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Stalled or Uneven Gender Revolution? A Long-Term Processual Framework for Understanding Why
Change Is Slow

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Recently much attention has been focused on whether the gender transformation of paid and unpaid work in society referred to as the gender revolution has hit a wall, or at least stalled. In this article, we discuss key trends in the gender division of labor across 13 developed countries over a 50-year period. These trends show little decisive evidence for a stall but rather a continuing, if uneven, long-term trend in the direction of greater gender equality. We set out a theoretical framework for understanding slow change in the division of unpaid work and care (lagged generational change). We argue that, through a long-term view of the processes of change, this framework can help address why progress in the convergence in paid and unpaid work promised by the gender revolution has been so slow.

Key Words: Gender convergence, gender division of labor, gender revolution, housework, lagged adaptation, stalled revolution.

In her influential *Scientific American* article “Time Spent in Housework,” Vanek (1974) argued that women’s housework had not declined since the 1920s, despite the widespread entry of women into the paid labor force over the 20th century and the pervasive diffusion of labor-saving home appliances. Since the time that article was written, however, there has been increasing evidence both of women spending less time in housework and of a complementary increase in men’s contributions (Bianchi, Robinson, & Milkie, 2006; Gershuny, 2000; Gershuny & Robinson, 1988; Robinson & Godbey, 1997). Recently, much attention has been focused on whether this gender transformation of paid and unpaid labor in society has hit a wall, or at least stalled.

Although women have made wide gains in the public sphere of employment over the past half century, on many fronts the progress in gender equality appeared to slow in the late 1990s and early 2000s in the United States. Stalling has been identified in trends in the percentage of women in employment, in gendered school-subject choices, and in attitudes toward gender equality and the division of unpaid labor (e.g., Cotter, Hermsen, & Vanneman, 2011; England, 2010). *New York Times* articles by the family historian Stephanie Coontz (2013) and the family sociologist Philip Cohen (2014) drew widespread attention to this stalled view of the U.S. movement toward gender equality. Although both of these pieces took a more measured view of patterns of change, the media was quick to seize on the idea of a stall—or even the “end” of the gender revolution—as meaning that Americans have got as far as they’re going to get with gender equality.

Much of the evidence for the stalling of the gender revolution relates to the late 1990s and first decade of the 21st century in the United States; various trends in the direction of greater gender equality showed a leveling off there during this period. We argue, however, that progress toward gender equality should always be regarded as a long-term, uneven process. Huge changes in women’s opportunities have occurred over several generations, but at the same time any long-

term process of change is subject to setbacks that result from historical contingencies (Ridgeway, 2011). The term *gender revolution*—implying a single dramatic moment of change—allows for a leveling observed over a relatively short period to be described as the “end of,” or a stall in, that revolution. It is evident, for example, that currently neither the institutional context surrounding workplace opportunities to combine employment with family responsibilities nor normative stereotypes of masculinity have adapted sufficiently to women’s increasing engagement in the labor force. It is clear that we need to take a longer perspective on change than that associated with metaphors of revolution (Sullivan, 2006).

In this article, we set out a theoretical framework that posits a processual, longer-term perspective on change, or lagged generational change. The existing literature has adopted a rather short-term view of change, arguing that certain trends observed over the 1990s and first decade of the 21st century, for example, signaled a meaningful change in the nature, and even direction, of the gender revolution. Within our proposed framework, these trends may be considered short-term variations in long-term historical processes of transformation in gender relations, which stretch over generations. These variations arise from historical contingencies associated with specific configurations of employment and family policies, and gender ideologies. We argue that to understand the long-term processes of gender transformation, we need to adopt a longer-term framework that can take account of both the policy and the ideational levels of analysis, as well as the individual-level interactions and socialization that reflect and also influence those levels. The aim is to promote better understanding the processes of positive change that have led to this point and that may help promote such change.

In what follows we first review the literature on the stalled revolution. We then present our theoretical framework in the context of other multilevel models of change in the gender division of

labor. We then discuss a 50-year sequence of nationally representative cross-national time-use data across 14 developed countries, which currently provide the longest perspective currently available on changes in the gender division of labor and care. We contend that analyses of these data show no decisive evidence for a stall; instead, they show a continuing, if uneven, trend in the direction of greater equality in the gender division of labor. We conclude by addressing the implications of these findings in the context of the multilevel framework that we propose.

THE “STALLED REVOLUTION”: A REVIEW

The idea of a stalled revolution in the domestic division of labor has been around for more than 25 years. In 1989 Hochschild described a process whereby women had entered the “first shift” of the workforce (i.e., the revolution), but this had resulted in surprisingly meager change in who did the domestic “second shift” (i.e., the stall). Hochschild’s research involving the observation of family members as they went about their daily activities epitomized the feminist project of trying to delve into the “black box” of the household. Up to the 1960s there had been little interest in the domestic division of household labor, with previous economic research treating the household as a rationally organized black box. In contrast, early feminist research in the area focused on trying to understand the reasons for the unequal gender distribution of family work, especially how and why housework was so unequally distributed, and why so little had changed in the face of women’s entry into paid employment (e.g., Berk, 1985; Blood & Wolfe, 1960; Oakley, 1974). Early cross-sectional results using the U.S. time-use data series (measuring the exact amounts of time that men and women spent in household tasks) demonstrated the persistence of a large gender gap in housework and childcare time, even though women’s housework time was shown to be declining (Coverman & Sheley, 1986). Subsequent analyses, however, began to show increasing signs of gender convergence in unpaid work times in the United States (Bianchi et al., 2000;

Shelton, 1992) and cross-nationally (Altintas & Sullivan, 2016; Hook, 2010). This convergence was predominantly created by substantial drops in women's housework time, coupled with small increases in the time that men devoted to housework and childcare. In keeping with the dominant focus on intrahousehold processes, the emphasis of quantitative empirical analyses for most of the period up to the first decade of the 21st century was on understanding what goes on inside the home and why the distribution of housework among heterosexual couples remained so unequal. Various theoretical perspectives relating to the individual or household level received support as possible explanations for the continuing gender gap—the best known of which have been economic dependency theory, time availability, and gender display (e.g., Bittman, England, Folbre, Sayer, & Matheson, 2003; Brines, 1994; Greenstein, 2000; Gupta, 2007). However, no real consensus emerged as to the relative importance of these explanations (Bianchi & Milkie, 2010).

In the first decade of the 21st century the further development of cross-national, cross-time series of time-use data began to shift the focus. High-profile research started to appear in the United States showing a general decrease in women's housework, with some corresponding increases in men's housework and a larger increase in men's childcare time (Bianchi et al., 2006; Sandberg & Hofferth, 2005; Sayer, 2005). Cross-national data showed that the same trends were also evident across Europe, Canada, and Australia (Bianchi et al., 2006; Bittman et al., 2003; Evertsson & Neramo, 2004; Gauthier, Smeeding, & Furstenberg, 2004; Gershuny, 2000; Kan, Sullivan, & Gershuny, 2011). It became clear that a widespread process of gender convergence was appearing across many countries—women's contributions to housework were decreasing substantially, whereas men's contributions continued to increase slowly (albeit starting from a very much lower level). Both mothers and fathers were increasing their childcare time.

Country variations in these international trends also led to a change in the explanatory focus, with a greater emphasis on national contextual variables such as gender ideology and policy. Particularly influential was the idea that different national social policies relating to women's employment, parental leave, and early childcare provision provide different constraints and opportunities for the continuation of the gender revolution in unpaid work and care—an idea taken up by Esping-Andersen (2009). However, long-term trends that are consistent across countries also suggested the operation of something more than the effect of policy measures. They suggested a wider change in gender ideologies, particularly among younger cohorts, in the direction of more egalitarian beliefs (Braun & Scott, 2009). Thus, in the 2000s, the research focus became more international—new analyses appeared using country-level variables and the newly developed multilevel methodologies attempting to understand the contribution and articulation of macro-level (i.e., policy and ideology) and micro-level (i.e., individual education and employment status) explanations for the gender gap in housework and care (Craig & Mullan, 2010; Cooke & Baxter, 2010; Davis & Greenstein, 2004; Hook, 2006, 2010; Fuwa & Cohen, 2007; Knudsen & Waerness, 2007; Sayer & Gornick, 2012; Voicu, Voicu, & Strapcov, 2008). These analyses revealed that women do less housework and men do more housework in countries that have (a) higher levels of full-time employment among women, (b) greater provision of publicly funded childcare, (c) relatively short paid maternal leave periods, and (d) more egalitarian gender attitudes.

This shift in emphasis in empirical research to incorporate both individual and national variables occurred hand in hand with the development over the 1990s and 2000s of new multilevel theoretical perspectives on gender. There were several examples appearing during this period of sociological theories attempting to address the relationships between the levels of structure and

action in relation to gender.¹ These perspectives enabled the addressing of the recursive relationships between normative gender ideologies, gendered interactions and institutional policies, and the mutual interweaving of these different levels. They were thereby able to locate the doing of gender through housework (e.g., Berk, 1985) within wider frameworks that linked the micro-level (individual and social) to the macro level of ideology and institutions in a mutually constitutive way. They also provided overarching frameworks within which meso-level theories of unpaid work and care (e.g., spousal economic bargaining based on relative resources, gender deviance neutralization) may be located and theorized.

An early example of a recursive multilevel sociological framework to describe changing gender relations, building explicitly on the doing gender perspective advanced by West and Zimmerman (1987), is Connell's (1987, 1995) theory of configurations of gender practice. According to Connell (1987), a theory of practice is important to get a "grip on the interweaving of personal life and social structure" (p. 61). Connell identified three levels of practice: personality, social relations, and institutions. Masculinity and femininity are regarded as processes in the configuration of these practices over time. Crucially, according to Connell (1995), the enactment of masculinity and femininity in personal life also has the ability to transform the existing structures of gender. Risman's (2004) framework of the gender structure explicitly identified gender as a socially constructed stratification system, identifying three levels of this structure: individual, ideological, and institutional. Gender is not only internalized at the individual level; it also carries with it the cultural and interactional expectations that are attached to women and men because of their gender category. She articulates the potentially transformative nature of practices on existing gender structures in the following way: "To focus only on structure

¹ The multilevel sociological approach also resonates with the ecological perspective developed by Bronfenbrenner in 1979. In this perspective the ecological environment is a set of nested systems, an approach that has also been usefully applied in work on the family division of labor; see Perry-Jenkins, Newkirk, and Ghunney (2013).

as constraint minimizes its importance. Not only are women and men coerced into differential social roles; they often choose their gendered paths” (Risman, 2004, p. 431).

Sullivan’s (2006) model of embedded interaction also belongs to this group of multilevel theoretical models, although its focus is more explicitly on changing domestic gender relations. It is a precursor of the framework of lagged generational change that we outline in this article. It describes a recursive process occurring across the levels of (a) individual resources and gender consciousness, (b) gendered interaction and negotiation, and (c) the wider discursive sphere. The concept of gender consciousness was described by Gerson and Peiss (1985) as a continuum along which a more generalized gender awareness may be succeeded under certain conditions by a consciousness of the rights (or entitlements) associated with specific gendered locations on the basis of information from the wider society. The rise of the feminist movement in the 1960s and 1970s, for example, provided new conditions for the development of gender consciousness. The concept of the wider discursive sphere is equivalent to Risman’s ideological level, although it was conceived as more inclusive, encompassing not only attitudes and ideologies about gender but also gendered discourses and symbolic representations. In this approach, day-to-day interaction (including the performance of housework and negotiation over housework) has a dialectic relationship with gender consciousness, is affected by the material and relational resources of each partner, and is embedded in a wider discursive context. So change in domestic gender relations arises through interaction in a context of changing gender consciousness and change in relational resources (primarily those of women). In addition, it occurs within a wider discursive context, with which it has a recursive relationship. For example, political action (collective agency) in the public arena can play an important part not only in struggling for and winning political and economic gains for women but also in contributing to the broader discourse, and thus changes in

the gender consciousness of both men and women. The argument suggests, therefore, that to investigate the possibilities of change in the domestic sphere, we should be examining the specific interplay of gender consciousness, relational resources, and material circumstances in their concrete, interactional manifestations.

As these multilevel theoretical frameworks were being developed, debate continued into the 2000s between those arguing that a general, widespread gender convergence in unpaid work times was in process and those continuing to view men's changes in the home as small and insignificant (Bianchi & Milkie, 2010). Feeding into the latter perspective has been the second coming of the idea of the stalled revolution. The most recent version of the stall hypothesis emerged in the United States in the late 2000s. The initial empirical support for this new stall hypothesis was mostly based on U.S. data showing an apparent increase in conservative attitudes (Cotter, Hermsen, & Vanneman, 2011), a slowing of the trend toward college subject desegregation by gender, and a slowdown in mothers' engagement in the labor force (Hoffman, 2009; England, 2010). Some support for a stall in attitudes was also reported using Australian data (Van Egmond, Baxter, Buchler, & Western, 2010), and for the United States and Britain (Braun & Scott, 2009). These trends seemed to offer support for the idea that the trend toward gender equality in the division of labor had slowed. The most prominent explanations for this "second stall" referred to gender essentialism in women's work and family choices (Cotter et al., 2011). According to this argument, a new cultural frame of egalitarian essentialism, arising during the 1990s, combined support for stay-at-home mothering with a rhetoric of choice and equality, thus providing support for a return to traditional normative gender roles. The argument went that this new cultural frame effectively created a ceiling effect, beyond which the trend toward greater gender equality in the division of labor would be unable to continue.

However, two factors suggest that the idea of a ceiling effect created by gender essentialism may not be sustainable as a general explanation. The first is suggested by the experience of Scandinavian countries, where the trend in the gender division of housework and care continues in the direction of greater gender egalitarianism and is indeed approaching equality between women and men. For example, in Sweden in 2010 (the most recent Swedish time-use survey), women's share of routine housework time was down to 56% from 64% in 1990. Their share of childcare time was 58%, down from 65% in 1990 (Pailhé, Solasz, & Stanfors, 2017). Furthermore, men and women's attitudes regarding gender equality continue to converge in the direction of greater egalitarianism (Braun & Scott, 2009). These ongoing processes of change in response to both concerted policy efforts and egalitarian normative gender ideologies suggest that where political will is implemented in relevant policies, and where gender equality has long been regarded as a social goal, the process of gender convergence in family work and care can continue.

The second factor is the continuing widespread increase in father's childcare time. Time-use data show that U.S. parents, both men and women, have substantially increased their time investment in childcare of all kinds over the past few decades (Bianchi et al., 2006; Sandberg & Hofferth, 2005; Sayer, Bianchi, & Robinson, 2004). These increases are also present cross-nationally across a range of developed countries (Kan et al., 2011; Sayer, Gauthier, & Furstenberg, 2004). Recent research focusing on differences between educational groups and types of childcare shows that increases have been most notable among more highly educated mothers and fathers, and in childcare activities that promote children's opportunities for learning (Altintas, 2016; Craig, Powell, & Smyth, 2014; Dotti Sani & Treas, 2016; Sullivan, 2010; Sullivan, Billari, & Altintas, 2014). Although Raley, Bianchi, and Wang (2012) suggested that

U.S. fathers do more routine care tasks when mothers are employed, these increases in mother and father childcare time in routine and developmental activities suggest that an explanation based on a ceiling effect in men's engagement in a traditionally feminine-defined task like childcare is difficult to sustain.

In fact, there are certain reasons for thinking that some of the data and evidence used to support the idea of a stall in the U.S. data may be open to doubt. First, the U.S. time-use surveys from the 1990s are less than fully nationally representative (because of their relatively small samples, collected for different purposes and including different survey instruments). Several sources over the past decade have raised questions about the results and comparability of these surveys with later data (see Allard et al., 2007; Bianchi et al., 2012; Egerton et al., 2005).

Although comparison of the American Heritage Time Use Study data sets with the more recent, nationally representative large-scale U.S. data, the American Time Use Survey, suggests that there may have been a slowing of the trend toward gender convergence in housework between 1985 and 2000–2010 in the United States, the appearance of a stall, or even a reversal, in the 1990s appears anomalous (see Altintas & Sullivan, 2016).

Second, it is possible that some authors may have been too quick to seize on the idea of a stall in gender attitudes. In their highly influential article published in *American Journal of Sociology*, Cotter et al. (2011) constructed a composite gender-equality attitude scale to show that attitudes about gender equality generally had stalled. However, only three of the questions included in the scale related to issues of domestic gender equality; the fourth related to whether men made for better politicians than women. In the raw data, only this latter question reflecting attitudes toward women's role in the political sphere showed a significant reversal since the 1990s (Cotter et al., 2011). Cotter et al. (2011) also show that, in contrast, gender attitudes to the

domestic equality questions fluctuated in the 1990s, followed by a steady rise in the direction of greater egalitarianism during the period 2000–2008. Braun and Scott (2009) insisted that the interpretation of their analysis of International Social Survey Programme attitude data should emphasize a leveling off for certain countries only (particularly the United States and Britain), and not a general cessation or reversal in attitudes on equality.

In summary, although it is clear that large gender gaps in family work still exist, a long-term, cross-national lens indicates that the trend in the direction of greater gender equality in family work and care continues. There may be some evidence for a slowing over the recent decade in certain countries, but we tend to agree with Bianchi et al. (2012) that this does not constitute a real ceiling effect; the experience of the Scandinavian countries and the growing participation of fathers in childcare indicate that much can still be achieved in progress toward gender equality. A growing body of evidence lends support to this argument. First, those with higher education and younger cohorts of men appear to be changing their behavior more rapidly than others (Brooks & Bolzendahl, 2004; Lachance-Grzela & Bouchard, 2010). Second, there appears to be a shift away from rigid gender specialization in partnerships toward a more flexible, egalitarian model (Schwartz & Han, 2014). Finally, on the cross-national level, there are indications that more traditional countries are now moving faster in the direction of egalitarianism over time than countries where the gender equality revolution has progressed further (Esping-Andersen & Billari, 2015; Geist & Cohen, 2011; Sullivan et al., 2014). In contrast, there is no doubt that structural and ideological factors act to inhibit continuing convergence in domestic gender equality. It is clear that, to emulate the success of the Scandinavian countries with respect to gender equality, significant changes both in the institutional context and in the ideological terrain need to occur in other countries. The approach described here belongs to the tradition of those multilevel

theoretical frameworks that attempt to integrate the effects of structural, individual, and ideological levels of analysis in the understanding of these changes.

A LONG-TERM THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK: LAGGED GENERATIONAL CHANGE

Large-scale social changes involve complex patterns of relations between institutional factors, ideological structures, and individual resources, and our theoretical framework involves a combination of these levels. We propose a multilevel framework of analysis that links changes at the institutional and ideological levels to processes of behavioral change as they occur in interaction between women and men in the domestic sphere. We also include an explicit focus on understanding why such changes might be expected to be slow. We link the multilevel theoretical structures described in the previous section to the model of lagged adaptation, and we refer to the resulting approach lagged generational change.

The idea of lagged adaptation was based on a longitudinal analysis of U.K., U.S., and German panel data investigating how couples adapt their domestic work following changes in relative spousal employment status (Gershuny, Bittman, & Brice, 2005). Those authors found that men adapted their behavior following an increase in their female partner's employment hours. However, this adaptation was slow and incomplete, operating according to what the authors had previously termed a *lagged adaptation response*. According to the model of lagged adaptation, couple employment status is recursively linked both to attitudes absorbed during childhood socialization and to public policy and social norms (Gershuny, Godwin, & Jones, 1994).

In this article, we extend the model of lagged adaptation to incorporate a generational dimension (in addition to the lag in men's responses to changes in their partner's employment)—hence the term *lagged generational change*. The type of multilevel recursive relationship we propose with this model may be usefully visualized in the “bathtub” model shown in Figure 1.

<Figure 1 About Here>

Coleman (1990) represented two mutually influencing levels of social change, societal and individual, in a visual model that has been variously referred to as “Coleman’s boat” or “Coleman’s bathtub.” These macro and micro levels are shown in our version of the model in Figure 1 by the lines (labeled 1 and 2) of the bathtub respectively. These levels interact in mutually influencing directions, from macro to micro and from micro to macro (indicated by the sides of the bathtub, and the arrows 3 and 4). What is particularly useful about this model is the explicit longitudinal dimension, which links early gender socialization to peer and spousal interactions in later life, all in a wider context of ideological norms, regulatory systems, and material constraints. The line at the base of Figure 1 shows time flowing from left to right across the page (Time t_0 to Time t_3). The influence indicated by all the arrows labeled 3 is that exerted by the prevailing ideologies, expectations, and constraints of the societies in which individuals live on their actions and interactions (i.e., the macro to micro influences). The arrows labeled 4 represent the countervailing pressures exerted by the actions and interactions of individuals on systems of public discourse, regulation, and hegemonic power (i.e., the micro to macro influences). Explicit in the arrays of arrows is the continuous counterposition of influence in both directions (macro to micro and micro to macro) across time.

We can use this model to conceptualize an example of the processes influencing the gender division of unpaid work and care over the past half century. We start at the micro level, with a girl’s initial gender socialization in her household of origin (t_1). Her parents’ domestic practices can be expected at least partly to reflect a previous generation’s gender attitudes and expectations (t_0). These are already out of step with current conditions because of, for example, the slow and imperfect communication of policy changes, as well as her parents’ socialization within ideologies

and conventions inherited from their own parents. The educational and employment opportunities for girls in most societies over the latter part of the 20th century were significantly greater than those that were available to their mothers, although their brothers' options were, in most cases, not so different from those of their fathers. Therefore, if and when the girl later forms a heterosexual partnership, her paid employment combined with her and her partner's inherited expectations of differential gendered responsibilities and expectations, leads to an unfair accumulation of paid and unpaid work on her shoulders. She experiences these as various specific sorts of disadvantages in the form of reduced life chances in relation to leisure time, limited choices regarding family formation options, restrictions on career development, or all of these in combination.

At the same time, she is involved in social interactions relating to these issues of work–family balance, particularly in the context of her interaction with her partner. It is the mixed outcomes of this discourse that provides the Shakespearean-influenced “Exit, Voice or Suffering” title of the lagged adaptation article previously referred to (Gershuny et al., 2005). The idea is that, in the face of the slow and often incomplete adaptation of husbands to their wives' increasing paid employment, women's choices are limited: to suffer in silence while doing the bulk of the housework, to exit either the labor market or the marriage, or to raise her voice to negotiate change thus facing potential marital conflict.

As a result of these interactional processes at the level of individuals and households, there is a gradual buildup of pressure for new forms of regulation at the macro level (e.g., in statutory parental and, more recently, paternal leave provisions), for changes in tax and benefit systems (e.g., allowances for childcare costs), and for new public service provision (e.g., improvements in the availability of both public and employment-located childcare). So, the influence that spousal and peer interaction has on the public discourse is recursively linked to the influence that macro-

level norms and regulatory systems have on individual-level socialization and interaction. In both we might expect to observe a substantial time lag. In the first case, there is a delay while changes in individual-level gender ideologies and strategies diffuse into the public discourse. These changes may subsequently become adopted in the platforms of social movements and political parties and, in turn, with or without the aid of direct political action, become manifest in the policies of governments and government agencies. In the second case, there is delay while changes in regulatory systems or normative ideologies diffuse, and while the implications of these changes are articulated in changed individual practices and behavior. The influence of social movements, such as the women's movement of the 1960s and 1970s can, depending on their support and momentum, have either a slowing or an accelerating effect on promoting change. In the end, change can be slow but also persistent enough over the long term to dissolve the pillars of previously existing structures (Sullivan, 2006).

LONG-TERM TRENDS IN THE GENDERED DIVISION OF LABOR AND LAGGED GENERATIONAL CHANGE

There are various methodologies for collecting information on the balance of work (paid and unpaid) and care activities carried out by men and women within households. Conventional questionnaire items such as "How much time do you normally spend each week in (paid work/cooking/cleaning)?" are widely used (e.g., in the Panel Survey of Income Dynamics, PSID). But it has been demonstrated that respondents are unable to answer these questions accurately (all the more so when the respondent acts as proxy for the spouse, as in the case of the PSID (Kan & Pudney, 2008; Robinson, Martin, Glorieux, & Minnen, 2011). A similar issue is faced by analysts of money expenditures; respondents do not in general maintain running budgetary totals for

particular expenditure categories, so researchers ask them instead to record each individual purchase sequentially in an “expenditure diary” (Sudman & Ferber, 1974).

For the same reasons, time-use diaries, in which national random samples of both women and men provide a complete account of all their activities across the full 24 hours of a day, are generally thought to provide more accurate information than questionnaire items on time use. The time-diary method is well established. The first cross-national comparative (12 nation) time-diary survey in the mid-1960s (Szalai, 1972) provided a standard methodology and design that was later adopted by virtually all subsequent studies (other than the American Time Use Study). And this de facto standardization explains the relative ease through which surveys from different countries and subsequent historical periods can be harmonized on a post-fieldwork basis, even when the original researchers had no such purpose in mind.

The Multinational Time Use Study, harmonized on this post hoc basis, is the largest collection of comparative and historical time use materials available, containing currently nearly 80 surveys from 23 countries (Fisher & Gershuny, 2013; for a full description of the study, see <http://www.timeuse.org/mtus>). Here we graph simple trends in women’s and men’s household production time for 13 Western developed countries (plus Australia), over a 50-year period from the 1960s through to the end of the 2000s. These analyses include 500,000 days of diary data contributed by respondents aged between 20 and 59. Although for the purposes of this article we graph these trends in the form of simple average minutes for working-age men and women, we note that multivariate and multilevel models show these trends to be robust when controlling for standard socioeconomic and demographic variables (e.g., Altintas & Sullivan, 2016; Hook, 2010; Kan et al., 2011).

We begin with trends in core housework. As Davis and Greenstein (2013) argued in their article titled “Why Study Housework?” the traditionally feminine-associated, mundane tasks of core housework are things that people are unhappy and unwilling to do. This means that who does the housework can serve as a significant indicator of who has power within households.

<Insert Figure 2 about here>

Figure 2 shows trends in core housework (cleaning, cooking, and laundry) for working-age women and men, respectively. There is a striking downward trend for women, indicating significant reductions in housework, cooking, and laundry time over the 50 years. There is a less impressive, but nonetheless largely consistent, increase for men. We note first a clear and substantial distinction in levels between women and men. Average minutes spent in this activity by women and men do not overlap (note vertical scales), and for most countries the gender gap remains large. In addition, there does appear to be some leveling off or even decline in men’s contributions in certain countries more recently. However, the overwhelming visual impression is of an ongoing, long-term, cross-national gender convergence.

When we consider the overall total of unpaid family work and care, the decline in women’s core housework has been offset by two other general changes that have affected both women and men. First is increased time spent in shopping, which reflects an increase in the volume of consumption as a result of the rising tide of affluence throughout the second half of the 20th century, and the progressive replacement of local retail establishments by large self-service supermarkets, which requires more travel time in private cars.

The second, concurrent change is the growth in the time that both parents spend in childcare. As described by Sayer et al. (2004), a range of reasons can be adduced to explain this: (a) increasing levels of anxiety about child safety (whether due to media generated panics or well-

founded concerns about child abuse); (b) the additional “quality” time spent, particularly by middle-class parents, in activities designed to increase their children’s human capital and boost their chance of accessing elite higher educational institutions (Lareau, 2003; Ramey & Ramey, 2010); and (c) the time spent in secondary childcare activities, as revealed by diary surveys that collect information both on primary and secondary activities.

Figure 3 shows trends in the combined total of unpaid family work and care for working-age women and men (including shopping and other household work, and care). Although, as for Figure 2, the vertical axes on the two graphs do not meet—reflecting women’s disproportionate load of unpaid work and care—there has nevertheless been a clear movement in the direction of greater gender equality. It is often observed, correctly, that equalizing trends in the gender balance of both core housework and all unpaid household work and care mainly reflect a reduction in women’s contributions rather than an increase in men’s contributions (Bianchi et al., 2006). However, it is also clear that men’s overall contributions have increased on a cross-national basis over the previous 50 years.

<Insert Figure 3 about here>

Reflecting the trends in Figure 3, Figure 4 shows working-age women’s declining share of unpaid work and care as a percentage of all working age women’s and men’s unpaid work and care. Focusing here on broad distinctions between countries, the Scandinavian countries (Denmark, Sweden, Norway, and Finland) have been the most consistently egalitarian, at least since the 1980s. The U.S. trend is quite consistent with those of the Scandinavian countries, although it does appear to level off somewhat in more recent decades. The United Kingdom, Canada, and most of Continental Europe (including Germany, Netherlands, and Slovenia) have performed slightly better than Australia and France in terms of increasing relative gender equity,

and noticeably better than the southern European countries (Spain and Italy, where men still do less than 30% of the unpaid work).

<Insert Fig 4 about here>

Finally, Figure 5 shows the overall gender division of labor—the balance of all paid and unpaid work and care between working-age men and women. For most countries, women’s ratio of all work hovers fairly closely around 50% (representing equal total paid and unpaid workloads), and there are no obvious long-term, cross-national trends. The limits of the ratio, for the great majority of countries and periods, lie within the range of 48%–52%. This suggests “iso-work,” a reference to the term coined by Burda, Hamermesh, and Weil (2013), to describe the parity of total work (paid plus unpaid) undertaken by women and men in wealthy nations.

<Insert Fig 5 about here>

Focusing again on country differences, during the early 2000s women did slightly less total work than men in Italy, Spain, and Slovenia. In contrast, in the Netherlands and Norway, women tended to do more total work than men. These differences represent a combination of female employment rates, women’s employment hours, and the amount of unpaid work and care done by women and men. For example, Slovenia has very high rates of female employment, although in Italy and Spain women still spend very long hours in housework (see Figure 1) and in overall unpaid work and care (see Figure 2). Although these cross-national overall averages for working-age women and men lend some support to the concept of iso-work, it is also the case that, within specific countries, particular subgroups of the population tend to do more total work than others, most notably women who are combining employment with childcare.

SUMMARY

We have described continuing long-term, cross-national trends in both paid and unpaid work in the direction of greater gender equality. Echoing the findings of previous research, over the past 50 years women have substantially reduced their housework time, whereas men have increased theirs somewhat. Both men and women have substantially increased the amount of time they spend in childcare. Although we show graphs based on raw data, more methodologically sophisticated analyses such as those referred to in the review section do not alter the direction or pattern of these trends.

We have argued that in any long-term process of social change we might expect to see some slowdown, or even a reversal. Among the countries surveyed here, though, historical trends in the direction of greater gender equality in the division of labor combined with the general increase in attitudinal support for greater equality (Coontz, 2013) provide a strong challenge to the idea that progress toward gender equality has stalled. Although there are intercountry differences, reflecting the influence of both institutional factors and gender ideology, long-term trends are in the same direction across these countries. This suggests that we are still in the throes of a cross-national historical process of stuttering social change in the direction of greater gender equality in the division of labor. In contrast to the idea of revolution, connoting a rapid and dramatic moment of change, we argue for a different metaphor—a slow drip of change, perhaps with consequences that are barely noticeable from year to year but that in the end are persistent enough to lead to the dissolution of existing structures (Sullivan, 2006).

The model of lagged generational change that we have proposed is designed to help understand why some of these processes might be expected to be so slow. In this model, daily practices and social interactions reflect and are constitutive of institutional-level factors (e.g., gender ideologies, public discourse, welfare and legal systems), which change as a result of

recursive processes that stretch over generations. These changes are important in the long run, but they are often complex and stuttering. We should not expect too much from them in a short period of time, and neither should we be complacent about the future.

CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS

We have presented a broad review of the empirical evidence that challenges the idea of a long-term stall, or even reversal, in trends toward greater gender equality in the division of labor. Research based on time-use data is increasingly documenting long-term gender convergence in both paid and unpaid work in more detail than we have been able to provide here (e.g., Hook, 2010; Kan et al., 2011; Pailhé et al., 2017). However, the long-term processes and mechanisms that underpin this convergence have been much less frequently addressed in the literature. The theoretical contribution of this article is to outline a multilevel longitudinal theoretical framework for understanding the long-term processes involved in the move toward gender equality. Our model of lagged generational change takes a cross-generational approach that seeks to explain why these sorts of changes can be so drawn out and subject to periods of slowing and acceleration. It extends the model of lagged adaptation to encompass intergenerational change in relation to the division of domestic labor and care, drawing on multilevel theoretical models that have sought to articulate individual, interactional, and ideological levels of analysis. The innovative contribution is to introduce an intergenerational perspective into these multilevel perspectives, one that focuses explicitly on the long-term processes involved in slow change.

There are many aspects of our argument that deserve more detailed investigation and specification. For example, the empirically grounded description of the range of institutional and individual factors indicated by the arrows in Figure 1 and the wider sociopolitical circumstances in which these factors might interact to promote or hinder the pace of change. In addition, future

research could focus on the ways meso-level theories relating to the domestic division of housework and care such as economic bargaining theory may be incorporated into this intergenerational, multilevel explanatory framework, or how normative ideologies of masculinity and femininity both feed into and are affected by the performance of housework.

We note that the literature addressing the idea of the stall is primarily based either on specific studies of heterosexual couples (as in Hochschild's work) or on the analysis of nationally representative large-scale data (e.g., the figures in this article, as well as Cotter, Hermson, & Vanneman, 2011; England, 2010). The nuances of difference in relation to race and sexuality, and of the intersectionality among race, sexuality, and education, are largely lost in such approaches. There is by now a growing literature on differences in relation to the performance of various household work and care tasks by race/ethnicity (Cabrera, Hofferth, & Chae, 2011; Kan & Laurie, 2016; Sayer & Fine, 2010) and sexuality (Goldberg, 2013; Kurdek, 2004). However, research on how these differences have changed over the past few decades is still rare. It is important to see analyses that incorporate such intersectionalities within the framework of lagged generational change. This might help us assess whether the changes and trends associated with the gender revolution (or stall) are affecting different groups differently.

We also note that, despite widespread attitudinal support for "fairness" in the gender division of labor, and the apparently approximately equal overall gender burden of paid plus unpaid work, there remains a clear distinction between iso-work and equality. The equal-but-different composition of overall gendered work time implies a situation of unfairness in terms of economic life chances. The combination of post-childbirth biology, essentialist gender ideologies, masculinist workplace attitudes, and policy measures designed to enable women rather than men to combine employment with caring means that it is still, generally, the woman in a couple who

takes time out of the workforce or goes part-time following the birth of child. This in turn affects the gender wage gap, the disadvantage women experience in respect of their opportunities for career advancement, earnings, and ultimately pensions. If men spend more time in paid work than their female partners do, they also accumulate more human capital, that is, more earning power in the long term. And if women stay at home to care for the children while their male partners work longer hours at their jobs, the earnings–capability gap widens. This helps explain why in most countries of the Western developed world, we find iso-work coupled with gender wage gaps.

In relation to policy conclusions, we suggest two possible institutional solutions to promote greater gender equality in both paid and unpaid labor. One is to substantially subsidize early childcare provision through raising taxes, as in the Scandinavian model of welfare. The other, even more challenging, is to implement statutory reduction of working hours for both partners in combination with policies supporting genuine work–family flexibility, permitting couples to stagger their paid work in order to care for their children (Fraser, 1994). This would enable a shorter duration of paid childcare, thus making it more affordable. It would also permit fathers to spend more time with their children. The fact that fathers are spending more time in childcare activities even when policy conditions are not so conducive suggests that there is a demand for these types of measures (Altintas & Sullivan, 2017; Sayer et al., 2004). Despite long-term U.S. trends moving in a more egalitarian direction, a combination of both of these lines of policy action helps explain why the Scandinavian countries continue to perform better than developed Anglophone countries in terms of gender equality. The combination of policies that permit employed fathers to spend more (paid) time caring for their children with those that provide early public childcare are part of why, according to the World Economic Forum’s (2016) Global Gender Gap Index, the Scandinavian countries remain the best countries in which to be a woman.

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FIGURE 1. LAGGED GENERATIONAL CHANGE.




FIGURE 2. CORE HOUSEWORK TIME (AVERAGE MINS/DAY) FOR WOMEN (TOP) AND MEN (BOTTOM), BY COUNTRY





FIGURE 3. TOTAL UNPAID WORK AND CARE TIME (AVERAGE MINS/DAY) FOR WOMEN (TOP) AND MEN (BOTTOM), BY COUNTRY.



Key




FIGURE 4. WOMEN'S AVERAGE UNPAID WORK AND CARE TIME AS A PROPORTION OF WOMEN'S AND MEN'S UNPAID WORK AND CARE TIME (MINS/DAY), BY COUNTRY.




FIGURE 5. WOMEN’S WORK TIME AS A PROPORTION OF WOMEN’S AND MEN’S PAID AND UNPAID WORK AND CARE TIME (MINS/DAY), BY COUNTRY.

