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# Social Networks, Personalized Advertising and Privacy Controls

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# Social Networks, Personalized Advertising and Privacy Controls

## **Abstract**

This paper investigates how internet users' perception of control over their personal information affects how likely they are to click on online advertising on a social networking website. The paper uses data from a randomized field experiment that examined the effectiveness of personalizing ad text with user-posted personal information relative to generic text. The website gave users more control over their personally identifiable information in the middle of the field test. However, the website did not change how advertisers used data to target and personalize ads. Before the policy change, personalized ads did not perform particularly well. However, after this enhancement of perceived control over privacy, users were nearly twice as likely to click on personalized ads. Ads that targeted but did not use personalized text remained unchanged in effectiveness. The increase in effectiveness was larger for ads that used more unique private information to personalize their message and for target groups who were more likely to use opt-out privacy settings.

**Keywords:** Privacy, Online Advertising, Social Networks

Many Internet firms have collected a huge amount of personal data from their users and use this data to allow their advertisers to target and personalize ads. Consumers might see personalized ad content on such sites as more appealing and more connected to their interests [2, 22], but they also may see it as ‘not only creepy, but off-putting’ if they feel that the firm has violated their privacy [36]. These privacy concerns may lead to ‘reactance’ which leads consumers to resist the ad’s appeal [43]. ‘Reactance’ is a motivational state when consumers resist something they find coercive by behaving in the opposite way to the one intended [8, 11, 9].

Internet firms are unsure about whether they should directly address such concerns by strengthening privacy controls. Theoretically, this could minimize the potential for customer reactance and improve the performance of online advertising, because behavioral research shows that consumer perceptions of control reduce reactance [37]. This holds even if the controls are only tangentially related to the area where reactance may be invoked [32, 38]. For example, cancer patients are more likely to comply with restrictive treatment regimes if they are given perceived control over another aspect of their medical care. However, there is the risk that addressing consumer privacy concerns but continuing to use consumer data to personalize ads may make users less likely to respond to such ads. This ambiguity makes it an empirical question as to how strengthening privacy controls affects advertising performance.

I explore this question using data from a randomized field experiment conducted by a US-based nonprofit to optimize its advertising campaigns on Facebook, a social networking website. These campaigns were shown to 1.2 million Facebook users. The nonprofit’s aim was to raise awareness of its work improving education for women in East Africa. The nonprofit randomized whether it explicitly personalized the ad copy to match data from the user’s profile. In one condition, consumers saw ads that, for example, explicitly mentioned a celebrity that was featured in their Facebook profile. In other conditions they just saw generic text.

In the middle of the field experiment, in response to mounting media criticism, Facebook changed their privacy policies. The policy change introduced an easy-to-use privacy control in-

terface, reduced the amount of information that was automatically required to be displayed, and also gave users new controls over how their personally identifiable data could be tracked or used by third parties. This change did not, however, affect the underlying algorithm by which advertising was displayed, targeted and personalized, since the advertising platform used anonymous data. So, before and after the policy change, advertisers could still choose to target ads towards Oprah Winfrey fans, and personalize the advertising message to mention ‘Oprah Winfrey,’ in exactly the same manner as they did before. What changed was simply how easy it was for users to control access to their information by regular Facebook users.

The nonprofit had not anticipated there would be such a change when it launched its field test of its ads. However, the fact that this occurred mid-way through the field experiment is valuable for measuring the effect of a firm responding to privacy concerns by improving privacy controls on advertising effectiveness, while circumventing the usual endogeneity issues.

This paper’s analysis spans five weeks of campaign-level click-through data that falls either side of the introduction of the new privacy controls. It finds that personalized advertising, surprisingly, was relatively ineffective before Facebook introduced new privacy controls. However, personalized advertising was nearly twice as effective at attracting users to the nonprofit’s Facebook page after the shift in Facebook policy that gave users more control over their personal information. There was no significant change in the effectiveness of advertising that was shown to the same people but used a generic message over the period. This is to be expected, because such ads do not make clear to consumers whether their private information is being used to target.

This interpretation rests on the assumption that there were no underlying changes in user behavior or the environment that coincided with the introduction of the new privacy controls but were not directly attributable to the introduction of these controls. There was no significant change in the ads shown, the user composition of Facebook, use of the website, or advertiser behavior during the period studied. There was also no change in how likely people were to sign up for the nonprofit’s news feed after clicking on the ad, suggesting that the result is not an artifact of curiosity. Another

concern is that there was a lot of publicity around the policy change, so the analysis deploys many different controls for media coverage.

Building on existing research that documents that ‘reactance’ to personalized advertising is greatest when the information used is more unique [43], the paper then explores whether the positive effect of improved privacy controls was greatest for ads that used more unique information. Though some celebrities in the data, like Oprah Winfrey, have as many as two million fans on Facebook, some of the celebrities or undergraduate institutions were unusual enough that their potential reach was only in the thousands. Personalization was relatively more effective for personalized ads that used unusual information after privacy controls were enhanced. This provides evidence that consumers were concerned that the information being used in the ads was simply too personal to be used in an ad without a corresponding sense of control over their data.

The analysis then explores whether the measured effect depends on the extent to which consumers use privacy settings on Facebook. This is empirically ambiguous. On the one hand, consumers who care about privacy and use privacy settings may be more upset if they set high levels of privacy restrictions and still see highly personalized advertising. On the other hand, such consumers who are more aware of privacy matters on Facebook may have experienced the most reactance prior to Facebook addressing privacy complaints with the improved set of privacy policies. They may have also been the most reassured that they could now explicitly prevent Facebook from sharing their click data with third parties. Further analysis suggests that the measured effect is larger for groups of consumers who used privacy controls to restrict the ability of another ad product to use their data. This also provides evidence that the measured effect is associated with tastes for privacy controls rather than other external factors.

## **0.1 Contribution**

These findings contribute at four levels.

First, to the author’s knowledge, this is the first paper that uses field data to study the con-

sequences for advertising outcomes of a firm responding to user privacy concerns by introducing improved privacy controls. (author?) [42] found that 66 percent of Americans do not want marketers to tailor advertisements to their interests. Fear of such resistance has led advertisers to limit their tailoring of ads [24]. The finding that there are positive effects for an advertising platform, in this instance, from addressing users' privacy concerns is therefore useful.

Second, these findings have implications for privacy regulation. Currently, proposed regulations such as 'Do Not Track' governing online behavioral advertising in the US are focused around the mechanics of how websites implement opt-in and opt-out use of cookies and other tracking devices. Previous empirical research suggests that this approach, by limiting the use of data by firms, reduces ad effectiveness ((author?) [19, 40]). By contrast, the results in this paper show that in this setting, when a social networking website allowed customers to choose how personally identifiable information about them was shared and used, there was no negative effect on advertising performance. This is an important finding for policymakers deciding on whether to emphasize user-based controls in privacy regulation both in the US and elsewhere.

On the academic side, this paper builds on research that has focused on more general questions of the role of control in mediating privacy concerns. Early research on privacy tended to simply describe privacy as a matter of giving users control over their data [30]. However, more recent research in information systems has challenged this and has shown how individual-level control can mediate privacy concerns [16, 12, 25].<sup>1</sup> This remains the case even if the control is merely perceptual or over tangential information, and access to the focal data remains unchanged [35, 44, 7, 45]. The contribution of the paper to this literature is to demonstrate empirically that perceptual control over privacy can affect responsiveness to advertising in addition to social and personal interactions.

The paper also contributes to the online advertising literature that has studied targeting in data-rich social media sites. This is important because social networking websites now account for one-third of all online display advertising [27]. However, social networking websites have pre-

viously been perceived as being problematic venues for advertising because of extremely low click-through rates [21]. This paper suggests that if such sites are successful at reassuring consumers that they are in control of their privacy, firms can use personalization of ads to generate higher click-through rates. Previous studies in marketing about social networking have looked at how offline social networks can be used to target [26], how such social networking sites can use advertising to obtain members [39], how social networks can be used to target ads [41], and also how makers of applications designed to be used on social networking sites can best advertise their products [3]. Outside of social networks, (author?) [17] have shown that privacy concerns can influence ad effectiveness.

## **1 Data**

### **1.1 The Nonprofit**

The nonprofit running the experiment provides educational scholarships in East Africa that enable bright girls from poor families to go to or stay in high school. Part of the nonprofit's mission involves explaining its work in Africa to US residents and also engaging their enthusiasm and support for its programs. In order to do this, the nonprofit set up a Facebook 'page' that explained its mission and allowed people who were interested to see photos, read stories and watch videos about the girls who had been helped by the program.

To attract people to become fans of its Facebook page, the nonprofit started advertising using Facebook's own advertising platform. Initially, it ran an untargeted ad campaign which displayed an ad in April 2010 to all users of Facebook that live in the US and are 18 years and older. This campaign experienced a very low click-through rate and attracted fewer than five new 'fans' to the website. The disappointing nature of this campaign led the nonprofit to determine whether it could engage further with its potential supporters by both targeting and personalizing ad content.



## 1.2 Randomized Campaign

The nonprofit decided to target both graduates from 20 liberal arts colleges with a reputation for supporting female education and Facebook users who had expressed affinity with 19 celebrities and writers who in the past had made statements supporting the education of girls in Africa or African female empowerment in general. The nonprofit is eager to protect the privacy of its supporters, and consequently has asked the authors to not reveal the names of either the actual celebrities or the schools that were used in this advertising campaign. Examples could be Oprah Winfrey, who has set up a girls' school in South Africa, or Serena Williams, who was a supporter of 'Build African Schools.' Data from Facebook advertising interface suggests there was very little overlap in fans across these different groups.

In order to establish whether Facebook user data should be used merely to target ads, or should in addition be used to personalize the content of the advertising message, they decided to experiment with two different ad formats. Table 1 summarizes the different conditions used. In the targeted and personalized condition, the ad explicitly mentioned the undergraduate institution or the celebrity's name. In the targeted but non-personalized case, the ad was similar in content but did not explicitly mention the undergraduate institution or the celebrity's name that had been used to target the ad. In both cases, the baseline or 'non-personalized' message was not completely generic, but instead alluded to a broad user characteristic. Therefore, the estimates reflect the incremental benefit of personalized ad-content that has specific and concrete personal information relative to ad content that uses non-specific and non-concrete information. In each case, the ad was accompanied by the same picture of a girl who had been helped by the program. Based on the work of (author?) [34], this girl had a sad expression.

[Table 1 about here.]

The nonprofit also continued to use as its baseline an untargeted campaign that reached out to all adult US Facebook users simultaneously. This provided an additional baseline control for

advertising effectiveness over the course of the study. The text of this baseline and untargeted ad read “Support [Charity Name]. Help girls in East Africa change their lives through education.” All campaigns were restricted to Facebook users who live in the US, and were 18 years and older who were not already fans of the nonprofit. The nonprofit set a daily maximum spending cap on advertising campaigns. It also agreed to pay at most \$.50 for each click produced by the different advertising campaigns.

### **1.3 The Introduction of Improved Privacy Controls**

What was unique and potentially valuable about this field experiment was that on May 24, 2010 (after the field experiment was planned and initiated and the first data collected), Mark Zuckerberg, the CEO of Facebook, announced that the company would be simplifying and clarifying its privacy settings as well as rolling back some previous changes that had made Facebook users’ information more public. Studying this change was not the purpose of the randomized field experiment, but it presents a unique opportunity to study how a change in user privacy controls in social networking sites could change consumer responses to advertising, since the nonprofit tested the ads using the same randomization technique before and after the change in the privacy-control interface.

Facebook introduced this improved privacy interface after being heavily criticized because its privacy settings were very granular and difficult to access. For example, (**author?**) [6] pointed out in the national press that the 5,850 words of Facebook’s privacy policy were longer than the United States Constitution, and that users wanting to manage their privacy settings had to navigate through 50 settings with more than 170 options. As detailed in Table A-3, Facebook had previously acted to reduce the amount of control users had over their data and had attracted negative publicity for doing so. In December 2009, ten privacy groups filed a complaint with the Federal Trade Commission<sup>2</sup> over changes to Facebook’s privacy policy, which included default settings that made users’ status updates available potentially to all Internet users, as well as making users’ friend lists publicly available.

There were three major components to Facebook's change in privacy interface. The first was that all privacy settings were aggregated into one simple control. Users no longer had to deal with 170 granular options. As depicted in appendix Figure A-1, this interface was far more approachable and easily adjustable than before. Second, Facebook no longer required users' friends and connections to be visible to everyone. Third, Facebook made it easier to opt out with a single click from third-party applications from accessing users' personal information. Generally, these changes were received favorably. For example, the chairman of the American Civil Liberties Union, Chris Conley, wrote, 'The addition of simplified options (combined with the continued ability to fine-tune your settings if you wish) and user control over Facebook's 'connections' are significant improvements to Facebook's privacy.'

This change in privacy settings did not change how the banner ads that were served on Facebook were targeted, or whether advertisers could use user information to personalize ads. Display advertising was treated separately because, as Facebook states, 'Facebook's ad targeting is done entirely anonymously. If advertisers select demographic targeting for their ads, Facebook automatically matches those ads to the appropriate audience. Advertisers only receive anonymous data reports.' To reassure advertisers that the change would not adversely affect them, Facebook sent out an email to its advertisers saying that 'this change will not affect your advertising campaigns' (The full letter is reproduced in the appendix.) This means that though users were given control over how much information was being shared publicly and the extent to which they were being tracked by third parties, the actual mechanism by which the ads tested were targeted and served did not change.

One consequence of studying a real-life firm shift in privacy policy is that, unlike with a lab experiment, many things were changed at once. Therefore, ultimately the measured effect is a combination of different privacy measures, as well as how they were reported and received in the press. Indeed, the estimate captures, besides an increased sense of control, other positive effects of Facebook's improved privacy policy, such as higher trust in the firm. Since these improvements in

general perceptions may attend any firm's improvement of privacy policies in response to privacy critiques, this still makes the policy estimates of managerial interest.

#### **1.4 Data**

The nonprofit shared daily data from Facebook on how well each of the ads performed for the duration of the experiment. For each of the 79 different ad campaigns, there was daily data on the number of times they were shown and the number of clicks they received. In total these ads were shown to 1.2 million users and received 1,995 clicks. The nonprofit was not informed by Facebook whether they appeared on mobile devices or in the newsfeed, but it believes that at the time the majority of ads on Facebook were shown on the right-hand-side of the screen. When a user clicked on the ad, they were taken to the nonprofit's Facebook page. The data spanned 2.5 weeks on either side of the introduction of privacy controls on May 28, 2010.

This data included the number of unique impressions (that is, the number of users the ad was shown to) and the number of clicks each ad received. Each of these clicks came from a unique user. It contains information on the date that click was received, but not the time. It also includes data on the cost to the nonprofit per click and the imputed cost per thousand impressions. 'Ad-reach' measures the number of Facebook users who were eligible to be shown the ad for any targeted ad campaign. This ad-reach data allows exploration in subsequent regressions of the behavioral mechanism. To protect the privacy of the nonprofit's supporters, the data did not contain information about the backgrounds or identities of those who chose to like it, or on any of their actions after they made that choice.

Table 2 reports the summary statistics. The average number of clicks relative to ad impressions is small, at two-tenths of one percentage point. The maximum click-through rate is 3 percentage points. This average is even smaller when looking at the daily level, since many campaigns received no clicks on a given day, inflating the appearance of low click-through rates. However, this is similar to rates reported by other advertisers for Facebook ads. In their provocatively-titled

piece ‘Facebook Ad Click-Through Rates Are Really Pitiful,’ (**author?**) [4] reported average click-through rates between .01% and .06%.

Table 2 also reports summary statistics for the data used as controls for user exposure to news about Facebook and privacy. The first is data from Factiva about the number of newspapers that had stories that contained the words ‘privacy’ and ‘Facebook’ and how many words each article had that was devoted to the topic. There was also data on whether the news article appeared in a renowned newspaper. The second is data from Google Trends that gives an index for the number of searches for Facebook and privacy. This index lies between 0-100 and captures the relative volume of searches over time for particular search terms for people who use the Google search engine in the US.

[Table 2 about here.]

## 2 Analysis

Figure 1 displays the average click-through rate for each campaign before and after the introduction of improved privacy controls. Before the policy change, the personalized ads were underperforming relative to their generic counterparts. This is surprising, given the expectation that displaying personalized ad text would increase their relevance and consequently their appeal. However, after the policy change the more expected pattern prevails where ads with personalized content were relatively more effective than generically worded but targeted ads or untargeted ads. This change was highly significant ( $p$ -value=0.0047). The effects of targeting ads without personalizing their content before and after the introduction of improved privacy controls were not significantly different ( $p$ -value=0.407). There appears to be little change in the effectiveness of the untargeted campaign, though of course with only one campaign it is impossible to assess statistical significance when simply comparing a single before and after period. Analysis of click-through rates at the daily level suggests that there was no statistically significant change in the effectiveness for untargeted ads after the introduction of improved privacy controls.

[Figure 1 about here.]

Figure 2 examines whether there were any differences for the campaigns targeted to undergraduate institutions and celebrities. It is evident that on average the celebrity-focused campaign was more successful at attracting clicks. However, it appears clear that there was a similar incremental jump in the effectiveness of personalized ads after the introduction of improved privacy controls for both categories of Facebook users: Those with affinities for different schools, and those with affinities for different celebrities.

[Figure 2 about here.]

Figure 1 suggests that the personalization of display ads was more effective after Facebook facilitated users' taking control of their personal information. Regression analysis, however, allows both an assessment of statistical significance and the use of more controls.

In the regression, the click-through rate  $ClickRate_{jt}$  for ad  $j$  on day  $t$  targeted at group  $k$  is a function of:

$$\begin{aligned} ClickRate_{jt} = & \beta Personalized_j \times PostPolicy_t + \alpha Personalized_j \\ & + \theta_1 MediaAttention_t \times Personalized_j \\ & + \gamma_k + \delta_t + \epsilon_j \end{aligned} \tag{1}$$

$Personalized_j$  is an indicator variable equal to one if the ad contained personalized content that reflected the data on celebrity affinity or undergraduate school used to target, and zero if there was no personalized content.  $PostPolicy_t$  is an indicator variable equal to one if the date was after the privacy-settings policy change took place, and zero otherwise. The coefficient  $\beta$  captures the effect of their interaction.  $\theta$  captures the effect of various controls that allow the effectiveness of personalized advertising to vary with media attention.  $\gamma_k$  is a vector of 39 fixed effects for the

20 different undergraduate institutions and each of the 19 celebrities targeted. These control for underlying systematic differences in how likely people within that target segment were to respond to this charity. The specification includes a vector of date dummies  $\delta_t$ . These are collinear with  $PostPolicy_t$ , which means that  $PostPolicy_t$  is dropped from the specification as are the vector of controls for the direct effect of the media  $MediaAttention$ . Because the ads are randomized,  $\delta_t$  and  $\gamma_k$  should primarily improve efficiency. The specification is estimated using Ordinary Least Squares. Following the strategy presented by (author?) [5], standard errors are clustered at the ad-campaign level to avoid artificially understating the size of the standard errors due to use of repeated panel data.

Table 3 presents empirical estimates that incrementally build up to the full specification in equation (1). Column (1) is an initial simplified specification. The crucial coefficient of interest is  $Personalized \times PostPolicy$ . This captures how an individual exposed to a personalized ad responds differently to a personalized ad after Facebook's change in privacy policy, relative to an ad shown to the same people that had generic wording. It suggests a positive and significant increase in the performance of personalized ads relative to merely targeted ads after the introduction of enhanced user privacy controls. The magnitude of the estimates suggest that the click-through rate increased by .024, relative to an average baseline click-through rate of .023 for personalized ads before the introduction of improved privacy controls. The negative coefficient  $Personalized$ , which is marginally significant, suggests that prior to the change in privacy settings, personalized ads were less effective than ads that did not use personalized ad copy.<sup>3</sup>

Column (2) adds an additional interaction which controls for how many news stories there were that day that contained the words 'Facebook' and 'Privacy'. Of course, while news stories capture some of the idea of general salience, they do not necessary reflect the extent to which news about Facebook and privacy concerns were being processed and acted on by Facebook users. To capture this, the analysis expands to include an additional control that captures the number of daily searches using the terms 'Facebook' and 'Privacy' on Google as reported by the 'Google Trends'

index, which is reported on a scale between 0 and 100. In line with the idea that the results reported in Column (1) were larger because of the media buzz surrounding the introduction of improved privacy controls, the key interaction between *Personalized*  $\times$  *PostPolicy* is smaller in magnitude, though still statistically significant. Column (3) reports results from the main specification which, combines both of these controls as summarized by equation (1). Though the estimated effect for *Personalized*  $\times$  *PostPolicy* is smaller at 0.0174, it is still a significant increase relative to the average baseline click-through rate for personalized ads before the introduction of improved privacy controls of 0.007.

[Table 3 about here.]

The remainder of the results reported in the table, investigate alternative ways of controlling for media coverage. Column (4) reports the results of a specification that allows for an additional day-delay lag in the effect of media stories appearing and Column (5) reports results of a specification allows a lag both for the effect of stories from the previous day, and the day prior to that. This is motivated by work by (author?) [33], who examine how there are often delays in affective response to policy news - in their case, the advent of mad cow disease. In both cases these lags enhance the precision and increase the size of the estimates. It is noticeable that the effect of the second lag is significant and negative in Column (5), suggesting that there was a general negative effect on clicking behavior from Facebook media coverage two days prior to the user being on Facebook and seeing the ad. Very speculatively, one explanation may be that the effect of critical media is augmented when there is multi-day coverage.

Column (6) reports a specification that uses data from Factiva that allows us to distinguish between news stories that were reported in the major press and the specialized press and allow the effect to vary with these different types of media. Column (7) reports a specification that uses a word-weighted measure for these controls, to reflect the extent of coverage rather than just the presence of coverage. Specifically, this measure weights the effect of each article by how many



words it contains. This allows the effect of an article which was longer and took up more page space to be more profound, than a brief or paragraph- long article. Both of these alternative ways of specifying media presence produce a similarly sized estimate to that of the main specification in Column (3). In general, the results of Columns (4)-(7) are reassuring that the measured effect of the introduction of privacy controls is robust to different ways of controlling for the extensive media coverage.

There is a relatively low  $R^2$  across all specifications. This low level of explanatory power is shared by much of the online advertising literature [31, 17]. One possible explanation is that consumers are skilled at avoiding looking at online advertising when viewing webpages, introducing measurement error [13] and requiring researchers to assemble large datasets to measure effects precisely. In addition, this is simply the average effects of the policy - there may have been many Facebook users for whom the policy had essentially no effect as they had no intention of ever clicking on ads.

This empirical analysis uses a short time window of five weeks. This means it is less likely that there is some long-run trend, for example increasing user acceptance of ad personalization or ‘habituation’ to privacy concerns, that drives the results. To show robustness to an even shorter window, Column (1) reports estimates exclusively for 10 days from Day 13 to Day 22 (five days before and five days after) around the introduction of improved privacy controls. The results for a specification with no controls, reported in Column (1) of Table 4, were positive but larger than for the full period. Examining similar ten-day windows in the pre-policy change period exhibited no evidence of any significant change in preferences for personalized advertising. One explanation is that the introduction of improved privacy controls was particularly salient in this 10-day window due to the amount of media coverage, meaning that people were more sensitized to personalized advertising. Column (2) explores this by including controls from the main specification in Column (3) of Table 3 for news stories and general ‘buzz’ about the introduction of improved privacy controls. The results are also robust to excluding the period where the service was rolled out and

the days spanning announcement and implementation. Columns (3) and (4) of Table 4 examine the effect of excluding the immediate ten-day window around the policy change. Similarly, Columns (5) and (6) examine the effect of using a window that excludes the immediate 20 days around the policy change. The results are reasonably similar, though the news controls generally appear to increase the precision of the estimates for these windows outside the immediate time of the policy change. Another noticeable pattern is that the point estimates are largest for the 10-day window immediately surrounding the period. One explanation for this could be that users were more likely to recall or remember the change in privacy settings close to the time the policy change occurred. However, this is speculation based on the relative size of point estimates - a combined regression suggests that there is no statistically significant difference in the size of the estimated point estimates.

[Table 4 about here.]

With any research that relies on a natural experiment for identification, there are open questions about what precisely is the local average treatment effect that is being estimated. The estimates include controls for the direct effect of media - if the media is telling users that Facebook is bad and intrusive, they may be less likely to click on personalized ads, regardless of whether or not Facebook has privacy controls in place. The media controls (in particular the lags) should help control for this. What the media controls cannot do, however, is control for the fact that as a result of the media publicity, many Facebook users were aware of the change in policy. This means that the correct interpretation of what is measured is that these estimates apply to a large firm that is under media scrutiny for its privacy policies and consequently can rely on the fact that its users found out about changes in its privacy policy. These estimates may be less applicable to small firms who cannot rely on the media to highlight changes in their privacy policy and controls for them.

## 2.1 Further Robustness Checks

The assumption that allows us to ascribe causality to the estimates is that there was no change in Facebook user and advertiser behavior and the external environment that drove the results that was not associated with the change in privacy controls.<sup>4</sup> This section uses further external data to provide evidence surrounding this assumption.

An obvious concern is that though there could be an increase in the proportion of clicks for an ad, this increase might not have been helpful for the marketing aims of the nonprofit. For example, an alternative explanation for the results is that after the introduction of improved privacy controls, consumers became more likely to click on an ad that appeared too intrusive, in order to find out what data the advertiser had or because they were curious as to how they obtained their data, rather than it being the case they were more likely to respond positively to the advertising message.

The nonprofit shared weekly update emails from Facebook that recorded how many people had become their ‘fan’ on Facebook and subscribed to their newsfeed, to help rule out this alternative explanation. In the two weeks prior to the introduction of improved privacy controls, there was a 0.97 correlation between the number of fans and number of clicks. After the introduction of improved privacy controls, there was a 0.96 correlation between the number of fans and number of clicks. There was no statistically significant difference between these two correlations, suggesting that it was not the case that after the introduction of improved privacy controls people were more likely to click on the ad even if they had no interest in the work of the nonprofit. In general, the nonprofit considers the campaign to have been a success, especially given the relatively small cost of the trial (less than \$1,000). In their most recent fundraising campaign, around six percent of revenues from new donors came directly from their Facebook page.

One potential concern is that the results reflect a change in the number of Facebook users. For example, the negative publicity could have driven more experienced users away, leaving only users who were likely to react to personalized advertising using Facebook. According to the figures

on the advertising ‘reach’ made available to advertisers by Facebook, the potential audience did not decrease for any of the ads following the policy change, instead showing only a very small increase. In Table A-4 in the appendix, comScore data based on their panel of two million internet users suggests that this was not the case, and that there was actually an increase in the number of users. There were only small changes in the composition of the user base in June relative to May, and the shifts did not seem to be more dramatic than the shifts seen from April to May. The **(author?)** [20] test allows testing for outliers in the full year of data, with the caveat that there is a limited number of observations. The results of this test did not indicate that observed changes between May and June deviated from the expected normal distribution.

Though observed demographics were reasonably similar, there is always the possibility that the composition of Facebook users changed in an unobserved way and that this influenced which ads were shown in the period after the introduction of privacy controls. For example, there could have been more fans of a celebrity who was famous for directly reaching out to the public and whose fans consequently were more likely to have a taste for personalization using Facebook after the introduction of improved privacy controls. Empirically, the mix of ads displayed did not change over time. If the composition of ads did change, then this could be a response to the fact that more consumers of that type were going online or, alternatively, that the same number of consumers were spending longer online. Table A-6 in the appendix reports the results and shows that there was no change in which ads were shown based on their observable characteristics, though there may of course have been unobserved changes based on their unobserved characteristics.

It is also possible that, rather than a change in user composition, the measured effect could have been driven by a dramatic change in how people use Facebook. For example, an alternative explanation of the results could be that after the introduction of improved privacy controls, people were more likely to spend time on Facebook and consequently more likely to eventually click on a personalized ad, perhaps because they mistook it for non-commercial content. Table A-5 in the appendix presents data from Compete, Inc., about how users’ browsing behavior on Facebook

changed over 2010. There does not appear to be any large or dramatic change in users' browsing behavior in the period studied, compared to the natural fluctuations that are apparent for the rest of the year. Again, the (author?) [20] test for outliers indicated that the post-policy period did not deviate from the expected normal distribution.

Another concern is that the results could reflect a change in the composition of advertisers. For example, perhaps other advertisers pulled out of Facebook as a result of the negative publicity concerning the privacy interface, meaning that perhaps there were fewer advertisers competing to personalize advertising, which made the personalized ads relatively more attractive. Though not a direct test, there is evidence against this interpretation in the pricing data for the ads. If there had been a drop-off in advertisers, this should have translated to a decrease in the price paid in the ad auction, as the price should theoretically be a function of the number of bidders [28]. However, the small drop in cost per click of 1.5 cents (3%) after the introduction of improved privacy controls was not statistically significant ( $p$ -value=0.59).

## **2.2 Mechanism: Rarity of User Information**

(author?) [14, 43] have shown that personalized ads can lead to a process of 'reactance' [8], where consumers deliberately resist ads that they perceive as intrusive. A potential explanation for why addressing privacy concerns by improving privacy controls was associated with improved advertising performance is that it reduced consumers' level of reactance to personalized advertising.

To provide evidence for this proposed mechanism, this analysis exploits the fact that earlier studies have shown that reactance to personalized advertising is larger for ads that use more unique information about the consumer [43]. For example, if an ad were personalized around the fact that a Facebook user liked 'cooking,' then Facebook has 3,167,540 users who say on their profiles that they like cooking. The use of such information might be felt to be less intrusive and consequently less likely to invoke reactance. However, if an ad were personalized around the fact that a user liked the Korean delicacy kimchi, then there are only 6,180 Facebook users who say that they like

kimchi; knowing that such a preference is relatively rare might make the user more concerned they were being tracked by the advertiser in a privacy-violating manner, increasing intrusiveness and consequently provoking reactance.

To explore this in this empirical setting, the analysis employes additional data on how many users were in the target group for that particular campaign. Equation (1) is expanded so that the click-through rate  $ClickRate_{jt}$  for ad  $j$  on day  $t$  targeted at group  $k$  is now a function of:

$$\begin{aligned}
 ClickRate_{jt} = & \beta_1 Personalized_j \times PostPolicy_t \times AdReach_k + \\
 & \beta_2 Personalized_j \times PostPolicy_t + \beta_3 PostPolicy_t \times AdReach_k + \\
 & \alpha_1 Personalized_j + \alpha_2 Personalized_j \times AdReach_k \\
 & \theta MediaAttention_t \times Personalized_j + \gamma_k + \delta_t + \epsilon_j
 \end{aligned} \tag{2}$$

$AdReach_k$ ,  $MediaAttention_t$  and  $Postpolicy_t$  are collinear with the date and campaign fixed effects, so are dropped from the equation.

Table 5 uses equation (3) to investigate how the estimates were moderated by how large or small the reach of the ad was - how many people, potentially, the ad could be shown to. Column (1) of Table 5 reports how the efficacy of personalized ads relative to ads that were targeted to users' interests before and after the introduction of improved privacy controls was affected by ad-reach for the initial specification. The negative coefficient on  $PostPolicy \times Personalized \times AdReach$  suggests that the positive effect is smaller for ads that had a larger ad-reach than those that had a smaller ad-reach. In other words, personalization was relatively more successful after the introduction of privacy controls for celebrities who had smaller fan bases or schools with smaller numbers of graduates on Facebook, as can be seen from the larger point estimate for  $PostPolicy \times Personalized$  relative to Table 3, Column (1).

Columns (2)-(6) of Table 5 echo the earlier analysis in Columns (3)-(7) of Table 3 by adding

incremental controls for different types of media attention. The result remains robust to these different controls. Ad-Reach is denominated in millions of users. Therefore, roughly extrapolating from the linear functional form, the estimates suggest that for ads for the campaigns in the sample that have target audiences of greater than 243,000, the effect of the policy was canceled out. However, for the median campaign, which had 7,560 people in the target market, the introduction of privacy controls actually raised the click-through percentage by 0.03.

[Table 5 about here.]

### **2.3 The Role of Privacy Settings Usage**

These results are reasonably compelling that the result is driven by the rarity of information used which in turn should be linked to privacy concerns. However, it is still only indirectly linked to privacy controls. Though Facebook did not share information about whether users did indeed change their privacy settings using the newly introduced controls, the nonprofit did give data on average usage of alternative privacy controls by different groups of Facebook users, allowing examination of whether the effect was indeed strongest for users who are most likely to use privacy controls.

It is not clear whether the effect will be largest for users who care about privacy controls. It may be that consumers who care about privacy would be most upset if they set highly protective privacy settings and still see highly personalized advertising. On the other hand, such consumers who are more aware of privacy matters on Facebook may have experienced the most reactance prior to Facebook addressing privacy complaints with the improved set of privacy policies. They may have also been the most reassured that they could now explicitly prevent Facebook from sharing their click data with third parties.

Specifically, this new analysis exploits the fact that after the events studied in this paper, Facebook introduced a new product called ‘social advertising’. This new form of advertising is described in detail in (author?) [41]. These are ads which feature the name of friends who have

‘liked’ a webpage. Facebook users can use the Facebook privacy controls to prevent their name being featured in these ads to their friends who may be targeted by a firm. This percentage of ‘opt-outs’ is shared with the advertising firm. Therefore, two years after the original data was collected, the nonprofit briefly (at the author’s request) ran new social ad campaigns that were targeted at each of the 39 original target groups. This allowed a measure for for each of these target groups on what proportion of ads shown to the target Facebook users had the friend’s name and image removed.

There are two obvious assumptions underlying this measure. The first is that because this ad product and data did not exist at the time of the natural experiment, this procedure assumes that a taste for using privacy controls remains static in the target groups over time, or at least that if there was a change, that all target groups changed at the same rate. This is based on empirical evidence that suggests that though the absolute level of privacy taste can change, the rate of change across demographic groups does not differ [18].

The second assumption is that a taste for privacy controls among the friends of people who are in the target group reflects the taste for privacy controls of the members of the target group themselves. The advertising data is constructed so that a firm can only ever observe usage of privacy controls by the friends of any target group it selects, not the target group itself. Therefore, there is an implicit assumption that there is a correlation across friends in terms of tastes for the use of privacy controls. Such homophily or correlations across friends in tastes for privacy has been documented in field data from online social networks by (author?) [1, 23].

On average, 14.9% of the ad impressions were affected by Facebook users opting-out of showing their name and photo. There was considerable variation in this statistic across the 39 target groups, varying from 56% to 0%.

Including this measure of privacy control use, modifies equation (1) for the click-through rate  $ClickRate_{jt}$  for ad  $j$  on day  $t$  targeted at group  $k$  in the following manner:



$$\begin{aligned}
ClickRate_{jt} = & \beta_1 Personalized_j \times PostPolicy_t \times PrivacyControlsUse_k + \\
& \beta_2 Personalized_j \times PostPolicy_t + \beta_3 PostPolicy_t \times PrivacyControlsUse_k + \\
& \alpha_1 Personalized_j + \alpha_2 Personalized_j \times PrivacyControlsUse_k \\
& \theta MediaAttention_t \times Personalized_j + \gamma_k + \delta_t + \epsilon_j
\end{aligned} \tag{3}$$

The results are reported in Table 6. It is important to emphasize that these results pool data collected two years after the date of the original data with the original data to construct the interaction variable  $PrivacyControlsUse_k$ . The estimates for  $Personalized_j \times PostPolicy_t \times PrivacyControlsUse_k$  are reasonably consistent across the different specifications that allow for different media controls. In each case they suggest that as more people in the group targeted use privacy controls, the larger is the effect of introducing privacy controls.

That the usage of privacy controls across the different groups targeted by the firms mediates the effect size is further evidence that the increase in personalized advertising effectiveness observed in Figure 1 was driven by customers' affinity for privacy controls, rather than by media coverage or other explanations of the effect.

[Table 6 about here.]

### **3 Implications**

This paper explores the consequences for data-rich websites, such as social networks, that try to support themselves through advertising, of addressing privacy concerns by offering users more control over their privacy. The paper uses data from a randomized experiment conducted by a nonprofit that was designed to explore the relative merits of targeted ads with generic text, and ads that used user information to personalize the content of the ad. During the field experiment, the social networking site on which the experiment was being conducted unexpectedly announced that it would change the interface through which users controlled their privacy settings. These changes, which were publicly applauded by consumer advocates, gave users greater control over what personally identifiable information was shared and whether third parties could track their movements. However, advertisers could still use the same personal data to target and personalize advertising messages with before and after the policy change.

Recent research [15] has emphasized that to succeed in the new world of social media, brands must relinquish control. This research parallels such findings by emphasizing that to succeed, web platforms need to give control over privacy settings to their users if they want to use user data to enhance their offerings.

Empirical analysis suggests that after this change in policy, Facebook users were nearly twice as likely to react positively to personalized ad content and click on personalized ads. There was generally no economically significant change in their reactions to untargeted or merely targeted ads. This suggests that publicly giving users control over their private information can benefit advertising-supported media and advertisers on social-networking sites. This has important consequences for the current policy debate, which views the introduction of privacy controls as being harmful to advertising outcomes [19].

There are limitations to this research. First, the randomized experiment was conducted by a nonprofit with an appealing cause. Consumers may be ready to ascribe less pernicious motives to

an nonprofit than to a for-profit company when they observe their advertising. Second, this randomized experiment was conducted at a time when privacy concerns were particularly sensitive and salient in consumers' eyes. Though, the analysis deploys controls for the extent of the publicity surrounding privacy and Facebook, it is not clear how the results would change when the introduction of controls is not so heavily publicized by the media. Third, the analysis focuses on a particular platform with a specific business model and community of users and the results cannot be extrapolated more generally to other websites or situations without further analysis. Fourth, it is not clear how long the measured positive effects persisted after the introduction of privacy controls for personalized advertising. Fifth, it is difficult to project general economic effects of such policy change without more information on the penetration of personalized advertising on platforms like Facebook. Last, the type of privacy control introduced by Facebook was just one of a myriad of potential ways that social networks or other advertising-supported websites could have used to give control over their privacy settings to their users. Notwithstanding these limitations, this paper does provide initial evidence of how addressing privacy concerns of consumers is important for online advertising venues.

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## Notes

<sup>1</sup>There is some evidence, however, that such individual-controls imposed costs on the systems considering adopting the privacy controls [29, 10]

<sup>2</sup><http://epic.org/privacy/inrefacebook/EPIC-FacebookComplaint.pdf>.

<sup>3</sup>Earlier versions of this paper demonstrated robustness to a logit model. Since this was achieved by simply converting the aggregate-level data to be on the individual level, the results were similar.

<sup>4</sup>The online web appendix replicates the natural experiment by using data from an online survey that tested consumer reactions to different online ads. These ads displayed either unique or not-at-all-unique private information that the same consumer had supplied earlier, in contexts where respondents either felt they had control over their personal information or that they did not. The results from this experiment confirm the earlier findings and, by explicitly measuring stated reactance, provide support for a behavioral mechanism where reactance is reduced for highly personal advertising if consumers perceive they have control over their privacy.

Figure 1: Comparison in Click-Through Rates Before and After




Figure 2: Comparison in Click-Through Rates Before and After




Table 1: Campaign appeals in different conditions

Information used to target ad	College	Interest
Targeted and Personalized	As a [undergraduate institution name] graduate you had the benefit of a great education. Help girls in East Africa change their lives through education.	As a fan of [name of celebrity] you know that strong women matter. Help girls in East Africa change their lives through education.
Targeted and Non-Personalized	You had the benefit of a great education. Help girls in East Africa change their lives through education.	You know that strong women matter. Help girls in East Africa change their lives through education.

Table 2: Summary statistics

	Mean	Std Dev	Min	Max
Average Impressions	15694.0	47807.1	337	376528
Average Click-Through (Percentage Points)	0.023	0.14	0	3.13
Ad-Reach (000)	95	210	9,800	990,000
Average Cost Per Click	0.38	0.095	0.11	0.50
Cost per 1000 views	0.095	0.11	0	0.39
News Article containing 'Facebook' & 'Privacy'	61.1	39.7	10	210
Major Newspaper Articles containing 'Facebook' & 'Privacy'	3.24	1.54	1	7
Google Searches	75.7	7.46	62	91
Words Devoted to News	37887	39559	1160	152240

Campaign-level data. 79 Different Campaigns (78 campaigns based on 39 different target groups each with personalized and targeted variants. 1 untargeted campaign). Table A-1 in the appendix clarifies the different sources of each of these pieces of data.

Table 3: After introduction of improved privacy controls, personalized advertising became more effective

	No Controls (1)	Controls News (2)	Combined (3)	Lags (4)	Lags 2 (5)	Specialized vs. Main (6)	Word- Weighted (7)
Personalized $\times$ PostPolicy	0.0236** (0.0102)	0.0246** (0.0100)	0.0174** (0.00358)	0.0191*** (0.00218)	0.0212*** (0.00181)	0.0161*** (0.00144)	0.0168*** (0.00140)
Personalized	-0.0119* (0.00627)	-0.106 (0.106)	0.339 (0.187)	0.309 (0.151)	0.297 (0.139)	0.106 (0.176)	0.133 (0.232)
Personalized Ad $\times$ News Articles		0.0185 (0.0214)	0.0510 (0.0531)	0.0644 (0.0746)	0.0660 (0.0752)		
Personalized Ad $\times$ Google Searches			-0.139 (0.0976)	-0.139 (0.0988)	-0.134 (0.0952)	-0.0200 (0.0460)	-0.0260 (0.0570)
Personalized Ad $\times$ News Articles (Lag)				-0.0102 (0.0152)	0.0158 (0.0194)		
Personalized Ad $\times$ News Articles (Lag 2)					-0.0305*** (0.00518)		
Personalized Ad $\times$ Major Newspapers						-0.00278 (0.00353)	
Personalized Ad $\times$ Specialized News						-0.0124 (0.00768)	
Personalized Ad $\times$ Major Newspapers (Lag)						0.00420 (0.00457)	
Personalized Ad $\times$ Specialized News (Lag)						-0.00312* (0.00130)	
Personalized Ad $\times$ Major News (words)							-0.00153 (0.00153)
Personalized Ad $\times$ Specialized News (words)							-0.00238 (0.00195)
Date Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Targeted Group Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	2730	2730	2730	2730	2730	2730	2730
R <sup>2</sup>	0.060	0.060	0.061	0.061	0.061	0.061	0.060

OLS Estimates. Dependent variable is percentage daily click through rate for each of 79 campaigns.

Robust standard errors clustered at ad-level. \*  $p < .10$ , \*\*  $p < .05$ , \*\*\*  $p < .01$

*PostPolicy<sub>it</sub>* is collinear with the date fixed effects and dropped from the specification.

Table 4: Looking at different time windows

	10 Day		Excluding 10 Day		Excluding 20 Day	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Personalized $\times$ PostPolicy	0.0554*** (0.0208)	0.0505** (0.0229)	0.0149** (0.00711)	0.0161** (0.00786)	0.0235** (0.0105)	0.0205*** (0.00723)
Personalized	-0.0112 (0.0115)	0.0106 (0.0404)	-0.0141*** (0.00464)	0.286 (0.312)	-0.00528** (0.00248)	0.0248 (0.0355)
Date Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Targeting Variable Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
News+Search Controls	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes
Observations	780	780	1872	1872	1326	1326
$R^2$	0.118	0.119	0.044	0.043	0.052	0.045

OLS Estimates. Dependent variable is percentage daily click-through rate for each of 79 campaigns. Robust standard errors clustered at ad-level. \*  $p < .10$ , \*\*  $p < .05$ , \*\*\*  $p < .01$ .  $PostPolicy_t$  is collinear with the date fixed effects and dropped from the specification.



Table 5: Mechanism: Role of rarity of information

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	No Controls	Controls	Lags	Lags 2	Specialized vs. Main	Word-Weighted
Post-Policy × Personalized × Ad-Reach	-0.0852** (0.0421)	-0.0852*** (0.0312)	-0.0852*** (0.0313)	-0.0852*** (0.0312)	-0.0852*** (0.0313)	-0.0852*** (0.0312)
Post-Policy × Personalized	0.0317** (0.0147)	0.0262** (0.0112)	0.0273*** (0.00996)	0.0293*** (0.0102)	0.0242** (0.0107)	0.0250** (0.0119)
Personalized	-0.0153** (0.00670)	0.294 (0.363)	0.306 (0.268)	0.293 (0.267)	0.102 (0.250)	0.129 (0.266)
Personalized × Ad-Reach	0.0354 (0.0214)	0.0354* (0.0209)	0.0354* (0.0210)	0.0354* (0.0210)	0.0354* (0.0211)	0.0354* (0.0210)
Post-Policy × Ad-Reach	0.0150 (0.0350)	0.0150 (0.0204)	0.0150 (0.0204)	0.0150 (0.0203)	0.0150 (0.0204)	0.0150 (0.0204)
Personalized Ad × Number Facebook News Articles		0.0467 (0.0355)				
Personalized Ad × Google Facebook Privacy Searches		-0.124 (0.108)	-0.139** (0.0620)	-0.134** (0.0616)	-0.0200 (0.0588)	-0.0260 (0.0607)
Personalized Ad × News Articles			0.0644* (0.0342)	0.0660* (0.0342)		
Personalized Ad × News Articles (Lag)			-0.0102 (0.0206)	0.0158 (0.0237)		
Personalized Ad × News Articles (Lag 2)				-0.0305* (0.0176)		
Personalized Ad × Major Newspapers					-0.00278 (0.00955)	
Personalized Ad × Specialized News					-0.0124* (0.00663)	
Personalized Ad × Major Newspapers (Lag)					0.00420 (0.00781)	
Personalized Ad × Specialized News (Lag)					-0.00312 (0.00918)	
Personalized Ad × Major News (words)						-0.00153 (0.00282)
Personalized Ad × Specialized News (words)						-0.00238 (0.00187)
Date Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Targeted Group Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	2730	2730	2730	2730	2730	2730
R <sup>2</sup>	0.062	0.062	0.062	0.063	0.062	0.062

OLS Estimates. Dependent variable is percentage daily click-through rate for each of 79 campaigns.

Robust standard errors clustered at ad-level. \*  $p < .10$ , \*\*  $p < .05$ , \*\*\*  $p < .01$

*PostPolicy<sub>it</sub>* is collinear with the date fixed effects and dropped from the specification. *Ad-Reach<sub>k</sub>* is collinear with the fixed effects for the group targeted and also dropped from the specification.

Table 6: Mechanism: Role of privacy setting Usage

	No Controls	Controls	Lags	Lags 2	Specialized vs. Main	Word-Weighted
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Personalized $\times$ Postpolicy $\times$ PrivacyControlUse	0.0942** (0.0419)	0.0942** (0.0419)	0.0942** (0.0418)	0.0942** (0.0419)	0.0942** (0.0419)	0.0942** (0.0419)
Personalized $\times$ PostPolicy	0.0375*** (0.0126)	0.0314*** (0.0113)	0.0331*** (0.0115)	0.0351*** (0.0117)	0.0300** (0.0117)	0.0308** (0.0128)
Personalized	-0.0119* (0.00627)	0.339 (0.266)	0.309 (0.268)	0.297 (0.267)	0.106 (0.250)	0.133 (0.266)
Postpolicy $\times$ PrivacyControlUse	0.00394 (0.0398)	0.00394 (0.0396)	0.00394 (0.0396)	0.00394 (0.0396)	0.00394 (0.0396)	0.00394 (0.0397)
Personalized Ad $\times$ News Articles		0.0510*** (0.0191)	0.0644* (0.0341)	0.0660* (0.0341)		
Personalized Ad $\times$ Google Searches		-0.139** (0.0619)	-0.139** (0.0620)	-0.134** (0.0615)	-0.0200 (0.0588)	-0.0260 (0.0606)
Personalized Ad $\times$ News Articles (Lag)			-0.0102 (0.0206)	0.0158 (0.0236)		
Personalized Ad $\times$ News Articles (Lag 2)				-0.0305* (0.0175)		
Personalized Ad $\times$ Major Newspapers					-0.00278 (0.00954)	
Personalized Ad $\times$ Specialized News					-0.0124* (0.00662)	
Personalized Ad $\times$ Major Newspapers (Lag)					0.00420 (0.00781)	
Personalized Ad $\times$ Specialized News (Lag)					-0.00312 (0.00918)	
Personalized Ad $\times$ Major News (words)						-0.00153 (0.00282)
Personalized Ad $\times$ Specialized News (words)						-0.00238 (0.00186)
Date Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Targeted Group Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	2730	2730	2730	2730	2730	2730
$R^2$	0.061	0.062	0.062	0.062	0.062	0.061

OLS Estimates. Dependent variable is percentage daily click-through rate for each of 79 campaigns.

Robust standard errors clustered at ad-level. \*  $p < .10$ , \*\*  $p < .05$ , \*\*\*  $p < .01$

$PostPolicy_t$  is collinear with the date fixed effects and dropped from the specification.  $PrivacyControlUse$  is collinear with the fixed effects for the group targeted and also dropped from the specification.

## A Data Appendix

Table A-1: Sources of data used in the study

Data Variable	Data Source
Impressions	Facebook Campaign Data Provided by the nonprofit
Clicks	Facebook Campaign Data Provided by the nonprofit
Ad-Reach (000000)	Facebook Campaign Data Provided by the nonprofit
Average Cost Per Click	Facebook Campaign Data Provided by the nonprofit
Cost per 1000 views	Facebook Campaign Data Provided by the nonprofit
Daily volume of News Articles mentioning Facebook and Privacy	Factiva Database: <a href="http://global.factiva.com">http://global.factiva.com</a>
Daily volume of Words Devoted to News	Factiva Database: <a href="http://global.factiva.com">http://global.factiva.com</a>
Google Searches using Facebook and Privacy	Google Trends <a href="http://www.google.com/trends/">www.google.com/trends/</a>
Facebook users in that interest-group using privacy controls for social advertising	Facebook Campaign Data Provided by the nonprofit 2-years after the initial field test

Table A-2: Top 10 U.S. online display ad publishers Q3 2010

Website	Display Ad Impressions (MM)	Share of Display Ad Impressions
Facebook.com	297,046	23.1
Yahoo! Sites	140,949	11.0
Microsoft Sites	64,009	5.0
Fox Interactive Media	48,252	3.8
Google Sites	35,043	2.7
AOL, Inc.	32,330	2.5
Turner Network	21,268	1.7
Glam Media	13,274	1.0
eBay	8,421	0.7
ESPN	8,261	0.6

*Source: comScore Ad Metrix. Display ads include static and rich media ads.*

Table A-3: Timeline for Facebook growth, privacy and advertising

Date	Event
February 2004	Facebook launched from Harvard dorm room.
November 2007	Facebook launches 'Facebook ads'. Advertising pilot involving 'beacons' (small 1x1 pixel web bugs) allows Facebook to track users' movements over other websites for purposes of targeting.
December 2007	Facebook makes Beacon an opt-out service after negative publicity.
September 2009	Beacon ad targeting program shut down amid class-action suit.
November 2009	Facebook changes its default settings to publicly reveal more of its users' information that had previously only been available to Facebook users. This information could now be tracked by third-party search engines.
December 9 2009	Privacy settings are entirely removed from certain categories of users' information. These categories include the user's name, profile photo, list of friends and pages they were a fan of, gender, geographic region, and networks the user was connected to. They are instead labeled as publicly available to everyone, and can only be partially controlled by limiting search privacy settings. Founder Mark Zuckerberg's photos are apparently inadvertently made public by the change in settings.
December 17 2009	Coalition of privacy groups led by the Electronic Frontier Foundation files a complaint with Federal Trade Commission over changes to privacy settings
April 2010	Facebook users' General Information becomes publicly exposed whenever they connect to certain applications or websites such as the online review site Yelp. General Information includes users' name and their friends' names, profile pictures, gender, user IDs, connections, and any content shared using the Everyone privacy setting.
May 12 2010	New York Times publishes article entitled 'Facebook Privacy: A Bewildering Tangle of Options' [6]. This ignites a firestorm of negative press about Facebook and privacy.
Monday May 24 2010	Facebook founder Mark Zuckerberg announces in an editorial in the Washington Post that Facebook will institute new privacy settings
Wednesday May 26 2010	Facebook unveils new privacy settings in press event
Thursday May 27 2010	Facebook starts rollout of privacy settings. New York Times publishes 'A Guide to Facebook's New Privacy Settings'.
Saturday May 29 2010	First reports of new privacy setting controls being seen by users

*Additional Sources: Facebook's official public timeline; 'Facebook's Eroding Privacy Policy: A Timeline': Electronic Frontier Foundation April 2010.*

Table A-4: There were only small changes in Facebook user composition

Proportion of Group	April 2010	May 2010	June 2010
Age <17	10.4	10.6	11.4
Age 18-24	19.2	19.4	18.6
Age 25-34	20.8	20.7	20.8
Age 35-44	20.4	19.9	19.9
Age 45-54	16.7	16.5	16.5
Age 55-64	8	8.1	8.1
Age 65+	4.6	4.8	4.7
Income <\$15k	10.1	10.3	9.7
Income \$15-24k	6.2	6.1	5.9
Income \$25-39k	12.5	12.7	13.5
Income \$40-59k	22.1	22	24.2
Income \$60-74k	10.9	11.3	9.6
Income \$75-99k	16.8	16.3	15.3
Income \$100k+	21.5	21.2	21.8
Male	47.2	47.1	48.2
Female	52.8	52.9	51.8
Total Unique Visitors	121 Million	130 Million	141 Million

*Source: Comscore Marketer Database*

Table A-5: There was little change in how Facebook users used the website

Date	Average Stay	Visits / Person	Pages / Visit
Dec-09	21:29	22.27	29.46
Jan-10	23:06	22.15	33.52
Feb-10	22:14	21.08	35.33
Mar-10	21:30	23.4	29:00
Apr-10	21:54	23.27	25.45
May-10	22:39	24.9	27.27
Jun-10	21:50	24.37	24.78
Jul-10	22:28	24.61	28.64
Aug-10	22:28	26.86	30.33
Sep-10	22:25	26.12	27.49
Oct-10	24:30	26.52	24.64
Nov-10	24:56	26.55	23.86
Dec-10	25:48	26.46	24.24

Source: Compete, Inc

Table A-6: Test of whether there was a change in the types of ads were being shown before and after the introduction of improved privacy controls

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
PostPolicy	-77.71 (117.9)	-108.6 (236.1)	-17.32 (70.60)	26.90 (163.6)
PostPolicy × School Indicator		-60.14 (241.3)		71.91 (170.9)
PostPolicy × Ad Reach			633.0 (923.0)	710.1 (908.0)
Targeted Group Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	2730	2730	2730	2730
$R^2$	0.050	0.050	0.051	0.051

OLS Estimates. Dependent variable is number of times each ad is shown.


Robust standard errors clustered at ad-level. \*  $p < .10$ , \*\*  $p < .05$ , \*\*\*  $p < .01$

$Ad-Reach_k$  and  $School$  are collinear with the fixed effects for the group targeted and also dropped from the specification.

Column (2) suggests that it was not the case that more ads associated with undergraduate institutions were shown after the introduction of improved privacy controls. Column (3) suggests it was not the case that ads that had a larger potential reach, for example ads associated with famous celebrities, were shown more frequently after the introduction of improved privacy controls. Column (4) combines these two measures and again finds no significant change after the policy in terms of what ads were shown. A specification which interacted the 39 groups targeted with the  $Postpolicy$  indicator produced no significant interactions.

## B The change in privacy controls

Figure A-1: Facebook: Screenshots of privacy options before and after the introduction of privacy controls



Source: Gawker Media

## **A-1 Exhibit A: Facebook's Notification to Advertisers: May 26, 2010**

Facebook will roll out changes today that will make it easier for our users to understand and control their privacy settings. As this change will have an impact on our users, we wanted to let you, a valued advertising partner, know about it. Please note that this change will not affect your advertising campaigns and there is no action required on your part.

Facebook is a company that moves quickly, constantly innovating and launching new products to improve the user experience. The feedback we heard from users was that in our efforts to innovate, some of our privacy settings had become confusing.

We believe in listening to our users and taking their feedback into account whenever possible. We think the following changes address these concerns by providing users with more control over their privacy settings and making them more simple to use.

Starting today, Facebook will:

- \* Provide an easy-to-use “master” control that enables users to set who can see the content they share through Facebook. This enables users to choose, with just one click, the overall privacy level they’re comfortable with for the content they share on Facebook. Of course, users can still use all of the granular controls we’ve always offered, if they wish.
- \* Significantly reduce the amount of information that must be visible to everyone on Facebook. Facebook will no longer require that users’ friends and connections are visible to everyone. Only Name, Profile Picture, Networks and Gender must be publicly available. Users can opt to make all other connections private.
- \* Make it simple to control whether other applications and websites access any user information. While a majority of our users love Facebook apps and Facebook-enhanced websites, some may prefer not to share their information outside of Facebook. Users can now opt out with just one click.

I encourage you to take a moment to read our CEO Mark Zuckerberg's blog post and check out the new Facebook Privacy Page.

Thanks, The Facebook Ads Team