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Gabriel Schwake

ABSTRACT Settling in Palestine is an integral part of the national revival of the Jewish nation, which eventually led to the establishment of the state of Israel. This paper defines the Practical Zionism territorial strategy as a Settle and Rule mechanism that evolved through four periods of development, from the pre-state era to the post-state era: first, the agricultural settlements of the 1920s and 1930s (cultivate and rule); second, the 1950s' industrial towns (industrialize and rule); third, the suburbs of the 1980s (suburbanize and rule) and; and fourth, the recent corporate-led development (financialize and rule). This paper argues that the national settlement mission transformed according to the changes in the modes of production and the interests of the ruling hegemony. Therefore, it focuses on four different national plans for the frontier area of the Galilee and analyses the layout of the proposed new settlements and the architecture of the housing units.

The [Bio]Politics of the Built Environment

The built environment is the human-made space in which we all conduct our everyday life. Being a social and cultural artifact, it reproduces the relations of production of the social context in which it was made. These relations are dictated by the leading political, cultural, social, and economic hegemony, which according to Antonio Gramsci, controls

"Everything which influences or is able to influence public opinion, directly or indirectly… even architecture, and the layout and names of the streets."[1] Henri Lefebvre took this further and claims that [human-made] space: "in addition to being a means of production … is also a means of control, and hence of domination."[2] The built environment is thus dictated by the interests of ruling cultural, economic and political elites, in order to echo and preserve their authority. According to Kim Dovey, states use a variety of spatial practices in order to manipulate or seduce the individual to cooperate with the dominant social order.[3] Whether through ideology, indoctrination, or the appeal to the individual's needs and desires, the production of space is an integral part of modern biopolitics, which refers to the state's monopoly over violence on the one hand and its ability to secure and improve the individual's life on the other. Therefore, with the emphasis on national identity and care, the modern state is able to transform the collective of different individuals into a unified and manageable body.[4]

Nevertheless as social structures change, so do the leading hegemonic values and the biopolitical role of the built environment. While early modern states put emphasis on promoting a national identity through built space,[5] the postwar welfare-states focused on taming the individual through modernization and care. On the other hand, the neoliberal order of the late 1970s, which focuses on consumption and the financialization of space, appeals to the individual by the option of becoming a homeowner, and therefore a potential shareholder.[6] Nevertheless, these are all different implementations of the politicization of the built environment and constitute an evolution of the biopolitical role of space over the past century.

In Israel, the biopolitical role of the built environment was (and still is) a physical and geographical one. Though the initial essence of Zionist settlement in Palestine was equivocal and consisted of multiple interpretations, it rapidly turned into a territorial project where land control was of significant urban influence. Focusing on the act of settlement as a governance apparatus, this strategy could be understood as a *settle and rule* policy; adopting and adapting the phrase of *divide et impera*, translated from Latin as divide and rule.[7] However, as the hegemonic cultural, economic and political values of Zionism and the state of Israel transformed over the last 100 years so did the implementation of this strategy. The early national and state-led efforts concentrated on the construction of rural villages and development towns, in what could be defined as *cultivate and rule* and later *industrialize and rule*. With the liberalization of the local economy and society, the state privatized the act of settlement and began relying more heavily on the private sector. During the 1970s, this transition included a growing emphasis on quality of life and supported the individualistic, suburban dream of middle-class families. Nonetheless, the increasing involvement of private entrepreneurs turned the settlement enterprise



Figure 1
Evolution of Settlement mechanism (illustrated by the author).

into a financial and corporate-led development project. Eventually, the *suburbanize and rule* perspective was replaced by a *financialize and rule* approach, which completed the privatization of this national project.

Instead of focusing on only one period, this paper offers a century-long perspective that illustrates the changes in the national settlement enterprise. While it retained its territorial objectives the role of the individual transformed according to the changes in the local economy and society. It focuses on Galilee, a peripheral and predominantly Arab area in northern Israel, which witnessed several different settlement strategies in the past 100 years that represent the national territorial agenda. The paper concentrates on four different stages that demonstrate the four changes in settlement strategies (Figure 1). First is the rural development of the pre-statehood years. Second, are the development towns of the 1950s and 1960s. Third, is the suburbanization of the 1970s and 1980s, and fourth is the current corporate-led urban development. Analyzing these four settlement stages this paper argues that they constitute different spatial manifestations of the same territorial agenda.

Settle and rule

> It is not our historic claims that determined the borders of the land, but rather our posts. Our role now is to seize and settle.[8]

Kibush HaShmama (conquering the wasteland) was a leading narrative in the Practical and Labor[9] Zionist approaches that led to the establishment of the state of Israel.[10] The idea of "a land without a people to a people without a land,"[11] portrayed Palestine as an empty, undeveloped and unsettled land awaiting redemption. Similar to the American expansion westward, settling the Israeli frontier was not only a means to appropriate lands but also to form a new local national identity.[12] This shared identity was a crucial aspect in the formation of the modern nation-state, which significantly relied on a union between the political and national entities.[13] Thus, it was by the act of settling the "land without people" that the "people without a land" would become a nation. Consequently, the formation of settlements, housing, and dwelling units were a leading national mission. The method in which these were developed, however, transformed significantly over the years. Though the *settle and rule* approach sustained, the manner of its implementation adapted according to changes in the local economy and culture. Eventually, what began as a pioneer act of conquering the frontier, turned into an elaborate and complex real estate venture.

The modern development of Jewish settlements in Palestine commenced with the first waves of Zionist immigration to Palestine in the late nineteenth century. Though impossible to speak of "a" unified Zionist doctrine, the leading Practical Zionism approach supported a variety of activities aimed to actively promote the establishment of a homeland for the Jewish nation in Palestine.[14] *Land redemption* (*Geulat Adama*) – meaning redeeming the Land of Israel to its rightful owners – was one of the main activities of the Practical Zionism approach. What began as a sporadic and relatively insignificant presence, shortly turned into a large settlement enterprise, fueled by the growing demand for Jewish independence and additional waves of immigration.[15]

This mission continued to evolve after the formation of the state of Israel in 1948. The young government aimed to strengthen and secure its control of former Arab territories and over the new border areas while decentralizing the local Jewish population that was heavily concentrated in the Tel Aviv metropolitan area.[16] The young state took responsibility for the settlement mechanism and acted jointly with the pre-state organizations, as it asked to settle the millions of Jewish immigrants across its new borders.[17] The state therefore planned, funded and constructed a series of new industrial towns, and offered housing, subsistence, and occupational opportunities, while creating a unified nation and promoting its territorial control.[18]

The political role of the built environment was maintained and intensified from the 1970s, along with the occupation of the West-Bank in 1967 and the (attempted) fortification of the state's control in peripheral areas.[19] While allegedly these endeavors were different, they used the same basic tactics of establishing new settlements as a tool to secure territorial dominance.[20] During the 1990s, the state's new approach

asked, for the first time, to stop the construction of new towns, and rather to disperse the population by expanding existing settlements;[21] a restriction that did not apply to so-called frontier areas.[22] The objective of developing the periphery was maintained, however, it was subjected to the market, and as the state sought to enhance its territorial project it tried to create new markets.[23] Thus, territorial expansion continued to play a leading role, while its implementation and method of realization changed significantly throughout the years.[24]

Cultivate and rule

In the pre-statehood years, the main frontier settlement efforts were carried out by the various Labor Zionism movements. These movements, headed by the Zionist-Socialist *Mapai* party, which formed the ruling hegemony of the Jewish population during the British Mandate, promoted the establishment of small-scale rural settlements all across Palestine. Agriculture and rural settlements were therefore used to expand the borders of the future Jewish state; or as the well-known quote of Zionist leader Joseph Trumpeldor explains: "Wherever the Jewish plow plows its last furrow, that is where the border will run."[25] This led to the famous *Moshavim* and *Kibbutzim*, which expanded the areas populated by Jews while also acting as a disciplinary mechanism, and that was supposed to reconnect the Jewish nation to its historic fatherland through active cultivation. The pioneer agricultural rural experience was therefore both an end and a means; all focused to promote the physical and spiritual Jewish national revival.[26]

The pioneer experience was an integral part of the land redemption efforts. The new settlements were supposed to enlarge the area populated by Jews, while promoting the formation of a healthy and idealistic society. *Conquering the labor* (*kibush-haavoda*) and *Conquering the wilderness* (*kibush-hashmama*) were thus complementary terms, as the physical cultivation of the land would eventually complete the rebirth of the Jewish nation in its historic homeland.[27] The *Halutz* (pioneer) was perceived as an adventurous, firm and ideological character that is involved in conquering the wilderness through its cultivation and by establishing new rural settlements. The image of the *Halutz* turned into the ideal prototype of practical Zionism; a contra to the anti-Semitic image of Jews as a nation of wandering and deformed moneylenders and merchants.[28] Settling the frontier was an act of *Hagshama* or fulfillment, where one fulfills one's individual calling as part of the greater national mission.[29]

The pioneer rural settlement in these years followed their settling group's level of communality and agricultural considerations. The *kibbutzim*, being communal agrarian settlements, were made out of a shared public core that contained the dining hall and all other public functions, surrounded by a ring of communal dwelling units. On the edge of the kibbutz, one could find the industrial and agrarian functions, which were mostly comprised of a cowshed, a stall, a factory or a packing house

(Figure 2). This contrasted the Moshavim, which were less communal and were made out of private households with relatively small communal features. Accordingly, they consisted of a shared public core, surrounded in this case, by single-family detached houses and their private farmland.[30]

Perhaps one of the best examples of the *cultivate and rule* mechanism are the *Wall and Tower* (*Homa U-Migdal*) settlements of the late 1930s. This was a "settlement offensive" with a clear objective to strengthen Jewish presence all across Palestine, in light of the Arab revolt of 1936 and the British attempts to compose a territorial solution for the area. The *Wall and Tower* settlements were named after their construction method which was based on the fast establishment of outposts by erecting prefabricated wooden towers and shacks, enclosed by a system of fencing and barbed wires. Between 1936 and 1939, some 60 new sites were established in this method, which then turned into agricultural settlements.[31]

One of the most famous *Wall and Tower* settlements is Kibbutz Hanita. The Jewish National Fund (JNF) bought the land of the future kibbutz in 1937, and the Jewish Agency (JA) organized the establishment of the temporary settling point in 1938. Located adjacent to the border with Lebanon, the site was the northernmost settling point and a substantial outpost to the Zionist territorial campaign in Galilee. Several months later, the JNF sent the designated settling group, which would turn the site into a kibbutz. As a kibbutz, Hanita was characterized by strong communal features, consisting of a public core surrounded by an array of small housings units, which were basically rows of one-room apartments all sharing a communal open green space (Figure 3). The focus of the plan was therefore the communal center, which included the main public functions such as the dining hall, the post office, and the secretariat. The individual sphere was thus limited to the privacy of the couple's bedroom, while all other activities, even parenting, were to be done communally. The



Figure 2
Left - Kibbutz; Right - Moshav (Arieh Sharon Archive).



Figure 3
Left - Hanita, 1938, Zoltan Kluger (GPO). Right - Hanita, 1974. (ILA).

communal aspects continued to the agricultural fields and farming area, as they too were owned and cultivated collectively.

Not all *Wall and Tower* settlements turned into kibbutzim and almost a quarter of them became Moshavim. Subsequently, they consisted of a small public core, with an array of private houses, erected on their own agricultural plots. The houses, built by the JNF, were two-room units and quite small scale. Yet, unlike the ones in the kibbutzim, they were intended to serve a nuclear family, providing them with their own private space. In the moshav, the family, its private house and farming plot were the basis of the spatial construction of the rural settlement, while the public core was intended to provide the needed hierarchy and orientation.

Whether as kibbutz or moshav, the various rural settlements were the leading tool in the pre-statehood years. Though differing in their layout and architecture, all these settlements had a leading joint concept: the alliance between agriculture and land redemption. Through rural labor, the settlers were able to physically reclaim the land and to secure its control. This *cultivate and rule* approach was a spiritual and physical effort, meant to create a new society while reclaiming territory. Consequently, the produced space relied on the promotion of a pioneer and communal culture with strong defense considerations. This method was the main force in the pre-statehood years, and though the focus would shift toward industrial towns rural settlements would continue to form a substantial factor in frontier settlement even after the establishment of the state of Israel.

Industrialize and rule

In May 1948, the end of the British Mandate and the declaration of the establishment of the state of Israel ignited the first Israeli-Arab war, which would significantly alter the demographic and territorial balance in the area.[32] In 1949, with the end of the war, the Jewish state was larger than that initially proposed in 1947 by the United Nations partition plan,

as it included several Arab areas, as well as around 600 Arab villages and towns that were vacated by their 700,000 inhabitants who had fled or were deported to neighboring states.[33]

The official Israeli policy was to prevent the Arab Palestinian refugees from returning to their homes.[34] Former Arab areas, as well as areas along the new borders or ones with an Arab majority, turned into the state's internal frontiers.[35] In order to preserve the new situation and to strengthen the state's territorial control, the Israeli government began the construction of new settlements immediately after the war.[36] Thus, continuing the mechanism of *settle and rule*. Settling was now not only an act of physical control, but also of consciousness and narrative, as it included cleansing the area of its Arab Palestinian heritage.[37] New settlements were therefore intended to preserve the results of the 1948 war. Michel Foucault, in his analyses of power relations, stated that: "Politics is the continuation of war by other means."[38] In the Israeli case, although the violent aspect of war ended with the 1949 armistice agreement it continued through the state's territorial policy, which focused on securing its physical and spiritual geographical dominance.

The young state's strategic plan, composed by Arieh Sharon,[39] continued the pre-war Zionist policy of securing territorial ownership by settlement. Resembling Walter Christaller's Central Places theory of the 1930s,[40] Sharon suggested dispersing the Israeli population, from the coastline area into a hierarchal system of new industrial towns that would expand into the country's periphery (Figure 4). This national decentralization of the [Jewish] population was, according to Sharon "imperative for national and defense standpoints."[41] The former sporadic and quite tactical settling practices were therefore replaced by a governmental-controlled strategic one that harnessed the development of the state's industry and infrastructure. The Israeli nation-building process had therefore both spiritual and physical aspects, as the newly developed built environment's national role consisted of housing provision and socialization, and territorial control.[42]

Sharon's plan was based on a coalition between the state's industrial needs and its political interests. In the introduction to the 1951 master plan for the young state of Israel, Sharon stated that: "The physical planning of a country must be based on economic, social, and defense considerations."[43] Moreover, Sharon claimed that the new towns would provide the proper habitation, education and employment to the Jewish immigrants and will therefore "expedite their integration into one organic and productive unit."[44] The state's strategy corresponded with the Fordist-Keynesian welfare-state approach.[45] Here, the state provided the individual with a variety of social services in exchange for his/her labor and civil obedience, tying his/her personal interests to that of the state and its industry.[46] Housing provision, as claimed by Peter Marcuse, was a seemingly benevolent act that tightened the dependence of the individual to the state, helping the state to control its citizens.[47] It therefore formed an integral part of the state's disciplinary institution.[48] The modernist

Figure 4
Sharon's Plan-1951
(Arieh Sharon Archive).

Israeli industrial towns of the early statehood years became a tool intended to construct and shape a new form of collective belonging,[49] while continuing the national territorial mission. Or in other words, to *industrialize and rule*.

The northern Israeli city of Karmiel was built in the early 1960s from an ideal example of the Israeli industrial towns of the first two decades. Planned in the late 1950s, Karmiel was supposed to strengthen the Israeli presence in the predominantly Arab area of Galilee; an area that was hardly settled by Jews during the pre-statehood days. However, unlike before 1948, where land had to be purchased from its owners, after 1948, being the sovereign power, the state of Israel had the ability to confiscate lands from their owners, in the pretense of defense measure, emergency regulations, abandoned areas ordinance and several other reasons.[50] For the same reasons the Israeli government was able to confiscate land from the Arab villages of Dir Al Asad, Nahaf and Bi'ne.[51] On the regional level, besides its demographic role, Karmiel was supposed to form the new provincial center, providing the area with the needed civic services and occupational opportunities. As an industrial town, Karmiel followed the typical urban concepts of all other towns built

during the same years; continuing Sharon's hierarchal strategic order, which consisted on a strict division of the different functions of dwelling, industry and civil services. The core of the new town was the civil center and surrounding it were the residential complexes, which were basically reproduced dwelling estates, while the industrial area was purposely detached in plan from the new settlement (Figure 5).

Karmiel played complementary political, ideological and economic roles. On the national level, it was intended to fortify the young state's control in the periphery, while decreasing the pressure of the heavily populated coastal plain. At the same time, it was also meant to industrialize the rural periphery and to develop and modernize the young Israeli economy. Nevertheless, the modernist setting and the reproduced dwelling units were supposed to turn the newly arriving Jewish immigrants into a cohesive and solid community. Thus, turning them into a unified body that is connected to the state through welfare and care. Addressing the national, economic and security considerations, Karmiel embodied the main principles of Sharon's strategical plan, which though never officially approved, continued to dictate the development of Israel in the 1960s and 1970s. The main effort remained to disperse the country's Jewish population in a hierarchal network of industrial towns, which would create a descending order of centers, spreading from the main metropolitan region into the periphery.[52] The planning discourse continued to concentrate on issues centered on "priority of development" and "development towns."[53]

The dozens of industrial development towns, like Karmiel, are considered to be one of the main controversial episodes in the urban history of the state of Israel.[54] They were forcibly populated, mostly by underprivileged *Mizrahi*[55] Jewish immigrants, and as the attempt to industrialize the periphery failed, 'development town' turned into a synonym for urban failure, discrimination, and neglect.[56] Moreover, the anonymous and reproduced housing estates were perceived as alienating environments, and in the liberalizing and individualizing process, Israeli society of the 1970s began focusing on self-expression and self-



Figure 5
Left - Perspective of Karmiel, 1961, MCH; Right - Karmiel under construction, 1965 (GPO).

fulfillment. Consequently, the *industrialize and rule* policy promoted through the 1950s and 1960s was shortly replaced by a new one, which focused on living standards and private initiatives. This initially began as an attempt to prevent negative immigration from development towns by providing better dwelling opportunities locally, consisting of a detached private household, and later developed as a model for new settlements.[57]

Suburbanize and rule

By the early 1970s, Israeli society would go through significant social and cultural changes. The liberalization and privatization that began a decade earlier, accelerated in 1977 with the election of the first liberal-oriented right-wing government and reached a point of no return during the 1980s. In this process, several key national enterprises and services were sold to the private sector.[58] As a result, the national settlement mission was privatized as well, and the local built environment began being influenced not only by national considerations such as ideology, identity, security, and sovereignty but also by economic and personal imperatives.[59]

At the same time, the national mission to continue constructing new settlements was not abandoned. In a way, it intensified with the occupation of the West Bank in 1967 and the political turnover of 1977. The economic changes that followed the 1977 turnover were realized in many aspects of Israeli culture and society.[60] Unlike the early statehood days, where the pioneer spirit formed the main driving force behind frontier settlement, in the liberalizing of Israel this act was no longer merely an ideological deed, but also an attempt to improve one's individual living conditions.[61] While in the first decades the state-led urban development was a counter-urban effort focused on a national redistribution of the country's population, by the late 1980s this turned into a metropolitan-based local-decentralization effort.[62] Quality of life in a suburban context therefore became an integral part in the construction of new settlements.[63] New settlements, offering larger houses in small communities in a commuting distance from the main city centers became the main national territorial interest.[64] A strategy of *suburbanize and rule* where the national *Hagshama* (fulfillment) was tied to *Hagshama Atzmit* (self-fulfillment).

Even though suburban-like houses were already part of the local scenery, especially in the Built Your Own House neighborhoods that began emerging in the 1960s, local suburban typologies appeared only in the late 1970s. The first was the Community-Settlement (*Yishuv-Kihilati*), which while initiated by the Ministry of Agriculture (MA) and initially functioned as frontier settlements, had no agricultural functions. It housed mainly ex-city dwellers seeking better living quality in a detached private house with a sensation of living close to nature in ex-urban areas. This type of modern rurality was a common phenomenon in industrialized countries in the 1970s, due to the decline of agriculture, which was also accompanied by a decline in urban life and vast rurbanization. The term

"Community Settlements" derives from their establishment method which relied on the formation of small-scale homogenous groups often with a common ideological background. The emphasis on a community-led effort created an opportunity to live in a gated community, as the right to acquire private property in these settlements usually includes a process of screening by an admissions committee.[65] In this sense, the Community Settlement embodies the increased sectorialism that identified the decline of the welfare-state. Here, key civil services turned into political bargaining tools and were traded in the formation of political coalitions with the different sectors of society.[66]

The ex-urban Community Settlements were followed by the Suburban Settlement (*Yeshuv-Parvari*).[67] While the former consisted of a small-scale pre-organized community, the later was usually built by large-scale private developers. These would have a stronger emphasis on private family life and a less homogeneous character. Developed using private capital meant that the development mechanism was also affected by profitability and financial interests, which limited their use mainly to the main metropolitan areas and to where the real estate prices supported such private investments.

Yaa'd, a small-scale peripheral locality of 150 families, represents an ideal example of a Community Settlement. Established in 1974, it consisted of a group of graduates from the Israeli Institute of Technology, who were interested in establishing their own small community. It was incorporated in the Judaization efforts of Galilee, led by the Ministry of Agriculture (MA) and the JA, which included the "Lookouts Plan" (*Tochnit Hamitzpim*)[68] of the 1970s that sought to enlarge Jewish presence in the areas.[69] The MA and the JA offered the group the site of Ya'ad. The original plan was to create an industrial moshav. Eventually, it turned into a typical Community Settlement.[70] After receiving the site, the first families moved into temporary dwelling units provided by the JA, which by the early 1980s were replaced by permanent ones (Figure 6). The layout of Ya'ad corresponded with the principles of the Community Settlements. It consisted of a single gate entrance, which led to the joint public core that was located on the site's highest point. The inner streets of the settlement were placed along the ridgeline enabling the immediate



Figure 6
Left - Ya'ad, 1979. Moshe Milner (GPO); Right - Yaad, 1978 (ILA).

mobilized access to each private lot. The location of the houses on the topography ensured a prominent exposure to the surrounding landscape and a high level of privacy.

The Suburban Settlement of Kfar-Vradim was also part of the Lookouts Plan. In 1979 Israeli businessman Steph Wertheimer received over 7,000 km^2 from the Israel Land Administration in order to establish a new settlement along the northern Israeli border. Wertheimer's Kfar-Vradim Development Company ltd, funded and controlled the development of the new settlement. Kfar-Vradim was initially planned in two stages, each compromised of almost 2,000 units, with a total population of nearly 15,000 inhabitants. Instead of relying on a hierarchal system of roads and functions, the planned fabric consisted of a system of winding roads and *cul de sac* streets, giving easy and instant access to each of the private lots. The settlement's nonhierarchical form enabled the implementation of construction in phases and the isolation of each unit from the larger context. Unlike the former reproduced housing estates or the state-funded Community Settlements, the houses of Kfar-Vradim were much more lavish and extravagant, with a higher emphasis on design and esthetics (Figure 7). Thus, the spatial concept of the Suburban Settlement focused on parceling and commodifying the entire site into smaller plots consisting of marketable, private real estate. The private family house was the essence of the entire project, promising better living standards and quality of life, in return for participating in the national territorial project.

Both new settlement typologies embody the local, social and cultural changes of the 1970s and 1980s. The attempt to attract upper-middle-class families to peripheral areas by promising them better living conditions was an integral part of the privatization of the production of new settlements. Thus, tying their personal desires to the national territorial agenda. Eventually, what began as a tool for self-fulfillment led to the commodification of the settlement project, which would play a crucial role in the development of the local built environment as larger private developers began to take the lead.

Figure 7
Left - Kfar-Vradim under construction, 1985. Zvi Reiter (JNF); Right - Outline of Kfar-Vradim, 1985 (ILA).

Financialize and rule

The decline in the Israeli welfare state was parallel to the decline in the global one, and the rise of neoliberalism and market economy.[71] Consequently, the former welfare system went through a process of privatization, where key social services began being supplied by corporations instead of the State. Liberalizing the welfare system meant that the state privatized its disciplinary institutions, therefore altering the interests that shaped its built environment. Increasing the involvement of private capital in urban development increased the commodification of the urban system.[72] The only way the individual was able to participate in this process was by investing private funds, literally buying a "piece of capitalism,"[73] to participate in the "financialization of the everyday life."[74] While the early privatized settlement efforts focused on attracting families by promising better living standards, later ones included a growing reliance on large-scale private corporations that transformed the settlement mechanism into a real estate project. Subjected by the financial logic of the market, a house in a new settlement turned into an investment and its owner became a shareholder in the national territorial mission to *financialize and rule*. In each phase, the state used a different mechanism to enforce its interests on the individual, whether by forcing him/her to move to the periphery, seducing him/her by the suburban lifestyle, or by incorporating the territorial project into the existing social structure as an integral part of the market economy.[75]

The financialization of Galilee was a long and extended process. A financially driven urban development project has to rely on a demand from potential consumers, which would form an essential part of the real estate market. Being a social and geographical periphery, the Galilee was not the ideal place for sound private investment. In the 1990s, the Israeli government, interested in increasing the Jewish population of Galilee, directed a large percent of the mass Jewish immigration from the former Soviet Union to the development towns of the region. However, the majority of the ex-Soviet wave eventually chose to settle in the central district area, hindering the national effort to strengthen Galilee.[76] Consequently, the Israeli government chose to focus more on financially feasible projects in the main metropolitans and less on the periphery.

The housing crises of the 2010s promoted the financialization of Galilee. The crises, which was an outcome of the 2008 global economic crash, was fueled by the new low-interest rate, the uncertainty of the stock market and almost two decades of a lack of substantial state-led housing development. This led to a vicious circle of rising demands and rising prices, which the government sought once again to solve by enlarging the overall supply of dwelling units. The government's strategy relied on large-scale residential projects in the outskirts of existing towns and cities while determining a price ceiling for a percentile of the newly built apartments that will be sold to young financially mobile couples. The government reignited the supply and demand by enabling the

Figure 8
Left- Mt-Karmi, 2018 (google.maps); Right- Compounds marketing plan for, 2018. (MCH).

construction of the supply and securing the fulfillment of the demand. Consequently, former peripheral areas that were almost unmarketable in the 2000s suddenly turned into attractive real estate opportunities. In Karmiel, halted and on-hold projects became in demand. An example is the 2003 plan for the approved transformation of 15,000 km^2 on the vacant site of Mt-Karmi into a new neighborhood of 3,500 units.[77] After almost a decade of being on hold, in 2013, the Israel Land Administration (ILA) promoted a detailed plan for the neighborhood that would eventually lead to its realization. This plan consisted of 2,600 dwellings. While the original intention was to create a low-rise residential area, the new proposal relied on mid-rise buildings of 10–20 units each (Figure 8). A more concentrated construction meant a more efficient construction process, which could create a more financially feasible project.

The tender process of the neighborhood began in 2015. The ILA and Ministry of Construction and Housing (MCH) chose to realize the 2,600 units of Mt-Karmi in three different stages, with the first being of around 700 units in six different compounds. The ILA proceeded in staged phases as it hoped that the success of the first phases would eventually lead to more successful future tenders. The construction of the residential buildings was accompanied by an intense marketing process. Already before the groundworks began, the different developers chosen in the tenders launched an aggressive advertising campaign meant to sell all apartments before the start of construction. The marketing techniques focused on quality of life, affordability and high building standards. Interesting is the fact that all compounds consisted of a single reproduced residential model, a simplistic layout and a duplicated basic apartment, all optimizing the construction process and ensuring a higher investment return.

The financialization of Galilee formed a sort of a doubled-edged sword for the Israeli establishment. The national agenda was to attract Jewish families.[78] However, relying on the private market, the new

development addressed the entire Israeli population, including the Arab sector. For the Arab population of Galilee, which suffers from a severe lack of urban development, the recent projects are an opportunity to upgrade their living conditions while staying close to their existing social and cultural context. The Israeli administrations' varied attempts not to "lose" Galilee included specially designated, or semi-closed compounds, targeted at Jewish communities. These were selectively privatized housing projects that focused on the Orthodox or Ultra-Orthodox sectors.[79] Other initiatives included strengthening Galilee as a suburban ring to the metropolitan region of Haifa. This initiative included a vast investment infrastructure which would ease the daily commute. In 2016 and 2017 the railway lines to Afula and Karmiel were completed turning both development towns into extensions of the city centers to which they were initially planned as a contra.

Financializing the housing development meant harnessing it to the logic of real estate investment. In places where there was no actual market that would justify the construction of new residential neighborhoods, like in Karmiel, the state would intervene in order to create one, illustrating once again that the "free market" is created by the State. However, as the State adjusted the planning of the new housing projects in order to suite the rentability consideration of the private developers, the market that was created by the State eventually began physically forming its creator.

Conclusions: From Pioneers to Shareholders

On July 19th of 2018, the Israeli parliament approved the controversial Nation-State Bill, a Basic Law with constitutional status, which defines the State of Israel as the nation-state of the Jewish people. One clause addressed the issue of Jewish settlement stating that: "The state views the development of Jewish settlement as a national value and will act to encourage and promote its establishment and consolidation."[80] By mentioning Jewish settlement as a national interest, this bill proves that the *settle and rule* strategy did not cease. In fact, it still continues to exist as a leading ideological principle. Continuing along the different periods, from the pre-statehood efforts through to the nation-building decades of the 1950s and 1960s to the current neoliberal years of the early 2000s, the *settle and rule* ideology has evolved and changed according to the transitions in the Israeli economy and hegemony.

However as it is shown here, the method of settlement development changed significantly over the period of study. This change was in line with the transitions within the Israeli economy and hegemony, and therefore also in the biopolitical role of space. As liberalization of the local economy accelerated, the State began acting less as a provider and more as an enabler. Consequently, while earlier new settlements appealed to the individual through ideological and welfare incentives these were replaced by an appeal to her/his personal desires and economic aspirations. Accordingly, the *suburbanize and rule* tactic

settlements were developed more through private individuals, seeking a better quality of life. With the acceleration of privatization, private individuals were replaced by corporations, and the development of settlements was tied to the logic of the market, becoming an investment as a part of a *financialize and rule* mechanism. The individual therefore took on different roles in this national project. First, he/she was a pioneer who aimed to redeem her/his ancestral land; then a worker, part of the evolving industrial enterprise; later he/she turned into a commuter, seeking better living standards. Today he/she is a shareholder in the financial venture that the settlement process had become.

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