



<http://www.diva-portal.org>

Postprint

This is the accepted version of a paper published in *Journal of Political Marketing*. This paper has been peer-reviewed but does not include the final publisher proof-corrections or journal pagination.

Citation for the original published paper (version of record):

Simons, G. (2016)

Stability and Change in Putin's Political Image during the 2000 and 2012 Presidential Elections:
Putin 1.0 and Putin 2.0?

Journal of Political Marketing

<http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/15377857.2016.1151114>


Access to the published version may require subscription.

N.B. When citing this work, cite the original published paper.

This is an Accepted Manuscript of an article published by Taylor & Francis
in *Journal of Political Marketing* on 16 Feb 2016, available online: <http://www.tandfonline.com/10.1080/15377857.2016.1151114>

Permanent link to this version:

<http://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:uu:diva-277000>



Stability and Change in Putin's Political Image during the 2000 and 2012 Presidential Elections: Putin 1.0 and Putin 2.0?

Greg Simons

To cite this article: Greg Simons (2016): Stability and Change in Putin's Political Image during the 2000 and 2012 Presidential Elections: Putin 1.0 and Putin 2.0?, Journal of Political Marketing, DOI: [10.1080/15377857.2016.1151114](https://doi.org/10.1080/15377857.2016.1151114)

To link to this article: <http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/15377857.2016.1151114>



Accepted author version posted online: 16 Feb 2016.



Submit your article to this journal [↗](#)



View related articles [↗](#)



View Crossmark data [↗](#)

Stability and Change in Putin's Political Image During the 2000 and 2012 Presidential Elections: Putin 1.0 and Putin 2.0?

Greg Simons

Swedish National Defence College and Uppsala University, Sweden

Address correspondence to Greg Simons.

Abstract

There has been a lot of research done on 'Western' politicians and the political systems with regards to political marketing. But what about other countries, and especially those that possess a different political standard? This article seeks to address one particular Russian politician – Vladimir Putin. He rose from obscurity to become Russia's second president (after Boris Yeltsin). Two presidential elections form the focus of attention, 2000 and 2012. The aim is to try and discover the consistencies and breaks in the manufacturing of Putin's political image and reputation. A number of breaks and continuities were discovered in terms of how Putin is marketed. This seems to be a reflection of the changes taking places in Russia's political environment, which then needs to be taken into consideration when political marketing is conducted.

Keywords: political image, political reputation management, President Vladimir Putin, presidential elections, Russia

INTRODUCTION

Political marketing is becoming an essential tool in politics around the globe. It is an indispensable informational tool to present the image and reputation of political figures to the general public. Understanding how this is achieved is an important skill in understanding or at least trying to make sense of the formalities of a democratic system, especially when political marketing is combined with elections. In spite of arguments concerning the level of democracy in Russia (the strength and viability), it does hold elections, which heightens political competition and risk, and the search for a competitive edge over rivals.

This paper shall look at and analyse the aspects of consistency and change in the projected political image of Vladimir Putin from his first presidential election campaign in the year 2000 with his most recent election campaign for the 2012 election. A fundamental question shall be analysed in the paper: does a Putin 1.0 and 2.0 exist or not? Political marketing shall be used as the lens with which to view and to make sense of the collected empirical material.

In the first election campaign Putin was an unknown figure thrust in to the public light at the end of President Boris Yeltsin's chaotic rule. What were the projected images of this new comer to Russian politics, and how did these connect with public expectations/hopes? How did he interact with the Russian public and what were the narratives and slogans he used to carry his message?

By 2012, Putin was a well-established figure in Russian politics. He had served two terms as President and one term as Prime Minister. Yet there were some new challenges to face when he ran for office in the presidential elections, not least of which was the growing voice of political protest in major urban areas. Additionally, he now had a legacy as a political figure, which included

his serving eight years as President of Russia. The results were mixed, carrying different meaning for different groups; the decrease in the level of individual freedoms versus a stronger and more assertive Russia on the international stage.

POLITICAL MARKETING

Before moving to the subject of political marketing, it is necessary to differentiate between two broad categories within the sphere of marketing in general. The first category is *transaction marketing*, which focuses upon singular purchases and does not build a relationship with its audience. In this scenario, the communicator tries to win the target audience over repeatedly, without regard to any previous contact and/or transactions. The other category is *relationship marketing*, within the Nordic School the customer is seen as an active participant in the process and a potential adder of value. Thus the communicator and the audience have a joint responsibility for the final result (Johansen 2005, 88).

The distinction between *transaction marketing* and *relationship marketing* is the latter centres on value creation and not solely value distribution of the former. “Products are only facilitators of value. Instead, value for customers is created through the relationship and interactions between the customer and service provider” (Johansen 2005, 88). Thus, for the purposes of this article, *relationship marketing* provides a more appropriate variant for understanding the process of communications between domestic audiences and Vladimir Putin.

As an initial point of departure, stock needs to be taken of the current debate and understanding of political marketing. There is an inconclusive debate as to whether political marketing is something new or that has existed for some time. Arguments by scholars are divided on the issue. However, what is clear is that political marketing has become an integral part of the

political process only recently (since the 1990s) (Wring 1997; Egan 1999; Henneberg and O'Shaughnessy 2007). The discipline is linked to the issue of electioneering, and there has been criticism of the role played by political marketing in the process. One of the primary concerns is the belief that it "is responsible for reducing important messages to glib phrases or soundbites and, potentially, removing rationality from the electorates' decision-making" However, Egan argues that "successful politicians have always recognised the importance of image over issues" (Egan 1999, 496; Henneberg 2004, 229). Therefore, the situation is dependent upon the perception of the images and the rhetoric, rather than the substance.

An example of a definition that is used within political marketing is provided by Wring (1997, 653), who conceives it as "the party or candidate's use of opinion research and environmental analysis to produce and promote a competitive offering which will help realise organisational aims and satisfy groups of electors in exchange for their votes." The hook for the communicator is to create something that is attention grabbing, and then draws the audience in to a relationship with the messenger.

From an organisational perspective, with the focus being on the audience where the central significance of intellectual capital being a major asset is stressed on a continuous basis, means that a strong organisation should be a decentralised one that is in close proximity to the market. In doing so, this brings the audience closer to the 'production process' and shall determine the success or otherwise, of the communication (in meeting organisational objectives) (Johansen 2005, 91). In some regards, political marketing is an attempt to project belief to the voting public in the politician's or political party's ability to govern (by creating the image of competence and trustworthiness – highlighting intangible assets), something that is emotive in nature and not a clear cut policy platform, but there is a need to remove the perception of risk among sceptical

target audiences' (O'Shaughnessy 2001, 1048; Butler and Collins 1994, 20). Certain issues come to the fore during periods of political tension (such as during elections), which is tailored to the public's perception in its value symbolism (O'Shaughnessy 2001, 1050; Lock and Harris 1996, 17). One of the mechanisms that are used to highlight key issues is language. However, whilst language is a good tool for directing perception it simultaneously limits it (O'Shaughnessy 2001, 1056) by narrowing the perceived choices in options and opinions. Indeed, politicians and political parties attempt to 'brand' policies and ideas, then they try to create barriers in order to 'own' certain issues (Butler and Collins 1994, 22). This is a means to try and lever the perception of political product differentiation in order to increase the attractiveness and distinctiveness of the political brand to the electorate.

An organisation must carefully consider and prepare itself before communicating with such an audience. In order for a communicator to succeed in an information environment as this one "the marketing philosophy needs to be a totally integrated concept underlying all activities conducted by the organisation and deeply embedded in the minds of all employees" (Johansen 2005, 91). Intellectual capital is a key element in the process, which drives the process and relationships. It witnesses the coming together of employees, network partners, customers (audience) and company culture, this combines knowledge and relationships within the marketing context (Johansen 2005, 92). Political marketing certainly contains value as an organising concept, however, it is not a miracle working tool that can be used as a standalone mechanism for all problems (O'Shaughnessy 2001, 1047). This rule is easily overlooked when information technologies are employed, often with high expectations from the users.

Dominic Wring from Loughborough University, provides three factors for the advent and increase in the use of political marketing (in a Western/liberal democracy context). In recent

decades there has been an increasing level of voter volatility, which has been matched by an interest in understanding electoral behaviour through the application of rational choice theory. This is compared to a business that seeks to expand its market share. The second reason/factor is the changing nature of the economic base, from industrial sector to tertiary sector focus. These changes have been consolidated through the use of marketing, which is a key component of the tertiary sector. The approach and techniques of marketing have now become an indispensable component in fighting modern election campaigns. An increase in attention and importance has been attached to management in the non-profit sector, of which politics is a part. This in turn has drawn a greater focus on identifying and analysing political marketing as a concept and a practice (Wring 1999). One of the important points, which are becoming increasingly voiced, is the fact that political marketing does not start and finish with an election, it is an ongoing practice (Henneberg 2004, 235; Wring 1999). How does the Russian system compare to studies in Western/liberal democratic political environments?

RUSSIAN PUBLIC OPINION

The rise of political consultants has been spectacular over the recent decades, events in Russia reflect this trend. How Russian elections have been fought, from the late Soviet to the current period has changed markedly. There has been an increasing level of participation from political consultants, who in some ways try to act as a bridge between the electorate and the political candidate. Political consultants research and locate public mood and sentiment. Then seek to construct a suitable political brand/image through political marketing that appeals to those prevailing moods and sentiments. Those that are successful in bridging the gap get elected.

Initially, there was a foreign presence, such as Boris Yeltsin's critical presidential campaign in 1996 in the wake of the First Chechen War. However, this has not meant a straightforward transfer of American knowledge and practice to the Russian environment. Campaign methodologies and electoral technologies have advanced well beyond this and a thriving internal industry has developed (Hutcheson 2007, 50). This serves as a basis for political candidates to be able to research, understand and connect to what the Russian public want.

In the run-up to the 2000 presidential elections, the electorate knew very little about Vladimir Putin, who he was and what he stood for in terms of policy. This was off-set by the lack of what were seen as being worthy or viable alternative candidates, and the beginning of the Second Chechen War in 1999 (which was popular among voters at the time).¹ The years of chaos and instability under President Boris Yeltsin produced a strong desire for order and stability. In one poll, which was widely quoted, approximately one third of respondents said that they were prepared to give up some freedom/liberty in return for stability Speaker's Advisory Group on Russia 2000, 174).

A number of opinions changed between 2000 and 2012, which were picked up by opinion polls. The polling agency FOM (Public Opinion Foundation) conducted a poll on 12–13 May 2012 to determine what the Russian public wanted and expected from their president. Some 1500 people in 43 Russian regions were questioned. Only 29% favoured the policy that he pursued from 1999–2008, 53% wanted him to change his policy. There was a demand for greater attention to be paid to health care, education and a greater social focus in general (such as on developing the economy, lowering prices, increasing wages, fighting crime and corruption). 38% of respondents stated that with his accumulated experience as president, he should have an easier time during this presidency than during the previous two.²

2000 RUSSIAN PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS – PUTIN 1.0

Professionals had carefully nurtured Vladimir Putin's public image in the PR business. There have been very few lapses, which contradict the carefully manufactured image. In 1996, prior to Putin's rapid rise to prominence, he was an unemployed city official from St. Petersburg. Through contacts he was able to initiate a series of events which would lead him to several high-ranking government service jobs in the Kremlin's bureaucratic apparatus. His patron was the Kremlin's Chief of Staff, Pavel Borodin (Putin 2000, 125).

Putin rose rapidly through the ranks of the civil service, culminating in his appointment as the director of the FSB in 1998 (the FSB-Federal Security Service is the successor of the KGB). After Yeltsin had selected Putin to be his eventual successor, a flurry of activity was aimed at building a suitable image for the heir apparent. His earlier career in the KGB and low public profile gave the PR people a 'blank canvas' on which to create the desired image. Within the Russian context, the KGB had a more positive connotation owing to its reputation as being one of the least corrupt institutions of the Soviet period, i.e. that it worked in the national interest, rather than self-interest.

Mass media were the selected means of carrying the Putin 1.0 image and message to the Russian voting public. It was geared at delivering a uniform message to the largest audience possible. This was assisted by the fact that a polls conducted in 2000 discovered that 90% of those interviewed stated that television was the main source of political news (Lipman and McFaul 2001, 124; see White and Oates 2003 for further information on the influence of television). And the state has a dominant presence in the sphere of national television (White, Oates, and McAllister

2005, 195), which is utilised as an *administrative resource*.³ In the following, I will discuss how this was realised.

Putin: The Creation of a Popular Figure

Although Putin had been chosen by Yeltsin to succeed him, a distance between the two politicians needed to be established. Yeltsin had negative connotations associated with his public persona, which presented a problem. Yeltsin's image was tarnished by years of corruption, health problems, alcoholism, nepotism and a devastated economy. He needed to offer a candidate which appeared to be the opposite of what he appeared to be, if he was to be successful in having his candidate accepted by the public on voting day.

Putin set out to establish himself as a young, vital and energetic man of action by opening a campaign against the breakaway republic Chechnya after a Chechen incursion into Dagestan and the Moscow apartment bombings. His leadership style, and perhaps appeal to mobilising nationalist sentiment were effective capturing the votes of a weary public (Colton and Hale 2009, 477). But this was only one of the professional traits, which he sought to create. The following are some of the means used by Putin to establish his personal credentials in the eyes of the voting public.

Putin travelled widely around Russia-trying to distance himself from a Moscow centric approach. The all-inclusive approach brings the meaning that everyone matters, from the biggest city to the smallest village. He rode in Moscow's suburban trains and chatted with commuters-this act establishes the premise that Putin is able to relate to the 'ordinary' man in the street. Putin was the dinner guest of an ordinary Kazan family-once again demonstrating his close proximity to the problems of ordinary Russians that he is able to understand and empathise with the populace and

is not above them. He met with women at a textile factory in Ivanovo-in this move Putin appears to demonstrate that he values the female constituency as well by attempting to court women voters (something which Yeltsin never did). Putin also spent a night on a nuclear submarine and flew in a military jet over Chechnya-these actions were to demonstrate Putin's ability to be an effective Commander-in-Chief, by virtue of the fact that he has spent time with 'his' men on 'dangerous' military duties (Brown 2001, 172).

Putin's creation of self-image is fraught with possible dangers, but the power of his creation of self lies in what this self represents. "Selfhood [...] is a chronically unstable productivity brought situationally-not invariably-to some form of imaginary order, to some purpose, as realised in the course of culturally patterned interactions (Battaglia 1995, 2)." That is to say, that Putin's 'new' image needs to be constantly reinforced and must evolve in a society if the message is to remain effective. An image cannot be created and then left to its own devices, because the message design will ultimately fail. In a time of great upheaval, during the last of Yeltsin's period of *bespredel*, Putin came to be represented as stability, law and order. This is what the public appeared to demand.

The Making of a President

The PR strategy has been aimed at showing Putin as an honest and apolitical political figure. This strategy was stepped up during the election campaign. Putin's image 'minders' wanted to show that he was not an ordinary politician, but an honest person who cares deeply about Russia. During the presidential race, Putin never actually issued a programme. Instead he published an open letter to voters which outlined Russia's problems. The open letter offered no concrete

solutions, only a promise to tackle the problems and to restore Russia's former greatness (Brown 2001, 172).

News often showed favourable coverage of Putin, surrounded by supporters. A positive spin was also put on his refusal to participate in televised debates. Putin was promoted as Russia's new face, while depicting his opponents as relics of the Yeltsin era. This was in spite of the fact that Putin was Yeltsin's handpicked successor. A majority of news coverage was devoted to following Putin. The positive spin could be maintained in spite of the saturation coverage, because Putin only gave interviews to sympathetic reporters (Brown 2001, 332).

Putin faced relatively few risks of adverse publicity in his carefully managed PR campaign. He was never 'exposed' to 'hostile' reporters, never put in an unpredictable environment (such as a televised political debate) and generally was able to choose the time and place of his interviews. This situation was able to secure Putin with a guaranteed outcome, prior to any interview. Putin was able to maintain a moral ascendancy over the interviewer, which promoted the appearance of a strong leader.

By refusing to be drawn into a conventional campaign Putin was possibly able to distance himself in the public psyche from the largely discredited politicians. Additionally, by stating the obvious with regard to Russia's problems, he displayed an empathy and greater understanding of the average public feeling by putting into words what few if any politicians would dare say. If he had promised various measures and they failed, Putin would have been held to account personally, by the public. This way ensured that there was nothing of substance he could be held to account for, he merely mouthed public sentiment and aspirations. Putin won the March 2000 presidential elections in the first round. The next presidential elections were due in 2004.

Maintaining the Image

During Putin's two years in office, numerous opinion polls have been conducted concerning President and his leadership. A portion of these polls relates to Putin's popularity rating as Russia's leader. The majority of the polls give Putin high ratings, as much as 70–80% approval ratings. A possible effect of these polls would be to reinforce an image in the public's mind that Putin is a very popular leader, without regard to how the polls deduced their statistics. The newspaper *Novye Izvestia* raised the above issues well on November 28, 2001 in the article *Putin's Rating Needs Verification*.⁴

On the whole Putin's public image did not face a serious challenge to the created perception. The sole exception to this occurred when the Kursk incident was initially mishandled, when Putin did not immediately break from his holiday. The Presidential Press Service, who normally look after the President's PR needs, were absent on this occasion. The Kursk sank on 12 August 2000, which was in the middle of a series of political repositioning and consolidation as a result of a change in power (Putin succeeding Yeltsin). There was a lot of jostling occurring in political circles, ambitious politicians seeking the new President's favour and patronage and the opposition repositioning themselves.

On August 8, 2000 a metro underpass at Pushkin Square was bombed. Putin was also in the midst of bringing 'rogue' oligarchs to heel, Vladimir Gusinsky of *Media-Most* and Boris Berezovsky of *Logovaz*. This was being done to ensure governmental control of television broadcasting (channels with nationwide coverage). These distractions permitted a brief breakdown in the otherwise a well-managed public image of the President. The break was brief and therefore no permanent damage to Putin's public image seems to have occurred at the time.

A more broad-based effort was then developed to create and cultivate a desired image. Some measure of control has been secured over the mass media through a mixture of legislation and intimidation (such as the raids on *Media-Most* in May 2000). One of the means used to reinforce an idealised image of Putin is through a proliferation of biographies. Among the first of these was *First Person*, by Vladimir Putin. This book portrays a very 'correct' picture of an 'ordinary man' who is devoted to his family and Russia (Putin, 2000).

Former military journalist Oleg Blotsky (working in the propaganda section) undertook a trilogy with the blessing of Vladimir Putin (Sergei Yastrzhembsky, the presidential aide, acted as the go-between).⁵ Blotsky's volumes to date include, *Vladimir Putin: A Life History* (volume 1) and *Vladimir Putin: A Rise to Power* (volume 2). This series of biographies appears to be aimed at manufacturing a very serene, modest and sincere portrait of the Putins.

An anti-thesis to the official oriented versions appeared in Moscow on December 25, 2001. The book featuring the Putin family, *Piquant Friendship* was written by Irene Pietsch. She was an acquaintance of Lyudmila Putina, beginning when Vladimir Putin was stationed in Germany. Several Russian newspapers refused to publish any excerpts from the book. This is most likely due to some unflattering criticism levelled at the President. Most of the criticism seems to refer to chauvinistic and boorish behaviour displayed towards Lyudmila Putina.⁶

Brand Putin: The Beginning

Putin's initial lack of public profile may have been a contributing factor to Yeltsin nominating him as his successor. None of the negative connotations, which plagued many of the more experienced politicians, were associated with Putin. As an unknown factor the PR specialists were better able to create a political figure that would appeal to the public.

The government had control of the media and therefore possessed the means to create and transmit their desired ideal image. Yeltsin ensured that the full resources of the government supported Putin. His impending retirement from political office would leave him in a vulnerable position if a 'non-friendly' politician would win the presidential election.

In stark contrast to Yeltsin's public image of ill health, lethargy, inaction and chaos, Putin was given the chance (with large-scale state media presence on hand) to be portrayed as energetic, youthful, brave and a dedicated family man. The numerous favourable qualities associated with Putin through his widely covered actions showed a man who was determined, patriotic and willing to restore Russia's and the Russians' place in the world. It was recently noted by Boris Dubin, the various successes of Putin's first terms.

So there are differences, but nevertheless the "zero" years in Russia was formed and strengthened the so-called "Putin majority". It is estimated many researchers, no less than 60% of the population, some sociologists have even given him a 70 and it happens that 75%. This "Putin majority" united by the fact that it is more or less similar answers on the sign for Russian identity issues. These combine the answers to the challenges of our time: a positive attitude to the idea of Russia as a great power, the idea that Russia needs a strong personal power of the President or the "first person", reserved and even suspicious attitude toward the West, various degrees of xenophobia, in which the slogan "Russia for the Russian" in some degree shared by more than half of the respondents.⁷

Through a mixture of legal manoeuvring and intimidation, high profile opposition media were pacified. This reduced the availability and access to alternative information (to the government's view) in Russian society. The use of opinion polls has supplemented the Kremlin's

PR strategy by creating the appearance of topics of public debate and consensus reached on the issues discussed.

Lastly, the illusions of the PR generated idealised public image of Putin were reinforced through the use of literature. Rapid successions of politically correct biographies on the Putin family have appeared. These books have been produced under strict supervision and offer a mostly positive and glowing view of Russia's First Family. The appearance of book literature may be an attempt to add greater credence to Putin's ascribed personal qualities by using a more respected and traditional means of conveying the message.

2012 RUSSIAN PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS – PUTIN 2.0

The image of the political leader is made up by a number of different factors. One article noted that a significant “factor is the ratio of the dynamics of positive and negative evaluations of the policy made as a result of direct (observation) or indirect image-forming information (derived from public opinion polls, ratings of confidence etc.).”⁸ According to the article, the influence of the electorate is often underestimated, whereas the policy and image makers’ effect is overestimated.

Marketing Putin to the People: The Electorate

One of the continuities of Putin’s political marketing and projected image was the ‘macho’ aspect of a tough and disciplined leader who favoured sport, not drinking or smoking. This implies an association of someone that takes care and responsibility for their state of health. Linked to this project, in some ways, is Putin as a sex symbol. This is not a random aspect of PR or political marketing, and makes perfect sense when statistics indicate that there are 10 million more women than men in Russia. A multitude of calendars featuring Putin in various poses have been

circulating. Then these images need to be balanced by, according to sociologists, the male segment of the population's desire for the strong hand of the ruler.⁹ Putin was somewhat of a pioneer in Russian politics when he was targeting women voters in the 2000 presidential elections. Women make up one segment of the voting population though, what about other more general tendencies?

One article identified a number of different factors in Putin's political marketing that explain his election victory in 2012. One of these factors is the nature of the Russian electorate, which is largely conservative in nature. Different appeals were made to them, for instance, the contents of Putin's seven articles. A second factor is creating an impression and fear of foreign forces interfering in Russia's domestic affairs. When the leaders of Russia's opposition parties met with US Ambassador Michael McFaul, it served to create the perception of illustrating Putin's warning. The third factor was Putin positioning himself as being the best guarantee of economic stability that was done by distancing himself from the left and right wing extremes. Thus the main gist of Putin's marketing was Putin not as the hope of Russia, but Putin as the bearer of stability (in terms of maintaining the nation's sovereignty and territorial integrity, plus the issue of social justice.¹⁰ Therefore, Putin did not run on a remarkable slogan, but a predictable/dependable one – order and stability. This contrasted, for instance, to Dmitry Medvedev's slogan of innovation and modernisation, which created the fear in some circles of a *new perestroika*.¹¹

Putin's Articles

In the period before the 2012 presidential elections a number of different articles were published in major Russian newspapers, which were penned by Vladimir Putin. These articles were published throughout January and February, focused upon a number of different domestic and foreign policy issues. The titles of the articles in question are: *Russia Muscles up – The*

Challenges we Must Rise to Face; Russia: The Ethnicity Issue; Economic Tasks; Democracy and the Quality of Government; Building Justice: A Social Policy for Russia; Being Strong: National Security Guarantees for Russia; Russia and the Changing World.

The first article to appear was *Russia Muscles up – The Challenges we Must Rise to Face*, which was heralded as being an invitation to join a broad public dialogue “about the future, about priorities, long-term choices, national development and national prospects.” It was published in the newspaper *Izvestia*. There are references to the ability to constructively critique individual politicians, for the public to be able to discuss different avenues of social and economic development, and improving the quality of life and social justice. A great deal of attention is paid to various economic progress, which is focussed upon the greater material benefits enjoyed by individual citizens since the collapse of the Soviet Union. A recurring theme of the article is the need for a united effort (politicians and citizens) to work towards the public good. Throughout the article, references are made to the Russian character of courage and unity in overcoming adversity. Putin acknowledges that some problems exist, but with his experience as prime minister and president, the challenges can be overcome.¹² The article uses a mixture of populist and patriotic appeals together with some messages that address a number of concerns that were raised in the pre-2012 presidential election polls (to be more responsive to criticism and alternative advice for instance).

The next article, *Russia: The Ethnicity Issue*, which appeared in the newspaper *Nezavisimaya Gazeta* and broached a highly sensitive issue in Russia. On the one hand the article warns of the dangers of inter-ethnic and inter-religious conflict. On the other hand details Russia’s special place owing to the absence of immigrants owing to its tradition of multi-ethnic and multi-religious composition (Russia being a multi-ethnic rather than ethnic state). Putin called for the

use of patriotism, to be instilled at the individual level in society. It was stated that individuals should be aware of their ethnic and religious foundations, but be proud of being Russian (in the civic as opposed to ethnic sense). The Russian people and culture are described as being the lynchpin of Russia's strength and resilience.¹³ This is another emotional appeal to the public, the premise of the argument implies the need for some set of common and shared values (based upon a national strategy of 'civic patriotism'). The message is the need for national unity against threats shall mean Russia shall prevail.

Economic Tasks, the third article, which appeared in the newspaper *Vedomosti*, the problem of modernising Russia's economy and locating and attracting the necessary material and personnel resources to realise this goal is discussed. The narrative is about the modernisation of the existing industries and infrastructure. This is to be done in order to make Russian goods more competitive within the global economy, Putin acknowledges Russia as being integrated into the global economy (he characterises the Russian economy as being "stronger than the economies of most other countries"). Innovation is also a subject of this article, which promotes the idea of innovation being created in Russia by Russians, starting with universities (as opposed to being bought). A number of loosely defined macro-economic ideas are prescribed for long-term growth.¹⁴ Once more, the article is couched in terms of potential opportunities for various segments of society. Among the groups identified as being beneficiaries are universities, private business and the research/scientific community.

The next article was published in the business newspaper *Kommersant* and was titled *Democracy and the Quality of Government*. This article was meant to outline a responsible and responsive government, which caters to the needs of the people. Among the topics covered were the defeat of corruption and reforming the judicial system. The article stated that "sustainable

social development is impossible without a competent state, while genuine democracy is a fundamental condition for developing a state designed to serve public interests.” A significant narrative of the article is that government and democracy should serve the interests of the people. However, noted one shortcoming in the process. “Today, the quality of governance in Russia lags behind the readiness of civil society to participate in it. Our civil society has become much more mature, active and responsible. We need to modernise the mechanisms of our democracy so that they correspond to this increase in social activity.”¹⁵ Thus there is a call for civic society to interface with the political system. Many of the issues raised here touch upon the points of concern among the electorate that were identified in polls and surveys.

Building Justice: A Social Policy for Russia was published in the newspaper *Komsomolskaya Pravda*. This article, as in the other articles, details the policy successes of Putin and further challenges that lie on the road ahead in order to develop the country and standard of living. “I will not discuss the obvious successes. We have made great strides in improving the situation in the demographic sphere, in pensions and in reducing poverty. We have achieved tangible results in the fields of education, healthcare and culture. But today we have to discuss the as yet unresolved issues, as well as the objectives which must form the agenda for the next stage of Russia’s development.” The article goes on to discuss the potential for different classes and professions in Russia to reach their potential and to realise opportunities for social and professional growth.¹⁶ Topics covered within this frame included, the environment, housing and utilities, health, education and culture, pensions and social assistance. When in Moscow (May 2012) and discussing with Russian friends and acquaintances the underlying reasons for the street protests these were the reasons given that motivated previously apolitical citizens. To protect what social privileges still remain for themselves and future generations.

The article *Being Strong: National Security Guarantees for Russia* was the next to be published, appearing in the newspaper *Rossiskaya Gazeta*. It was an article concerning ensuring Russia's strength as a deterrent to those seeking to harm the country or her sovereignty. "There will be no possibility of this, even a hypothetical one, with respect to Russia. In other words, we should not tempt anyone by allowing ourselves to be weak." A loose understanding and method is suggested that would prevent a weak Russia. "Obviously, we will not be able to strengthen our international position, develop our economy or our democratic institutions if we are unable to protect Russia – if we fail to calculate the risks of possible conflicts, secure our military-technological independence and prepare an adequate military response capability as a last-resort response to some kind of challenge." A long-term perspective is suggested that links the political system and economy with the state of security and readiness. The army was praised for having saved Russia during the turbulent 1990s. A great deal of attention is paid to the idea of paying attention to and modernising the armed forces and the defence industrial complex.¹⁷ These sectors represent a significant number of voters, and make an understandable target audience.

Moskovskiye Novosti published *Russia and the Changing World*, which was the final article. Russia is characterised as playing "a unique role on the world political map" as a constructive and strategic-thinking actor. Within the frame of the upheavals in the Middle East and North Africa in the so-called Arab Spring, Putin positions Russia as the voice of reason and counter-balance to the Western excesses and interference in the region, and their poor faith towards Russia. In Putin's vision outlined in this article, Russia is not only to protect the interests of partner countries, but also Russian compatriots. There was also the notion to promote a deeper understanding of Russia around the globe through exporting culture and education.¹⁸ This article

is using the narrative of Russia as a strong and constructive actor in international relations, which will not tolerate being ignored or her interests violated.

A selection of various domestic and foreign policy issues are raised by Putin in his articles. These are posed in an emotional (as opposed to logically argued) manner and are somewhat vague as to how the stated goals are to be achieved (through policy formulation and implementation). The different appeals, both positive and negative, have similar themes. Russia is a great country, which requires the people to work together in order to realise this greatness and its destiny. There are many hurdles to overcome in society, although it is starting to move along the right track, Russia's long history of overcoming adversity will prove to be useful in the current circumstances. Putin positions himself as being an experienced politician with a good track record and the interests of the ordinary Russian at heart. Notions of making life easier for Russian citizens are voiced, for instance combating corruption and social justice are often mentioned. However, by raising these issues it may be hoped that the narrative can be set and to some extent the popular issues (or simply there is greater resonance with the voters) can be 'owned' by Putin.

Weaknesses in Putin's Political Armour

However, not all analysts saw the promise of stability and order as being attractive to the whole electorate. The twins of United Russia and Vladimir Putin seemed to becoming 'stale' to the Russian audience according to an expert panel on political advertising during the 2012 campaign.¹⁹ This observation seems to be in keeping with a Moscow-based journalist that was interviewed by the author. Dmitry Babich reflected on the question as to the primary changes in the political landscape that Putin faced in 2012. The constituency was much more hostile and suspicious of Putin in 2012, which made his task of winning them over much more difficult.

In my view, the campaign of 2011–2012 was much more on the defensive and it was damaged by the following dichotomy: 1/ The electorate of Putin is still moderately left, the struggling, but not desperate part of the population cautiously holding on to the few remaining social "reperes" (in French - holding points, hooks that hold you up) for fear of plunging into the mess of managerial dictate (our version of "laissez-faire capitalism") 2/ The governments that Putin appoints are all centre-right at best, gearing their policies to the liquidation of the remaining social guarantees, destroying the old system of free education, health care, theatres ... etc.²⁰

Babich's comments seem to hint at a growing gulf between Putin and the mass electorate owing to the historical legacy of policies harming the interests of the lower and middle classes. Conditions in the political sphere were changing, especially when comparing 2000 with 2012. How did Putin respond to this change? When posed with the question as to how the situation of the 2012 presidential elections was different to the 2000 elections, Dmitry Strovsky made the following observations.

In fact, if in 2000 Putin presumably knew what he was going to do, now the situation became much worse due to his own reluctance to understand that the situation has changed, and the previous methods of instructiveness no longer works. In the meantime Putin does not seem to know very well what he can do in new political conditions. It is not random that after the 2012 election campaign he nominated the former chief of the unit in Nizhny Tagil, the city in Sverdlovsk region for the position of presidential envoy in the Ural Federal okrug. This man, Kholmanskikh, promised to bring a tank onto the streets of Ekaterinburg and kick off all protesters demanding political reforms in the country. This illustrates once again an inability for Putin to change the situation and his temptation to rule

with such methods as before. It is obvious that during the 2012 camping Putin turned out to be unable to suggest something new for Russia.²¹

Strovsky's comments seem to show a politician that was not sure of how to react to the changing situation. He preferred to stay with 'tried and true' methods and responses. How did this impact upon the key personality traits of his personal brand, which proved popular in the 2000 presidential elections? Polls were conducted in 2000, 2008 and 2012 by the Levada Centre around the question "what strong suits would you attribute to Vladimir Putin?" A man of action – 49% in 2000, 62% in 2008 and 39% in 2012; His education appeals – 23% in 2000, 52% in 2008 and 28% in 2012; Intellectuality – 19% in 2000, 43% in 2008 and 18% in 2012; Strength, will and courage – 25% in 2000, 34% in 2008 and 18% in 2012.²²

These polls show that the 'traditional' personal traits that were popular in 2000 are no longer popular in the current political environment. Further, these increasingly less popular traits are not being evolved or new traits being developed. Even though these aspects seem to be in the process of becoming less relevant in 2012, which implies a number of things that can include the consistent reliance on a narrow circle of advisors and a lack of awareness or understanding of the current prevailing conditions.

Putin's Remaining Strengths and Attractiveness

Having posed a number of problematic issues that Putin has faced in the 2012 presidential elections, there are still one or two aspects that still favour him.

Only a great connoisseur of Russian national psyche can explain this strange coexistence in Russia of a leftist voter and centre-right elite. Part of this paradox can be explained by Putin's long-groomed image of a "strict disciplinarian" who can talk tough even to

oligarchs of Mikhail Khodorkovsky's type, thus replacing real policy with a reassuring image. Part of it may come from a lack of alternative. The aging communist leader Gennady Zyuganov or the “social-democratic” front man of the Just Russia party Sergei Mironov, with their unrealistic promises of a return to Soviet free-of-charge social guarantees, are not seen by the majority as serious alternatives.²³

One of the greatest assets and advantages possessed by Putin is the perception of a lack of viable alternative political candidates to challenge him. His reputation, perhaps one can even talk of it as a political brand, is recognised. Although it is not the ideal choice, it is still perceived as being better than his political rivals.

ANALYSIS: PUTIN IN 2000 VERSUS 2012²⁴

From looking at the two periods, 2000 and 2012, a number of common factors that influence the political marketing of Putin are discernible. This can be referred as being the three Ps of political marketing – Person, Promotion and Policy. These factors combine to influence the image and reputation of the politician or political party. Person refers to the nature and the character of the politician being marketed to the voting public. Promotion concerns the nature and the style that promotes the *person*. Person and promotion are cultivated by the politician and his campaign team, perhaps not controlled, but certainly steered by Putin and his team. The third P is Policy, which is in effect the track record of a politician and political party. In effect, this is his or her historical legacy. Although the policy was implemented by the politician or party, its perception and reputation are developed in the minds of the voters. In spite of promotion, the reception of its effect shall be determined by whether the public considers the policy to be positive or negative (dictated by issues of self-interest).

The type of marketing that he engages in with the electorate is relationship marketing as opposed to the transaction variant. In 2000 and 2012 he crafted his message and image so that it seemed he was in touch with, understanding and sympathetic to the plight of the average Russian (hence the populist rhetoric regarding combating corruption and oligarchs for instance). His physical appearance via his wardrobe did change, which may indicate changes in terms of wants and expectations from the electorate. In 2000 he wore very formal suits and was very businesslike in the wake of the chaos left after Yeltsin's rule. There was a desire for a strong statesman to manage the political and economic environment. In 2012 he was wearing smart casuals, and even seen to be 'crying' publicly. This change came in the wake of criticism that Putin was out of touch, he was not empathetic and the lack of public desire for someone that will not listen to the public and rule the country singlehandedly and rigidly.

Changes in the political and social environment necessitated changes to Putin's public persona, did this change occur in order to continue to appeal to the public? There were some interesting changes in style and circumstances that were used by Putin in the 2000 and 2012 presidential elections. Strovsky summarised what he saw as Putin's greatest challenges that he faced in a changed political environment.

In my opinion, there is a big difference in developing the Putin campaigns in 2000 and 2012. To begin with, in 2000 Putin was in a better situation since any people believed that as KGB man he will normalize the situation in the country. He did much in economics on the stage, but destroyed all the origins of freedoms. In 2000 he declared fulfilment of civic demands as his priority, the same was repeated twelve years after but in fact the situation is getting worse with an increasing level of bureaucracy. Putin declared his right to speak on behalf of the whole nation but the nation itself was getting more divided over the last

few years, this affected the situation prior to the 2012 elections. Unlike 2000, Putin used a new tactics by trying to convince the nation that much, if not everything was progressing extremely well. He did not participate in election debates as before leaving his opponents alone, but instead published seven articles in outlets such as Komsomolskaya Pravda, Izvestia and the others. In those ones he declared the political and economic priorities for the future. However, the main problem for these articles was their instructiveness and vague arguments on how Putin is going to fulfil his promises. It was clear that Putin tended to draw people's attention that the powers are not sleeping however it did not console thousands of people who were protesting in the streets of Moscow and some other Russian cities.²⁵

From these observations by Strovsky, it seems that Putin was experiencing a great deal of difficulty in adapting to the changed political landscape. In fact, great difficulties are apparent in his trying to adjust and account for the new and challenging political realities through transforming his communication strategy and projected image. This conclusion has been backed by articles appearing in the mass media. In one critique of Putin, the situation was characterised by the message that more of the same is to be expected. Among the criticisms were that Putin's weaknesses stemmed from not listening to anyone and only trusting a narrow circle of close people. This leads to hearing what you want to hear and filtering out that which is not liked or understood. These aspects together with his go-it-alone approach have the cumulative effect of putting him further and further out of touch, and to follow the path that has already been tried (and not to do things differently).²⁶ The out of touch narrative seems to be one of the main weaknesses of Putin in the current context.

Policy formulation and execution has certainly proved to be another weak point for Putin in 2012, which did not exist in 2000 owing to his lack of political history. The dilemma of Putin's policy during his first terms of office as president were summarised by one particular article, which stressed the issue of pragmatic aims versus heavy handed means.

The Putin 1.0 era was characterised by increasing hubris on Russia's part and the frequent subordination of pragmatic economic aims to more authoritarian traits as Putin and his security-minded colleagues – the siloviki – attempted not only to reassert Russia's position internationally, but also to re-establish order and reassert Kremlin control over the economy after the perceived chaos of the 1990s.²⁷

Thus the needed reforms and changes necessary for revitalising Russian society were sacrificed for greater political power and control. There are also critics that argue the policies of Putin 1.0 and 2.0 are very much alike. Alexander Gabuev from *Kommersant Daily* made this point. "Putin's latest article, *Russia and the Changing World*, shows that presidential candidate Putin 2.0's foreign political efforts in no way differ from those of President Putin 1.0."²⁸ These arguments create a complex picture as to whether a Putin 1.0 and a Putin 2.0 exist. Or perhaps these may in fact be part and parcel of the same political brand/phenomena?

CONCLUSION

In the introduction, the question concerning whether a Putin 1.0 and Putin 2.0 can be said to exist or not. The answer to the question, owing to the nature of image and perception, in addition to the 'real' world exists in two parts – the rhetorical environment (of perception) and the physical environment. Concerning the rhetorical environment, there is already the use of the term Putin 2.0 in articles about Putin's second term. Therefore the answer is yes, Putin 2.0 at least, does exist on

this level. With regard to the physical environment, the answer is also yes. Major differences exist in the identified Three Ps (person, promotion and policy) between the 2000 and 2012 presidential election campaign, and Putin's relationship with Russian voters.

Putin in the 2000 presidential elections was a newcomer with a seemingly good background for taking Russia's national interests to heart. This was likely to be perceived as a lower risk to the voters with the established politicians who had a reputation, which in many cases was negative. He managed to evoke a sense of hope after a very difficult period in the country's creation and development. This was not done through clear policies, but through employing specific rhetoric and symbolism that appealed to the public. Putin 1.0 consisted of a person (Vladimir Putin) and his promotion. He did not contain the element of policy as he had no history in federal level that would give him a public profile and a history in policy formulation and implementation.

The 2012 presidential elections did see a Putin 2.0, although there are many similarities with the projected public persona and brand from 2000, owing to the reputation that was gained from his time as president and prime minister. Putin's reputation gained from the policy field was partly negative owing to the degradation of social services and increased sense of social injustice. This aspect was certainly addressed by Putin. But more importantly was the perception was maintained that there is a lack of viable alternatives to Putin, hence a vote for Putin was a means to minimise risk and uncertainty.

Political marketing is one of the means employed by the political establishment (others include the use of *administrative resources*, for example) in an attempt to control perception and power in the political sphere. The political actor with the most resources, best personnel and biggest budget has a distinct advantage over their rivals as they are in a better position to shape the perception of the voters. Political marketing therefore is the mechanism to create a relationship

with the voters, from the political side the known brand of Vladimir Putin and from the voters' side is the vote for Putin (as a symbol of confidence in the person and legitimacy for his presidency).

AUTHOR NOTE

Greg Simons is a researcher at the Uppsala Centre for Russian and Eurasian Studies, the National Centre for Crisis Management Research and Training at the Swedish National Defence College and at the Department of Communication Sciences at Turība University in Riga (Latvia). The research focus is on different aspects of political and mass communication, especially in Russia, Ukraine and war zones. He has authored numerous books and articles on these subjects in journals, among others, the *European Journal of Communication*, *Demokratizatsiya*, plus a number of books with *Ashgate* publishing.

NOTES

¹*Russia Presidential Pre-Election Assessment Report*, IRI: Advancing Democracy Worldwide,
<http://www.iri.org/sites/default/files/Russia's%202000%20Presidential%20Election%20Pre-Election%20Assessment%20Report.pdf>, 20 March 2000, pp. 7–8.

²*Most Russians Want Stronger Social Aspect to Putin Policy – Poll*, Interfax, 17 May 2012.
From Johnson's Russia List 2012=#91, 18 May 2012.

³Administrative resources are the use of state owned or controlled assets by candidates from the ruling party as a means to get further influence and publicity, and therefore a competitive advantage over their political rivals.

⁴Nadzharkov, Alexander, "Putin's Rating Needs Verification", *Novye Izvestia*, November 28, 2001. Johnson's Russia List #5569, November 28, 2001.

⁵"Book About Life of Putin to be Released Soon", Interfax, January 16, 2002. Johnson's Russia List #6027, January 17, 2002. Sergei Yastrzhembsky was President Yeltsin's Press Secretary and has managed to maintain his position of influence and power in the Putin administration.

⁶BBC Monitoring, "Book on Putin's Family Life goes on Sale in Moscow", December 25, 2001. Johnson's Russia List #5616, December 25, 2001.

⁷*Борис Дубин: Не революция, а признак усталости от статус-кво* (Boris Dubin: Not a revolution, but a sign of fatigue from the status quo), Analysis and Opinion, RIA, http://www.ria.ru/vybor2012_analysis/20120221/571338649.html, 21 February 2012 (accessed June 12, 2012).

⁸Petrova, E., and V. Zhebit, *Имидж политика: Работа имиджмейкеров или состояние электората?* (Image policy: The work of image-makers or the state of the electorate?), Corporate Imageology, http://www.ci-journal.ru/article/35/200801image_putin, 1 March 2008 (accessed June 12, 2012).

⁹*Россия: как меняется имидж Путина* (*Russia: The Changing Image of Putin*), Выбор Народа (Choice of the People), <http://vybor-naroda.org/stovyborah/1987-rossiya-kak-menyaetsya-imidzh-putina.html>, 3 August 2011 (accessed July 2, 2012).

¹⁰Межуев, Б., Путин хорошо понимал, что он уже не может победить как ‘президент надежды’ (Putin Knew Well, That he was Not Able to Win as the ‘President of Hope’), KM.RU, <http://www.km.ru/v-rossii/2012/03/07/prezidentskie-vybory-2012-goda/putin-khorosho-ponimal-chto-uzhe-ne-mozhet-pobedi>, 9 March 2012 (accessed July 2, 2012).

¹¹Тема: *Контуры нового реваншизма. Чем опасен проект "Путин-2012"* (Theme: *The Contours of New Revanchist. How Dangerous is Project "Putin-2012"*), Liberty.ru, <http://liberty.ru/Themes/Kontury-novogo-revanshizma.-СНem-opasen-proekt-Putin-2012>, No Date Given (accessed July 2, 2012).

¹²Putin, V., *Russia Muscles Up – the Challenges we Must Rise to Face*, The Official Site of the Prime Minister of the Russian Federation, <http://premier.gov.ru/eng/events/news/17755/>, 16 January 2012 (accessed May 18, 2012).

¹³Putin, V., *Russia: The Ethnicity Issue*, Official Site of the Prime Minister of the Russian Federation, <http://premier.gov.ru/eng/events/news/17831/>, 23 January 2012 (accessed May 18, 2012).

¹⁴Putin, V., *Economic Tasks*, Official Site of the Prime Minister of the Russian Federation, <http://premier.gov.ru/eng/events/news/17888/>, 30 January 2012 (accessed 18 May 2012).

¹⁵Putin, V., *Democracy and the Quality of Government*, Official Site of the Prime Minister of the Russian Federation, <http://premier.gov.ru/eng/events/news/18006/>, 6 February 2012 (accessed 18 May 2012).

¹⁶Putin, V., *Building Justice: A Social Policy for Russia*, Official Site of the Prime Minister of the Russian Federation, <http://premier.gov.ru/eng/events/news/18071/>, 13 February 2012 (accessed 18 May 2012).

¹⁷Putin, V., *Being Strong: National Security Guarantees for Russia*, Official Site of the Prime Minister of the Russian Federation, <http://premier.gov.ru/eng/events/news/18185/>, 20 February 2012 (accessed 18 May 2012).

¹⁸Putin, V., *Russia and the Changing World*, Official Site of the Prime Minister of the Russian Federation, <http://premier.gov.ru/eng/events/news/18252/>, 27 February 2012 (accessed 18 May 2012).

¹⁹Мясникова, О., Экспертный клуб «Политическая реклама президентской кампании-2012» (Expert Club “Political Advertising of the Presidential Campaign-2012), Press Club: Green Lamp, <http://www.greenlamp.spb.ru/2012/03/01/%D1%8D%D0%BA%D1%81%D0%BF%D0%B5%D1%80%D1%82%D0%BD%D1%8B%D0%B9-%D0%BA%D0%BB%D1%83%D0%B1-%C2%AB%D0%BF%D0%BE%D0%BB%D0%B8%D1%82%D0%B8%D1%87%D0%B5%D1%81%D0%BA%D0%B0%D1%8F-%D1%80%D0%B5%D0%BA%D0%BB%D0%B0-2/>, 1 March 2012 (accessed 2 July 2012).

²⁰Questions were posed to Dmitry Babich via email. Dmitry Babich is a Moscow-based journalist. Answers to the questions were received on 28 May 2012.

²¹Questions were posed to Professor Dmitry Strovsky from the Faculty of Journalism at Ural Federal University in the city of Ekaterinburg by email. This reply was received on 10 June 2012.

²²Khamrayev, V., *Vladimir Putin's Strong Suit Gets Weaker*, *Levada Centre Director Lev Gudkov: Attractiveness of Putin's Image is Dimming*, *Kommersant*, 17 May 2012. Johnson's Russia List 2012-#90, 17 May 2012.

²³Babich, D., *Russians Assess the Country's new Government*, *Opinion*, *Russia Beyond the Headlines*, http://rbth.ru/articles/2012/05/24/russians_assess_the_countrys_new_government_15711.html, 24 May 2012 (accessed 12 June 2012).

²⁴For further reading, on the subjects of the Russian campaign environment and how opposition politicians campaign, please see the following. Hesli, V. L., and W. M. Reisinger. (Editors). 2003. *The 1999–2000 Elections in Russia: Their Impact and Legacy*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; Oversloot, H., and R. Verheul. 2006. "Political Parties and the State in Russia." *Journal of Communist Studies and Transition Politics*. 22 (3):383–405. Special Issue on Political Parties and the State in Post-Communist Europe; Enikolopov, R., M. Petrova, and E. Zhuravskaya. 2011. December. "Media and Persuasion: Evidence from Russia." *The American Economic Review* 101 (7):3253–85; Levitskaya, E., *Navalny Campaign Brings New Style into Russian Politics*, *Russia Beyond the Headlines*, http://rbth.co.uk/politics/2013/10/07/navalny_campaign_brings_new_style_into_russian_politics_30539.html, 7 October 2013 (accessed 13 January 2014); Golosov, G., *Russia's Silent Election*

Campaign, Open Democracy, <http://www.opendemocracy.net/od-russia/grigorii-golosov/russias-silent-election-campaign>, 29 November 2011 (accessed 13 January 2014).

²⁵Questions were posed to Professor Dmitry Strovsky from the Faculty of Journalism at Ural Federal University in the city of Ekaterinburg by email. This reply was received on 10 June 2012.

²⁶Trudolyubov, M., *Old Putin*, *Vedomosti*, 10 May 2012. Johnson's Russia List 2012=#86, 11 May 2012.

²⁷Pryde, I., *Will Putin 2.0 Mean a Return to the Prosperity of the 2000s?* *Russia Beyond the Headlines*, http://rbth.ru/articles/2012/03/28/will_putin_20_mean_a_return_to_the_prosperity_of_the_2000s_15196.html, 28 March 2012 (accessed 9 June 2012).

²⁸*Putin 2.0: Insight From Experts*, *Russia Beyond the Headlines*, http://rbth.ru/articles/2012/02/28/putin_20_insight_from_experts_14948.html, 28 February 2012 (accessed 9 June 2012).

References

Battaglia, B. (Editor). 1995. *Rhetorics of Self-making*. Los Angeles: University of California Press.

Brown, A. (Editor). 2001. *Contemporary Russian Politics: A Reader*. New York: Oxford University Press.

Butler, P., and N. Collins. 1994. "Political Marketing: Structure and Process." *European Journal of Marketing* 28 (1):19–34. doi:10.1108/03090569410049154

Chapter 12. 2000, September. "Despite Years of Policy Failure, A Bright Russian Future is Still Possible," In *Russia's Road to Corruption: How the Clinton Administration Exported*

Government Instead of Free Enterprise and Failed the Russian People, edited by Speaker's Advisory Group on Russia, 166–175. Washington, DC: US House of Representatives.

Colton, T. J., and H. E. Hale. 2009. "The Putin Vote: Presidential Electorates in a Hybrid Regime." *Slavic Review* 68 (3):473–503.

Egan, J. 1999. "Political Marketing: Lessons from the Mainstream." *Journal of Marketing Management* 15 (6):495–503. doi:10.1362/026725799785045806

Henneberg, S. C. 2004. "The Views of an Advocatus Dei: Political Marketing and its Critics." *Journal of Public Affairs* 4 (3):225–43. doi:10.1002/pa.187

Henneberg, S. C., and N. J. O'Shaughnessy. 2007. "Theory and Concept Development in Political Marketing." *Journal of Political Marketing* 6 (2–3):5–31. doi:10.1300/j199v06n02_02

Hutcheson, D. S. 2007. "How to Win Elections and Influence People." *Journal of Political Marketing* 5 (4):47–70. doi:10.1300/j199v05n04_03

Johansen, H. P. M. 2005. "Political Marketing." *Journal of Political Marketing* 4 (4):85–105.

Lipman, M., and M. McFaul. 2001. "Managed Democracy." *The Harvard Journal of Press/Politics* 6 (3):116–27. in *Russia: Putin and the Press*.

Lock, A., and P. Harris. 1996. "Political Marketing – vive la Difference!" *European Journal of Marketing* 30 (10):14–24. doi:10.1108/03090569610149764

O'Shaughnessy, N. 2001. "The Marketing of Political Marketing." *European Journal of Marketing* 35 (9/10):1047–57.

Putin, V. 2000. *First Person*. London: Hutchinson.

White, S., and S. Oates. 2003. "Politics and the Media in Post-communist Russia." *Politics* 23 (1):31–37.

White, S., S. Oates, and I. McAllister. 2005, April. "Media Effects and Russian Elections, 1999–2000." *British Journal of Political Science* 35 (2):191–208.

Wring, D. 1997. "Reconciling Marketing with Political Science: Theories of Political Marketing." *Journal of Marketing Management* 13 (7):651–63. doi:10.1080/0267257x.1997.9964502

Wring, D. 1999. "The Marketing Colonisation of Political Campaigning." In *A Handbook of Political Marketing*, edited by B. Newman, 41–53. London: Sage.