

Self Reliance in Kenya

The Case of Harambee

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Rasmus Rasmusson

Scandinavian Institute of African Studies, Uppsala

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Foreword and Acknowledgements

Many African countries have now been independent for ten years or more. Planning — and implementation — for development has brought challenges, some success and some frustration.

Much of the frustration and the frequent inability to achieve broadly based rural development has to do with failure to grasp how development is perceived by the small man. Many government programmes, some of them aided and prodded by foreign donors, rest on very weak ground in terms of knowledge and appreciation of the aspirations of those who are to be "developed". The scale and scope of such programmes are often irrelevant or even alien to the nature of grass-roots development effort.

This realization has in most countries led to attempts at "bottom-up" development, assumed to improve self-reliance by more use of indigeneous resources, and assumed to improve performance by ensuring some popular participation and project design geared to local needs.

The Kenyan Harambee Self-help movement offers an interesting example of "bottom-up" development of more than one decade, with little and often no government financial support. The movement appears to reflect pragmatic local priorities and offers an opportunity to test what local people "really want". Harambee self-help existed before the ideological calls for self-reliant development, and raises the issue whether in fact ideological build-up can or should precede actual development efforts.

Almost everybody arriving in Kenya, dealing with Kenyan development prospects and problems, teaching students and doing research, or trying to explain about Kenya to outsiders, will find it necessary to know something about Harambee self-help as a development strategy, a way of filling needs, and a way of working and living in Kenya. One of the authors, Philip Mbithi, has lived with it all his life and found it a fundamental trait of Kenyan rural societies. The other author, Rasmus Rasmusson, found any reasonable analysis of Kenyan economic and social development dependent on first assessing Harambee. It was therefore natural for the authors to get together, compare notes on the literature and research on Harambee that already existed, and see what seemed to be the major gaps. The major gap was the lack of a study starting from the local level and encompassing all kinds of projects and activities labelled Harambee. There were a number of studies dealing with specific sectors, e.g. secondary schools or cattle dips; dealing with one particular area, e.g. Kitui district, or dealing with one particular aspect, e.g. the relationship between peripheral groups and a politically established Clite.

With the financial support of the Scandinavian Institute for African Studies,

the Ford Foundation, and the Swedish International Development Authority, it was possible for the authors to launch a nation-wide survey of grass-roots Harambee self-help with the active involvement of over sixty students of the Department of Sociology of the University of Nairobi and also a few students of the Department of Economics. The study was designed in close collaboration with all students, especially those in their final year of studies.

The immense volume of soft and hard data generated by the survey took some two years to summarize, assess, compile and re-assess. The support of the Swedish Agency for Research Cooperation with Developing Countries, and the Community Development Division of the Ministry for Housing and Social Services helped us financially and technically in compiling the data; the latter organisation giving us access to its quarterly self-help statistics as part of their request to us to analyse the employment effects of Harambee.

The survey results are presented in considerable detail in this book. The reader will also find a list of the areas surveyed and available literature on Harambee and related subjects at the end of the book (References and Appendix 1).

Much of the book deals with regional differences in Harambee. A reader less familiar with Kenya may find the maps at the end of this foreword useful for familiarizing himself with the great variety in Kenya's ecology and ethnic composition.

Administratively, Kenya is divided into eight provinces: Central, Eastern, Rift Valley, Western, Nyanza, Coast, North-Eastern and (the city of) Nairobi.

There are very wide ecological and ethnic variations within most of these provinces. The most homogeneous are Central, Nyanza and Western, all with reasonably high rainfall, good soil, developed agriculture and inhabited by the three largest ethnic groups: the Kikuyus, Luos and Abaluhyas respectively. Rift Valley, Eastern and Coast Provinces each contain wide variations between high-potential agricultural land, and very dry areas. Part of Eastern Province is inhabited by the fourth largest ethnic group: the Akamba. Finally, North-Eastern Province, like large parts of Eastern, Rift Valley and Coast, is dry pastoral land or semi-desert, inhabited by nomads.

90 per cent of Kenya's 13.5 million people live in rural areas, and 70 per cent work in agriculture.

In this book the reader will meet with a lot of Kenya Administration terms. The most important administrative units of Kenya and the major officials at the corresponding levels are listed in Appendix II.



The provinces of Kenya, animal communities and ecological regions
(from F. F. Ojany and R. B. Ogendo, Kenya: A Study in Physical and Human Geography)



Ethnic groups
(from F. F. Ojany and R. B. Ogendo, Kenya: A Study in Physical and Human Geography)

I. Introduction

General Introduction

Harambee is a term used in the discussion of economic and social development in Kenya, just as similar concepts are used in many other developing countries all over the world. Similar terms used elsewhere include such terms as "Ujamaa" in Tanzania and "humanism" in Zambia. Harambee is more than a propaganda phrase and contrary to some opinions, Harambee is not a means by which peasants in Kenya are manipulated by the élite. Especially in rural areas of Kenya, Harambee self-help is estimated to contribute over 30 per cent of development investment and is an important way of life which is founded on indigeneous social institutions.

Government documents indicate how keen the government of Kenya is to expand Harambee so that it becomes a way of life and a strategy of development for all Kenyans. The purpose of this book is to present a systematic analysis of Harambee for purposes of future policy decisions, for students of peasant movements and those interested in self-reliance as an approach to overall national development.

The Concept of Harambee

Harambee as a concept, meaning collective effort, "pull together", is not new to Kenya. The concept embodies ideas of mutual assistance, joint effort, mutual social responsibility, community self-reliance. It is applied in day-to-day life in such ways as collective neighbourhood house-building, weeding, bush clearing, irrigation, harvesting and fund raising. The term is found in the languages of many tribes of Kenya; the Luo call it *Konyir Rende,* the Luhya call it Obwasio, the Kikuyu call it Ngwatio, the Kamba call it Mwethia and the Masai call it Ematonyok.

The concept of Harambee is indigeneous to Kenya. It was applied to the activities of a village or neighbourhood, in the activities of age and sex groupings and was supported by the value of mutual self-assistance. In analysing its indigenous form among the Nyeri Kikuyu and the Kamba, Mbithi (1971) and Mutiso (1970) show that the basic social units involved in this form of social exchange were female groups differentiated in terms of functions by age and often by kinship and mixed kin groups such as clans, neighbourhood or village groups. Although very structurally specific, the associations were voluntary and hence to maintain a high degree of solidarity and effectiveness the

group norms, membership and participation values and other criteria were very specific.

Thus, before independence Harambee was a grass-roots form of social exchange of labour and other forms of mutual assistance. The concept became a national slogan, a motto on the national crest and a rally cry on Madaraka Day in June 1963 when the President of Kenya, Mzee Jomo Kenyatta formally made it such. After this day, Harambee is used to denote collective effort, community self-reliance, cooperative enterprises and all forms of collective self-reliance. Nationally, Harambee self-help development effort is distinct from other development activities. Some of the generalized characteristics of Harambee which will be tested later in the book include the following:—

(a) Harambee self-help projects reflect a bottom-up rather than a top-down development project initiation. Harambee projects are normally initiated, planned, implemented and maintained by local communities. The validity of this generalization will be tested in other chapters of this book.

(b) Harambee self-help activities are heavily biased towards the use of local resources such as human labour, local power such as oxen, donkeys, camels, the use of local materials in construction such as wooden structures, earth-bricks, grass thatch, and the use of donations in kind such as donations of livestock, food, individual material property.

(c) The participation of individuals in Harambee self-help is guided by the principle of the collective good rather than individual gain. In emphasising the principle of collective good, participation is organised in such a way that the self-image of each individual is reinforced and enhanced. This is often through public praise of each contributor. The effort then is meaningful to the individual in terms of his psychological needs for identity, committment, re-assurance and worth and also in terms of the individual's membership in active traditionally and politically legitimate groups.

(d) The choice of projects is guided by the principle of satisfying the immediate need of participating members and groups. This local level ideology, which can be summarized as "enlightened community and collective self-interest" is a very typical criterion for project choice. In most cases, it is what the group feels is needful which determines whom the group associates with, which resource mobilization strategy would be effective and what incentives, catch phrases would be appropriate to increase committment.

The economic significance of Harambee is crucial. Table 1 shows that it is estimated that between 1967 and 1973, Harambee contributed 11.4% of the overall national development expenditure. As Aanes (1975) shows, 43 per cent of all enrolled students in Kenya's secondary schools attended non-government assisted Harambee schools. Between 1967 and 1973 Harambee contributed over 40 per cent of the overall national development expenditure to education and controlled over 62 per cent of all secondary schools in the country. Harambee investment dominates all investment within certain sectors. This is borne out in Table 1. Harambee investments in certain rural development sectors are in fact larger than national development investment. Overall Harambee contributions

Table 1. Comparative government development expenditure and Harambee investments, '000 £ K., 1965—1972

	1965/66		1966/67		1967168		1968169		1969170		1970171		1971/72		Total 1966/67—71/72		Ratio Hrb./ Govt.
	Govt	Hrb.	Govt.	Hrb.	Govt.	Hrb.	Govt	Hrb	Govt.	Hrb.	Govt.	Hrb.	Govt.	Hrb.	Govt.	Hrb.	%
Agriculture	7,800	—	9,765	159	7,307	290	7,968	176	4,096	279,3	3,697	304,1	5,269	500.3	38,372	1,709	4 4
Roads	3,397	—	3,901	57.6	6,060	88.7	7,385	44	8,080	39.6	13,644	29 5	17,596	40.6	56,666	300	0.6
Water Supplies	507	—	593	76.7	825	124	654	104	854	135.4	778	233.1	1.308	204.5	5,012	877.7	17.5
Education	1,238	—	1,106	1,125.8	2,963	1,481	3,258	1,220	1,914	1,305.6	1,687	1,361	2,456	1,686.3	13,384	8,180.5	61.1
Health	243	—	230	222 4	872	286.6	1,550	233.6	2,056	193 8	2,626	166.9	2,601	189.9	9,935	1,293	13.0
Housing, Buildings & Domestic	466	—	1,392	565.4	819	379.8	2,000	293	1,341	304.4	2,721	383.3	3,158	174.8	11,381	2,100	18.5
Fishenes	91	—	61	6	145	—	152	—	51	—	353	—	394	—	1,146	6	0.6
Community Dev																	
Sports	66	—	59	123.9	80	109.8	85	233.6	133	193.8	613	166.9	—	189.9	970	1,022	105.4
Total of Sectors above (rounded figures)	13,808	1,200	17,057	2,357	19,071	2,761	23,052	2,305	18,525	2,452	26,119	2,651	32,782	2,986	136,606	15,512	11.4

Hrb = Harambee

SOURCE Calculated from Development Plans 1970--1974, 1974—1978, Harambee self-help Report — Ministry of Co-operatives and Social Services 1972 and Statistical Abstract 1973. Government expenditure 1969170 taken from Development Estimates 1969/70 Sectoral distribution of Harambee expenditure 1965166 not available at time of writing.

in the field community development, such as community centres and recreation, exceeded government investment for most years during the period 1965 to 1972. In 1967 Harambee contributions to health projects and education were very close to matching government investment and the close ties with the field of education have been maintained from 1967 to 1972.

But perhaps the more significant contribution of Harambee is through its ability, as a development strategy, to increase significantly the mobilization of hitherto unavailable or immobile resources. It is a common feature in Harambee meetings to see women and men contributing their personal property such as beads and ear-rings, eggs, foods and artifacts which the income tax collector can never obtain. It is usual for people to work, dance and work day in and day out, hungry, cold, thirsty and un-complaining on a project they are strongly committed to. When this is compared with participation in pre-independence forced labour or to development efforts initiated by local governments before 1965, such as construction of roads, community halls and dispensaries, the maintenance of market places, etc., the performance of Harambee is outstanding.

The environment of Harambee

An interpretation of why Harambee is possible in Kenya is a complex analytical process. One of the most useful ways of approaching such an exercise is to develop in outline form all factors which appear, from an empirical perspective, to have a bearing on Harambee. Such factors would include the nature of economic planning, resource allocation and development, political realities and ideological cues, social organisation etc.

Planned development

Kenya's development planning from 1945 up to 1965 was based on a fundamental belief that all development occurs with planning.[1] The goals of development were largely technical goals such as increased output in all sectors of the economy, increased food production and expanded urban investment. The technical goal of development was the increased effective use of resources.

Thus planning in Kenya from 1945 to 1965 provides us with a framework for identifying the possible role of the bottom-up Harambee development effort. The technical planning exercise characteristic of this period can be summarized as outlined in Figure I.

The planning approach outline above makes some very serious assumptions, viz:

[1] 1945, the end of First World War, saw the beginning of detailed sectoral planning, especially in agriculture. 1965 saw the beginning of comprehensive post-independence planning. Kenya's first Five Year Plan was the 1966–70 Plan.

Figure I. *Diagnostic planning and project initiation*



(a) That any action programme determined through some form of baseline fact-finding, which exposes "casual" factors, will be necessary and sufficient to improve the situation. The collorary assumption is that social science fact-finding techniques and designs can supply causal relationships unchallenged by competing hypotheses, problems of assessing temporal sequence of causation, problems of representativeness and precision of data.

(b) That the recipients of planned programmes can be generalized into uniform systems, that there are insignificant micro-level variations within the systems and their production rationale can be ignored and/or assumed away.

(c) That self-generating development can be introduced through superior abstract planning which is insensitive to various localized development contexts. That development activities do not have to be learned or accommodated and thus the need for creating a realistic environment for relating plan programmes to unspecific local experience and issues is not really serious.

(d) That there is an irreversible direction of transfer of knowledge; from advanced systems to grass-roots systems. That there is a determinable favourable healthy direction of change towards which clients' activities can be redirected. That to the planner the problem and goal of change is as simple as sickness and health respectively.

It will be obvious from the above assumptions that the planner takes certain implied issues for granted. The planning model outlined, replete with its assumptions takes as given *the availability of all relevant data.* To impute causal relationships to know how to manipulate production systems, one assumes intimate knowledge of the total system and patterns of causation. In East Africa,

where data about the basic production systems, the peasants or even the industrial sectors is notoriously thin, the ability "to plan without data" has become a necessary status symbol. The ability to deliver a technically sound plan shares credibility only with computer print-outs and we rarely question the input. Data garbage which has face-validity is often used without any checks.

The result is all too often familiar. Scholars at the University of Nairobi have shown that such abstract planning leads to:

(i) *Miscomprehension* of plans and projects. For example social halls may be under-utilized and cattle dips unmaintained because of the failure of local populations to appreciate their utility.

(ii) *Suspicion* of the motives of developers especially when plans do not fit with any locally perceived priorities. In the words of one Senior Government Official in Kenya:

> In Kenya we are witnessing people turing away from government programmes, because government has never, in my experience, identified what people need. In this area, water is a major problem yet government plans indicate programmes for roads, land reform . . .

(iii) *Development & total dependency:* the increase of the expectation that government will do everything was fostered by centralized irrelevant planning which never raises any response from local communities who in the long run learn that response is not really necessary.

(iv) *Planning without data:* a practice of estimating development needs at the centre using limited information often leads to irrelevant goals, under- or over-supply of resources, faulty project phasing and critical bottlenecks in project implementation. **A** well-known example in Kenya was the planning in 1954 of a livestock stock-marketing programme on the basis of observation of livestock numbers through field-glasses from a hill. Such planning leads to incapacity to anticipate local resistance or fully utilize local potential especially by failing to adapt technical prescriptions to specific situations.

A pragmatic approach to development indicates that production systems operate an essentially multidimensional reality. If we use the farm for example, we note that farming and agricultural change is in essence a systematic change in a people's way of life, that farming subsumes technical as well as cultural parameters which are inseparable.

The farm household, for example, can be conceived for planning purposes, as living in a dynamic and fluid environment, one that is full of complex cognitions, values, beliefs, artifacts, messages and ideas, and one that is changing. Each householder and farm decision-maker is seen as a responsive and adaptive actor, attempting to cope with his teaming world. He is a member of a complex environment with conflicting demands e.g. the need to pay taxes, send children to school, buy improved seeds, insulate the family against witchcraft, accommodate complex family obligations, etc. The farm decision-maker lives in a community with complex socio-metric interaction networks such as age-sex groupings, professional groupings, with their variable behavioral prescriptions

and time demands.

Such a farm household must and is always processing these diverse complimentary and contradictory meaning areas into such operational terms that they emerge as integrated functional activities, farm activities, social activities, etc. Conceptually, the farmer sees his farm not in disconnected segments but as a cohesive whole, a production-cultural unit, the absolute personalization of his and his family's life. To him the community becomes a means of denoting legitimacy in associations as diverse as cooperatives, age groups, church committees, self-help participation, institutions such as land tenure, marriage and family and also production and allocation processes.

Similar analyses could be made for other production systems such as the family business, professional activities, and basic activities of most change institutions whose self-image, expansionistic and protective behaviour links them to predatory biological organisms with defensible territories.

On the other hand, planners and implementors use discrete academically convenient segmentation of reality into sectors and departments such as agriculture, health, community development, administration, political party, commerce, industry, etc. Such segmentation when reinforced by different technical frames of reference leads organisations to dramatize their uniqueness, the autonomy of their developmental packages. It is common knowledge that such institutions are often in open conflict and often sabotage one another's projects. In the case of agricultural development, a farmer is often a victim of confusing prescriptions. He is often the recipient of discrete messages: let us assume they are from the community development officer on local community projects, the agricultural officer on fertilizers to buy, the administrator on his arrears in taxes, the medical officer on malnutrition and food crops required, and then of course the witch doctor on what colour of hen to kill to cure his oldest wife's arthritis.

The government view of rural change has differed from that of the farming communities, and these differences in outlook have been further accentuated by Clitist and paternalistic attitude of change agents. For instance, fertilizer or marketing agencies are often poorly organised, uncoordinated and competitive. Change agents being untrained in communicating ideas, tend to use a paternalistic authoritarian approach towards rural people. However, the farmer's "decision on how to organise his labour will take into account the existing sex-task, age-task and time-task taboos, community demands on his family's labour, and competing social activities such as ceremonies, dances, self-help visits and barazas... The rejection of an important technical package (the content of most extension messages) is normally based on a rejection of its social implications" (Mbithi).[2]

Since central sectorial planning is done by the educated and income-wise élite of the nation, barriers in communication and feed-back to those planners from the people are created. This reduces the legitimacy and effectiveness of

[2] Mbithi, P. Rural Sociology and Rural Development: Its Application to Kenya East African Literature Bureau, Nairobi, 1974.

government programmes and retards development. Only a few of those locally perceived as leaders are active as change agents in agricultural development. Local entrepreneurs, teachers, pastors, clan leaders, rain doctors and the farmers themselves are usually not part of extension efforts.

For many farmers, therefore, agricultural development is not perceived as a very attractive opportunity. Government-sponsored cash crop programmes directed at individual farmers have failed to cater for the communal spirit. As a result of the technical and cultural gap between change agents on one hand and most local leaders and communities on the other, locally conceived social development programmes and projects are perceived as more attractive and more relevant than agricultural and economic development.

The élitist and sectorial biases of governmental rural development efforts have been further aggravated by faulty choice of scale. Chambers[3] points out, as an experience gained in the Special Rural Development Programme, that extension efforts by-pass the poorer strata of communities:

> The extension workers may be largely invisible to Senior officials but, worse, the poorer people are almost invisible to the extension workers. It is not just that they neglect them: they do not see them... There are only a few measures that can help those who are worse off which are not intensive in their demands on field staff, among them is the sale of inputs in small packages...

Concentration on the problems of larger farms applies to the work of the research stations, to input size and form, to the attentiveness of extension and marketing agents, and possibly even to infrastructural investment. All this further decreases the relative attractiveness of economic agricultural development efforts by the majority of the farmers, who are small-scale.

A final characteristic of government development programmes that might further decrease the attractiveness of agricultural efforts is their *relative inflexibility to local reaction.* After a long period of planning, government resources may be applied without the kind of adjustments to local reaction that could result in more widespread or greater implementation.

An example given by Chambers is the repeated attempts of the Kenya Department of Agriculture to persuade reluctant farmers to plant cotton. The less cotton these farmers grow, the greater will be the problem and the resources devoted to persuading them to grow more. More flexible opportunity orientation would have directed attention to a search for crops which would have been more rewarding to the farmers.

The picture that students of development get from casual analysis of planning and implementation of development is one of chaos managed through the development of strategic myopia in each respective sector and ministry. It is one where the recipient of change is irrelevant and his frustrations are seen as annoying childish side-lines.

The implications of such planning for the emergence of Harambee are easy to see. As mentioned earlier, such planning may lead to miscomprehension,

[3] Chambers, R. *Managing Rural Development.* Ideas and experience from East Africa. Scandinavian Institute of African Studies, Uppsala, 1974.

suspicion and rejection of projects planned from the centre. But more often, such projects are tolerated and exploited whenever possible. They are seen as manifestations of how government often does things and the irrelevancy of failure to meet local needs is often seen as characteristic of centrally planned projects.

To the grass-roots population therefore, central planning always leaves development gaps. These gaps may be failure to meet immediate local needs, or insufficient resources for specific development. The gaps in development could become serious sources of frustration, political lobbying and local attempts to establish direct links with the central planners to ensure access to resources. Such frustration, especially accompanied by failure to attract attention may also lead to the emergence of attempts to organise local efforts to meet some of the more acutely felt needs.

Resource allocation and relative deprivation

The concept of relative deprivation is used by sociologists to describe situations where individuals and groups articulate their assets (material, psychological and otherwise) negatively and assign their loss to the perceived advantage of other individuals or groups. For example, when farmers feel relatively deprived vis-à-vis city folk, they articulate their losses by specifying how city folk pay very little for farm produce, how they obtain high and regular wages, how they have more doctors per unit of population than rural people, how they have all the amenities and how the government continues to divert more national resources to urban areas. The concept of relative deprivation therefore is an ingroup trait and may lead to the development of a collective expression of marginality. It may also lead to aggression against the favoured parties or it may lead to aggressive competitiveness in an attempt to shift the pattern of advantages.

Resource allocation to different development areas is always carefully evaluated by local leaders and any advantages to any region are carefully assessed. In Kenya, planners have not paid full attention to resource distribution. We present below a discussion of this problem in specific areas.

Differential access to schooling and formal employment

One of the most important keys to the process of national development is the provision of education and training for children and adults. Education in Kenya is the main vehicle for social mobility status, wealth and success. Since all primary education is not yet either universal or free, there must be substantial concern for those who gain none of the advantages it offers for building their capacities, and thus the capacity of the nation, because they either never attend school or drop out at a very early stage. An examination of the figures for school attendance indicates that this group is not a random selection of young people,

Table 2. *Regional variation in school enrolment*

City/Province	Primary School Enrolment 1969		Secondary School Enrolment 1970 and 1972	
	Total Enrolment	Percentage of Total Provincial Population	Percentage of Relevant Age Group Attending School 1970	1972
Nairobi	60,944	11	18.0	16.8
Mombasa	N.A.	N.A.	13.0	12.8
Central	311,970	19	9.2	10.7
Western	169,930	12	6.2	7.7
Eastern	269,652	14	5.1	6.4
Coast	76,805	8	3.5	4.5
Nyanza	206,452	9	3.8	4.4
Rift Valley	183,233	8	3.6	4.1
North Eastern	3,301	1	0.6	1.2
Total	1,282,297	10.3	6.2	7.1

Sources: Ministry of Education *Annual Report* and *Population Census* 1969.
K. Kinyanjui, The Distribution of Educational Resources and Opportunities in Kenya, IDS, Discussion Paper 208, University of Nairobi, 1974.

but varies significantly from one region of the country to another and between the sexes. This variation is embarassingly close to ethnically determined variation.

The level of primary enrolment varies from 19 per cent of the total population in Central Province to as little as 1 per cent in North Eastern Province. If the provincial figures are disaggregated one discovers great disparities between districts, but most importantly, that all the semi-arid to arid areas have very low rates. It is not only North Eastern Province but also the drier areas of Coast, Eastern and Rift Valley Provinces which send few pupils to primary school, and which are, therefore, largely barred from many forms of wage employment.

Whereas Murang'a and Kiambu sent almost all their children in the relevant age groups to primary school in 1971,[4] districts like Samburu and Wajir sent only 19 and 9 per cent respectively.

The conclusions to be drawn from this brief examination of school enrolments are that certain areas of the country are still unable to offer many candidates of either sex to school system and thus indirectly, to the formal labour market. A recent survey of incomes in Nairobi indicates how important this is for access to jobs and the expectation of raising one's income. Data from this survey indicates that secondary schooling provides a 161 per cent advantage over primary schooling and that "the single most important variable in explaining the logarithm of an individual's hourly earnings is the level of edccational attainment".[5]

[4] K. Kinyanjui, The Distribution of Educational Resources and Opportunities in Kenya, IDS, Discussion Paper 208, University of Nairobi, 1974. Figures for Murang'a and Kiambu are actually 107 and 103 per cent due to repeaters and overage pupils.
[5] G. E. Johnson, "Determinants of Individual Hourly Earnings in Kenya", IDS Discussion Paper No. 99, University of Nairobi, 1971, p. 22.

Most parents and school age children are aware of this very important relationship between education and occupational and social mobility. The place of educational projects in Harambee activities has already been mentioned and will be discussed in detail later.

Regional Imbalances

Table 3 provides a comparison of some important indices of general development.

Table **3.** *Distribution of Social Services 1970*

Province	Percentage of Total Population	Percentage of School Enrolment 1970 Primary	Secondary	Percentage of NHC[1] Housing Expenditure 1970	Number of People Per Hospital Bed	Per Medical Practitioner
Rift Valley	20.4	14.7	12.1	6.0	820	1755
Nyanza	19.4	16.1	13.1	1.2	1269	2219
Eastern	17.4	20.2	13.6	2.4	834	1734
Central	15.3	24.9	22.9	15.1	766	1287
Western	12.3	13.1	10.1	2.9	1033	3569
Coast	8.6	6.3	9.3	7.2	511	707
Nairobi	4.4	4.4	18.7	65.2	152	84
North-Eastern	2.2	0.3	0.2		1308	1230
Whole Country	100 0	100.0	100.0	100.0	715	871

Source: Economic Survey 1971, Chapters 15 and 16.

[1] NHC – National Housing Corporation.

Regional imbalances in access to such advantages as roads, education, health services and other development projects are closely related to distances from the centre i.e. the major urban centres and high potential agricultural regions.

In the earlier discussion we pin-pointed education as a critical factor in the discussion of inequality and felt needs of grass-roots populations. It is important to draw out yet another factor, that is the provision of health services. In 1970, Nairobi had over 3,200 hospital beds out of a total of 14,000 hospital beds in the country, that is about 23 per cent of the beds available for about 2.5 per cent of the total population. No other province has such a high total. It is interesting to note that about 36 per cent of all the hospital beds in the country are concentrated in and around Nairobi, within a very small radius. Thus, although recurrent and development expenditure on health has increased rapidly in recent years, there is still a maldistribution of facilities. Medical practitioners nearly doubled between 1960 and 1970, growing from 766 to 1,437; while registered and enrolled nurses grew from 3,219 to 7,634; midwives from 1,448 to 3,347 and dentists from 52 to 87. As indicated in Table **3,** the number of people per medical practitioner still correlates highly with the

number of people per hospital bed, showing that most of the growth in private practice follows the pattern set by the public institutions and hence a high concentration of services in urban areas.

Economic Growth Patterns

In our effort to understand why Harambee was possible in Kenya, it is important to glance briefly at the patterns of economic development and draw inference on its impact on all categories of Kenyan population. In studying these growth patterns it is important to note that 90 per cent of Kenya's population is rural and only about 20 per cent of the total population is in wage employment. These two observations indicate that the majority of the population are in non-wage activities and are self-employed. Of the rural population, about 70 per cent are peasant farmers, 12 per cent are pastoralists. It can be inferred therefore that the majority of the population would not participate directly in economic activities outside agriculture and service sectors (see Table 4).

Table 4. *Distribution of Labour Force in 1960 (per cent)*

Country	Agriculture	Manufacture Mining	Services	Total
Ethiopia	88.0	4.5	7.5	100
Tanzania	89.4	3.8	6.8	100
Kenya	85.0	5.1	9.1	100
Malawi	92.4	2.8	4.8	100
Sudan	85.7	6.2	8.1	100
Zambia	78.6	7.0	14 4	100

Source: Labour Force Projections 1965—1985, Part II, Africa, Geneva 1971

Table 5 represents an outline of actual and projected rates of growth from different sectors of the economy. These growth rates, as implied above, occur within sectors where the populations participating are limited—i.e. by virtue of wage employment and control of basic production resources. Even within agriculture, the growth figures represent growth in monetary activities e.g. cash crops as contrasted with family subsistence production. Thus the impressive record rate of growth upto 1974 should also be interpreted as leading to growth in disparities.

The ILO/UNDP Mission report (1972) is very specific about this. In drawing out the cost of inaction in introducing desired changes in the structure of the economy they state:

> There are disquieting features in the present situation which make action urgent now: the rapid increase in population in relation to the limited supply of high potential land; the possibility of more serious foreign exchange constraints in the future than in the past; the accumulating frustration of the swelling number of youths with education-fed high aspiration for modern jobs. (p. 29)

In their analysis of economic problems in the country the mission pointed out that the Kenyan economy is characterized by the tendency for Nairobi and other urban areas to grow at the expense of the rural areas; of the richer regions to grow faster than the poorer areas; all leading to growing imbalances between regions and different groups of the population e.g. between men and women, pastoralists and cash croppers, educated and non-educated.

As will be discussed later, one of the critical contributions of Harambee is to attack these problems through the most disadvantaged groups such as women.

Table 5. *Growth Rates of Kenyan Economy by Sectors*

Sector of the Economy Monetary	Output				Investment		
	Average Growth		Share of Total Percentage		Average Growth	Share of Total Percentage	
	1964–72	1972–78[1]	1972	1978[1]	1972–78	1972	1978[1]
Agriculture	6.5	6.7	14.0	13.5	6.7	9.7	8.1
Forestry	6.3	9.0	0.6	0.7	20.1	0.2	0.3
Fishing	3.6	5.0	0.2	0.2	—	—	—
Mining and Quarrying	6.7	16.9	0.5	0.8	16.0	1.3	2.0
Manufacturing and Repairing	8.1	10.2	12.1	14.1	4.4	17.9	13.8
Construction	9.5	7.2	3.4	3.3	8.5	4.6	4.4
Electricity and Water	7.8	9.0	1.4	1.5	18.9	7.1	11.8
Transport Communications	7.0	7.2	7.2	7.1	8.5	13.1	12.6
Wholesale and Retail Trade	6.1	7.2	10.0	9.9	8.5	3.5	3.4
Other Enterprises and Household Production	7.9	7.2	11.7	11.6	8.5	16.2	15.7
Government	9.9	10.1	16.8	19.4	11.7	19.8	22.9
Non-monetary	3.8	3.8	22.1	17.9	3.8	6.6	5.0

Source: Development Plan 1974–1978, Pages 149–151

[1] The figures were projected in 1972 and serve only to show relative magnitudes owing to the current economic recession which was felt more acutely in Kenya by the beginning of 1974.

Political Factors

Political activities which normally determine the pattern of control of resources and national guidance, form the context within which one can understand the foregoing discussion of economic issues of deprivation and inequality. For example, the political climate is one of the factors which may determine whether regional economic disparities will be an explosive issue or not, whether communities and regions will develop inward and introspective traits or identify with the political or economic centres and whether the political and economic centres will be one entity or different power blocks.

Mutiso and Godfrey (1973) present a chronological outline of political development which appears to be useful for our purposes. They argue that 1962 to 1965 was a period when the ruling party, Kenya African National Union

(KANU), suppressed regionalism by absorbing leaders of Kenya African Democratic Union (KADU) and Akamba Peoples Party (APP). They argue that although this was effective at the national level, it created conflict between KANU groups who had been associated with the party at its beginning and at independence and those who had not. This was administratively contained within the second measure in suppressing regionalism by the strengthening of the provincial administration. The provincial commissioners became confirmed in their role as the agents of the centre, a role which became increasingly important with the abolition of the politically semi-autonomous regions in 1964 and the introduction of licences for political meetings. They argue that 1965—1969 was the period during which two important processes took place. Firstly the "party-line" leaders consolidated their position within KANU. Their rigid enforcement of a more conservative party line displaced several national leaders who moved into competition at the district level. The second process therefore was the emergence of national level leaders at the periphery, who exploited the already mushrooming Harambee groups. They argue that the bitterest political in-fighting between 1966 and 1969 was in the Harambee groups. The provincial administration reacted to this exploitation of Harambee groups by attempting to control Harambee and banning those which they regarded as blatant covers for politicians.

In their analysis therefore, they see Harambee as gaining momentum in 1966, through its exploitation by the displaced "national" leaders. The eventual loss of conspicuous strength of KANU from 1969 to the present-day saw the increasing strength of local politics and the chances for political mobility offered by Harambee.

Concurrently another equally important development was taking place. Before independence, nationalist ideology was couched in such slogans that it appeared to promise easy things and increased material well-being soon after the colonialists and imperialist exploiters left. This led to rising expectations of what independence would deliver. The 1962—1965 period was therefore one of gradual disillusionment with the realities of post-independence self-reassessment and apparent breach of promise by the leaders. The year 1965 witnessed the publication of Sessional Paper No. 10 on African Socialism calling on self-reliance and hard work. This document also coincided with the publication of the first post- independence Five Year Development Plan, again emphasizing the harsh realities of development, the need for hard work, self-reliance and reduced dependency on government.

Social Organisation

Social psychologists argue that for individuals to develop and sustain their identity and self-image, they should be reinforced by all stimuli emanating from their social environment. They argue that individuals belong to groups, partially to satisfy their craving for companionship, acceptance, encouragement and

to constantly bounce their world view against those of the group or of specific members of the group. Reference group theory of behaviour specifies these relationships and guides us to the conclusion that participation in groups has a fundamental psychological component whose importance has never been carefully drawn out from among other incentive factors such as material rewards.

Ethno-scientists on the other hand argue that the assocational networks of many individuals operate within a specific cultural media. They argue that every human collectivity has a specific way of interpreting reality and that this way differs from others in that it has been developed over time from experiences of men and their adaptive responses to their physio-cultural environment. Thus, over time any collectivity develops a specific world view which attains uniformity and leads to coherent value and belief systems.

These two perspectives indicate how those surviving indigeneous organisational forms or collectivities still retain emotional and other psychological attractions for the majority non-élite Kenyan population. They have traditional legitimacy, and the validity of test over time.

In discussing the indigeneous social groups relevant to Harambee, Martin Hill (1973), Mbithi (1971) and Mutiso (1972) pin-point all indigeneous forms of associations such as age-groups, sex groups, neighbourhood work parties, religious congregations, kinship groups, professional association. They indicate that these groups have highly rationalized social control principles, clear group ideology and adequate logic as to why members should participate or not. The following case study outlines some of the salient issues.

A Typical Self-Help Scene: Eastern Kenya

In a typical self-help project, participants walk to the project site from the sublocation and surrounding areas. Those representing special groups such as clans are provided with transport by their groups. The first to arrive start playing drums or singing and some dance short rhythms just as assemblies in traditional dances usually start. Each specific group assembles under its flag which may be marked with the sign of its totem e.g. the lion, the eagle, and specific colours. All groups assemble in a general dance or work formation. The dignitaries such as the chief, headman, clan leaders, project committee members, visiting politicians and wealthy businessmen and citymen sit near the table of the Master of Ceremonies. The local clans normally prepare food and supply water and local young men act as marshals, dance partners and general handimen.

As all expected participants arrive the tempo of work and dance increases as each group attempts to out-perform its neighbour and as they attempt to catch the eye of the dignitaries. The Master of Ceremonies will from time to time interrupt activities to make announcements. For example, he will outline the aims of the project, the possible benefits of the project to all involved, the probable external and government assistance. He will introduce the dignitaries and request them to contribute. All contributions are announced publicly and all sing songs of praise to the contributor. If contributions are meagre, the songs will exhalt the wealth

of the conspicuously rich and appeal to their love for their local area. As contributions shift to non-dignitaries, the Master of Ceremonies will interrupt work and dance. "Stop dancing everyone. I have a nice surprise for you. Our School Committee, a body of men dedicated to the education of our children has donated a bull for all of you to eat", — general clapping of hands, drum rhythm and songs, "and has given to this building project sixty shillings". Or he would shout suddenly, "Musau son of Muli has donated fifty cents". Clapping and general attempt to see who Musau is. Musau is pleasantly embarassed. He grins, dances or waves. Donations which continue to pour in may be money, eggs, poultry, food, cement, a lorry full of sand or even the land on which the project stands.

It will be seen from the description of a typical scene that:

(i) The social groups within which the individual operates are critical. It is within these groups that discipline is maintained. Fines are informally imposed for those who fail to turn up or perform sloppily. The roles are clear and include the captain, the song leader, the drummers, the rhythm setter, the flag bearer and the workers who move the soil, carry bricks or water, dig or cut.

(ii) The individual is still very important and his contribution is treated as very important however small.

(iii) The potential for getting to know other people, exchange gossip, form new alliances should not be under-estimated. Kenya's rural settlement patterns — apart from those in the Coastal belt — are the scattered homestead type and occasions for getting together have become increasingly restricted due to a general Christian religious ban on most forms of indigeneous associations. For example, all dances were seen as immoral, most ritual parties such as traditional baptism, circumcision and rites of passage were discouraged. Irrespective of the proportion of the population which is Christian, most people are aware of this ban and prefer not to offend their neighbours who may be Christian. Thus Harambee forms the only widely accepted mixture of dance, work and song.

II. Conceptual and Empirical Interpretation of Harambee

The role of theory in this book will be seen as that of presenting comprehensive and carefully argued out interpretations and generalizations about Harambee. A theory is seen as a logical system built upon assumptions which have obvious face validity and tested statements.

Harambee has been interpreted in about two distinct but complimentary ways. The conceptual interpretations do not obviously exhaust all social science frames of reference and should be treated as means of helping the reader obtain a deeper perspective into the nature of Harambee.

Harambee as a solidarity movement

It is widely accepted by students of "collective behaviour" that phenomena as diverse as nationalism, strikes, sect movements, and even women's fashions share a common denominator. One way to characterize them is to say that they all reflect a sharp contrast, and often, opposition to policies held by the larger incorporating structure of which they are a part.

Harambee self-help groups can be included among the above categories. Their reactiveness is reflected in their selection of projects, their priorities as opposed to current government priorities and their reinforcement of traditional organisation. As will be shown later, Harambee groups appear to choose projects opposite to those that the local change agents would have chosen or recommended.

The term reactive sub-group or sub-system was coined by F.W. Young (1968) in a cross-cultural study of peasant and nativistic movements. The term, though useful, could not be operationalized easily and the term "solidarity" was substituted. It was defined as the degree to which the *social symbols, values, norms and organisational principles maintained by a group are organised to convey a unified and focused definition of the situation.* The term "definition of the situation" is synonymous with such as "meaning" "interpretation", "world view".

In terms of this orientation, the social group is seen as a unit which is organising diversity of meaning into a unified, integrated and coherent framework which approximates as operational culture. Thus the unified focus of specific groups will increase when:

(i) Such groups increase the delineation of their perceived uniqueness and create or adapt symbols of group identity so that membership is sharply defined. Such symbols for the Harambee movement will include such terms as "mabati women groups", literally denoting those female Harambee groups

whose original focus was to build houses using corrugated iron roofing; or "Mbai sya eitu", literally meaning women clan groups; or the Nyakinywa Harambee dancers.

(ii) Such groups increasingly dramatize their attributes. Dramatization is the manipulation of symbols so that particular meanings are given sharp relief. It is a communication strategy which involves the arrangement of the components of behaviour so that a particular focus is achieved. Thus such groups will design flags and use totem signs and uniforms to articulate their identity. They appoint their representatives through an elaborate ritual, and in Eastern Kenya these officials may go through a marriage ceremony when they are afterwards defined as "brides" to the local Harambee movement and are expected to meet their obligations diligently and with love.

(iii) Such groups increasingly show hostility towards individualism and develop ideological elaboration to rationalize the sanctity of the collectivity. Such internal defensive social control efforts are matched by external defensive activities where groups identify rivals. This leads to a sharpening of a calculus of group attributes. They develop rhetoric such as "we are struggling to educate our children as we cannot give them bows and arrows or spears to go out and hunt or raid. The pen is the new weapon". "We are bringing water to a starving land", "Our children are doomed to servitude to X or Y groups or tribes, if we fail to provide secondary education".

Coser (1954) has stressed the tendency of solidarity or reactive groups to search for rivals, enemies and on occasions to invent them. Harambee groups have frequently defined their lack of development as caused by the development of other groups. The concept of one group under-developing another is a very attractive concept to such groups.

However, it is useful to see Harambee groups as relatively quite similar and operating a development front in confrontation with central élite development. This confrontation arises, as indicated earlier, from the perceived irrelevancy of central planning and the disillusionment of the common man with the inability of post-independence government to meet the promises of the former nationalist leaders. It is clear then that the grass-roots can be seen as operating an essentially similar perception of the development reality with respect to central government development efforts.

However, the centre periphery disenchantment may be experienced through increased local inter-group conflict, clan against clan, one interest group against another, one region against another, one ethnic group against another, depending on the source of leadership and organisational base used to structure a Harambee unit. The leadership role is to articulate the parameters of relative deprivation. In Kenya this occurred between 1962 and 1967 under conditions of rising expectations for everyone, creating an overall environment of frustration and a very clear estimation of what was needed. By 1966, after the 1964--1970 Development Plan, reviewed in 1966, and also after the Sessional Paper No. 10, 1965, it became clear that government planning was not likely to get at what people considered to be critical areas. More roads, more credit

to progressive farmers and traders, more extension workers focussing on the 10 per cent progressive, more competition for relatively decreasing chances at government schools, all this left the bulk of the population bewildered and potentially aggressive. Roling (1973) and Mbithi (1973) have noted cases of increased drunkedness and rural thuggery while Wiper (1974) has noted a high relationship between the above phenomena and increased sect and rivalist movements. We also have data on increased population movements and migration to the towns.

In our conceptualization, it was fortunate that rural Kenya still maintained indigeneous forms of community insurance against sickness, hunger and labour shortages and individual frustration in the form, for example, of reciprocal work and leisure groups. The pressure of social institutions which maximized social expression, ego articulation, such as women age-group parties, made it possible to rechannel some of the resultant aggression to an area which had been opened by political forethought. To local people, as shown earlier, Harambee meant self-reliance, get *up and go*, dramatize African (Luo, Kikuyu, Samburu, etc) capacity to develop themselves.

Such slogans would have had little impact in another environment. Even then, they took time to be internalized. The Harambee call was expressed in June 1963 but it dit not take root firmly until 1967, when the infection of grass-roots disillusionment with the promise of Uhuru became a reality.

The social-psychological nature of Harambee has been also identified by Hill (1974) who notes that at the higher level, ethnic rivalry in Harambee is seen in terms of the very high degree of correlation between the number, type and size of Harambee projects with tribal confrontation e.g. Kikuyu/Luo rivalry leading to a Harambee project for every 380 persons and 430 persons in Central Province and Nyanza Province respectively as compared to other provinces.[1] To rationalize this view he argues that self-help leadership at the local level cannot be divorced from the normal political process of striving for influence or power over others at the local, regional and national level. Thus the bridging variable is leadership which is transferable across social levels from the individual of the nation where the presidential call "Harambee" acts as an overarching symbol.

Harambee as a centre-periphery relationship

Mutiso (1971, 1973) interprets Harambee as based on the dynamics of Kenya's changing social structure. He argues that the polarization of western defined social values, social mobility patterns and socio-metric interaction patterns in

[1] Nyanza has 40 per cent of all completed self-help projects in 1968, Central Province 21 per cent (Winans), Local Initiative and Government Response: Development Politics in Kenya, University of Washington (paper presented to the African Studies Association, 1972 annual meeting), from unpublished report of Ministry of Cooperatives and Social Services, 1969. The corresponding value percentages were 24 and 25 (population percentages 19 and 15).

the form of an emerging tlite on the one hand should be seen against equally well-defined indigeneous and neo-indigeneous value-interaction patterns representing the majority of the population. This polarization creates a social cleavage which makes the indigeneous system the periphery and the tlite the centre. To Mutiso, the fact that the backbone of the Harambee movement is the periphery, is a re-affirmation of the periphery's alienation from the economic and political centre and their desire to co-opt leadership from the centre or open mobility patterns from the periphery into the centre. This, he argues, is seen as essential if the periphery is in the long run going to be able to re-channel the allocation of resources and access to opportunity into the periphery.

Harambee therefore, to Mutiso, is an attempt to organise the periphery into a powerful bargaining machinery or a power block born of the marginality of periphery and spearheaded by the displaced national level party leaders whose most powerful followers are the most marginal of Kenya's population i.e the uneducated rural women.

In supporting this orientation, Frank Holmquist sees Harambee as a pre-emptive strategy. In his studies of project choice patterns in Kisii, he concludes that such choices are dictated by an ever-present confrontation between government change agents and local interest groups. He found that project choice strategy articulates and dramatizes local level perception, that government planning and development approach for the region is, in essence, unaware (either by design or accident) of local needs: that the only way to reorientate government attention to the local needs is by dramatizing the irrelevancy and lack of obvious utility to local populations. This is done specifically by degrading the central planners' choice criteria and deliberately choosing divergent strategies and goals. By so doing, local people hope to eventually pressurize government to recognize and sponsor programmes which have local support. This strategy which also exploits uniqueness of local criteria and uniqueness of locally designed projects so as to arrest government interest, assumes that government will continue with their traditional planning approach but is able and willing to take over locally initiated projects. Thus the pre-emptive strategy is not a strategy to sabotage government development efforts but a deliberate attempt to attract attention and alleviate irrelevant planning and centralized decision-making.

Discussion and summary

The two approaches are essentially complimentary and have the following similarities:

(i) They see Harambee as arising from the disenchantment or cleavage of a strongly traditional periphery or grass-roots population with a planning economic and political centre.

(ii) The cleavage has led to the emergence of powerful sentiments and groups in the periphery (solidarity) which are focused in designing local efforts

for their own ends and also to attract and change the centre's resource allocation strategy.

However, the two approaches differ in a very fundamental sense. The solidarity principle paves the way for analysing Harambee independently of the central administration and opens the way for discussing group characteristics and the concepts of *incentives* and *motivation.* The centre-periphery analysis on the other hand, while indicating that Harambee may be a temporary phenomenon organised purely to manipulate the development situation, gives analytical strength to the solidarity principle in that it focuses on the bargaining which is fundamentally Harambee. Solidarity groups could be purely consumer organisations and are rarely found in the sphere of development. Earlier we indicated that the well known reactive systems, except the trade unions, are outside the field of technical development such as sect-movements, nativistic movements, fashion movements. Thus the centre-periphery analysis introduces the central focus of Harambee activity—development activity which undeniably serves other functions such as psychological functions as discussed earlier.

Both perspectives pin-point specific traits of Harambee, which will be given more attention in later sections, viz:

(a) Harambee initially was a common man's movement which took form with its declaration by the President of Kenya and the publication of Sessional Paper No. 10 in 1965.

(b) Harambee is a collective self-reliant development effort born of the frustration of the poor, marginal, non-tlite populations.

(c) The collective nature of Harambee is operationalized in its use of indigeneous group forms and principles of mutual self-assistance.

III. The Study of Harambee

Introduction

Harambee as defined earlier is a behavioural phenomena of small groups which takes an aggregate form of a national movement. Sociologically, the location of Harambee is in the operation of specific groups all over the country and, to some extent, in the behaviour of leaders both at the national and local level.

However, the behaviour of these groups varies owing to their relative linkages with the national centre, their level of economic and social development, their indigeneous social organizational patterns and their exposure to activities in other parts of the country.

Harambee behaviour, as dictated by certain shared values, norms and activities is only identifiable in circumstances which men define as Harambee meetings, Maramhee project activities, Harambee fund raising. For the purposes of the study, therefore, the Harambee projects were used to re-construct the nature of Harambee and were used as secondary units of analysis.

Thus for the present purposes two levels of study were delineated: (a) the structural administrative level, and (b) the operational project level. The administrative units were used in the primary sampling. It was within these units that projects were identified for the detailed sociological study.

Primary sampling

The primary sampling unit, as mentioned earlier, was that of the sublocation. The sublocation is the smallest administrative unit headed by a sub-chiefand is composed of several "villages". The sublocation is large enough to incorporate and support basic social institutions such as schools and dispensaries, but small enough to represent intensive social relations where most adult household beads know one another.

Occasionally, and especially in pastoral and nomadic areas, there would be no suhlocation or even locational boundaries. Thus sometimes the location or even the division would constitute the primary sampling unit.

65 sampling units were selected by stratified random sampling. The strata were identified so as to cover the broadest variations with regard to the following factors:—

— Economic potential and economic activities ranging from dry-!and pastoralism to high-potential, wet-area, intensive commercial farming.

— Degree of isolation from the national centre in structural terms such as road network, mass media use, and intensity of physical development projects such as water works, cash crops, schools, etc.

The major strata included the coastal belt, the dry marginal farming regions, the high agricultural potential zones and the arid pastoral and nomadic zones. These zones were found also to give reasonable variability with regard to two other important background factors assumed to have an important bearing on the pattern and scope of Harambee activity, i.e. ethnic variability and community organisational and social participation patterns.

Within each strata, all relevant districts were identified and all divisions enumerated into a sampling frame. A > 10 per cent random sample was selected from each sampling frame.

At the sublocational level, the following structural data were collected using conspicuous information sources like local government officers (chiefs, sub-chiefs, community development assistants) and government files.

— Level of development, through indicating the existence or non-existence of a set of development items, in 1967 and in 1973 (the time of the investigation).

— List of all projects initiated since 1967, the year of initiation, and the initiating body or person.

— List of all self-help projects initiated since 1967, their start and completion year (or whether ongoing or abandoned), initiators and leaders. Nearly 600 projects had their status thus identified.

The secondary project level sample

The first investigation using the primary sample was the prerequisite and determinant of the second: a random sample of self-help projects within each of the primary sampling units, from the list of all self-help projects. The project was the unit of study, with a purposive sample of leaders as nominated by the key informants.

For each primary unit, five projects were selected. When the project inventory contained five projects or less, all were investigated. A total of 311 projects were thus surveyed. For each project, the interviewer was to interview three nominated leaders. A total of over 900 self-help project leaders were thus interviewed.

Such interviews must be made by persons familiar with and familiar to the environment of the respondents. The interviewers—mostly sociology students—were selected so that they could go to their home areas or areas they were very familiar with in order to maximize rapport, exposure and minimize language difficulties and suspicion by respondents. However, other biases, e.g. by the interviewer's wish to put his home area in a favourable light might have been introduced.

The investigations now described used a rather comprehensive set of questionnaires. To obtain a check on reported individual donators and donations (kind and size) so-called cash books of the projects were scrutinized whenever available. This also revealed the existence of repetitive donors and resource transfers from outside the sublocation.

The tertiary project contributor/consumer survey

To complete the grass-roots survey and to weed out any likely biases of key informants (leaders) speaking about projects where they were instrumental and may have had vested interests, another and complementary grass-roots survey was made. Twenty projects out of the 311 investigated were selected by purposive sampling, across the strata, to represent the most common kinds of projects found (schools, nurseries, cattle dips, water and health projects).

Within the locally defined project service area, potential contributors/consumers were randomly selected and interviewed. Selection was done by picking every nth household head from the local tax register, interviewing either that head or if not available his wife/her husband. This survey thus included also non-contributors and nonconsumers of services and their reasons for not contributing or not consuming services of the project.

The research steps described hitherto are summarized in the following table.

Level	Method of Selection	Informant	Focus of Study
Sublocational (administrative unit)	Stratified random sampling		Observable development patterns. What pattern might cause a feeling of local deprivation and marginality. The sequence or relative weights of Harambee and non-Harambee investment. Production periods of Harambee projects
The Project	Random sampling within sublocation	Positional leaders e.g. chief, community development officer, priest.	
Project key informant	Successive nomination of leaders by original key informants who act as judges	Project initiators, committee members or work group leaders	Motives for initiative, initiators, forms of initiation, motivation for contributing. Portraying the project implementation process, Including patterns of resource mobilization. Portraying people's perception of the Harambee concept, actors' perception of the local situation.
The contributor/consumer. Individual level	Random sampling within project area	Household head.	Motives for contributing or not contributing, or utilizing or not utilizing project, extent and manner of use, kind and volume of contribution, alternative use, expected and perceived benefits.

The methodology might best be described as a comparative study (the sublocational level) and a short case study with time projection.

The case studies

To add information and give perspective to the grassroots survey, each interviewer was instructed to write an essay about the area of the following structure:

(i) Resource endowment
(ii) Major economic activities
(iii) Description of society
(iv) How self-help projects seem to be related to the above three points, e.g. with regard to:
- Mode or modes of self-help resource extraction
- Forms and nature of government involvement, or co-operation with government
- Forms and nature of non-government involvement, or co-operation (e.g. missionaries, churches)
- How the focus of self-help activities has moved over time
- On self-help projects that have been abandoned

(v) Describing problems of the field work
(vi) Making subjective analysis of current problems in the area, as perceived by the people there.

The official statistics

The department of Social Services of the Ministry of Housing and Social Services collects data on a quarterly basis at the project level on self-help inputs in terms of labour (skilled and unskilled), cash and materials donated by the people, and contributions given by other donors. These data were analyzed for projects in the districts where the 20-project consumer/contributor interviews had been made.

This analysis was made to add information on technology choice, possible conflict in labour use on self-help and agriculture, and activity levels in areas of different potential.

It also added data on the production cycles of different kinds of projects and in different areas.

Assessing centre activities

The grass-roots surveys could only be expected to cover some of the activities or contributions of central politicians, business and foreign agencies. These activities, however, would probably be largely covered by the press. Therefore, compilation and analysis was done on three years of newspaper cuttings on self-help project donations in the Standard and one year of such cuttings in the Daily Nation (the two largest dailies in Kenya). These compilations were done

in an attempt to illuminate possible grass-roots cooption of the centre, and the activities of centre forces like politicians, business and foreign agencies including the possible interdependance in Harambee between the grass-roots and such "conspicuous" levels.

Critique of methodology. Biases

Most of the interviewers were sociology students. They were selected because of their superior knowledge of local conditions, necessary to avoid at least most of the many pitfalls of non-local researchers when approaching rural people. For the consumers/contributors survey, economics students also participated.

A core group of students participated in the pilot testing of the original questionnaires on rural respondents in their respective home areas. This led to a number of revisions of the draft questionnaires. Many original questions were obviously incomprehensible (especially when translated into the vernacular from English, as had to be done) or even offensive, to respondents.

The initial core group of students then participated in the training of the interviewers for the survey, and visited them in the field during the conduct of the inquiry.

Inspite of the testing of the questionnaires, the students' reports (describing problems of field work) showed certain remaining problems. Other likely biases came out in the preliminary analysis of the data. A few such biases deserve special mention at this stage:

— Project initiators, leaders and contributors/consumers may have an inherant desire to impress the interviewer about their own role and the success of the project. There were some checks on this: students inspected projects to assess status (e.g. whether completed, ongoing or abandoned), and contributions could often be checked against cash-book notations and information given by other respondents. Students had a standard introduction stressing this was a research project without any direct link to subsequent funding.

— On the inventory of development items and projects, positional leaders and files might give faulty information. Moreover, it would often be difficult to define whether an item or a project was within a certain sub-location boundary or not. Participation and access criteria could not always clearly be applied. A strict application of boundaries would often be irrelevant. Therefore in the final analysis the boundaries were defined according to the pattern of participation and participant catchment area for each specific project.

— The additional data sought (inputs statistics and newspaper reports) obviously have a number of biases. The statistics may reflect local over-reporting, or negligence in reporting. It is difficult to assess degrees and consistency in over- and under-reporting in each case. The newspaper reports will focus on conspicuous events (areas, projects). This is not such a serious bias since here our specific purpose was to gain additional information precisely on such events. The data from these sources is therefore used as supporting data.

Table *Most Frequent Project Types by 1973 Survey and 1972 by National Expenditure Statistics*

	I 1973 Survey			II National Expenditure Statistics (1972)		
Rank	Kind of Project selected	Frequency	Percentage of Sample	Kind of Project	Expenditure Volume Volume (£K 000)	Percentage of National Investment in Harambee
1	Primary schools	73	23 5	Primary schools	990	31 7
2	Nurseries	51	16 4	Secondary schools	386	12 4
3	Cattle dips and Crushes	40	12 9	Cattle dips and Crushes	351	11 3
4	Secondary schools	28	9 0	Health centres and dispensaries	190	6 1
5	Health dispensaries	26	8 4	Churches and mosques	178	5 7
6	Dams and water catchments, water supplies	24	7 7	Piped water supplies	172	5 5
7	Churches and mosques	20	6 4	Nurseries	156	5 0
				Other constructions and building	156	5 0
				Teachers' houses	155	5 0
	Sub-total of projects listed above	262	84 3	Sub-total	2 734	87 7
	Total, projects sampled for investigation	311	100 0	Total, self-help capital formation 1972	3 116	100 0

— Finally, some interviewers may have been careless or inconsistent when filling in observations and replies. Some such deficiencies were noted and could be rectified in the subsequent systematic check of forms with each interviewer by ourselves. Some omissions and errors were corrected during the field research on supervision visits.

However, it should be noted that this is the first study of the Kenyan Harambee movement which undertakes detailed examination of projects across all regions of the country. It is the first study which pays strict attention to the different levels of development activities and organisation at the grass-roots level. It is also the first study which utilizes university-trained students to observe social phenomena in their home areas.

The projects studied

Table 6 shows the most commonly initiated self-help projects during the period 1967 to 1973 (the 65 sub-location survey, first column), and the largest investment items in 1972 (Community Development national expenditure statistics, second column).

An attempt is made to rank the projects as identified in our sample of 1973 and as identified in the overall national census on Harambee of 1972.

The rankings of the two sources largely agree. Schools and nurseries top the lists, followed by cattle dips, health and water delivery systems, and churches and mosques.

The socially oriented projects (educational and health projects, churches and mosques, community halls) were found to constitute some 70% of all projects, whether measured in frequency or investment volume, while economic projects constituted the rest (roads, agricultural projects, and water supplies). We concluded that socially oriented projects, and education in particular, rank high among peoples' priorities.

Both the official statistics and the grass-roots survey indicate that there is a large backlog of uncompleted projects, generally increasing in number each year. Some of these finally become abandoned. In the study, therefore, we had to select those projects studied from the "ongoing" or "completed" projects.

The national statistics of the Community Development Division give the following data on the production flow of self-help projects 1971—1973:

Table 7. Flora, *of* Projects *1971—1973*

Year	Continued from the previous year (cumulative)	Newly started	Abandoned	Completed	Continuing into next year (ongoing)
1971	5,074	6,597	3,325	1,841	6,505
1972	6,010	2,841	1,057	1,800	5,994
1973	7,190	3,064	740	1,704	7,810

For each of the three years, the number of completed projects is modest in relation to the number continued into the next year.

There are also statistics for earlier years (1967—1970).[1] Figures for 1969 and 1970 are similar, figures for 1967 and 1968 giving probably very inflated figures on started and completed projects. Those figures exceeding 20,000 per year, probably include Harambee working and farming groups, mabati groups etc. and not merely projects.

The statistics for 1971—1973 show for the first year a larger number of ongoing projects at the end than at the beginning, and a larger abandonment frequency. The figures for 1972 and 1973 are different, showing some restraint in the starting of new projects, similar completion rates as for 1971, and much more modest abandonment rates.

Our survey of projects started between 1967 and 1973 indicated that for this nation-wide sample, most projects started during this period remained as on-going ones in 1973. Out of 270 projects whose status was identified, 95 were completed by 1973, 168 were still ongoing and 7 had become abandoned.

[1] Table A, Ten Great Years ofself-Help Movement in Kenya (Community Development Division, 1974)

IV. Harambee Leadership Patterns

Introduction

In the introductory chapters it was suggested that Harambee is a common man's "bottom-up" development movement whose major actors are basically the rural poor, the marginal groups, and a sprinkling of political leaders displaced from the centre. It was also suggested that this movement was given a national image through top level legitimization and support by the President of Kenya in his formal declaration in 1963.

It was shown, however, that inspite of this top level legitimization, the thrust and driving force of Harambee is the marginality, social control and organisation, and aspirations of the periphery vis-à-vis the central development machinery of government. Such a force would be expected to generate its own leadership potential and co-opt "conspicuous" actors like centre politicians, civil servants, businessmen, foreign agencies who, by their control over development resources may in turn steer the direction of Harambee by patronizing specific projects.

However, at the grass-roots project level, Harambee will have its own leaders (project initiators, project committee members, work group leaders) and the actual contributors of labour, money, materials and other donations. Given the small size of many Harambee projects, it should be expected that local people will dominate not only as contributors, but also as leaders. The aim of this chapter is to test to what extent this expectation is true.

In this chapter we shall outline the general characteristics of leaders in terms of socio-economic criteria such as sex, occupation, education and age. We shall then observe if particular kinds of leaders appear to show particular preference for certain kinds of projects, for example, housewives for nursery schools, farmers for cattle-dips, teachers for secondary schools, etc. We also wish to determine the role of government officers. We shall also be interested in the continuity of leadership as from initiatorship to work group leadership. Such continuity may be important to the consistency and success of the project, as we shall later analyze in Chapter Six. It is also interesting to note if one leader is active in more than one project. Finally, we will try to make observations on criteria for leadership selection and how actual selection of leaders takes place.

Comparative studies of leadership

In order to describe more graphically the salient factors in Karambee leadership a comparative study of leadership is presented for three districts in the Coast Province and three districts in Western Province. The Coast Province study encompasses 19 projects and the Western Province study 39 projects. The description should give perspective to the aggregate national data presented later.

Socio-Economic Traits of Leaders

As mentioned earlier, at the grass-roots project level, leaders are identified according to their influential positions in the three stages of project development. The first stage is project initiation where the leader may initiate the project by creating awareness and articulating a need, arranging discussion groups and meetings. The second stage is the organisation phase where the leader defines participation criteria, fund raising. The final stage is the implementation phase where the leader may be in charge of a work group, or be responsible for maintaining interest and commitment.

Initiators

(a) ***Sex:*** The Coast Province data shows that in the sample there is only one female initiator and forty-six male initiators as compared to eight female initiators and one hundred male initiators in Western Province. The differences across the provinces are not really significant and the data indicates that formal female initiators are very few. This factor will be discussed at the conclusion of this chapter.

(b) *Occupation*

Table 8. *Occupational Profile of Initiators*

Occupation	Coast Province %	Western Province %
Politicians[1]	11	5
Farmers	30	56
Government Officers		
District Commissioners and Officers	4	—
Chiefs and Subchiefs	28	17
Community Development Assistants	5	1
District Education Officer	2	—
District Agricultural Officer	2	—
Others	4	1
Clergymen	2	4
Businessmen/Traders	6	
Teachers	4	13
Clerks	—	2
Artisans	2	
Total	100	100
Total Sample	47	108

[1] In Coast Province, one Cabinet Ministers and three Councillors

In both samples, farmers and chiefs/subchiefs dominate. Whereas farmers made up more than half of the initiators of the Western Province sample, government officers are the first category in the Coast sample, making up nearly one-half of the total. Chiefs and subchiefs come a close second to farmers in the Coast sample whereas they play a more modest role in the Western Province sample, but still remain the second largest group. The Western

Province sample has a category which is almost lacking in the Coast i.e. teachers. Politicians are more prominent in the Coast Province than in Western Province.

(c) *Education*

Table 9. *Level of Education of Initiators (Percentage)*

Province	None	Primary	Secondary	Higher	Vague or Unknown
Coast	23 4	44.7	4.3	10.6	17.0
Western	2.5	67.8	14.4	5.1	10 2

Primary education is the most common category for both samples. The Western educational levels seem generally higher than for the Coast.

(d) *Age:* Age is unknown for most initiators and where it is known the results are similar for the two provinces. More than half are above 40 years of age.

Committee Members

(a) *Sex:* Females remain very scarce as formal leaders and in Coast Province there are only 2 while 88 committee members are male. In Western Province, they remain at about the same ratio as for initiators, i.e. 8 per cent (11 as opposed to 129 males).

(b) *Occupation:*

Table 10: *Occupational Profile of Committee Members*

Occupation	Coast Province %	Western Province %
Politicians	9	4
Clergymen	3	4
Businessmen/Traders	8	3
Teachers	3	10
Clerks	1	1
Artisans	—	1
Farmers	33	55
Housewives	1	1
Government Officers, of which		
District Commissioners		
District Officers	3	
Chiefs, Subchiefs	17	13
Community Development Assistants	—	1
District Agricultural Officers	1	—
Dist Vet. Officers	—	1
Other Government Officers	5	3
Vague or Unknown	16	3
Total	100	100
Sample Size	90	140

Farmers remain the single most important group in both provinces, but are more than half of Western Committee members and only one-third of Coast members. Government officers remain relatively more important in Coast Province and so do politicians[1] and businessmen. Chiefs and Subchiefs are again more frequent in Coast Province. Teachers remain few in the Coast sample. In the Western sample, farmers have become relatively more important in committees as compared to initiatorship, whereas chiefs/subchiefs have become less important.

(c) *Education:*

Table 11. *Level of Education for Committee Members*

Province	None	Primary	Secondary	Higher	Vague or Unknown
Coast	30	38	6	6	20[2]
Western	5	69	15	2	9

[2] Many of which can be assumed to have no formal education

Primary education is again the most common category, but the general educational level remains lower for Coast, which still has a large category of leaders without formal education.

(d) *Age:* Age is given for a minority of the committee members. Both for Coast and Western most members are between 40 and 54 years of age. This corresponds closely to the initiatorship data.

Work Group Leaders

(a) *Sex:* In this category, females practically disappear in Western Province too (1 female and 72 males) while they still remain on a low level in Coast Province (1 female and 43 males).

[1] This is partly due to multiple leadership The same two MPs and two councillors occupy 8 leadership positions.

(b) *Occupation:*

Table 12. *Occupational Profile of Work Group Leaders*

Occupation	Coast Province %	Western Province %
Politicians	5	2
Clergymen	2	8
Businessmen	—	—
Teachers	2	7
Clerks	2	—
Artisans	—	7
Farmers	44	49
Housewives	2	—
Government Officers, or which		
District Commissioners		
District Officers	2	2
Chiefs, Subchiefs	37	22
Community Development Officers		1
Community Development Assistants		1
District Agricultural Officers	2	—
Other Government Officers	2	1
Total	100	100
Total Sample	44	73

For Coast, farmers and civil servants are equally prominent; for Western, farmers remain most prominent—about half of all work group leaders are farmers. Chiefs and subchiefs remain more prominent in Coast than in Western. Clergymen, teachers and artisans figure as work group leaders in Western, but hardly in Coast. Politicians contribute insignificantly to both samples.

In Coast, chiefs and subchiefs have become even more important in work group leadership as compared to committee membership. In Western, the proportion of farmers has dropped, and the proportion of chiefs and subchiefs has increased. Teachers have also dropped.

(c) *Education*

Table 13. *Level of Education for Work Group Leaders*

Province	None	Primary	Secondary	Higher	Vague or Unknown
Coast	43	34	0	9	14
Western	1	76	11	4	8

For work group leaders, primary education dominates only for the Western sample. For the Coast, no formal education is the most common attribute. The educational level appears generally higher for early stage leadership in the Coast sample:

Table 14. Educational Levels of Leaders in Coast Province

Type of Leadership	No Education	Primary	Secondary	Higher	Vague or Unknown	Total
Initiators	23	45	4	11	17	100
Committee members	31	38	6	6	19	100
Work group leaders	43	34	0	9	14	100

The proportion of vague/unknown educational levels are about the same for all categories and probably represent no or little formal education.

The data for Western Province does not show any marked differences in educational levels for the different leadership groups although work group leadership has lower educational levels.

(d) ***Age:*** Age is again unknown for most work group leaders. For both samples, most of those included are in the age group 40—49 years.

Are Particular Kinds of Leaders found for Particular Kinds of Projects?

In Coast province, we found politzcians as initiators only of bigger and more costly projects such as secondary schools and water projects. In committees, they were found for most kinds of projects. As work group leaders we rarely found them, and never for small projects such as nursery schools, primary schools or cattle dips. In Western province, we found four out of the five politicians active as committee members on the committees for the largest kind of project: secondary schools.

Coast businessmen were engaged as committee members in bigger projects: a village polytechnic and a health project. Four out of five initiator-clergymen in Western Province had started schools, and only one a church.

Teachers and artzsans were hardly found in any function in Coast Province. In Western Province, 13 out of 15 initiating teachers were for educational projects. For committee membership, the figures were 12 out of 14. Artisans were found as work group leaders of secondary school and cattle dip projects.

Fanners in Coast Province were especially found as the initiators of smaller projects like nursery schools, primary schools and health projects. They were also very frequent as committee members and work group leaders or the smallest projects: the nursery schools. A similar picture emerged for Western Province: farmers initiated primary schools, nursery schools and cattle dips in that order. They held committee membership and work group leadership especially for primary schools and nursery schools.

Chiefs and *subchiefs* were found as initiators, members and work group leaders of all types of projects in Coast and Western Provinces, just as farmers were similarily found in Western Province.

In Coast Province, a farmer and a chief were a very common leadership pair in most functions.

For Western Province, cattle dips and churches show the greatest "occupational concentration" in initiatorship; farmers constitute the bulk, with chiefs and sub-chiefs especially with respect to cattle dips.

The few women initiators participated in secondary schools, nursery schools and health centres. Women committee members were especially active in nursery schools. Four of the six initiators with higher education went for secondary schools and the only two work group leaders with higher education were active at a secondary school and a village polytechnic.

The Role of Government Officers as Leaders Continuity in Leadership and Multiple Leaders

Government presence in Harambee appears stronger in the Coast sample than in Western Province. In the Coast, government officers make up almost one-half of initiators (45%) and work group leaders (44%), but are less frequent in project committees (24%). In Western Province, government officers made up only 19% of initiators. In both provinces the large bulk of these government officers is made up of chiefs and subchiefs.

The following was found in respect of leadership continuity, i.e. the extent to which initiators remain as committee members and committee members as work group leaders, and initiators are found as work group leaders; and in respect of multiple leadership. The unweighted averages (figures for each project given equal weight irrespective of number of leaders on which continuity has been observed) are shown in the table below.

Table 15. Leadership Continuity

Province	Percentage overlap between		
	Initiators/ committee members	Committee members/ work group leaders	Initiators/ work group leaders
Western	47	46	44
Coast	38	61	43

The Coast continuity varies greatly, appearing largest in the transition from committee members to work group leaders. This is largely due to the fact that a work group leader is often automatically taken from the committee. The rather high overlap for initiators/work group leaders indicates that although initiators drop out of the committees, they return in implementation.

Continuity in Coast sublocations appears higher than what has been calculated for all 65 sublocations investigated in the survey. This is due to multiple leadership which may reflect low recruitment of leaders. Such low recruitment and subsequent ability of leaders to occupy several positions is reflected in the

fact that out of 19 projects 16 have multiple leaders. Multiple leadership is especially found in the Taita sublocation where the record is set by a subchief who holds offices in four projects. He is chairman and work group leader of a dispensary, treasurer and work group leader of a secondary school, and work group leader of a nursery school and a water project. Chiefs and subchiefs are the most frequent multiple officeholders. We also find, in that order of frequency: farmers, businessmen, politicians and pastors.

For the *Western* sample, continuity again varies greatly between different projects and different sublocations. The average is that about half of one leadership group transfers to the next phase.

Multiple leadership appears relatively *less common* for the Western Province sample than for Coast. There are only 6 cases of multiple leaders, some of which recur through initiatorship to committees and/or work group leadership. Four of them are subchiefs, one a Member of Parliament and one a preacher. This tallies with the Coast observation of subchiefs as the most frequent multiple office-holders.

General Discussion of Local Leadership Issues

Socio-economic Factors

(a) *Sex:* The foregoing tables indicate that females are not prominent in any of the leadership categories in the two provinces. Although the Western Province sample shows a slightly higher proportion (7—8 %) as compared to the Coast (2%), the fact still remains that there are extremely few formal women leaders in a movement whose major contributors especially in labour, are women. Several reasons may be the explanation.

(i) For the Coast Province, among the Muslim community, women do not normally play conspicuous leadership roles, especially in mixed groups.

(ii) For all ethnic groups and for Harambee activities, there is a prevalence of indigeneous male-female relationships where women use men as nominal leaders and spokesmen in mixed groups, committees, barazas, and all formal activities. We use the phrase "use men" deliberately since the influence of women on all matters cannot be measured by their formal representation. In Eastern and Central Province we found that female groups nominated certain male figures as "parent" or "leader" figure to represent them in all formal matters but that such leaders were not needed in day-to-day group activities.

One case study from a non-Muslim Coast Province District—Taita, shows that men of the ages 30—60 and almost all married women participate in all functions including leadership functions.

(iii) A case study from Bungoma also explains the relative absence of female formal leaders...

Local leadership is made up of the subchief, CDA and headmen all of whom are men at present. We so far haven't had a female as head of a village . (Study by J P F Simiyu on Makuselwa sublocation of Bungoma district).

(b) *Occupation:* The data lead us to conclude that locational/sublocational leaders like farmers, chiefs and subchiefs form the bulk of leaders. Both samples showed a sprinkling of more "conspicuous" leaders like politicians, clergymen, businessmen/traders and goverment officers from the district/divisional level.

By putting together two major occupation groups for the two samples we get the following table:

Table 16. *Occupational Grouping of Leaders*

	Percentage of Persons in Group out of		
	Initiators	*Committee members*	*Work group leaders*
I Coast			
1. Politicians, clergymen, businessmen, district and divisional level government officers	26	24	11
2. Teachers, clerks, artisans, farmers, housewives, locational and sublocational level government officers	74	60	89
3 Vague, or unknown occupations	0	16	0
II *Western*			
1 Politicians, clergymen, businessmen, district and divisional level government officers	9	11	8
2 Teachers, clerks. artisans, farmers, housewives, locational and sublocational level government officers	91	86	92
3 Vague, or unknown occupations	0	3	0

The very central position of the chief and subchief as a legitimate group leader and "broker" for projects is especially clear for the Coast province sample. We do not argue that the importance of chiefs and subchiefs is a reflection of provincial government attempts to "control" Harambee. This relationship is clearly argued by Nyangira[3] who relates Provincial and District administration activities to those of the chiefs and subchiefs.

We accept that such links between chiefs/subchiefs and their administrative superiors exist. They may well apply to self-help activities. However, the Coast and Western Province case studies do not indicate that the sublocational level projects were the result of provincial or district level directives, but rather the result of interaction between a chief/subchief and his "subjects". Indirectly of course, their continued involvement indicates support from the top and permission for them to spend government time in this manner. The great role of the chief and subchief merits closer inspection. This role is particularly dominant in the Coast Province.

The Taita case study points to the great role of the sublocational committee or baraza in the project, and how the chief or subchief is a main actor in these committees.

[3] N Nyangira, Chiefs' Barazas as Agents of Administrative and Political Penetration.

The members of "umoja" groups meet frequently... "the subchief... teaches them for instance the importance of education, health and farming methods.... The subchief of this area tends to be an important person as regards the self-help projects, in that all projects are or have been identified with his knowledge. He is a member of all the project committees. The main reason for involving the subchief in all the projects is that he is a 'middle man' between the government and the people. The subchief is therefore an all-round leader, 'a man of many parts'. As such he is again one of the most well-known contributors to all 'umoja' (Harambee) activities. He has to do that because, as he says, he has to set a good example to his people....

...Another factor which attributes to the leadership of the subchiefis that he is also leader of the Sublocational Committee (baraza) which exhibits both social and political responsibility. Being a member of the baraza is an important qualification for leadership in various projects. Members of the baraza exhibit the characteristics of a primary group. Members know each other face to face and each other's background so that they know the abilities of each other. It is at the baraza that problems facing the area are discussed and a solution formulated. A project initiated therefore definitely includes members of the baraza and therefore they form the majority of members of the project committee...."

An initiator must obviously use the existing machinery:

. After the imtiator has convinced the sublocational committee about the importance of the project to the development of the area, then the subchief, or one of his village headmen, announces the decision at the market place on market day ... And those at the market pass the information on to the rest at home . Once the project has been approved by the sublocational committee there is normally no opposition from the people . . . (Case Study for Taita).

The *Kwale* case study says:

In all the instances, the government involvement or co-operation has arrived after the project is already on the move. In the nearby locations of the Kilifi district, projects have been taken over by the government In this area, a lot can be pointed out on the role of chiefs and subchiefs in initiating and planning projects, which, although minor ones, are the first ....

This function of local level government officers comes out even more clearly in the *Tana River* case study:

(After defining a need the local population) . . with the help of their local leaders such as the chief and headmen . . ask for greater help from government officials and get their work moving.

Local leadership is given to the local people according to their influence and capability. The chief of the location is the obvious positional leader. He has an assistant subchief and various village headmen .

In Hola the chief was the initiator of three of the four projects (all self-help projects that had been started in Hola since 1967). He is also the committee chairman of two projects, and the fund-raising leader of one:

in all the projects the chief is the leading Initiator since no Baraza would succeed without him It is not unusual to find that he is adviser. promotor and chairman in many self-help projects and also leader in other activities for smoother running of the projects . . .

The *Taita* study brought out how closely knit together local leadership is, and that a sublocational committee functioned as a source of leader recruitment and caused the particularly large multiple leadership shown for Taita. The closely knit character of Taita leadership also leads to some role conflict and confusion: "... People tend to confuse the responsibility of a chairman and treasurer" (for the dip, project chairman and treasurer are the same person, for the dispensary the treasurer does not know his function but refers to the subchief, limiting his duty to that of collecting funds and giving the funds and the cash book to the chief). The subchief or chief stands out as a very clear central leader with "broker" functions.

In the Taita study initiative comes from inside a closely knit group of leaders of traditional legitimacy. The subchief is an important actor in this group, spending a lot of time arguing and educating. He is also the "ambassador" and spokesman of the leadership group, and appears as a middle-man or "broker" between the people, as represented by the sublocational committee, and government. Office-holders in projects will again be recruited from the Committee.

For the *Western* sample, we noted that the chief and subchief are not such prominent leaders. However, they do have a role as local leaders as projects are often announced at their barazas. The case studies from Western Province indicate, however, that chiefs and subchiefs frequently have two important drawbacks as self-help leaders:

— Local societies are often split into clans, the chief representing only one, or being an immigrant altogether. There are thus leadership rivalries. The chiefs may also be lumped together with negative connotations about irrelevant government development, and thus lose local legitimacy.

— Resource extraction for self-help is sometimes a forced process, where the chief or subchief plays an unpopular role:

> ... it is a common thing that whenever a project is started, one of the administrative officials, for example, the chief announces or tells his subchief to announce it. He too goes around to collect the necessary funds from the public. The form of the contributions is not necessarily cash, often the subchief moves around with his gang to collect hens, goats from those who are not able to raise it in the form of cash. If any one proves to be unwilling to contribute force could well be applied. If one subchief proves to be lenient, those who have contributed put pressure on him to squeeze something at least out of everybody .... (Case Study from a sublocation in Bungoma)

Still, chiefs and subchiefs often have a recognized, legitimate role in self-help also in the Western Province sample. There are also indications of his "brokerage role":

> As to the initiating and planning of several projects in this sublocation, it has been the responsibility of local leadership under the subchief. Occasionally, the District Officer and District Commissioner come in to offer pieces of advice. So is the chief too. Otherwise the whole responsibility is on the local leaders so long as the amount they decide to charge is acceptable to the District Officer . .

The role of politicians for instance is borne out in the following way in Coast case studies:

The *Kwale* case study indicated that a project idea might come somewhat unprepared from a preacher or a politician holding a meeting on another subject, but when suddenly feeling that a vaccuum existed he blurted out the proposal. This proposal might then be taken up locally and "pushed" around at subsequent meetings.

For *Tana River* the role of the local MP is also underlined:

> Other leaders include the MP and County Council leaders. They are all influential people and have contributed many forms of ideas towards the development and progress of the sublocation . . . .
>
> The MP figures as an initiator and committee member of one project, and a Councillor as initiator of one project and committee member of another.

The press and frequent statements by the Kenya administration on "politization" of Harambee does not tally with the survey observations, except that local politics can also be conducted by farmers and chiefs.

A field survey in Central Province and Meru by the Department of Economics, Nairobi University (B.R. Bolnick, Comparative Harambee, Institute for Development Studies, Working Paper 13911974) showed that project initiation in the areas studied was largely in the hands of non-politicians. Administrators came first, other local leaders second and politicians third in answer to the question "who initiates projects in your area". These observations tally with ours for Coast and Western Provinces except that farmers are not specifically mentioned by Bolnick. There is of course a fundamental difference in the way of seeking respondents. Our survey attempted to pinpoint leaders more specifically.

The Western case studies—where politicians were generally even more rare as leaders than for the Coast—do point to the role ofpoliticians. One case study points to the Member of Parliament as an initiator, another one ridicules his role:

> Self-help projects are normally announced by the local leaders and quite often they bring in the M. P. for the area to act as a motivator. . . .

> As for the initiation, organization and maintenance of Harambee projects we have a Member of Parliament of the area or some other big shot come around and say, "Hey folks of W, we are behind in this or that aspect of life". And then we stare at him in thought asking what he wants us to do about it. Then he says, "Let us collect money to build this or that thing! And as a show of compliance we voluntarily milk our pockets dry at the instant. . . . Then with or without the big shot the local leaders and elders meet another day and decide that so and so must donate so much in cash or in goods . . . .

Both instances look like a cooption of the centre by the periphery!

Teachers and *Clergymen* were noted as fairly frequent leaders in the Western sample, but not the Coast one. Case studies from Western Province point to teachers entering party politics and Harambee self-help at the same time. They speak of the important role of churches in fostering Harambee, but also point

to frequent rivalries wich may breed more, competing, projects.

The role of *Community Development Assistants* as brought out by the Western Province sample is defined in one of the case studies:

"Of all the government officers the most helpful is the CDA and his aides. Their role is advisory, financial and often moral encouragement The CDA accounted very much for the success of the secondary school . . "

This narrative suggests that Community Development Officers act as informal, non-nominated advisers, and that they will not be enumerated as project leaders.

Education is probably not a strong criterion for local Harambee leadership. The Taita case study brings out the following:

Qualifications for leadership includes ability of the individual, his experience of the project at hand—(for example a dip project had a progressive farmer both as chairman and treasurer because he knew how a dip should be constructed) . . . . The candidate must be faithful . . education is not important but of course he should be literate . . .

This tallies with our observations on moderate educational levels for leaders of Coast Province especially.

In the educationally more developed *Western* Province primary education is the most commonly found level among leaders whereas for Coast it is no formal education. Teachers are also much more common as leaders in Western Province.

Stockton's[4] study of Nyeri leadership did not show results markedly different from those presented here. 74.5 per cent had primary education and the rest had secondary education. Leaders in that study were defined as those who identified themselves as holders of formal leadership positions, self-help leaders, headmen and party officials.

(c) *Age:* Most age-enumerated leaders were between 40 and 59 years of age.[5] We know from the literature (e.g. D. Hunt, IDS) that marginality and a high sense of collective relative deprivation may be associated with age. This could encourage Harambee initiatives among older people. Leadership, and prestige, will, however also be associated with age. Finally, migration of young people from rural areas to urban areas may leave local rural leadership to older people. These different factors may account for the relatively high ages of recorded self-help leaders.

The Taita case study also illustrates why we find that leaders are usually elder people: "Many people in their 20s and 30s work elsewhere.... This means that the people who are left to participate in self-help projects are the farmers or rather the self-employed people, the traders."

[4] R. R. Stockton, Aspects of Leadership in Nyeri, Institute for Development Studies, S P 107, 1971.

[5] Stockton's essay on leadership in Nyeri shows that the majority of leaders were between 41 and 60 years.

A Kakamega case study points to one reason for elderly leadership:

. . . The chiefs and subchiefs have to meet a certain educational requirement, the "magurus" (headmen) and the "Elders Councils" are selected from a group of renowned old folk . .

Another case study from the same district supports this finding:

There are in all 14 headmen in Makuselwa sublocation. Whereas the subchief is only 35 years of age and a former teacher. most of the headmen are over 50, some over 60 and illiterate Quite a number of these are regarded as the opinion leaders and probably that explains why the subchief picked them as his co-administrators in the area .

Relationship Between Types of Leader and Choice of Projects

There is a definite relationship between types of leaders and types of projects. In both provinces, farmers go expecially for smaller projects like nursery schools, primary schools and cattle dips, whereas politicians and/or people of higher education go for larger projects like secondary schools. Chiefs and subchiefs go for all kinds of projects except possibly churches. The teachers of the Western Province sample are active almost entirely in educational projects. Thus, even at the sublocational level we find projects managed by farmers, for their own immediately perceived needs. But larger projects are started by more conspicuous leaders with more political aspirations. These aspirations may reflect an urge to uplift the standards of a local "constituency", but also competition between these local leaders and between them and more centrally positioned leaders.

Aggregate national leadership patterns

Data for this section is summarized from the study of 65 sublocations, 311 projects in 40 of the 41 districts of Kenya. The analysis will follow the same pattern used for the comparative study.

Socio-Economic Characteristics

(a) *Sex:* The sex distributions of initiators, Committee members and work group leaders was 93—94% males against 6—7% females.

The evidence of the two provincial sample case studies is supported by the aggregate national data. There are some areas, such as Central Province, where women are rather prominent as initiators: Central Province leads with 21.8 per cent women initiators. Second in women leadership is Rift Valley with 8.8 per cent. Western and Nyanza follow. In Nyanza, only sublocations in Kisumu district have female initiators. Eastern and Coast have very few female initi-

ators and North Eastern has none. The provincial rankings remain the same in terms of committee membership, but change for work group leadership. Table 17 outlines the picture.

Table 17. *Percent Female Leaders in Different Functions in the Provinces*

Province	Percent women among Initiators	Committee Members	Work Group Leaders
Central	21.8	20.3	15.2
Rift Valley	8.8	8.4	8.0
Western	7.0	7.7	1.3
Nyanza	5.3	6.4	2.3
Eastern	1.4	4.4	5.2
Coast	2.2	2.3	2.3
North Eastern	0	0	0
Total Average	6.0	7.0	5.7

Most women *initiators* are found for water projects, nurseries and schools. To this pattern is added churches and health centres in respect of committee membership. Most women work group leaders are found for nursery schools, other schools, water projects and churches.

(b) *Occupation:* Tables 17 A and 18 show the occupational distribution of all leaders found in the survey.

Table 18. *Major Occupational Groups (Percentage)*

Leadership Category	I. Politicians, Clergymen, Businessmen, District and Divisional Level Government Officers	II. Teachers, Clerks, Artisans, Farmers, Housewives, Locational and Sublocational Level Government Officers	III. Vague or unknown	Total
Initiators	34.2	65 5	0 3	100.0
Committee Members	29.6	66 9	3.5	100 0
Work group Leaders	19 7	78.9	1 4	100.0
Total	28 9	69.1	2.0	100.0

As for the provincial case studies, farmers are the biggest leadership category, followed by chiefs and subchiefs. This holds for the total of all leaders for initiatorship and for work group leadership. As committee members, chiefs and subchiefs are at par with teachers.

Other major leadership categories apart from teachers are businessmen and clergymen. Politicians make up less than five per cent of the total, and recede in importance from initiatorship (7.2%) to work group leadership (2.5%).

The same receding trends hold broadly for other conspicuous leaders: cler-

Table **17A.** *Occupational Distribution of Leaders (Percentage).*

Leadership category	Politicians	Clergymen	Businessmen	Teachers	Clerks	Artisans	Farmers	Housewives	Government officers							Vague	Sample size
									Office of the President		Ministry of Soc. Services		Ministry of Agric		Ministry of Education	Other		
									D	L/C	D	L/C	Agr.	Vet.				
Initiators	7.2	7 7	10.6	12.5	1 2	4.6	21 7	0.6	4.6	14.8	1.5	0.7	1.0	0.3	0.4	4.3	0.3	639
Committee Members	4 4	6.2	12 0	10.8	2.4	1.0	36.4	0.7	1.0	10.7	0.7	1.4	1.5	0	0	7.5	3.5	949
Work Group Leaders	2.5	5.3	5.3	13.0	1.9	3.6	36.8	1.1	1.3	17.1	0.2	0.8	0.4	0	0	9.3	1.4	475
Total	4.8	6.3	9.9	11.8	2.0	2 4	34.7	0.8	2.0	13.4	0.6	1.1	1.1	0	0.2	6.9	2.0	2063

Notes. D = District and Divisional Level
L/C = Locational and Sublocational level
The other government officers category is, e.g. Ministry of Health oflicers

The major categories stand out as in Table 18.

gymen and district and divisional level government officers. Instead, farmers take up their positions in committees and work group leadership. They make up more than one-third in both leadership categories, but little more than one-fifth of initiatorship.

Chiefs and subchiefs make up only about one-tenth of the committee members, but are more important especially in work group leadership. Businessmen and teachers are nearly as important as chiefs in the first two leadership functions, but retire to some 5 per cent in work group leadership.

A tendency of "conspicuous" groups to initiate but then withdraw and leave the floor to grass-roots leaders is shown by our data. This tendency was also shown in the Coast case study. Whereas the more conspicuous group I makes up more than one out of three initiators, they make up less than one out of five work group leaders.

Government officers average one out of four leaders, and are slightly more important in work group leadership. This is mainly a reflection of the increased importance of chiefs and subchiefs in work group leadership. Why do community development officers and assistants make up less than two per cent of the total? As we shall see in later project case studies, they are often important as "coaches". Their trained role is to inspire and organise, but not usually to take up formally recognised leadership. Chiefs and subchiefs show no such inhibitions. They were obviously over-represented in the Coast case study.

Leadership Characteristics by Province

Politicians are scarce or non-existent in all leadership functions in Nyanza Province. They form an unusually large proportion of committee members in Coast and Western Provinces, and about one-third of the initiators in North Eastern Province.

Clergymen are relatively scarce as initiators and committee members in Central Province, but form a large group among Nyanza initiators. One is tempted to assume that they occupy the role of politicians there.

Businessmen/Traders are scarce in Western Province, but most important in North Eastern Province in committee membership and work group leadership.

Teachers are represented at about the national average everywhere. They are slightly over-represented among work group leaders in Eastern Province.

Artisans are relatively important work group leaders in Central Province.

Farmers are always over-represented in Western Province. They are also over-represented in the two first leadership functions in Central Province, and the last leadership function in Nyanza. Farmers are generally under-represented in Rift Valley.

Housewives are over-represented in Central Province.

Government Officers are over-represented in Rift Valley and North Eastern initiation committees and in all aspects of Coast leadership. Over-representation of chiefs/subchiefs occurs on the Coast. North Eastern governmental

over-representation stems from Community Development Assistant initiators and District Commissioners/District Officers committee membership. Rift Valley over-representation stems from the group "other government officers" found in all three leadership categories. These officers are health inspectors, surveyors, foresters, rangers, and game wardens, post office employees, government employed accountants, clerks and labourers. Government officers are under-represented in all aspects of Central Province leadership.

Provincial "leadership features" may now be broadly characterized thus:

Central Province: Harambee stands out largely as a farmers and women's movement, with limited government involvement and little involvement of clergymen, With a relatively developed economic and social pattern, Central Province grass-roots leadership stands out as locally self-reliant.

Rift Valley Province: is extremely heterogeneous and the data hide great inter-regional variations, including newly settled agricultural regions, and large dry pastoral areas. Farmers still play a limited role, and civil servants play a big role.

North Eastern Province displays a similar pattern. We should however note that the sample here is small, and individuals strongly influence the averages. Obviously, North Eastern Province has few farmers. Government officers, in this case district and divisional officers of the Office of the President and the department of Community Development, play a leading role. So do traders, especially in committees and implementation.

Western and to some extent *Nyanza* Provinces show Harambee as a grass-roots level movement with more limited involvement of politicians and civil servants. Clergymen appear to take on a more important role than in other provinces.

Eastern Province fits best into the national average pattern (where farmers and chiefs/subchiefs come first) with the exception that teachers are slightly over-represented.

Education: Educational levels of leaders appear highest for the élite initiators of North Eastern Province and for Eastern Province committee members. Nyanza Province shows overall low proportions of leaders with secondary level and higher education. So does Coast Province, except for committe members.

Table 19. *Leaders' Educatzonal Status (Percentage)*

Leadership Category	Educational Level					
	No formal educauon	Primary education	Secondary education	Higher education	Vague or unknown	Total
Initiators	9.0	57.5	18 1	6.1	9.3	100.0
Committee members	13.9	56.9	11.9	3.4	13.9	100.0
Work group leaders	10.9	61.3	14.1	5.3	8 4	100 0
Overall Average	11.8	58 2	14.3	4.6	11.1	100 0

The age distribution of the national sample of leaders is summarized in Table 20.

Table 20. *Age of Leaders*

Category	Total number	Of which age group known for	Largest group found in interval	%	Three major intervals	%
Initiators	696	265	40—49	34	30—59	79
Committee members	1015	340	40—49	36	30—59	80
Work group leaders	504	168	40—49	42	30—59	86

As for the provincial samples, 40—49 is the most common interval.

Relationships between Types of Leaders and Types of Projects

The following traits emerged at the national sample level. Firstly we should consider which are the most commonly found occupations for each type of project and leadership category. Farmers make up 43 per cent of all initiators of nursery schools, followed by chiefs and subchiefs who make up 22 per cent.

Secondly, we must consider cases when an occupation is also over-represented in its particular function, as compared to its average representation. Quoting the example given above, farmers are over-represented as initiators of nursery schools (43 per cent), since their average frequency as initiators is only 21.7 per cent. The same applies to chiefs and subchiefs as nursery school initiators. Their 22 per cent exceeds their average frequency as initiators, which is only 14.8.

If we define dramatic over-representation as cases where the occupational frequency for that project type is more than four times the average occupational frequency for all projects, the following traits emerge:

The most dramatic over-representation i.e. more than five-fold the average, is for *artisans*[6] as *initiators of water projects.* Apparently artisans (plumbers, carpenters, masons, mechanics, etc.) feel a particular call to argue for a fairly technically complicated Harambee venture like a water project.

Next comes the five-fold over-representation of *clergymen* as *work group leaders for high schools and village polytechnics.* This may reflect the particular involvement of the National Christian Council of Kenya (NCCK) in village polytechnic construction. (Clergymen are also over-represented in all leadership categories of church projects.)

Finally, government officers show a more than four-fold over-representation in two cases: *District Commissioners and District Officers* in the *initiation of churches and mosques,* and *chiefs/subchiefs* in *committees for social/community halls.* The latter observation is largely the freak result of small numbers. The first observation is

[6] We disregard the 20-fold artisan *over-representation in roads committee* membership Although it seems a plausible pattern, it is the freak result of small numbers.

partly the reflection of a large proportion of churches and mosques initiated in North Eastern Province, where District Commissioners and District Officers are a major leadership group.

Other observations on relative over-representation of different occupational groups can be summarized thus:

Politicians who make up only 7 per cent of all initiators yet constitute 20 per cent of all *high school and village polytechnic initiators.* They are also over-represented in the initiation of another usually large and costly project type: *health projects.* Politicians are also nearly four-fold over-represented in *high school and village polytechnic committees* (but scarce in work group leadership).

Clergymen, apart from their great over-representation as work group leaders for village polytechnics, naturally stand out as *leaders in all phases of church and mosque projects.* They are also over-represented in *initiating secondary schools.*

Businessmen are prominent in *committees* of large and costly projects: *high schools/village polytechnics, and health projects.* It is difficult to say whether businessmen are used as "levers" by other local leaders to boost financially and technically burdensome projects, or whether they take the lead in launching such projects. Both statements may hold, and be interdependent.

Teachers play a particular role in *all leadership categories* for *secondary schools.* This seems a reasonable proposition: teachers wish to elevate local educational standards, and seek possibly also their own career advancement. Teachers are also prominent as *work group leaders* in respect of *high schools and village polytechnics.* This may again be a reflection of their knowledge, and also of the fact that they are used as educational planners during the construction of such projects.

Farmers are over-represented in *all aspects of nursery school, primary school and cattle dip* leadership. This tallies with our previous conclusions on farmer preference for small projects of immediate relevance. They show the same over-representation in all leadership functions for *roads.*

Chiefs and subchiefs do not show any particular pattern of over-representation. They are over-represented in certain leadership functions of certain projects but their degree of over-representation is never big. Chiefs and subchiefs remain advocates of general development. As initiators, they appear, however, to be involved more in nursery schools, health projects, cattle dips, high schools and village polytechnics. Their leverage is applied—or used—both for small and big projects. Nowhere are they over-represented as committee members, sharing their capacity, status or rule over all types of projects. As *work group leaders,* they feature above average for health projects, water projects, secondary schools and cattle dips. These projects appear to demand special labour organisation and technical expertise, which could be a reason why chiefs and subchiefs apply their energy on them in an attempt to safeguard adequate standards, or even to prevent embezzlement of resources.

Summary and Conclusions

The survey data confirm that Harambee leadership at the sublocational level constitutes *local* leadership. *Farmers* dominate, and their preference is for small localized projects relevant to their immediate needs: nursery schools, primary schools, cattle dips, and roads. Farmer domination is not uniform, and regional differences are important to note: newly settled or marginal areas like some districts in Rift Valley and North Eastern Province instead show an involvement of government officers higher than the overall national average for initiatorship, committee membership and work group leadership. Also in areas of limited leader recruitment like Coast Province, government officers are important.

The most important category of government leaders at the grass-roots level are *chiefs and subchiefs*. They promote general development, and do not seem to favour any particular kinds of projects. Chiefs and subchiefs are important "controllers" of local machinery and often function as "brokers". They do not appear to follow the directives of the provincial and district administrations, if any directives at all.

More *conspicuous leaders* like politicians, senior clergymen, businessmen, district and divisional level government officers seem to play a limited role. Conspicuous leaders generally favour larger projects like secondary schools, village polytechnics and health projects.

Teachers are another important leader category, roughly at par with businessmen. Teachers obviously promote educational projects, often secondary schools. As committee members, teachers average the same overall frequency as chiefs and subchiefs. Clergymen are, on the average, more important than politicians. In Nyanza, clergymen appear to fill the leadership gap in Harambee left by politicians.

Women are rare as formally nominated leaders. They occupy a relatively strong position in Central Province. They are found as initiators of water projects (where *artisans* also play a special role), nursery schools and other schools, agricultural projects and housing projects.

For the whole sample 57—61 per cent of each leadership category has primary education. The relative concentration of conspicuous leaders among initiators is reflected in education: one-fourth of all initiators have secondary or higher education, which is more than for other leadership categories.

Continuity in leadership and multiple leadership will be more important in areas of limited recruitment, like Coast Province. In case studies of Coast and Western Province, we found great variation in continuity between individual projects. On an average, one-half of each leadership stage is transferred to the next one. More than 40 per cent of initiators were found as work group leaders, which suggests a "revival" of initiators in implementation.

V. Contribution Patterns

Introduction

As in the case of leadership in projects on the sublocational level, we expect to find the common man as major contributor. His—and her—money and labour may even make up the bulk of total investment. We shall not only try to establish what the role of local people is, but also the role of people and bodies outside local communities.

Contributions to self-help projects can take many forms. The most obvious one is the ostentatious fund-raising meeting sometimes reported in the press. A good fund-raising meeting will be presided over by a number of VIPs such as the District Commissioner, local Member of Parliament, leaders of ethnic central organisations such as GEMA, Luo Union, New Akamba Union and important businessmen. A Minister may even be there. These and others will make rousing speeches urging for contributions and the speeches will be enhanced by the chanting of songs and dancing by women's groups and school-children. The contributions are handed over to one of the VIPs in full view of everybody, and all this is acknowledged by shouts of appreciation and hand clappings.

The first donation may be several hundred shillings in cash. The last donation may be a few eggs of a women farmer. Contributions in kind are auctioned immediately afterwards. With sentiments and willingness to sacrifice running high, the bulls, cows, goats, chicken, sugarcane auctioned may fetch handsome prices.

Other forms of Harambee contributions involve *collections* organised by Harambee groups or organising committees involving visits to people's homes, or *levies* on produce and income, imposed in connection with delivery or sale of such produce, for example by cooperative societies. A related levy, usually in connection with big, national or regional projects like Harambee Institutes of Technology, is deductions made on wages and salaries. If contributions on Harambee days are given voluntarily but under social pressure, the kinds of contributions just mentioned will involve varying degrees of stronger compulsion.

The size of individual cash contributions at the grassroots level will vary greatly according to the economic activity and potential of the area and according to the individual's socio-economic status. In a less monetized area parents may donate a standard two (2) shillings each to a nursery school. In a prosperous agricultural area, donations to a secondary school may reach 400—500 shillings per family and this donation may often be repeated over the years. Donations are often at standard rates, which are sometimes different for

men and women. Sometimes labour may be given as an alternative to cash. Progressive donation patterns are often observed, implying a thousand shillings or so for the Member of Parliament or prominent businessman and a few hundred shillings for local leaders and some 10 to 20 shillings for local farmers.

Contributions in kind, such as work, materials, livestock are given at the project site. Labour inputs are given on specified days or parts of days and women normally supply the bulk of labour contributions.

Cash versus labour contributions

Table 21 shows that for 1972, according to the official statistics, an investment off 2.7 million out of a total Harambee investment of £3.1 million came from the people and that the largest item within that bulk was *cash.* In these statistics, an hour of unskilled labour is valued at 30 cents and an hour of skilled labour at shs. 1.25.

Table 21. *Harambee Contributions* 1972 *(£K)*

Contributions by the People				Other Sources			Grand
Labour	Material	Cash	Total	Central govt.	Local auth.	Other Donors	Total
855,274	531,705	1,320,100	2,707,079	234,017	25,169	149,658	3,115,923

Source: Community Development Division, A Statistical Analysis on Self-help Projects, (i) 1972, (ii) (1967—71), Nairobi, 1973, Table J.

Cash has increased its relative importance as part of total contributions over time. Cash contributions for 1972 are almost half of the peoples contributions as compared to about one-third in 1967 and 1968. There are several factors which may explain the increasing trend towards more cash contributions:

(a) The changing nature of the projects towards more capital intensive ones such as water projects.

(b) Increase of urban-rural income transfers especially from urban Harambee groups supporting rural programmes.

(c) Changing structure of participants within Harambee programmes where organisation sophistication may bring more higher income groups into the activities.

Roughly, as cash percentages have increased over the years, the *labour* input percentage has remained stable between one-quarter and one-third of the total, whereas *materzal* inputs have declined.

It must be noted, however, that the labour input has been measured at the same unit values in 1967 as 1973 whereas cash and materials inputs reflect inflation during the period. In real terms therefore, labour contributions may even have shown some increase. This will certainly be the case if we inflate the

labour cost by, say, 15 per cent, a proportion by which the value of materials and cash may have been inflated between 1967 and 1973.[1]

Distribution between major donor categories and provinces

We have already noted that according to the official statistics, contributions from the people often exceed 90 per cent of total self-help capital formation in a year. For the years 1967—1973, the percentage has varied between a low of 84.9 per cent (1971) to a high of 94.2 per cent (1969).[2] Table 22 shows contributor category structure in 1972, and its distribution between different provinces.

Contributions from the people will include donations made by visiting dignitaries at meetings at the project level (information given by self-help statistical division of Ministry of Housing and Social Services).

Table 22. *Sources and Kinds of Contributions, Province-wise 1972 (£K. '000)*

Province	Contribution by the People				Other Assistance				Grand Total
	Labour	Material	Cash	Total	Central govt.	Local auth.	Other donor	Total	
Central	215	190	518	922	47	7	26	80	1003
Coast	87	24	69	180	32	0	26	59	239
Eastern	168	47	205	420	40	3	21	64	484
North Eastern	22	5	14	40	20	2	2	24	64
Western	74	43	69	187	30	4	10	44	231
Nyanza	150	115	142	407	25	1	25	52	459
Rift Valley	139	107	304	551	38	8	39	85	626
All	855	531	1321	2707	232	25	149	408	3116
Percentage				86.9				13 1	100

Source: Community Development Division, A Statistical Analysis on Self-help Projects, Nairobi, 1973.

Contributions from other sources than the people vary[3] between a high of 15.1 per cent (1971) to a low of 5.8 per cent (1969).

Contributor socio-economic characteristics

It was suggested in earlier chapters that contributors to sublocational Harambee projects are the local populations and groups such as farmers and women.

[1] Note that according to the Development Plan 1974 the ratio of price inflation averaged 2.5 per cent per year, 1963—1972. Development Plan 1974--1978, Part I, pg. 179.

[2] p. 2, Ten Great Years of Self-Help Movement in Kenya (Community Development Division, 1974)

[3] Community Development Division, Ten Great Years of Self-help Movement in Kenya, Nairobi, 1974

The consumer contributor survey generated the sex, occupational, educational and age characteristics as outlined below.

(a) ***Sex:*** Out of 324 consumers/contributors, 133 were women. This is 41 per cent of the total, whereas only some 6–7 per cent of all self-help leaders were women. Female participation is not uniform across projects and areas. Female participation appears especially high for health projects.[4] It is also relatively highest for projects in Eastern and Central Provinces. This may relate to our findings in respect of leadership, where female leadership showed the highest averages for Central—but not Eastern—Province.

(b) *Occupation:* Contributors were distributed as follows between occupational groups: farmers and housewives made up some 63 per cent of the sample. Chiefs/subchiefs and businessmen (local traders) each made up 6 per cent, teachers, artisans and other government officers each about 5. Pastors and clerks each made up about 3 per cent. The contributor sample is, for obvious reasons, more grass-roots than the leader sample previously discussed: farmers, housewives, artisans, clerks are more strongly represented in the former. Conspicuous leaders like politicians and district/divisional level government officers are not represented at all.

(c) *Education:* About 40 per cent of the contributor sample have primary education, 30 per cent none, 22 per cent secondary. This pattern is not markedly different from that for leaders. Both categories embody some 70 per cent of no or primary education, with the difference that among contributors those entirely without formal education are more numerous. Stockton's Nyeri sample of landowners showed primary education for some 80 per cent of respondents.

(d) *Age:* The contributor sample shows a wide spread over different age groups. 54 per cent are in the age category 30—59 years of age with a heavy concentration around the 30—49 years group. Leaders had a 79—86 per cent concentration around the 30—59 age group. We also find young people among contributors: over 15 per cent are 29 years or below. There are some very old people too: nearly 12 per cent are 70 years or more. Leaders show a greater age concentration around the 40—69 age group than contributors.

(e) *Participation Rates:* Out of the potential contributors sampled, only 14.7 per cent did not contribute in any way.

Practically all contributors donated cash, but only half of them did self-help labour. Almost one-third gave two inputs, usually both cash and labour. Some 12 per cent donated materials.

[4] Subsequent analysis of perceived benefits (chapter 7) will show that health and water projects are perceived as especially benefiting women (and children).

Cash contribution structure for selected 80 projects in Coast, Central and Nyanza provinces

The survey provided data for a range of the single largest contributions to all projects studied. The size of the largest contributions vary greatly according to the size of projects, the type of external donors and leadership patronage.

The projects studied include 15 primary schools, 14 secondary schools and village polytechnics, 9 nursery schools, 8 health centres and dispensaries, 11 cattle dips, 11 water projects, 10 churches, roads, and community halls. Data used for all projects included summaries of cash book receipts, treasurers reports.

Individual Size of Contributions

The individual size of cash donations will vary greatly. The five largest *individual donations* found among the 80 projects each amount to a sum between 2.500 and 10,000 shs. Four of the five donations were made by politicians, and it is interesting to note that two of them went to areas outside their constituencies. One of the five donations was made by a businessman.

Obviously, *bodies and organisations* can produce even larger cash donations. The table below shows the largest ones found in the 80 projects (Table **23).**

This table really only tells us that in our sample there are a few large projects attracting several large donations from a few big donors. However, it is interesting to note that Nyanza and the Coast Provinces, often thought of as neglected provinces, do attract a set of large donations, that the largest Central Government grant observed went to Nyandarua district, and that the two second largest government grants went to Nyanza Province.

The national statistics previously cited indicate however, that *the bulk of cash*

These statistics may, however, include some VIPs and certainly local bodies, in the "people's contributions". **A** donation from an M.P. at a fund-raising meeting will. for instance, be included in people's contributions. Contributions—including those in kind—from the Central Government were only 7.5 per cent of the total in 1972, and those from other donors (such as Kenya Charity Sweepstake, foreign bodies like CARE and DANIDA, and missionaries/missions) were only some 4.5 per cent.

Provincial Contribution Patterns

Before going more into the relative sizes of individual local contributions, we can note some general traits on the contributions structure in the three different provinces dealt with here: For *Coast Province,* we find to a considerable extent the same "local VIPs" contributing to several projects. The total contributions by these active donators vary between a registered maximum of 2,600 shs. to a

Table 23. *Cash contributions from organisations (amounts in shillings)*

Name of body	Particulars on donations				
	Province	District	Sublocation	Project	Amount
Mombasa Rotary Club	Coast	Kwale	Mazeras	Mazeras village polytechnic	90,000
Central Government	Central	Nyandarua	Wanjohi	Wanjohi Secondary school	30,000
CARE	Central	Nyandarua	Wanjohi		10,000
Kenya Charity Sweepstake	Nairobi	Nairobi	Mutu-ini	Mutu-ini High school	10,000
Central Government	Nyanza	Kisii	Mokomoni	Mokomoni cattle dip	9,000
DANIDA	Central	Nyeri	Karia	Ngangarthi cattle dip	7,000
Kenya charity sweepstake	Coast	Kwale	Mazeras	Mazeras Village Polytechnic	5,000
Local Council	Nvanza	S Nyanza	Mabera	Kubiveye Health Centre	4,925
Kenya Charity Sweepstake	Central	Nyandarua	Wanjohi	Wanjohi Secondary school	3,500
Central Govt	Nvanza	S. Nvanza	Mabera	Kubiveye Health Centre	3,254.80
Kenya Charity Sweepstake	Nyanza	Kisumu	Kombewa	Primary schools girls tuition block	3,000
Nvachwa Mission	Nyanza	Kisii	Bonyakoni	Masimba Church	3,000

Source: Cash books of Self-help projects surveyed.

minimum of 15 shs.

The repetitive donors are almost all national or local leaders such as ministers, chiefs, subchiefs or other civil servants, teachers, businessmen. Only three of the 26 repetitive donors found in this Coast sample are farmers. They each donate to two or three or even four projects where they are usually committee office holders of at least one. Two ministers and a businessman are the biggest donors. The other repetitive donors have given some one or two hundred shillings, often donating more to projects where they are not office-holders than to those where they are.

In these non-urban rather sparsely populated Coast sublocations a limited number of persons are likely to provide the organisational skills and cash needed. We are thus likely to find them in several projects (perhaps because of

their own moral obligation, prestige or because of social pressure exerted upon them). This point is illustrated by comparing office holders of Golini sublocation in Kwale District, with the total population structure as measured by a sample of every tenth household head from the tax payers' register in the sublocation.

Government employees who have a small, but regular pay, make over half of the office holders cum contributors registered in the survey, but only 11 per cent of household heads as per the tax-payers register sample.

For *Nyanza Province* the contributor structure has two distinct traits. The first one is the frequent *group donations* made by *associations* from the sublocations formed by emigrants in Nairobi. The cash income earners that are employed in the city collect money and hand it over to self-help projects in their own areas. They may in fact often be the ultimate initiators of these projects. Table 24 gives few examples of emigrant group donations.

Table 24. *Donations by associations to Kisumu District*

District	Sub-location	Association	Project	Cash Donation	Percent of total
Kisumu	Kombewa	Kanyachwera Association in Nairobi	Nyamgun school	950	~40
		Workers in Nbi		300	
		Kombewa Association in Nbi.	Diemo school, Teachers' Houses	600	~30
		Worker in Kampala		20	
		Katieno Working group in Nbi.	Primary school, Girls' tuition block	1200	>50
	Gem Rae	Rae organisation in Nbi. (incl. IBM Manager, Medical Doctor, Police Inspector)	Rae Girls Secondary School	>3100	~30 (out of 20 largest)
		Gem Rae Association in Nbi.	Gem Rae Primary school	1435	58 (out of 20 largest)
		Other emigrants (University lecturer, reglstrar-surveyor, executive officer of EAA, Kisumu Town Clerk)		1800	
	Nyamware	Association of Kochieng in Nairobi	Alenchi primary school	800	60 (out of 20 largest)

This urban rural income transfer in Nyanza appears to be concentrated on projects in Kisumu district. However, a second and related trait reinforces the impression of urban-rural income and wealth transfers through self-help cash contributions. This is the largest part of cash contributions given by civil servants and other urban wage earners.[5] Our data do not pinpoint the residence of these contributors, but it can be assumed that they are frequently in urban areas. A few examples are given in Table 25.

Table 25. *Cash donations of higher income earners*

District	Sub Location	Project	Frequent occupations among 20 largest donors	Sum of 20 largest donations	Amount of Average donations, 20 largest
S. Nyanza	Kokoth	Secondary school	Pastors, businessmen, teachers, government servants, (also the chief and one farmer)	5600	280
Siaya	Katwenga	Health dispensary	A railway official, businessmen, teachers	5124	256
		Maternity ward	Businessmen, teachers, civil servants	4744	237
		Water project	A bishop, businessmen, teachers	3545	177
Kisumu	Gem Rae	Secondary school	Teachers, government servants	9340	467
		Primary school	A bank manager, 2 registrars, teachers	5535	277

If the sum of 20 largest donations is large it may mean one of two things. The project may have succeeded in attracting aid from Central Government, Kenya Charity Sweepstake, or a clan association, or it has in general succeeded in attracting a set of large individual donations. The data indicate that the Nyanza Province sample has many big sums of the 20 largest contributors because of much urban-rural transfer in that province. The Central Province sample derives its rather big number of such sums through a few government grants and single VIP large donations. This is outlined in Table 26.

[5] Mbithi points out that the first generation of the "élite" (defined as civil service, diplomatic service, professionals such as doctors and engineers, managers, researchers, businessmen) with "hobbies and interaction networks" such as membership in clubs and associations, demonstrate their ties with rural families by repatriating more than 30 per cent of their "urban" wage income to rural areas (Mbithi, Rural Sociology and Rural Development Its Application to Kenya, Nairobi, pp. 50–51)

Table 26. Examples of large sums of 20 largest donations

Province	District	Sub-Location	Project	Sum of 20 largest donations	Reasons for large total
Coast	Kwale	Mazeras	Village Polytechnic	108,890	Mombasa Rotary Club gave 90,000
	Taita Taveta	Mgomranji	Health Dispensary	51,005	Central Government gave 40,000 grant
	Kilifi	Kaloleni	Social Hall	20,940	Businessman gave 6,900
Central	Kiambu	Karatu	Primary school	7,000	
	Nyandarua	Wanjohi	Primary school	4,000	Central Govt. grant 1,800
			Secondary school	4,250	Provincial Commissioner gave 1,500
	Kirinyaga	Gichuru	Cattle dip	4,500	Member of Parliament gave 3,000
	Nyeri	Karia	Cattle dip	10,000	Danida grant 7,000
	Muranga	Gatura	Cattle dip	8,800	Member of Parliament gave 3,000
	Muranga	Gatura	Church	5,400	Member of Parliament gave 3,050
	Kiambu	Kinoo	Water proj.	8,500	
	Kirinyaga	Gichuru	Water scheme	8,000	
Nyanza	Kisumu	Gem Rae	Primary school	4,400	
	Siaya	Katwenga	Secondary school	4,834	
	Kisumu	Nyamwart	Secondary school	5,900	
	Kisii	Bonyakoni	Secondary school	48,820	3,500 grant from Minister
	S. Nyanza	Mabera	Health Centre	11,148	Local authority gave 4,295
	Siaya	Katwenga	Church	4,735	
	S. Nyanza	Kokoth	Water proj.	3,700	

Finally for Central Province, the data give no clear-cut story. Farmers, probably many of them cash crop cultivators, give donations of one or several hundred shillings. In Wanjohi sublocation of Nyandarua, for instance, farmers and traders give equally for a primary school; over 200 shillings each. Many Kisii farmers of Nyanza Province make contributions of the same magnitude. However in other areas of Nyanza, such magnitudes are generally given by teachers and businessmen/traders. Several Kisii cooperatives gave between 3,000 and 10,000 each for a secondary school.

In our survey however, Central Province as such does not show any particular concentration of donations by politicians and other VIPs. The two largest personal donations by politicians in our survey were recorded for Coast Province. No particular concentration of politicians donations in Central Province is found. The survey sample records do reveal, however, three large MP donations of about 3,000 shs., each in Central Province.

Support from Central Government, Kenya Charity Sweepstake, Foreign Agencies, Politicians, and Kenya Businessmen

The largest recorded *Central Government support* per project is for Coast Province. This derives largely from a set of government grants for Tana River District projects, connected with the irrigation and settlement schemes there. For Central Province, the bulk is a grant to a Nairobi school. The largest recorded *foreign support* for Central Province is entirely made up of a 7,000 shs. DANIDA and a 10,000 CARE grant. A Mombasa Rotary Club 90,000 shs. donation for Mazeras Village Polytechnic explains the big Coast figure for Kenya businessmen. Politicians contributions, which is the provincially most equally spread input per project, show a variation between some 300 shs. per project for Nyanza, to some 900 for Coast, with Central Province in the middle with some 600 shs.

Local authorities, long plagued by poor finances, play a minor role as cash donors. Two donations are noted for Nyanza Province, one in South Nyanza district of 4,925 shs., one in Kisii of 1,000 shs.

Local Level Contributions

It is, however, the *local people themselves who are the most important contributors to self-help.* The national statistics *and* the sample from our survey both show this. The national statistics indicate that in 1972, almost half of the contributions from the people were in cash. This cash constituted some 42 per cent of the total self-help inputs.

The average local people's cash percentage for the three provinces is 70 per cent for the projects in question.

The 1973 official statistics register a dramatic increase in cash contributions of the people, from the 1972 figure of £K. 1,320,000 to £K. 2,473,000. Using the latter figure, the local people's cash contribution percentage for 1973, out of total contributions, is 57 per cent. This should be compared with the 70 per cent registered for the sample.

So, the argument still holds that it is local people's contributions in the form of cash and material inputs that are dominant. The people's cash input per individual varies greatly. Table 27 gives a few examples, taken from the sample of the 80 projects. In the poorest areas, or for very small projects, a farmer may limit his donation to some ten to fifty shillings. However, most individual contributions reach one or several hundred shillings. This is a major achievement—and burden—for any farmer.

The burden of cash contributions is further illustrated in Table 28 which shows a set of contributions to five self-help projects. Most consumers of the services of the project have contributed cash.

Such a burden on local populations indicate that there may be an increasing

inability by the same local populations to obtain the items seen as alternatives to cash contributions to Harambee. Such alternatives include food, school fees, clothes, agricultural inputs and personal saving.

Table 27. *Some Characteristics of people's cash contributions*

Province	District	Sub/Location	Project	Common sizes of contributions, and kind of contributors
Coast	Kwale	Golini	Primary School	Parents Shs. 20 each, government employees Shs. 45; Shs. 2 each per week if not working or contributing materials
	Taita Taveta	Mgomranji	Nursery	Shs. S 5 0 each, Pastors, Traders, Teachers, Farmers
	Tana River	Hola	Primary School	Shs. 15 each, farmers
			Dispensary	Shs. 30 each, farmers
Central	Kiambu	Karatu	Cattle Dip	Farmers, Shs. 100 each
	Kiambu	Karatu	Primary School	several farmers Shs. 300—350 each
	Kirinyaga	Gichuru	Water Scheme	Many, Shs. 200—400
	Nyandarua	Murungaru	Health Centre	Shs. 100 each
	Nyandarua	Wanjohi	Nursery	Farmers, Shs. 12—60
Nyanza	Kisii	Mokomoni	Cattle Dip	700 farmers gave Shs 2000 during one year through Co-operative Society deductions.
			Church	Farmers, many which female gave Shs. 25 each
		Bonyakoni	School	Many donors, Shs. 67—267 each
	S Nyanza	Mabera	Cattle Dip	Some 60 farmers, Shs. 10 each session, each. Repeated
	Siaya	Katwenga	Maternity Ward	Mostly businessmen, teachers, civil servants, Shs. 100—350 each
	Kisumu	Nyamwa-re	Girls' Secondary School	Clerks, teachers, farmers, fishermen, Shs. 210—400 each.
			Nursery	Housewives, Shs. 10—20 each.

Table 28. *Consumer contributions and attitudes*

Province	District	Sub-location	Project	Donor occupation	No. of such donors	Sex distribution of donors	Amount of individual donations (Shs)	On alternative use of resources	On other projects considered more urgent than this one
Central	Kiambu	Kinoo	Water project	Welder	1		600	Buy chicken for egg prod.	
				Driver	1	3F	600		High school
				Labourer	1	6M	600	Domestic goods	
				Farmer	6		1—800		Health centre secondary school, high school
					(one respondent mentions pressure—forced to deposit shs 200/)				
		Karatu	School	Chief	1		600		
				Trader	1	7F	600	Trading	
				Bus conductor	1	7M	0		
				Farmer	11		400—975	Farming, plant tea, buy cow, domestic purposes, consumption, clothing	none mentioned
	Muranga	Githumu	Cattle Dip	Businessmen	3		50—60	Employ labourers, buy chemicals, beer	water project (1)
				Shopkeeper	1		0		
				Bartender	1		60	Domestic expenditure, contribute to primary school	none mentioned
				Mason	2	5F	60	school fees	
				Driver	1	24M	100	paying for vehicle	
				Clerk	1		0		
				Watchman	1		0	Buy spraying	none
				Cook	1		60	chemicals. Buy	mentioned
				Carpenter	2		60	timber. Buy 60 tea plants.	
				Farmer	17		0—120 (usually 60)	Pay school fees, food, long coat, sugar, spraying chemicals, one sheep, new clothes for children, food for children.	

Nyanza	Kisii	Mokomoni	Cattle Dip	Trader	2		10—25	Savings	secondary school
				Teacher		10F		Spraying chemicals, school fees, chemicals, food, home necessities, Farm labour, savings, home necessities, food, children's wear	Health Centre secondary school
				Farmer	4	26M	5—20		
					30 (one respondent said he contributed under pressure)		5—20		
Eastern	Machakos	Hithangaini	School	Ungraded Dresser	1		120	Another school project on behalf of my daughter	none given
				Farmer	7	4F 8M	20—80	Fertilizer for coffee, school fees, coffee spray, school fund in another school, buy food, (eat it up in a day—201–)	
				Housewife	4		7—120	Eat-buy food for a week (Shs. 60), buy food for a day (Shs. 7), pay school fund in primary school where children go, buy food to last the fortnight (Shs. 80)	none given

Labour Contribution

Introduction

Our discussion of the contributors has so far focussed on cash donations. We indicated the relative dominance of cash as an item of the people's contributions in terms of volume.

However, local input of labour stands out as the essence of local group action, with its strong linkage to social organisation and community cohesion and local focus on immediate, local needs. Labour is not an easily marketed, freely movable production factor. It is limited to geographical and associational factors and also by degree of expertise.

Labour is of two major kinds. The official statistics use the term "unskilled" to denote inputs by farmers, women and others in digging, carrying, watering and other menial activities. The term "skilled" is used for the (usually paid for) work of masons, carpenters, or the whole package of services provided by a contractor. We shall start by looking at project production processes to ascertain total input of skilled and unskilled labour. This will help us assess what the national statistics on self-help labour input imply in terms of manpower. It will also give some insight into factor mix ("choice of technology") for different projects. After this, we shall look at examples of individual labour sacrifice to self-help.

Project Case Studies

The evidence is that the gestation period of a self-help project is a long and slow process. It may be either constituted by short occasional bursts of activity, a few large production periods interspaced with long periods of little or no activity, or by a small input of labour and materials over a very long period.

To gain more insight into employment patterns over time, we have traced the production history of some projects according to the quarterly statistical reports of Community Development Division, for the period first quarter 1971 to second quarter 1974. This is a $3^1/_2$ year period (42 months) during which many projects should be completed.

The input data were tabulated only for the most common type of projects, namely cattle dips, water projects, health centres, nurseries, and primary and secondary schools. These projects, however, constitute some 73 per cent of the total number of projects, and some 82 per cent of estimated capital formation in Harambee self-help in 1972.

The data, of quite an immense volume, were tabulated for the following districts only:

District	*Restriction*
Busia	All projects named above, except primary schools. These were very numerous. Every fifth was selected, resulting in tabulation of data for 18 primary schools.
Kiambu, Muranga, Machakos and Kisii	For these districts, every "n:th" project was chosen within each category, so that the following number of projects were traced:

For each district		*Total*
Cattle dips	3	12
Health centres	2	8
Water projects	2	8
Secondary schools	3	12
Primary schools	4	16
Nursery schools	4	16

The five districts are identical to those where the consumer/contributor survey of 20 projects was conducted.

We shall look first at the results of the Busia tabulations. They are for:

18	primary schools
9	secondary schools
8	nursery schools
23	cattle dips
6	health centres.

Apparently, there were no water projects at all in Busia District, being produced during the period of study (The Busia data were for two years only).

In the following tables, we attempt to summarize the tabulations to show production patterns, and also thereby relative mixes of different inputs.

Skilled Work

Table 29 shows that the most skilled work-intensive project in Busia during the period of two years was a secondary school, consuming 5100 hours. The lowest skilled labour input for a secondary school is 200 hours only, but this refers to an extension merely (a kitchen probably) for Amukura Secondary School. The average labour input for 9 secondary schools in the two year period is 1574 hours, spread over an average of 3–7 quarters (one year roughly) of production. The spread is a bit larger, indicating temporary stoppages, or periods of no input of skilled work.

For *primary* schools the average input of skilled work is only slightly less (1417 hours) but the spread figures are higher. The primary schools take longer to build.

Cattle dips show the most uniform input of skilled work. Those completed, or near completion, take an input of some 1500—2000 hours. The average time of input is also low, less than three-quarters of a year.

Nurseries take little skilled work input.

Table 29. *Contribution patterns and Relative Mixes of Different Inputs, Busia District*

Type of Project	n	Skilled work Total hours			Time distribution No. of input quarters			Total spread		
		Max.	Min.	Av.	Max.	Min.	Av.	Max.	Min.	Av.
Primary schools	18	3089	132	1417	8	1	4.9	8	1	6.3
Secondary schools	9	5100	200	1574	6	1	3.7	7	1	4.4
Nursery schools	8	788	0	204	4	0	1	5	0	1.3
Cattle Dips	23	1905	0	702	5	0	2.8	7	0	3.2
Health Centres	6	1168	260	495	4	2	3.3	8	2	4.7
All Projects	64	5100	0	945						

Unskilled Work

Table 30 gives the corresponding data for *unskilled work inputs.* Whereas the *secondary schools* have roughly the same input of skilled and unskilled work, *primary schools* seem to rely on a much higher input ratio of unskilled work.[6] As in the case of skilled work, primary schools take unskilled work for long periods, obviously with occasional stops (average period of work input 4.6 quarters, but the average spread of this input is 6.2 quarters.

Nurseries, that hardly took any skilled work, seem to require a lot of unskilled work.

Cattle Dips seem to have a time production pattern which is almost identical for skilled and unskilled work.

Table 30. *Contribution Patterns and Relative Mixes of Different Inputs, Busia District*

Type of Project	n	Unskilled work Total hours			Time distribution No. of input quarters			Total Spread		
		Max.	Min.	Av.	Max.	Min.	Av.	Max.	Min	Av.
Primary Schools	18	5480	128	2250	8	1	4.6	8	1	6.2
Secondary Schools	9	5200	0	1922	6	1	2.8	6	0	3.1
Nursery Schools	8	3988	36	1122	4	1	2.4	7	1	2.4
Cattle Dips	23	2797	0	1060	5	0	2.4	7	0	2.8
Health Centres	6	4868	0	2128	4	0	2.7	7	0	3.7
All Projects	64	5480	0	1624						

Estimates of Total Labour Input in Busia District

From the data on quarterly labour consumption over the two-year period for each kind of project (assuming that our selection of every fifth primary school gave us a random and representative sample), it is possible to estimate the total skilled labour input into the five categories of projects at some 162,000 hours over two years. The corresponding figure for unskilled work is some 264,000 hours. These figures are equivalent to:

[6] For primary schools, average unskilled labour input is 2250 hours, for secondary only 1922

Category of Work	Input per year, hours	Input per year, man-days at 6 hours each	Input per year, man-years at 300 days each
Skilled	81,000	13,500	45
Unskilled	132,000	22,000	73.3

Table V of the Community Development official statistics[7] shows the value of self-help production in Busia District in 1973. Out of a total labour input valued at £13,823 as much as £11,806 or 85.5 per cent is attributable to the five project categories we have dealt with[8] above. As a rough approximation, we could increase the labour input figures calculated by 15 per cent to estimate total average self-help labour input in Busia during one year of the third quarter 1972—second quarter 1974 period: (rounded figures).

Category of Work	Input per year, hours	Input per year, man-days at 6 hours each	Input per year, man years at 300 days each
Skilled	93,000	15,500	51,7
Unskilled	152,000	25,300	84.3
Both categories	245,000	40,800	136.0

We can either visualise 136 men and women working full time on self-help in Busia or, which is a more realistic figure, a few hundred fundis working part-time and thousands of farmers and farmers wives putting in many intermittent days and hours of work in self-help production.

The 1969 census estimates the Busia district population as follows:

Male population		Female population		All	
Total	Adults	Total	Adults	Total	Adults
95,141	42,729	105,345	53,947	200,486	96,676

About half of the population is adults (above 18 years), totalling 96,700. With an estimated population increase of between 3.2 and 3.5 per cent per year, the adult population of Busia in 1973 should be some 111,000 people.

For the peak labour input of skilled work in 1973, there was a total input of some 21,000 hours (fourth quarter) or 3,500 days of 6 hours each. This is equivalent to a full-time employment of some 47 masons and builders (fundis).

The corresponding peak period for unskilled work is for the first quarter, with an effort of some 49,000 hours. This is equivalent to some 8,200 days of work or nearly 750 people working one day per week. It implies that on an average some one per cent of the adult population would be thus engaged in self-help work during the peak quarter of the year.

[7] Ten Great Years of Self-help Movement in Kenya.

[8] All agricultural projects in the statistics are assumed to be cattle dips—a reasonable assumption.

Other Districts and National Level

In Table 31 we show the ratio of input of skilled work, on one hand, and what must be considered the prerequisites of such input of skilled work on the other hand, that is cash from the people (including materials) and contributions from other donors than the people (e.g. Central and Local Government, Kenya Charity Sweepstake, foreign agencies and foundations etc.), which again will usually be in the form of cash, as those primary inputs that permit utilisation of (paid) skilled workers/fundis.

Table 31. *Input Patterns for Projects in Five Districts of Kenya (percentage)*

Projects: Five districts in Kenya	Busia	Kiambu	Muranga	Kisii	Machakos	Unweighted Average
Nursery schools	67.1	46.1	7.0	47.5	25.5	38.6
Primary schools	28.1	19.1	20.9	6.6	41.4	23.2
Secondary schools	24.3	48.8	3.8	12.3	19.0	21.6
Cattle Dips	15.9	10.0	2 7	4.6	12.8	9.2
Health Centres	12 8	47.8	1.8	2 2	27.0	18.3
Water Projects		5.0	0 9	–	1 5	2.5
All Projects	17.0	21.1	3.9	7.3	5.5	11.0

Note: Ratio indicates relationship between input of skilled labour on one hand and input of cash and materials on the other hand.

The ratios calculated will of course reflect the valuation of an hour of skilled work, standardized at shs. 1.25. Had a higher valuation been selected, all the ratios would have increased. The ratios will always stay well below 100 per cent which merely means that the cash flow to the project must exceed payment flows to fundis.

Corresponding calculations for the projects selected in the other districts (Muranga, Machakos, Kisii, Kiambu) are undertaken to establish whether the production patterns appeared similar to those of Busia.

For Busia the ratio for all projects between skilled labour on the one hand and cash and material input on the other is 17 per cent. For the other districts the ratio for primary schools varies between a low of 6.6 per cent for Kisii, to a high of 41.4 per cent for Machakos with a weighted average for Kiambu, Muranga, Kisii and Machakos districts of 20.0 per cent, (unweighted 23.2 per cent). This figure may be compared with the 28.1 per cent for Busia primary schools.

The unweighted average ratio of skilled labour to cash and materials contributions for all projects in the four districts is 11 per cent, as compared with the 17 per cent of Busia district. The most "skill"-intensive district is Kiambu (21.1 per cent) the least "skill[w]-intensive is Muranga (3.9 per cent).

These percentages are influenced by a multitude of factors, e.g.

— the relative input of unskilled work, as a substitute for skilled work.

— the mixture of different kinds of projects produced in the various districts.

If our sample has a national representativeness, the 1973 official statistics could be recalculated in terms of skilled labour employment in the following manner: (rounded figures)

Input of materials from the people:	£K	491,000
cash from the people:	£K	2,473,000
contributions from Central Government, Local Authorities and other donors (will be cash and material)	£K	369,000
Total cash and materials contributions	£K	3,333,000

Estimate of skilled labour input 11 per cent of £K3,333,000 = £K366,600. At 1.25 shs./hr. this is equivalent to 5,865,600 man-hours or 977,600 man-days, or some 3,260 man-years.

This then could either constitute permanent employment of some 3,000 fundis in self-help over the year or, as the 1973 Community Development statistics foreword suggests: "it is estimated that at least some 20,000 artisans who would have been idle, are involved in self-help constructional work every year"—this then implying part-time work. We shall now attempt to check this extremely rough calculation through another method.

The quarterly inputs statistics tell us that there is a difference in the propensity of different kinds of projects to generate skilled employment from certain inputs of cash and materials. It appears for instance that the "skill intensity" is greater for small than for large projects. One reason for this would be the simple, technological economies of scale. Even a small project needs a certain skilled input from a mason or a carpenter, and this input will be relatively greater for small projects.

This tendency appears clear from the Busia data which include many projects, but less so for the other districts of smaller samples.

Averaging and rounding the work input data for the five districts and correcting them for time spread gives us the following employment figures in a givenyear, say 1973:

For each project that is a·	Number of Hours	
	Skilled employment	Unskilled employment
Secondary school	1800	4000
Primary school	1000	2333
Nursery school	300[1]	1400
Cattle dip	600[2]	2000[2]
Health centre/Dispensary	400	3000
Water project[3]	250	5000

[1] Completion of tasks over two quarters only
[2] Completion of tasks over three quarters only
[3] A very heterogeneous category. A 2-year spread of the synthesis project is assumed

These data were then combined with the national statistics on the number of completed, ongoing and newly started projects in 1973. If we assume: (a) that the bias introduced by omitting other projects (churches and mosques, etc.) cancels the bias introduced by using quicker completion times than those

indicated by the survey and (b) that ongoing and completed projects have twice the time spread of completed ones and take labour inputs only *half* of 1973, this extremely rough method of calculation leads us to an estimation of direct skilled labour input into self-help of some 3,592,000 hours in 1973, or some 600,000 man-days, or 2000 man-years. This may be compared with the estimate on page 81, based on the ratio between skilled work input, and cash + materials, suggesting some 3,300 man-years.[8]

For unskilled work, the total input during 1973 is estimated at 9,674,000 hours, or 1,612,000 man-days, or some 5,400 man-years.[9]

Individual Contributions at the Project Level

The statistical presentation on labour inputs has shown the considerable magnitude and variety involved. Motivation and perceived results will be dealt with in subsequent chapters. We end this presentation by quoting concrete examples of labour input by individuals at the project level. These examples have been taken from the contributor/consumer survey in project catchment areas.

Table 32 gives some examples of magnitudes of individual labour input, and perceived alternatives.

Table 32. ***Labour input illustrations*** *and alternatives*

Area	Project	Labour input, magnitudes/categories	Alternative use/ earnings of input
Machakos	Cattle dip (Kasinga)	14 out of 28 respondents gave labour. 11 of these were females, of which four were over 50 years. 3 men were over 50 years. Most gave 48 days, some less	Work on the farm, pick coffee. (earn shs 5/– per day) Other information Shs 1.20 per hour for coffee picking, or shs. 4/–
Machakos	Cattle dip (Kiteta)	9 out of 22 respondents gave labour. All were male, and 5 above 50 years. Contributions between carrying sand and stones for Shs. 25, and labour worth Shs. 500/–	No alternative use quoted.
Machakos	Cattle dip (Unoo)	None out of 24 respondents gave labour	—
Machakos	Water Project (Kimutwa)	All respondents say they could have worked on their shambas	

[8] And with the figure for one of 41 districts in Busia, of 52 man-years during the period third quarter 1972 to second quarter 1973 If all districts had the same labour input, the total would be some 2100 man-years of skilled work.

[9] Which may be compared with the Busia figure of 84 man-years. If all districts had the same labour input, the total would be some 3400 man-years of unskilled work

Area	Project	Labour input, magnitudes/categories	Alternative use/ earnings of input
Machakos	Kyanguli secondary school	5 out of 15 respondents say they contributed 2 as administrative leaders, 3 others (2 housewives) putting in 2 hours\day for 2 years, 26 days, and 52 days.	2 hours\day for 2 years = 1200 hours, valued at 1041– only The days valued at 5/–
Machakos	Kiteta school	16 out of 24 respondents. A few days to 36 months.	9 said work on the farms 1 help in another project. 1 work for money 2 do business
Machakos	Kimutwa Health Centre	23 female respondents, most of them young, all contributed labour (carrying stones, sand and water)	(Only references to cash input are given)
Machakos	Kiteta Health Centre	Out of 33 respondents, only 2 contributed unspecified labour	
Machakos	Kisinga Health Centre	12 out of 17 respondents contributed 156—624 days each. One was an engineer— Shs 5/day. Farmers 2/50—10/–/day. Wives 1—10 shs\day	7 said weed the shamba 3 said prune coffee 1 said plant vegetables 1 (engineer) sell drugs
Kiambu	Karatu Cattle dip	Only 7 out of 23 respondents, gave labour. Mostly unspecified, 5 och 6 days at 3 shs. per day (all were female)	Use it in farming
Kiambu	Karatu school	18 out of 20 e.g. every Wednesday for 3 years	Work on the farm. 6 Plant tea trees: 2 Farming said to give 6101 – /day.
Kiambu	Kinoo Nursery	18 out of 21 gave 2—4 days Carpenter:5/–/day (ditto for teacher and mason)	Women, fetching water, cutting grass, shs 3 50 Men, carrying stones digging foundation, casual labour, shs. 4—8/–
Muranga	Kandara Cattle dip	8 out of 34 respondents gave labour 6 of these were males, and all well above 40 years 6 gave 1 day, 2 gave 2 days per week.	No alternative given Valuation 3—5 shillings per day
Muranga	School (Kandara)	18 out of 26 respondents say they contributed labour Most of them are male, and over 50 or near 50 years 1—3 days per week, a few 3 days per month	Valued at 4—10 shillings per day One says cash crop farming is alternative extra farm hand. man\woman Shs 60 child Shs 30 Govt rural works man Shs 2001– +
Kisii	Cattle dip (Mokomi)	5 out of 36 respondents say only gave labour	No alternative given

We find that the relative propensity to give labour varies very much between projects, and within the same district. It is often old people and/or females who give labour. The results reflect the findings presented in the beginning of this chapter, namely that labour participation rates are generally lower than cash contribution participation rates. Still, sacrifices involved are very considerable.

Alternatives, usually in farming, are valued around 5--10 shillings per day.

Conspicuous National Level Contributions

Introduction

Our presentation hitherto has focussed on contributors as seen from the grass-roots project level, through interviews with key informants, consumers/contributors, the analysis of cash books and inputs statistics also collected at the grass-roots level. This presentation has brought out major donors like M. P.s, businessmen and government agencies, acting at the grass-roots level. Their involvement may be the result of successful cooption by grass-roots people like farmers, housewives, chiefs and subchiefs. It may also reflect the determination of these conspicuous donors to influence or guide progress at the local level. This may be done by tying promise of a contribution to certain undertakings by the local community in terms of type and size of project or a subsequent method of running a project in much the same way as foreign donors will put conditions to an aid recipient.[10]

It is however, likely that centre donors attempt to create Harambee movements of their own, e.g. by starting projects other than the sublocational level ones. Such activities cannot except by chance be revealed by project samples at the sublocational level. This is why we chose to seek information on these "other level" central, "conspicuous" Harambee activities in terms of donors, donations and projects. This was done by organising the information provided by newspaper cuttings from the East African Standard (now the Standard) for the full years 1971 to 1973 and from the Daily Nation for the period May 1973 to April 1974.[11] This was analysed—as far as the material will permit—to indicate size of donations, types of projects, donor preferences, donor characteristics—and regional distributions of contributions.

Newspapers are more likely to cover an event where a prominent person or foreign donors are involved, where the size of the project is large, or when it is

[10] An intermediate position is taken by the central government aid giving agency to self-help. It will demand certain information on a project, Including planned production phases and resource flows, and hence some minimum technical requirements.

[11] The *time periods* chosen (1971—73 and 1973—74 respectively) reflect opportunity and convenience Through the cooperation of Mr. Dmitrius Constas we were given access to compilations of the 1971—73 Standard newspaper cuttings on Harambee contributions. These compilations concentrated on the large donors, excluding contributions made by local people like the farmers The 1973—74 Nation compilations reflect the Interest of one of the authors, R Rasmusson, to familiarize himself with self-help and the efforts of Mrs G Almgren to compile and analyze these data in a manner comparable to the Standard data though including contributions by local people.

situated conveniently near to large urban centres. The first two biases are desirable, since we wish to complement the description of Harambee with precisely such events. The last bias may partly be offset by the use of newspapers which use the Kenya News Agency for a broader coverage.

The relevance of newspaper presentation of Harambee is considered great, since it is likely to influence attitudes and perceptions of Harambee among all strata of the nation, and consequently influence the future of self-help and general development in Kenya.

The data therefore is treated as qualitative information which is useful only in pin-pointing significant contrasts and pecularities of conspicuous national level Harambee. As mentioned above, the "reported" Harambee is seen by many policy makers and urban based readers as the only reality of Harambee. This definition becomes real however when it is used as a basis for action and hence the need to compare the patterns established by the newspaper cuttings with the broader survey data.

The Relative Size of Conspicuous Donations

We have already pointed out that the people's cash contributions is the largest single source. In all provinces except North Eastern, the people's contributions are larger than the sum of all other donor items taken together. Central Government contributions do not vary as much as those from other sources, and are consequently of considerable importance in provinces of comparatively low self-help effort. Local authorities' contributions are everywhere marginal. The contributions of the category called *other donors,* with which we are going to deal especially in respect of the East African Standard newspaper cuttings, are for each province less than or equal to Central Government contributions. *They account for some 5 per cent* only of total contributions in 1979. Table **33** shows how they were distributed between different kinds of projects in 1972 with the recently published 1973 figures added. Despite a recorded rapid increase of total self-help investment from 1972 to 1973, the contributions from other donors shows a registered decline. In 1973, these contributions were less than **3** per cent of the total.

Table **33.** *Total contributions by other donors in 1972 & 1973. (£K '000, Rounded figures)*

Kind of Project	Total donations, other donors 1972	1973
Educational	87	68
Agricultural	17	11
Water supplies	14	10
Social welfare and recreation	13	11
Health projects	9	9
Other projects	10	6
Total	150	115

Source: Community Development Divisions Statistics

The 1971—73 East African Standard news cuttings give data for contributions by political persons (PP), Kenya businessmen etc. (KB), Foreign individuals and agencies etc. (F), Kenya Charity Sweepstake (KCS) and Others (O) as per Table 34.

Table 34. *Contributions by Different Categories of Other Donors*

	(£K.'000) East African Standard			Other donors category as per Community Development National Statistics (not categorized)		
Category	1971	1972	1973	1971	1972	1973
PP	10.4	12.9	12.0			
KB	28.8	46.6	59.8			
F	46.6	29.3	48.5			
KCS	4.2	14.8	21.1			
O	0.8	2.6	0.2			
Total	90.9	104.2	141.6	116.5	149.7	115.2

The newspaper data show an upward trend of the other donors' contributions, with Kenya Businessmen and Kenya Charity Sweepstake accounting for the increase. The news cuttings and national statistics classification will not be directly comparable, but the 1972 fit is reasonable, assuming that not *all* other donors/"VIP" contributions were given coverage by the East African Standard. The two sources show different trends from 1972 to 1973 with a drop in total donations as per the national statistics. Statistics from the Central Bureau of Statistics give the following figures for contributions from "other donors":

(rounded figures, £K)

1967:	30,000	1969:	89,000
1968:	37,000	1970:	90,000

This category of donations between 1967 and 1972 increased five times and thus increased even more in relative importance. There was a big jump from 1968 to 1969.

Projects recorded as Receiving £K 1000 or more and their Regional Distribution

A total of £K 336,807 has been registered by the *Standard* as donated by other donors during 1971—73. Out of this £K 240,281, or almost two-thirds, went to 41 projects only (i.e. an average of £K 5,860 per project), indicating the existence of a "conspicuous concentration" tendency among the VIP donors.

We find that the Institutes of Technology account for almost one-third of the sum of large donations, followed by a large High School donation, and seven secondary school donations (eight if a girls hostel for secondary school pupils is included).

These items are then followed by Ufanisi House, Gatundu Self-help hospital and the University of Nairobi.

The largest "per project" donations are found for Alliance Girls High School, Gatundu Self-help hospital, Nairobi University, and Ufanisi House and a special school for disabled. Only socially oriented projects are found among these large recipients with the exception of a trading centre.

The emergence of Harambee Institutes of Technology is probably an important explanation to the rise over 1971—73 of the Kenya Businessmen and Foreign donations recorded earlier. Mutiso and Godfrey[12] show that fund-raising targets for each larger Harambee Institutes of Technology varies between 10 and 30 million shillings, that there is a system of attracting "founder-members" or "life-members" at some one to two thousand shillings each, and that "local and foreign-owned firms, individual Asian and European citizens and non-citizens, and Africans (usually politicians) from other areas of the nation usually feature in a list of contributors. Some firms make a point of contributing equally to each institute, but the already well off institutes tend to gain more from this process; for instance, Lonhro gave the equivalent of 320,000 shillings to Kiambu" (op.cit.). Foreign assistance, for instance, from the Netherlands, has also been received.

This in turn is interpreted by the authors as an attempt by foreign enterprises to tie the future technical development and choice of equipment and training methods of the institutes to technologies of the firms/countries in question.

We also note that it is large and ostentatious projects that figure prominently among those receiving "VIP" contributions. We hardly find any primary schools. There are no cattle dips, health centres and water projects. There is one nursery only. These are clearly under-represented as compared to the national average. This statement holds even if the remaining one-third of the contributions below £K 1000 per project are taken into account.

Table 35 shows the *regional distribution* of the 41 largest project-donations:

Table 35. *Regional Distribution of the 41 Largest Recorded Recipient Projects, 1971—73*

Province	Number of projects	Total amount of donations for these projects (£K)
Central	20	158,408
Rift Valley	8	48,380
Coast	5	s 23,706
Nyanza	5	22,530
Western	3	10,257

This distribution is probably a combined reflection of selective newspaper coverage, and the inclination and capacity of the two largest categories among other donors—Kenyan businessmen, enterprises etc. and foreign individuals,

[12] E.M. Godfrey and C.G. Mutiso, The Political Economy of Self-help Kenya's Harambee Institutes of Technology, IDS, Discussion Paper No. 169, Nairobi, 1973.

agencies, companies etc.—to concentrate donations to the economically most developed part of Kenya.

The impression of selective regional distribution still holds when *all* noted contributions by other donors are analyzed. Central Province stays in a clear lead, with Kiambu District responsible for the bulk, followed by Nairobi. Coast Province ranks second largely because of Mombasa town receiving more than £K 28,000 for a few large projects. This will again reflect the combined effects of some newspaper coverage concentration on major towns, and donor concentration on areas of intensive economic development.

The records show similar areas of concentration in the other provinces, when this is broken down into the District level. The leading districts are Kisumu, Machakos, Nakuru and Kakamega for Nyanza, Eastern, Rift Valley and Western Provinces respectively. The other districts as mentioned earlier are Kiambu, Mombasa and the City of Nairobi.

Out of total registered contributions by the Standard 1971—73, of £K 336,801, 70 per cent or 235,980 went to those seven districts of Kenya that have been named above. Subject to the bias of newspaper coverage there is an indication that "VIP" contributions centre on urban/central districts. Nairobi and Mombasa are focal points. It is also fair to name Kiambu, Kisumu, Machakos, Nakuru and Kakamega as central districts of their respective provinces, offering particular 'investment opportunities'.

In the *Daily Nation* 46 projects accounted for more than 87 per cent of all recorded projects which received more than shs. 20,000 each during 1973—74. This is an even higher share than the corresponding two-thirds noted among "other donors" in the Standard coverage of 41 projects. The 46 projects totalled shs. 8,179,545. The regional distribution was as per Table 36.

Table 36. *Provincial Distributzon of Projects that received K. shs. 20,000 or more*

Province	Number of projects	Total amount donated (shs)
Central	24	4,985,863
Rift Valley	9	1,593,515
Western	4	732,457
Coast	3	104,505
Nyanza	3	232,085
Eastern	3	531,120

North Eastern Province is not represented amongst those receiving large donations. The distribution looks very much like the one in Table 35 for the East African Standard. The average contribution per project is 177,800 shs. The distribution of large recipients between different kinds of projects is shown in Table 38.

The Institutes of Technology dominate with 68 per cent of the sum of donations to all large recipients. A few economically oriented projects are on

the list. It is of some interest to compare average total donations to projects that are also found in our grass-roots survey. This is shown in Table **37.**

Table **37.** *Project Cash Investment Sizes, Large Recipients and Grass-root Survey*

Kind of Project	Total Cash Donations As per large recipients Daily Nation	As per grass-roots survey
Primary school	43,500	500 — 20,000
Secondary school	38,700	15,000 — 170,000
Nursery school	26,100	500 — 2,500
Health Centre	50,000	4,000 — 70,000
Church	41,900	2,500 — 20,000
Water Project	38,500	2,000 — 20,000
Cattle Dip	26,100	9,000 — 16,000

Generally, the reported projects are far above the range of those in the survey, which is what one would expect.

Table **38.** *Main project types among large recipients (Shs. 1973/74)*

Project Type	Number of Projects	Total donations	Average size per donor
Educatzon			
Institutes of Technology	8	5,573,820	696,727
Secondary Schools	11	425,797	38,709
Pnmary Schools	4	173,816	43,454
Village Polytechnics	7[1]	1,099,500	98,871[2]
Industrial Training Centre	1	42,600	
Special School	1	100,000	100,000
Nursery	1	26,000	26,100
Orphanages etc			
Children's home	1	97,300	97,300
Orphanage	1	44,250	44,250
Health			
Hospital	1	172,505	172,505
Health Education Centre	1	82,000	82,000
Health Centre	1	50,000	50,000
Churches	3	125.630	41.877
Water Supplies			
Piped water projects	3	115.639	38.548
Varzous			
Cattle Dip	1	26,100	26,100
Settlement	1	24,356	24,350
Total, including village polytechnic lump sum	46	8,179,545	177,815

[1] A donation of Shs 450,000 to village polytechnics in Central Province has been looked upon as one project only

[2] Average excludes the lump sum of Shs. 450,000 to village polytechnics

Donors Recorded as Contributing £K 500 or More and Their Preferences

The *Standard* newspaper cuttings were also used for compiling a list of the biggest donors, of £K 500 or more, over the three years. *Kenya Charity Sweepstake* was number one, making its largest contributions to Nyanza and Rift Valley Provinces, and Central Province. The *Government* of *Netherlands* came next, probably partly due to its large donation to Kiambu Harambee Institute of Technology in Central Province. This donor has contributed to the Central Province only in contrast to the more even spread of Kenya Central Government Grants. In fact, the Dutch government was probably the first to react on non-government aid applications in the early emergence of the Institutes and made its donation to one of the Institutes that seemed nearest to getting off the ground.

The *Chandaria Foundation* is registered as having concentrated £K 14,000 to the Coast Province, whereas British-American Tobacco Company has put the bulk of its contributions, or £K 11,142 into Central Province. The *Government* of *the Federal Republic of Germany,* also high up on the list of large donors, has like the Netherlands, directed its contributions to Central Province. A number of Asian businessmen and firms, some prominent politicians and Kenyan African and foreign firms feature prominently among the largest donors. Table 39 brings out some large donors of two categories—foreign agencies and governments, and business firms—showing the provincial distribution of their contributions.

The donations from these two categories of donors are both reported as having a heavy concentration on Central Province. This goes especially for foreign agencies and governments. Business firms would be expected to donate where their economic interests lie, so with the considerable industrial/commercial/decision-making concentration to the Nairobi/Thika area the reported distribution of donations is not surprising. The allocation to Rift Valley is mainly explained by the donations of Magadi Soda Company Limited, and Brook Bond Leibing (Kenya) Limited, both of which have major establishments in that province. Table 40 shows the regional distribution of donations by non-profit making foundations and trusts.

Quite a different distributional picture emerges. All provinces have donations reported. This is mainly due to the policies of the Kenya Charity Sweepstake. Coast Province is in the lead because of the large Chandaria Foundation Grant. If donations from foreign foundations registered in table 39 (Krupp Foundation, Quakers of USA, etc.) were added the impression of a fair regional distribution would be even stronger.

Subject to the biases of newspaper coverage, the *Standard* news cuttings indicate that regional imbalances in the allocation of grants for self-help are mainly introduced by donations from foreign governments and local and foreign business firms, and that these imbalances are partly offset by the

allocation of non-profit making foundations and trusts—and, as has been showed previously, Kenya government self-help grants.

Table 39. *Provincial distribution of some large donations from foreign agencies/governments, and business firms* 1971—73. *(£K)*

Donor	Central	Coast	Eastern	North Eastern	Nyanza	Rift Valley	West-ern	Common to several provinces	Total
I) Foreign agencies/ governments									
Government of Netherlands	27,000								27,000
Government of W. Germany	10,000								10,000
Krupp Foundation (West Germany)						3,075			3,075
Quakers of USA							3,000		3,000
Government of France		2,250							2,250
Norwegian Volunteer Services					2,229				2,229
Canadian Hunger Foundation	2,050								2,050
Canadian CIDA	2,050								2,050
Raskob Foundation (USA)	1,420								1,420
Oxfam Organisation		1,000							1,000
Australian Catholic Relief Service	850								850
Total, foreign agencies/governments	43,370	3,350			2,229	3,075	3,000		54,924
(II) Business Firms									
B.A.T. Kenya Ltd.	11,142	450	50		500		550		12,692
Liernroy Bharmel Limited	10,000								10,000
Kenya Breweries	2,500	1,250			500	1,000			5,250
Magadi Soda Co.		500				4,000			4,500
Bata Shoe Co.	3,540					25			3,565
Crown & Seal Co	3,500								3,500
Brook Bond Liebig Kenya Ltd.						2,050	150	1,100	3,300
Kisumu Cotton Mills								2,750	2,750
Muthari Enterprises Limited	2,000								2,000
E. A. Industries Ltd.	750				500		500		1,750
Toyota Motor Co.	1,600								1,600
Shell (Kenya) Ltd.	1,425	125							1,550
E A. Mirag Exporters Ltd.	500					150		850	1,500
Total	36,957	2,325	50		1,500	7,225	1,200	4,700	53,957

Table.40. *Provincial distribution of some large donations from foundations and trusts, 1971–73 (£K)*

Donors	Central	Coast	Eastern	North Eastern	Nyanza	Rift Valley	Western	Common to several provinces	Total
Kenya Charity Sweepstate	6,271	3,670	4,700	2,150	8,160	7,025	5,905	2,250	40,170
Chandaria Foundation		14,000				250			14,250
Lions Club Nairobi	6,150								6,150
Anjarwalla Brothers (in fulfillment of the late Mr. Anjarwalla's wish)		5,660							5,660
Aga Khan	2,500	1,000	500				1,250		5,250
Lions Club Kericho						1,875			1,875
Lions Club Mombasa		1,000							1,000
Rotary Club Mombasa		800							800
Nairobi Coast Social Club	125	424							549
Kethsi and Virmuti Trust of Thika	500								500
Total, Foundations & Trusts	15,546	26,554	5,200	2,150	8,160	9,150	7,155	2,250	76,165

The *Daily Nation* newspaper cuttings were also used for compiling a list of the biggest donors,contributing shs. 10,000 or more over the period. The *Danish Development Assistance Agency, DANIDA* stands out as the largest donor with some shs. 1,205,000. This is mainly because of its large contribution to Muranga Institute of Technology.

The *Government* numbered two with the bulk of its contributions going to Central Province, followed by Eastern Province. The main grants were for village polytechnics. The *Standard* compilations did not include government grants. The national statistics show a modest role for government grants. The total reported for government contributions in the Nation, 1973—74, is some shs. 1,165,000. The total reported in the statistics for 1972 is some 4,680,000 and for 1973 slightly more, 4,689,000. So, even if the *Daily Nation* has given prominence to government grants in its reports, it has only covered about one-fourth and it has not reflected the rather even geographical spread of these grants and has in fact attributed the bulk of them to Central Province.

Teachers in Kakamega are reported as the third largest donor and were reported as contributing 488,000 shs. to the Western College of Technology. The *Standard* reported the largest donor as the *Kenya Charity Sweepstake* with 261,000 shs. The bulk of this is not identified with any particular region. The remainder is spread over most of the provinces. Only four politicians and individual businessmen are found among the 28 largest donors. *Muranga farmers* come fifth with a 200,000 shs. donation presumably to Muranga Institute of Technology.

There is a total of 28 donors reported to have donated 20,000 shs. or more. The sum of their donations is some shs. 4,346,000 of which some 66 per cent is recorded for Central Province. The corresponding figure for the *Standard* during

three years was some 51 per cent.

We shall now analyse if there are any geographical distribution patterns among the big donors. Table 41 shows the regional distribution of big foreign agencies/governments and business firms on one hand and foundations and trusts on the other hand. The same picture as given by the *Standard* emerges. Contributions by foreign agencies/governments and business firms are reported as heavily concentrated on Central Province. This goes especially for foreign agencies and governments (which has included also a few associations of foreigners). A different picture for foundations and trusts emerges. The donations reported show a fairly equal spread over the nation. Again, we are left with the impression that regional imbalances, introduced by foreign interests and foreign and indigenous business firms are partly offset by donations from non-profit making organisations.

Table 41. *Provincial distribution of some large donations from foreign agencies/governments, business firms, foundations and trusts 1973/74. (Shs. '000)*

Donor	Central	Coast	Eastern	North Eastern	Nyanza	Rift Valley	Western	Common to several provinces	Total
(I) Foreign agencies/ governments									
DANIDA, Denmark	1,205								1,205
CIDA, Canada	82								82
Catholic Secretariat									
Fund for Overseas Development in Britain	47								47
Wives of the envoys, Nairobi	25								25
"People in South America"							62		62
American Women's Association in Kenya	11								11
Total	1,370						62		1,432
(II) Business Firms									
Louisiana Land & Exploration Co.	10								
Paradise Investment Dev Co.	20								
U.S. Educational Partnership Inc.	100								100
Kenya Co	12		5						17
Kisumu Cotton Mills	20	5	5		10	5	10		55
Total	162	5	10		10	5	10		202
(III) Foundations & Trusts									
Kenya Charity Sweepstake	35		10	30	8	28		150	261
Lions Club		39							39
Kenya Freedom from Hunger Campaign	22	5	5		12	5	10		59
CARE		12					55		67
Salfee Foundation	14	2	2		4	2	4		
Total	71	58	17	30	24	35	69	150	454

The 1973 Community Development national statistics show total contributions by CARE and Kenya Freedom from Hunger Council 1968—73 and 1964--73, respectively.[13] CARE contributions are shown as having a very equal spread over the provinces, whereas FFHC contributions (to self-help projects only which is some 10 per cent of total FFHC grants) are shown as heavily concentrated to Central Province. The Daily Nation data indicate however a shift in this policy of concentration.

Conspicuous Donors versus the People

The Daily Nation reported the Harambee Institutes of Technology, village polytechnics, primary and secondary schools, in that order, as the most popular projects. Businessmen are reported responsible for a large part of donations to the Institutes of Technology. Equally, the major part of contributions from foreign sources are reported as going to Institutes of Technology. This is actually largely made up by one contribution given to Muranga Institute of Technology by DANIDA, Denmark. The foreign money given to primary schools is composed of 5 donations to different schools. Again, we have comparatively large sums donated to Gatundu Self-help Hospital and Mama Ngina Childrens Home. Here it is a case of a few large donations. Aga Khan is for instance responsible for shs. 100,000 to Gatundu Self-help Hospital and 50,000 to Mama Ngina Childrens Home.

The Government, apart from giving a sum to various self-help projects in Central Province, is reported to direct all grants to village polytechnics in different parts of the nation and an Industrial Training Centre in Nairobi. The impression is made that after having supported primary and secondary schools the Government now has turned towards polytechnics as a direct attention on the school leaver problem.

Contributions from *politicians* although modest, appear to go to primary and secondary schools, filling the gap created by lack of government grants there. Churches and Institutes of Technology also attract attention from this group of donors.

The great bulk of reported contributions come from the people. They are reported as the largest contributor category to the Institutes of Technology. Some 65 per cent of the total sum for Kimathi Institute of Technology was collected during one fund-raising meeting in Nyeri district. Other educational projects follow. Secondary schools are reported second after the Institutes of Technology. People's contributions are distributed over almost all kinds of projects (19 kinds reported) whereas there is an increasing reported concentration and selectivity by businessmen (11), politicians (10) and foreign agencies (9).

[13] op.cit. Tables C_5 and D_5.

How do the reported donor preferences for certain kinds of projects tally with the national statistics for 1973? These do not include contributions to Institutes of Technology. The statistics[14] note a concentration on educational projects by "other donors". This is compatible with the *Daily Nation's* reports, showing that foreign agencies and politicians favour schools. The *Government* registers the bulk of its grants to educational projects, followed by water supplies and agricultural projects (dips).There was nothing about the two latter items in the *Daily Nation.* Finally, cash contributions by *the people* rank highest for social welfare and recreation projects (e.g. churces and community halls) followed closely by educational projects. Nursery schools (separated from educational projects in the statistics) come third. This fits reasonably with the picture given by the *Daily Nation* except that the paper has registered little contributions to nursery schools.

Summary of Observations and Conclusions

Our analysis suggest the following:

— Subject to the biases of newspaper coverage, conspicuous donors concentrate on fewer and bigger projects than grass-roots donors. Both levels share in common their preference for educational projects, but whereas the grass-root focus on nursery schools and primary schools, the conspicuous donors favour big institutions like Harambee Institutes of Technology, High schools, village polytechnics and secondary schools. However, the grass-roots level seems induced to contribute heavily to these large projects, and stands out as the biggest contributor category to the Institutes of Technology.

— Some central donors appear to introduce regional imbalances. Apart from the imbalances caused by the concentration of donations from firms, businessmen and foreign governments and agencies, to Institutes of Technology, these donor categories appear also to favour the most developed areas of the nation. These tendencies of increased regional imbalances however, seem to be partly offset by the donation patterns of Central Government and non-profit making foundations and trusts. These donations show a wide regional spread.

— Donations by politicians appear to conform rather with those of firms and foreign agencies, than with those of Central Government and foundations/trusts. The reported donations of politicians, however, also show some concentration on primary schools and churches. Since firms and foreign agencies form by far the largest "other donor" category both according to the *Standard* and *Nation* compilations, their policies (or "non-policies") of regional and project-wise distribution deserve careful note. The relative exclusiveness in these respects appear to run counter to our idea of Harambee self-help as a (successful) reaction of the periphery and marginal groups attempting to cater for immediate, local needs. The Institutes of Technology stand out as the foremost

[14] Table 0, op.cit., (1974)

example of central success in attracting or steering the grass-roots away from immediate and local needs. This will increase the burden on the common man and may as subsequent project case studies in chapter seven will show, result in the frustration through excessive self-help contribution burdens.

— Newspaper reporting of Harambee is heavily biased towards conspicuous projects and conspicuous donors and does not reflect the overall complexity of Kenyan Harambee self-help movement, especially as it operates at the grass-roots level.

VI. Some Factors Determining the Viability of Harambee

The empirical relationships

Earlier theoretical interpretation of Harambee indicated that certain factors were critical to Harambee. These included indigeneous social organization, history of planned development, local definitions of the development situation, leadership, patterns of resource mobilization and perceived costs and benefits.

The empirical relations among these factors are summarized in Figure II.

Fig. II *Empirical Relationships*



Key: ⟷ Reciprocal relationship
→ Single direction relationship

Key concepts

The diagram will indicate that at the grass-roots level the key concepts include: local leadership, local definitions of the development situation (perceptions), patterns of project choice and implementation and Harambee outcome.

These and a few more factors were used in the analysis of grass-roots Harambee. Each factor to be analyzed is discussed below in an attempt to give it a working definition.

Perception

In analysing each project, attempts were made to identify what local people perceive as their local needs, their resources and their access to government services and resources. In this context the issue of how dependent towards government local people felt or whether they felt more dependent in certain areas of development than in other areas was a critical question. In the general area of perception or definition of the local situation, certain indices were isolated.

Definition of the Harambee Concept

This term was interpreted as revealed by key informants' replies to the questions "what do you understand by the word Harambee (self-help)?" and "What aspects, in your opinion, distinguish a Harambee project from a non-Harambee project?" We believe that replies which carry strong and clear definitions, for instance on the mode of operation (organisation, initiation, dynamics) of Harambee, on self-reliance aspects and uniqueness in term of resource mobilization, indicate committed and resourceful groups and leaders, and thus important prerequisites for good project performance.

Motives for Initiating the Project

This term was interpreted as contained in leaders' replies to the questions "What reasons, problems, what aspects of the area, what motivation led you, the group, him/her to initiate the project", and "why was this project initiated, and not some other one"? Clear and strong motives in terms of need, including *filling* a gap, realism of the venture, self-reliance in term *of* group articulation (this may include cool assessment of what outside sources to tap), social *pressures*/collective pressures, including felt responsibility as an (elected) leader, "drift" (example given by other areas, combined with a wish to draw more outside attention); all these are assumed to reflect leader commitment conducive to good performance of the project.

Reasons for Contributing Physically (in Cash, Kind or Labour)

As revealed by leaders' response to the questions "Did/do you contribute"?, "If yes, what reasons made/make you contribute"? (checked against the subsequent question "with what did/do you contribute"?), and "If no, what reasons led you not to contribute"? Firstly, poor motivation signalled by lack of contribution could lead to poor project performance. Secondly, positive motivation can be graded in the same manner as for motives for initiating projects.

Leadership

In the analysis of each project, attempts were made to identify the characteristics of those who influenced group decisions, who had conspicuous official positions, or were reputed to determine the course of action. Specific characteristics as outlined below were of special interest.

Socio-Economic Characteristics

Occupation, age, sex and education of those who are labelled initiators, committeee members and work group leaders of the self-help projects studied. This data were given in reply to the following questions:

- Who initiated this project?
  Name..... Sex ..... Age ..... Education .....
  Occupation .....
- Who are the leaders (committee members, chairman, treasurer etc.) of this project?
  Name ..... Age ..... Sex ..... Education .....
  Occupation .....
- Who is the person(s) that leads or actually led the work on the spot? (define also the activity performed).[1]

Government Involvement

The presence ofgouernment *officers* as initiators, committee members and work group leaders was of special interest. Government involvement is then measured as the percentage of initiators, committee members and work group leaders that are government officers. The assumption is that the absence ofgovernment officers may result in insufficient outside support and insufficient local leverage, and thus poor performance, of the project. Complete government involvement may result in the project losing its perceived character of a self-help venture, which may also result in insufficient contributions, and poor performance. Government involvement may be more desirable (or undesirable) in some leadership functions than others.

[1] Only persons identified by the majority of respondents were included in our analysis.

Continuity of Leadership

As measured by the percentage overlap between initiators and committee members, between committee members and work group leaders, and between initiators and work group leaders. The assumption is that absence of overlap, or complete overlap, may result in poor project performance because in the first case there is insufficient consistency and continuity, and determination in planning and implementation and secondly because not enough fresh ideas and leverage are put into the project implementation.

Selection of Leaders

Criteria for leadership selection and methods for election were identified as revealed by the case studies and replies to the following interview questions:

— How is the group organised?—mention key positions (roles).

— How does one gain these positions? (respectively)

It was assumed that the degree of participation in election or selection of leaders was important to leadership legitimacy and public commitment to the project, and its subsequent performance. In some cases the leadership selection criteria were so clear and generally accepted that leadership was easily identified and accepted.

Mode of Initiating a Project:

As revealed by the case studies and replies to the following question:

— How did you/the group/he/she initiate it? (the project) It was assumed that thorough procedures for involving important leaders and large population~or making small groups committed, would influence project performance positively, and that poor announcement, insufficient lobbying or advertising will have the opposite effect. Detailed consultation within groups and across groups was assumed to be important.

Implementation

In analysing Harambee outcome, the pattern of resource mobilization, the style of work, were expected to be important determinants of Harambee outcome.

Contributors and Contributions

These were identified according to answers to the following questions:

— Who are the members of this self-help group for this project?

— What are the group's sources of finances, ideas, work, materials, crops/animals, house (land)?

— Do you/the group have any co-operation with outside groups, people, bodies, organisations?

— If yes, which ones (specify).

In addition to the above, information taken from the summaries of cash books and leaders/key informants answers on their contribution "if yes, with what did you contribute—money, ideas, work, materials, crops/animals, house (land), were used.

Whenever possible, occupation, age, sex and education of contributors was established.

It was expected that a reasonably broad spectrum of support, including individuals or organisations outside the sublocation, and also government officers may be conducive to good performance of the project. Also, an input mix reflecting local resource endowment and the planned technology of the project should assist good performance.

Work Style

The organisation of joint group work and systematic labour contributions were expected to lead to better performance than employment of paid labour.

Method of isolating key factors

As indicated in Figure II, the empirical relationships cannot stand as conceptualized without careful testing with empirical data. Data for testing these relationships were derived from all the surveys. However, specific control data were introduced through a comparison of those projects which succeeded with those which failed or were abandoned. Thus, for any one sublocation, a specific project was identified and matched with the same type of project in the same area, involving the same population especially when the only factor they had different was success or failure.

This approach relies heavily on Mill's method of difference which stipulates "If an instance in which the phenomena under investigation occurs and an instance in which it does not occur, have every circumstance in common save one, the one occurring in the former; the circumstance in which alone the two instances differ is... the cause... of the phenomena".[2]

In our study the instance is Harambee project activity. The phenomenon is success or failure of the project activity. The circumstances are the factors which influence Harambee outcome. For example, in studying two Harambee nursery schools (the instances) the phenomena will be success of one project and failure of the other. The analytical exercise will be the identification of those factors (circumstances) in which they significantly differ. The inference drawn will relate success or failure to these differences.

[2] See, John Stuart Mill. *A System of Logic*. Longmans, Green and Company, London, 1925, p. 256.

Areas and projects studied

The following areas and projects were studied. They were chosen to represent a wide range of economic potential, the degree of isolation from the national centre, and physical development. The time ofinvestigation was October 1973, so estimates of construction periods are up to that date.

Province Dıstrict, Sublocation	Successful project and estimated time for completion	Unsuccessful project (ongoing or abandoned)
Coast:		
Kwale. Golini	Nursery school (6 months)	Nursery school (abandoned)
Kwale, Mazeras	Nursery school (6 months)	Secondary school (ongoing, 52 months)
Taita-Taveta, Mgambonyı	Health dispensary (some 12 months)	Water project (ongoıng, 21 months)
Tana Rıver Hola	Cattle dip (one year)	Primary school (ongoing, 39 months)
Eastern		
Machakos, Kasınga	Cattle dip (two years)	Prımary school (ongoıng, 52 months)
Central		
Kıambu, Kınoo	(no completed projects)	Water project (ongoing, 76 months) Cattle dip (abandoned)
Kirinyaga, Gitaku	Church (72 months)	Health centre (ongoing, 76 months)
Nyanza		
Kisii, Bonyakonı	Secondary schooi (two years)	Health dispensary (completed, 4 years)
Kisumu, Kombewa- Katıeno	Primary school (52 months)	Water project (abandoned)
Western		
Kakamega. Eshinadumba		No completed projects General analysis
Busia. Kısoko	Nursery schooi (6 months)	Vıllage polytechnıc (28 months)
Rıft Valley		
Transnzoia, Saboti	Nursery school (one year) Sec Sch (1st phase, 1 yr.)	Secondary school (abandoned)
Barıngo, Mogotıo	Secondary school (form I + II operating after a few months)	(no unsuccessful projects)
North Eastern		
Wajir, Central Division	Nursery school 16 months)	Prımary school (64 months)

The comparative case studies

When analysing the case studies we shall observe patterns of perception, leadership and implementation and their effect on Harambee outcome. We will however not rigidly follow the sequence of "clusters", but let the facts of each case study speak for themselves. Some conditions like perception of the local situation, and government services may apply to the whole sublocation and be equally felt by supporters of all projects. In other cases, they act as an inspiration to supporters of one project, and cause apathy in another one. Criteria for selection of leaders may be universal to all projects in the sublocation. Such factors are still considered important to provide a background to the individual project case studies. They are described when it is felt appropriate to do so.

Coast Province

Kwale District, Golini Sublocation

Comparing the Golini nursery school projects, there were no particular differences in Harambee perception of the key informants. It was noted that, however, there was a distinct difference in the *motives for initiating the projects.* The abandoned project shows an *"exclusive, segregationist"* cause, namely that Kwale Boma officers' children could not attend the same nursery school as those of prison officers'. It was started by the District Officer, now departed, who seemed to be the sole real promotor of the project, being the only initiator, organizer and work group leader mentioned by respondents. No committee had been formed. The District officer had used paid workers for starting the construction. There seemed to be no local voluntary work inputs.

The successful nursery school had been started as a response to broadly felt local needs. Respondents speak about children suffering most since they could not attend an existing nursery that was too far avay, about children as the leaders of tomorrow needing knowledge before going to Standard I etc. As opposed to the unsuccessful nursery school some feasibility reckoning had been done: a respondent noted that the number of children was large enough for the opening of a new nursery school.

Two contributors to the unsuccessful project, a Community Development Assistant and a social worker, did what they termed to be *minimum duty:* organizing a dance (through which in fact 2,000 to 2,400 shs, were collected) and storing materials. Work was provided by paid labourers and an acre of land was granted by the County Council.

All key informants said *they worked for the construction* of the successful project. Special Harambee days for work were arranged, and those who did not come to work instead paid shs. 2 each. Building poles were taken by people from the forest, and land (4 acres) was donated by the chairman, a farmer. Whereas the unsuccessful nursery school seems to have had no outside co-operation except by the County Council donation of an acre of land, the successful project had

obtained co-operation (unspecified) from Community Development and the Red Cross. For the successful project, men and women over 30 years were mentioned as participants, and for the other project no participant groups were identified. Leaders of the successful project were elected at a baraza, by the counting of hands whereas leaders for the unsuccessful project appear to have been self-appointed.

Kwale District, Mazeras Sublocation: A Nursery School and a Secondary School

This sublocation is only some ten miles from Mombasa town. Mazeras is also a railway and road terminus for the neighbouring Kilifi district. People can commute easily with Mombasa. The Mariakani milk scheme and the Methodist Missionary activities give the sublocation a lively development image.

Need and Opportunities: *Harambee* Perception: The problem of localized services is illustrated by the school problem: the local government has helped construct two primary schools where part of the help has come from the local population in the provision of teachers houses. However, this assistance is still considered poor since it does not include secondary schools. The problem expressed by the people interviewed is that there is a serious need for a secondary school, and that they do not understand why the government could offer to support two primary schools without supporting a secondary school, where their children could be absorbed for higher education. Currently the absence of a secondary school has led many of the local boys and girls to go to boarding schools elsewhere in the country or to surrounding areas such as Kinango, Taru or Rabai. There is therefore, a clear need for a secondary school. However, the construction of a Harambee secondary school appears to be so slow that the effort was construed a failure. There appear to be the following reasons: Firstly, the sublocation has been subjected to a lot of development demonstration i.e. methods, government schemes etc. Secondly, local people perceive these development activities to be irrelevant. Thirdly, local government in times of better finances did construct two primary schools. This appeared to set a precedence that if the government wanted, it could build secondary schools as well. Thus, although a strong need for secondary education is felt, a sense of self-reliance does not seem very strong. Although the initial steps to construct a secondary school were taken, the feeling that the government (again) should provide most of the resources is still very strong.

In Mazeras sublocation, a nursery school seems more feasible in relation to local willingness to mobilize resources. This is reflected in the responses by leaders on how the *Harambee* concept is perceived. In respect to the *unsuccessful* secondary school, the replies carry a sense of resignation: contributions are small, projects take a long time to start and complete. For the nursery, replies are slanted a bit differently. The respondents indicate that the problems are surmountable and mobilization of resources is possible.

It also seems that there was greater pressure mounted for starting of the

nursery school. This is reflected in a reply to the question on motives for starting the project: "too many childrens' mothers willingw—local female push should not be underrated.

There is also a difference in the ways in which *leaders* were *selected:* for the nursery school it is said that all were *voted in,* but for the *secondary school,* the initiators "have been *assumed leaders".* Some of the secondary school leaders are distant, high-ranking town folk like a company manager, a director of the District Education Board, and a bank accountant. No committee had yet been organised for the secondary school.

On *contributions and outside cooperation* we find that quite a lot of funds were collected for both projects (the nursery school of course needing much less to get off the ground), and that President Kenyatta had laid the foundation stone for the nursery school and donated some iron sheets. An MP, and Cabinet Minister, had made cash donations to both projects. Finally, the nursery school was supported by the local Church congregation.

Taita District, Mgambonyi Sublocation: A Health Dispensary and a Water Project

This sublocation is some ten miles from the district capital, Wundanyi. Its economic activities are termed embryonic but most small scale farmers are said to be members of a cooperative society, supplying vegetables to Mombasa and also members of Taita coffee cooperative society responsible for primary processing and sale of coffee. Early missionary activities have split the society into roughly three strata: Protestants, catholics and non-christian traditionalists, broken up a number of traditional useful regulatory practices and undermined continuity of indigeneous social structure, though not in obvious ways.

Perception of local situation: The main governmental activities include activities of departments such as veterinary, agriculture, forestry and works. "Central and local government activities are not perceived as intensive. No project has ever been initiated by the government without the people being involved in the projects. In fact in their own definition of the government activities, the informants interviewed said that government work was to collect taxes, maintain the forests and construct major roads. Otherwise the government activities are less realised or recognised by the people at the grass-roots. However, substantial contributions for various projects initiated in the area come from the government." (Case study by R. K. Mbwagwa, Sociology student, 1973.)

Need and Opportunities, Harambee Perception:

The people of Mgambonyi are like other people within the Taita-Taveta district They are development conscious in that they have realised that the Improvement of their area depends on them and not on anybody from outside They have also taken note of the fact that our country is developing and therefore her needs are abundant The government cannot therefore finance all the projects deemed necessary for the improvement of any area. In fact people here believe that the only work they cannot do are activities like tarmacking roads (or construction of roads with bulldozer tractors, running hospitals and any activity that requires scientific knowledge. (Source Chairman, Harambee Committee, Wundanyi)

The feeling of togetherness is strong, and is built on traditions. Reciprocity—that is "I do to you what you do to me"—was the order of life. It is from this phenomenon that "Umoja" (self-help as called locally) activities are based on. This tradition has decreased in strength through the fragmentation brought about by missionary activities, and economic segregation in economic development. Much of it remains in Umoja groups.

The functions of the (Umoja) groups are many. The group gives the individual a sense of belonging, identity and of course interaction among individuals are more intimate. The group has its own norms and values. Such values as reciprocity characterize the group. (Extracted from the case study by Mbwagwa)

In comparison with the previous sublocation, Mazeras, the motivation and possibilities of joint, self-reliant action appears strong.

In comparing the Taita projects it was noted that the reasons for starting the successful project, the health dispensary, were stronger and more emotional than for the unsuccessful project; the water scheme. Reasons for initiating the former project refer to the fact that people have died in transit to the district hospital, that many women gave birth to children in their homes and had difficulties, or that pregnant women were operated by traditional medicine men, many of them dying, etc. For the water project a lopsided motive is mentioned, namely the need to use a government grant so that it should not go to other people. This is an indirect motive not related to the nature of the specific project.

The *unsuccessful project was initiated "from above". A* baraza was called "where we were addressed by a government authority from the Ministry of Health. He stressed the need for water at the dispensary to be used in the mixing of medicines.. . ." This perception is strengthened by the subsequent comment that one of the major actors in the scheme, a cash-contributing farmer, wanted the water to be diverted to his home in another location.

Both projects received substantial government grants possibly at a very early stage. This was then followed by *very substantial Local donations to the dispensary* (10,000 from the Member of Parliament, local people cash donations reported at 19,000 shs., and labour from sublocational people estimated at 11,500 shs.). No similar mobilization was achieved for the water project for which the register notes only a few hundred shillings in local donations.

The chairman of the dispensary project donated a cow, worth 240 shs., another leader donated also a cow, and the treasurer gave 100 shs. The water project chairman and treasurer each gave only 15 shs., reflecting probably less commitment to the idea.

It is finally said that the dispensary is "the only (project) supported by most of the people. People of the sublocation working in town also sent their contributions". (This might be the explanation of the considerable cash amounts raised). The dispensary is the only project to have had donations in the form of cows. Mgambonyi nursery school initiated at the same time as the dispensary was abandoned "because people who contributed in labour and

cash deemed the latter more important than the nursery".

The successful dispensary seems to have been initiated in a more participative fashion, supporters were more strongly motivated, and more successful in obtaining support from within the sublocation, as well as from residents outside the area.

Tana River District, Hola sublocation: A Cattle Dip and a Primary School

Hola is the centre of attempts at irrigated agricultural development far away from other growth poles. It has become ethnically heterogeneous. It is a "colonized" area in the sense that non-nomads are responsible for the new agricultural ventures and the administration, and most shopkeepers are Arabs or coastal muslims.

Since Hola is the capital of the district, there are all the major government services These include a district hospital, an airfield, administrative services, agricultural services and even a police station and a prison. (From Case Study by J. K. Mugwika, Sociology student, 1973.)

It is therefore assumed *that the perception and needs felt,* relevant to self-help activities, will mainly be those of the immigrants, some of them having been there since 1952.

Comparing Tana River projects is quite difficult since the area is more recently developed, has a great scarcity of local resources, and is experiencing considerable government "push" in the development of the area.

The successful cattle dip is characterised by *greater continuity in leadership and greater government involvement* therein. A chief and a skilled professional, the District Agricultural Officer, are involved. The government "push" is also reflected in responses on how the project was started. "... baraza called by the chief and other leaders to discuss the initiation progress of the cattle dip". One is not clear whether in fact the project was started as a government project, to he continued on "self-help" basis.

The *planned character* of the dip construction is also reflected in the respondents' comments on what they understood by Harambee, namely that "the project is completed quickly..." and "...one item after the other is completed".

Motivation for the *school project* also appears high. One speaks of the need for providing education for children who otherwise risked their lives walking long distances in areas infested with wild animals. The dip leaders, however, refer to a number of very concrete economic gains (less animal deaths and diseases, better prices for livestock, more milk, etc.), and they had the support—or original push—of the District Agricultural Officer, to which the school had no counterpart.

The *school,* with an uneducated farmer as the project committee chairman, has possibly lost the momentum of the dip through its lengthy construction cycle. Also the chairman appears less committed and has less "drive" than his

dip counterpart, the chief. The farmer said he gave 25 shs. and was "present when the building started", whereas the chief gave 50 shs. (and 10 to the school), encouraging people to contribute. Moreover, the secretary-farmer of the dip gave 20 shs. and "dug the dip" through. He surely did not do it alone, but for the dip it is said that people who did not pay cash "volunteered to work", whereas for the school it is only vaguely said that "people volunteer to work", without relating this to whether they donate cash or not.

Both projects received government grants (the dip 1,000 shs., the school 1,200), and both were said to receive help from neighbouring Zubaki location. However, the dip seems to have had an active involvement of a number of traders who made donations ranging from 100 to 300 shs. each. It was also helped (in an unspecified manner) by CARE, the school being supported by the County Council which might prove a financially and administratively weaker counterpart.

We attribute the different outcomes of the two projects to the particular circumstances of this governmentally developed area, where a Harambee project must have an official backing similar to that of a government project before it can get off the ground.

Discussion and Summary—Coast Case Studies

The Coast Province has a varied ecology and potential ranging from a relatively rich coastal belt in which we find the Mazeras sublocation, a dry scrubland in which we find the Hola sublocation and an over-populated mountainous district, Taita District in which we find Mgambonyi sublocation.

However, inspite of these variations, the reasons for success or failure of Harambee projects appear very similar as to eliminate the need for separate treatment. Below is enumerated some of the critical reasons for success of Harambee projects as exposed by the case studies:

(a) The leadership of a Harambee project must be selected or elected by the local people from a broad spectrum of groups and must continue over time and across different phases of the project e.g. initiation, resource mobilization and actual construction.

(b) The local community should participate in contributing labour and materials as a whole and there should be no divisions or certain groups left out.

(c) The need for the project should be widely shared and defined as relevant, immediate and hence the benefits of the project should be obvious and sufficient for all participants.

(d) Identification of needed resources should be very precise and these resources should be seen to exist within the local community. The resources needed to maintain the project must also be identified. Alternatively, early and planned lobbying for outside assistance should be done.

(e) The participating groups should have a history of mutual self-assistance and working together and should not differ in social status e.g. local groups

versus government officers groups.

(f) Intensive government assistance if carefully channelled can increase the validity of a project.

(g) Implementation of the project should probably be sequential and the duration of the total project should not be long i.e. over 2–3 years.

Eastern Province

Machakos District, Kasinga sublocation: A Cattle Dip and a Primary School

The cattle dip was completed within some 24 months, the school has been ongoing for 52 months. The pair does not represent any drastic contrasts of success and failure. It is said that the school is partially used, and that classes are under construction for the fourth and fifth classes (Std. 4 and 5).

The required labour and capital of the two projects might be similar. The dip is estimated as a bit above 18,000 shs., while the school is estimated at over 25,000 shs.

The area has no abandoned projects. It is four miles from Machakos town. This nearness is cited as the reason why comparatively few projects have been springing up. For instance, people use the district hospital in Machakos.

Projects are said to increase in size over time. The sequence over time is three nursery schools (1967, 1968, 1970), one primary school (1969) and one cattle dip (1969), one road (1972), one water project (1973) and one secondary school (1973). One goes from e.g. nursery schools to cattle dips, crossing the sublocational borders in terms of service areas.

A comparison of the two projects in terms ofperception shows that although both projects may be supported by strong reasons among the participants, the dip offers more immediate, financial benefits, which might again increase determination. Expected benefits focus on eradication of ticks, and improvement of general health of cattle. The dip permits grade cattle and greater incomes. Interviews with randomly selected consumers, or potential consumers of the services of the dip, showed that all maintained their will to contribute to the dip rather than some other project. Hardly anybody felt that there had been a more urgent project.

In leadership, there is greater government involvement in the cattle dip. The cattle dip also has advantages in implementation: it has a more stable financial backing. Cattle dip members must pay a "share" of 52 shs., whereas school supporters provide 30 shs. for males, 15 for females. In fact, the cattle dip has had some 160 farmers pay up shares, and the same farmers have each put in some 200 or 300 hours of work. For the school there is the statement that "every household in the section has to provide one worker during a working day", but the frequency of these working days is not specified.

There is no clear evidence why out of two projects of about the same size, one

should be completed much more quickly. We tentatively attribute quicker completion of the cattle dip to greater financial and labour input commitment and control, made easier by the prospects of immediate economic benefits.

Central Province

Areas near Nairobi—a Case Study and Discussion of General Traits

Kiambu District, Kinoo Sublocation: A Water Project and a Cattle Dip

In this case study we shall deal with two projects that both appear unsuccessful. The purpose is to bring out particular traits of Harambee near urban areas, and how these traits may increase overall chances of failure. The water project, started in 1967 was still uncompleted in 1973. Lack of money is said to be the cause. The cattle dip has been completed but was subsequently abandoned. It is said that people got annoyed and disinterested.

(i) *Local Situation.* Kinoo is only 11 miles from Nairobi, on the Nakuru road. It is more rural than Dagoretti, however. Agriculture is the mainstay. A few farmers own about seven to ten acres of land, expecially those who live around Muthiga and Kinoo shopping centres. Most have only one or two acres, growing only enough food for subsistence. A few richer farmers keep dairy cattle, poultry and pigs. Some sell milk to cooperatives.

The area has a relatively high educational sophistication. We find a fair number of skilled professionals. There is general awareness of the proximity to Nairobi.

The case study (by K. N. Muchugiah, Sociology student, 1973) goes on to say that:

> government involvement is very effective around this area. Central and Local government offer a number of services. It is said that "local government is involved in the minor activities such as nursery schools . . . water supply . . ." It is also pointed out that " . . the local government has no right to issue orders to the people who are involved in the self-help projects unless the project receives aid from the government . .

(ii) *Perception in General and the Role of Community Development.* A lot is revealed about interaction between people and self-help on one hand, and government on the other. For instance:

> some may even tell you that it is (Harambee) to be working together without the Interference of the government . .
>
> whenever the word "Harambee" comes into a project most people are willing to cooperate This is because people believe that they were given freedom or independence and therefore should not be forced—like in those days of colonialism . . .
>
> If the government starts the project, it is most likely a failure because most people think that the government will run the project after it is completed; this has happened in Kinoo location e.g the cattle dip project The people will therefore lose interest mostly if the leader of the project is a civil servant. The local people assume that a civil servant will not be able to understand the local problems The projects started by the government fail if the government fails to allocate enough

funds to run the project, hence the local people claim that their projects will hardly fall because once the project is completed it will be theirs and their pride. The local people may resent the government take-over because they initiated the project and therefore it is their pride . . . .

On the other hand, projects are means of reaching the government, in that, if a self-help project is run smoothly by the members of the project, the government might decide to provide capital to this project. . . .

However, the local leaders usually invite the Community Development Assistant to seek his advice, hence most of these CDAs are members of various projects and are very useful because they provide good ideas on how to run and organise these projects. It is interesting to note that most of the members of different projects are aware of the fact that the CDAs have undergone training on how to promote development of people in their home areas and therefore have a background on how to organise and run the projects, this is why the local leaders and the project members invite them to their local meetings . . .

The useful role that CDAs can perform comes out very clearly in the case of two projects in another sublocation of Kiambu district: Karatu. The only major difference that could be found between a cattle dip completed in about a year's time, and a primary school which had been under construction for some 52 months and was still uncompleted, related to the apparently more dynamic and mobilizing kind of leadership offered by a CDA.

This assumption was confirmed by key persons' replies to the question on the form of initiating the two projects:

Cattle Dip	School
Baraza was called by CDA supported by the present treasurer, secretary and chairman.	Personal canvassing and a baraza called by a young farmer-treasurer and another farmer.
A committee of friends called a baraza with the then CDA as the umbrella to convince the general public (this is in response given by the chairman).	An unknown person called a meeting chaired by subchief to explain the importance of a school in the locality.
A baraza was called by CDA, subchief, councillor, and treasurer to convince the public of the need for such a project	A baraza was called for, chaired by the then subchief

The difference is subtle. The school initiation, just like the cattle dip initiation, looks like a process of discussion and persuasion. We note however that the CDA is quoted alternatively as one who calls a baraza, and as one who has a more discrete, perhaps negotiating role. For the school, it is more the subchief who stands as the leader. Their different roles and attitudes could make for some difference in the start of the two projects.

We now revert to the case study in point, Kinoo sublocation.

(iii) *Leadership in general* is said to be based on age, respect, social status, and sometimes education. Leaders are elected from the most outstanding female or male personality within the most senior active age group.

In these groups of the middle-aged women who are over 40 years, the woman who is chosen is elected as the local leader. She is the key coordinator of activity and represents this almost wholly female movement in the chiefs and self-help committee. This committee often includes . . . local government representatives, all sublocational and locational government representatives . . .

Apparently, therefore, when local government officers come into self-help in this "legitimate" way, they can perhaps play a useful role, and do not have negative connotations attributed to them.

However, the traditional leadership described above is being increasingly challenged by other younger and more educated groups.

(iv) *The Water Project. Perception.* The various needs expressed appear quite broad-based, like relieving women from carrying water from a distant river, getting cleaner water, water for animals etc. The secretary, however, speaks about needing water for his house, and that he is tired of employing people to get water from the river.

Leadership. We cannot pinpoint any inherent conflicts or deficiencies in the leadership patterns. The project was initiated by a clerk (56 years old) and a businessman (like the clerk he had secondary education) and two farmers (primary education). The clerk became the treasurer and one of the farmers the chairman. A headman also joined the committee. No women, who were supposed to be beneficiaries, are formal leaders.

Implementation. The chairman speaks of some rich merchants as the main donors (confirmed by cash book summaries where four gave 2,000 shs. together). The book also shows that money and material worth 5,000 shs. were donated by big farmers and businessmen. This could be a sign of redistribution, but is more likely a sign that the project went in for individual taps, and became expensive. Most small scale subsistence farmers could no longer participate, if they ever participated.[3] It was the more educated Maendeleo ya Wanawake women's group who participated by donating 500 shs. and helping to cook food for the workers. Thus, female labour itself does not seem to have been introduced, and there was hardly any free local labour of any kind.

We conclude that the scope of the project became too limited, and did not match original expectations. It became more of a "private project".

(v) *The Cattle Dip. Perception.* The chairman says he contributed 50 shs. because he was among the few who kept grade cattle, adding,

otherwise without the project we uere not going to he allowed to keep the grade cattle

The headman-cum-secretary gives as one of the motives for starting the project:

forced by the chief. and Veterinary Department to contribute money for the project, everyone who kept grade cattle

[3] The chairmanifarmer says he donated 100 shs per year to the project This seemed a lot for the majority of farmers with one or two acres, mainly of subsistence crops

On motivation to contribute (50 shs. again), he repeats being forced by the local government and the Veterinary Department. The church leader repeats the same evidence. All respondents give the same story on who would benefit from the project: rich farmers and their wives, namely those who keep grade cattle.

The cattle dip was initiated by a clerk, a headman, a church leader and a businessman. These same people and a farmer constitute the committee. The clerk is the chairman, the headman is the treasurer. Clerk, headman and church leader are repeated as work group leaders. Overlap is 80, 100 and 100 per cent and government involvement is 25, 20 and 33 per cent.

All key informants say that leaders were elected on the basis of wealth and prestige, and appointed by the local government. The following reasons for failure are finally given.

Chairman	Secretary (church leader)	Secretary (headman)
Government interference	The government interfered	Because it was not a voluntary based but on forced base.
Some people were benefiting from it and this depressed others, hence bnnging about failure.	People disinterested and mostly because government interfered.	Leaders ate the money and the project could be no more.
	No money to run the project.	

This project apparently did not fulfil the basic Harambee qualification in terms of a reasonably broad base, and voluntariness.

(vi) *Particular Problems of Projects Near Nairobi.* Harambee self-help activities in the vicinity of Nairobi appear to suffer particular difficulties because of this vicinity. A popular sublocation of Dagoretti outside Nairobi had only two self-help projects, both uncompleted though started in 1962 and 1969. There is a strong government cadre around Nairobi. Government involvement may become excessively strong and authoritative, killing people's initiative and commitment. Services are often already quite good, and the need for self-help is felt less. Some people have also acquired urban incomes and form an exclusive class who try to tap their poorer neighbour's resources for projects from which these cannot benefit.

Relatively high incomes decrease people's willingness to contribute labour. The difficulty to mobilize unpaid labour is further aggravated by lack of popular support and exclusiveness, or projects, where the common man's needs are already fairly well served by strong government and local government infrastructure. The result is capital-intensive self-help projects.

On labour inputs, chapter five showed that the propensity to use paid artisans was especially high in Kiambu secondary schools. The Kiambu ratio of skilled labour to cash and materials (48.8 per cent) was higher than the ratio for any other district.

This illustrates the tendency in more prosperous areas with considerable cash incomes to "buy" self-help labour rather than inject a lot of local unpaid voluntary, and generally unskilled labour.

There are many different ways of constructing self-help projects. Cash inputs will for instance vary widely for the same kind of project in different parts of the country. This will partly reflect differences in size, but also differences in choice of technology, e.g. the relative use of local materials and local unskilled labour (which really means labour skilled only in the use of local materials) versus factory-made materials and hired fundis.

There is great variety. Some primary schools in Central Province may take very sizeable inputs of cash and labour, while some schools in, e.g. Rift Valley, take minimal cash input and work is apparently done by the parents themselves. This is the core of the Harambee concept as usually understood.

We conclude that projects near to urban areas and/or in areas with high cash incomes run the risk of being caught in a "vicious circle" of skill-intensive technology choice, insufficient local priority and lack of popular willingness to sacrifice to the project especially in the form of contributing unpaid labour.

Areas Further from Nairobi

Kirinyaga District, Gitaku Sublocation: A Church and a Health Centre

Introduction. The church was completed in some 6 years. The health centre was still uncompleted after 6 years. This does not mean any great degree of difference in performance. Projects in general mature slowly because of what the case study (Ephraim J. Muttahi, Sociology student, 1973) terms as the *poverty of the area,* one of mainly subsistence farming. There is a "top" class of some 30 immigrant Nyeri progressive farmers who do not usually participate in Harambee. (A school project of theirs was shelved after a conflict about land. The school would have dispossessed squatters.) There is the "middle" class of subsistence farmers with ungraded cattle, these farmers form the bulk of Harambee participants. Finally there are the landless.

Comparing the Projects

(i) *Perception:* Harambee is, according to all respondents, defined as togetherness, a people's affair, localized implementation and localized access to benefits.

Reasons for initiating are as follows:

For the Church	For the Health Centre
"People in this area had been promised help only if they started working ."	"Our MP has been promising us but never built . . "
"To accelerate the progress of the areas."	"Ours only part of the division without ."
"Since they had initiated most of the projects . built Harambee schools, they needed the church next "	

Let us look at projects started over time:

Projects initiation in Gitaku, Kirinyaga

Type of project	Second-ary school	Health centre dispensary	Water Project	Church	Cattle Dip	Shop	Ruora group (iron sheets)
Year of initiation	1967 1972	1967 1968	1965 1970	1967	1968 1969 1970 1972	1970	1972

The information given on all projects is vague, and it is difficult to follow the fate of different projects. Most appear still to be ongoing. When the church was initiated, a water project had been started, and a health centre and a secondary school had or were about to be started. Cattle dips, shop and Ruora group came later. The church could be regarded as the final step before economically oriented projects are increased.

(ii) *Leadership.* The *church* was initiated by a preacher, the *health centre* by a subchief.

The same preacher became chairman of the church project, a farmer the treasurer, and a teacher and other major donors were members of committee. The health centre added another subchief as treasurer and work group leader, the original subchief being the chairman.

Work group leaders of the church project were the teacher and another preacher, and for the centre the subchief (building activities).

Overlap is 100 for both projects in respect of committee and work group leaders.

(iii) *Implementation. Contributions and cooperation.* Key informants on the church specified their contributions (one—the preacher—had given 800 shs. and two acres of land, another gave 20 shs. per month, one had given 80 shs. and had been drawing building water nearby). *Health centre* key informants were all vague, "a lot of money", "any amount I get anytime...".

In actual fact, the church had a large donation of 20,000 shs. from Consolata Fathers and reportedly also people's cash contributions derived from work on other people's farms—a major sacrifice. The cash book for the health centre could not be found, one key respondent only loosely suggesting people contributed 28,000 shs. This is somewhat unlikely. There may be considerable enthusiasm and willingness to contribute, but there is also said to be a lack of local leadership. People are said to lack examples of successes and the examples of leadership that such success provides. There are only the Nyeri immigrants, who are considered as outsiders.

We conclude that the great scarcity of resources is a major constraint to any self-help project in the area. There is no high-level government cooperation or leverage. In these circumstances, the successful project (the church) could probably only be completed through the leadership and contributions of catholic fathers.

Nyanza Province

Kisii District, Bonyakoni Sublocation: A Secondary School and a Dispensary

The school was completed in two years, the dispensary in four years. Since the risk of abandonment increases considerably with long construction periods, we regard the dispensary as a less successful project than the school.

Perception: Leaders and respondents in respect of the two projects give similar answers on how they perceive the Harambee concept. Initiation by few, but cooperation by many is underlined. Two respondents in respect of the dispensary (not office holders) say that those active in Harambee do part of the work only, but the same kind of responses are also given by two office holders in the school committee.

On reasons for initiating the project, the need seems even more strongly expressed for the dispensary. There is a special tinge to the need of the dispensary, namely that people get hurt in tribal wars between Kipsigis and Masai, to which conflict area this sublocation borders.

Reasons for contributing appear strong for both projects. The level of contributions is higher for the school. Respondents say 200,450, and 150 shs. (the 450 is not confirmed by the cash book extract), whereas respondent contributions to the dispensary stayed at 50, 45 and 45 shs.

Leadership: The secondary school was initiated in 1971 by a watchman (38 years old, primary education), a trader and two farmers (all with primary education). The watchman was elected as treasurer in the committee, and was joined by a cnief (48 years) as chairman. A 35 year-old teacher with higher education was elected as secretary of the committee and three of the initiating farmers as members of the committee.

The watchman, the chief and the teacher of higher education were also work group leaders. Overlap became 29,100 and 33 per cent, government involvement rising from 0 to 14 and then to 33 per cent.

The dispensary had a different leadership structure. It was initiated by a farmer and a teacher, both of primary education. The teacher then "disappeared" from leadership functions. The committee was made up of three more farmers (male, primary) and one female farmer (no education) plus two traders, one of whom became chairman and the other one treasurer. This chairman was only 31 years, and had primary education.

The initiating farmer was the only work group leader. Overlap is 14, 100 and 100 per cent, and there is *no government involvement in any leadership function.*

The case study by E. M. Masagura, Sociology student (1973) shows that there are three groups of initiators found in the sublocation: Councillors, cooperative society officers and church officials. The latter category is said to initiate only church projects. We find that none of the initiators of the two projects is a cooperative office-holder, but we do find that it is the cooperative societies which form the basis for resource mobilization (see below), so they may be regarded as prerequisites for initiating projects.

Implementation: The case study shows that Bonyakoni was one of the areas where tea was first started. This has led to government construction of feeder roads and training of small-scale farmers on tea and graded cattle at Kisii Farmers Training Centre. This development had two consequences: considerable increases in cash incomes, with cooperative societies acting as "banks" and Harambee resource extraction usually made in the form of deductions, from the payments made to individual farmers from the societies. The other consequence related to the Harambee projects studied is that because of the existence of roads, the government started mobile clinics, which might have decreased somewhat the need for the dispensary. In addition, the government did eventually take over Ramasha dispensary whereas it refused to take over another dispensary constructed on self-help basis and started through active involvement of the local Member of Parliament.

Therefore, the main resource providers for the two projects for the school are the Masimba and Ramasha Pyrethrum societies (five different societies are shown in the cash book as providing 28,000 shs.), and for the dispensary, the pyrethrum and tea societies, (total contribution 20,000 shs. according to respondents).

However, resource extraction for the dispensary may not have been so efficient. The cashbook merely lists a set of farmers who have each donated 50 shs. Moreover, national and local VIPs are almost entirely lacking in the dispensary cash book: only two agricultural field inspectors are taken up apart from the farmers, and the trader-chairman. The school appears to have succeeded in getting big conspicuous donations: three ministers have given a total of 6,500 shs., an Asian trader gave transport services worth 3,000 shs., Kenya Charity Sweepstake gave 10,000 shs., Community Development gave materials valued at 2,000 shs. Councillors, chiefs, etc. also figure among the donors.

This seems to be the main factor of success. For reasons of size and leadership leverage, or just plain luck, the school attracted large cash resources which permitted a much more rapid completion of a project probably more costly than the dispensary. This may have been achieved also through a more efficient and ostentatious way of announcing the project.

The case study shows that projects tend to be initiated/announced at general meetings of cooperative societies and school committees. It is also said that government "comes in halfway", e.g. through materials from the CDA, and the DC "who really went round with his District Officer to give moral courage and help to see that the money for the projects was not embezzled..." (case study report). We conclude that the school through the structure of its leadership and the way the project was announced, managed to cut a big slice of outside help which accounts for a completion time which must be considered rapid for a project of that size.

Kisumu District, Kombewa-Katieno Sublocation: A Primary School and a Water Project

Barkorwa Girls' Primary Boarding School, completed in 52 months, is considered a success as compared to Ndiru Water Project, constructed during 1967—70 but not finished, and now abandoned.

(i) *The Local Situatzon, and Government Activities:* The background case study for the area by M. T. Okuku, Sociology student (1973), points to the existence of some government services like a dispensary and a primary school run by the government, land adjudication and agricultural and veterinary technical assistance. A number of self-help projects are said to have been promised government assistance, but then have stalled for lack of such assistance.

The local situation and government activities may be perceived by people as suggested in the case study:

> However, the Government is involved in agricultural extension services through its field-extension officers and instructors . . . . One of the most important issues on hand was the talk given by a young extension officer about loans . . . His audience complained about the impossible requirements Agricultural Department demanded of those who were interested in loans, and of the Increased prices charged for fertilizers. These people were basically small scale farmers and could not understand the reason why large-scale farmers . were charged less when they bought large quantities of fertilizers and seeds than small-scale farmers who wanted only a bag or two . .

Even with a number of government activities at the local level, there is some frustration among perhaps the majority of the local population, and this reflects negatively on their perception of all government services. It may also result in an unfair criticism of unfulfilled government promises of support for various projects.

The same theme comes up again:

> Thirdly, some leaders complained about the promises of help from the Government which did not materialize in many cases. In four out of the five projects I studied, there was no direct help either in terms of money or materials from the government. Such contributions are usually given through the District officers and District commissioners or the chief.

The local scene is summarized thus:

> Kombewa sublocation is typical of an area in a developing country. It is a society aspiring to keep up with the technological and social changes prevalent in our system. By so doing its inhabitants engage in various Harambee acuvities which in modern Kenya are the symbols ofdevelopment and the sign that people are progressive .
>
> Society is in many ways being fragmented, which might increase leadership rivalries, and lead to profileration of projects . " Whereas the people here are all Luo-speakers they follow the semi-Westernized cultural confusion inherited from the European missionaries and social change. There are many divisions . . ." These are then referred to as divisions between old and young, Catholics and Protestants, Luo Nomiya Church and Legio Maria, subsistence farmers and wealthier farmers, urbanites and locals, etc. "Cultural values and norms are in a state of change and there is disparity between modernity and traditionalism"

This fragmentation may be one of the reasons for the proliferation of projects, quoted thus:

The malady with our projects is that too many are started and are expected to develop side by side. Before two projects are completed there is a third and a fourth springing up. The result of this is to *overburden contributors*. Overburden in time spent at meetings, work, and other barazas, overburden in money . . . .

The evolution of projects over time is as shown below:

Number of Projects Started in Year

Year	1967	68	69	70	71	72	73	1967—73
Type of project								
Educational		2	1	2		3		8
Health				1				1
Water	1			1				2
Social hall, etc.	1		1					2
Road							1	1
Bridge							1	1
Cattle Dip							2	2
Total	2	2	2	4		3	4	17

If two of the 1970 peak projects of four had been spread into the "empty" 1971, the trend would have been flat with a rise to 3 projects in 1972 and four projects in 1973. Out of the ongoing projects (and we include the ones without known status in that figure), one was started in 1968, two in 1970, two in 1972 and three in 1973. *The backlog of unfinished projects has increased steadily,* and might cause local "stress". Note the switch to economically oriented projects in 1973.

The cash contributions of these (local) people ranged normally from 30 to 300 shs. This is contributions given in general meetings which are attended by people from all over the location. This means that when Kombewa people organise a Harambee meeting it is not sufficient to invite only those from Kombewa sublocation. Several of those who appeared on the contribution form were not residents of their various sublocations but were from neighbouring sublocations within the location

The "overworking" tendency of many local inhabitants is explained by the fact that a person may belong to many groups at the same time, all asking for his contributions:

In most of the projects that I studied members of the working groups were mainly local farmers and their wives who were members of both religious work groups and non-religious more or less administrative work group units This meant that a couple could be called upon to go and work at the same project by different leaders. The type of labour might change, the leaders changed, *but the individuals called to duty were the same.* Thus a woman may work under a women's leader one day, and be called again by a church group leader to do work on the same project (or on another) the next day. . .

We thus have many cases of "repetitive labour", just as we found repetitive or multiple donors in general in the Coast case studies.

The situation appears tough for some:

Some respondents reported that they were overburdened by Harambee activities. Four days in a week there were sublocational or inter-locational Harambee work or meetings which required men and wives.

This overworking may be an important reason why people feel there is a proliferation of projects that they cannot cope with.

Methods of collecting resources for self-help projects also varies. In two of the projects I visited there was a standardized Instalment which every family (household) head had to pay before the Harambee day was convened. In project No. 1 (Nyamgun school) there was a membership fee of 15 shs. and another fee which made it 20 shs. Money given at the general meeting for contributions was only a big addition to this first instalment.

Before this Instalment was paid, the leaders of the project had a right to *go* to the household concerned and ask formally for it or part of it. It was usually the chairman and treasurer who did this. This is easily seen as a coercive reminder by project leaders . .

This action should be seen as very strong social pressure, but does not amount to forced extraction. As noted previously, chairmen and treasurers tended to be *elected* by show of hands, so they would carry considerable legitimacy.

Contributions given on Harambee days will also be made under strong social pressure, but not by force:

Contributions given on Harambee day (general meeting) were the more *voluntary.* In cases where the church was involved, church leaders appealed to moral obligation of the congregation towards society. It was on some such occasions that one Cathechist leader condemned "selfish people" who did not contribute financially or in terms of labour and materials towards building of churches (no such self-help projects are noted), or Harambee schools, and forecast such peoples' impoverishment through God's hands . . .

However, for larger scale projects, such as

Harambee projects which officially involve the whole location such as Harambee secondary schools, and at the provincial level—financial support for Ramogi Institute of Advanced Technology--local government leaders were authorized to go round and *seize* goods such as chickens or furniture for financial ransom by unwilling villagers . .

If villagers already felt overburdened by ongoing sublocational level Harambee projects, this additional burden certainly increased their frustration and may even have led to absolute impoverishment. Many villagers may for instance be hard put to understand what they can get out of an Institute of Technology.

The conclusion is that although an element of coercion was creeping into Harambee projects, the bulk of the donations were basically given voluntarily. The limitation to contribution was mainly an overburdening of local farmers' resources.

(ii) *Perception. The Harambee concept* was interpreted in very broad terms, when respondents replied to question 4 "What aspects, in your opinion, distinguishes a Harambee project from a non-Harambee project?" Informants did not see the importance of deciding what was Harambee and what was not, save in cases where a man built his own house or the government constructed housing for its administrative or settlement officers . . . .

The replies given by water project leaders to the question "What do you understand by the term Harambee self-help?" appear to carry some negative connotations, such as:

"Large scale."

"Such a project with aim of inviting government help" ("voluntary membership..."). ... "However the necessity of coercing some laggards ...."

Our previous findings about weary people overburdened by projects, negative coercive characteristics of larger scale projects, and the apparently unsure nature of government promises of help, sound warning signals in respect of these attitudes. Compare them with attitudes reflected by leaders of the school project:

"Take an individual less expense"

"Not financed by government or one man"

"Efforts by local population to erect building without direct help from missions or government" (as we shall see, no government and little mission help was in fact received).

The differences in Harambee perception, are however marginal for the two projects.

Reasons for Initiating the Projects: We find similar "reliance" reasons given, e.g. for the school that the mission was ready to assist, and for the water scheme that WHO was ready to help. We can find no clear motivational differences in terms of *need.* If anything, need is more strongly expressed in respect of the water project. One respondent, however, makes an interesting remark: "... profits from water payments could boost the school's treasury..."

First, we must note that the success of Borkorwa school had special reasons, which reduce the significance of this "success". A temporary tuition block already existed, but the adjoining Catholic mission wanted to expand. It offered to compensate the school for the tearing down of the temporary block, and construction of a more permanent building nearby. A school committee already existed.

The mission's contribution seems to have been limited to the provision of iron sheets, and — which was somewhat controversial — the provision of a foreign catholic father as treasurer:

> Some informants were against the idea of appointing the Rev. Father as treasurer because it was totally against local Africanization policy

Others referred to the assignment as one which assured safe handling of funds collected.

The Ndiru *water project* was started for a number of reasons, i.e. to provide a nearby primary school with water, people of another school, a local market, etc. Promises of assistance from the Water Development Authority and WHO appear to have been strong motives for starting the project. Differences in motives for contributing come out like this:

School	Water
It was our project, it was originally a Barkorwa people's project	*It was not solely a Kowe clan's project, I* stood to benefit because I live in this area
As a leader in the project. I had to give an example	My wife was involved from the start

(iii) *Leadership. Socio-Economic Characteristics, Government Involvement and Continuity.* For each of the projects, we find a female among the *initiators*.[4] For the school, she is a trader-farmer cum agricultural assistant with primary schooling, for the water project she is a trader with primary schooling. For the school, the other initiators are said to be the Catholic father, the headmaster and a 50-year-old farmer, the water project having also a teacher of one of the client schools as initiator.

On *committee members* we note that the school has a farmer cum musician, termed as a "charismatic fun-maker" as donation leader (he is uneducated). The water project has an MP as a donation leader and a Councillor as chairman.

Among *work group leaders* we note *a stronger official representation in the water project* (a chief and two subchiefs as work group leaders). The school has only one of its three work group leaders as a government officer: a subchief. Government involvement in all phases is higher for the water project. For the school it is zero in initiation and committee membership.

This could be important in terms of what we said previously about forced resource extraction by local government officers.

Continuity/overlap is higher for the school in all instances, but not very high. This might help in terms of determined execution. The complicated water project might in fact have been in even greater need of leadership continuity.

Criteria for Selection of Leaders: In general, it is said that leaders are selected among visibly wealthy people people with sons working in urban areas—again visibly wealthy—agricultural and religious leaders. Chiefs and subchiefs are also often given posts in a project committee. Especially chairmen and treasurers are voted by show of hands. Others may become committee members by virtue of their capacity or position, e.g. chief, teacher, technician.

There is an important difference here between the two projects studied. Whereas most school leaders were voted in by show of hands, some water project committee members were not. Government and WHO officials became automatic members.

Mode of Initzation. The outer form of znitiatzng the project seems more simple and straightforward for the school. Government officers from the Ministry of Health and Water Development Department (WDD) were active in the water project initiation, and "A WDD official also gave his promises..." The actual flow of funds and resources to the water project seems to have been a complicated and possibly not properly planned procedure, bearing in mind all the different actors.

(iv) *Implementation. Contributions and Contributors.* The success of a project may

[4] The case study warns us about puttıng too much emphasis on ındıvıduals in terms of ınıtıatıon: "On question 5, 'Who ınıtıated this Harambee project?' ınformants tended towards defınıng the group who started ıt, not the ındıvıduals. Only reluctantly dıd they pınpoint a few people, and only then to satısfy my curıosity. The ıdea was that nobody ıs endowed wıth the specific quality of startıng or ınıtıatıng a project A ppoject ıs started by a church group, a subchıef's workıng committee or government people .

depend on its ability to draw funds from wealthier people in the community, and from town workers.

Emigrant Kombewers are an important contributor group:

On several important occasions it is also easy to distinguish the Kombewa/Nairobi Workers Association-that is a group made up of people who work in or study in Nairobi. It is natural that people who work in various townships form such organisations, as their numbers increase. Such associations help transport deceased persons from their particular towns back home for burial and often meet some costs of the burial ceremonies Their sources of money are most often personal donations and profits that accrue from banking or trading with this money. Youth clubs arrange two parties per year and invite their friends to these Guests to these parties have a fixed entrance fee to pay and expect to pay some more during certain activities inside the fenced ground . . . .

Emigrant associations appear to play a special role in resource mobilization in Nyanza, and Kisumu district in particular. This also came out in the study of the cash books of self-help projects in Coast, Central and Nyanza provinces, quoted in chapter five.

(v) *Conclusions.* We conclude that the rather sophisticated water project overtaxed the ability of local resource mobilization, already hard pressed by other projects. The project was also complicated by interaction with Central Government and foreign agencies, who perhaps had not from the beginning clarified their position, or even might have come out with various vague, but exhilarating, promises.

The school was much more successful in extracting funds from important wealthier people and emigrants.

Finally, the water project seems to have a certain stamp of exclusiveness as compared to the girls' school. It seems to have been perceived of as especially meant for a secondary school (to which most local parents could not send their children), and for teachers of that, and other schools.

The water project seems to have been introduced partly through external pressures, and at too early a stage of local development.

Western Province

Kakamega District, Eshinadumba Sublocation: A Pattern of Project Stagnation

In this section we shall seek the explanation why not one single project can yet be termed a success. We find the following pattern of projects started in the sublocation:

1961: a primary school
1964: a church
1970: a nursery school
1972: two churches, a nursery school, and a primary school
1973: three churches and a cattle dip

None of these projects were completed at the time of the survey (October 1973). Why has none of the early projects been completed?

(i) *The Local Situation and Perceptions:* The case study by J.J. Akonga, Sociology student (1973) explains:

> In talking about how the availability of resources, economic activities and leadership affect recruitment to the Harambee spirit, I would introduce two concepts *non-participation and individualism as the two major constraints to the movement* not only in this sublocation but also Western Province as a whole . . . .

The study goes on to point to the *struggle for subsistence on small plots.*[5] *People do not talk about development at the sublocational level.*

> *One is content when he has cultivated his land and looks forward to what he can derive from it . . . .*

Appeals by the subchief to do Harambee projects do not look logical to the people.[6] Besides,

> the subchief has no good medium of announcing such meetings since not many people may come to listen to the subchief . .

The churches are more successful. Although people do not perhaps like their leaders, they "have emotional affiliation to it" (the church).[7]

The case study suggests that there is very *poor communication between positional leaders and the people.* There is no organised and no determined way for the MP or DO to reach people. Further,

> The subchief is therefore a very unpopular man and alienated from his people. He is lumped with the government in "they"

(because he has long been associated with the bitter experience of tax defaulters).

People's negative attitude to development—as it seems—is in turn due to their experience of government activities. For instance, there are demonstrations of cooking, sewing and proper cultivation methods, but these are done in the Swahili medium, so:

> the local population does not benefit and it looks like an alien innovation .
>
> Apart from the roads therefore, there is no direct way the government, either local or central, is felt in the area as a developing force In my interviews I found this has a lot of influence on people's attitudes towards development

(ii) *Leadership and Implementation.* The lack of what we would call development impetus is reflected in the fact that no dispensary has been established in this popular area. People have to go all the way to Maseno, where Mission treatment is given only for a fee. We have noted that two single leaders, neither of them apparently with any great leverage, have attempted to start eight projects during two years. Had there been proper consultations, the initiatives would

[5] Ref. F M. Rukandema, "Some Economic Arithmetic of Poverty Preliminary Farm Data from Bukura and Shitoli sublocations of Kakamega District", IDS, W P 253, 1975.

[6] The subchief is quoted as the initiator of three projects, a primary school and a nursery, both in 1972, and a cattle dip in 1973

[7] A single priest is quoted as the initiator of five projects during 1972 and 1973 All of them except one were churches

either not have been taken at all, or some very small and inexpensive projects of immediate benefit in say smallscale subsistence agriculture may have been initiated instead.

So people feel tired and do not haue the resources to contribute (labour may in fact be in short supply). (Rukandema (op. cit.) says this may be because of the big dependency ration in families). Here are some replies of respondents on why projects have not been completed:

We are building three primary schools with our money. We also build churches so the cattle dip is just one of the projects. (cattle dip)

People are slow to contribute due to other problems requiring money. e.g school fees, food (church)

There are many projects being built at the same time and yet people are generally poor (nursery)

People are slow to contribute since they are now fed up with Harambee projects—contributing all the time . . . (nursery)

Each parent contribution per year must be little (10 shs.) otherwise unable raise school fees (nursery)

It is also said that parents do not provide labour. Labourers are hired instead. With shortage both of cash and labour and little local motivation, projects may not succeed.

Busia District, Kisoko Sublocation: A Village Polytechnic and a Nursery School

The village polytechnic has been ongoing for some 28 months, whereas the nursery school was completed in some 6 months. We should note firstly the very different size of the two projects, secondly that the VP seems to have started some limited activities in the unfinished building. In this paper we focus inter alia on the different structures brought about by sheer size differences.

(i) *Perception. The Local Situation.* The area is ethnically heterogeneous (Teso, Luo, Bukusu, Marach). There is said to exist quite a lot of tension, resulting in few self-help projects.

Chart of Harambee Projects in Kisoko Sublocation



(O.G = Ongoing)

We hypothesize that there is limited ability in the area to fund larger projects, and that the heterogenity and conflict within the area also makes it difficult to rally enough support for large projects, like the Village Polytechnic.

Perception: To the key informants Harambee is "a means of self-help to build the nation" and similar statements. One key informant adds that sources of finance are limited to local contributions, and respondents in respect of the nursery school all underline strongly various self-reliance aspects, e.g. "Entirely people's project", "Local initiative", "Run by the people themselves, project entirely run by people".

The nursery school respondents also underline localization: "Local people affected—make it a success" and "physical contribution".

For the Village Polytechnic, with more outside support (see below), respondents reflect a more vague, abstract, "national level" perception.

Reasons for Inztiating. With respect to the VP, special reference is made to unemployment of CPE's and local need of technically qualified people.

For the nursery school, it is seen as a way of increasing primary enrolment (which is said to have dropped recently), make children get used to school early, free mothers to do other work, keep children happy together. Also realism, "lack of facilities to start a more ambitious project".

Reasons for Contributng. to the VP "necessity, due to position as leader, etc."; for the nursery school, similar responses, and to help the community and feeling the project as such was a necessity.

(ii) *Leadership. Socio-economic Data.* The VP was initiated in 1971 by a farmer of unknown education (became chairman). Two priests and an instructor from the Ministry of Agriculture are also mentioned. All of them are attributed higher education. The nursery school was initiated by a 43 year-old teacher (who became chairman) and two farmers without education.

The *committee members:* for the VP the initiating farmer (chairman) a subchief (40 years, primary, teacher) and a carpenter (primary education, work group leader also); for the nursery school, same as the initiators, a teacher and two farmers, one of them acting also as a work group leader.

Work group leadership: for the VP two priests, one of them mentioned as an initiator. The carpenter not mentioned. The nursery school: the initiating teacher, and another teacher (secondary education).

Government Involvement. The case study by Valentine Esyalai, Sociology student (1973) says that:

> Chiefs move in to assume responsibility over finances (which happened with the VP), and government officers push Harambee projects to some success

Subchiefs and CDA's are said to be the most active ones. The MP is said to neglect this area (he is from another location), the chief discriminating against smaller tribes. Government involvement is found only in *committee membership* of the VP (33 per cent). There is more in the nursery school.

Continuity is much higher for the nursery school, 100, 50 and 100 per cent. For the VP it is 30, 0 and 0 per cent.

Leadership Selection and Mode of Initiation. The VP was initiated at a chiefs baraza, whereas the nursery school seems to have had a more low-key, local level start. The chairman says it was started by sending messages to parents for a meeting, at which a decision was passed. In both projects, leaders were said to have been elected by popular vote.

(iii) *Implementation.* Ford Foundation, NCCK and the Community Development assisted the VP, which hired labour with CD funds. For the nursery school, local farmers, by sale of crops, seem more important. Government officers also contributed to the nursery school and the Community Development gave some materials. Again, it is said that paid labour (for this small project) was utilized.

An analysis of inputs in all projects in Busia 1972—74 as per the Community Development quarterly statistical reports revealed the following input averages for secondary schools (the nearest we can find to a VP) and nursery schools (see chapter five).

Table 42. *Input Characteristics for Nursery Schools and Secendary Schools in Busia District*

	Skilled work input (hours)	Spread over no of quarters	Ratio skilled work/cash + material input (%)	Unskilled work input (hours)	Spread over no. of quarters
Nursery school	204	1.3	67	1122	2.9
Secondary school	1574	4.4	24	1922	3 1

Nursery schools are relatively "skill-intensive" but of course demand little cash in absolute terms. Secondary schools demand eight times as much skilled work, spread over a period more than three times as long. We think that this sustained input of masons, carpenters of considerable cost is a major constraint to the finishing of larger-scale buildings in Busia, at least in areas of limited cash incomes like the sublocation we are studying.

As we said in the beginning, it is wrong to judge the VP as having failed. It is much larger. We should not expect to find any dramatic differences in the various structural conditions of the two projects. We note, however, that continuity of leadership in the VP was poor as compared to the nursery school, while at the same time the VP is a much more complicated project. We think that small projects needing a smaller constituency stand a better chance of succeeding in this reportedly heterogeneous area. Nursery school respondents underline self-reliance and localization aspects, and admit that a nursery school is about what one can cope with. The nursery school obviously needs far less cash to be completed. Finally, the nursery school was started in a fashion that involved a number of individual parents more intensively than a chiefs baraza, the method of initiating the VP.

Rift Valley Province

Transzoia District, Saboti Sublocation (A High Potential Area). Two Secondary Schools and a Nursery School

The nursery school and one secondary school are in the same part of the sublocation. The nursery school was completed in about a year, or less, and is termed "the only successful Harambee project in that area". The school, started in 1969, is abandoned (application to start it as a Harambee project was made already in 1966, but granted only in 1968, work starting the following year).

The secondary school in the other part of the sublocation had its first phase completed in some 12 months, and then in 1972 it admitted its first intake of 40 students into Form I. It was registered and the first phase was completed in the same year, 1971. The first phase consists of two classrooms, two teacher's houses, one dormitory and **3** pit latrines.

General Observations on the Area

The Local Situation: Saboti sublocation is different from other areas we have studied. It is ex-European farm land, a recently settled area with a heterogeneous population. It is a society in the making, with social groups still on tribal lines. The largest is the Luhya who originate from Bungoma and Kakamega districts. The second are the Kalenjin tribes, third is the Kikuyu, fourth are the Turkana (employed as cattle herders or just "roaming" about), then Iteso from Busia and finally Luos, and Kambas "from drought-stricken Kambaland. There are also a few Somali traders" (case study by Peter Bhoyyo, Sociology student, 1973).

Government Activities in support ofagricultural development are termed as very strong. The area is 5 miles from district headquarters in Kitale. Central government has a keen interest in Company Farms (or Co-operative farms). It is responsible for the supply of loans, through the Agricultural Finance Corporation. Through the ADC, it regulates how much acreage has to come under cultivation.

Major government services in the area (also) include the maintenance of primary schools, roads and dispensaries Other services include water supply, the police, and regular extension visits by veterinary officers, agricultural instructors and credit agents from Kitale .

Crop cultivation comes first (maize, beans, wheat, tea, coffee and cabbages). Livestock comes second (grade cattle, Jerseys for milk predominate).

Previously European-owned farms had been advertised for sale. Some of them appear to have become individual farms, some group or co-operative farms. The really big problem and priority of a new farmer in the area is to collect enough money to pay his share in the purchase of a cooperative farm:

Perhaps the most urgent worry of most people in the area is that they have not yet completed their shares of 3,600 shs for the Company Farms For many it means that they stand the chance of being bought out on failure to complete their shares

Other related problems are the following ones: repayment of short-term loans (failure may also mean losing the share), complicated demands by the administration for farm progress reports, and the unclear question of title to land, which is reported for Company Farms. All households desire a freehold title in perpetuity.

All farmers do not own land. Squatters, having nowhere to go, have settled on the Company farms. Shareholders do not want them.

The government has stepped in and declared that squatters were to stay to supply the labour under a paid wages scheme.

The position is reported as an unstable one:

They have to be paid and given a free piece of land for a homestead.

Need and Opportunities: The heterogenity of the society, and the financial ambitions and problems of farmers will obviously affect self-help initiatives and achievements. The following points should be noted:

— Contributors or potential contributors have a choice between saving for their shares or loan repayments, and contributing to Harambee. For those who have not finished their payments, the choice is a difficult one, and shares and loan payments will naturally have first preference.

— Squatters obviously may have no other resource to offer than labour. Yet, since they do not know if they are going to stay—and may prefer trying their luck in another area—their willingness to contribute to projects from which they may never benefit, must be limited.

— Positional leadership looks different in Saboti. There is no system of headmen and sub-headmen. A subchief and a Farm Manager are responsible directly to the chief. (Chiefs tend to be Kalenjin whereas the local MP and the local Councillors are all Luhya, which is another source of potential conflict.)

— Government and the Diocese of Eldoret, and other outside agencies, are very important in self-help project support, and initiation.

The evolution of self-help projects is shown in the table below.

Time Spread of Self-help Projects in Saboti

Year / Type of project started	1967	68	69	70	71	72	73	Total
Nursery school	1[c]							1
Primary school	1[o]	3[o]		1[o]				5
Secondary school	1[o]		1[a]		1[c]	1*[o]		4
Youth centre				1[a]				1
Health centre				1[o]				1
Cattle dip							1[o]	1
	3	3	1	3	1	1	1	13

Notes "=Ongoing, [a]=Abandoned, [c]=Completed, *high school for girls. Secondary school started in 1971 has only first phase completed. We find that there are only two completed projects (one partially), two abandoned projects and nine ongoing projects, two since 1967, 3 since 1968.

The increasing backlog of uncompleted, often large, projects, seems to have restrained the starting of new projects in 1971—73. Note that the last project, the cattle dip, has a direct economic "pay off'. Note that the first project to be started, the nursery school (1966167) was a small one and was completed quickly.

We shall now study characteristics of the three projects selected.

The Projects Studied

(i) *Perception: Harambee perceptions* are similar, and the concept was heard by most of the respondents for the first time in work on tea estates etc. before or at independence. Leaders of the successful nursery school underline resource constraints:

"Scarcity of money . . . ."
"Little money . . . ."

whereas a leader in the abandoned secondary school speaks of Harambee projects as "big enough for the community" and "large costs", implying that one might have started something too big for local conditions. Respondents in respect of the successful secondary school speak more about wider mobilization, e.g. "backing of the community", "even lazy people become hardworking when doing Harambee work", etc.

On reasons for initiating and contributing to the projects, it is the two successful projects which appear most "manipulated": Secondary school respondents speak about being encouraged by a catholic priest and spurred by the support promised from the Diocese. Nursery school leaders speak of government influence:

It is a government plan for every farm to have its own nursery school,

and underlines the role of the Community Development Assistant and Community Development Officer:

It was started by the CDO because it would benefit everyone

and

we could get help from the CDA who proposed this nursery school

The unsuccessful school, on the contrary, might have come up too early:

first school ever to be started in the sublocation . .

(which is not quite true). We find that initiation was also "manipulated", with good intention,

The late Mr. Jackson has played a significant role in encouraging (by contributing and donations) the projects in the area . .

Then:

When Mr. Jackson died at the end of 1968 the contributions ceased almost suddenly in 1969. The project had to be abandoned after constructing the foundation only . . . .

And:

It is significant that the chief and other government administrators who have generally played a leading role in other projects in Saboti sublocation generally seemed to have nothing to do with the projects in Kapretwa area . . . .

(ii) *Leadership.* The successful nursery school was initiated by a farmer and a CDA, the successful secondary school by a priest, a teacher, a farmer and a chief. The unsuccessful secondary school was initiated by a white farmer, a teacher and a businessman. In the committees, a bishop and an MP came in on the successful school, a trader and more farmers in the nursery school, a squatter farmer on the unsuccessful school. A priest and an MP were on the work group leadership of the successful school. The unsuccessful school only had the late white farmer and the businessmen. *Overlap* is highest for the unsuccessful school, which however, has no *government involvement* in initiation like the successful projects. This seems to be a crucial point.

The case study notes:

At the inception of a project the chiefs and CDA's initiatives tend to be outstanding. Others like the District Commissioners, District Officers or District Educational Officers are never mentioned a lot except in one or two cases.

Chief G. K. particularly has contributed to most projects in the area: his contributions include calling barazas, advising, making personal donations and actually initiating a project himself (Saboti Harambee Health Centre, for which the government is said to be responsible for the detailed plans of the construction, supervised by the PHT. The government has also promised to supply the staff on its completion). The CDA's part is mainly his constant advice and donations occasionally. He is also in charge of distributing government donations (mainly materials) to "deserving projects".

The Diocese of Eldoret, in the person of Bishop N. and Fr. D. was active in Initiating Saboti Secondary School, to which it donated money and materials and is also responsible for running it and paying its teachers . . . . (This is the successful school studied here.)

(iii) *Implementation.* We have noted the very real alternative cost of contributions. The nursery school probably got quickly off the ground because of the very limited resources needed for it. Leaders had to donate only 5 shs. each and help in mudding. Kapretwa residents managed the work inputs. Community Development support for roofing, and 50 shs. per month for a teacher were sufficient. A quarter acre of land was all that was needed. The CDA was instrumental; it is said by all respondents that the chairman was appointed by the CDO, and that the CDA had asked him to inform the people to come and build the nursery school. "They accepted and work started..." The project was small enough, considered urgent enough and did not constitute the heavy burden to contributors that the secondary school subsequently became. Its slightly authoritative style and induction by a government officer did not negatively influence this outcome but rather the opposite. We know anyway

that CD personnel are assumed to be able to present a project in a manner that may appeal to popular feelings.

The secondary school in the same section did not get enough leverage. The white farmer contributed 2,300 shs. and transport facilities, "and informed other (European) farm managers to get their people involved. . . ." Squatters were the bulk of expected contributors, but they did not have the resources and enough interest. Contributions were very slow-coming. Four estates/farms managed 4,000 shs., squatters and forest residents quarried stones, and an adjoining primary school gave the land. But the project did not have any involvement of government officers, and squatters were not too committed. Could their children subsequently utilize the school? This is some information given:

The majority of the residents of Kapretwa are squatters who have no or little chance of ever owning land there. Of late many squatters have left the farm for other areas where they can buy Company farms. . . . It is therefore significant that these squatters rather than contribute to a permanent Kapretwa project, contribute elsewhere where they expect to purchase a farm. Most Kapretwa residents contribute to Saboti Harambee Health Centre and Saboti Harambee Secondary School . . . . (The successful one we are also studying).

(iv) *Conclusions.* The reason for failure of the Kapretwa Secondary School are given in the terms just quoted. People paying more attention to the Saboti project which was anyway started nearby, people not having money, migrating elsewhere, no help from anyone, etc.

The unsuccessful school topped its bad fortune by attempting to get funds through wage deductions. Another unsuccessful project, the Youth Centre, tried the same method.

Otherwise, the somewhat authoritative ways of initiating projects and extracting resources seem characteristic for all projects in this area of poor leadership. This is the way it goes, according to the case study.

In most cases when the initiatior had the total agreement of the people for the project (how does he know this?), he approaches the chief for support. The chief then calls a baraza, normally attended by the CDA (DO and DEO depending on size and nature of project). The chief will confirm whether the people really want the project (again, the views of other government officers like DO, CDA, DEO are listened to) . . .

Election of office-bearers follows, and a fund-raising rally is announced.

For the fund-raising everyone is advised to attend. Details are also reached for the recruitment of labour Subsequently receipt books are issued to every farm under a receiver After some time the receivers return the receipt books and their collections to the treasurer. More receipt books are issued and this goes on for some time. Each farm must also send a number of men to work on the project for a number of days plus contribute a specified number of trailers of stones and sand . . . .

The reasons for success of the other secondary school has already been hinted at. It was also an "authoritative" project, prodded by the Diocese, which also promised and gave a lot of support; 4,000 shs. and materials came from there, plus funds for recurrent expenses. The local MP made a contribution, Central

government gave materials worth more than 6,200 shs, a wealthy farmer (the chairman) gave no less than 18 acres of land (valued at 18,000 shs.), resident farmers (squatters?) contributed 12,000 and even Shell Company made a small donation.

The project had the full support of the farmers around. The project too had good connections with outside bodies . . . has also been described as the most successful project not only in the sublocation but also in the whole location . . . .

Baringo District, Mogotio Sublocation (A Low Potential Area). A Secondary School and Inferences on a General Success Pattern

This sublocation has no projects that are abandoned or ongoing. We shall describe the general background of a secondary school started recently and with forms I and II already operating.

(i) *Perception: The Local Situation.* The area is mainly a pastoral one, government services focused on veterinary services and ranching. Government activities are otherwise characterized as meagre and of a "care-taking" nature.

The administrators help in seeing that politics do not hinder the progress of the programmes which the wananchi start . . (Case study by M. M. Wanyoike, Sociology student, 1973).

Informants say they feel neglected by government, and that the area is lagging behind all other areas. It is also felt that development has been concentrated in parts of Baringo other than this sublocation.

Reasons for *Initiating and Contributing.* Initiation motives appear strong in terms of need. Two interesting replies are given; namely that rivalry between two important politicians contributed to the start of the project, and competition with other areas as a cause for the start of the project.

Donors express strong reasons and seem to have contributed generously. The case study notes that:

The problems which lead to initiation of the projects are usually perceived by most of the people. This means that when the idea of the projects is put forward the people tend to give it a spontaneous support. This is revealed by the fact that the people accept to contribute their livestock . . others sell maize . . one of my informants, a Mr. S., told me that he was aware that the project, which was a secondary school did not or was not going to benefit him. However, he wanted to set an example to others. He argued that he had no small children of school age. . but. . . he believed in the development of the area in general . . .

(ii) *Leadership.* Some of the success of the project may lie in the willingness to contribute and the solidarity just described. Other reasons may lie with leadership. We find a high-level leadership: the school has been initiated by an MP-cum-school manager, a rather wealthy businessman-cum-farmer, and a school teacher. The MP and the District Officer are on the committee, together with a farmer and the teacher. Most of these people are found as work group leaders. Overlap is considerable, government involvement lacking, except for the DO.

The project was carefully introduced: a big meeting was called through sub-chiefs' barazas, letters were sent to councillors and administrative officers like the DC and DOs and it was announced over the radio before a big fund-raising meeting. The two politicians' rivalry seems to have been productive in terms of both focussing on the project (they have also both given considerable donations).

(iii) *Implementation.* The size of the undertaking is underlined by respondents' saying that it is a district project with large groups participating. The project has received considerable outside support: 5,000 shs, from Kenya Charity Sweepstakes, 2,000 shs. from Community Development, 6,500 shs. from the two rival politicians. Donations from outside the sublocation are said to total 54,000 shs., the local population contributing 30,000 shs.[8]

A number of farmers and businessmen have made large donations of the range 500—1,500 shs.

Materials and transport services were largely donated. A lot of people provided unpaid labour, but some skilled people were also employed.

We conclude that a generally rather poor, pastoral area, has succeeded in implementing a large and costly project because of people's willingness to be involved in large-scale mobilization of resources, to contribute and work and because of the merging of rival political leadership and other large conspicuous contributions spurred by skillful advertising.

North-Eastern Province

Wajir District, Central Division. A Nursery School and a Primary School

The nursery school was completed in some six months whereas the primary school has been ongoing for 64 months. These two projects will of course reflect very different investment bulks. It is said that the school is in operation, and that one classroom is added each year. However, the school started in 1968 should then by 1973 have five classes. This does not seem to be the case. In relative terms, the nursery school appears to be a more rapidly, although limited, implemented project. It might be compared to one classroom.

(i) *Perception: The Local Situation.* The Central division of Wajir is mainly inhabited by the two major nomad tribes of the region: the Somali and the Boran. (Case study by C. N.J. Wairia, Sociology student, 1973).

Both (Somali and Boran) live in separate manyattas adjacent to each other. To a newcomer it looks like one continuous village but the demarcation is clear to the local people. Historically the two tribes have been warring against each other and these conflicts persist today although underground. While initiating a project the leaders of both villages must be consulted to gain the villages' consent. The present site of the manyattas was allocated in 1970 as part of the preventive measures against cholera which took a good toll of life in this region. The manyattas were situated within the town vicinity but have been moved to one kilometre out of the town. Conflict occurs if anything is

[8] These figures may be inflated. The 20 largest donations as per cash book add up to 24,400 shs. However, materials bought alone total 30,698 shs.

initiated without the consultation of the two manyattas. Whether it be for their immediate gain or otherwise, they require to be called to a baraza and be informed of it. Otherwise if one manyatta agrees to it and the other does not, this will perpetuate the rivalry between the two. This has been the major obstacle in initiating or building any lavatories Toilet facilities in the two manyattas are non-existent.

Need and Opportunities, Harambee Perception

Due to lack ofagricultural potential and limitation by natural and geographical isolation since the area is semi-desert, there cannot be any viable economic activity other than herding of livestock especially camels. However, all local energies appear to be geared towards opening up new schools. This area has been lagging behind in the production of educated wage-employed people. Until 1970 there was only one primary school with classes beyond standard four. Now there are ten primary schools, one will go up to standard seven this year, another next year. By 1980 all will be going up to standard seven, if the one classroom per year trend continues. Schools therefore seem to be the major requirement of the area. These statements may refer to that part of the nomad population that has become settled around Wajir because of access to water.

From the self-help point of view, the society can be said to be homogeneous once a consensus is reached. This mostly comes in the personality of the DC. Provision of labour—which can be said to be the major qualification of classifying these projects as Harambee—is an obligation of both manyattas. There could grow a tendency of or a feeling of working for one manyatta if it were not for the strong hand of the DC who directs the projects often personally. However, there is a discernible growing understanding by the people of the benefits of these projects and these are avoiding tribal rivalry.

Self-help here seems something quite different from the densely populated agricultural areas of say Central and Nyanza Provinces. However, judging from the narrative above, it does not just amount to forced labour for government projects. Som measure of consultation with manyatta leaders takes place, and the necessary labour will be provided only if there is reasonable approval by both manyattas, through their leaders.

All key persons interviewed heard the Harambee concept for the first time at independence, over the radio, by the President and in Wajir. The only exception to this is a female respondent who says she heard it from the people, adding, however, that she also heard it on the radio and in the market.

There is however an interesting difference in the nuance of understanding the Harambee concept between leaders of the two projects. Most of them speak about the communal and togetherness aspects of Harambee, but slightly more negative connotations come out from the school project leaders:

"No difference between Harambee and non-Harambee" (the treasurer of the school project, who first characterized Harambee as "work together and help each other communally").

"Any kind of work whether individual or communal" (a female member of the school committee, 40 years, and of the Maendeleo ya Wanawake). Again this is contradicted by a subsequent statement that Harambee is working and contributing together.

"No proper estimates . . ." (the chairman of the school project, a statement which does not seem to reflect a very sound approach).

The school project leaders seem to have a contradictory or vague concept of Harambee, as compared to the nursery school project leaders.

Reasons for Initiating the Projects, and Contributing to them: All respondents appear

to show considerable, and roughly equal, commitment. However, the treasurer of the school project has no idea how much money he gave, which seems odd, especially for a treasurer. This might however just reflect unwillingness to part with the information.

(ii) *Leadership: General. Government Offers* are quoted as a group of their own. Especially since the more high-ranking ones come from the outside. Moreover,

> Anybody who has been to Nairobi is by implication a widely travelled man and will occupy a social position higher than others. His opinions are more likely to be heard and adopted than those of a local man . . . .

Then:

> The *businessmen* occupy a rank of their own. They command public respect and are mostly the project leaders. Although almost all the projects are led by businessmen, it is not a prerequisite for leadership. But a feeling prevails within the people that such people have the capability and know-how to organise and lead successfully. The village headmen are members of the local village committees. Each manyatta elects a committee to look after their welfare and interests and to discuss with the government representatives initiating projects or on any matters affecting the whole manyatta. The two committees are the proper representatives of the people and their recommendation is bound to be taken up as the will of the people.

Socio-economic Characteristics. The *nursery school* was initiated by a trader, aged 40, parents and "the village committee". However, key informants term the initiators as "the villages", in the plural. Another respondent underlines that "all the villagers" are members.

Theschool was initiated by one 55-year-old trader, not the same one as for the nursery school. The same trader became chairman, and another 50-year-old trader became the treasurer. For the nursery school, the initiating trader of that project became chairman, two other traders (50 and 40 years old) became treasurer and work group leader.

For the nursery school the initiating trader-chairman, and the trader-treasurer became work group leaders. For the school, that trader-chairman is termed as the one leading all building activities, a task spent then over five years.

(iii) *Implementation: Contributions and Contributors.* We have already said that the nursery school was supported by both villages. The school respondents speak more vaguely about all people in Wajir town being members of the group.

Resources for the nursery school were provided by the people (2,116.90 shs. to be exact), by the CDO, Social services (materials), by the County Council (land) and by the people (work). For the school the government and CARE is said to have provided materials worth 15,000 shs. and the treasurer says that people contributed no less than 5,000 shs. (the cash books register a few donations of 5 to 34.65 shs, and forty contributions of one shilling each). Land for the school was also given by the County Council, and work by local people.

Whereas school respondents say there was no cooperation with outside groups and bodies (which is really wrong, CARE for instance did contribute),

the nursery school respondents note that there was cooperation with the divisional development committee, and the "township committee". We do not quite know what body the last one represents, but the divisional development committee is the embryo of a "local parliament" with divisional officers of the various ministries, the local MP, perhaps the local KANU chairman, and other local leaders represented. Cooperation or communication with such a body, no doubt facilitated through the apparently dynamic chairman of the nursery school, might certainly have boosted the project.

(iv) *Conclusions.* We have found certain differences in the nature of leadership of the two projects, with a possibly more dynamic local chairman for the nursery school, and involvement of the CDO. Also, the nursery school seems to have been more extensively "cleared" with both manyatta committees. Finally, nursery school project leaders seem more clear and positive on what the Harambee concept implies.

Summary of observations and conclusions

The table below represents a condensed summary of the local explanation for success or failure of projects. The patterns appear clear. Thus success appears to be associated with the following:

(i) Self-reliant values superimposed on strongly felt and well-articulated local needs.

(ii) Participative leadership selection so that leaders have a broad-based legitimacy.

(iii) A clear assessment of local resource limitations, possible external sources and best means of resource mobilization.

(iv) Initiation strategies which include open discussions, formal and informal consultations within small groups and between individuals.

(v) Projects should be planned to be completed in a limited and specified period rather than drag on for long periods.

(vi) Government involvement should be materially supportive, consultative and coordinatory and not imposive.

(vii) Projects should be selected to reflect the nature and limitations of local resources. Overburdening of local contributors should be avoided.

(viii) Leadership continuity through the stages of project maturation appears as important as the ability of the community to recruit new leaders, avoid multiple project leadership and co-opt support from outside the community.

The unsuccessful project is characterized by vague motives, conflicting—sometimes very selfish—individual goals, authoritative non-elected leadership, vague unfulfilled promises, local dependence on government for all development activity, local conflict and political competition, too many Harambee projects and so on.

Table *43. Summary of Observations on the Case Studies of Successful and Unsuccessful Projects*

Province, district, sub-location	Successful Project Perception	Leadership	Implementation
Coast Kwale Golini	Broadly felt local needs and enough children (nursery)	Elected leaders	All worked in construction. Special Harambee days. Community development and Red Cross assisted.
Kwale Mazeras	Government activities weak. Projects too small for government to do. Strong feelings about Harambee ability to overcome difficulties.	Leaders voted in.	Church congregation support. President laid foundation stone and donated. Cabinet Minister donated.
Taita Mgambonyi	Limited role of government. Self-reliance ("improvement of our area depends on ourselves"). Strong emotional need (health disp: people, women die).	Subchief formally more involved (chairman & work group leader)	Considerable local and emigrant mobilization after government grant. Much labour. Office holders gave much.
Tana River Hola	Harambee: "project is completed quickly item by item". Strong economic motives. Strong govt. push (poor newly developed area).	District Agricultural Officer (skilled technician) & chief involved. Greater continuity and govt. involvement in leadership.	Considerable contributions from traders and CARE. Chairman gave more, and more physical work.
Eastern Machakos Kasinga	Consumers maintain will to contribute to this project rather than other (cattle dip). Felt most urgent project. More immediate economic benefits.	Greater govt. involvement in all phases (33%, 25%, 33%) for initiators, committee and work groups respectively.	Greater and more stable financial inputs (shares). Bigger and standardized labour inputs per participant (200—300 hours).
Nairobi Dagoretti	(No successful projects)		
Central Kiambu, Karatu		Community Development Assistant with more discrete and negotiating role one of the initiators. Possibly more dynamic and mobilizing leadership.	Received a govt, grant
Kiambu, Kinoo	(No successful projects)		
Kirinyaga, Gitaku	Promised help only if we started working. A missing phase, project needed.		Area is poor, and projects mature slowly, but this project got substantial aid from outside.
Nyanza Kisii, Bonyakoni		Government involvement rising (0%, 14%, 33%). Chief and work group leader. Efficient announcement.	Key informants high contributions. Big "conspicuous donations" maybe because of project size and leaders' leverage.

Unsuccessful Project Perception	Leadership	Implementation
"Exclusive, segregationist"	District ollicer self-appointed. No committee.	Paid workers. Contributors did "minimum duty"
Half-hearted will: "Why does not government do it . . .?" Expensive. Harambee "contributions small, take long time to start and complete.	Outside higher level initiative. Assumed leaders. No committee.	(Cabinet Minister donated) Materials collected but no work.
Need to use govt. grant so nobody else gets it. "Divert water to me" (a major actor)	Initiated from above (govt. authority, "you should"). Councillor more involved.	No local mobilization. Office holders gave little.
	Less continuity and govt. involvement in leadership.	Weaker County Council supported. Chairman gave less cash and little or no physical work.
	Lower govt, involvement (0, 17, 0 %)	Lower and possibly more unstable inputs of cash and labour.
Vague and conflicting Harambee perception and motivation for starting. Low self-reliance, nearness to Nairobi. People realize schooling does not create employment.	High level initiation and leadership (Member of Parliament, etc.) Loss of continuity in implementation (100, 100, 0 %). No govt. involvement.	"Skill-intensive Harambee psychology". Cash and labour contributions scarce. Project caught in evil circle: skill-intensity, insufficient local priority, little or no govt. involvement and support.
	Subchief possibly more authoritative attitude. Admin. policeman among initiators.	Received no government grant.
Water. "tired ofemploying people to get me the water". Cattle Dip: "Forced by government if to have a grade cattle."	Dip. Leaders elected on basis of wealth and prestige, and appointed by local government.	Water. Possibly for individual taps, exclusive, rich, private Cattle Dip: Government interference, forced.
"Our Member of Parliament has been promising, but never built."		No outside help. Key informants vague on their own contributions
(First self-help project.) Need possibly reduced by government mobile dispensaries.	No government involvement in any leadership function. Only vague statements about holding meetings	Same resource extraction as successful project but less efficient. National and local VIPs almost lacking as contributors.

Province, district, sub-location	Successful Project Perception	Leadership	Implementation
Kisumu, Katieno	Harambee: "Takes an individual less expense" and expressions of self-reliance. Motive for contributing: "it was our project".	Charismatic funmaker as donation leader. No govt. involvement. Higher overlap. More simple initiation. Leaders voted by show of hands.	Leaders put in more physical work. Women dominated. Attracted more conspicuous donors. Local contributions on Harambee Day, specified amount.
Western Kakamega Eshinadumba	(No successful projects)		
Busia, Kisoko	Harambee: Self-reliance aspects: "entirely peoples' project, local initiative, run entirely by people themselves". Localization; and realism: lack of facilities to start a more ambitious project.	Big overlap, Low-key, local start: chairman sent messages to parents for a meeting, at which a decision was passed.	Need little cash.
Rift Valley Trans-Nzoia Saboti	Leaders underline Harambee resource constraints: " scarcity of money, little money" (nursery school). Leaders speak of Harambee as "backed by community, even lazy people become hardworking".		Govt. prodding, esp. by CDO/CDA. Project small enough even for squatters to cope with. Encouraged and supervised by Diocese. Good financial leverage from Diocese, Central Govt., MP, wealthy farmers gave land.
Banngo, Mogotio	Strong local will to compete with other areas and mobilize resources. Merging political competitors. Unselfish major contributors.	Top level govt. civil servants involved. Widespread announcements. Big project.	Big donations from outside VIPs. Large local donations from more well-to-do people.
North Eastern Wajir		Properly cleared with both villages concerned Dynamic chairman centrally placed.	Cooperation with District Development Committee.

Unsuccessful Project Perception	Leadership	Implementation
Harambee: largescale, with aim of inviting govt. help, necessity of coercing laggards. Motive promises from WDA and WHO. Selfish motives from some. Certain exclusiveness. "Not solely a K clan project", etc.	Higher govt. involvement. Lower overlap. Negative connotations of govt. promises and resource extraction. More technically complicated. WDA and WHO officials automatic members.	Men dominated. Fewer conspicuous donors. Complicated flow of funds. Policy clash. People's cash "collected by subchiefs . . ."
"Apathy and individualism." Full job managingsubsistence. Alienation to govt. "Irrelevant programmes".	Govt. officers lack legitimacy. No means of communicating with population.	Subchief and priest introduce many projects. No will or ability to contribute. Labour shortage?
Harambee perception more vague, abstract "national level" perception.	Little overlap (and more complicated project) Chief s baraza.	Skill-intensive needing much cash (in area of limited cash)
Leaders speak of Harambee as "big enough for community large costs".	Govt. officers (who usually active) absent.	European initiator farmer died. Not enough financial leverage. Forced wage deductions.
(No unsuccessful project)		
Vague and contradicting Harambee concepts.	Less dynamic chairman without other leadership posts. Leaders vague on outside support.	Treasurer vague on own contribution. Little cooperation with outside groups.

Mbithi's observations on the greater "life expectancy" of Harambee/locally initiated projects as compared to government/centrally initiated ones tally with our observations on criterions of success and failure of Harambee projects.

Table 44 suggests a correlation between local initiative and the success of a project. It shows the relationship between the nature of specific rural projects, the centre of decision-making and planning, the nature of participation and the success of projects.

Table 44. *An evaluatiue approach to community projects in four communities in Eastern Kenya*

Decision	Group Origin of Decision and Plan Implementation	Participants	Period	Remarks
1. Construction Harambee High School	Clan Leaders in consultation with community development officials	Clans, family heads, individuals, and women age-groups.	1964	Successful in all four communities
2. Building maternity	Women leaders, clan leaders, officials	Clans, family heads, individuals, mainly women	1964	Successful
3. Compost-making	Extension officers	Communities, farmers	1948	Could not replace cattle manure-failed
4. Destocking	Government officials	Communities, homestead heads	1946—1960	Failed
5. Resistance to destocking and terracing	Local cattle owners and homestead leaders	Communities, family heads	1948—1960	Successful in all four communities
6. Adoption of cotton communal plantations	Government	Communities, farmers and their households	1965—1967	Failing
7. Maintaining irrigation channels	Government	Communities, individual plot owners and their households	1956	Failed
8. Adoption of early maturing maize	Government researchers and extension officers	Communities, individual farm households	1962—1967	Slow but successful
9. Maintaining irrigation channels	Village committee	Community households	1966—1968	Tottering
10. Land allocation to migrants	Village committee	Community "village committee"	1965	Successful

Source: P. M. Mbithi, Rural Sociology and Rural Development, East African Literature Bureau, Nairobi, 1974.

VII. Changing Local Perceptions as a Factor in the Continuity of Harambee

Introduction

The project case studies presented in chapter six suggest that the outcome of Harambee projects depends on a variety of factors, including the following:

(a) The nature of local project leadership, degree and type of government involvement and style of resource mobilization.

(b) The size of external contributions and degree of involvement of leaders with linkages outside the community, such as cabinet ministers.

(c) The style of project organisation, project size and its relationship to other projects.

(d) The socio-economic status (income levels, occupation and education) of the participants and leaders and the degree of status exclusiveness of the leaders.

(e) The relation of project outcome to the aspirations and felt needs of the local people.

All these factors were brought out piecemeal in the discussion of factors leading to success or failure of projects. These case studies and early discussions have expanded and discussed in greater detail the factors of leadership, resource mobilization styles, external contributors, project size, socio-economic statuses of leaders.

The theoretical relationships of these factors which influence the performance of Harambee are summarized in the empirical model presented below.

The model summarizes the empirical relations so far brought out in preceeding chapters and some which need further analysis.

The basic argument is that national level development environment and resource distribution patterns are perceived by local people through the coloured glasses of their own local environment. This local environment, which constitutes local organisational structures, local resource endowment, local development activities, is evaluated by individuals and groups who have their own values, aspirations, needs and which in turn have been tempered by their experiences whether negative or positive. In a study of perceived development possibilities, in Ishiara, Eastern Kenya, Mbithi (1974) found that the experiences of local people with a government livestock de-stocking programme had led to very negative values about the role of government in the development of the area. "From past experience we know that the government is only interested in taking away our cattle and forcing us to grow crops only. If we do this we will die and it is best they leave us alone to develop as we see best." (Mzee Ngunjiri, Ishiara Market, 1972).

Diagı *Empirical relationship of Key Factors Influencing Harambee Continuity*



The continued support of Harambee activities strains individual resources and the alternative of letting the government initiate all activities and finance them is extremely attractive. Thus the continued support of Harambee suggests certain push factors as possibilities:

(i) That local communities initiate Harambee projects to increase their access to government resources by pressurizing government support.

(ii) That perceived benefits of Harambee are very attractive to local people and unattainable through the normal government development process.

(iii) That local people are becoming increasingly self-reliant and are organising themselves successfully for self-development.

(iv) That national level leadership and local leadership are generating motivational themes and ethics to make Harambee a philosophically acceptable principle and way of development.

Whatever is the true possibility or possibilities, the observed facts indicate that Harambee is not purely a demonstration of the ability of national leaders to manipulate local people. The data indicates that there is tremendous commitment among local people to support Harambee activities. Thus, peoples attitudes, values and definitions of the reality of Harambee is a critical dimension in understanding the continuity of the Harambee movement.

As yet, we have not discussed in any depth the role of local attitudes, aspirations and felt needs as factors which guide people's responses to the principle of Harambee and influence their Harambee behaviour. These aspects, which we treat as indices of local perceptions are critical in helping us understand why local people sacrifice their time, resources and personal comfort in support of Harambee.

However, the factor of perception still remains vague in terms of what it really means, how central it is to Harambee, and how it is related to other factors. This chapter will analyse the empirical aspect and operational implications of this factor in greater detail.

Perception of Harambee is defined as the process by which people become aware of the definition and practical implications of the principle of Harambee. The definition also includes the assessment of how such awareness influences the attitudes and activities of local individuals and communities, especially as they relate to local development efforts.

Perception was measured by summarizing responses to questions which addressed themselves to the following:

(i) Respondents' understanding of the original meaning of Harambee and how Harambee projects differ from non-Harambee projects.

(ii) Respondents' understanding of the basic individual, group, and community level motives for initiating specific projects.

(iii) Respondents' basic reasons for contributing and sacrificing own capital, labour and time to specific projects.

(iv) Respondents' cost/benefit expectations as articulated by leaders in project initiation or as evaluated from experience.

The perceived origin and meaning of Harambee

As indicated in the first chapter, the concept of Harambee is not new to Kenya and is found in the languages of most ethnic groups in Kenya. However, the principle of Harambee, meaning collective self-reliance at local, regional and national level is attributed to a specific source.

Particularly the President of Kenya, Mzee Jomo Kenyatta is seen by the majority of the respondents as the source of the new meaning of Harambee. They indicate that they heard him discussing the principle at meetings, through the radio, through newspapers or through other political leaders who also attribute the source to the President.

As suggested in chapter one, the latent energies of Harambee as a mobilizing principle were released some time after Madaraka Day 1963 when the President made the first formal call. Although many respondents refer to Madaraka Day call "Harambee", they indicate that they became active in projects much later. This suggests a time lag when the call had to be translated into tangible action proposals.

Some Nyanza Province respondents first heard the word Harambee from Omolo Ongiro, better known as *"Omolo Harambee",* a Luo leader involved in the freedom struggle of the 1950s. Omolo used the word Harambee as a keyword at meetings in 1955 protesting against British-led land registration that was perceived to deprive poor peasants of their land.[1] This created great unity and stopped a registration process that benefited only so-called progressive farmers. This local Harambee perception focussed more on protest and unity against central policies than active economic and social improvement. How did it lay the foundation for subsequent impressive self-help efforts in Nyanza?

In President Kenyatta's speech on 28 May, 1963, when KANU's victory in the general elections was announced, he underlined the concepts of building one nation, and forging national unity. There is a relationship between this call, geared at self-reliant welfare improvement, and Omolo Harambee's campaigns. Omolo Harambee combined his call for disobedience against land registration executed by the colonial government with a call for the release of Jomo Kenyatta from his detention in Lodwar. Perceptions in Nyanza thus became geared to the person and subsequent calls of the President, relating to the "production-oriented" aspects of Harambee.

> . . . but you must know that Kenyatta alone cannot give you everything. All things we must do together to develop our country, to get education for our children, to have doctors, to build roads, to improve or provide all day-to-day essentials . . . (President Kenyatta's speech on Independence Day, 12 December, 1963).

The quotation brings out the essence of the content of previous and subsequent self-help activities, such as the construction of schools and health projects, and infra-structural improvement.

Many respondents first became aware of the Harambee concept in activity,

[1] See Owino-Ombudo, Harambee — Its Origin and Growth, Academic Publishers, Nairobi, 1972.

when they themselves were participating in a physical act such as lifting, pushing or pulling something heavy or when building a bridge, a school or a house, i.e. participating in their first Harambee project or in other forms of communal labour. Others first became aware of the concept as members of a small group such as neighbourhood group or a drinking party. Others have first heard it from people rather close to themselves or opinion leaders such as teachers, church leaders, chiefs or subchiefs, a close friend or from a relative. Some respondents became aware of the concept at local meetings in the market place, trading centre, a chiefs baraza or a political rally or from a politician visiting the area. KANU and KAU meetings are sometimes referred to as sources of information about Harambee. One respondent in Kisii heard of Harambee in 1952 from a visiting Mau Mau leader.

The conclusion which appears rather obvious is that the concept of Harambee existed as a concrete theme of joint work in many parts of Kenya before independence and that this theme was expanded and given a national perspective by the President's call at independence which has been repeated and defined into tangible activities by agents such as local leaders, administrators, local populations in the intervening years.

However the social organisation on which Harambee is based must not be seen as insignificant. Harambee is not simply an association of people deciding to come together and organise themselves for their particular interest. Self-help is grounded firmly in existing social ties, rights and duties which have existed and will exist beyond the requirements of a specific project.

As Mbithi (1973), Mutiso (1972) and Hill (1974) show in their separate studies of the social organisation of Harambee in Nyeri, Machakos and Kitui respectively, Harambee is founded on the various forms of reciprocal work groups such as "ngwataniro", "mwethya", "mwilaso" "ielo" and other associations such as "mbari", "nthuke", "ngolano". As indicated in our discussion on case studies, Harambee is difficult to organise in towns where such organisational base is absent. The exception is where such urban self-help activity is directed to a rural "home area" or supported by the business community.

The above observations are also supported by our observation on the weak Harambee structure found among the nomadic peoples of North Kenya. Harambee in these regions indicates a strong reliance on administrative officers such as District Commissioner, District Officer and also on businessmen for initiation. In this area, we found less clarity in knowledge about the origin of Harambee, very recent exposure and distortions such as:

Heard it first in the District Development Committee

at a baraza conducted by the local government officials, trying to make the public understand the meaning and uses of Harambee

Harambee is usually a scheme of work financed by an individual, labour given by many

Means to go to foreign land and carry property and build what you want

North Eastern Province responses are a fraction of all responses but still account for 26 per cent of all responses that quote President Kenyatta as the source of the concept and 27 per cent of those that say they heard it over the

radio. The majority of North Eastern Province respondents however had heard of Harambee from a District Commissioner, a District Officer or a Community Development Officer. The majority also specify a place outside North Eastern Province as the locus for first hearing the word Harambee. Finally, North Eastern Province accounts for no less than 39 per cent of all replies that were vague or stated "don't know" in respect of their perception of what Harambee is.

We *conclude* that Harambee is certainly not a temporary phenomenon but that it rests solidly on local social organisation and a tradition of group activity. This base has been strengthened and has exerted itself into new investment activities and dimensions through leverage and encouragement by top political support. However, Harambee activity cannot be excessively exploited for political purposes. If many politicians or administrators suggest or prod for new ventures that are too many or too big, local social organisation and resource endowment is likely to put a brake on such proliferation. This is shown by Mbithi (1972) for Tetu division of Nyeri district, Central Province. Excessive political pressures, not clearly related to local need, led to a "retreat" of Harambee activity into smaller and possibly fewer projects. Social organisation here stood out not only as a *constraint* to large scale Harambee activity, but also as an *insurance mechanism* to save Harambee for inherently locally relevant activities.

In areas of more recent administrative penetration such as North Eastern Province, the origin and meaning of Harambee displays a more vague, "imported" character. Harambee here appears to be less based on social organisation patterns. As the case study of projects in Wajir (chapter six) shows, however, some degree of urbanization may hold the key to some project success. In Central Province/Nairobi, the opposite seemed true.

The major traits that distinguish Harambee from non-Harambee projects

Responses to the question about what respondents see as the major traits that distinguish Harambee projects from non-Harambee projects were broken down into a few major categories as shown in Table 45.

The table indicates that Harambee projects are seen as essentially confined to specific territories, for specific communities or for specified populations, who are normally the initiators and projected consumers. It also indicates, although there is conflicting evidence, that Harambee is seen as a voluntary activity. This issue will be discussed later.

There are clear ideas that Harambee differs also in the source of financial support which is essentially local and also in capital/labour intensity where Harambee is seen as more labour intensive. This perception is accompanied by the view that Harambee projects are poor in technical expertise, though they use more local resources.

Table 45. *What Aspects in your Opinion Distinguish a Harambee from a Non-Harambee Project. (Per Province, % of Total Score.)*

Responses	Nyanza	Western	Rift Valley	Eastern	Coast	Central	North-Eastern
1. Embraces populations of defined boundaries	43	13	12	14	18	18	4
2 Locally initiated and managed	4	0	18	25	26	16	18
3 People's contributions are voluntary	5	13	14	22	37	6	50
4 Project utilized by all when completed	2	8	9	18	1	38	0
5 Projects initiated by Government	0	0	0	2	0	0	0
6 Contributions are compulsory	8	0	14	0	0	0	0
7. Lack of adequate funds	9	31	6	7	3	6	0
8 No external sources of funds	6	8	23	7	1	0	8
9. Project gets Government sources of funds	3	2	0	1	10	1	8
10 Projects are non-profit-making	0	0	0	0	0	13	0
11. Projects are political arenas	0	6	4	0	0	0	0
12 Quick completion of project	0	8	0	4	1	0	8
13. Slow completion of project	3	4	0	0	0	0	0
14 No difference	10	0	0	0	0	0	4
15. Project of a poorer quality due to lack of technical experts	7	7	0	0	3	1	0
16 Reflects African Socialism	0	0	0	0	0	1	0
Percent	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
"n"	88	52	57	120	273	157	26

"n" all provinces. 773

These perceptions tally with our earlier conclusions. Together they predict continued localization and size restriction of Harambee and underline the gap between such local activities and the activities of "conspicuous" Harambee actors as described in chapter five.

Project-specific expressions of need

Table 46 is a compilation of the replies given by key informants on the following question: "What reasons, problems, what aspects of the area, what motivation led you/the group/him/her to initiate the project?" (List). An informant has often given several replies to this question. Each reply has been tabulated separately.

The most frequent and generally the most varied and elaborated motive for initiation of a project relates to the education and betterment of children (and adults). This is merely a reflection of the dominance of educational projects. These motives are recorded in nearly two-thirds of all the sublocations surveyed, and take 35 per cent of all answers. They sometimes take the particular aspect of also freeing mothers (parents) from looking after children all day.

"Technical and nearness" reasons overlap especially the educational and

health care motivations. This category of replies refers to situations when respondents wanted to bring a facility within better reach of children and parents. It also refers to cases of excessive congestion of existing facilities.

Table 46. *Leaders* on *Why a Certain Project was Started*

Kind of answer	Most frequent particular answer	% of areas where this answer given	% frequency, kind of answer
Relating to the education and betterment of children (and adults)	Need for foundation for education, i e nursery school	61 6	35 0
Technical and nearness reasons	Distance problem	69.2	16.7
Relating to improvement of water supplies	Water supply for human consumption	44.6	10 1
Relating to improvement of cattle	Need to eradicate cattle diseases	49.1	8 9
Other project-oriented reasons	Need for a church	40.0	9 4
General social and economic reasons	To develop the area	30 8	3.7
Relating to improvement of health	Need for a health centre	29.1	3.3
Harambee reasons	Spirit of Harambee	21 6	3 1
Mobilization reasons	To encourage help from others	13.9	2 3
Competition reasons	Competition with other areas	21.6	1 9
Outside leverage	Encouragement by Government officials	10 8	1 9
Other answers			1 5
Vague answers			2 2
N		65	100 0

The third most common reason for initiating a project refers to the need of water for human consumption and irrigation, or the need of cleaner water for human consumption. The need for a cattle dip comes number four in frequency.

The need to improve health services comes further down the list (3.8 per cent) in spite of the higher frequency of health projects in the sample (8.4 per cent). This is because the motives for initiating health projects are often not expressed in terms of direct alleviation of sickness, but in terms of improving the perceived quality of these services by bringing them nearer to patients.[2]

The table on motives reflects leader preoccupations against the background of a project decision already made. There is nothing to suggest that priorities cannot change as a result of e.g. a reappraisal of perceived benefits of past operations.

[2] A case study of perceived benefits from health projects will confirm this view, as expressed by consumers/contributors

Independence in defining needs

"Outside leverage" can be perceived as positive encouragement e.g. by government technicians, offering advice and occasionally other resources (e.g. grants from Community Development), or as negative, excessive interference. The table on reasons for initiating projects (see Table 46) shows "encouragement" by government officers as a rare reason for the initiation of a project (2 per cent). Statements on Harambee perception confirm the capacity for independent action and government intervention is not often taken up.

Statements concern decision without government authority, without being forced, and in fields where government has not initiated any programmes. Some responses take up encouragement by government, or government aid, as factors contributing to the definition or acceptance of a need and attempts to cater for it. The case studies in chapter six indicated, however, that strong government involvement in newly settled or marginal areas might be a precondition for the emergence of Harambee projects.

Table 45 shows that many more respondents feel local initiation and management is a criterion of self-help projects than those who feel it is initiated by government.

The most common perception is that at the sublocational level needs are in fact *locally* defined, and cases of national level influence in project selection by cooption of local leaders is at least not acknowledged. The data on actual leadership in chapter four also suggested a modest role of more "conspicuous" leaders in local Harambee affairs.

One particular regional trait should be underiined, however. For peripheral areas like those in North Eastern Province, Lamu, West Pokot, Uasin Gishu, Turkana and Samburu districts, the pattern of motives for project initiation differs from that of the nation as a whole.

"Outside leverage", in the form of encouragement or persuasion by government officers is a much more frequent basis for project initiation. Dire nutritional needs of orphans from the Shifta war is a commonly found reason for the initiation of specific projects. Finally, especially for Samburu, "competition reasons", namely the feeling that one's area is lagging behind others, is more frequent.

Reasons for contributing

Tables 47 and 48 indicate that compulsion plays a part in participation. This may be involuntary or may be due to the fact that one is a leader and is publicly committed to contribute. Mobilizing others to contribute by one's own example is a prominent reason. Also, contrary to conventional wisdom, local people appear to have very objective technical reasons for contributing to Harambee. This confirms Harambee perception data on need identification as *localized* and that project initiation is characterized by clear specification of project goals.

Table 48 is based on very limited responses from the very few who did not contribute. It indicates that being away from the community, expressed poverty, perceived inability to eventually benefit from the project, and contribution to other Harambee projects are some key reasons for non-contribution.

As indicated in the empirical model, locally defined needs and perceptions of what Harambee can do are important factors in the support and continuity of Harambee projects. Table 47 shows that the desire to improve one's own area, demonstrate committment to develop one's own area to others and also expectation of benefits are the three most important reasons.

Degree of voluntariness and project proliferation

In the survey there was conflicting evidence as to whether Harambee involvement is compulsory. Within certain districts, this aspect of direct forced participation was obvious. In addition, one could argue that group social pressure which characterized Harambee self-help contribution tactics at the local level is a clear form of compulsion.

Table 45 showed that more respondents underlined voluntariness as an aspect distinguishing Harambee from non-Harambee activities, than those underlining compulsion. There were some interesting regional differences in the data, summarized below:

Voluntariness versus Compulsion as a Noted Characteristic of Harambee Projects (Per Province, % of Total Score.)

Response	Nyanza	Western	Rift Valley	Eastern	Coast	Central
People's contributions are voluntary	5	13	14	22	37	6
Contributions are compulsory	8	0	14	0	0	0

Table 48 suggests more frequent voluntary than compulsory contributions as characterizing Harambee projects. Nyanza and Rift Valley stand out as "centres of compulsion". In the few responses of North Eastern Province with its imported, government-led Harambee, perceptions reflect a hope or desire for "voluntary" contributions.

Statements about voluntariness, made by key informants and leaders are likely to show particular biases. A leader is unlikely to reveal—even through his general statements on what Harambee is—that compulsion plays a major role.

Willingness to contribute is likely to depend on a number of factors, e.g. perceived ability to benefit from the subsequent project. This in turn will depend on the contributors "nearness" to the proposed project and its leaders. If the project is physically near, small in size and appearing to offer immediate, relevant benefits, the common man is likely to contribute willingly. These

Table 47. *If yes, What Reasons Make/Made you Contribute? (% per Province Total.)*

Project	Reason	Coast	Eastern	Rift Valley	Central	Western	Nyanza
	1. I wanted to improve my area	16	7	12	4	31	29
	2 Compulsory—could not go against collective will—forced		6	—	10	13	21
	3. As a Committee Member, I wanted to motivate others to contribute	15	43	35	12	5	—
	4. I knew I would benefit from the project once completed	5	5	—	—	—	—
All	5. We very much needed the project (for unspecified reasons)	31	7	22	—	13	—
	6. Current idea and practice	4	—	14	—	—	29
	7. I only help in organising dances	2	—	—	—	—	—
	8. Our MPs encouraged us	2	—	—	4	—	—
	9. People clap at rallies when one contributes		—	6	—	—	—
1. Cattle Dip	(a) Eradicate ticks and restore health of domestic animals		18	—	14	—	—
2. Education	(b) To reduce walking distance for pupils	10	—	—	—	—	—
	(c) Provide opportunities for more successful students	5	2	—	18	9	—
	(d) So the government would take over the school	1	—	—	—	—	—
	(e) As an investment in our children for normal benefits	4	—	—	15	—	—
	(f) To reduce hooliganism and delinquency	—	—	—	—	24	—
3 Health	(g) Reduce walking distance for patients to the nearest medical facility	—	—	2	—	—	8
4. Water	(h) My home is on the pipeline	½	—	—	—	—	—
	(i) Reduce time going to draw from the well	—	7	—	—	—	—
	(j) For my grade cattle	4½	—	—	—	—	—
5. Church	(k) I contributed as a Christian	—	5	9	23	5	13
	Average	100	100	100	100	100	100
	N	302	188	91	73	38	24

perceived characteristics of a project proposal are likely to coincide with a situation where the contributor is also close to the leader or even member of the same group, and hence a party in the decision-making process.

B.R. Bolnick (1974) found from data generated by the Department of Economics, University of Nairobi, that respondents in a case study, who themselves were allowed to define "willingness", gave a variety of replies.

Table 48. *If no, what Reasons Led You Not to Contribute? (% per Province Total.)*

Reason	Western	Rift Valley	North Eastern	Central	Eastern	Nyanza	Coast
1. Had nothing to contribute	63.0	0 0	25.0	0.0	25.0	33 0	17.0
2. I would not benefit from the project	0.0	17 0	0.0	0.0	4.0	33 0	17.0
3. I was not resident in this locality	0 0	50.0	50 0	33.0	0.0	0 0	16.0
4. I was unaware of any fund-raising meeting	37 0	17.0	25.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	33.0
5. None given	0.0	0 0	0.0	0.0	58.0	0.0	0.0
6. I had contributed towards another Harambee project	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	13.0	0.0	0.0
7. I wasn't interested in the project	0 0	16.0	0.0	67 0	0.0	34.0	
8. We had external sources of funds from the government	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0 0	0.0	17.0
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
N	8	12	8	6	24	6	6

Table 49. *Respondent Situations and Degree of Willingness in Contributing*

Characteristic of Respondent Relation to Meeting or Project Situation	Percentage Respondents who contributed willingly
Rally chaired by national leader, for secondary school (HS)	86
Ditto, for health centre(HC)	79
Knew local leader speaking at rally personally (HS)	95
(HC)	90
Did not know him (HS)	52
(HC)	51
Had children in primary school (HS)	97
Did not have children in primary school (HS)	42
Hospital near home before contributing (HC)	69
Hospital not near home before contributing (HC)	82

Source Bolnick, B R., Comparative Harambee: History and Theory of Voluntary Collective Behaviour, IDS, University of Nairobi, W P No 39, 1974
HS—Harambee Secondary School
HC—Health Centre

The differences indicate a close relationship between nearness of need and leader, and willingness to contribute.

The discussion so far has suggested that Harambee projects are essentially small, localized and that social organisation and work styles are structured for the requirements of small projects. However, two characteristics of Harambee increase the probability that Harambee resource mobilization will include aspects of coercion.

(i) The increased proliferation of projects arising from multiple needs, as defined not only by local people but also by leaders will lead to a strain on local

individual contributors' resources. Increasing strain on resources will increase the competition of Harambee objectives with those of the family and reduce the spontaneity of contributions.

(ii) Increased number of projects per given region will increase the chances that certain projects will not meet the approval of certain local groups and lead to divergence of opinion and support. This may lead to pressure on local people to conform with collective will and force contributions.

The project case studies in chapter six suggested that in a number of sublocations there was an imbalance between the number of new projects and local ability and willingness to locally generate the necessary resources. In 51 out of 59 sublocations for which data was available, there were two, three or four times as many projects in 1973 as in 1968. In the same sample the number of ongoing projects in 1973 was larger than the number of completed projects. Thus out of 270 projects only 95 were completed.

The effect of such a backlog on the morale of local people is likely to be highly negative. Whereas the average completion time of the 95 completed projects was a bit over two years, the average construction time of ongoing projects already exceeded that of completed ones by 9 months. Not only is the backlog big, but each project is on an average slower in reaching completion. The proliferation of projects in almost all sublocations surveyed should make it exceedingly difficult to rely on strictly voiuntary contributions only to complete them all. As the project case studies show, some projects that have popular support will be completed, and others will remain ongoing and possibly become abandoned. In some sublocations, widespread frustration may spread and Harambee activity may come to a standstill. Whatever the case, the Harambee perception about implementation being a quick, easy and happy process, as reported by many respondents, is likely to suffer.

Perceived outcome of projects

The project case studies and earlier discussion in this chapter have brought out some factors which are important for the speedy completion of a project. Many of these conditions relate to the expected benefits of a project. Such expectations will influence the degree of participation of individuals and groups.

As mentioned earlier, such increased participation will depend on the clarity and credibility of perceived benefits. The case studies presented beiow offer examples of how local people perceive the benefits of projects.

Perceived Benefits of Cattle Dips

The following perceived benefits were mentioned by respondents.

Table 50. *Responses on perceived benefits (cattle dips)*

Benefit	Frequency of response		Percentage
"Health benefits"			
No cattle death	10		
No more ticks	19		
Less cattle death	5		
Reduce diseases	5		
Control of diseases	6		
Healthy livestock	37		
Good cattle due to no ticks	2	84	63.2
"Income benefits"			
Milk output is higher (very high) and no more cattle death	14		
Healthy cattle and good skins (for selling)	4		
Good price when selling	2		
Good meat when killed	1		
Brings a lot of money	3	24	18.0
"Service benefits"			
Easier than spraying	2		
Short distance for cattle	3		
Pay little for dipping	5	10	7.5
Not ascertained	4	4	3 0
No benefits	6	6	4 5
Not applicable (not using dip)	5	5	3 8
Total		133	100.0

Increased health of livestock and reduced death is seen to provide cattle owners with a more reliable source of income, and a capital stock more easily marketable. This tendency is also reflected in the second category of benefits, where respondents perceived greater (more regular) milk output. Finally, a few respondents note the proximity, low cost and ease of the service.

The nature of responses indicate very sharp awareness of benefits which would accrue from the construction of a cattle dip. Such clarity of perception would lead to precise decisions about participation and contribution of own resources. Our case studies indicate that such clarity of perception has helped in the organisation of Masai herdsmen into effective Harambee groups for the construction of cattle dips, watering places and holding grounds.

Perceived Benefits of Health Centres and Dispensaries

The welfare effects of Harambee health projects will depend on whether the government takes over a project or not. Operating personnel can be allocated and paid only if the government takes over a project. This does not apply to other self-help projects, which are usually run wholly or partly on a continued self-help basis.

Many—perhaps a majority—of Kenyans cannot reach a national, provincial or district hospital for treatment. To the extent that health centres and dispensaries can provide treatment, it is likely to be focussed on some or all of the following major plagues and illnesses:

- Contagious infant and children's diseases
- Stomach and intestinal diseases
- Malnutrition
- Bilharzia
- Malaria
- Tuberculosis, and to some extent leprosy
- Smallpox, sleeping sickness and polio, also to some extent.

A few "modern" diseases could be added to the list, namely traffic accidents and injuries from fighting and the beating of wives and children, all related to the problems of alcohol consumption and increased social tension.

The sample of consumers and potential consumers of the services of health centres and dispensaries did not—to the extent the above narrative on need of care might suggest—give evidence that alleviation of common sicknesses was considered a major perceived benefit. Respondents instead stressed the nearness factor. Walking distances to seek care were frequently reduced some 6--10 miles by the establishment of a centre or a dispensary. A consequent benefit was the saving of transportation costs and obviously time. Treatment was usually considered much better than previously; quicker and more accessible.

The story could have been taken from a so-called developed country like Sweden. People, tired of travelling long distances to queue for impersonal attention, appreciate proximity and reasonably quick treatment, perhaps by somebody they know and over whom the local community may well have some social control. There may be little improvement in the physical characteristics of treatment, but treatment is felt to be better and perceived cures may lie at the psychological level too. Time is saved both in transportation and waiting.

The many female visitors with children should save considerable time for the benefit of their great role in agricultural production. With Kenyan women doing some 80 to 90 per cent of work input in agriculture, to which is added a heavy burden of children's upbringing and household tasks, any improvement in local health facilities should have a considerable impact on their productivity and the incomes of rural families.

Table 51 shows some results of questions on perceived benefits.

Table 51. *Respondents on perceived benefits (health centres and dispensaries)*

What advantages does present facility give that the previous one did not?			How does the community gain?		
"Service benefits"	n	%	*"Service benefits" (general)*	n	%
Good treatment	24		Get treatment	22	
Nearer home and good treatment	25		Through medical service	18	
Sufficient advice	1		Given advice	1	
Quick service/attention for there are few people			Good service/attention	6	
Health education and easy treatment			Aid when sick		
There is water and good doctors			Easily treated		
Quick recovery after treatment	1		Quick attention	9	
In-patients are few	1		Free treatment	2	
Free medicine	2		Free medicine	3	
		61.8			60 6
			Service benefits, "uulnerable groups"		
			Bring children to the clinic	5	
			Ditto, they are treated well	6	
			Maternity clinic	4	
"Nearness benejits"			*"Nearness benefits"*		
Very near	14		It is very near	11	
Near the road	3		Near home	1	
No transport expenses	6		No transport cost	9	
		22.5			20.2
Don't know	1		Don't know	5	4 8
Not applicable (non-use)	15				
		15.7			4 8
Total	102	100 0		104	100 0

Centres and dispensaries obviously provide employment for operating personnel like medical assistants, nurses, dressers, sweepers, etc. Some of this personnel might otherwise have gone to national, provincial and district institutions, catering for populations with possibly already higher health care availability and better health than the rural people whose welfare is now increased.

Rural health facilities will also generate demand for certain community services like water.

Perceived Benefits of Water Projects

Water projects will vary much in scope and ambition. They are often supposed to cater both for human and animal consumption, and for agriculture (irrigation). Drinking, washing and irrigating are all given as uses in some cases.

Here are the results of a small sample benefiting from a particular project (see Table 52).

Water projects, like health projects, seem firstly to cater for "vulnerable groups", women and children. They reduce walking distances and time spent, and improve health. They leave room for more productive, income-earning activities.

Table 52. *Respondent5 on Perceived Benefits. (A Water Project): A Case Study in Machakos*

Category Benefitung	n	Nature of Perceived Benefits	n	Perceived Effects of Benefits	n
\\'omen	10	Draw water nearby	9	Water problem is solved	5
		Water in their houses	1	They will settle down	3
				Short distance	2
Children	9	They are clean due to water	5	Healthy and clean	4
		Have water in school	4		
f		Happy pupils, don't have to carry water	2		
Farmers	8	Grow more crops	4		
		Watering their crops	3		
		Good crops	1	Healthy cattle and more milk	4
		Short distance for their cattle	4		
Teachers	3	Water in school	3		
Total	30		36		

Water is also important as an input into agriculture and livestock development.

Water projects also appear to have spin-off effects. An organised water supply may be a prerequisite both for a cattle dip and a school. In the particular instance above, primary schools, cattle dips and nursery schools were especially mentioned as facilitated by the water project.

Water supplies will of course also be conducive to the setting up of commercial installations and small industry. In general, water projects stand out as perhaps the greatest development levers of all self-help projects with considerable income/employment/welfare effects not only through these projects themselves, but also all the projects made possible or more attractive through the regular provision of cleaner water.

The perceived benefits of a project stand out very clearly when services are suspended. The data summarized in the text illustrates use, need and effects of a water project in Machakos district, whose services were drastically reduced when a pump was stolen. Before, people had water delivered to a set of communal taps, but after the removal of the pump people had to collect water from the dam where the pump was formerly placed. All collectors of water were interviewed during one week.

Water was collected by 192 individuals of 19 years or above, 80 per cent of

whom were women, and by 245 children, 75 per cent of whom were girls.

Most collectors of water walked several kilometres, some of them 8—10, a few 15 kms. Many collectors fetched water several times a day. Multiple collection was about as frequent among adults as among children.

With an average walking distance of some 6 kilometres each way, repeat collectors walked more than 24 kms per day. The better part of a working day (or school day) was thus used in collecting water.

The case study illustrates very clearly the drastic loss of benefits through the suspension of services of the pump. Scores of people have to spend a large part of their day, in this agriculturally busy but dry area, in walking for water.

The local herdsmen also complain bitterly about the loss of service since using one common watering point for livestock leads to easy communication of livestock diseases, poor uncontrolled breeding, loss of body weight due to long walking distances and the formation of cattle tracks which lead to soil erosion. The heads of families worry about possible spread of disease arising from the use of a common watering place even for human beings since standards of hygiene vary and the good protection of the catchment dam is very difficult. The case study indicated that people were washing much less frequently and as the majority of the people taking time to fetch water were women and girls, the time taken in preparing food, cleaning the house and looking after children had lessened leading to possible problems of nutrition and child-care in addition to a drop in time available for farm activities.

Perceiued Benefits of Educational Projects

Consumer (parents, and pupils) responses will be especially difficult to interpret in terms of benefits likely to be reaped in an often distant future, with perhaps a demand for different skills structure.

Nursery schools are regarded by many parents as a means of increasing their children's competitiveness in subsequent primary schooling, and preparing them in a general way for such schooling. Among other benefits frequently mentioned are freeing mothers for other work, and saving on costs or contributions to those who otherwise look after children.

Nursery schools, just like water and health projects, with a capacity for mother and child care, should be seen as an important means of alleviating over-burdened rural women, permitting them to concentrate more on demanding and income-earning agricultural tasks and activities like more nutritious food preparation.

It is much more difficult to analyse perceived benefits from *primary and secondary schools* in terms of how such perceptions may guide the future development patterns of grassroots Harambee. The consumer/contributor survey, including interviews with both parents, pupils and teachers, does reveal a set of mainly positive beliefs and aspirations. Most respondents made general statements on the value of education, higher literacy rates and subsequent increased

employment opportunities. Few respondents could specify the expected exact nature and magnitude of these benefits, however. It was difficult to assess the extent to which these replies reflected past commitment to a project and wishful thinking, and to what extent they reflected strongly held perceptions that may be expected to guide future project planning and decisions, participation and resource mobilization for Harambee educational projects. The various student tracer projects conducted suggest that both parents and students should by now be aware of the fallacy of believing that a general "book" education is going to considerably improve future income and employment opportunities of a (Harambee) school pupil.

Martin Hill[3] suggests that the benefits of Harambee schools lie largely in that they stimulate, directly and indirectly, other development as well as providing basic facilities for development. This standpoint is confirmed by the consumer/contributor survey results. Many respondents point to the numerous activities that flourish around a school. Local trade will prosper from the small cash economy created through and around a school. There will be an increased demand for vegetables, food-stuffs and milk, especially for a boarding school. School supplies will be in demand.

A number of other projects may be spurred by the emergence of a school. Adult literacy, water projects, womens' welfare clubs apart from kiosks, dukas, etc. may emerge, and are mentioned by many respondents as actually observed spin-off effects.

Hill also suggests that even a technically poor secondary schooling will improve a pupil's chance of finding employment, and that in less developed areas of the nation even moderate skills can be useful in a not-so-sophisticated rural commercial and technical development sector.

Finally, he sees Harambee schools as belonging to "a gradual process of overall rural development and upgrading of facilities of all kinds including educational levels... people with more education are more development-oriented and active than people with less education...

Two tendencies of this nature are suggested by the survey of projects in 65 sublocations:

(a) The inventory of all projects and the time distribution of starting them indicated that schools are relatively early development items, followed by sets of other projects. This tallies with the previous statements by respondents on "spin-off' effects of schools.

(b) We also note from chapter four the importance of teachers as initiators and local leaders. Not only do schools employ teachers and raise the hopes and perhaps opportunity-seeking aggressiveness of young people. They also provide the breeding-ground for more Harambee self-help activities. Initiative and entrepreneurship do not have to wait for sophisticated or task-oriented education. The change from no education to education, however poor, is a great shift, producing momentum in a local economy.

[3] Martin J D Hill, Self-help in Education and Development A Social Anthropological Study in Kitui, Kenya. Bureau of Educational Research, University of Nairobi, Staff Paper, 1974

The foregoing discussion has brought out the general aspects of perceived benefits of Harambee education. However, to obtain a deeper understanding of why parents support Harambee schools through paying large school fees, building funds, buying uniforms and text books and why students still enroll in these schools, we carried out a case study in Githunguri and Kandara, Central Province, of 160 students and parents in 4 Harambee and non-Harambee government-aided schools (by Miss R. W. Njoroge, undergraduate student).

The case study established that in this area the failure rate of students in Harambee schools is alarming as compared to those in government-aided schools.

Table 53. *Performance in Examinations by Type of School*

Year	Government Aided	Harambee
	Average % Failure	Average % Failure
1971	3	50
1972	3	50
1973	4	64
1974	4	80
1975	3	95
Average	3 4	68
No of students	755	249

Those children attending Harambee secondary schools are quite aware of the poor academic facilities available in such schools. The evaluation shows that the majority of students in Harambee schools see the following shortcomings in their schools: poor teachers who are not trained or qualified, poor library and laboratory facilities, poor school management, very high school fees, no boarding facilities, poor examination performance.

When the students were asked why they enrolled in the school, they mentioned that they had no choice as their primary examination results were poor and could not obtain places in government-aided schools. This is an extremely valid argument since government-aided secondary schools absorb about 11 per cent of all primary school leavers as compared to unaided secondary schools (Harambee) which absorb about 15 per cent of all primary school leavers.

Parental reasons on why they sent their children to Harambee schools are more vague and diverse. Most parents have never been to school themselves and cannot assess curriculum and academic programmes effectively. But the majority of parents complained of the large school fees although they hoped that their children would pass well. Some parents sent their children to these schools as there was no-where else they could send them and the children were too young to seek employment.

Thus the support of Harambee secondary education appears to arise from:

(i) That government-aided schools take a very small proportion of children completing primary education for secondary school education.

(ii) That these schools serve to keep in training children who are too young to otherwise seek employment or be usefully employed in the farm.

(iii) That parents lag behind in realizing fully the very poor performance of Harambee secondary schools in relation to their children.

VIII. Policy Implications

In this chapter we shall briefly review the central government policies that might be conducive to the further development of Harambee self-help as a means of raising national welfare.

Harambee self-help has three major advantages from the point of view of an enlightened central planner: it mobilizes hitherto inflexible resources, transfers savings into investment with little resource losses, and it highlights and fills developmental gaps in terms of project choice and project scale.

Mobilizing hitherto Inflexible Resources and Transferring Savings into Investment

The income taxation system in Kenya, although it has increased its progressiveness somewhat through the Finance Minister's reforms of 1973, introduced through the 1973—1974 national budget, does not—as compared to standards in e.g. Tanzania and so-called developed countries like Sweden and Britain—mobilize to a very large extent the higher incomes for national developmental purposes. It has been the policy of the Government of Kenya to promote African entrepreneurship and skills by leaving a large share of the higher income untaxed. However, pressure on the economic (and political) élite to contribute to Harambee is very strong. Loyalty to one's own home area, on the part of élite members, is also strong. Hence, Harambee nets in not only large cash contributions from those members of Kenya society that are well off, but also some of their skills and organisational capacity. The alternative cost of such inputs may not be very high, from the societal point of view. In fact, the alternatives may often be conspicuous consumption, largely of imported goods, or short-run speculative investment that might be of limited national importance and in addition might contribute to a further rise of the price level.

There is another aspect to this particular kind of resource mobilization. Savings, largely generated in urban areas, are normally not readily transferred to rural areas. They are much more easily re-invested in 'safe' rewarding and large urban projects such as 'housing', commercial enterprises and industry. It is true for instance that the Kenya Commercial Bank has set up a large number of rural offices--but this is more likely to absorb rural savings for urban purposes than vice versa.

A parallel is given by those savings generated by taxation, including customs levies and fees for government services. These savings go to the central government budget. Again, central government propensity to incur expenditure

has generally been much higher for large, 'safe' and urban centred objectives. This is documented by the frequent under-expenditure in the case of rural development activities, and over-expenditure in the case of modern/urban sector development. It is for instance generally much easier and quicker to set up a large industrial establishment than a set of small dispersed cottage industries.

Harambee in this context, constitutes a rapid transfer of locally achieved saving to similarly local investment, without the leakages, including administrative overheads and delays incurred through a central banking system or a central budget. Harambee can be regarded as locally applied taxes for local project specific purposes. This has been argued by many economists as a recipe for achieving motivated and relevant development at low cost. Harambee taxation will generally also be more acceptable than centrally initiated taxation systems for purposes not readily identified as benefiting the local tax payer, such as the former graduated personal tax or the coffee cess. In this context, Harambee self-help resource mobilization erodes the legitimacy of local formal taxation systems. There is little scope left, for example, for the activities of local authorities.

It is not only inflexible resources of higher income earners and central savings that are mobilized through Harambee. Take the example of a farmer donating a goat on Harambee Day; the goat is sold at the auction, transforming the farmer's stock into cash investment funds. Since it is sold usually at a price far above the market rate, it also nets cash from other people — perhaps businessmen. Had the farmer not donated the goat, it would have probably been subsequently consumed by the family, or at some festive occasion.

Local people's contributions to Harambee often imply mobilization of hitherto inflexible resources such as labour, animal draft power, small livestock (as quoted above) and, of course, local leadership resources and indigenous motivational resources that previously might have had no productive outlet.

Filling Developmental Gaps in Terms of Project Choice and Project Scale

Harambee ability to high-light and fill developmental gaps, has two aspects. One refers to project choice, the other one to choice *of* scale. Related to the last one is choice of appropriate technology. Project choice examples are the nursery schools (children trained for primary schools, given increased chances of group work, perhaps some nutritional food, and mothers freed from care duties a few hours a day), and at the other end of the scale, the Harambee Institutes of Technology (technical training at the intermediate level, hitherto neglected in a colonially inherited élite-based academic educational system). The village polytechnics are another example. At the general level of project choice, Harambee with its focus on the social-educational field, is an important development gap-filling. Long before independence, Kenyans seeking some appropriate al-

ternative education, instituted Harambee schools. In planning terms, Harambee focus contributes to the much repeated, but frequently neglected goal of social development and increasing the individual's participation and span of control in matters affecting his own situation, welfare and future.

On the choice of scale, grass-roots Harambee introduces small projects suitable to localized consumption. Water schemes such as piped water, and dams, health dispensaries and cattle dips, nursery schools and schools, are designed to avoid "ivory tower" bias. Investment costs are reasonable, local and cheap materials are used and imported, costly ones are avoided. Much local labour—largely unskilled—is used, and the design often constitutes a reasonable unit of initial investment and subsequent maintenance which, again, can be catered for locally. In planning terms, Harambee helps achieve the national goal of increasing employment and again, increasing participation. It is also likely to improve the acceptance of those government officers that are involved. Their bias for capital-intensive, "neat" foreign exchange-intensive project design, introduced through a combination of expatriate influence and treasury restrictions on the expansion of recurrent expenditure, is likely to be reduced by observing and getting engaged in Harambee projects.

What are then the policy means for supporting Harambee self-help? The very nature of Harambee self-help limits both the possibility and desirability of policy influence. The following means can be enumerated:

— Financial support

— "Cadre support" through Community Development Staff, and leadership training.

— Regulatory practices to hinder or minimize negative traits such as conspicuous donors "coopting the grass-roots", concentrating activities to a limited number of projects and regions; forced extraction patterns and excessive local competition and proliferation of projects.

Financial Support

Government investment support for self-help projects amounted to some 7 per cent of the total self-help investment in 1972. The data in chapter five suggested government support was well spread regionally. The Community Development Division of the Ministry for Housing and Social Services operates an application system which (in theory) contains the following administrative steps:

(i) Application for authority to start a self-help project, to be addressed to the Secretary of the District Development Committee.[1] This application is evaluated and commented upon by the Divisional Community Development Committee and the District Community Development Committee. The Com-

[1] The District Development Committee, DDC, is the local planning and development coordinating body made up of heads of local government departments, Members of Parliament, local businessmen, and chaired by the District Commissioner Note that a permit to collect funds is also required from the Office of the President through the Provincial and District Commissioners.

munity Development Officer may hand over a diary for the records of the project, to the Project Committee.

(ii) If technical assistance, e.g. by the Water Development Ministry or the Ministries of Agriculture and Health is required, a project phasing form, showing intended operations spread over weeks and months during a year, should be filled in.

(iii) If financial assistance is requested, a rather long and specific form must be submitted to the Community Development Division in Nairobi, identifying the project and its leadership, expected date of initiation and completion of the project, how and if existing plans have been approved of by government technical experts: what new services the project is expected to provide and to whom; previous project activities by the same group/community; required size and nature of assistance, and expected local self-help inputs; expected outside aid, and details about planned future project maintenance and running.

This procedure requires organisational sophistication on the part of self-help initiators, and government District and Divisional Community Development Committees may not even exist. Considerable government self-help grants allocation must take place with procedures that are less rigid.

The case studies in chapter six suggest that other factors than those on implementation hold the key to success of a project. Local perceptions, need, leadership styles etc.—not easily identified and filled in on an application form—are highly relevant. If government grants should be allocated to projects most likely to succeed, one can argue that another kind of investigation on local leadership, local attitudes, local definitions of need, external linkages should give criteria for allocation. One can also argue that government grants should not be allocated to those projects—or areas—most likely to succeed, but to those barely likely to succeed, and thus highly dependent on the resources and morale boost provided by a government grant.

Government grants can be directed so as to make certain self-help initiatives more attractive or feasible than others.

Some of the case studies in chapter six suggested that economically oriented projects might come in at later stages in self-help development. This can be a reaction to poor pay-off from a set of socially oriented projects. It was suggested in chapter seven that economic returns might prove very poor. Other socially oriented projects like health centres and dispensaries might remain unused after completion because no staff is available. Finally, resource constraints in a area might make economic projects that pay off rapidly a necessity to generate more funds for future self-help. All these different factors create an environment conducive to more economically oriented project choice, especially if government aid is timed and adapted to such a situation. Government support to village polytechnics and cattle dips illustrate the case.

"Cadre Support" and Leadership Training

A different set of criteria for grant allocations, as suggested in the last paragraph, could well be administered by those government field workers that were given the highest marks for useful leadership participation in initiation and implementation of self-help projects, namely the Chiefs and Community Development Assistants and Officers.[2]

Chiefs and subchiefs are a large and important leadership group (see chapter four). This group shows concern for general area development, yet has so far been offered little training in such a highly sensitive and political leadership task.

In fact, lack of more specified directives or advice on their functions may have contributed to excessive project initiations by chiefs and subchiefs, and subsequent forced extraction patterns (see chapter seven).

The project case studies showed that some unsuccessful projects used forced resource extraction. The most extreme form of coercion, reported in some areas, is confiscation and sale of property, often by local administrators like chief and subchiefs to generate cash "contributions". The most pure form of voluntariness comes through clearly perceived need and foresighted leaders. Strong social pressure is exerted on prospective contributors by imposing social sanctions against deviant behaviour, exclusion from the services of a project, and by the atmosphere generated by the presence of many people and leaders. Intermediate forms may also involve fines for absence from meetings or obligation to provide labour instead of cash. Quotas for contributions may be set up for clans or geographic areas. Sometimes large contributions by wealthy people makes coercion unnecessary. Labour contributions appear to be of a more voluntary character than cash and material contributions. This will relate to original Harambee perceptions of a joint work as the essence of Harambee, and lower alternative cost of labour in most rural societies. In some marginal areas, labour is "bought" or coerced by a supply of food and water.

These observations underline the great role (positive and negative) that chiefs and subchiefs can play in Harambee development. Careful assessment of local capacity and need by these officers, in cooperation with a Community Development cadre, can mean the difference between, on the one hand, project proliferation, force and frustration; and on the other hand, success through an adequate mixing and volume of projects.

Greater information flow between the national and grass-roots level could also improve the nature of Harambee investment. This is not to suggest that a dialogue would extinguish the conflicts and equalize local perceptions with national ones. Increased information on what the government is doing pre-

[2] Martin Hill (op.cit.) and M. Wallis, the Community Development Assistant in Kenya, IDS, Nairobi, 1974, note the great financial constraints to Community Development Assistant's activities.

sented in a manner relevant to the grass-roots needs might however shift some Harambee grass-roots activities to avoid continued build-up of unused and under-utilized facilities like schools and health projects. Local leadership could manouver more skillfully in project choice and initiation.

Regulatory Practices

The Government profile must by necessity remain low in Harambee self-help in order not to smother it or alter its basic character in a way that returns it to the forced labour of colonial days.

It is clear from the foregoing paragraph that government financial support and leadership training should try to promote labour-intensive forms of Harambee.

Complaints about Harambee being "politicized" and over-burdening local people appear, according to the case studies of chapter six and the section on "conspicuous" donors in chapter five, to stem from a set of large projects being added to a previously already broad-based local Harambee activity.

A useful role of government regulatory practices could be to "filter" the start of such new projects or to reduce the efforts to extract resources also for these projects from the poorer strata of rural societies. Present practices mean "taxation" of these strata for purposes which they cannot perceive as fair, since those projects are not likely to benefit them or their children.

It is tempting to suggest that the government should try to regulate all "conspicuous" (and foreign) flows of assistance to self-help in order to reduce the regional imbalances and large project concentration.

Regional imbalances are introduced especially through the donations (read sometimes "project initiations") by business firms, and foreign agencies (see chapter five). Regulation could be done either by attempting to steer them directly, or by seeing that other flows like those from Kenya Charity Sweepstake and government grants, as is already largely the case—go to more neglected areas and small projects.

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Appendix I

Areas Surveyed

Province	District	Sublocation (sometimes location or division)
Coast	Kwale	Golini
		Mazeras
	Kilifi	Kaloleni
	Taita Taveta	Mgambonyi
		Tausa
	Tana River	Hola
	Lamu	Witu
Eastern	Machakos	Kithangaini
		Makueni
		Kasinga
	Kitui	Kauisuni
		Mulango
	Embu	Mbita
		Kangaru
	Meru	Kanyakine
		Ndangani
	Marsabit	Mountain
	Isiolo	Isiolio
	Samburu	Maralal
Nairobi	Nairobi	Dagoretti
Central	Muranga	Gitura
		Githumu
	Kiambu	Karatu
		Kinoo
	Kirinyaga	Gichuru
		Gitaku
	Nyeri	Itemini
		Karia
	Nyandarua	Murungaru
		Wanjohi
North-Eastern	Mandera	Mandera
	Wajir	Central
	Garissa	Garissa
Rift Valley	Narok	Lower Migi
		(in division Mau)
	Nandi	Banye-Kapker
	Nakuru	Molo
	Transnzoia	Saboti
	Elgeyo-Marakwet	Kessup
	Kericho	Buret 3
	Laikipia	Nanyuki
	Baringo	Mogotio
	West Pokot	Sangat
	Uasin Gishu	Ainabkoi
	Turkana	Kalokol
	Kajiado	Ilkangere

Province	District	Sublocation (sometimes location or division)
Nyanza	Kisii	Mokomoni
		Bonyakoni
		Mwamonari
	South Nyanza	Kokoth
		Mabera
	Siaya	Omia-Mwalo
		Katwenga
		Gangu
	Kisumu	Kombewa
		Gem Rae
		Nyamware
Western	Kakamega	Ebutenyi
		Savange
		Matungu
	Busia	Amukura
		Kisoko
	Bungoma	Kimininı/Ndaru
		Makuselwa
		Changara

Appendix II

Administrative unit	Representative at the corresponding level	
	Office of the President	Some functional Ministries
The Nation	The President	Cabinet Ministers, Permanent Secretaries etc
The Province	Provincial Commissioner (PC)	Various Provincial Officers
The District	District Commissioner (DC)	E.g. District Agricultural Officer, (DAO), Distr. Educational Officer, (DEO), Distr. Community Development Officer (CDO)
The Division	District Officer (in charge of a division, DO)	Assistant Agricultural Officer (AAO), Community Development Assistant (CDA)
The Location	Chief	Agricultural Assistant (AO), also CDA
The Sub-location	Subchief, Assistant Chief	
The Village	Village headman	

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