreed upon, which prompted one commentator to remark that the East Timorese strategy 'seems to have been at least partly successful' (Allard 2004a). But this optimistic spirit proved to be fleeting—the talks broke down again in October and have since continued at their previous slow pace.

By threatening its wealthy neighbour with its own state failure, East Timor attempted to use the label as a discursive resource. This measure took the Australians at their own words—since the Howard government had previously expressed its willingness, even its obligation, to prevent state failure from occurring in the South Pacific by whatever means necessary, it was impossible to downplay the importance of the whole affair. And, apparently, the tactic did pay some dividends, as a journalist noted in August 2004: 'Government sources said the Prime Minister has been concerned about Mr Downer's belligerence and was keen to secure East Timor's economic viability, recognising a failed state on Australia's doorstep was a major security threat' (Allard 2004a).

Conclusion

This paper has sought to investigate Mark Duffield's theory of the merging of development and security. It has identified state failure as the central unifying theme bringing together underdevelopment and insecurity. Noting a global trend of the securitisation of state failure, it has then conducted a case study of the Australian security discourse. Evidence from this case study allows for several conclusions.

Firstly, the securitisation of state failure has been completed in Australia's regional relations. All three criteria enunciated by Buzan, Waever and de Wilde have been fulfilled, including the effect on interstate relations. In the case of Australia,

securitisation has probably been even more complete than in most other countries. Australian security discourse has also quickly permeated the South Pacific (New Zealand remains an exception), which highlights the degree to which a regional hegemonic power can influence regional discourse. However, as the example of East Timor shows, developing countries are not as powerless as they might appear at first glance. By creatively appropriating the discourse for their own ends, these states can try to profit from the shift in security discourse, just as many Northern African and Middle East regimes try to capitalise on developed countries' fear of Islamic fundamentalism.

Secondly, the case study represents one piece of evidence in favour of Duffield's theory. The state represents the conceptual bridge between development and security, with failed states being the paradigmatic nexus between economic underdevelopment and insecurity. While the discourse around failed states used to be concerned with developmental and humanitarian issues, it has now acquired a security dimension that is crowding out other concerns. Issues of development are increasingly being perceived and treated as security concerns. Although this paper has mostly covered political discourse, a look at policy decisions leads to the same conclusion. For example, both RAMSI and the ECP were paid for by funds from AusAID, even though these initiatives substantially go beyond development purposes in the traditional sense of the term.

However, Duffield's theory should not be overstated. Development and security are still in the process of merging but, as yet, they have not been fully integrated. Evidence for this conclusion comes from emergent moves to securitise underdevelopment and poverty. While Duffield is of the opinion that underdevelopment has already been redefined as dangerous (2001, 28), this paper argues that, so far, securitising moves have been relatively circumspect and have not been accepted by their intended audiences. In Australia, some examples of these statements can be found. In October 2003, Alexander Downer connected the breakdown of state institutions to a lack of transparency and good governance, 'including open economic policy' (Downer 2003e). In a speech, Prime Minister Howard highlighted the link between poverty and terrorism. The solution, he said, would not be increased development aid but trade liberalisation (Allard 2004b). These statements shed light on the government's position that trade barriers create failed states, and failed states create terrorists. In this rationale, even economic and trade policy play a role in the war on terror. However, these statements support this paper's conclusion that it would be too early to speak of the securitisation of underdevelopment and poverty as complete, even if the process is already underway.

Thirdly, the merging of development and security has serious implications for development policy and development aid. During the Cold War, aid was used mostly to reward friendly regimes without regard to development prospects, but this was done covertly while upholding development policy's stated goal of improving standards of living. Now, the purpose of aid has been redefined—it is no longer employed for development but for conflict prevention (Duffield 2001, 35). The obvious danger is that if aid becomes a resource for conflict prevention and post-conflict reconstruction, then its allocation will follow security concerns. Aid will not go to those who need it most, but to those who seem to be the biggest threat.

Duffield's theory of the gradual merging of development and security is a wide-ranging explanation of current global trends. Therefore, the present study could only provide evidence from a small part of the politics that Duffield seeks

to explain. Further empirical work is necessary before the theory can be considered proven conclusively. Nevertheless, this paper has found Duffield's theory broadly confirmed. If the merging of development and security continues, we will see further changes in development and defence policies, possibly even an integration of these concerns into coherent frameworks and institutions. This raises the question as to what, if anything, 'security' and 'development' would still mean in such a context. It is too early to offer anything beyond speculation, but the conceptual questions that arise therefrom could very well be one of the major challenges for policy-relevant political science in the next decade or so.

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