

# **State Failure Task Force Report: Phase III Findings**

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## **State Failure Task Force Report: Phase III Findings**

### **Scope Note**

This report is the third that comprehensively details findings from the State Failure Task Force, a group formed in response to a request from senior US policymakers to identify factors associated with serious internal political crises. The findings described in this report were first presented at a conference held on June 14, 2000, in McLean, Virginia, at the offices of Science Applications International Corporation (SAIC). Since then, the Task Force has further updated and refined its work, and those results will be presented in a future report.

For background on the project, data, and findings from Phases I and II of the Task Force's work, see, respectively: Daniel C. Esty, Jack Goldstone, Ted Robert Gurr, Pamela Surko, and Alan Unger, *Working Papers: State Failure Task Force Report*, McLean, VA: Science Applications International Corporation, 30 November 1995; and Daniel C. Esty, Jack A. Goldstone, Ted Robert Gurr, Barbara Harff, Marc Levy, Geoffrey D. Dabelko, Pamela T. Surko, and Alan N. Unger, *State Failure Task Force Report: Phase II Findings*, McLean, VA: Science Applications International Corporation, 31 July 1998. Finally, we must note that, although the work of the Task Force was funded by the CIA's Directorate of Intelligence, neither the Task Force's analyses nor the contents of this report are based on intelligence reporting. The report does not represent the official view of the US Government, the US Intelligence Community, or the Central Intelligence Agency, but rather the views of the individual authors.



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## **State Failure Task Force Report: Phase III Findings**

### **Executive Summary**

#### **Goals**

This report is the culmination of a five-year effort to identify measurable characteristics of countries around the world that affect the risk of serious political instability, which we term “state failure.” Events such as the Islamic revolutions in Iran and Afghanistan, the ethnic wars in Somalia and former Yugoslavia, the collapse of the Soviet Union, the genocide in Rwanda, and the complex combination of ethnic and revolutionary conflicts in places such as Sierra Leone, Indonesia, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo, are all examples of the kinds of state failure this effort addresses.

The State Failure Task Force (SFTF) sought to identify the underlying or structural conditions associated with the occurrence of state failure within the next two years. These conditions were first identified for a global model encompassing all countries and all types of state failures. The Task Force then undertook four further analyses focused on specific geographic regions and types of failure of particular interest to policy makers:

- Sub-Saharan Africa.
- Predominantly Muslim Countries.
- Ethnic Wars.
- Genocides/Politicides.

In addition to its core focus of developing models that assess the risk of state failure, the Task Force examined several other questions of interest to policymakers:

- Do changes in population or the environment directly affect the risk of state failure?
- Does openness to international trade or engagement in international alliances affect the risk of state failure?

- Do some states have greater or lesser capacity to cope with pressures that can lead to state failure?

## **Data and Methods**

The Task Force’s analysis relies on a truly unparalleled global data set. Assembled since 1994 with guidance from more than two-dozen area experts and scholars of political conflict, this data set contains information on nearly 1,300 political, demographic, economic, social, and environmental variables for all countries of the world from 1955 to 1998. Much of this information was drawn from existing databases provided by the World Bank, United Nations, US Census Bureau, and other organizations and independent scholars, but the Task Force also developed new data specifically for this project.

Among the most important data developed especially for this project is the list of 114 state-failure events that began between 1955 and 1998. This list indicates the starting and ending dates for all serious cases of four different kinds of internal political crisis—revolutionary wars, ethnic wars, adverse regime changes, and genocides—that occurred in independent states with populations of at least 500,000.

The Task Force used a number of different techniques to generate data and identify factors most closely associated with state failure, including logistic regression analysis, neural network analysis, and expert surveys.<sup>1</sup> All of these methods converged on a fairly stable and robust set of results.

The core of the Task Force’s method is random case-control comparisons. This technique examines conditions in “failed” countries two years before the onset of failure and compares them with conditions in a randomly selected set of “control” countries, matched by year and region, that did *not* fail in the ensuing years. This comparison allows us to identify those conditions most closely associated with state failure and to estimate the impact of differences in those conditions on the risk of failure. This technique is considered particularly appropriate for analysis of rare events, where analysis of time-series, cross-sectional data tends to produce biased estimates and may overstate the significance of variables that fluctuate over time.

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<sup>1</sup> For a description of the Task Force’s analytic process, see appendix A.



### **State Failure Defined**

In this study, state failure was defined to include four types of events, each of which indicates severe political instability. For a list of all state-failure events beginning between 1955 and 1998, see appendix A.

***Revolutionary wars.*** Episodes of sustained violent conflict between governments and politically organized challengers that seek to overthrow the central government, to replace its leaders, or to seize power in one region.

***Ethnic wars.*** Episodes of sustained violent conflict in which national, ethnic, religious, or other communal minorities challenge governments to seek major changes in status.

***Adverse regime changes.*** Major, abrupt shifts in patterns of governance, including state collapse, periods of severe elite or regime instability, and shifts away from democracy toward authoritarian rule.

***Genocides and politicides.*** Sustained policies by states or their agents, or, in civil wars, by either of the contending authorities that result in the deaths of a substantial portion of a communal or political group.

### **Key Findings**

Our analysis produced models that, when applied to historical data, correctly classified stable countries and countries headed for state failure with 70- to 80-percent accuracy.

Several conditions were associated with several types of state failure and with failure in many different global regions. These key drivers were:

- Quality of life, that is, the material well-being of a country's citizens.
- Regime type, that is, the character of a country's political institutions.
- International influences, including openness to trade, memberships in regional organizations, and violent conflicts in neighboring countries.
- The ethnic or religious composition of country's population or leadership.

Additional factors, such as patterns of development, types of ideology, and the number of years a political leader has spent in office, were important in particular regions or for particular types of failure but did not prove significant in a global analysis.

Before summarizing the results, a few words are in order on odds ratios, which we use to describe our findings. Odds ratios are commonly used to compare the likelihood of an event's occurrence across two mutually exclusive groups. The results of our logistic regression analyses can be used to estimate odds ratios for each factor in the model, controlling for all other factors. Values much greater than one indicate that the factor in question (for example, partial democracy or high infant mortality) has a substantial effect on the risk of state failure.

### **Global Model**

This model identifies factors associated with the risk of all types of state failure in all countries. Our global analysis correctly classified 72 percent of the state-failure and control cases in the historical data.

The strongest influence on the risk of state failure was regime type. All other things being equal, we found the odds of failure to be *seven times* as high for partial democracies as they were for full democracies and autocracies.

In addition, each of the following risk factors roughly *doubled* the odds of state failure:

- Low levels of material well-being, measured by infant mortality rates.
- Low trade openness, measured by imports plus exports as a percent of GDP.
- The presence of major civil conflicts in two or more bordering states.

This analysis also found that total population and population density had a moderate relationship to state failure. Countries with larger populations and higher population density had 30-percent and 40-percent greater odds of state failure, respectively.

No direct relationship to state failure was found for environmental factors, ethnic or religious discrimination, price inflation, government debt, or military spending. Nevertheless, such factors might have *indirect* effects on state failure, if they influence a country's material well-being or its engagement in international trade.

### **Sub-Saharan Africa Model**

This model correctly classified 80 percent of the state failures and control cases in the historical data.

As in the global analysis, the strongest factor associated with state failure among African countries is regime type. In Sub-Saharan Africa, *almost all* partial democracies failed within a few years, and even full democracies confronted odds of failure *five times* as large as autocratic regimes.

As the Task Force noted, however, these findings do not mean that democracies cannot survive in Africa. This view is based on the observation that transitions to democracy often follow a complex and indirect path. Attaining stable democracy might be likened to learning a difficult skill—multiple attempts and setbacks are a normal part of the process. It is worth recalling that the United States, France, and Germany also experienced periods of internal war and autocratic or semi-autocratic rule after their initial adoption of democratic institutions. Thus, high rates of failure in democracies and partial democracies may indicate the need for repeated attempts to democratize and for attention to other factors that affect the incidence of state failure, if stable democracy is to be attained.

The Africa model identified several other factors associated with increased risk of state failure. The odds of failure were *two to five times* as high in states with low trade openness, ethnic discrimination, new or entrenched leaders, or unbalanced patterns of development. The latter two findings are of particular interest.

The duration of a leader's tenure matters. African countries with new leaders (those in office less than five years) or entrenched leaders (those in office for 15 or more years) had odds of failure roughly three times as high as countries with leaders who had been in office for five to 14 years.

Patterns of development also matter, and measures of per capita wealth do not tell the whole story. Countries in Sub-Saharan Africa can be sorted into three groups according to their levels of urbanization and wealth: high development, with relatively high urbanization and GDP per capita; low development, with relatively low urbanization and GDP per capita; and unbalanced development, with high urbanization but low GDP per capita. In countries with unbalanced development, such as, Democratic Republic of the Congo or Sierra Leone, urbanization has occurred not because of the growth of commercial enterprise and an urban middle class, but in spite of their absence.

These development patterns were strongly related to the risk of state failure. Unsurprisingly, countries with relatively high development faced the smallest risk of failure. Countries with low development, by contrast, had odds of failure *three times* as high. More striking, however, was the finding that countries with unbalanced development had odds of failure nearly *five times* as high. Thus, for Africa at least, attention to GDP per capita alone provides only partial insight into conditions for stability, and broader patterns of development are important.

In the Africa model, neither population size nor population density was significant when the above factors were taken into account. In addition, no relationship was found between environmental indicators and political stability, although this may be due to the absence or poor quality of environmental data.

### **Muslim Countries Model**

This analysis investigated the risk of state failure in predominantly Muslim countries, which we defined as countries with populations that are at least 40-percent Muslim. The Muslim countries model correctly classified 78 percent of state failures and non-failures in the historical data.

As with the global and Africa models, regime type had the strongest influence on state failure. Both partial and full democracies faced odds of failure *five times* as high as their autocratic counterparts did. As with Sub-Saharan Africa, this finding probably reflects the fragility of new or incomplete democracies, rather than some cultural incompatibility with democracy as such.

Also, as with the global and Africa models, a greater risk of state failure was associated with high infant mortality, low trade openness, a large population, and the occurrence of major conflicts in bordering states. The effects of these factors were smaller, however, than they were in the global and Muslim models; all other things being equal, each was associated with a *50-to-70 percent* increase in the odds of state failure.

Three new factors emerged as important in this model. First, countries with Islamic sects faced odds of failure *three times* as high as those lacking such sectarian activity. Second, the religious diversity of the population as a whole mattered. Countries with either unusually diverse or unusually homogeneous populations had odds of failure nearly *three times* as high as those with moderate religious diversity. This relationship may exist because the exclusivist claims of Islamic religion are pursued more vigorously if one group is highly dominant, or if none are, whereas

societies that include several major religious groups may tend to habituate compromise or cooperation. Finally, membership in regional organizations was also found to have a stabilizing effect; countries with relatively few international memberships were *almost twice* as likely to experience state failure as those with many memberships.

The Task Force also measured the degree of allegiance to *sharia*, or traditional Islamic law, in Muslim countries and examined its impact on state failure. Our analysis found no net association between allegiance to *sharia* law and the risk of state failure, once the above factors were taken into account.

Taken together, these findings suggest a broader conclusion regarding the role of religion in state failure in the Muslim world: although religion clearly is very salient to politics in many Muslim countries, the key drivers of state failure in the Muslim world are, in most respects, the same as those in the rest of the world.

### **Ethnic War Model**

Despite a decline in the rate of new ethnic wars in the late 1990s, ethnic war remains the most common form of armed conflict within states today. The ethnic war model developed by the Task Force correctly classified 79 percent of the outbreaks of ethnic war or its absence in the historical data.

According to our analysis, the factors most strongly associated with the outbreak of ethnic war are a recent history of ethnic conflict, ethnic diversity, and ethnic discrimination. For countries that had previously experienced a major ethnic conflict, the odds of a new ethnic war starting were *three times* as high. For countries with very diverse populations, the odds of ethnic war were roughly *four times* as high. Most striking of all, for countries where certain ethnic minorities are subjected to significant political or economic discrimination, the odds of a new ethnic war were more than *ten times* as high.

As is true for other types of state failure, lower levels of material well-being are associated with a greater risk of ethnic war. We found that countries with worse-than-average infant mortality faced roughly *double* the odds of an outbreak of ethnic war.

Finally, as was true in the Muslim countries model, international isolation also seems to increase the risk of ethnic war. All other things being equal, countries with relatively few memberships in regional organizations faced

odds of failure *three times* as high as countries with many regional memberships.

### **Genocides and Politicides Model**

Genocides and politicides are the least frequent—but often the most alarming—type of state failure the Task Force examined. We found that genocides and politicides almost never occur in an otherwise stable environment; instead, they usually follow other kinds of state failures, such as revolutions, authoritarian coups, or ethnic wars. In light of this pattern, our analysis compared state failures that produced genocides or politicides with state failures that did not. The resulting model correctly classified 79 percent of the historical data.

A key factor affecting the risk of genocide or politicide in the context of state failure is a country's history of violent upheaval. The odds of genocide were *three times* as high in countries with relatively frequent or intense upheaval in the past 15 years as they were for countries with relatively little recent upheaval.

The ethnic character of elites, their ideology, and a country's religious composition also have powerful effects on the risk of genocide. Other things equal, the odds of genocide were *three to five times* higher when any of the following factors are present: elites who are predominantly drawn from one particular ethnic group, elites who espouse an exclusionary ideology, or a single religious group with a strongly dominant position in society.

Full or partially democratic regimes were somewhat less likely than autocracies to face impending genocides or politicides, but this association was not statistically significant. Note that this relationship is weak not because democratic regimes commit genocides or politicides but because young democracies often fail, and their failure can lead to genocidal episodes.

Intriguingly, the factor most strongly countering the likelihood of genocide and politicide is engagement in international trade. All other things being equal, countries with below-average trade openness confronted odds of genocide more than *six times* as high as countries with above-average openness.

## **New Directions**

The Task Force is aware that not all regimes respond in the same way to the kinds of pressures that can produce state failure. We believe the capacity of regimes to gather resources and cope with such pressures is a crucial determinant of whether or not state failure will occur. To investigate this issue, the Task Force has begun an expert survey that will provide a measure of state capacity and of changes in that capacity over time.

Initial tests of this survey suggest that two distinct kinds of capacity affect a state's capacity to resist political crisis: the organizational *effectiveness* of that state and the *legitimacy* of its authority. Knowing a state's capacity in these respects appears likely to provide even more accurate assessments of the risks of impending state failure. We are particularly interested in examining whether these kinds of capacity shape the impact of environmental degradation or regional conflict on the risk of state failure.

The Task Force also recognizes that annual, country-level data often lack detail on local and short-term factors that may play an important role in the outbreak of violent conflict. To determine the usefulness of more finely grained data for the analysis and forecasting of various state-failure events, we are collecting local and regional data and week-by-week event data for a small sample of countries.

Finally, the Task Force has not taken full advantage of the information our dataset already contains on the end dates of failure events. We plan to return to this and seek to identify conditions that lead to the impending termination of state failures. We believe that understanding the factors leading state failure episodes to end is just as important for forecasting and policy as understanding when they begin.





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# State Failure Task Force Report: Phase III Findings

## Introduction

This report represents the culmination of a five-year effort to identify measurable characteristics of countries around the world that affect the risk of serious political instability, which we term “state failure.” Various types of state failure have posed major challenges to policymakers seeking to stabilize democratic regimes, prevent genocides, and provide humanitarian assistance during conditions of violence and political crisis. Events such as the Islamic revolutions in Iran and Afghanistan, the ethnic wars in Somalia and former Yugoslavia, the collapse of the Soviet Union, the genocide in Rwanda, and the complex combination of ethnic and revolutionary conflicts in such places as Sierra Leone, Indonesia, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo, are examples of the kinds of political crisis this research project has addressed.

The research described in this report was designed to help policymakers anticipate and react to state failures. Analysis was guided by two questions in particular:

- Are there any measurable characteristics of states that can help us forecast (two years in advance) which countries face the greatest risks of state failure.
- Are there any measurable characteristics of states that are strongly associated with higher risks of failure, and thus might be appropriate targets for policies to reduce those risks in the future?

In addition to these core questions, this research provides insights into several additional issues of interest to scholars and policymakers:

- What trends exist in the number and types of state failure in different regions in recent decades?

- Do changes in population or the environment have a direct impact on the risk of state failure?
- Does openness to international trade have a direct impact on the risk of state failure?
- What factors, if any, provide states with a greater or lesser capacity to respond to pressures that can lead to state failure?
- Are there different factors associated with different types of state failure or with state failure in different regions of the world?

The Task Force’s analysis was designed to look ahead two years using annual data from open sources, such as the World Bank, the United Nations, and the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD).

## Data and Methods

The results presented in this report are derived from a truly unparalleled global data set.<sup>2</sup> Assembled since 1994 with the guidance of over two dozen scholars with expertise on political conflict and on different parts of the world, this data set contains information for all countries in the world on nearly 1,300 political, demographic, economic, social, and environmental variables from 1955 to 1998. Much of this information was drawn from existing databases provided by the World Bank, the United Nations, the US Census Bureau, and other organizations, as well as data sets developed by individual scholars. Members of the Task Force developed additional data sets specifically for this project.

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<sup>2</sup> Portions of the data set that data providers have approved for public release and other project-related materials can be found on the World Wide Web at <http://www.cidcm.umd.edu/inscr/stfail/index.htm>.

The most important information collected specifically for this project captures the basic characteristics of major political crises that have occurred around the world since 1955. This data set indicates the starting and ending dates of all cases of four different kinds of state-failure events that occurred in independent states with populations of at least 500,000:

- **Revolutionary wars.** Episodes of sustained violent conflict between governments and politically organized challengers that seek to overthrow the central government, to replace its leaders, or seize power in one region.
- **Ethnic wars.** Episodes of sustained violent conflict in which national, ethnic, religious, or other communal minorities challenge governments to seek major changes in status.
- **Adverse regime changes.** Major, abrupt shifts in patterns of governance, including state collapse, periods of severe elite or regime instability, and shifts away from democracy toward authoritarian rule.
- **Genocides and politicides.** Sustained policies by states or their agents, or, in civil wars, by either of the contending authorities that result in the deaths of a substantial portion of a communal or political group.

The Task Force used a number of different techniques to generate data and identify factors most closely associated with state failure, including logistic regression analysis, neural network analysis, and expert surveys.<sup>3</sup> All of these methods converged on a fairly stable and robust set of results.

The core of the Task Force’s analytic process is random case-control comparisons. As we have applied it, this method compares conditions in “problem” countries shortly before the onset of state failure with conditions in a randomly selected set of “control” countries, matched by year and region that

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<sup>3</sup> For a description of the Task Force’s analytic process, see appendix A.

did *not* experience failures in the ensuing several years. By relying on detailed data profiles of countries that did and did not experience state failure, this method offers some of the advantages of case studies. At the same time, the use of randomly selected controls allows robust statistical analysis, even for events that are relatively rare. Although this method has been widely used in epidemiological research to study factors associated with the incidence of various diseases, we believe our research marks the first time this method has been extensively applied to the study of socio-political data.<sup>4</sup>

### Organization of the Report

The first section describes how the Task Force defined and measured the concept of state failure. The following five sections present the results of our analyses for five different groupings of the historical state-failure cases:

- A *global* analysis that included all countries and all types of state failure.
- A regional analysis focused on all types of state failure in *Sub-Saharan African countries*.
- A regional analysis focused on all types of state failure in *predominantly Muslim countries* (defined here as all countries in which Muslims comprise 40 percent or more of the population).
- A topical analysis focused on *ethnic wars* in all countries.
- A topical analysis focused on *genocides and politicides* in all countries.

These analyses produced models that, when applied to the historical data, correctly classified countries experiencing state failure and stable countries with 70- to 80-percent accuracy.

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<sup>4</sup> N.E. Breslow and N.E. Day, “The Analysis of Case-Control Studies,” *Statistical Methods in Cancer Research*, Vol. 1 (International Agency for Research on Cancer: Lyon, 1980).

## Measuring State Failure

The first challenge facing the Task Force was to identify systematically all occurrences of state failure between 1955 and 1998 and to match each case with a number of control cases where no such crises existed.

### State Failure Defined

State failure is a new term for a type of serious political crisis exemplified by events that occurred in the 1990s in Somalia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Liberia, and Afghanistan. Foreign-policy observers have characterized a failed state as one “utterly incapable of sustaining itself as a member of the international community,” and they generally attribute state failure to conditions such as civil strife, government breakdown, and economic privation.<sup>5</sup>

Narrowly defined, state failures consist of instances in which central state authority collapses for several years. Fewer than 20 such episodes occurred globally between 1955 and 1998, however—too few for robust statistical analysis. Furthermore, events that fall beneath this total-collapse threshold often pose challenges to US foreign policy as well. For these reasons, the Task Force broadened its definition of state failure to include a wider range of civil conflicts, political crises, and massive human-rights violations that are typically associated with state breakdown.

*For the purposes of this study, state failure was defined to include four categories of events.* A complete list of all events beginning between 1955 and 1998 that met one of these definitions can be found in appendix A.

- **Revolutionary wars.** Episodes of sustained violent conflict between governments and politically organized challengers that seek to overthrow the central government, replace its leaders, or seize power in one region. Most revolutionary wars are fought by guerrilla armies organized by clandestine political movements. Recent examples include wars

in Colombia since 1984, Algeria since 1991, and Tajikistan from 1992 to 1998. A few, such as the Iranian revolution of 1978 and the student revolutionary movement in China in 1989, were mass movements that organized campaigns of demonstrations. These mass movements are included only if one or both parties used substantial violence.

- **Ethnic wars:** Episodes of sustained violent conflict in which national, ethnic, religious, or other communal minorities challenge governments to seek major changes in status. Most ethnic wars since 1955 have been guerrilla or civil wars in which the challengers sought independence or regional autonomy. Recent examples include wars involving Muslims in the Philippines since 1972, Tamils in Sri Lanka since 1983, and Chechens in Russia since 1994. A few, such as events in South Africa’s townships in 1976-77, involved large-scale, violent protests aimed at political change. Clashes between rival communal groups are not considered ethnic war unless they involve conflict over state power.
- **Adverse regime changes:** Major, abrupt shifts in patterns of governance, including state collapse, periods of severe elite or regime instability, and shifts away from democratic toward authoritarian rule. Some adverse regime changes are preceded by revolutionary or ethnic wars, as in Cuba in 1959 or Liberia in 1990. Some precipitate large-scale violence that may be followed by massive human-rights violations. Adverse regime changes are analytically distinct from internal wars, however, and sometimes occur with minimal open violence. Peaceful changes from authoritarian rule to democratic governance are not considered state failures and thus are not included in this category.
- **Genocides and politicides:** Sustained policies by states or their agents, or, in civil wars, by either of the contending authorities that result in the deaths of a substantial portion of a communal or political group. In genocides, the victimized groups are defined primarily by their communal (that is, ethno-linguistic or religious) characteristics. Recent examples include violence in Rwanda in 1994 and

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<sup>5</sup> Gerald B. Helman and Steven R. Ratner, “Saving Failed States,” *Foreign Policy*, 89 (Winter 1992-93): pp. 3-20.

continuing violence in Sudan. In politicides, victims are defined primarily in terms of their political opposition to the regime or dominant groups. Examples include “dirty wars” in Chile in 1973-76, Argentina in 1976-80, and El Salvador in 1980-89.

Three of the four types of state failure are evidenced by violence (the exception is adverse regime change). For two of the three violent failure types—revolutionary wars and ethnic wars—the Task Force used a dual threshold to determine whether an event had occurred and, if so, when it began and ended: 1,000 directly related deaths over the course of the conflict and 100 directly related deaths per year. In the case of genocides and politicides, we considered the intent of the violence to be the key criterion and we did not employ such a threshold.

One vexing issue confronting efforts to analyze state failure is that revolutionary and ethnic wars, regime crises, and gross human-rights violations often happen concurrently. A related problem is that the same type of state failure often recurs in a country with little respite between the end of one crisis and the start of the next. For analytical purposes, we generally treated these overlapping or sequential events as a single case of state failure. In cases where multiple failure events overlapped, the failure was considered to have begun at the start of the first event and to have ended at the conclusion of the last event. Sequential events were treated as a single case if less than five years elapsed between the end of one event and the start of the next.

We refer to cases involving overlapping or sequential events as *complex cases* and to isolated failure events as *discrete cases*. Together, the complex and discrete cases form the set of *consolidated cases* that was the object of our primary analysis.

### **Global Patterns in State Failure, 1955-98**

The Task Force identified 251 events representing 136 consolidated cases of state failure beginning between 1955 and 1998. Table A-2 in appendix A provides a detailed list of these cases by country. Although this list undoubtedly omits some low-magnitude events, it includes all serious state failures

that began during this period in all countries in the international system with populations greater than 500,000.

**Types of Failure.** Adverse regime changes were by far the most common form of state failure between 1955 and 1988, followed by ethnic wars and revolutionary wars (see figure 1). Genocides and politicides were relatively rare, occurring just 36 times in that 44-year period but included some of the most horrible political violence of the modern era, in places such as Cambodia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Rwanda.


- When crises that overlapped or occurred in quick succession are combined into a single complex case, our data set includes 135 consolidated cases of state failure.

**Timing of Failures.** The rate of new state failures surged in the 1960s and again in the early 1990s, periods during which a host of new states was born as imperial powers withdrew (from Africa in the 1960s) or collapsed (the Soviet Union in 1991) (see figure 2). After rising in the early 1960s, the proportion of all countries in failure held steady for roughly 25 years. It then jumped to an all-time high in the early 1990s, when the developing world experienced a marked increase in ethnic wars and failures of efforts at democratizing regimes. The proportion of countries in failure then receded to its “normal” level later in that decade, suggesting that the preceding surge was, in fact, a temporary event. Also notable is the fact that the rate of new state failures has been stable since 1955; the median number of new failures per year was three, and only 11 of the 44 years (25 percent) deviated from that norm by more than one event.

The patterns over time differ across different kinds of failure. Revolutionary wars (see figure 3) erupted most frequently in the 15 years from 1975 to 1989 (an average of two new wars per year, compared with an average of one for the period as a whole), whereas ethnic wars (see figure 4) peaked in the early 1990s (eight new ethnic wars in 1991 alone, compared with an average of one new ethnic war per year for the period as a whole). This pattern supports the notion




**Figure 1**  
**State Failure Events, by Type, 1955-98**



**Figure 2**  
**Global Incidence of State Failure, 1955-98**

*Note double axes, scale change*



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that the issues around which violent political conflict is organized may have shifted with the end of the Cold War, from ideology to ethnicity and community, but the rate of violent political conflict changed little. Adverse regime changes (see figure 5) exhibit an interesting pattern in the latter part of the century. Not a single adverse regime change occurred anywhere in the world from 1984 to 1988, a five-year hiatus unmatched by any other type of state failure. From 1989 to 1998, however, the rate of adverse regime change surged to an average of 3.5 new events per year—well above the average of two per year for the period as a whole—as many newly democratic or partially democratic regimes in Africa and the Soviet successor states slid back into autocracy. By 1998, the rate had returned to a more typical level, suggesting that the wave of backslides might finally be ending.

Although there seems to be no definitive pattern over time in the rate at which genocides break out, there is a decisive trend toward their cessation in the 1990s (see figure 6). In 1998, only one country, Sudan, was experiencing an ongoing genocide or politicide, by far the lowest rate for any failure type.

***Sequences of Failure.*** The Task Force also discovered patterns in the sequence of events within complex state failures, which comprise 62 of 135 consolidated cases (46 percent). Some types of state failure are particularly likely to lead to other types or to follow from them:

- **Whether revolutionary or ethnic, internal wars often beget other kinds of state failure.** Of the 55 revolutionary wars that began between 1955 and 1998, 22 (40 percent) were the first event in a complex failure that subsequently included one or more adverse regime transitions, ethnic wars, or genocides. The proportion was similar for ethnic wars; 23 of 64 (36 percent) of these were the first event in a complex case.
- **Adverse regime changes often occur in isolation.** More than two-fifths (41 of 96) of all adverse regime changes between 1955 and 1998 occurred without following or triggering other forms of state failure, the highest proportion of any of the four

forms of state failure. Less than one-fifth (18 of 96) proved to be the first stage in a complex event.


- **Genocides and politicides nearly always occur in the wake of other kinds of state failure.** Only one of the 36 genocides or politicides that began between 1955 and 1998 occurred in a country that was not already experiencing some form of state failure (Syria 1981-82). Furthermore, the linkages between genocides and the failure events that precede them are usually clear-cut. Two basic patterns emerge. In some instances, an authoritarian regime seizes power and sets out to eliminate political opponents (for example, Chile 1973-76). In others, a regime responds to revolutionary or ethnic war with extreme measures purportedly intended to re-establish security (for example, Indonesia against suspected Communists in 1965-66 and against East Timorese after 1975).

***Effects of the End of the Cold War.*** Although there was, as noted above, a short-term increase in the early 1990s in the number of new state failures, many of which were associated with the collapse of the USSR and the end of the Cold War, the level of state failure seemed to have reverted to a more typical rate by the latter part of the decade. To investigate whether the end of the Cold War brought with it a change in the conditions that tend to produce state failure, the Task Force tested its models to see if the factors associated with serious political instability had changed after 1990. We found no substantial changes in the correlates of failure. Thus, the end of the Cold War brought with it a short-term increase in disorder but not a change in the fundamental political relationships that tend to produce disorder.

***State Failure by Region.*** Unsurprisingly, different geographic regions account for markedly different shares of the consolidated cases of state failure (see figure 7). Sub-Saharan Africa accounted for the largest share, 32 percent, while East Asia and the Americas accounted for the smallest shares—13 and 14 percent, respectively. The Near East, which includes the South Asian countries of India, Pakistan, and Bangladesh as well as North Africa and the


**Figure 3**  
**Global Incidence of Revolutionary War, 1955-98**

*Note double axes, scale change*




**Figure 4**  
**Global Incidence of Ethnic War, 1955-98**

*Note double axes, scale change*




**Figure 5**  
**Global Incidence of Adverse Regime Change, 1955-98**

*Note double axes, scale change*




**Figure 6**  
**Global Incidence of Genocide/Politicide, 1955-98**

*Note double axes, scale change*



**Figure 7**  
**Consolidated Cases of State Failure,**  
**by Region, 1955-98**



Middle East, experienced 22 percent of the consolidated cases, while Europe and the former USSR accounted for 19 percent.

### Phase III Initiatives

In Phase I of its research<sup>6</sup> the State Failure Task Force developed a global model of the major correlates of serious political instability from 1957 to 1994. Despite including just three variables—infant mortality, trade openness, and level of democracy—that model correctly classified two-thirds of the historical cases. In Phase II,<sup>7</sup> the Task Force confirmed and refined that model by

<sup>6</sup> See Daniel C. Esty, Jack Goldstone, Ted Robert Gurr, Pamela Surko, and Alan Unger, *Working Papers: State Failure Task Force Report* (McLean, VA: Science Applications International Corporation, 30 November 1995).

<sup>7</sup> See Daniel C. Esty, Jack A. Goldstone, Ted Robert Gurr, Barbara Harff, Marc Levy, Geoffrey D. Dabelko, Pamela T. Surko, and Alan N. Unger, *State Failure Task Force Report: Phase II Findings* (McLean, VA: Science Applications International Corporation, 31 July 1998).

extending the period of observation to 1996, varying the set of control cases and testing new or refined variables, the most important of which was a three-category indicator for level of democracy that distinguished partial democracies from full democracies and autocracies. The Phase II analysis strongly confirmed the Phase I findings and demonstrated that partial democracies—states with a mix of democratic and autocratic characteristics—are the most vulnerable to state failure.

In Phase III, the Task Force expanded the period of observation to 1955-98, examined the impact of international influences, and investigated in greater depth the relationship between trade openness and the risk of state failure.

### Assessing the Impact of International Influences

Phases I and II of the Task Force's research focused on the domestic structural factors that serve as preconditions for the onset of state failure.<sup>8</sup> States do not operate in isolation, however; domestic conflicts affect the security and prosperity of the international community, and the international community influences the conditions and course of domestic conflicts. Indeed, most policymakers and analysts assume that bilateral and multilateral policies can forestall some state failures and minimize the severity of others.

Identifying and measuring the effects of specific policies in a complex and ever-changing international political environment is extremely difficult. Policies of direct intervention, whether diplomatic, economic, or military, may themselves be symptomatic of "system failure." Put another way, international intervention often represents a dramatic escalation in external engagement that had previously failed to avert, or even contributed

<sup>8</sup> Previous analyses have assessed the impact of certain kinds of international economic policies, such as the presence of standby agreements with the International Monetary Fund (IMF), on the likelihood of state failure, but the relationships have generally been weak and inconsistent.

to, an escalation in internal conflict. Before the effects of micro-policy adjustments can be properly assessed, the impact of broader systemic influences must be identified and mapped.

To begin assessing the effects of such factors on the outbreak, course, and outcome of state failures, the Task Force collected data on three major types of external influence:

- Armed conflicts in neighboring countries.
- Memberships in conventional inter-governmental organizations.
- Bilateral trade flows.

The Task Force's research was constrained by the scarcity of pre-existing global datasets. The increased involvement of nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) in humanitarian crises and civil-conflict situations over the past 20 years is recognized as a crucial additional component of external influence, but no extant data resources recording these activities have been identified. We expect to take advantage of data on global arms transfers once it is made available.

Our research shows that external influences do affect a country's risk of state failure. Fewer memberships in intergovernmental organizations was a significant predictor of ethnic war and of state failure in Muslim countries and a greater number of armed conflicts in neighboring states was associated with a greater risk of state failure globally and in Muslim countries. In a particularly striking result, we found that a country's level of trade openness had a significant effect in several models.

#### **Assessing the Impact of Trade Openness**

The Task Force has examined a wide range of economic variables and their association with state failure including: inflation rates; total and per capita investment; levels of government taxation, debt, and spending; flows of foreign aid and rates of GDP growth. None of these, however, has proven to be significantly associated with state failure in models that also include indicators of a country's quality of life (as measured by infant

mortality or GDP per capita relative to world medians) and regime type. The one persistent exception, for a wide variety of global, regional, and failure-type analyses, is a country's openness to international trade, measured as the value of a country's imports plus exports as a percentage of GDP. Higher trade openness is strongly associated with a significantly lower risk of state failure. Depending on the region or type of failure, countries with levels of trade openness below the global median were *two to two-and-one-half times* as likely to experience state failure as countries with above-median levels of trade openness.

Why should low trade openness go hand in hand with a higher risk of state failure? Several economists pointed out to the Task Force that trade openness is generally related to population; countries with larger populations generally supply more of their own needs, and their imports and exports therefore tend to be smaller relative to their domestic economy. Economists also maintain that countries at higher levels of development benefit more from trade and thus are likely to have higher levels of trade. However, we found that even when controlling for both population size and population density, and for levels of development, the effect of trade openness on state failure was still significant. The impact of trade openness worked the same way whether looking at the entire world or only at a sample of countries generally less disposed to trade, such as those of Sub-Saharan Africa. We found that trade openness was generally unrelated to other economic and trade variables, such as the concentration of a country's exports, or of its trading partners, or its GDP per capita.

A growing body of social-science research links trade openness to a host of other virtues, including faster economic growth, strengthened democracy, and improved environmental performance. These virtues, in turn, are widely thought to be associated with political stability. In this story, trade openness helps to produce political and economic outcomes that reduce the risk of state failure. Trade leads to faster growth and more democracy, both of which encourage political stability.

While almost certainly true in part, this interpretation cannot fully explain the Task Force’s findings. All of our models have included measures of political institutions, and the Task Force has tested models that included economic growth on its own and together with trade openness. Through all of these permutations, trade openness has remained significant, indicating some independent association between this variable and political stability.

The most compelling interpretation starts with the observation that the trade-openness indicator is probably measuring more than trading activity alone. Economic “gravity” theories of the determinants of trade suggest that all other things equal, countries of similar size and levels of development should have roughly similar levels of trade.<sup>9</sup> Therefore, countries that have markedly below-median levels of trade, after controlling for population and development level, would seem to have something “wrong” with them—something that is distorting or constraining their normal propensity to trade.

These distortions might result from government or elite interference in the economy, perhaps in the form of crony capitalism or destructive modes of corruption. These distortions could also reflect a lack of secure protection of property and enforcement of contracts, both of which are prerequisites for truly open trade. They might also reflect conflicts or rent-seeking between the state

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<sup>9</sup> In its simplest form, the gravity model for trade postulates that the amount of exports from country A to country B is directly proportional to the product of country sizes (measured by GDP, population, and area), and inversely proportional to the distance between them. Researchers have investigated many different extensions, variations, and refinements, and our work applied a particular model parameterization used by Federal Reserve economists. See Jeffrey A. Frankel, Ernesto Stein and Shang-Jin Wei, “Regional Trading Arrangements: Natural or Supernatural?” *American Economic Review* Vol. 86, No. 2 (May 1996: 52-56), for more on gravity theories of trade.

and elite groups that makes trade more costly or hazardous than it should be.

Whatever the precise mechanism, we believe that relatively low trade openness serves as a highly sensitive indicator of the costs imposed on a country by the inability of the state and elites to cooperate in upholding the rules of law and fair practices. In addition to inhibiting trade, this inability to cooperate may encourage political instability. This interpretation gibes with other research by political scientists who have found that high levels of free trade are associated with stable elite coalitions and with lower levels of international conflict with other states.<sup>10</sup>

Trade openness may also help promote political stability by encouraging states to invest in social development. This effect, however, would seem to depend on what is being produced for export. Exports of natural resources and agricultural products require mostly unskilled labor and often make easier targets for state officials seeking to extract side-payments. By contrast, the production of manufactured goods for export requires skilled labor and is typically more diversified. In countries where exports are substantial and manufactured goods make up a larger portion of those exports, elite interests are more likely to align in favor of social investment, and workers are likely to command better wages—outcomes that are broadly associated with greater political stability.<sup>11</sup>

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<sup>10</sup> See, for example, Havard Hagra, “Development and the Liberal Peace: What Does It Take to Be a Trading State?” *Journal of Peace Research* Vol. 37, No. 1 (January 2000: 5–30), and Etel Solingen, *Regional Orders at Century’s Dawn: Global and Domestic Influence on Grand Strategy* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1998).

<sup>11</sup> The classic formulation of this argument comes from Johan Galtung, “A Structural Theory of Imperialism,” *Journal of Peace Research* Vol. 8, No. 2 (1971: 81–117). See also Francois Bourignon and Christian Morrison, *External Trade and Income Distribution* (Paris: OECD, 1989) and Adrian Wood, *North-South Trade, Employment and Inequality* (Oxford: Clarendon, 1994) for more recent analyses that confirm this view.

**Table 1**  
**Variables Used in the Global Model**

Variable	Name	What the Variable Measures	Data Sources
Infant mortality	UND26Y	Number of deaths of infants under one year of age per 1,000 live births, logged and normalized. The Task Force considers this variable a sensitive indicator of the quality of life for a country's general population. It is highly correlated with other measures of development, such as GDP per capita.	United Nations' <i>World Population Prospects 1950–2060</i>
Regime type	POLX	Indicates full democracy, partial democracy, or autocracy. This variable was constructed from information on political institutions. Democratic regimes have competitive political participation, elected chief executives, and significant checks on executive power. Partial democracies have a mix of democratic and autocratic institutions, with democratic features outweighing autocratic ones.	Polity III
Trade openness	WDIOPEN, PWTOPEN	Dollar value of a country's imports plus exports divided by its GDP. The global model compares countries above and below the world median. Surprisingly, the only economic variable the Task Force examined that correlated closely with trade openness was road density, which is generally considered an indicator of a country's level of development, and which has specific implications for trade.	World Bank's <i>World Development Indicators</i> , Penn World Tables 5.6
Population size	WDIPOPT, CAPTPOP	Number of inhabitants, in thousands, logged and normalized.	United Nations' <i>World Population Prospects 1950–2060</i> , Correlates of War Project
Population density	WDIPOP, UND10Y	Number of inhabitants per square kilometer, logged and normalized.	World Bank's <i>World Development Indicators</i> , United Nations' <i>World Population Prospects 1950–2060</i>
Bordering states with major civil conflict	MACNCIV	The number of bordering states experiencing major violent internal conflicts. The model compares countries with two or more such neighbors to those with one or none. This is one of several indicators the Task Force has used to assess the effects of "bad neighborhoods" on state failure.	Monty Marshall, CIDCM, University of Maryland



## Refining the Global Model

### Model Results

In Phase III, the Task Force’s global analysis identified a number of variables as significantly associated with an increased risk of state failure around the world (see table 1):

- High infant mortality.
- Partial democracy.

- Low trade openness.
- Large population.
- Violent internal conflicts in several neighboring states.

The Task Force’s global model correctly classified 72 percent of the historical failures and control cases from which it was estimated (see table 2), a significant improvement over the 66 percent obtained in Phase I and Phase II.

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**Table 2**  
**Global Model Results**

Variable	Greater Risk	Lesser Risk	Odds Ratio	P-Value
Infant Mortality***	Higher	Lower	2.0	< 0.001
Regime Type***	Partial democracies	Autocracies	7.5	< 0.001
	Full democracies		1.1	0.893
Trade Openness*	Below median	Above median	1.7	0.062
Total Population*	Larger	Smaller	1.3	0.072
Population Density**	Higher	Lower	1.4	0.038
Bordering States with Major Civil Conflict**	Two or more	Zero or one	1.9	0.023

N=114 state failures, 342 controls

This model correctly classified 72.8 percent of the state failures and 71.9 percent of the controls.

\* Significant at the 0.10 level;

\*\* Significant at the 0.05 level;

\*\*\* Significant at the 0.01 level.

*Notes on the statistics:* Odds ratios provide an approximation of the relative risk of state failure for two mutually exclusive groups. The results of a logistic regression analysis can be used to estimate odds ratios for each factor in the model, controlling for all other factors. The p-value provides a test of the statistical significance of an individual variable in the multivariate model. Values close to zero suggest rejection of the null hypothesis, that is, they indicate that the variable has a measurable effect on the risk of state failure.

In this table, the odds ratios for infant mortality ratiosotal population, and population density, compare estimated risks one standard deviation apart.

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Higher classification accuracy can be obtained by focusing on specific geographic regions or types of state failure. Nevertheless, the model produced by the global analysis offers two major advantages over its narrower counterparts. First, it is the only model that allows us to compare the relative risks of failure for countries in different regions (for example, Pakistan and Zimbabwe), or to estimate failure risks for countries in regions with too few countries to permit robust statistical analysis, such as Latin America or Eastern Europe. Second, only a global model can identify factors associated with increased risk of state failure around the world, thereby highlighting for policy attention those factors that might provide the broadest advantage for efforts to reduce the rate of state failure.

### Findings

**Infant Mortality.** The Task Force used several different indicators to measure a country's quality of life, which generally tracks its level of development. We have examined GDP per capita, life expectancy, and calories consumed per capita, as well as infant mortality. We also experimented with a "basket" of quality-of-life indicators that combined these measures into a single index. All of these indicators are highly correlated and yield similar statistical results. By a slight margin, however, a country's infant mortality rate is most consistently associated with state failure.<sup>12</sup> Because infant mortality declined during the period under study, we measured infant mortality as a normalized variable, that is, each country's infant mortality is measured relative to the global median for that year. For states with relatively high infant mortality—those whose logged, normalized infant mortality rate is at least one standard deviation above the world average—the odds of failure were *twice as high* as for countries with relatively low infant mortality, that is, those countries in which the logged infant mortality rate is

at least one standard deviation below the world average.

We do not believe that changes in infant mortality rates as such cause changes in the risk of state failure. Rather, we believe a country's infant mortality rate provides a sensitive indicator of broader changes in economic development and material well-being. The forces to which infant mortality rates appear to be sensitive include the quality of a country's medical and public health systems, levels of maternal and infant nutrition, access to shelter and clean drinking water, and levels of education and literacy. Only when all of these indicators move together—as they generally do in our data—would we expect to find changes in the incidence of state failure.

**Regime Type.** Of the variables examined in our analyses, regime type has the most powerful association with the risk of state failure. All other things being equal, the odds of failure were roughly equivalent for regimes we identified as full democracies and full autocracies (see figure 8). Although the odds for full democracies were 10-percent greater, the difference was not statistically significant. By contrast, the odds of failure were *seven* times as high for regimes we identified as partial democracies. The characteristic of partial democracies that correlates most strongly with a high risk of state failure, our analysis shows, is the combination of a powerful chief executive with a relatively fractious or ineffective legislature (see appendix A, table A-2 for polity scores by country in 1998).

This result is not surprising. Partial democracies are often regimes at odds with themselves. By definition, these regimes have some elements of democracy, such as elections to choose legislatures or chief executives, nominally independent courts, or the presence of competing political parties. Partial democracies, however, generally combine these ostensibly democratic practices with other conditions inimical to democracy, such as sharp limits on political speech and organization, restrictive voting rules or fraudulent election procedures that prevent citizens from making meaningful choices, and extreme concentrations of power in the hands of a

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<sup>12</sup> Infant mortality might work better because it is the most consistently and widely reported of these variables. It also might be that infant mortality best captures not only a country's overall level of material well-being, but also the distribution of that well-being across society as it affects one very vulnerable group, namely, newborns.

**Figure 8**  
**Regime Type, by Country, 1998\***



Study limited to states in the international system with 1998 populations greater than 500,000. Also excludes the United States.

Boundary representation is not necessarily authoritative.

Full Democracies		Partial Democracies	Autocracies	
Argentina	Madagascar	Albania	Afghanistan	Morocco
Australia	Malawi	Armenia	Algeria	Niger
Austria	Mauritius	Bangladesh	Angola	Nigeria
Belgium	Mongolia	Bosnia and Herzegovina	Azerbaijan	North Korea
Benin	Namibia	Central African Republic	Bahrain	Oman
Bolivia	Nepal	Colombia	Belarus	Qatar
Botswana	Netherlands	Comoros	Bhutan	Rwanda
Brazil	New Zealand	Ethiopia	Burkina Faso	Saudi Arabia
Bulgaria	Nicaragua	Georgia	Burma	Serbia and Montenegro
Canada	Norway	Ghana	Burundi	Singapore
Chile	Panama	Guinea	Cambodia	Somalia
Costa Rica	Papua New Guinea	Guinea	Cameroon	Sudan
Cyprus	Philippines	Guyana	Chad	Swaziland
Czech Republic	Poland	Haiti	China	Syria
Denmark	Portugal	Honduras	Congo, Democratic Republic of the	Tajikistan
Dominican Republic	Romania	Kenya	Congo, Republic of the	Togo
Ecuador	Slovakia	Kyrgyzstan	Côte d'Ivoire	Tunisia
Estonia	Slovenia	Liberia	Croatia	Turkmenistan
El Salvador	South Africa	Malaysia	Cuba	Uganda
Fiji	South Korea	Mali	Egypt	United Arab Emirates
Finland	Spain	Mexico	Eritrea	Uzbekistan
France	Sweden	Moldova	Gabon	Vietnam
Germany	Switzerland	Mozambique	Gambia, The	Yemen
Greece	Taiwan	Pakistan	Guinea-Bissau	Zimbabwe
Guatemala	Thailand	Paraguay	Indonesia	
Hungary	Trinidad/Tobago	Peru	Iran	
India	Turkey	Russia	Iraq	
Ireland	United Kingdom	Senegal	Jordan	
Israel	Uruguay	Sierra Leone	Kazakhstan	
Italy	Venezuela	Sri Lanka	Kuwait	
Jamaica		Tanzania	Laos	
Japan		Ukraine	Lebanon	
Latvia		Zambia	Lesotho	
Lithuania			Libya	
Macedonia, The				
Former Yugoslav Rep. of				

\*Based on Polity III dataset.

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chief executive or the ruling party. Examples of such states are the Fujimori regime in Peru and South Africa under apartheid.

Partial democracies tend to emerge by one of two paths. In some cases, an authoritarian regime “softens,” attempting to placate foreign donors or assuage domestic critics by adopting some trappings of democracy. Even these cosmetic changes, however, often have the unintended consequence of providing opposition groups with institutional footholds. Because the regime in power may have no intention of yielding its authority, such measures often lead to more frequent and more severe confrontations that can generate political instability. The other and more common path by which partial democracies arise is for a democratic regime, often one recently established and fearful of social instability, to “backslide” toward autocracy by placing restrictions on its opponents, or on the exercise of civil rights. Whichever path they have followed, partial democracies are generally short lived. Our data indicate that many last fewer than five years. In addition, while some partial democracies transition up to full democracy, many more backslide into autocracy.

Despite these patterns, the Task Force does *not* believe that gradual transitions to democracy are doomed. Far from it. Instead, states typically move several times between democracy, autocracy, and partial democracy before arriving at stable democracy. Indeed, this pattern should be familiar to us from the histories of the United States, France, and Germany, all of which experienced bouts of civil war or lapses into authoritarian rule after they adopted democratic institutions.

In general, four lessons should be drawn from the high rate of state failure in partially democratic regimes:

- **Societies rarely move directly from non-democratic governance to stable democracy; setbacks and reversals often occur before stable democracy is achieved.** Not every reversal of democracy should be seen as a terminal event.

However painful, such setbacks are part of the learning process by which most societies gradually build toward a stable democracy. Viewed in this light, adverse regime changes usually call for renewed efforts to secure democratic institutions rather than resignation over their inapplicability.

- **Simply installing a democratic or partially democratic regime is unlikely to produce political stability.** When considering policy options, the full range of risk factors confronting such regimes should be taken into account. Efforts to reduce the vulnerability of new or partial democracies to state failure are unlikely to succeed unless they also address other risk-mitigating factors, such as high levels of material well-being and openness to trade.
- **Elections themselves do little to ensure the stability of democracy.** In fact, the major democratic institution we found to be most strongly associated with instability in partial democracies is some form of executive or legislative elections. What seems to distinguish the more stable democracies from the unstable partial democracies is not the occurrence of elections but the presence of legislatures that are genuinely effective at making laws and constraining executive authority.
- **Because they are more likely to backslide into autocracy, partial democracies bear closer watching.**

*Trade Openness.* The global model shows that, after controlling for population and level of development, the odds of state failure were nearly twice as high in countries with relatively low trade openness than in countries with higher trade openness. The result is the same whether imports, exports, and GDP are calculated in terms of current prices or in terms of prices adjusted for purchasing power parity. We used the purchasing power parity (PPP) estimates in all of the models described in this report, but this choice is not crucial to any of our results.

**Table 3**  
**Other Variables Tested in the Global Model**

<b>Political and Leadership</b>	<b>Economic and Environmental</b>
Economic discrimination	Trading partner concentration*
Political discrimination	GDP per capita*
Separatist activity*	Change in GDP per capita*
Discrimination or separatist activity*	Land burden
Party fractionalization	Change in reserves
Parliamentary responsibility*	Government debt
Party legitimacy	Trade with OECD countries
Class character of the ruling elite	Annual change in inflation rate*
Ideological character of the ruling elite	Cropland area*
Regime type*	Irrigated land*
Regime duration*	Access to safe water
Leader's years in office*	Damage due to drought
Freedom House political rights index*	Famine
Freedom House civil rights index*	
Amnesty International political terror scale*	
US Department of State political terror index	
Neighboring countries in major armed conflict*	
Membership in regional organizations*	
<b>Demographic and Societal</b>	
Youth bulge*	
Labor force as a percent of population*	
Annual change in infant mortality	
Life expectancy	
Secondary school enrollment ratio	
Annual change in secondary school enrollment ratio	
Calories per capita	
Urban population*	
Urban population growth rate	
Ethno-linguistic fractionalization	
Ethnic fractionalization*	
Religious fractionalization	

\*Indicates variables that were significant at the  $p < 0.10$  level in the initial t-test/chi-square screening.

**Population Size and Density.** The Task Force originally included population size and population density in the models in order to tease out the independent effects of trade openness. As was noted above, economists have found a powerful association between demographic variables and trade, however the effect we observed was not simply an artifact of this relationship.

Population size and density also have modest, independent associations with the risk of imminent state failure. Countries with relatively large populations were found to have odds of failure roughly *30 percent greater* than countries with relatively small populations. Similarly, we found that densely populated countries had odds of failure *40 percent greater* than their sparsely populated counterparts did.<sup>13</sup> Both variables were at least marginally statistically significant.

Although the magnitude of these effects is small compared with the other variables in the model, their presence indicates that population characteristics do affect the risk of state failure, even when controlling for differences in levels of development. Some political scientists have argued that larger populations are more difficult to control, and that mobilization, which is a necessary precursor to large-scale violent conflict, occurs more readily in countries with denser populations.<sup>14</sup> Our results offer some evidence in support of these views.

**Conflicts in Neighboring States.** Conflict can spill across borders in many ways. Soldiers sometimes cross borders in pursuit of opponents. Refugees often cross borders as well, placing economic burdens on the countries into which they move and exacerbating existing social tensions. The presence of major conflicts in neighboring states might mean that guns

and other weapons are more readily available throughout the region. Concern for the plight of ethnic kin, or even the mere example of conflict, might also encourage groups to act violently.<sup>15</sup>

Based on these observations, the Task Force experimented with a number of specifications for such spillover effects. We obtained the most consistent results when we focused on cases in which *two or more* bordering countries were experiencing a major, violent internal conflict. For countries in such bad neighborhoods,” the odds of state failure were almost *twice as high* as they were for countries with one or no bordering states embroiled in civil conflict.

### **Confirming and Refining the Sub-Saharan Africa Model**

The strength of any global analysis of state failure is the ability to make general statements about the phenomenon that apply to nearly every country in the world. That strength is just one side of a coin, however, and any global analysis carries with it an unavoidable shortcoming. By lumping the wealthy, stable democracies of Europe and North America together with the relatively poor, often autocratic or partially democratic countries of the developing world, one risks producing a model that highlights the obvious differences between rich and poor nations but fails to identify important distinctions within those categories.

To test our results against this problem, and to explore in greater depth those parts of the world where state failure has been most common since 1955, the Task Force has pursued a separate analysis of state failure in Sub-Saharan Africa. This analysis began in Phase II when, in addition to testing all of

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<sup>13</sup> For population size and population density, the odds ratios referred to here are based on a comparison of countries in which the logged value was at least one standard deviation above or below the global mean.

<sup>14</sup> David Laitin and James Fearon, “Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil War,” paper prepared for presentation at the first LiCEP Meetings, Duke University, April 21, 2000.

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<sup>15</sup> See Monty G. Marshall, *Third World War* (Rowman & Littlefield, 1999) for more on these issues.

the variables that emerged as significant in the preceding global analysis, the Task Force examined other factors that Africa experts suggested were particularly important, such as a country's colonial heritage, conditions of ethnic discrimination, and levels of urbanization.

In Phase III, the Task Force sought to confirm and refine its earlier findings on Sub-Saharan Africa. In particular, we reanalyzed the data against an expanded period of observation that encompassed more failure events and investigated new or refined measures for several key variables, including interaction effects between economic and demographic factors that emerged as significant in earlier work (see table 4).

#### **Patterns in State Failure in Sub-Saharan Africa, 1955-98**

After the Cold War's conclusion, new state-failure events continued to shake Sub-Saharan Africa throughout the 1990s. The proportion of African countries experiencing some form of state failure was higher in the mid-1990s than it was at any other time in the post-colonial era (see figure 9). Sixteen of the 44 consolidated cases of state failure in this region—some 36 percent—began between 1988 and 1998. This matches the total from 1960 to 1972, the tumultuous period during which most of these countries first gained their independence.

The rates of the various types of state failure in Sub-Saharan Africa over the 44-year period do not differ dramatically from the pattern for the world as a whole. For both sets of countries, adverse regime change is the most frequent type of state failure by far, followed by ethnic war, revolutionary war, and genocide (see figure 10). Ethnic wars were somewhat more common in Africa than they were globally, but the difference is not nearly as large as arguments about the essentially "tribal" character of African politics would suggest. The sharpest difference comes in genocides and politicides; Sub-Saharan Africa experienced 14 of these events between 1955 and 1998, nearly two-fifths of the global total.

#### **Model Results**

According to the analysis, the major risk factors for state failure in Sub-Saharan African are:

- Partial democracy and, to a lesser extent, full democracy.
- Active ethnic discrimination.
- Low or unbalanced development.
- Low trade openness.
- New or entrenched political leadership.
- A country's colonial heritage, with former French colonies at lower risk.

Our Sub-Saharan Africa model correctly classified 80 percent of the historical cases from which it was estimated. Even within this relatively high-risk region, our analysis was largely successful at distinguishing countries facing imminent failure from their more stable counterparts. Several of the variables in the model were included to capture non-linear effects or to isolate the independent effects of other variables. Odds ratios and p-values for all of the variables are reported in table 5.

#### **Findings**

**The major predictors of state failure in Africa are the same factors that predict state failure around the world.** In this regard, at least, Sub-Saharan Africa is not entirely exceptional. As was true in the global model, regime type bore the strongest relationship to the incidence of state failure in Sub-Saharan Africa, with partial democracies facing the greatest risk. In addition, as in the global model, higher trade openness was associated with a lower risk of state failure. Infant mortality does not appear in the Africa model, but other measures of economic well being do.

**African countries less open to trade are at greater risk.** Although economic theory suggests that less developed nations have less to gain from international trade, our analysis found a stronger association


**Table 4**  
**Variables Used in the Sub-Saharan Africa Model**

Variable	Name	What the Variable Measures	Data Source
Regime type	POLX	Indicates whether a country is a full democracy, partial democracy, or autocracy. This variable was constructed from information on political institutions. Democratic regimes have competitive political participation, elected chief executives, and significant checks on executive power. Partial democracies have a mix of democratic and autocratic institutions, with democratic features outweighing autocratic ones.	Polity III
Trade openness	WDIOPEN, PWTOPEN	Dollar value of a country's imports plus exports divided by its GDP. The Sub-Saharan Africa model compares countries above and below the regional median. Surprisingly, the only economic variable the Task Force examined that correlated closely with trade openness was road density, which is generally considered an indicator of a country's level of development, and which has specific implications for trade.	World Bank's <i>World Development Indicators</i> , Penn World Tables 5.6
Population size	WDIPOPT, CAPTPOP	Number of inhabitants, in thousands, logged and normalized.	United Nations' <i>World Population Prospects 1950–2060</i> , Correlates of War project
Over-urbanization	WDIGDPPC, PWTRGDPC UNUURBPC	Sorts countries into three baskets: (1) low urbanization; (2) high urbanization and low GDP per capita; or (3) high urbanization and high GDP per capita. For both variables, "high" and "low" refer to normalized values above or below the regional median.	World Bank's <i>World Development Indicators</i> , Penn World Tables 5.6, United Nations' <i>World Population Prospects 1950–2060</i>
Colonial heritage	SFTGFREN	Indicates whether a country was ever a colony of France. We chose to focus on France as a country with many former colonies and a still-active role during much of the period we covered.	Input from regional experts
Discrimination	DISPOTA2	Signifies the existence of at least one politically significant communal group that was subject to significant political or economic discrimination or that sought greater political autonomy from the state.	Minorities at Risk Dataset
Leader's tenure	BNNYROFF	Number of years a chief of state has held office. Countries were sorted into three baskets according to the length of their leader's tenure: less than five years, five to 14 years, or 15 or more years. This variable offers one indication of the character of a country's leadership.	Henry S. Bienen and Nicolas van de Walle, <i>Of Time and Power: Leadership Duration in the Modern World</i> , as updated by the Task Force.




**Figure 9**  
**Incidence of State Failure in Sub-Saharan Africa, 1955-98**

*Note double axes, scale change*



**Figure 10**  
**State Failure Events in Sub-Saharan Africa, by Type, 1955-98**



**Table 5**  
**Sub-Saharan Africa Model Results**

Variable	Greater Risk	Lesser Risk	Odds Ratio	P-Value
Trade Openness*	Below median	Above median	2.6	0.09
Total Population	Larger	Smaller	1.1	0.80
Regime Type***	Partial democracy	Autocracy	30.1	< 0.01
	Full Democracy		4.7	0.05
Pattern of Development**	Low urbanization	High urbanization, high GDP per capita	3.0	0.07
	High urbanization, low GDP per capita		4.8	0.02
Colonial Heritage	Not a former French colony	Former French colony	1.8	0.23
Discrimination***	Present	Absent	4.8	0.02
Leader's Tenure*	Brief (four years or less in office)	Five to 14 years in office	2.4	0.11
	Long (15 or more years in office)		3.4	0.08

N=44 state failures, 131 controls

This model correctly classified 79.5 percent of the state failures and 79.4 percent of the controls.

\* Significant at the 0.10 level;

\*\* Significant at the 0.05 level;

\*\*\* Significant at the < 0.01 level.

*Notes on the Statistics:* Odds ratios provide an approximation of the relative risk of state failure for two mutually exclusive groups. The results of a logistic regression analysis can be used to estimate odds ratios for each factor in the model, controlling for all other factors. The p-value provides a test of the statistical significance of an individual variable in the multivariate model. Values close to zero suggest rejection of the null hypothesis, that is, they indicate that the variable has a measurable effect on the risk of state failure.

In this table, the odds ratio for total population compares estimated risks for groups one standard deviation apart.

between trade openness and political stability in Africa than in the world as a whole. All other things being equal, the odds of failure were two-and-one-half times greater for Sub-Saharan African countries with below-median levels of trade openness.

**Population size is not a significant correlate of state failure in Sub-Saharan Africa.** Population was included in the Sub-Saharan Africa model primarily to isolate the independent effects of trade openness. In contrast to the global model, we found no link between population size and state failure in this region.

**The risk of state failure is lower in former French colonies.** The legacies of colonial rule and their influence on contemporary economic and political life are a core, and often highly controversial, topic of African studies. Our analysis investigated one aspect of this complex subject in a simple fashion; we included variables indicating which European power had previously colonized a country and checked for any relationship connected to the risk of state failure. We found an intriguing, though not statistically significant, association between a country's colonial heritage and its propensity to state failure. The model indicates that former French colonies face somewhat lower odds of failure than countries

once colonized by other powers. Whether this association results from the institutional or cultural legacy of French rule, from France's frequent interventions in the politics and economies of its former colonies, or from some other unobserved commonality is unclear. Because the sample size is so small—there are only 15 former French colonies in Sub-Saharan Africa—the magnitude of any such effect is also highly uncertain.

**Partial democracies are extremely fragile in Africa, and even full democracies are more vulnerable in this region.** Partial democracies nearly always fail in Sub-Saharan Africa, and the odds of failure in full democracies are nearly *five times* as high as they are for autocracies, according to our analysis. Nevertheless, we do not believe this result implies that democracy cannot work in Africa. As noted above, many countries experience transitions and reversals. Many of the stable democracies in our data became stable democracies before 1955. In the earlier years, stable democracies experienced periods of conflict and autocracy.

**In Sub-Saharan Africa, both the level and the pattern of economic development matter.** In Sub-Saharan Africa, the development indicator that has the most robust relationship to stability is not GDP per capita, or even the rate of GDP growth (both of which are often distorted by oil exports and fluctuations in commodity prices). Instead, it is urbanization. Urbanized African countries tend to be more stable than their relatively rural neighbors are. According to analysis, relatively rural African countries confront odds of state failure *three times* as high as their more urbanized counterparts do.<sup>16</sup>

There is an important caveat, however. In Sub-Saharan Africa, it was not simply the level but the *pattern* of economic development that best differentiated stable states from those about to fail. The chief issue is the relationship between wealth and urbanization. Countries with higher urbanization but

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<sup>16</sup> Relatively rural countries are those in which urbanization was below the median for Sub-Saharan Africa. More urbanized countries are those in which urbanization was above the regional median.

relatively low GDP per capita—what we refer to as *unbalanced* development—were at significantly greater risk than those in which these two factors moved in tandem.<sup>17</sup>

Unbalanced development has been criticized as being harmful to growth. Our analysis shows a clear link between unbalanced development and increased risk of state failure. In light of this finding, we believe that development strategies focused entirely on relative levels of GDP per capita may be missing important elements of the larger picture affecting political stability.

**African societies that practice ethnic discrimination face a substantially greater risk of state failure.** Countries where at least one ethnic group is subjected to significant economic or political discrimination face odds of failure *five times* as high as countries without such practices, according to our analysis.<sup>18</sup> Furthermore, the multivariable model suggests that discrimination contributes as much to the risk of state failure as unbalanced development. These findings support the view that ethnic tensions are a key source of political conflict in Africa.

**States with inexperienced or entrenched leaders are more likely to fail.** We found an association between the number of years a political leader has spent in office and the risk of state failure. All other things being equal, Sub-Saharan African countries are most stable when a leader has been in power for at least five but not more than 14 years. Inexperience apparently hurts; countries in which leaders had held office for four or fewer years face odds of failure

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<sup>17</sup> This finding echoes a prominent theoretical literature that emerged in political science in the mid-1960s. Concerned primarily with the problem of political order in developing countries, this literature views gaps between the pace of social and economic change on one hand and the development of political organizations and procedures on the other as a key source of political instability. See especially Samuel Huntington, *Political Order in Changing Societies* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968).

<sup>18</sup> Data on ethnic discrimination were adapted from the Minorities at Risk Project. On the Web, see <http://www.cidcm.umd.edu/mar/>.

**Table 6**  
**Other Variables Tested in the Sub-Saharan Africa Model**

<b>Political and Leadership</b>	<b>Economic and Environmental</b>
Change in democracy	Trading partner concentration*
Economic discrimination	GDP per capita
Political discrimination	Change in GDP per capita
Separatist activity	Land burden
Party fractionalization	Change in reserves
Parliamentary responsibility*	Government debt
Party legitimacy*	Trade with OECD countries
Class character of the ruling elite*	Annual change in inflation rate*
Ideological character of the ruling elite	Cropland area
Regime duration	Irrigated land
Freedom House political rights index*	Access to safe water
Freedom House civil liberties index	Damage due to drought
Amnesty International political terror scale	Famine
US Department of State political terror index	
Neighboring countries in major armed conflict	
Neighboring countries in major civil/ethnic conflict	
Membership in regional organizations	
<b>Demographic and Societal</b>	
Youth bulge*	
Labor force as a percent of population*	
Infant mortality	
Annual change in infant mortality*	
Life expectancy	
Secondary school enrollment ratio	
Annual change in secondary school enrollment ratio	
Calories per capita	
Urban population	
Urban population growth rate	
Ethno-linguistic fractionalization*	
Ethnic fractionalization	
Religious fractionalization	

\*Indicates variables that were significant at the  $p < 0.10$  level in the initial t-test/chi-square screening

*more than twice* as high as countries with more experienced leaders. Once a leader has held office for 15 years or more, however, the benefits of experience appear to erode dramatically. Whether due to the enfeebling of aging leaders, the succession struggles that arise over who will succeed them, the accumulation of demands for change, or some other unobserved effect, countries in which the leader has held office for 15 or more years confront odds of failure *more than three times* as high as countries with leaders in the five-to-14-year window.

### Next Steps

Its high accuracy aside, this regional model has two major limitations. First, it attends only to national-level data, whereas many conflicts clearly originate in conditions at the sub-national or even local level. Second, the factors included in our model generally represent a snapshot of slow-changing, structural characteristics, whereas state failures are often triggered by fast-moving events occurring closer to the failure's onset.

The Task Force is now working on analyses that will address both of these issues. For selected countries, we are gathering sub-national data on economic, demographic, and political conditions.

### Fitting a Muslim Countries Model

A core goal of the Task Force's investigation of state failure in the Muslim world was to test the oft-stated assumption that Muslim countries have unique social and political dynamics. Despite the existence of a vast amount of literature on Islam and politics, few empirical studies have compared the dynamics of political instability in Muslim countries with the world as a whole. Our investigation aimed to identify factors contributing to state failure in Muslim countries, and to explore the degree to which religious factors contribute to the risk of political instability there.

Our analysis included all countries with total populations larger than 500,000 that were at least 40-percent Muslim. This set of countries includes African, European, and Asian states that vary significantly in their levels of economic development,

political organization, and their culture and history (see figure 11). The unifying themes are the presence of predominantly Muslim populations and the institutions and values that that situation usually entails.

We set out to investigate several controversial issues specific to the Muslim world:


***Islam and Democracy.*** Islamists, Western scholars and policymakers alike frequently describe Islam as a totalistic system in which no distinctions can be made between religious, social, and political institutions.<sup>19</sup> This description raises important questions about the compatibility of Islam and democracy. In many Muslim countries, the Islamic state is seen as the chief alternative to an inherently Western, and therefore alien, model of government, namely, democratic capitalism. This antagonistic interpretation implies that democracies are more likely to fail in Muslim societies. On its face, the rarity of democracy in the Muslim world seems to support this view, but it says little about the relative stability of Muslim countries that have established democratic institutions.

***Persecution of Sectarian Groups.*** Sectarian groups are those identified by Muslim scholars as *zanadika*, an Islamic legal concept best translated as "heretics dangerous to the state." These include Alawi, Ahmadiyah, and certain Sufi orders, including the Bektashi, considered by many to be heretical. Baha'is and Druze are also included because most Muslims consider them heretical sects, rather than independent sects—most of which are offshoots of Shia Islam—are subject to persecution. Discrimination against Baha'is in Iran and Ahmadiyah in Pakistan are examples of the persecution these groups often face,

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<sup>19</sup> Samuel Huntington, *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1996) is among the most prominent Western advocates of this view, but it is also central to Islamic political thought. Here see Muhammad Arkoun, "The Concept of Authority in Islamic Thought," in Klaus Ferdinand and Mehdi Mozaffari (eds.), *Islam: State and Society* (London: John Adams, 1988).

**Figure 11**  
**Countries Included in Muslim Countries Analysis**



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examples of the persecution these groups often face, and tensions between sectarians and “mainstream” Muslims may play a role in encouraging political instability.

***State Administration of Family Law.*** The view of Islam as a totalistic system also highlights the potentially destabilizing effects of state efforts to supplant Islamic religious law, or *sharia*. In principle, *sharia* is all encompassing, regulating all aspects of social, economic, ritual, and personal life. Unlike secular law, which is designed to operate without regard to particular religious beliefs, *sharia* is important to many who regard it as an essential element of Muslim identity. Thus, conflicts over the degree to which the state should or should not enforce *sharia* can lead to challenges to state authority. Afghanistan, Algeria, Egypt, Indonesia, Kuwait, Nigeria, and Pakistan are among the Muslim countries in which such controversies have erupted in the 1980s and 1990s.

#### **Patterns in State Failure in Muslim Countries, 1955-98**

The Task Force identified 55 instances of state failure in Muslim countries between 1955 and 1998 (see figure 12). The chief trend evident from this chart is a slowdown in the rate of new failures from the mid-1960s to the early 1990s. From 1966 to 1989, the average number of failures per year in the Muslim world was 0.88, compared with averages of 1.63 from 1955 to 1965 and 1.78 in 1990-98. The slowing rate of new events corresponded to a decline in the proportion of countries experiencing state failure. However, a new rash of failure events in the early 1990s pushed that figure above 40 percent for the first time, suggesting that state failure was a bigger problem for Muslim countries in the 1990s than it ever had been.

Adverse regime transitions represented the most frequent type of state failure in Muslim countries by far, indicating that the fragility of central governments has been a leading source of

political crisis in the Muslim world since 1955<sup>20</sup> (see figure 13). Revolutionary and ethnic wars have also been significant sources of instability, occurring 22 and 25 times, respectively, during those same four-and-a-half decades.

The cumulative duration of state failures in Muslim countries compared with the rest of the world is shown in figure 14. The first pair of columns shows that Muslim countries spent slightly more than one of every four years between 1955 and 1998 in some form of state failure, substantially higher than the one of every seven years for the non-Muslim world. The gap was widest on a percentage basis in genocides or politicides. Muslim countries spent more than twice as many years in the throes of a genocide or politicide than non-Muslim countries did. The gap was smaller but substantial in adverse regime changes and ethnic wars as well, with Muslim countries again experiencing these kinds of failure for more years than the rest of the world.

#### **Model Results**

Our analysis highlighted a number of variables as correlates of state failure in Muslim countries (see table 7):


- Partial or full democracy.
- The presence of sectarian Islam.
- Very low or high religious diversity.
- Few memberships in regional organizations.
- Low trade openness.
- Large populations.
- Violent internal conflict in neighboring states.
- High infant mortality.

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
<sup>20</sup> Note that the counts sum to more than 55, because some complex state failures involved more than one type of event.

**Figure 12**  
**Incidence of State Failure in Muslim Countries, 1955-98**

*Note double axes, scale change*




**Figure 13**  
**State Failure Events in Muslim Countries, by Type, 1955-98**



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**Figure 14**  
**Proportion of Years With State Failure Events, 1955-98:**  
**Muslim Countries vs. Rest of the World**



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Our Muslim-countries model correctly classified 73 percent of the historical cases, proving somewhat less accurate than the Task Force’s Sub-Saharan Africa model (80 percent correctly classified) and about as accurate as the global model. Odds ratios and p-values for the Muslim-countries model are reported in table 8.

### Findings

**Democracies and partial democracies are no more likely to fail in Muslim countries than they are elsewhere.** Our analysis shows that Muslim countries with democratic or partially democratic regimes confront odds of failure more than *five times* as high as Muslim autocracies.<sup>21</sup> At first blush, that finding

seems to support the view that Islam and democracy mix uneasily. In fact, democracies and partial democracies historically have failed at about the same rate around the globe as they do in the Muslim world.

In the global model, the odds of state failure for partial democracies were more than seven times as high as the odds for autocracies; in Muslim countries, the odds of failure for partial democracies (there are hardly any full democracies) are only five times as high as the odds for autocracies. In other words, democratic and partially democratic regimes appear to be no less stable in the Muslim countries than they are in the world as a whole. While not a definitive test of the argument that Muslim societies are especially

<sup>21</sup> Partial and full democracies are lumped together because there were not enough full democracies in our sample of Muslim countries to generate statistically meaningful comparisons with the other regime types. In

our sample of 190 country-years, only 12 were coded as full democracies. Seven of those 12 represented instances of state failure.

**Table 7**  
**Variables Used in the Muslim Countries Model**

Variable	Name	What the Variable Measures	Data Sources
Regime type	POLX	Indicates whether a country is a full democracy, partial democracy, or autocracy. This variable was constructed from information on political institutions. Democratic regimes have competitive political participation, elected chief executives, and significant checks on executive power. Partial democracies combine democratic and autocratic institutions, with democratic features outweighing autocratic ones.	Polity III
Trade openness	WDIOPEN, PWTOOPEN	Dollar value of a country's imports plus exports divided by its GDP. The model compares countries above and below the median for all Muslim countries. Surprisingly, the only economic variable the Task Force examined that correlated closely with trade openness was road density, which is generally considered an indicator of a country's level of development and which has specific implications for trade.	World Bank's <i>World Development Indicators</i> , Penn World Tables 5,6
Population size	WDIPOP, CAPTOPP	Number of inhabitants, in thousands, logged and normalized.	United Nations' <i>World Population Prospects 1950–2060</i> , Correlates of War project
Infant mortality	UND26Y	Number of deaths of infants under one year of age per 1,000 live births, logged and normalized. The Task Force considers this variable a sensitive indicator of the quality of life for a country's general population. It correlates closely to other measures of development, such as GDP per capita.	United Nations' <i>World Population Prospects 1950–2060</i>
Sectarian Islam	ISLMSECT	Indicates the presence in the country's population of Islamic sects considered heretical by most other Muslims.	State Failure Task Force
Religious diversity	HRELMUSL	Based on a Herfindahl index that indicates the degree of religious diversity in the country's population. To estimate the model, countries were sorted into three baskets: (1) low diversity (> 0.75), (2) medium diversity (> 0.5 to 0.75), and (3) high diversity (< 0.5).	State Failure Task Force
Armed conflict in neighboring states	MACNAC	Count of the number of bordering states experiencing major armed conflicts of any kind. This indicator is one of several the Task Force has used to measure the impact of "bad neighborhoods" on the risk of state failure.	Monty Marshall, CIDCM, University of Maryland
Regional memberships	CIOD	Number of regional inter-governmental organizations in which the country was a member. The Task Force considers this variable an indicator of the strength a country's linkages to the international community.	Monty Marshall, CIDCM, University of Maryland

**Table 8**  
**Muslim Countries Model Results**

Variable	Higher Risk	Lower Risk	Odds Ratio	P-Value
Infant Mortality**	Higher	Lower	1.7	0.03
Trade Openness	Below median	Above median	1.4	0.39
Total Population*	Larger	Smaller	1.5	0.06
Regime Type***	Partial or full democracies	Autocracies	5.5	< 0.01
Religious Diversity**	Low (Herfindahl index > 0.75)	Moderate (Herfindahl index between 0.5 and 0.75)	2.7	0.05
	High (Herfindahl index ≤ 0.5)		2.9	0.05
Sectarian Islamic Groups***	Present	Not present	3.4	< 0.01
Memberships in Regional Organizations***	Fewer	More	1.7	< 0.01
Neighboring States with Major Armed Conflicts*	More	Fewer	1.4	0.07

N=51 state failures, 156 controls

This model correctly classified 78.4 percent of the state failures and 70.5 percent of the controls.

\*Significant at the  $p < 0.10$  level.

\*\*Significant at the  $p < 0.05$  level;

\*\*\*Significant at the  $p < 0.01$  level

*Notes on the statistics:* Odds ratios provide an approximation of the relative risk of state failure for two mutually exclusive groups. The results of a logistic regression analysis can be used to estimate odds ratios for each factor in the model, controlling for all other factors. The p-value provides a test of the statistical significance of an individual variable in the multivariate model. Values close to zero suggest rejection of the null hypothesis, that is, they indicate that the variable has a measurable effect on the risk of state failure.

In this table, the odds ratios for infant mortality, total population, memberships in regional organizations, and neighboring states with major armed conflicts compare estimated risks for groups one standard deviation apart.

inhospitable to democracy, the similarity of these odds ratios certainly casts doubt on that notion.

**The presence of sectarian groups is strongly associated with state failure in Muslim countries.**

The odds of state failure are more than three times as high in countries that are home sectarian Muslim groups, according to our analysis. This result appears to reflect the harsh and sometimes-violent persecution these sectarian groups often experience. This issue is particularly significant today in Pakistan, where the

Ahmadiyah have been legally defined as “non-Muslims,” and in Iran, where Bahai are regularly subject to persecution. The sectarian issue is potentially serious in Syria, the only Muslim country currently governed by members of such sects,<sup>22</sup> and

<sup>22</sup> The Alawi maintain that Ali ibn al-Talib (d. 661), the cousin and son-in-law of the Prophet Muhammad, was God in human form. For orthodox Sunni Muslims, and even for the Shia, for whom the veneration of Ali and other members of the Prophet Muhammad’s family is a

in Saudi Arabia, Iraq, and Pakistan, where Shia Muslims are subject to severe discrimination.

**Distinctions between Arab and non-Arab, OPEC and non-OPEC, and oil producing and non-oil-producing countries are not systematically related to the risk of state failure.** Variables flagging Arab states, OPEC members, and oil-producing countries were statistically insignificant in our analysis, and the odds of state failure differed little across these categories. These results suggest that the dynamics of state failure are similar across Muslim countries around the world, regardless of their status as oil producers or their Arab identity. Universal indicators such as infant mortality, trade openness, the level of democracy, and regional politics are better predictors of instability throughout the Muslim world, as they are for the world as a whole.

**State administration of family law may heighten political instability, but the effect is not a strong one.** We found that from 1955 to 1998 countries in which personal conduct codes were administered by state-established *sharia* courts, secular courts, or some combination thereof had considerably higher rates of state failure than countries in which non-state religious or customary procedures prevailed in matters of family law. Apparently, state administration of family law is a risky matter in Muslim countries. Yet, when we added a variable denoting state involvement in family law to the multivariate model shown in table 7, this new variable was not statistically significant. Perhaps the variables noting the presence of sectarian groups and the impact of religious diversity are picking up this effect, because the impact of state involvement in family law is most likely to produce conflict when the

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central element of theological discourse and popular religion, this is an unspeakable heresy, and they generally detest the Alawi. Many Syrian Alawi joined the secularist Ba'ath Party in the 1940s, and Syria's late president, Hafez al-Asad, sought to minimize differences between Alawi and other Muslims.

population is divided on the interpretation of Muslim precepts.<sup>23</sup>

**Other Variables in the Muslim Countries Model**  
*Infant Mortality.* Although this variable directly measures reported deaths to infants under one year old per thousand live births, it also serves as an indirect measure of quality of life. Infant mortality is strongly correlated with a variety of other variables encompassing economic performance, education, social welfare, environmental quality, and democratic institutions. Muslim countries with high infant mortality are more likely to have problems than others. It is statistically significant in our analysis, but its effect on the odds of state failure—to increase those odds by 10 percent—is smaller than that of the other factors in the multivariate model.

*Regime Type.* As in previous models, the character of a country's political institutions exerts a powerful effect on the risk of state failure in Muslim countries. Because there are hardly any full democracies in the Muslim world, we compared the odds of failure for autocracies to the odds for any type of democracy but the latter are overwhelmingly partial democracies. As in the global and African models, the odds of failure for these democracies are substantially greater than for autocracies—in this case, by a factor of five-and-one-half. Full democracies may be more stable in the Muslim world, as they are elsewhere, but the absence of such regimes makes statistical analysis of their stability virtually impossible.

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<sup>23</sup> To understand this apparently ambiguous result—a high odds ratio but no statistical significance in a multivariate model—it is important to note that in only 12 percent of our sample (23 of 188 country-years) was the state *not* administering *sharia* law in some fashion. The small number of country-years without state administration makes statistical comparison more difficult; there simply are not enough Muslim countries where the state is not entangled in the administration of *sharia* law to produce a robust test of the hypothesis that state administration promotes instability.

**Table 9**  
**Other Variables Tested in the Muslim Countries Model**

<b>Political and Leadership</b>	<b>Economic and Environmental</b>
Change in democracy	Trade openness*
Economic discrimination	Trading partner concentration
Political discrimination	Oil producer indicator
Separatist activity*	OPEC member
Discrimination or separatist activity	GDP per capita*
Party fractionalization*	Change in GDP per capita
Parliamentary responsibility	Land burden
Party legitimacy*	Change in reserves
Class character of the ruling elite	Government debt*
Ideological character of the ruling elite	Trade with OECD countries
Regime duration	Annual change in inflation rate*
Leader's years in office	Cropland area*
Freedom House political rights index*	Irrigated land*
Freedom House civil liberties index*	Access to safe water
Amnesty International political terror scale	Damage due to drought
US Department of State political terror index	Famine
Neighboring countries in major civil/ethnic conflict	
Memberships in regional organizations*	
<b>Demographic and Societal</b>	<b>Muslim-Country Specific</b>
Youth bulge	Arab country
Labor force as a percent of population	Islamic family law: type of administration
Annual change in infant mortality*	Islamic family law: as a source of controversy
Life expectancy	Percent Sunni
Secondary school enrollment ratio	Percent Muslim
Annual change in secondary school enrollment ratio	
Calories per capita	
Population density*	
Urban population*	
Urban population growth rate*	
Ethnic fractionalization	
Religious fractionalization	

\*Indicates variables that were significant at the  $p < 0.10$  level in the initial t-test/chi-square screening

**Trade Openness.** In other models, trade openness emerged as a significant factor. Including this variable in the Muslim countries model improves model accuracy, but the variable itself is not statistically significant. The statistical significance of this variable is sometimes masked by its correlation to population size; countries with larger populations tend to have both lower trade openness and higher odds of failure. The estimated effect of trade openness on the odds of failure in the Muslim model—countries with lower trade openness have 40-percent greater odds of state failure—is consistent with findings in other models. Thus, trade openness has an effect in Muslim countries as well, and its lack of statistical significance is due only to overlap with the strong population effect observed for these countries.

**Memberships in Regional Organizations.** This variable indicates the number of regional organizations to which a country belongs, relative to the global average. It is intended to capture the extent of a country's political engagement with its neighbors. All other things being equal, analysis shows Muslim countries with a below-average number of regional memberships confront odds of failure 70 percent greater than do Muslim countries with an above-average number.

**Conflict in Neighboring States.** This variable identifies countries with two or more bordering states involved in any kind of major armed conflict. It is colloquially referred to as the “bad neighborhood” indicator, and bad neighborhoods are thought to produce more instability. Analysis indicates that, among Muslim countries, the odds of failure are 40 percent greater when two or more neighbors are embroiled in violent conflict.

**Religious Diversity.** This variable is an index that measures the religious composition of the population. Sunni, Shia, and sectarian Muslims (as well as all other religions) were considered separate groups for our analysis. Countries with high index values tend to be dominated by a single religious community. Countries with lower values tend to have at least two religious communities relatively close in size to one

another. Countries in the middle range generally have a single dominant religion and a significant minority community. Prior research on ethnic conflict has found the middle range to be the most prone to violence. Scholars attribute this finding to the tensions that often arise between a majority group and a minority large enough to be considered threatening to the majority's dominance. When the population is divided among two or three groups equal in size, those groups tend to develop accommodations that allow them to coexist more peacefully. Contrary to this conventional wisdom, our analysis indicates that the risk of state failure is generally higher in Muslim countries with low or high levels of religious diversity; specifically, we found that countries close to the ends of the scale confront odds of failure nearly three times as high as those in the middle.

### **Fitting a Model for Ethnic Wars**

Since the waning years of the Cold War, ethnic conflict has come to represent the most common form of political violence within countries around the world. In the 1990s, new ethnic wars outnumbered new revolutionary wars nearly three to one. Ethnic conflicts have often served as the lead crisis in a series of related state failures. Nearly half of the 61 ethnic wars that began between 1955 and 1998 either preceded or coincided with some other state-failure events. Some ethnic wars set off a cascade of additional ethnic conflicts; others led to the collapse of governments; and still others prompted governments to initiate large-scale, indiscriminate killings labeled by the Task Force as genocides or politicides.

Because ethnic violence is such a significant part of the story of state failure in recent decades and since the end of the Cold War in particular, the Task Force decided in Phase III of its research to fit a model focused specifically on this phenomenon.

### **Patterns in Ethnic War, 1955–98**

The Task Force identified 66 ethnic wars that began around the world between 1955 and 1998. The rate of new ethnic wars peaked when the Soviet Union was

collapsing and the Cold War was ending (see figure 16). Eight new conflicts erupted in 1991 alone, more than double the number from any other year since 1955, and 20 ethnic wars—nearly one-third of the total for the entire 44-year period—broke out in the seven years between 1988 and 1994. Around this same time, ethnic wars displaced revolutionary wars as the most common form of violent internal conflict in the world.<sup>24</sup>

Also worth noting, however, is an apparent decline in major ethnic conflict in the latter half of the 1990s. Only three new ethnic wars erupted in the four years following 1994, and by 1998, the proportion of countries around the world embroiled in ethnic war had fallen to 15 percent. While certainly not cause for complacency, this downturn does cast doubt on the view that the post-Cold War world would inevitably suffer from ever-more intense and widespread ethnic violence.<sup>25</sup>

#### Model Results

Our analysis identified several variables as significant risk factors for the onset of ethnic war (see table 9):

- High infant mortality.
- Active ethnic discrimination.
- High ethnic diversity.
- A recent history of violent political upheaval.
- Few memberships in regional organizations.

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<sup>24</sup> T.R. Gurr, *People Versus States: Minorities at Risk in the New Century* (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace, 2000).

<sup>25</sup> Probably the most widely read expression of the view that violent ethnic conflict would spread inexorably in the post-Cold War world is Robert D. Kaplan's "The Coming Anarchy," *Atlantic Monthly* (February 1994). Also relevant is Daniel Patrick Moynihan, *Pandemonium: Ethnicity in International Relations* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1994). For a more thorough treatment of evidence to the contrary, see T.R. Gurr, "Ethnic Warfare on the Wane," *Foreign Affairs* Vol. 79, No. 3 (May/June 2000): pp. 52-64.

Our six-variable model for ethnic wars correctly classified 79 percent of the historical cases from which it was estimated. All six of the variables in this model were significant at the  $p < 0.05$  level. Odds ratios and p-values for the model are shown in table 10.


#### Findings

**Ethnic discrimination encourages ethnic war.** All other things being equal, countries in which communal groups were subjected to deliberate discrimination as a matter of widespread social practice, government policy, or both, are roughly 13 times as likely to plunge into ethnic war as compared to countries with no such practices. Furthermore, in our multi-variable model, discrimination has a stronger impact than any other single factor. Discrimination indicates the presence of inter-group tensions that can erupt into violent conflict, and it suggests a motive for aggrieved minorities to take up arms against the state. This interpretation, however, is at odds with a growing body of scholarship that seeks to recast ethnic conflict in largely instrumentalist terms, arguing that ethnicity is simply the window dressing insurgents use to win sympathy for their cause. According to this school of thought, the opportunity to make war drives its outbreak, and the experiences of everyday people are largely irrelevant to the risk of ethnic conflict. We believe our research casts doubt on this instrumentalist view, at least in its more rigid forms. The weight our model assigns to discrimination suggests that the quality of relations between ethnic groups, and thus by implication the salience of ethnicity itself, profoundly affects the risk of ethnic war. In short, ethnicity still matters.


**The more ethnically diverse a society, the greater the risk of ethnic war.** Countries with highly diverse populations face odds of failure *five times* as high as countries with largely homogeneous populations. For countries with moderately diverse populations—typically comprised of two or three large groups and perhaps some much smaller ones—the odds of ethnic war were *three times* as high. Our model indicates that this pattern holds even when discrimination and other quality-of-life issues are accounted for. At least in part, this relationship is a matter of probability.

**Figure 15**  
**Global Incidence of Ethnic War, 1955-98**

*Note double axes, scale change*



**Figure 16**  
**Onsets of Ethnic War, by Region, 1955-98**



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**Table 10**  
**Variables Used in the Ethnic War Model**

Variable	Name	What the Variable Measures	Data Source
Infant mortality	UND26Y	Number of deaths of infants under one year of age per 1,000 live births, logged and normalized. The Task Force considers this variable a sensitive indicator of the quality of life for a country's general population. It is highly correlated with other measures of development, such as GDP per capita.	United Nations' <i>World Population Prospects 1950-2060</i>
Ethnic discrimination	DISPOTA2	Signifies the existence of at least one politically significant communal group that was subject to significant political or economic discrimination or that sought greater political autonomy from the state.	Minorities at Risk Data set
Ethnic diversity	CULETHP1 thru CULETHP7	Based on a Herfindahl index that indicates the level of ethnic diversity in the country's population. To estimate the model, countries were sorted into three baskets: (1) low diversity (> 0.7), (2) medium diversity (0.5 to 0.7), and (3) high diversity (< 0.5).	Correlates of War Project's Cultural Data set
Regional memberships	CIOD	Count of the number of regional inter-governmental organizations in which the country was a member. The Task Force considers this variable an indicator of the strength a country's linkages to the international community.	Monty Marshall, CIDCM, University of Maryland
Upheaval	SFTPUHVL	Indicates whether or not a country has experienced any state failure in the previous 15 years. For former colonies, this variable includes conflicts that occurred in the colonial period.	State Failure Task Force Problem Set

By definition, ethnic war cannot happen in homogeneous societies, and more groups mean more chances that one will rebel. Previous research suggests a U-shaped relationship between diversity and conflict. Various scholars have argued that the risk of conflict is highest in societies with two or three groups relatively close in size and is much lower in ethnically fragmented societies, where

groups have strong incentives to accommodate one another.<sup>26</sup>

**Ethnic wars tend to happen in poor, weak, and isolated states.** Consistent with findings for state failure in general, our model identifies a significant relationship between a country's level of development (measured by its infant mortality

<sup>26</sup> See, for example, Donald Horowitz, *Ethnic Groups in Conflict* (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1985).

**Table 11**  
**Ethnic War Model Results**

Variable	Higher Risk	Lower Risk	Odds Ratio	P-Value
Upheaval***	Any state failure in prior 15 years	No state failure in prior 15 years	3.5	< 0.01
Discrimination***	Present	Absent	13.0	< 0.01
Ethnic Diversity**	High (Herfindahl < 0.25)	Low (Herfindahl ≥ 0.7)	4.6	0.02
	Moderate (Herfindahl ≥ 0.25 and < 0.70)		3.2	0.01
Infant Mortality**	Higher	Lower	1.9	0.02
Memberships in Regional Organizations**	Fewer	More	2.7	0.02

N = 59 ethnic wars, 172 controls

This model correctly classified 81.4 percent of the ethnic wars and 78.5 percent of the controls.

\* Significant at the  $p < 0.10$  level;

\*\* Significant at the  $p < 0.05$  level;

\*\*\* Significant at the  $p < 0.01$  level.

*Notes on the Statistics:* Odds ratios provide an approximation of the relative risk of state failure for two mutually exclusive groups. The results of a logistic regression analysis can be used to estimate odds ratios for each factor in the model, controlling for all other factors. The p-value provides a test of the statistical significance of an individual variable in the multivariate model. Values close to zero suggest rejection of the null hypothesis, i.e., they indicate that the variable has a measurable effect on the risk of state failure.

In this table, the odds ratios for infant mortality and memberships in regional organizations compare estimated risks for groups one standard deviation apart.

rate) and the risk of ethnic war. In the ethnic war model, we also found even stronger associations with the occurrence of state failure in the last 15 years, and with international isolation, indicated by relatively small number of memberships in regional inter-governmental organizations. These findings suggest that efforts to improve citizens' quality of life and to engage countries in affairs beyond their borders may reduce the risk of ethnic war.

#### **Other Variables in the Ethnic War Model**

**Infant Mortality.** Infant mortality is significant in the ethnic war model, but it has a weaker effect than other factors. The odds ratio associated with this variable is substantially lower than any of the others. When it comes to the risk of ethnic war, the quality of life for the population as a whole (which is what the Task Force thinks infant mortality registers) appears to be less important than the quality of life for particular minority groups. The indicator of deliberate discrimination captures information about the quality of life of the targeted group.

**Table 12**  
**Other Variables Tested in the Ethnic War Model**

<b>Political and Leadership</b>	<b>Economic and Environmental</b>
Democracy*	Trade openness*
Change in democracy*	Trading partner concentration*
Economic discrimination*	GDP per capita*
Political discrimination*	Change in GDP per capita
Separatist activity*	Land burden
Party fractionalization	Change in reserves
Parliamentary responsibility*	Government debt
Party legitimacy*	Trade with OECD countries
Class character of the ruling elite*	Annual change in inflation rate
Ideological character of the ruling elite	Cropland area*
Regime duration	Irrigated land*
Freedom House political rights index*	Access to safe water*
Freedom House civil liberties index*	Damage due to drought
Amnesty International political terror scale*	Famine
US Department of State political terror index	
Neighboring countries in major armed conflict*	
Neighboring countries in major civil/ethnic conflict*	
<b>Demographic and Societal</b>	
Youth bulge*	
Labor force as a percent of population	
Annual change in infant mortality*	
Life expectancy*	
Secondary school enrollment ratio*	
Annual change in secondary school enrollment ratio	
Calories per capita*	
Total population*	
Population density	
Urban population*	
Urban population growth rate	
Ethno-linguistic fractionalization	
Religious fractionalization	

\*Indicates variables that were significant at the  $p < 0.10$  level in the initial t-test/chi-square screening.

**Memberships in Regional Inter-Governmental Organizations.** Countries with below average numbers of memberships are three times as likely to have ethnic conflicts than countries that have above average numbers of memberships. This finding is important for both academic theory and policy purposes. It confirms the expectation that countries tied into regional networks are more likely to follow the kinds of policies, and to attract the kind of assistance and advice, that might enable them to head off violent ethnic challenges.

**Regime Type.** Also notable are several variables included in the Task Force's global model that do not appear to be significant correlates of impending ethnic war. One is regime type, which appears in all of the other Task Force's models and has a powerful influence on the risk of state failure. When regime type is included in the ethnic conflict model, however, it is not statistically significant. This apparently occurs because few democracies have ethnic wars, and those that do have practiced active discrimination. In other words, democracies are not immune to ethnic conflict, and the likelihood that they will tip into violence depends primarily on their policies toward minorities. Consequently, we find a strong association between ethnic war and discrimination but none with regime type.

**Trade Openness.** Trade openness is also absent from the ethnic war model. As with the global model, countries with high trade openness generally have a lower risk of state failure, and we did find a significant bivariate correlation between openness and the risk of ethnic war. In multivariate models, however, openness was not significant. This result appears to stem from a relationship between trade openness and the indicator of memberships in regional organizations that was included in the final model. Both factors are correlated with vulnerability to ethnic war, but it appears that international political linkages may be more important than economic ties in reducing the risk of ethnic conflict.

## **Fitting a Model for Genocides and Politicides**

Genocides and politicides are the least frequent, though often the most alarming type of state failure the Task Force examined. Significantly, we observed that genocides and politicides almost never occur in an otherwise stable environment; instead, they usually follow other kinds of state failures, such as revolutions, authoritarian coups, or ethnic wars. In light of this pattern, our analysis compared state failures that produced genocides or politicides with state failures that did not. The model the Task Force derived is intended to assess the risk that a country will experience a genocide or politicide in the near future, given that it is already experiencing state failure.

To date, most researchers have used case studies and the comparative method to test theoretical arguments about the causes of genocide and politicide.<sup>27</sup> By contrast, the State Failure Task Force sought to apply statistical techniques to this phenomenon. The starting point for the Task Force's analysis was a theoretical model developed by Barbara Harff and previously tested in comparative case studies.<sup>28</sup> The key variables in this model include the extent of prior political upheaval, regime type, the composition and ideology of elites, and a country's international status.

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<sup>27</sup> An exception is Helen Fein, who has done a "tree" analysis of the conditions of geno/politicide in post-colonial countries, in "Accounting for Genocide after 1945: Theories and Some Findings," *International Journal of Group Rights* 1 (1993). Her results are generally consistent with those reported here.

<sup>28</sup> Barbara Harff, "The Etiology of Genocides," pp. 41-59 in Isidor Wallimann and Michael N. Dobkowski (eds.), *Genocide and the Modern Age: Etiology and Case Studies of Mass Death* (New York: Greenwood Press, 1987); "Early Warning of Potential Genocide: The Cases of Rwanda, Burundi, Bosnia, and Abkhazia," pp. 47-78 in T. R. Gurr and Barbara Harff, *Early Warning of Communal Conflicts and Genocide: Linking Empirical Research to International Responses* (Tokyo: United Nations University Press, Monograph Series on Governance and Conflict Resolution, 1996).

Most variables in this theoretical model correspond to factors identified by other researchers.<sup>29</sup> The study reported here is a refinement of previous empirical tests reported in November 1998 and July 1999. A number of additional variables, indicators, and models were tested, with results that are consistent with both theory and the previous results.

### **Defining Genocide and Politicide**

The Genocide Convention defines genocides and politicides as “the promotion, execution, and/or implied consent of sustained policies by governing elites or their agent—or, in the case of civil war, either of the contending authorities—that result in the death of a substantial portion of a communal, political, or politicized ethnic group.” In genocides, the victimized groups are defined primarily in terms of their communal characteristics. In politicides, by contrast, groups are defined primarily in terms of their political opposition to the regime and dominant groups. The United Nation’s Genocide Convention (1949) prohibits “killing members of a group” and “deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or part.” The definition used in this study excludes that part of the Convention that prohibits actions “causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group” because this encompasses a great many groups that have lost their cohesion and

identity, but not their lives, because of processes of socio-economic change.

The Genocide Convention excludes groups of victims defined by their political position or actions. Raphael Lemkin coined the term genocide in 1944 and later sought the support of as many states as possible for a legal document that would outlaw mass killings and prescribe sanctions against potential perpetrators. The first draft of the Convention included political groups but was rejected by the USSR and its allies—thus the final draft omitted any reference to political mass murder. Task Force member Barbara Harff’s concept of politicide is used to encompass cases with politically defined victims. The definition of genocide and politicide used in this long-term study, which began in 1984, is among definitions accepted and widely used by researchers.<sup>30</sup>

The cases of genocide and politicide analyzed by the State Failure Task Force were identified in Harff’s study.<sup>31</sup> This list was revised and updated for the Task Force in 1999 and is widely accepted by researchers, a number of whom have used it for comparative research, sometimes adding or deleting a few cases.<sup>32</sup> The chief alternative data set is

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<sup>29</sup> See Fein, “Genocide: A Sociological Perspective”, pp. 32-50; Leo Kuper, *Genocide: Its Political Use in the Twentieth Century* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1981); Ervin Staub, *The Roots of Evil: The Origins of Genocide and Other Group Violence* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1989); Frank Chalk and Kurt Jonassohn, *The History and Sociology of Genocide: Analyses and Case Studies* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1990); and Robert Melson, *Revolution and Genocide* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1992). Parallels between variables in Harff and Fein’s theories are systematically compared in Helen Fein, “Tools and Alarms: Uses of Models for Explanation and Anticipation,” *Journal of Ethno-Development* 4 (July 1994): 31-35. Harff gives somewhat more attention to international factors.

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<sup>30</sup> The definition is developed more fully in Barbara Harff’s “Recognizing Genocides and Politicides,” in Helen Fein (ed.), *Genocide Watch* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1992): 27-41. Definitions are compared by Helen Fein in *Genocide: A Sociological Perspective* (London and Newbury Park, CA: Sage Publications for the International Sociological Association, 2nd ed., 1993): 8-31.

<sup>31</sup> Earlier versions of the list of episodes are included in Barbara Harff and Ted Robert Gurr, “Research Note: Toward Empirical Theory of Genocides and Politicides: Identification and Measurement of Cases since 1945,” *International Studies Quarterly* 32 (1988): 359-371; and Barbara Harff, “Recognizing Genocides and Politicides,” 1992.

<sup>32</sup> Comparative empirical studies that use this list of After 1945: Theories and Some Findings,” *International Journal of Group Rights* 1 (1993); Roy Licklider, “The Consequences of Negotiated Settlements in Civil Wars, 1945-1993,” *American Political Science Review* Vol. 89, No. 3, (1995): 681-690; Matthew Krain, “State-

R.J. Rummel's compilation of cases of so-called "democide," which is defined much more broadly to include all instances in which large numbers of people die or are killed as a result of conflict.<sup>33</sup>

Three operational guidelines were used to identify cases of genocide or politicide:

- First, the state's complicity in mass murder had to be established. Any persistent, coherent pattern of action by the state and its agents or by a dominant social group that brought about a people's destruction, in whole or part, was considered prima facie evidence of state responsibility.
- A second issue concerns the duration of a group's victimization. The physical destruction of a people takes time; it implies a persistent, coherent pattern of actions. In light of this, the case list compiled by the Task Force includes only episodes that lasted six months or longer. Brief episodes, such as the massacre of Palestinians at the Chatilla and Sabra camps in Beirut in 1982, are not included. At the other end of the time spectrum are attacks against groups that recur episodically, like those against the Kurds in Iraq. These episodes are treated in a manner consistent with the Task Force's rules for other cases: If episodes are separated by more than five years, they are considered discrete events; otherwise, they are considered part of a single event.

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Sponsored Mass Murder," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* Vol. 41, No. 3 (1997): 311-360; and Susanne Schmeidl, "Exploring the Causes of Forced Migration: A Pooled Analysis, 1971-1990," *Social Science Quarterly* Vol. 78, No. 2 (1997): 284-308.

<sup>33</sup> R.J. Rummel, *Death by Government* (New Brunswick: Transaction, 1994). Rummel's lists include most of the genocides and politicides in Harff's compilation, but they also include various other forms of state killings, including civilian victims of bombings in war. In our view, this list is not useful for the analysis of the conditions of genocide because it does not allow analysts to focus in on cases in which governments target specific groups for destruction.

- A third issue concerns thresholds of violence. In principle, "body counts" do not enter the Task Force's definition of what constitutes a genocide or politicide. If a regime's motive is to destroy a group, and if policies with that intent are sustained over a substantial period, then a few hundred killed constitutes a genocide or politicide as much as the death of tens of thousands would.

#### **Patterns in Genocide and Politicide, 1955-98**

Thirty-six episodes of political violence that began between 1955 and 1998 met the Task Force's operational criteria for genocide or politicide. This makes genocide by far the most infrequent form of state failure, and it seems even rarer when we observe that nine countries are responsible for 19 episodes, or slightly more than half of the global total.<sup>34</sup>


Onsets of genocide and politicide appear to cluster over time as well. Nearly all genocides since World War II occurred in one of three periods: the mid-1960s, the 1970s-early 1980s, and the late 1980s-early 1990s (see figure 17). These periods cover only half of the 44 years, but they include all but three of the 36 outbreaks of genocidal violence. The regional distribution of genocides and politicides corresponds closely to the global distribution of wealth. Put simply, the poorer the region, the more common the problem (see figure 18). Sub-Saharan Africa, the world's poorest region, experienced 14 outbreaks of genocide; Asia, the next poorest region, experienced 12; North Africa and the Middle East experienced five, with two of those occurring in the extremely impoverished country of Sudan. Latin America, the wealthiest of the world's less developed regions, experienced only four episodes; and the single episode that occurred in Europe happened in the

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
<sup>34</sup> Those nine countries are Burundi, China, Indonesia, Iraq, Pakistan, Rwanda, Sudan, Uganda, and Congo-Kinshasa (Zaire). Burundi had three episodes of genocide or politicide; all of the others had two.

**Figure 17**  
Global Incidence of Genocide/Politicide, 1955-98

Note double axes, scale change



**Figure 18**  
Onsets of Genocide/Politicide, by Region, 1955-98



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**Table 13**  
**Factors Contributing to Genocide/Politicide**

Conceptual Variables	Indicators Tested
<p><b>(1) Discrimination and Exclusion:</b> Discriminatory treatment of minorities and exclusion of some communal groups from the political elite are major factors in the genesis of geno/politicide. Discrimination and exclusion create and maintain polarization among groups and motivate disadvantaged or excluded groups to resist; resistance gives threatened elites a rationale for greater repression.</p>	<p><b>(1a) Ethnicity of the Ruling Elite:</b> This is a coded indicator that registers whether the ethnicity of the elite in a heterogeneous society has been an issue of political contention in the recent past. If such elites are not representative of all significant groups in the population, the indicator is coded 1. We also test effects of whether the elite represents a minority or majority group.</p> <p><b>(1b) Group Discrimination:</b> Public policy discriminates against one or more minorities.</p>
<p><b>(2) Political Upheaval:</b> Geno/politicides often occur in the immediate aftermath of political upheavals. Such upheavals include political crises, especially struggles for state power (coups, regime crises, or civil wars) and by violent conflicts including revolutions, ethnic wars, and international wars.</p>	<p><b>(2a) Magnitude of Previous State Failures:</b> The indicator is the sum of maximum annual magnitudes of all state failure events that occurred during the past 15 years.</p> <p><b>(2b) Previous Civil Strife:</b> The indicator is the average magnitude of all civil conflicts in a country during the previous 15 years.</p>
<p><b>(3) Exclusionary Ideology:</b> A history of violent conflict helps to reinforce a cultural disposition to accept violence to maintain power and settle disputes. This is fertile ground for the emergence of exclusionary, racist doctrines of national protection or social purification. Such doctrines help justify the destruction of victim groups by blaming and dehumanizing them.</p>	<p><b>(3) Exclusionary Elite Ideology:</b> This is a coded indicator that registers whether the elites are adherents of an exclusive ideology such as Marxist-Leninism, anti-Communism, militant Islam, Apartheid, or extreme nationalism.</p>
<p><b>(4) Type of Regime:</b> Democracies typically tolerate a wide range of political and ethnic challenges and have internal checks against repressive policies; autocratic governments are less tolerant of challengers and are more willing and able to use violence against them. Policies of genocide are more likely to be implemented by autocratic regimes.</p>	<p><b>(4) Autocracy:</b> This variable is constructed from information on political institutions. Autocratic regimes sharply restrict political participation, select chief executives within the political elite, and impose few or no institutional constraints on the exercise of executive power.</p>
<p><b>(5) International Economic Status of Regime:</b> Both resource-rich and low-status regimes are likely to escape international scrutiny or punishment for serious human rights violations. Here we only test for differences between high and low status regimes.</p>	<p><b>(5a) Trade Openness:</b> A country's total volume of trade (imports + exports) as a percentage of GDP is an indicator of its international connectedness and economic status.</p> <p><b>(5b) Membership in Intergovernmental Organizations:</b> We measure a country's international status by its number of membership in international organizations, excluding purely regional organizations.</p>
<p><b>Other Theoretical Variables:</b> Several other factors that are thought to contribute to the onset of geno/politicides are identified at the end of this report. Most important are <u>accelerators</u>, political events that act together to increase rapidly the level or significance of the most volatile of the general conditions. The occurrence of a large number of accelerators in a short period exponentially increases the likelihood of geno/politicide.</p>	<p><b>Other Indicators:</b> General models of state failure have identified several other indicators not discussed in theories of genocide that are also tested for this report. They include: <u>Degree of Religious Diversity (Herfindahl Index)</u>, which measures the relative size and number of religious groups in a given country; <u>Infant mortality</u>: Deaths of infants under one year old per thousand live births, a general indicator of standard of living and quality of life; <u>Youth bulge</u>: The ratio of the population in the 15-29-year age bracket to the 30-54-year age group.</p>



relatively underdeveloped former Communist region, in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

### **Method of Analysis**

In formal terms, the Task Force's analytic process centered on logistic regression models in which the dependent variable represents the conditional probability that a genocide or politicide will begin one year hence, given that a country is already experiencing state failure. Less formally, the model the Task Force developed estimates whether or not a country at the onset of internal war or adverse regime change will experience a genocide or politicide in the near future.

The approach to modeling the risk of genocides or politicides used in Phase III of the Task Force's research departed from earlier analyses in several significant ways:

- The Phase III model was estimated from all genocides/politicides that occurred in the context of state failure, including multiple genocide/politicides that occurred in the same failure. Previous analyses treated multiple genocides/politicides in the same failure as a single event.
- In the genocide/politicide cases, the Phase III model used the values of the independent variables from the year before the genocide. In the non-genocide controls, the model uses the values from the fourth year of the state failure (or, if the failure lasted four or fewer years, from the year immediately preceding the failure's end). This lag structure differs from our previous analyses, in which the values of the independent variables were taken from the year before the onset of the state failure encompassing the genocidal event. Although some genocides and politicides occurred the same year as the onset of a state failure, most (59 percent) occurred considerably later. The average lag from failure to genocide was four years, and the longest was 17 years. In these instances, conditions before the state failure may bear little resemblance to the conditions under which the genocide occurred. In light of that possibility, we decided to narrow the lag and thereby improve the correlation between predictors and events.

- The Phase III model uses a more sensitive indicator of prior state failure. Previous analyses relied on a variable that measured a country's history of state failure as a count of prior failure events. The analysis presented here used a new variable that takes into account additional information on the severity of those events. This "upheaval" indicator was defined as the sum of the annual maximum magnitudes of state failure in the past 15 years, adjusted for pre-colonial wars.

Two of the 36 cases of genocide or politicide in the Task Force's database (Pakistan 1973-77 and Uganda 1980-86) were not sufficiently separated in time to be considered distinct incidents for purposes of statistical analysis. A third genocide/politicide (South Vietnam 1965-75) and three control cases were missing data on trade openness. Consequently, the model described below was derived from a statistical comparison of 33 genocides and politicides with 97 control cases representing all state failures that did not involve a genocide or politicide.

### **Model Results**

Our analysis identified several variables as key risk factors for the onset of genocide in the context of a state failure (see tables 13 and 14):

- Autocratic rule.
- Low trade openness.
- The ethnic and ideological character of ruling elites.
- Low religious diversity.
- A history of violent upheaval.

Only seven of 33 impending genocides and 20 of the 97 non-genocides were classified incorrectly. Odds ratios and p-values for the six variables are reported in table 15.

**Table 14**  
**Variables Used in the Genocide/Politicide Model**

Variable	Name	What the Variable Measures	Data Source
Regime type	POLX	Indicates whether a country is a full democracy, partial democracy, or autocracy. This variable was constructed from information on political institutions. Democratic regimes have competitive political participation, elected chief executives, and significant checks on executive power. Partial democracies have a mix of democratic and autocratic institutions, with democratic features outweighing autocratic ones.	Polity III
Trade openness	WDIOPEN, PWTOOPEN	Dollar value of a country's imports plus exports divided by its GDP. Trade openness was measured as a continuous variable in this model. Surprisingly, the only economic variable the Task Force examined that correlated closely with trade openness was road density, which is generally considered an indicator of a country's level of development and which has specific implications for trade.	World Bank's <i>World Development Indicators</i> , Penn World Tables 5.6
Ideological character of the ruling elite	ELCELITI	Indicates whether or not a country's ruling elite espoused an ideology that is exclusionary, that is, that identifies some overriding purpose or principle that is used to restrict, persecute, or eliminate categories of people who are defined as antithetical to that purpose or principle.	Barbara Harff, US Naval Academy
Ethnic character of the ruling elite	ELCELETH	Indicates whether or not the ethnicity of a country's ruling elite was considered politically salient, be they members of the country's largest ethnic group or members of an ethno-cultural minority.	Barbara Harff, US Naval Academy
Religious diversity	CULRELH1 thru CULRELH7	Based on a Herfindahl index that indicates the level of religious diversity in the country's population. The model compares countries with high values (> 0.5) to countries with low values (< 0.5).	Correlates of War Project's Cultural Data set
Upheaval	SFTPUHVL	Sum of the maximum yearly magnitude of a country's state failure events over the previous 15 years. For former colonies, this variable includes conflicts that occurred during the colonial period.	State Failure Task Force Problem Set

Our six-variable model correctly classified 79 percent of the historical cases from which it was estimated.

**Table 15**  
**Genocide Model Results**

Variable	Greater Risk	Lesser Risk	Odds Ratio	P-Value
Regime Type	Autocracies	Democracies	2.4	0.17
Ethnic Character of Ruling Elite**	Politically salient	Not politically salient	4.8	0.01
Ideological Character of Ruling Elite**	Exclusionary ideology	No exclusionary ideology	2.9	0.04
Trade Openness***	Lower	Higher	6.5	< 0.01
Religious Diversity**	Lower	Higher	3.3	0.04
Upheaval**	Above average	Below average	3.6	0.01

N=33 genocides/politicides, 97 controls

This model correctly classified 78.8 percent of the genocides/politicides and 79.4 percent of the controls.

\*\*Significant at the  $p < 0.05$  level;

\*\*\*Significant at the  $p < 0.01$  level.

*Notes on the Statistics:* Odds ratios provide an approximation of the relative risk of state failure for two mutually exclusive groups. The results of a logistic regression analysis can be used to estimate odds ratios for each factor in the model, controlling for all other factors. The p-value provides a test of the statistical significance of an individual variable in the multivariate model. Values close to zero suggest rejection of the null hypothesis, that is, they indicate that the variable has a measurable effect on the risk of state failure.

In this table, the odds ratios for trade openness and religious diversity compare estimated risks for groups one standard deviation apart.

## Findings

**Genocide and politicide nearly always occur in the wake of other kinds of state failure.** As previously stated, only one of the 36 genocides and politicides identified as beginning between 1955 and 1998 occurred in a country that was not already experiencing some kind of state failure. The results are based on a comparison of failed states that engaged in genocide or politicide with failed states that did not. This also helps to explain why regime type is not statistically significant and infant mortality does not appear at all in this model. The character of a country's political institutions and the quality of life enjoyed by its

citizens strongly affect the risk of state failure, but once in failure, other factors become more important in determining the risk that government agents will pursue a policy of genocide or politicide.

Our model shows a strong relationship between the intensity of a country's recent state failures and the chance that a genocide or politicide will occur. The risk of genocide is greater in states that have failed more often or more gravely in the preceding 15 years. In effect, genocides and politicides tend to occur in countries where state failure is a chronic condition.

**Table 16**  
**Other Variables Tested for the Genocide/Politicide Model**

Average magnitude of past civil conflict in bordering states
Average magnitude of past internal ethnic and political violence
Average magnitude of past international wars
Discrimination indicator
Herfindahl concentration index of ethnic groups
Herfindahl concentration index of language groups
Infant mortality rate
Number of memberships in international organizations
Population size
Ratio of largest to next largest ethnic group
Ratio of largest to next largest religious group
Religious character of ruling elite
Youth bulge

**Politicized ethnicity and exclusionary ideology are key warning signs.** This point is intuitive, but it is worth highlighting that the statistical model strongly supports the intuition. Genocides and politicides tend to happen in failing states where ethnicity is highly politicized or elites espouse a belief system based on some overriding purpose or principle that identifies certain groups as opposing that principle. Not surprisingly, the risk of genocide or politicide is particularly high in cases where both factors are present.

**Economically isolated states are more vulnerable to genocide and politicide.** A country's openness to foreign trade offers a good indication of its relationships to the international community.

Our analysis shows that failed states more open to trade are significantly less likely to experience genocide or politicide. Even among states already in crisis, stronger ties to the international economy appear to reduce the risk that governments will use lethal violence against minorities or political opponents. This relationship typically takes one of

two forms. Resource-poor countries with little international trade may escape international scrutiny or punishment for genocidal actions because foreign governments care less about what happens there. Alternatively, countries with goods and commodities prized abroad may be scrutinized more closely for human-rights violations and consequently alter their behavior, at least enough to avoid becoming an international pariah.

**Genocides and politicides frequently pit dominant religious groups against small minorities.** Analysis shows that failing states in which most of the population belongs to a single religion are more likely to experience genocide and politicide. Those dominant groups tend to be the victimizers, not the victims—Shias attacking Baha'is in Iran, for example, or Muslims attacking Christians in Indonesia. In the context of ongoing state failure, the presence of a historically persecuted religious minority should be considered a significant warning sign of potential genocide, particularly if the country's ruling elite espouses an exclusionary ideology that blames or dehumanizes that minority.

## Future Directions

The findings in this report are all the more significant, in light of the fact that we have not been able to include some causal factors identified as important by other genocide scholars. In future analysis, it would be desirable to see whether the incorporation of such factors, such as existence of state security agencies that operate with few restraints, improves the predictive capability of our model.

Another promising avenue for research is the “accelerator” approach, which utilizes event data analysis to identify patterns and sequences of political events that signal the onset of genocide and politicide in high-risk situations. This approach has recently been tested on 10 of the genocide/politicide cases included in this analysis and is reported elsewhere.<sup>35</sup>

External support for a targeted group also has complex effects that merit empirical analysis. In our view, material support for politically active groups is likely to prolong conflict and may increase the risks of genocide/politicide. In addition, empty threats against violators are likely to contribute to escalation of violence and signal to elites that they can get away with mass murder without international repercussions.

## Developing a Measure of State Capacity

State capacity—the ability of a government to effectively pursue national objectives—has long been

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<sup>35</sup> Accelerator analyses are described in Harff, “Early Warning of Potential Genocide,” 1996, and in two chapters in John L. Davies and Ted Robert Gurr (eds.), *Preventive Measures: Building Risk Assessment and Crisis Early Warning Systems* (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 1998); Barbara Harff, “Early Warning of Humanitarian Crises: Sequential Models and the Role of Accelerators,” pp. 70-79; John L. Davies and Barbara Harff with Anne L. Speca, “Dynamic Data for Conflict Early Warning,” pp. 79-94; and Barbara Harff and Pamela Surko, “Accelerators of Genocide and Politicide: Postdictive Tests of an Early Warning Model for Ten Recent Cases,” Report Prepared for the Office of Transnational Issues,” August 1999.

considered a key factor in political stability.<sup>36</sup> The basic argument is this: If some states do a better job than others at developing basic infrastructure, operating the core machinery of government, and setting and implementing policy objectives, then those states, all other things being equal, ought to be more stable over time.

Unfortunately, few data sources provide useful measures of state capacity. Efforts to analyze quantitatively the role of state capacity have typically relied on proxy measures, such as GDP per capita. These proxy measures are unsatisfactory, however, because they do not allow analysts to isolate the independent effects of state capacity and because they typically represent something much narrower than the concept of capacity suggests.

For these reasons, efforts to apply statistical techniques to the study of political crisis (including those carried out by the State Failure Task Force) have seldom been able to test directly the impact of state capacity on stability. The result is a serious gap in empirical analysis; little is known about one of the causal factors both the scholarly and policy communities most often identify as important.

## Measuring State Capacity

To help fill this gap, the State Failure Task Force decided to experiment with a new way to measure state capacity that relied on a survey of country experts. A survey instrument was developed and tested, resulting in a set of 31 multiple-choice questions and three open-ended questions. The survey asks five broad categories of questions: political context, state legitimacy, human resources and organizations, institutions, and overall capacity. Following a trial period that resulted in refinements, the survey was placed on a website where it could be completed online.

The survey developers created a list of country experts, drawing primarily from academics who had

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<sup>36</sup> This view is implicit in the various capacity-building exercises supported by the US Government and many international organizations.

published articles in peer-reviewed journals about broad aspects of countries' politics. Complete responses were obtained from 199 experts, who covered 103 countries. We asked experts to answer each question for 1990 and 1999; in future years it would be necessary only to complete answers for a single year.

The data exist in three distinct forms. First, the individual responses from each coder are stored separately. Second, for countries having more than one coder we compute a composite score by averaging the responses of the different coders. Finally, we created a version of the data set that imputes missing values so that composite factor scores can be calculated. The imputation was performed according to the following decision rule: for a missing value, assign an imputed value equal to the average score within the same category and the same country.

For the 1999 data, 83 missing values were imputed out of 2,226 values; only 3.7 percent of the information used to create the 1999 capacity index is based on imputation. For the 1990, data the corresponding number was 118 (5.2 percent).

### **Interpretation of Survey Results**

Using the version of the data set with imputed values, we performed a principal component analysis. We did this only for questions 10 to 31, because questions 1 to 9 have to do with political context and do not measure state capacity; these questions were intended to facilitate the interpretation of capacity scores rather than to be elements of them.

Two distinct components were identified. The first, which gave significant weight to questions throughout the survey, we interpret as an index of *state effectiveness*. The state-effectiveness index is performance-related because it emphasizes questions having to do either directly with performance issues (such as the ability to set budgets and collect taxes) or indirectly via issues having to do with aspects of government that are instrumental toward achieving performance results (such as the skill level of the civil service). The second component gave significant

weight to a smaller set of questions, with the greatest emphasis on those questions having to do with aspects of legitimacy (such as the extent to which the state engages in illegitimate internal security tactics). We interpret this factor as an index of *state legitimacy*.

We also analyzed both the internal validity (that is to say, the extent to which the results are logical and internally consistent) and the external validity (that is to the extent to which the results are consistent with what we know about the real world) of the survey results.

The primary issue in assessing internal validity is inter-coder reliability (see table 17). The greater the degree to which any two respondents answering questions about the same country provide identical answers, the greater the level of inter-coder reliability. During the trial period, some questions that received low levels of inter-coder reliability were dropped. In the final survey, we tested the degree of convergence among coders for those countries having two or more respondents. The results were satisfactory. In general, inter-coder reliability was lowest among the political context questions and highest in the human resources and organizations and the institutions categories. The Task Force decided not to drop the questions with lower inter-coder reliability because of their potential utility in helping to discriminate among different categories of states. For quantitative analysis in which high inter-coder reliability is important, these questions can be omitted.

Testing external validity is difficult because of the paucity of available measures of state capacity. We performed two such tests. First, we correlated the index with a set of tangible indicators with a plausible theoretical connection to the concept of state capacity drawn from the World Development Indicators data. Telephones per capita, infant mortality rate, and GDP per capita had the highest correlations and were statistically significant. All the correlations were in the expected direction. Second, we compared our capacity measures with a series of World Bank

government performance measures.<sup>37</sup> These performance measures were calculated by aggregating a series of separate indexes created by a number of different sources, largely based on survey results from commercial sources. Because these World Bank performance measures constitute the closest analog to our measure of state capacity, we considered this comparison especially important.

As it happens, each of the World Bank aggregate measures was significantly correlated with the effectiveness score from our expert survey (see table 17). This strong correlation supports the conclusion that our survey data are externally valid. Additionally, the significant correlation between our legitimacy index and the World Bank's voice-and-accountability estimate suggests that it is sensible to interpret this component as a measure of state legitimacy.

The World Bank estimates also permitted us to conduct an additional test of internal validity. Here, we divided our data set into two groups, one consisting of countries with only a single coder and the other consisting of countries with multiple coders. We then calculated correlations with the World Bank performance estimates for each of these groups. If the survey instrument is prone to the bias of individual coders, then the correlations for single-coder countries ought to be weaker. In fact, we found no significant difference between the two sets. For example, the correlation between our index of state effectiveness and the World Bank's governmental effectiveness measure was 0.871 for single-respondent countries and 0.839 for multiple-respondent countries. This increases our confidence in the internal validity of the survey data.

### Using a Measure of State Capacity

The Task Force envisions several potential uses for the data generated by its state capacity survey:

- The most straightforward application of the survey results is to **incorporate the data into models of political instability**. Most of the Task Force's models require extensive historical data, and the capacity measures derived from our surveys cannot provide complete coverage across five decades. It is possible, however, to conduct other modeling exercises that are better suited to making use of these capacity measures. For example, an updated version of the environment model developed in Phase II of the Task Force's research,<sup>38</sup> which used telephones per capita as a proxy for state capacity, could easily be specified by replacing the telephone indicator with the state effectiveness index. In addition, current estimates of effectiveness and legitimacy could help analysts interpret outputs from the Task Force's models.
- The capacity data can also be used to **create other indices of relative state strength**. For example, the answers to the first section can be used to create a summed measure of the total severity of the problems facing a state. In this case, for 1999, Azerbaijan, Congo-Kinshasa, Burundi, and Sierra Leone emerge as facing the greatest severity problems. For example, one can take the measures that are indicative of overall state strength and divide their average by the average score for the variables measuring legitimacy, and obtain a ranking that identifies states that are high in strength but low in legitimacy. Such states are likely to be efficient at causing problems for their people as opposed to solving them. In 1999, the states scoring highest on this index were Bahrain, Burkina Faso, North Korea, Burma, Iraq, Sudan, Burundi, and Rwanda.
- Finally, it is possible to make use of the survey data to **engage in more contextual analysis**. The survey's final three questions ask experts to identify

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<sup>37</sup> The World Bank measures are reported in Daniel Kaufmann, Art Kraay and Pablo Zoido-Lobaton, "Aggregating Governance Indicators," (Washington, DC: World Bank, May 2000) and Kaufmann, Kraay, and Zoido-Lobaton, "Governance Matters," (Washington, DC: World Bank, May 2000).

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<sup>38</sup> Daniel C. Esty, Jack A. Goldstone, Ted Robert Gurr, Barbara Harff, Marc Levy, Geoffrey D. Dabelko, Pamela T. Surko, and Alan N. Unger, *State Failure Task Force Report: Phase II Findings* (McLean, VA: Science Applications International Corporation, 31 July 1998).

**Table 17**  
**Correlation of State Capacity Indices with World Bank Aggregate Government Performance Indicators**

<b>World Bank Indicator</b>	<b>Effectiveness Index</b>	<b>Legitimacy Index</b>
Voice and Accountability (measures political representation and freedom of the press). N=102	0.702***	0.423***
Instability and Political Violence. N=96	0.777***	0.139
Governmental Effectiveness. N=96	0.838***	0.134
Regulatory Burden (measures the tendency to impose regulations that hinder economic growth and social development). N=101	0.654***	0.167
Rule of Law. N=101	0.853***	0.084
Graft (measures the extent of corruption). N=96	0.857***	0.117

\*\*\*Significant at the 0.01 level (two-tailed test).

NOTE: The World Bank measures were all standardized to a common scale in which high values correspond to high levels of performance; thus, for example, a high score in the “Graft” measure indicates low levels of corruption.

the five most pressing challenges facing the state they are describing, and to suggest relevant indicators for those challenges. These are the only questions for which the experts compose answers in an open-ended format (all others are multiple choice). These responses can be used to conduct simple content analysis in a broad comparative sense, or to serve more narrowly as a source of expert judgment on smaller groups of countries. Such an analysis might be used to identify countries that face severe challenges from non-conventional threats to political stability, such as health issues and crime.

### Lessons Learned

Based on the experience of conducting the survey and analyzing the results, we draw the following lessons:

- It is possible to measure state capacity through an expert survey; the data pass basic tests of internal and external validity.
- Effectiveness and legitimacy appear to be distinct aspects to state capacity.
- The results appear to provide a useful basis for incorporating capacity measures into future modeling work.

- It is difficult to obtain complete coverage for all countries using the techniques employed here.

The last merits some elaboration because it represents the most serious shortcoming of the survey results. To increase confidence in the resulting data, the Task Force set strict criteria for identifying the experts who completed the survey. That the validity tests reported above were as solid as they were is a testament to the strength of those criteria. At the same time, those criteria may make it more difficult to generate results with complete global coverage. One key issue is the emphasis the criteria place on publications in peer-reviewed US journals. For many countries in the world, this criterion does not identify a sufficiently large set of experts, and in some cases it generates no experts at all.<sup>39</sup>

<sup>39</sup> Given the proliferation of new countries in recent years and the fact that the incentive structure in US academic institutions leads few scholars to become experts in small countries of low salience.



The selection criteria were fundamentally procedural rather than substantive. If the goal is to create a survey-based data set with global coverage, however, it may be necessary to introduce a parallel set of substantive criteria that judge country experts on the depth and quality of their expertise. Such substantive criteria need not be arbitrary. For example, the group of experts on Sub-Saharan African countries identified in this round of the survey work could be asked to provide names of additional experts for countries that would otherwise not be covered (such as Lesotho and The Gambia). Such a list would probably include people with expertise on the countries in question but who do not publish in the peer-reviewed literature.



## Appendix A

### General Material and Global Model Results

This appendix comprises three sections:

- A description of the **analytic methodology** the Task Force uses to develop its models.
- A detailed **list of state-failure events** that began between 1955 and 1998.
- A more detailed presentation of the **inputs and outputs to the global model**.

#### Analytic Methodology

The goal of the Task Force’s research is to develop statistical models that can be used to identify countries at greater risk of state failure, and in so doing to shed light on the foundations of state failure in ways that might inform the actions of US policymakers. The analytic process the Task Force uses to develop these models has remained consistent since the project’s inception: Task Force members suggest candidate explanatory variables based on theory and the availability of pertinent data. Once those data have been collected, single-variable tests are used to identify factors that more powerfully distinguish impending state failures from non-failures. Variables that show promise in the single-variable tests are tested in multivariate logistic regression models, and often in neural networks as well. A final multivariate model is selected primarily based on its accuracy. When choosing between models that provide similar accuracy, the Task Force favors models that include variables it considers of particular interest to policymakers.

Two of the models presented in this report—the ethnic war model and the Muslim countries model—are original to Phase III and were developed according to the just-described “funnel” process. Three of the models—the global model, the Sub-Saharan Africa model, and the genocide model—are refinements of those developed in Phase I or Phase II of the Task Force’s research. A different approach was used in these refinements, the primary goal of which was to improve model accuracy. Rather than starting the multivariate analysis over, new variables were simply added individually to the existing logistic regression model to see if they improved the model’s fit. If they did, they were kept; if not, they were rejected.<sup>40</sup>

The rest of this section describes the elements of this process in more detail.

#### Unit of Analysis

In all of the Task Force’s modeling efforts, the country year serves as the unit of analysis. Our database contains one record for each country that existed for each year of the historical period (in Phase III, 1955-98).

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<sup>40</sup> This is, of course, a gross generalization that does not apply exactly to each instance. For example, the Task Force has generally added measures of population size and density to models that initially included trade openness not because those variables improved the models’ fit, but because economists argued it was important to include them in order to tease out the independent effects of trade. Nevertheless, in all instances the model derived from the original analysis is used as the foundation for further investigation.

Each record contains measures of as many of our independent variables as possible. In some cases, those measures are imputed from previous years,

normalized, or otherwise adjusted for analytic purposes.

**Table A-1**  
**Country List**

Country	Begins <sup>1</sup>	Ends	Country Code
Afghanistan	1919	Present	AFG
Albania	1913	Present	ALB
Algeria	1962	Present	ALG
Angola	1975	Present	ANG
Argentina	1816	Present	ARG
Armenia	1991	Present	ARM
Australia	1901	Present	AUL
Austria	1918	Present	AUS
Azerbaijan	1991	Present	AZE
Bahrain	1971	Present	BAH
Bangladesh	1971	Present	BNG
Belarus	1991	Present	BLR
Belgium	1830	Present	BEL
Benin	1960	Present	BEN
Bhutan	1949	Present	BHU
Bolivia	1825	Present	BOL
Bosnia and Herzegovina	1992	Present	BOS
Botswana	1966	Present	BOT
Brazil	1822	Present	BRA
Bulgaria	1878	Present	BUL
Burkina Faso	1960	Present	BFO
Burma	1948	Present	MYA
Burundi	1962	Present	BUI
Cambodia	1953	Present	CAM
Cameroon	1960	Present	CAO
Canada	1867	Present	CAN
Central African Republic	1960	Present	CEN
Chad	1960	Present	CHA
Chile	1818	Present	CHL
China	1815	Present	CHN
Colombia	1819	Present	COL
Comoros	1975	Present	COM
Congo-Brazzaville	1960	Present	CON
Congo-Kinshasa	1960	Present	ZAI
Costa Rica	1838	Present	COS
Cote d'Ivoire	1960	Present	IVO
Croatia	1992	Present	CRO
Cuba	1902	Present	CUB
Cyprus	1960	Present	CYP
Czech Republic	1993	Present	CZR
Czechoslovakia	1918	1992	CZE
Denmark	1815	Present	DEN
Dominican Republic	1844	Present	DOM
Ecuador	1830	Present	ECU
Egypt	1951	Present	EGY

**Table A-1**  
**Country List (continued)**

<b>Country</b>	<b>Begins<sup>1</sup></b>	<b>Ends</b>	<b>Country Code</b>
Eritrea	1993	Present	ERI
Estonia	1991	Present	EST
Ethiopia	1898	1992	ETH
Ethiopia (1993-onwards)	1993	Present	ETI
Fiji	1970	Present	FJI
Finland	1917	Present	FIN
France	1815	Present	FRN
Gabon	1960	Present	GAB
Gambia, The	1965	Present	GAM
Georgia	1991	Present	GRG
Germany	1991	Present	GER
Germany, East	1949	1990	GDR
Germany, West	1949	1990	GFR
Ghana	1957	Present	GHA
Greece	1830	Present	GRC
Guatemala	1839	Present	GUA
Guinea	1958	Present	GUI
Guinea-Bissau	1974	Present	GNB
Guyana	1966	Present	GUY
Haiti	1815	Present	HAI
Honduras	1838	Present	HON
Hungary	1918	Present	HUN
India	1949	Present	IND
Indonesia	1949	Present	INS
Iran	1815	Present	IRN
Iraq	1932	Present	IRQ
Ireland	1922	Present	IRE
Israel	1948	Present	ISR
Italy	1861	Present	ITA
Jamaica	1962	Present	JAM
Japan	1815	Present	JPN
Jordan	1946	Present	JOR
Kazakhstan	1991	Present	KZK
Kenya	1963	Present	KEN
Korea, North	1948	Present	PRK
Korea, South	1948	Present	ROK
Kuwait	1961	Present	KUW
Kyrgyzstan	1991	Present	KYR
Laos	1954	Present	LAO
Latvia	1991	Present	LAT
Lebanon	1946	Present	LEB
Lesotho	1966	Present	LES
Liberia	1849	Present	LBR
Libya	1952	Present	LIB
Lithuania	1991	Present	LIT
Macedonia	1993	Present	MAC
Madagascar	1960	Present	MAG

**Table A-1**  
**Country List (continued)**

<b>Country</b>	<b>Begins<sup>1</sup></b>	<b>Ends</b>	<b>Country Code</b>
Malawi	1964	Present	MAW
Mauritania	1960	Present	MAA
Mauritius	1968	Present	MAS
Mexico	1821	Present	MEX
Moldova	1991	Present	MLD
Mongolia	1921	Present	MON
Morocco	1956	Present	MOR
Mozambique	1975	Present	MZM
Namibia	1990	Present	NAM
Nepal	1919	Present	NEP
Netherlands	1815	Present	NTH
New Zealand	1907	Present	NEW
Nicaragua	1838	Present	NIC
Niger	1960	Present	NIR
Nigeria	1960	Present	NIG
Norway	1815	Present	NOR
Oman	1951	Present	OMA
Pakistan	1971	Present	PAK
Pakistan (Pre-1971)	1947	1970	PKS
Panama	1903	Present	PAN
Papua New Guinea	1975	Present	PNG
Paraguay	1815	Present	PAR
Peru	1824	Present	PER
Philippines	1946	Present	PHI
Poland	1919	Present	POL
Portugal	1815	Present	POR
Qatar	1971	Present	QAT
Romania	1859	Present	RUM
Russia	1991	Present	RUS
Rwanda	1962	Present	RWA
Saudi Arabia	1927	Present	SAU
Senegal	1960	Present	SEN
Serbia/Montenegro	1992	Present	YGS
Sierra Leone	1961	Present	SIE
Singapore	1965	Present	SIN
Slovakia	1993	Present	SLO
Slovenia	1992	Present	SLV
Somalia	1960	Present	SOM
South Africa	1910	Present	SAF
Spain	1815	Present	SPN
Sri Lanka	1948	Present	SRI
Sudan	1956	Present	SUD
Swaziland	1968	Present	SWA
Sweden	1815	Present	SWD
Switzerland	1815	Present	SWZ
Syria	1946	Present	SYR
Taiwan	1949	Present	TAW
Tajikistan	1991	Present	TAJ

**Table A-1**  
**Country List (continued)**

Country	Begins <sup>1</sup>	Ends	Country Code
Tanzania	1961	Present	TAZ
Thailand	1815	Present	THI
Togo	1960	Present	TOG
Trinidad	1962	Present	TRI
Tunisia	1956	Present	TUN
Turkey	1815	Present	TUR
Turkmenistan	1991	Present	TKM
Uganda	1962	Present	UGA
Ukraine	1991	Present	UKR
United Arab Emirates	1971	Present	UAE
United Kingdom	1815	Present	UK
Uruguay	1828	Present	URU
USSR (Soviet Union)	1917	1990	USS
Uzbekistan	1991	Present	UZB
Venezuela	1830	Present	VEN
Vietnam	1976	Present	VIE
Vietnam, North	1954	1975	DRV
Vietnam, South	1954	1975	RVN
Yemen	1990	Present	YEM
Yemen, North	1926	1989	YAR
Yemen, South	1967	1989	YPR
Yugoslavia	1919	1991	YUG
Zambia	1964	Present	ZAM
Zimbabwe	1966	Present	ZIM

<sup>1</sup>Countries in existence at the end of the Napoleonic Wars were assigned an arbitrary beginning date of 1815.

### Case-Control Comparisons

The core of the Task Force’s control comparisons is random-case control comparisons. As we have applied it, this method compares conditions in “problem” countries shortly before the onset of state failure with conditions in a randomly selected set of “control” countries that did not experience failures in the preceding or ensuing several years. By relying on detailed data profiles of countries that did and did not experience state failure, this method offers some of the advantages of case studies. At the same time, the use of randomly selected controls allows robust statistical analysis of relationships within the data. Comparing quantitatively the failures with the non-failures allows us to identify variables that help to distinguish the two sets of cases and thus to develop models that help to anticipate future political crises. Although this method has been widely used in epidemiological research to study

factors associated with the incidence of various diseases, we believe our research marks the first time this method has been extensively applied to the study of socio-political data.<sup>41</sup>

Our cases and controls are selected as follows:

- For every instance of state failure in the data set, a data profile is developed for the country-year two years before the onset of that failure.

<sup>41</sup> N.E. Breslow and N.E. Day, “The Analysis of Case-Control Studies,” *Statistical Methods in Cancer Research, Vol. 1* (International Agency for Research on Cancer: Lyon, 1980):

Then, three “control” countries are randomly selected from among all countries that did not experience state failure within five years before or after the year in which that particular failure case began.

- A data profile is then developed for each of these three countries for the same year as the profile of the failure case.
- All four cases are then included in the sample for statistical analysis.<sup>42</sup>

The process differs slightly for the Task Force’s genocide model. For every instance of genocide or politicide in the data set, a data profile was developed for the country-year *one year before* the onset of that genocide/politicide. Control cases were selected from all cases of state failure that did not involve a genocide/politicide, and the data profile for the controls describes the country-year four years after the onset of that failure (or, for failures that lasted fewer than five years, the year immediately preceding the failure’s end).

### Single-Variable Tests

To begin identifying useful predictors of state failure, the Task Force relies on difference-of-means t-tests or chi-squared tests that compare the distribution of values for the imminent failure cases with the values for the control cases. When these distributions differ significantly—the Task Force generally employs a threshold of  $p < 0.15$  to screen variables at this stage—the variable is selected for investigation in multiple-variable models.<sup>43</sup> In addition, even if a

variable were not statistically significant in univariate testing, the Task Force would often test it in the multivariate model anyway, if we had strong theoretical reasons for believing it would influence the risk of state failure.

### Multiple-Variable Analysis

Once promising variables have been selected, the Task Force uses two techniques to identify the set of variables that, when taken together, most accurately discriminates between the control cases and the imminent state failures: logistic regression models and neural network analysis.

**Logistic Regression Models.** The outcome of interest in our research is whether a state can be expected to experience state failure two years hence, given current conditions. This outcome can be represented by a dichotomous (or yes/no) variable, and dichotomous variables are commonly modeled using logistic regression techniques. Logistic regression models classify cases by comparing the regression-generated probability of an event’s occurrence (that is, the likelihood of a “yes” outcome, or, in our research, of a state failure) to a cutpoint between 0 and 1; if the probability exceeds the cutpoint, the case is predicted to be at failure.<sup>44</sup> The coefficients associated with each independent variable indicate the effect of a unit change in that variable on the log odds of failure. The significance and relative magnitude of the various coefficients can be interpreted in the same manner as coefficients in a standard linear regression model.

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<sup>42</sup> Here is an example of how this process worked: Afghanistan experienced a complex failure beginning in 1978, so the data profile for anticipating that event describes conditions and trends in Afghanistan in 1976. Three control cases were then selected from among all countries that did not experience state failure between 1973 and 1983, the 10-year window around 1978. Once three countries had been selected, they were profiled as of 1976. All four of those 1976 profiles—Afghanistan plus three controls—were then added to the sample for statistical analysis.

<sup>43</sup> It is possible for significant correlations to be present in two- or three-variable distributions that may not show up in single-variable distributions. With scores of variables to screen, however, an exhaustive search for correlations between all possible combinations of

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variables simply was not feasible. The two-variable correlations alone would run into the several thousands. In any event, one expects that most relationships powerful enough to serve as useful predictors in a parsimonious model will have some signature in the univariate distributions.

<sup>44</sup> When the sample for analysis consists of three controls for every problem case, setting the cutpoint at approximately 0.25 equalizes sensitivity and specificity. Higher cut points achieve increased specificity at the expense of decreased sensitivity; lower ones have the opposite effect. The cutpoint that equalizes error rates in a particular analysis fluctuates, depending on the mix and the characteristics of usable cases in the analysis (cases with missing data for one or more of the model variables cannot be used for model estimation).



Logistic regression techniques offer a means to model the relationships between the outcome and independent variables of interest, and to determine which of those relationships are statistically significant. They do not, however, prescribe precisely how researchers should select which variables to include in the model, particularly when those researchers are concerned not simply with maximizing model accuracy, but also with gleaning substantive insights while minimizing model complexity. In light of these varied goals, the Task Force used several approaches to identify small sets of variables that closely fit the empirical data:

- **Variable clustering.** Logistic regression models that included all independent variables identified as significant in the Task Force's single-variable tests would generally have been unwieldy; there simply were not enough cases relative to the large number of variables to reliably estimate model coefficients. To address this problem, the analysis team often started by grouping the independent variables into theoretically motivated clusters. The three basic clusters used in the initial global model were political/leadership indicators, demographic/social indicators, and economic/environmental indicators. Additional clusters were often used for more narrowly focused models; in the genocide analysis, for example, indicators of communal divisions were considered separately from other demographic/social factors. Once the variables had been grouped into clusters, the team used the difference-of-means analysis (t-test) to identify the most significant variable or variables in each group. This smaller set of variables was then used in a logistic regression model, which provided additional information on the significance and magnitude of its relationship to the dependent variable.
- **Stepwise logistic regression.** The variable clustering approach is motivated primarily by social science theory; it is based on the idea that several broad sets of forces contribute to the risk of state

failure, so efforts to model that risk should include indicators representing these various forces. The Task Force is also interested in identifying the most efficient model—in other words, the model that achieves the greatest accuracy with the fewest variables. With this goal in mind, the analysis team also used stepwise logistic regression. Using the forward selection approach, variables from each cluster were added one at a time until further additions no longer improved the model's overall fit with the data beyond a given threshold. At each stage, the variable selected was the one that produces the greatest improvement in fit. The backward selection approach was also used; all variables selected in the clustering process were entered into a model together and then removed one at a time until further deletions significantly impaired the model's overall fit. These two approaches generally converged on the same sets of variables.

- **Additions to a Reduced Model.** Once a Parsimonious model had emerged from the clustering and stepwise regression approaches, additional variables were sometimes added either to highlight additional factors of substantive interest or to test the effects of factors not previously considered.

**Neural Network Analysis.** When researchers use logistic regression techniques, they are pre-selecting the form of the equation that relates the independent variables to the outcome of interest and then adjusting its parameters. Neural networks, by contrast, allow researchers to infer the particular form of the model's equation from the information implicit in large numbers of examples.

A neural network, or neural net, is a virtual computer built to solve a single problem. For the Task Force's purposes, that problem is the need to use the values of the various independent variables to sort cases into two categories: failures and non-failures. The computer is constructed out of many building blocks

that simply add and multiply. The process of constructing this computer is based on a library of examples where both the inputs (that is, independent variables) and the outcomes (that is, the dependent variable) are known. This information is used to adjust the connections in the computer until it does the best possible job of delivering correct outputs for all the examples. One advantage neural nets hold over logistic regression is that they are able to process cases with incomplete input data, although the expected accuracy for incomplete cases is not as high.

The Task Force primarily uses neural nets to explore the possibility that the logistic regression techniques described above are overlooking important variables or mis-specifying the relationship between particular independent variables and the risk of state failure.

### State Failure Events, 1955-98

Detailed definitions of the four types of events the Task Force considered instances of state failures are provided under the heading "State Failure Defined" in the *Measuring State Failure* section of this report's main text.

The list of events the Task Force used as its dependent variable was initially compiled for the Task Force by researchers at the University of Maryland's Center for International Development and Conflict Management (CIDCM) from existing, independent data sets.

- **Revolutionary wars.** The primary source was Melvin Small and David J. Singer, *Resort to Arms: International and Civil Wars 1816-1980* (Beverly Hills, CA; Sage, 1982), with an update through 1993 provided for the State Failure Project by Professor Singer at the University of Michigan. Civil wars by communal groups were included under ethnic wars.

- **Ethnic Wars.** From the Minorities at Risk project's profiles of conflicts involving all politically active communal groups from 1946 to 1989, updated and annotated for the State Failure Project. Primary references are T.R. Gurr, *Minorities at Risk: A Global View of Ethno-political Conflict* (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1993) and T.R. Gurr, "Peoples Against States: Ethno-political Conflict and the Changing World System," *International Studies Quarterly* 38, 3 (1994): pp.347-377.

- **Adverse Regime Transitions.** From T.R. Gurr's Polity data set, which includes annual codings of the authority traits of all regimes since 1800. The data set up was dated and annotated by Keith Jagers for the State Failure Project. The primary reference is Keith Jagers and T.R. Gurr, "Transitions to Democracy: Tracking Democracy's Third Wave with the Polity III Data," *Journal of Peace Research*, Vol. 32

- **Genocides and Politicides.** From Barbara Harff's inventory of episodes of gross human rights violations since World War II, updated and annotated by Barbara Harff and Michael Dravis for the State Failure Project. The primary reference is Barbara Harff, "Recognizing Genocides and Politicides," in Helen Fein, ed., *Genocide Watch* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1992): pp. 27-41.

For Phase II of the Task Force's research, the initial list was updated and enhanced by Dale Tuttle, Jonathan Fox, Keith Jagers, and Michael Dravis under the direction of Ted Robert Gurr and Barbara Harff. The procedures used to update and improve the list of state failures included:

- Examining additional conflicts and crises suggested by area specialists and Task Force members and then including those that met our general definitions.

- Deleting some cases used in Phase I because more detailed examination showed that they did not meet definitional criteria, or that information was too scanty to justify their inclusion.
- Consolidating overlapping cases of the same type. For example, multiple ethnic wars in India with overlapping time spans were consolidated into a single case.
- Reexamining and dividing cases of long duration into separate episodes. For example, the ethnic wars of the Kurds in Iraq from 1961 to the present were divided into three cases.
- Specifying beginning and ending months for almost all cases.
- Assigning yearly magnitudes to each case. *Revolutionary and ethnic wars* were coded for annual estimates of the number of rebel combatants or activists involved, and of fatalities, as well as the portion of country affected by the fighting. *Adverse regime changes* were coded for the extent of state authority failure, the collapse of democratic institutions, and the degree of violence accompanying the regime transition. *Genocides and politicides* were coded for the annual number of deaths. In the latter case, scales consisting of categories were used because of the imprecise nature of the information being coded.

For Phase III, the list was again updated and refined by Monty Marshall of the CIDCM at the University of Maryland.

#### **Changes to the List of Historical State Crises**

The set of crises used in the analyses reported here comprises 135 consolidated cases of state failure; some of those are discrete state-failure events, while others involve overlapping events, or events occurring in quick succession. The 135 consolidated cases are eight more than in Phase II of the Task

Force's study, which considered the period 1955-96. Added to the problem set in Phase III were:

- ***Revolutionary Wars.*** Violent revolts broke out in three states after 1996: in Congo-Brazzaville (1997), where pre-election tensions erupted into full-scale war; in Guinea-Bissau (1998-), where the dismissal of a military leader led to a failed coup attempt and an armed uprising; and in Indonesia (1997-), where widespread rioting contributed to the ouster of longtime leader Suharto. In addition, post-election violence in Lesotho in 1998 transformed a case of adverse regime change dated to 1994 into a complex case of state failure including a revolutionary-war event and extending into 1998.
- ***Ethnic Wars.*** Three states experienced outbreaks of ethnic war after 1996, and two prior cases of communal conflict were determined to have crossed the threshold for inclusion. All three of the "new" ethnic wars—in Georgia's Abkhazia region (1998-), in Yugoslavia's Kosovo (1998-), and in Indonesia's Aceh Province and in East Timor (1997-)—involved simmering ethnic conflicts that erupted into full-scale war. Meanwhile, separatist fighting in Senegal's Casamance region (1991-) and the Zapatista revolt in Mexico's Chiapas state (1994) were determined to have been sufficiently intense to merit inclusion in the Task Force's analyses.
- ***Adverse Regime Changes.*** New cases were identified in three African states—Congo-Brazzaville (1997), Guinea-Bissau (1998), and Zambia (1996)—and one Southeast Asian country, Cambodia (1997-98). Bahrain (1975) was also added to the list, and adverse regime change in Sierra Leone (1997) transformed an existing case of revolutionary war into a complex state failure.
- ***Genocides and Politicides.*** No new cases since 1996 were identified, although violence in ethnic wars in Kosovo and East Timor appeared to be approaching the definitional criteria for genocide.

**Table A-2**  
**Historical State Conflicts, Crises, and Transitions, 1955-98<sup>1</sup>**

Country	Type of Conflict	Began	Ended	Brief Description
Afghanistan	Complex <sup>2</sup>	4/78	— <sup>3</sup>	In wake of unrest stemming from assassination of prominent opposition leader, Daoud regime is overthrown in left-wing military coup, followed by political purges of ruling circles and Soviet invasion (REG <sup>4</sup> 4/78-12/79). Widespread insurgency by mujahidin revolution (REV) factions provokes Soviet and Afghan Government tactics of systematic terror, destruction of villages, execution of prisoners (GEN). Soviet-supported Najibullah regime falls after defection of General Dostam and his Uzbek militia. Mujahidin forces enter Kabul and establish interim Taliban-controlled central government (REG 2/92 – 9/96). Civil war continues among political factions based on Pashtun, Tajik, Uzbek, and Hazara ethnic groups as Taliban attempts to extend its authority (ETH from 5/92, REV from 5/92).
Albania	Complex	5/96	5/97	Third post-Communist parliamentary elections are marked by bloody police repression and electoral fraud; President Berisha uses intimidation, violence, and fraud to consolidate his political power (REG 5/96–5/96). Collapse of pyramid investment schemes ignites simmering dissatisfaction. Capital and southern half of country engulfed in fighting, looting, and rioting. Tension is defused somewhat when Barisha is forced to resign and new elections are called (REV 3/97–5/97); war in neighboring Kosovo diverts attention from internal politics to external events.
Algeria	Complex	7/62	12/62	In wake of independence from France, Algerian militants attack Europeans and Muslim civilians who collaborated with French colonial authorities (REV, ETH, GEN).
	Complex	5/91	—	Efforts by ruling FLN (National Liberation Front) to ensure its electoral success through legislative gerrymandering trigger mass protests. Military increases its political influence in effort to prevent election of Islamic. When Islamic Salvation Front wins elections, government cancels results (REG 5/91-1/92). Islamic militants and military-government initiate intense terror campaigns designed to undermine each other's support bases (REV from 5/91).
Angola	Complex	1/75		Post-independence civil war between Mbundu-dominated central government, Bakongo and Cabindan rebels, and UNITA (Union for the Total Independence of Angola), based on Ovimbundu people of south Angola (ETH, REV). Internationally brokered peace plan leads to multiparty elections, but UNITA's Savimbi rejects results and establishes rival government in Huambo (REG from 9/92). Both UNITA rebels and government forces perpetrate destructive campaigns and atrocities against civilians throughout conflict (GEN from 11/75). Lusaka protocol ends conflict for a short time but intense fighting erupts again in late 1998.

**Table A-2**  
**Historical State Conflicts, Crises, and Transitions, 1955-98<sup>1</sup> (continued)**

Country	Type of Conflict	Began	Ended	Brief Description
Argentina	Revolution	6/55	9/55	Forces loyal to President Peron battle rebels for control of government.
	Regime transition	6/66	6/66	Civilian government ousted by military coup in attempt to stem increasing influence of Peronists in electoral arena. State repression increases as urban violence escalates and falters.
	Complex	3/73	12/80	Domestic instability forces military regime to hold elections. Peronist victory ushers in period of political and social anarchy and military intervenes again (REG 3/73-3/76). Military declares state of siege and death squads target suspected leftists in campaign of kidnappings, torture, murder, and “disappearances” (GEN from 3/76).
Armenia	Regime transition	12/94	9/96	President Ter Petrossian suspends country’s most influential opposition party. Electoral malpractice and government intimidation tarnish subsequent legislative and presidential elections.
Azerbaijan	Complex	2/88	6/97	Armenian rebellion to secure independence of Nagorno-Karabakh enclave checked by 6/97 cease-fire (ETH). Post-Soviet democratic transition undermined by government instability, rebellion, and fraudulent presidential and legislative elections (REG 5/92-6/93).
Bahrain	Regime transition	8/75	8/75	Prime Minister complains of “obstruction” by the newly established National Assembly, which is then dissolved by the Emir. Emir reinstates absolute power, and there are no further elections.
Bangladesh	Regime transition	12/74	11/75	Floods, famine, and breakdown of law undermine parliamentary democracy. Brief experiment with strong presidential rule ends as anti-Mujib officers stage coup.
Belarus	Regime transition	4/95	11/96	President Lukashenko orders troops to storm parliament building and dissolves legislature. Electoral regulations prohibit legislature from convening for eight months. Once quorum is achieved, President Lukashenko restricts its action.
Benin	Regime transition	10/63	10/72	Labor and ethnic tensions undermine fragile democracy. In attempt to quell political instability, military intervenes twice before finally abolishing democratic institutions and institutionalizing military rule (10/63-12/65). Regional rivalries force military to transfer power to civilian governments. Ethnically diverse civilian triumvirate falls in second successful coup in three years. Marxist-Leninist state announced the following year (12/69-10/72)
Bosnia and Herzegovina	Complex	3/92	9/96	The breakup of the Yugoslav Federation leads to ethno-national conflict among Serb, Croat, and Muslim inhabitants of Bosnia and Herzegovina (REG, ETH 4/92-11/95). Muslim residents of Bosnia are subject to “ethnic cleansing” measures including destruction of property, forced resettlement, and execution, mainly by Serb and some Croat forces (GEN 5/92-11/95). Dayton peace accord ends fighting after country has been de facto partitioned along ethnic lines.
Brazil	Regime transition	4/64	10/65	Inflation and radical reforms proposed by new President Joao Goulart trigger overthrow of a weakly institutionalized democratic government by the armed forces. Bureaucratic-authoritarian regime violently represses left-wing opposition.
Burkina Faso	Regime transition	11/80	11/80	Leader of former military regime, President Lamizana, elected as head of civilian government. Subsequent economic crisis and labor unrest triggers military coup and suspension of Constitution.

**Table A-2**  
**Historical State Conflicts, Crises, and Transitions, 1955-98<sup>1</sup> (continued)**

Country	Type of Conflict	Began	Ended	Brief Description
Burma	Complex	8/61	—	Karen, Kachin, Shan, Mon, Chin, and other non-Burman peoples fight for greater regional autonomy (ETH). In 1962, political factionalism within ruling party and regional ethnic rebellions undermine democratic institutions and trigger military intervention. Military rule institutionalized in one-party socialist state (REG 3/62-7/62, GEN 1/78-12/78). In 1988, students in Rangoon organize increasingly violent protests against military rule and make an unsuccessful attempt to form revolutionary coalition with ethnic rebels (REV 3/88-6/89).
Burundi	Complex	2/63	12/73	Unstable political alliance between Tutsis and Hutus produces democratic stalemate. King increases his authority but is unable to resolve ethnic tensions and is overthrown by the Tutsi-dominated military (REG 2/63-11/66). Attempted coup by Hutu units in 1965 results in massacres of Tutsis in countryside, prompting Army to eliminate Hutu leaders. In 1972, militant Hutus massacre Tutsis, and Tutsi regime again responds with massive killings (GEN 10/65-12/73).
	Complex	8/88	—	Attempted democratic reforms prompt violence between historically dominant Tutsis and Hutu challengers (ETH 8/88 ongoing). Because of rural violence against local Tutsi officials, Tutsi-dominated army conducts unpremeditated massacres of Hutus (GEN 8/88). In 1993, Hutu opposition forces win first multiparty presidential and legislative elections, provoking disaffected Tutsi military forces to revolt and assassinate the Hutu president (REG 9/91-6/98). Subsequent armed clashes and massacres occur in three waves: Tutsi soldiers against Hutu civilians, Hutus against Tutsis, and Tutsis against Hutus (GEN 10/93-12/93).
Cambodia	Complex	3/70	1/79	Khmer Rouge insurgents supported by North Vietnam battle royalist government forces (REV 3/70-4/75). Once in power, they initiate restructuring of society leading to massive deaths by starvation, deprivation, executions, and massacres of old regime supporters, city dwellers, and tribal peoples, particularly Muslim Chams (GEN 4/75-1/79).
	Regime transition	7/97	12/98	Hun Sen ousts coalition partner and ends fractious coalition government installed following UN-supervised elections in 1993. Hun Sen consolidates power in a new coalition.
Chad	Complex	10/65	3/96	Recurring civil war among Chad's many communal groups with shifting alliances, but mainly along north-south lines (ETH). Failed attempt at national unification in 1978 leads to collapse of governance, intensified conflict, and international intervention (REG 8/78-6/84).
Chile	Complex	9/73	12/76	President Allende's democratically elected socialist government is overthrown in military coup. General Pinochet consolidates power, dissolves Congress, and suppresses left and center opposition (REG 9/73). Supporters of former regime and other leftists are arrested, tortured, missing, exiled, and summarily executed (GEN 9/73-12/76).

**Table A-2**  
**Historical State Conflicts, Crises, and Transitions, 1955-98<sup>1</sup> (continued)**

Country	Type of Conflict	Began	Ended	Brief Description
China	Complex	10/50	3/75	Recurrent Tibetan rebellions against Chinese occupation are suppressed; give way to episodic demonstrations (ETH 10/50-6/67). In 1959, Army and security forces suppress counterrevolutionary elements of society, including Tibetan Buddhists, landowners, and supporters of former Chiang Kaishek regime (GEN 3/59-12/59). In 1966, Red Guard youth gangs under loose direction of a Party faction target a wide spectrum of society for arrest, harassment, reeducation, torture, and execution (GEN 5/66-3/75). Red Army wars with Red Guards in an attempt to control the Cultural Revolution (REV 8/66-7/69).
	Complex	7/88	—	Episodic violent protests by Uyghurs in Xinjiang Province against Han Chinese control escalate by 1996 into terror campaign (ETH 7/88 ongoing). In 1989, students occupy Tiananmen Square demanding democratic reforms; government violently suppresses them and their supporters (REV 4/89-6/89).
Colombia	Revolution	5/84	—	Diverse leftwing groups, some of them in alliance with drug barons, battle government forces and rightwing paramilitary organizations in rural areas.
Comoros	Regime transition	9/95	3/96	Foreign-led mercenaries and disaffected Comorian troops overthrow elected government of President Djohar. French troops sent to the island one week later to arrest Djohar and mercenaries and reinstall elected prime minister.
Congo-Brazzaville	Regime transition	8/63	12/63	Fragile democracy weakened by ethnic and labor tensions. Military compels President Youlou to resign. Interim government established, before popular approval of new constitution, that creates one-party Marxist-Leninist state.
	Complex	6/97	10/97	Civil war erupts amid preelection tensions when President Lissouba's army attacks the residence of former dictator Sassou-Nguesso (REV). Transition to democracy ends when Sassou-Nguesso rallies supporters, backed by Angolan troops, and ousts Lissouba (REG).
Congo-Kinshasa	Complex	7/60	11/65	Independence is followed by intense political and tribal factionalism and the emergence of secessionist movements. Mutiny within ranks of military escalates into full-scale civil war. Rebels expel remnants of Belgian colonial apparatus (REV 7/60-8/65). Katanga and South Kasai secede from newly independent Congo (1960) followed by secession of Orientale and Kivu (1961) and rebellions in Stanleyville and Kwilu (1964) (ETH). To consolidate control, rebels massacre counterrevolutionaries, including educated Congolese, missionaries, and other Europeans (GEN 2/64-1/65). Failed attempt at democracy ends in establishment of military dictatorship under General Mobutu (REG 9/60-11/65).
	Complex	3/77	12/79	Independence movement of Lunda/Yeke (FNLC—Zaire National Liberation Front) invades Shaba (Katanga) Province, its traditional homeland (ETH 3/77-5/78). Episodic rebellions and agitation are countered by killings of political opponents, dissident tribesmen, and prisoners (GEN 3/77-12/79).
	Ethnic war	11/84	11/84	Second FNLC invasion of Shaba from bases in Angola, known as Shaba II Rebellion.

**Table A-2**  
**Historical State Conflicts, Crises, and Transitions, 1955-98<sup>1</sup> (continued)**

Country	Type of Conflict	Began	Ended	Brief Description
	Complex	9/91	—	In reaction to absolute power wielded by Mobutu's military-backed government, pro-democracy opposition pressures him to appoint new prime minister and government (REG 4/92-5/97). Communal violence erupts in Shaba (Katanga) between Luba-Kasai minority and dominant Lunda; regional governments become more autonomous (ETH 3/92 ongoing). Tutsis residing in eastern Zaire form core of rebel army that, with substantial help from Rwanda, defeats government troops and ousts Mobutu's regime (REV 10/96-ongoing). Disaffection with the policies of the nascent Kabila regime leads to the polarization of ethnic-militias and the widening of the conflict to include armed forces from regional states.
Croatia	Ethnic war	6/91	12/95	Serbs in eastern Croatia and Krajina fight newly independent Croat Government for autonomy; fighting checked in 1992 by UN peacekeeping force.
Cuba	Complex	12/56	12/61	Rural-based insurgents led by Fidel Castro overthrow military-backed Batista regime (REV 12/56-1/59). Single-party socialist state established by 1961 (REG 1/59-12/61).
Cyprus	Complex	11/63	6/68	Constitutional amendment proposed by President Makarios is unacceptable to Turkish-Cypriots, and the democratic coalition of Greek and Turkish parties collapses (REG). Intense communal fighting in 1963-64 leads to intervention by UN peacekeepers. After a brief flare-up in 1967, ethnic Turks set up separate administration in northern Cyprus (ETH 12/63-12/67).
	Regime transition	7/74	8/74	Coup by ethnic-Greek nationalists triggers intervention by armed forces from Turkey. Democracy restored in southern half of island while Turkish Cypriots establish de facto government in north.
Czechoslovakia	Regime transition	4/68	8/68	Communist reformers lead popular movement for political and economic liberalization. Soviet troops crush reform movement and install hardline government.
Dominican Republic	Complex	5/61	7/66	President Trujillo, de facto ruler since 1930, is assassinated. Military overthrows newly elected democratic government, establishes junta, and restricts leftwing parties (REG). Insurrection by military supporters of the deposed president results in external intervention in support of Wessin regime (REV 4/65-5/65).
Ecuador	Regime transition	6/70	2/72	President Velasco suspends Constitution, dissolves legislature, and assumes dictatorial powers to cope with financial emergency. Military deposes Velasco's authoritarian-democratic regime.
Egypt	Revolution	4/86	—	Terror campaign by militant Islamic groups against secular government; largely suppressed by mid-1996.
El Salvador	Complex	2/77	1/92	Amid widespread labor unrest, unprecedented levels of military intimidation and voter fraud characterize presidential elections. President Romero ushers in era of increased political repression (REG 2/77-11/77). Leftwing FMLN (Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front) insurgency ensues (REV 10/79-1/92). In face of widespread insurgency, military, security units, and death squads harass, imprison, and kill leftists among clergy, peasants, urban workers, and intellectuals (GEN 1/80-12/89).



**Table A-2**  
**Historical State Conflicts, Crises, and Transitions, 1955-98<sup>1</sup> (continued)**

Country	Type of Conflict	Began	Ended	Brief Description
Ethiopia	Complex	7/61	12/94	Eritrean secessionists led by ELF (Eritrean Liberation Front) and EPLF (Eritrean People's Liberation Front), joined by Afars, Oromos, and others in mid-1970s, fight civil wars for independence from successive imperial and Marxist regimes in Addis Ababa. Somalis in Ogaden rebel twice between 1961 and 1980 (ETH 7/61-5/91). In 1974, Emperor Selassie is deposed by leftwing military government, and Derg establishes repressive one-party socialist state (REG 9/74-11/74). Army, internal security units, and civilian defense squads massacre political and military elites, workers, students, bureaucrats, and others thought to oppose the revolutionary regime (GEN 7/76-12/79). In 1975, Tigrean Liberation Front joins regional separatists in war to seize control of the central government (REV 7/75-5/91). After Eritrean-Tigrean coalition movement defeats military-backed Derg government in May 1991, opposition groups boycott democratic elections as Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Front consolidates power (REG 5/91-12/94).
The Gambia	Regime transition	7/94	7/94	Longstanding multiparty system, dominated by President Dawda, is overthrown in military coup. Military rule reaffirmed with controversial elections of 1996.
Georgia	Complex	6/91	12/93	Abkhaz and South Ossetian regional governments fight for independence with backing from Russian military and political elements; effective autonomy secured in both regions by 1993 (ETH). While ethnic wars are under way, ousted President Gamsakhurdia fights an unsuccessful civil war (REV 12/92-3/93).
	Ethnic War	5/98	—	Fighting erupts in troubled Abkhazia as rebels drive ethnic Georgians out of contested lands.
Ghana	Regime transition	1/72	1/72	Reformist military regime permits multiparty elections. Inflation, corruption, and ethnic tension trigger military coup and suspension of party politics.
	Regime transition	7/78	12/81	Military regime's attempt to establish amnesty for Supreme Military Council before democratic elections triggers junior officer coup. Democratic experiment ends with second military coup.
Greece	Regime transition	4/67	12/67	Conflict between King Constantine II and Prime Minister Papandreou over control of military triggers government instability, social unrest, and, ultimately, rightwing military coup.
Guatemala	Complex	7/66	12/96	Communist insurgents battle military-dominated government forces in protracted revolutionary conflict, ended by negotiated settlement in 1996 (REV). In 1974, General Laugerud, candidate of military-backed rightwing ruling coalition, assumes presidency through electoral fraud and intensifies conflict against guerrillas (REG 3/74). Some indigenous Mayans who support populist and revolutionary causes join the insurgency (ETH 6/75-3/94). Military-dominated governments use severe repression including indiscriminate use of death squads against leftists and indigenous people (GEN 5/66-12/90).
Guinea-Bissau	Complex	6/98	—	Civil war breaks out when President Vieira dismisses General Mane (REV). Rebel soldiers, led by Mane, attempt coup (REG). Peace accord of November 1998 breaks down and fighting continues.

**Table A-2**  
**Historical State Conflicts, Crises, and Transitions, 1955-98<sup>1</sup> (continued)**

Country	Type of Conflict	Began	Ended	Brief Description
Guyana	Regime transition	4/78	10/80	Political domination of black-based PNC (People's National Congress) consolidated with abrogation of democratic constitution and use of electoral fraud. President is granted unlimited powers in new one-party state.
Haiti	Regime transition	9/91	9/91	Populist priest Jean Bertrand Aristide, elected president by large majority, is unwilling to govern within political system and alienates elite and foreign community. He is overthrown and replaced by military-supported puppet government.
Hungary	Regime transition	10/56	11/56	Factional disputes within Communist Party lead to civil unrest and formation of reformist coalition government. Soviet forces repress reformers and install hardline government.
India	Ethnic war	7/52	—	Federal government is challenged by autonomy rebellions by Nagas, Mizos, Tripuras, Bodos, others in Assam (from 1952); Sikhs in Punjab (from 1982); and Muslims in Kashmir (from 1989). Political concessions check some rebellions.
Indonesia	Complex	11/56	7/66	Rebels in Celebes, Sumatra, Java, and Ceram challenge Sukarno regime (REV 11/56-8/61). After Communists attempt coup, rightwing Muslim vigilantes massacre Party members and ethnic Chinese. Government formally bans Party, and military eliminates suspected Communists (GEN 10/65-7/66).
	Complex	11/75	7/92	East Timor rebels fight to regain autonomy lost when Indonesia invaded the former Portuguese colony in 11/75 (ETH 11/75-6/91). Timorese suspected of supporting rebels are killed in warfare, massacres, and famine (GEN 12/75-7/92).
	Complex	2/97	—	Economic decline leads to mass demonstrations and rioting in Jakarta. Suharto resigns and Habibie is named head of transitional government but rioting continues (REV). Fighting in East Timor resumes in 1997. Aceh increase oppositional activity. Anti-Ambonese and anti-Chinese violence takes place under cover of general protest and rioting (ETH 2/97 ongoing).
Iran	Regime transition	7/52	3/55	Limited democratic rule ends as coup ousts increasingly autocratic prime minister. Shah bans political competition and gradually assumes absolute power.
	Revolution	6/63	6/63	Government land reform laws spur Islamic groups to launch major antigovernment riots in Tehran and other cities.
	Complex	10/77	—	Islamic and political groups stage massive demonstrations against Shah Reza Pahlavi's government, efforts at repression and reform fail, and Ayatollah Khomeini establishes new Islamic Government (REV 10/77-2/79; REG 11/78-6/81). Kurds rebel for regional autonomy, fighting declines after 1984 to sporadic guerrilla activity (ETH 4/79 ongoing). Moderates (National Front) and conservatives (IRP Islamic Revival Party) use terror and repression in competition for political control (REV 6/81-1/83). To consolidate Islamic revolution, Khomeini government violently suppresses dissident Muslims (mujahidin) and rebel Kurds, selectively executes prominent Baha'is (GEN 6/81-12/92).

**Table A-2**  
**Historical State Conflicts, Crises, and Transitions, 1955-98<sup>1</sup> (continued)**

Country	Type of Conflict	Began	Ended	Brief Description
Iraq	Complex	7/61	3/75	Barzani's Kurdish Democratic Party revolts against General Qassim's regime and its successors in quest for regional autonomy (ETH 7/61-3/70). Fighting resumes in 4/74 as Kurds reject government autonomy plan that falls short of their demands (ETH 4/74-3/75). To suppress repeated rebellions for independent Kurdistan, military engages in large-scale massacres (GEN 6/63-3/75).
	Complex	9/80	—	Some Iraqi Kurds take advantage of Iran-Iraq war and Iranian support to mount new rebellion for autonomy (ETH 9/80-3/88). In 1988, military and security forces launch Al-Anfal campaign of indiscriminate violence to eliminate or neutralize guerrillas and their supporters (GEN 3/88-6/91). Kurdish rebels take advantage of Iraq's defeat in Gulf war to establish a de facto Kurdish state, protected by US- and British-led coalition forces, while Shia rebellion in the south is repressed by Iraqi forces (ETH 3/91 onward).
Israel	Ethnic war	6/67	—	Palestinians engage in guerrilla warfare and terror against Israel's repressive authority in Israeli-occupied Gaza and West Bank and in Israel proper. Anti-Israeli activity largely shifts away from lethal methods in late 1980s with the <i>intifada</i> and the Middle East Peace process.
Jordan	Regime transition	4/57	4/57	King Hussein demands resignation of his prime minister on suspicion of maneuvering to abolish monarchy. Multiparty elections for National Assembly rescinded as King bans all political parties.
	Revolution	6/67	7/71	Palestinian groups challenge government forces in effort to overthrow King Hussein's regime.
Kazakhstan	Regime transition	8/95	8/95	President Nazarbayev dissolves the legislature and rules by decree. Referendum on new Constitution confirms the extension of Nazarbayev's presidency to the year 2000.
Kenya	Ethnic war	10/91	9/93	Kalenjin and Masai supporters of the government are encouraged in attacks aimed at driving Kikuyu, Luo, and other rival groups from their villages in highlands.
Korea, South	Regime transition	5/61	10/63	Military coup ends brief experiments with civilian-led parliamentary democracy. Military-dominated democratic government gradually established.
	Revolution	10/79	10/79	Student unrest leads to wide-scale rioting and assassination of President Park Chunghee.
Kyrgyzstan	Regime transition	12/95	2/96	Legislature rejects President Akeyev's proposal to extend his term in office through national referendum but nonetheless agrees to hold presidential elections one year early. Akeyev easily wins reelection.
Laos	Complex	8/60	6/79	Military coup sparks sustained conflict as rebels fight unsuccessfully to overthrow rightist Somsanith regime (REV 8/60-5/62). Hmong (Meo) rebels encouraged to fight Pathet Lao; rebellion is suppressed after Pathet Lao takeover in 1975; no significant guerrilla activity after 1979 (ETH 7/61-6/79). Neutralists and Conservatives join forces to oppose Communist Pathet Lao insurgents. Pathet Lao gain power in 1975, but resistance by rightist forces continues (REV 3/63-3/79).
Lebanon	Revolution	5/58	7/58	Muslim opposition groups rebel against Christian-dominated government.

**Table A-2**  
**Historical State Conflicts, Crises, and Transitions, 1955-98<sup>1</sup> (continued)**

Country	Type of Conflict	Began	Ended	Brief Description
	Complex	7/65	9/92	Palestinian attacks against Israel from Lebanon cause conflict with Lebanese authorities (1965-92). Christian-dominated polity collapses in civil war among Druze, Shia, Maronite, and Sunni forces (ETH 7/65-7/91; REG 5/75-9/92); civil warfare is further complicated by Israeli invasion and partial occupation from 1985. New power-sharing constitution eventually established as elections are held under Syrian supervision in 1992.
Lesotho	Regime transition	1/70	1/70	Westminster-styled democracy brought to abrupt end after opposition wins narrow victory in first post-independence election. Prime Minister Jonathan invalidates vote, imprisons opposition leaders, dissolves parliament, and assumes dictatorial powers.
	Complex	8/94	12/98	Loose coalition of opposition forces involving armed forces, royalists, and opposition BNP (Basotho National Party) undermines newly elected BCP (Basotholand Congress Party) government. King Letsie III dissolves government and installs Provisional Council of State (REG 8/94-9/94). Protests against results of May 1998 elections are joined by mutiny of soldiers and shutdown of government by civil servants. Foreign troops impose order, and new elections are proposed (REG 5/98-12/98, REV 8/98-10/98).
Liberia	Complex	12/89	8/97	Repression by military against supporters of Charles Taylor leads to widespread civil war, collapse of Monrovia Government, and assassination of President Doe. National Patriotic Forces of Liberia (NPFL) and militias of rival tribally based political groups compete for control of devastated society (REV 12/89-7/93, REG 9/90-8/97).
Madagascar	Regime transition	5/72	6/75	Ethnic tensions and economic crisis undermine fragile democratic institutions. Elected president relinquishes powers to military in order to quell urban unrest. Factional fighting within military leads to reduction in political participation.
Mali	Ethnic war	6/90	2/93	Rebellion by nomadic Tuaregs seeking regional autonomy.
Mexico	Ethnic war	1/94	2/94	Zapatista (EZLN) rebels begin uprising in Chiapas, protesting treatment of indigenous peoples. Disturbance ignites demonstrations throughout country.
Moldova	Ethnic war	10/90	5/97	Russian-backed Slavic minority fights for autonomy in Trans-Dniester Republic.
Morocco	Regime transition	5/63	6/65	King Hassan resumes full legislative and executive powers after brief experiment with limited parliamentary rule.
	Ethnic war	10/75	11/89	Saharawis seek independence in southwestern part of country annexed by Morocco after Spanish colonial rule.
Mozambique	Revolution	7/76	10/92	Anti-Communist RENAMO (Mozambique National Resistance) rebels, supported by Rhodesia and South Africa, challenge Marxist regime, war ends with 1992 peace agreement.
Nicaragua	Complex	9/78	6/90	Leftist Sandinistas (FSLN-Sandinista National Liberation Front) lead popularly supported revolution that ends 42-year rule of Somoza family (REV 9/78-6/79). Sandinista-dominated junta consolidates power by eliminating opposition members from government (REG 7/79-3/81). Anti-Sandinista forces (Contras) oppose government (REV 2/81-6/90). Indigenous Miskitos of Atlantic coast region also rebel against Sandinista Government (ETH 2/81-6/90).

**Table A-2**  
**Historical State Conflicts, Crises, and Transitions, 1955-98<sup>1</sup> (continued)**

Country	Type of Conflict	Began	Ended	Brief Description
Niger	Regime transition	1/96	7/96	Military coup overthrows democratically elected government and suspends 1992 Constitution. Coup leader Colonel Ibrahim Mainassara Barre is elected president in seriously flawed elections.
Nigeria	Complex	12/64	1/70	Ethnic violence sparked by democratic elections triggers military coup and abandonment of state's federal structure. Countercoup by mostly Muslim officers from north results in reestablishment of federal system (REG 12/64-7/66). Countercoup and retaliatory massacres of Ibos in north precipitate secessionist civil war by Biafra, based on Ibos of eastern region (ETH 1/66-1/70).
	Complex	12/80	8/85	Islamic cults battle government forces in north (REV 12/80-1/81). Ethnic competition, widespread corruption, and electoral malpractice weaken democratic institution of Second Republic. Successive military coups bring to an end Second Republic and expand political role of armed forces (REG 12/83-8/85).
Oman	Revolution	3/65	3/76	Dhofar tribal insurrection escalates to ideological struggle between rebels and autocratic regime; rebels suppressed by 1976.
Pakistan	Complex	10/58	5/61	Decade-long experiment with parliamentary and presidential system ends when democratic constitution is abrogated, political parties dissolved, and government handed over to coalition of military officers and bureaucrats (REG 10/58). Sporadic violence erupts as Pashtuns seek autonomy (ETH 9/60-5/61).
	Complex	3/71	7/77	Post-election tensions between East and West Pakistan erupt into massive resistance by Bengali nationalists; intervention by India leads to establishment of independent Bangladesh (ETH 3/71-11/71). Military imposes martial law and uses tanks, airpower, and artillery to indiscriminately attack civilians (GEN 3/71-12/71). Baluchi rebellion against central authority, backed by opposition National Awami Party (ETH 2/73-7/77) is suppressed by military using indiscriminate violence against civilians (GEN 2/73-7/77). Surprise parliamentary elections called by democratic government in 1977, lead to escalating political violence. General Zia leads military coup, dissolves legislature, arrests politicians, and declares martial law (REG 3/77-7/77).
	Ethnic war	8/83	—	Violent campaign by Sindhis seeking autonomy; violent attacks on Muhajirs in Karachi.
Panama	Regime transition	10/68	12/69	Oligarchic democracy replaced by direct military rule after threatened shakeup of National Guard. Party activity suspended as Col. Torrijos consolidates power. Military coup and countercoup in 1969.
Papua New Guinea <sup>5</sup>	Ethnic war	11/88	1/98	Bougainvillean Revolutionary Army fights PNG forces to end large-scale mining and gain independence for the island of Bougainville.
Peru	Regime transition	10/68	10/68	President Belaunde's gridlocked democratic government overthrown in populist military coup. Congress dissolved and statist policy of socioeconomic reform pursued.
	Complex	3/82	4/97	Maoist guerrillas of Sendero Luminoso (Shining Path) attack government troops, terrorize rural and urban supporters of government (REV). Facing internal warfare and recession, President Fujimori, backed by military, dissolves Congress and suspends Constitution (REG 4/92).

**Table A-2**  
**Historical State Conflicts, Crises, and Transitions, 1955-98<sup>1</sup> (continued)**

Country	Type of Conflict	Began	Ended	Brief Description
Philippines	Complex	11/69	—	Six decades of elite-based democracy end as President Marcos, confronted by growing class and ethnic conflict, declares martial law and assumes dictatorial powers (REG 11/69-9/72). Leftist NPA (New People's Army) fights protracted guerrilla war aimed at overthrowing Manila regimes of Marcos and his elected successors (REV 7/72 ongoing). Muslim Moros mount guerrilla war for independence (ETH 10/72 ongoing). Moro resistance to Christian settlement and support for separatist guerrillas results in military and paramilitary terror tactics in which many Moros die in massacres and napalm bombings (GEN 9/72-6/76).
Romania	Revolution	12/89	12/89	Broad anti-Ceausescu coalition (National Salvation Front) overthrows Stalinist regime.
Russia	Ethnic war	7/90	12/96	Declarations of sovereignty by autonomous national regions in North Caucasus (Chechen, Ingush, others) and Far East (Buryat and others) lead to anti-Russian protest, interethnic clashes, and (in Chechnya) to open rebellion.
Rwanda	Complex	11/63	11/66	Cross-border incursions by Tutsi rebels prompt local Hutu officials to orchestrate vengeance attacks and massacres by Hutus, leading to flight of 200,000 Tutsi refugees (ETH, GEN 12/63-6/64).
	Complex	10/90	—	Tutsi exiles of RPF launch successive invasions from Uganda prompting sporadic violence between Hutu army and Tutsi civilians (ETH). Hutu-dominated military government promises return to democratic rule, and transitional government is established as Tutsi guerrillas invade (REG 6/91-7/94). When President Habyarimana's aircraft is shot down (4/94), Hutu government deploys military and armed gangs to systematically slaughter Tutsis and Hutu moderates (GEN 4/94-7/94). Ethnic-Tutsi RPF (Rwandan Patriotic Front) seizes control of government by 7/94 but is unable to control Hutu militias operating from cross-border sanctuaries.
Senegal	Regime transition	12/62	10/64	Increasing tensions between President Senghor and his prime minister lead to failed coup attempt by Prime Minister Dia. Senghor arrests Dia, strengthens constitutional powers of presidency, and establishes one-party rule.
	Ethnic war	6/91	—	Violence increases in Casamance region as Casamancais (MFDC) rebels intensify separatist campaign.
Sierra Leone	Regime transition	3/67	4/71	Regional factionalism within two-party democratic system triggers series of military coups after Siaka Stevens (a Limba) defeats Albert Margai (a Mende). President Stevens declares himself executive president and systematically restricts democratic opposition (REG 3/67-4/68, REG 9/70-4/71).
	Complex	3/91	—	Revolutionary United Front mobilizes rural peoples, mainly Temne, in armed rebellion that devastates much of country. Peace agreement of 11/96 fails to end conflict (REV). Mutinous soldiers side with RUF guerrillas to overthrow President Kabbah. Junta is defeated by ECOWAS troops in February 1998 but fighting continues (REG 5/97 ongoing)
Somalia	Regime transition	10/69	10/69	Increasingly autocratic style of elected government triggers clan-based violence. Military intervenes and establishes one-party socialist state.

**Table A-2**  
**Historical State Conflicts, Crises, and Transitions, 1955-98<sup>1</sup> (continued)**

Country	Type of Conflict	Began	Ended	Brief Description
	Complex	5/88	—	Siad Barre regime is challenged by rebellions of Somali National Movement, based on northern Issaq clan, and United Somali Congress, based on southern Hawiye clan (ETH, REV 5/88-8/94). Anti-insurgency operations by Barre forces cause large-scale civilian deaths (GEN 5/88-1/91) but fail to prevent establishment of de facto independent government of northern Somaliland (1988-91). Barre regime collapses but chronic violence among clan-based warlords in south prevents establishment of effective central government (REG 7/89 ongoing).
South Africa	Revolution	6/76	4/77	Violent protests by black workers and students erupt in townships and spread countrywide and are suppressed.
	Complex	8/84	6/96	Violent protests in black townships over poor economic conditions and lack of political rights lead to dismantling of apartheid policies and democratic elections won by ANC (African National Congress) (REV 8/84-4/ 94). Zulu Inkatha movement wars with ANC supporters for political control in Natal, initially with clandestine support from Afrikaner government's security forces (ETH 1/87-6/96).
Sri Lanka	Revolution	4/71	5/71	Marxist JVP (People's Liberation Front) attempts to overthrow government.
	Complex	7/83	—	Ethnic-Tamil grievances against pro-Sinhalese governmental policies erupt into secessionist civil war in the northeast (ETH 7/83 ongoing). Revolutionary campaign by Marxist Sinhalese JVP prompts government to unleash military and police death squads to eliminate JVP challenge (REV 7/87-12/89, GEN 9/89-1/90).
Sudan	Complex	10/56	3/72	Anyanya rebellion by non-Muslim population of southern Sudan against Muslim-dominated government ends with 1972 autonomy agreement (ETH). Government uses indiscriminate violence against civilian Southerners thought to support secessionist movement (GEN). Parliamentary democracy overthrown in 1958 military coup. Constitution abrogated and opposition parties banned as General Abbud consolidates political power (REG 11/ 58). Democratic government reestablished in 1964 but overthrown by leftwing military officers in 1969. Col. Numeiri establishes one-party state after failed coup by Communist elements within ruling military coalition (REG 5/69-10/71).
	Complex	7/83	—	Southern rebellion resumes under SPLA (Sudan People's Liberation Army) leadership after Muslim government violates autonomy agreement; in 1991 SPLA's breakup leads to new inter-communal violence within south (ETH 7/83 ongoing). Non-Muslim supporters of secession are targeted for destruction by indiscriminate military attacks, massacres by government-supported tribal militias, and government-induced privation and population displacement (GEN 9/83 ongoing). In 1989 military overthrows democratic government after attempts to reduce the influence of religion in politics. Legislature is dissolved and non-fundamentalist parties banned as Islamic state is established (REG 2/89-6/89).

**Table A-2**  
**Historical State Conflicts, Crises, and Transitions, 1955-98<sup>1</sup> (continued)**

Country	Type of Conflict	Began	Ended	Brief Description
Syria	Regime transition	2/58	7/63	Government led by pan-Arab, socialist Ba'ath party seeks union with Egypt to prevent formation of Communist-led regime. Syria secedes from United Arab Republic after military coup. Second coup establishes one-party state under neo-Baa'thist rule.
	Geno/politicide	4/81	2/82	Military and security forces crush revolt by Muslim Brotherhood centered in cities of Hama and Aleppo.
Tajikistan	Complex	4/92	—	Post-Soviet democratic transition halted as civil war plagues ethnically and regionally diverse country (REV 4/ 92 ongoing). Ex-Communists gain control of the political arena and restrict democratic participation (REG 5/ 92-12/92).
Thailand	Regime transition	3/57	9/57	Factional struggles within military-dominated government result in liberalization of political system as Prime Minister Phibun and General Pao (head of police) attempt to offset Field Marshal Sarit's advantages.
	Complex	7/67	7/83	Malay Muslims engage in sporadic separatist activity against state authorities in southern Thailand (ETH). Prime Minister Thanom executes coup against his own government, thereby ending three-year experiment with limited parliamentary democracy (REG 11/71). Persistent guerrilla insurgency and open warfare between leftist students and rightist paramilitary groups triggers military coup. Military establishes hardline civilian government that restricts political liberties and civil rights (REG 10/76-12/78).
	Complex	2/91	—	First directly elected prime minister in over a decade is overthrown in military coup after he attempts to limit army's political power. After failed attempt to establish pro-military government, coup leader is nominated as new prime minister (REG 2/91-9/92). Separatist rebellion by Malay Muslims resumes in south (ETH 8/93 ongoing). <sup>5</sup>
Turkey	Regime transition	4/71	4/71	Amid widespread social unrest, military oversees resignation of leftwing civilian government and initiates period of "guided democracy" under "above party" administrators.
	Complex	9/80	—	Parliamentary instability and widespread social unrest triggers military coup. Political activity banned as military lays groundwork for restoration of democracy under military supervision (REG 9/80). Kurds of militant PKK (Kurdistan Workers' Party) engage in protracted conflict with Turkish authorities in quest for independence, provoking deadly counterinsurgency campaigns (ETH 8/84 ongoing).



**Table A-2**  
**Historical State Conflicts, Crises, and Transitions, 1955-98<sup>1</sup> (continued)**

Country	Type of Conflict	Began	Ended	Brief Description
Uganda	Complex	2/66	—	Allegations of corruption and persistent ethnic tensions within federal democracy leads to suspension of Constitution, centralization of political authority, and creation of de facto one-party state under control of President Obote (REG 2/66-1/71). Gen. Idi Amin seizes power in 1971 and systematically exterminates political opponents and personal enemies. Tribes closely associated with his predecessor also are targeted (GEN 2/72-4/79). After Amin is overthrown by Tanzanian intervention, Obote again takes power. Amid banditry and rebellion by tribal supporters of Amin (ETH 10/80–ongoing), Obote’s political and tribal rivals are slaughtered on massive scale (GEN 5/79-1/86). Widespread corruption, repression, and ethnic conflict lead to overthrow of Obote’s military-backed civilian regime by General Musaveni’s National Resistance Army (REV 1/83-12/85). From 1986, rebellion is dominated by Langi and Acholi peoples at war with government forces dominated by Bagandans.
UK	Ethnic war <sup>5</sup>	4/69	10/94	Catholic IRA (Irish Republican Army) uses terror against British forces and militant Protestants in quest for union with Republic of Ireland.
Uruguay	Regime transition	7/72	6/73	Two-party democracy is undermined by Tupamaro’s campaign of urban guerrilla warfare. Army mutiny leads to dissolution of Congress and creation of civilian-military rule.
USSR (Soviet Union)	Complex	12/86	12/91	Georgians, Azeris, and Kazakhs engage in violent clashes while protesting Soviet rule; popular front movements win control of Baltic republic governments and declare sovereignty (ETH 12/86-8/91). Russian Republic (RSFSR) Congress adopts declaration of sovereignty, and Russian President Boris Yeltsin uses his new position of power to challenge authority of Gorbachev. Failed coup by Communist hardliners leads to formal dissolution of USSR (REG 6/90-12/91).
Vietnam, North	Ethnic war	7/58	3/75	Mountain tribal people (Montagnards) rebel against Communist government to gain greater autonomy.
Vietnam, South	Complex	1958	4/75	South Vietnamese Communists, supported by North Vietnam, rebel against regime; became internationalized civil war in 1965 (REV 1958-12/65). Government military and paramilitary forces engage in killings, reprisals, and bombardments against villagers supporting Viet Cong (GEN 1/65-4/75).
Yemen, North	Revolution	9/62	1/70	Royalist and Republican forces battle for control of government. Rival tribes join on opposite sides.
Yemen, South	Revolution	1/86	2/86	Rival factions in the Yemen Socialist Party (YSP) battle for control of government.
Yemen	Regime transition	5/90	10/94	Transition toward unified, democratic Yemen undermined by factional fighting. Northern leaders consolidate authority over southern leaders in aftermath of civil war.
Yugoslavia	Ethnic war	3/81	4/81	Ethnic rioting by Kosovar Albanians, leading to attacks on Yugoslav militiamen and federal institutions.

**Table A-2**  
**Historical State Conflicts, Crises, and Transitions, 1955-98<sup>1</sup> (continued)**

Country	Type of Conflict	Began	Ended	Brief Description
	Complex	4/90	1/92	Federated Republic slowly disintegrates after Communist government allows multiparty elections. Civil war intensifies as Serbian president, Slobodan Milosevic, attempts to create new "Greater Serbia" (REG 4/90-12/91). Slovenes and Croats fight wars of independence against Yugoslav federal troops (ETH 6/91-1/92).
	Ethnic war	2/98	—	Kosovar Liberation Army (KLA) mobilizes resistance to Serbian control of Kosovo (1996). Crackdown by Yugoslav Army in February 1998 leads to open warfare.
Zambia	Regime transition	12/68	12/72	Democratic institutions are weakened when political opposition to President Kaunda is restricted. Kaunda consolidates his political authority with formal establishment of one-party state.
	Regime transition	5/96	11/96	Constitutional amendments in May 1996 disqualify main opposition leader; President Chiluba easily wins subsequent elections.
Zimbabwe	Complex	12/72	12/87	White-dominated government fights black nationalists of ZAPU (Zimbabwe African People's Union) and ZANU (Zimbabwe African National Union), leading to negotiated settlement and black majority government (REV 12/72-12/79). Ndebele people initiate rioting and local rebellions against Shona-dominated ZANU governing coalition (ETH 6/81-12/87). Ethnic tensions and crackdown on political opposition weaken Zimbabwe's fragile democratic institutions. Merger of ZAPU with ruling ZANU effectively establishes one-party system (REG 2/82-12/87).

<sup>1</sup>This list is an updated and enhanced version of earlier versions that first appeared in Esty, Gurr, Goldstone, Surko, and Unger, *Working Papers: State Failure Task Force Report*, Science Application International Corporation (McLean, VA), Nov. 1995, and subsequently in Esty, Goldstone, Gurr, Harff, Levy, Dabelko, Surko, and Unger, *State Failure Task Force Report: Phase II Findings*, Science Applications International Corporation (McLean, VA), July 1998. Updates and enhancements were undertaken by Keith Jagers and Donna Ramsey Marshall under the direction of Monty G. Marshall in consultation with Ted Robert Gurr and Barbara Harff. Area experts have reviewed the list on several occasions; several cases were added, deleted, or modified on their recommendation.

<sup>2</sup>Complex events are made up of two or more temporally linked wars and crises. If events overlap or if four years or less separate the end of one event and the onset of the next, they are combined into complex events. The specific types of events and their dates, if different from the dates of the complex event, are shown in parentheses after the description.

<sup>3</sup>A dash in place of an ending date indicates a failure that is ongoing as of 31 December 1998.

<sup>4</sup>REG = Adverse Regime Change; ETH = Ethnic War; REV = Revolutionary War; GEN = Genocide or politicide.

<sup>5</sup>Ethnic wars of very low magnitude are included in the list but not in the set of conflicts, crises, and transitions analyzed for this report. There are two such cases: Papua New Guinea beginning 11/88 and the United Kingdom beginning 4/69. A third occurred in Thailand beginning in 1993, but it is included as part of a complex crisis that began in 1991.

**Table A-3**  
**Near-Total Failures of State Authority, 1955-1998**

<b>Country</b>	<b>Year</b>	<b>Event</b>
Congo	1960	Mutiny and civil war following independence
Cyprus	1964	Civil war following breakup of democratic coalition
Dominican Republic	1965-66	Revolutionary conflict in last stage of post-Trujillo transition
Nigeria	1966	Federal democracy overthrown in coup and counter-coup
Bangladesh	1974-75	Collapse of parliamentary democracy
Argentina	1975-76	Ineffective Peronist government overthrown by military
Lebanon	1975-90	Christian-dominated regime collapses in civil war
Chad	1978-83	Recurrence of civil war along North-South divide
Iran	1978-81	Regime collapse in final stage of Islamic revolution
Somalia	1990-	Collapse of Barre regime followed by clan-based warfare
Liberia	1990-96	Militias of rival groups fight for control of devastated society
Yugoslavia	1991	Breakup of Yugoslav federation
USSR	1991	Breakup of Soviet Union
Afghanistan	1992-95	Communal rivals fight for control of new government
Tajikistan	1992	Democratic transition ends in civil war
Bosnia and Herzegovina	1992-96	Serbs and Croats challenge newly independent government
Burundi	1992-96	Failure of democratic transition accompanied by communal war
Rwanda	1994	Tutsi invasion precipitates genocide and regime collapse
Congo-Kinshasa (Zaire)	1997-	Opposition forces fail to reestablish central governance after collapse of Mobutu regime
Sierra Leone	1997-	Mutinuous soldiers side with guerrillas to oust President Kabbah
Guinea-Bissau	1998	Civil war follows attempt by president to dismiss military leader

## Measuring Regime Type

We used the Polity III Global Data Set to measure the character of a country's political institutions, which we generally refer to as its regime type.<sup>45</sup> The Polity data were updated through 1998 for the State Failure Project by Monty Marshall at the University of Maryland.

Following conventional practices, we first combined Polity's 11-point scales of autocracy and democracy to create a single index, the democracy-minus-autocracy score, that ranges from minus 10 to 10. Countries at the high end of this scale have institutionalized procedures for open and competitive political participation, choose chief executives in competitive elections, and impose substantial limits on the powers of the chief executive. In countries at the low end of the scale, participation is sharply restricted or suppressed, chief executives are selected within the political elite, and once in office, chief executives exercise power with few or no institutional constraints. Many polities have a mix of autocratic and democratic features, and using the democracy-minus-autocracy score ensures that the category of partial democracy includes only polities in which democratic features outweigh autocratic ones.

In Phase III of our research, we used the democracy-minus-autocracy score to categorize polities into three groups:

- **Full Democracies.** (8 to 10 on the combined scale). This category includes all West European polities, the United States, and Canada, as well as numerous Asian and Latin American countries, such as Australia, Japan, Argentina (since 1983), Brazil (since 1986), and Costa Rica. Polities with a score of eight usually have fewer checks on executive

authority or slightly limit competitive political participation, at least when compared with 10s such as Sweden and the United Kingdom. In 1998, Venezuela was just above the threshold with a score of eight, while Ukraine was just below the threshold with a score of seven.

- **Partial Democracies.** (1 to 7 on the combined scale). These countries have some features of democracy but lack others. In some countries, such as South Africa before the end of apartheid, political participation is substantially restricted. In others, such as Sri Lanka, participation is characterized by intense, hostile, and sometimes violent rivalries. The typical failing of partial democracies, however, is a lack of significant restrictions on the power of the chief executive; participation may be open and elections held, but most power remains concentrated in the hands of the executive. Fitting this pattern in the 1990s were many of the recent transitional polities in Sub-Saharan Africa and the former Communist bloc, including Mozambique, Armenia, and Georgia.
- **Autocracies.** (minus 10 to 0 on the combined scale). This category includes all polities in which autocratic features outweigh democratic ones. The countries at the high end of the scale often are modernizing autocratic governments, such as those of Singapore and Egypt. Countries at the low end are generally fully institutionalized autocratic systems, such as those of China and Iraq. This category also includes military-dominated regimes, such as those of Indonesia during the Suharto era and Algeria. It also can include countries such as Kazakhstan that hold elections from which the opposition is effectively excluded.

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<sup>45</sup> Keith Jagers and Ted Robert Gurr, "Tracking Democracy's Third Wave with the Polity III Data," *Journal of Peace Research* Vol. 31, No. 4 (1995): pp.469-482.

Table A-4 shows the characteristics and values used to construct the indices of institutional democracy and autocracy.

**Table A-4**  
**Indicators of Institutional Democracy and Autocracy**

<b>Authority Coding</b>	<b>Democracy</b>	<b>Autocracy</b>
<b>Competitiveness of Political Participation</b>		
Competitive	3	0
Transitional	2	0
Factional	1	0
Restricted	0	1
Suppressed	0	2
<b>Regulation of Political Participation</b>		
Factional/Restricted	0	1
Restricted	0	2
<b>Competitiveness of Executive Recruitment</b>		
Election	2	0
Transitional	1	0
Selection	0	2
<b>Openness of Executive Recruitment</b>		
Election	1	0
Dual Hereditary/Election	1	0
Dual Hereditary/Designation	0	1
Closed	0	1
<b>Constraints on Chief Executive</b>		
Executive Parity or Subordination	4	0
Intermediate Category 1	3	0
Substantial Limitation	2	0
Intermediate Category 2	1	0
Slight to Moderate Limitations	0	1
Intermediate Category 3	0	2
Unlimited Power of Executive	0	3
<b>Maximum possible score— institutional democracy</b>	10	
<b>Maximum possible score— institutional autocracy</b>		10

Table A-5 shows, for each country with a population greater than 500,000, the values of the democracy and autocracy indices and the combined scale, as well as the regime type that combined scale represents, as of 1998.

**Table A-5**  
**Polity Democracy, Autocracy, and Combined Scores and Regime Type by Country, 1988**

Country	Democracy Score	Autocracy Score	Democracy-Minus Autocracy Score	Regime Type
Afghanistan	0	7	-7	Autocracy
Albania	7	1	6	Partial Democracy
Algeria	1	4	-3	Autocracy
Angola	1	4	-3	Autocracy
Argentina	8	0	8	Full Democracy
Armenia	6	0	6	Partial Democracy
Australia	10	0	10	Full Democracy
Austria	10	0	10	Full Democracy
Azerbaijan	0	6	-6	Autocracy
Bahrain	0	9	-9	Autocracy
Bangladesh	6	0	6	Partial Democracy
Belarus	0	7	-7	Autocracy
Belgium	10	0	10	Full Democracy
Benin	9	0	9	Full Democracy
Bhutan	0	8	-8	Autocracy
Bolivia	9	0	9	Full Democracy
Bosnia and Herzegovina	3	2	1	Partial Democracy
Botswana	8	0	8	Full Democracy
Brazil	8	0	8	Full Democracy
Bulgaria	8	0	8	Full Democracy
Burkina Faso	3	3	0	Autocracy
Burma	0	9	-9	Autocracy
Burundi	0	3	-3	Autocracy
Cambodia	1	4	-3	Autocracy
Cameroon	0	7	-7	Autocracy
Canada	10	0	10	Full Democracy
Central African Republic	6	0	6	Partial Democracy
Chad	1	3	-2	Autocracy
Chile	8	0	8	Full Democracy
China	0	7	-7	Autocracy
Colombia	7	0	7	Partial Democracy
Comoros	5	1	4	Partial Democracy
Congo-Brazzaville	0	6	-6	Autocracy
Congo-Kinshasa	0	7	-7	Autocracy
Costa Rica	10	0	10	Full Democracy
Cote d'Ivoire	0	6	-6	Autocracy

**Table A-5**  
**Polity Democracy, Autocracy, and Combined Scores and Regime Type by Country, 1988 (continued)**

Country	Democracy Score	Autocracy Score	Democracy-Minus Autocracy Score	Regime Type
Croatia	2	3	-1	Autocracy
Cuba	0	7	-7	Autocracy
Cyprus	10	0	10	Full Democracy
Czech Republic	10	0	10	Full Democracy
Denmark	10	0	10	Full Democracy
Dominican Republic	8	0	8	Full Democracy
Ecuador	9	0	9	Full Democracy
Egypt	1	4	-3	Autocracy
El Salvador	9	0	9	Full Democracy
Eritrea	1	3	-2	Autocracy
Estonia	8	0	8	Full Democracy
Ethiopia	3	2	1	Partial Democracy
Fiji	8	0	8	Full Democracy
Finland	10	0	10	Full Democracy
France	9	0	9	Full Democracy
Gabon	1	4	-3	Autocracy
Gambia, The	0	5	-5	Autocracy
Georgia	5	0	5	Partial Democracy
Germany	10	0	10	Full Democracy
Ghana	5	0	5	Partial Democracy
Greece	10	0	10	Full Democracy
Guatemala	8	0	8	Full Democracy
Guinea	3	2	1	Partial Democracy
Guinea-Bissau	-77 <sup>1</sup>	-77	0	Autocracy
Guyana	6	0	6	Partial Democracy
Haiti	7	0	7	Partial Democracy
Honduras	7	0	7	Partial Democracy
Hungary	10	0	10	Full Democracy
India	8	0	8	Full Democracy
Indonesia	0	5	-5	Autocracy
Iran	0	6	-6	Autocracy
Iraq	0	7	-7	Autocracy
Ireland	10	0	10	Full Democracy
Israel	9	0	9	Full Democracy
Italy	10	0	10	Full Democracy
Jamaica	9	0	9	Full Democracy
Japan	10	0	10	Full Democracy

<sup>1</sup>A score of minus 77 represents a period of “interregnum,” which indicates a complete collapse of central political authority. This generally occurs in the context of an internal war—as in Lebanon from 1978 to 1989 or Somalia from 1991 to the present—or a disruptive regime transition as in Afghanistan in 1978 or Iran in 1979.

**Table A-5**  
**Polity Democracy, Autocracy, and Combined Scores and Regime Type by Country, 1988 (continued)**

<b>Country</b>	<b>Democracy Score</b>	<b>Autocracy Score</b>	<b>Democracy-Minus Autocracy Score</b>	<b>Regime Type</b>
Jordan	1	4	-3	Autocracy
Kazakhstan	1	4	-3	Autocracy
Kenya	3	2	1	Partial Democracy
Korea, North	0	9	-9	Autocracy
Korea, South	10	0	10	Full Democracy
Kuwait	0	7	-7	Autocracy
Kyrgyzstan	3	1	2	Partial Democracy
Laos	0	7	-7	Autocracy
Latvia	8	0	8	Full Democracy
Lebanon	1	4	-3	Autocracy
Lesotho	-88 <sup>2</sup>	-88	0	Autocracy
Liberia	3	2	1	Partial Democracy
Libya	0	7	-7	Autocracy
Lithuania	10	0	10	Full Democracy
Macedonia	9	0	9	Full Democracy
Madagascar	8	0	8	Full Democracy
Malawi	8	0	8	Full Democracy
Malaysia	4	0	4	Partial Democracy
Mali	6	0	6	Partial Democracy
Mauritania	0	6	-6	Autocracy
Mauritius	10	0	10	Full Democracy
Mexico	6	0	6	Partial Democracy
Moldova	7	0	7	Partial Democracy
Mongolia	9	0	9	Full Democracy
Morocco	1	4	-3	Autocracy
Mozambique	6	0	6	Partial Democracy
Namibia	8	0	8	Full Democracy
Nepal	8	0	8	Full Democracy
Netherlands	10	0	10	Full Democracy
New Zealand	10	0	10	Full Democracy
Nicaragua	8	0	8	Full Democracy
Niger	0	6	-6	Autocracy
Nigeria	-88	-88	0	Autocracy
Norway	10	0	10	Full Democracy
Oman	0	9	-9	Autocracy
Pakistan	7	0	7	Partial Democracy

<sup>2</sup>A score of minus 88 represents a period of “transition.” Some new polities are preceded by a “transition” period during which new institutions are planned, legally constituted, and put into effect, for example, Zimbabwe in 1979. Democratic and quasi-democratic polities are particularly likely to be established in this manner, for example, Argentina in 1982.



**Table A-5**  
**Polity Democracy, Autocracy, and Combined Scores and Regime Type by Country, 1988 (continued)**

Country	Democracy Score	Autocracy Score	Democracy-Minus Autocracy Score	Regime Type
Panama	9	0	9	Full Democracy
Papua New Guinea	10	0	10	Full Democracy
Paraguay	7	0	7	Partial Democracy
Peru	3	1	2	Partial Democracy
Philippines	9	0	9	Full Democracy
Poland	9	0	9	Full Democracy
Portugal	10	0	10	Full Democracy
Qatar	0	10	-10	Autocracy
Romania	8	0	8	Full Democracy
Russia	5	1	4	Partial Democracy
Rwanda	0	6	-6	Autocracy
Saudi Arabia	0	10	-10	Autocracy
Senegal	3	1	2	Partial Democracy
Serbia and Montenegro	0	6	-6	Autocracy
Sierra Leone	5	1	4	Partial Democracy
Singapore	2	4	-2	Autocracy
Slovakia	8	0	8	Full Democracy
Slovenia	10	0	10	Full Democracy
Somalia	-77 <sup>1</sup>	-77	0	Autocracy
South Africa	9	0	9	Full Democracy
Spain	10	0	10	Full Democracy
Sri Lanka	6	1	5	Partial Democracy
Sudan	0	7	-7	Autocracy
Swaziland	0	9	-9	Autocracy
Sweden	10	0	10	Full Democracy
Switzerland	10	0	10	Full Democracy
Syria	0	9	-9	Autocracy
Taiwan	9	0	9	Full Democracy
Tajikistan	1	3	-2	Autocracy
Tanzania	3	2	1	Partial Democracy
Thailand	9	0	9	Full Democracy
Togo	1	3	-2	Autocracy
Trinidad	9	0	9	Full Democracy
Tunisia	1	4	-3	Autocracy
Turkey	8	0	8	Full Democracy
Turkmenistan	0	9	-9	Autocracy
Uganda	2	4	-2	Autocracy
Uruguay	10	0	10	Full Democracy

<sup>1</sup>A score of minus 77 represents a period of “interregnum,” which indicates a complete collapse of central political authority. This generally occurs in the context of an internal war—as in Lebanon from 1978 to 1989 or Somalia from 1991 to the present—or a disruptive regime transition as in Afghanistan in 1978 or Iran in 1979.

**Table A-5**  
**Polity Democracy, Autocracy, and Combined Scores and Regime Type by Country, 1988 (continued)**

<b>Country</b>	<b>Democracy Score</b>	<b>Autocracy Score</b>	<b>Democracy-Minus Autocracy Score</b>	<b>Regime Type</b>
Ukraine	7	0	7	Partial Democracy
United Arab Emirates	0	8	-8	Autocracy
United Kingdom	10	0	10	Full Democracy
Uzbekistan	0	9	-9	Autocracy
Venezuela	8	0	8	Full Democracy
Vietnam	0	7	-7	Autocracy
Yemen	3	3	0	Autocracy
Zambia	3	2	1	Partial Democracy
Zimbabwe	0	5	-5	Autocracy

## Global Model Inputs and Outputs

### Control Cases

Table A-6 lists the 381 country-years selected at random as control cases for the global analysis. The country most represented in the control sample is Malaysia, with eight years. Six countries are

represented with seven years, nine with six years, nine with five years, 15 with four years, 27 with three years, 26 with two years, and 39 with one year.

**Table A-6**  
**Control Cases Used To Estimate Global Model**

Country Code	Country Name	Years
AFG	Afghanistan	1958, 1961, 1965
ALB	Albania	1964
ALG	Algeria	1975, 1988
ARG	Argentina	1998
AUL	Australia	1958, 1961, 1967, 1970, 1979, 1986, 1997
AUS	Austria	1956, 1967, 1994
BAH	Bahrain	1971, 1986, 1995
BLR	Belarus	1991
BEL	Belgium	1981
BEN	Benin	1980, 1984, 1994, 1997
BHU	Bhutan	1956, 1960, 1963, 1970, 1975, 1978, 1995
BOL	Bolivia	1973
BOT	Botswana	1976, 1992
BRA	Brazil	1973
BUL	Bulgaria	1991
BFO	Burkina Faso	1963, 1968, 1988, 1991, 1994
MYA	Burma	1958
BUI	Burundi	1984
CAM	Cambodia	1958, 1962, 1965, 1991, 1994
CAO	Cameroon	1960, 1963, 1969, 1977, 1983, 1990
CAN	Canada	1977
CEN	Central African Republic	1961, 1972, 1975, 1988
CHA	Chad	1960, 1963
CHN	China	1981, 1986
COL	Colombia	1968, 1977
COM	Comoros	1975, 1991
CON	Congo-Brazzaville	1972, 1984, 1991
COS	Costa Rica	1956, 1978, 1992
IVO	Cote d'Ivoire	1963, 1972, 1988, 1994
CUB	Cuba	1968, 1982
CYP	Cyprus	1982, 1992
DEN	Denmark	1968, 1973, 1977, 1989
DJI	Djibouti <sup>1</sup>	1980, 1988

**Table A-6**  
**Control Cases Used To Estimate Global Model (continued)**

Country Code	Country Name	Years
DOM	Dominican Republic	1972, 1978, 1994
ECU	Ecuador	1978
EGY	Egypt	1958, 1965, 1974, 1981
SAL	El Salvador	1974
EQG	Equatorial Guinea <sup>1</sup>	1991, 1995
ERI	Eritrea	1996
EST	Estonia	1992
ETH	Ethiopia	1956
FJI	Fiji	1977, 1997
FIN	Finland	1956, 1961, 1966, 1974, 1984, 1990
FRN	France	1956, 1968
GAB	Gabon	1964, 1983, 1991, 1994, 1998
GAM	Gambia, The	1965, 1976, 1989
GDR	Germany, East	1984
GFR	Germany, West	1968
GHA	Ghana	1963, 1970, 1995
GRC	Greece	1961, 1978, 1984, 1998
GUI	Guinea	1961, 1965, 1968, 1972, 1980, 1990, 1996
GNB	Guinea-Bissau	1976, 1984, 1992
HAI	Haiti	1966
HON	Honduras	1963, 1968, 1971
INS	Indonesia	1971
IRN	Iran	1961, 1969
IRQ	Iraq	1958
IRE	Ireland	1966, 1980, 1991
ISR	Israel	1957, 1962
ITA	Italy	1968, 1982, 1989
JAM	Jamaica	1973, 1978
JPN	Japan	1958, 1963, 1971, 1974, 1978, 1983
JOR	Jordan	1962, 1992, 1995
KEN	Kenya	1963, 1970, 1977
PRK	Korea, North	1957, 1961, 1969, 1983, 1991
ROK	Korea, South	1995
KUW	Kuwait	1967, 1986, 1995
LAO	Laos	1957, 1986, 1991
LAT	Latvia	1994, 1997
LEB	Lebanon	1963
LES	Lesotho	1978, 1984
LBR	Liberia	1956, 1963, 1966, 1975
LIB	Libya	1958, 1963, 1967, 1971, 1980, 1995
LIT	Lithuania	1991
MAG	Madagascar	1960, 1963, 1966, 1983, 1989, 1992, 1997
MAW	Malawi	1969, 1980, 1984, 1988, 1991, 1994, 1998

**Table A-6**  
**Control Cases Used To Estimate Global Model (continued)**

Country Code	Country Name	Years
MAL	Malaysia	1958, 1962, 1965, 1969, 1975, 1983, 1990, 1998
MLI	Mali	1964, 1969
MAA	Mauritania	1963, 1967, 1970, 1990, 1996
MAS	Mauritius	1972, 1976, 1990
MEX	Mexico	1956, 1966, 1974
MON	Mongolia	1958, 1961, 1967, 1975, 1992, 1997
MOR	Morocco	1958, 1971, 1997
MZM	Mozambique	1997
NAM	Namibia	1991
NEP	Nepal	1958, 1961, 1967, 1978, 1988, 1995
NTH	Netherlands	1967, 1990
NEW	New Zealand	1958, 1963, 1975, 1979, 1983, 1998
NIC	Nicaragua	1963, 1970, 1996
NIR	Niger	1963, 1966, 1972, 1980, 1989
NIG	Nigeria	1991, 1996
NOR	Norway	1967, 1980, 1989
OMA	Oman	1957, 1960, 1963, 1986
PAN	Panama	1991
PNG	Papua New Guinea	1977, 1980, 1983, 1991, 1997
PAR	Paraguay	1970
PER	Peru	1966
PHI	Philippines	1960, 1967
POR	Portugal	1970, 1990
QAT	Qatar	1986
RUM	Romania	1973
RWA	Rwanda	1972, 1988
SAU	Saudi Arabia	1957, 1962, 1965, 1974, 1980, 1983, 1990
SEN	Senegal	1972
SIE	Sierra Leone	1961, 1965, 1978
SIN	Singapore	1967, 1975, 1986, 1990, 1995
SLO	Slovakia	1998
SOM	Somalia	1962, 1967, 1976, 1980
SAF	South Africa	1956, 1963, 1972
SPN	Spain	1966, 1996
SRI	Sri Lanka	1958, 1961
SUD	Sudan	1977
SWA	Swaziland	1968, 1976, 1996
SWD	Sweden	1956, 1964, 1968, 1973, 1980
SWZ	Switzerland	1972, 1994
SYR	Syria	1991
TAW	Taiwan	1957, 1961, 1967, 1971, 1977, 1995
TAZ	Tanzania	1963, 1967, 1990, 1996
TOG	Togo	1962, 1991, 1995, 1998

**Table A-6**  
**Control Cases Used To Estimate Global Model (continued)**

<b>Country Code</b>	<b>Country Name</b>	<b>Years</b>
TRI	Trinidad	1971, 1981, 1992, 1996
TUN	Tunisia	1956, 1961, 1965, 1970, 1975, 1994
TUR	Turkey	1964
UGA	Uganda	1962
UAE	United Arab Emirates	1975, 1979, 1991
URU	Uruguay	1963
USS	USSR (Soviet Union)	1956, 1962, 1967, 1975
VEN	Venezuela	1972
VIE	Vietnam	1988, 1991, 1998
YAR	Yemen, North	1958, 1986, 1981
YPR	Yemen, South	1981
YUG	Yugoslavia	1961, 1968, 1971, 1978
ZAM	Zambia	1964, 1978, 1990, 1994

<sup>1</sup>Djibouti and Equatorial Guinea were inadvertently included in the set of countries from which control cases were selected, despite falling below our population size cutoff of 500,000.

## Model Results

The Task Force’s global analysis identified six factors as significantly associated with the risk of state failure around the world (see table A-9). One of those

factors—regime type—is represented in the model by two variables. Coefficients and p-values<sup>1</sup> associated with the seven variables are presented in table A-7.

**Table A-7**  
**Global Model Coefficients (N = 114 state failures, 342 controls)**

Variable	Coefficient	P-value
Infant mortality rate (Log, normalized, continuous)	0.7990	0.0002
Partial democracy indicator	2.0117	<0.0001
Democracy indicator	0.0515	0.8925
Trade openness (dichotomized, 1 = below the median, 0 = above the median)	0.5193	0.0618
Total population (log, normalized, continuous)	0.1882	0.0720
Population density (log, normalized, continuous)	0.2171	0.0384
Number of border states with major civil conflict (Dichotomized, 1=2 or more, 0=less than 2)	0.6451	0.0234

<sup>1</sup>“P-value” refers to a test of the statistical significance of an individual variable in multi-variable models. Values close to zero indicate that the variable has a measurable effect on state failure.

As table A-8 indicates, this seven-variable model correctly classified 72 percent of the failures and control cases in the historical data from which it was

estimated. The model classified problem and control cases with equal accuracy.

**Table A-8**  
**Classification Accuracy of the Global Model**

Case Type	Classification correct		Classification incorrect		Total
	Number	Percent	Number	Percent	
Problem	83	72.8	31	27.2	114
Control	246	71.9	96	28.1	342
Total cases	329	72.1	127	27.9	456

Table A-9 lists the variables used in the model, describes how they were measured, and indicates the sources of the relevant data. Table A-10 shows the classification results and the values of the variables included in the final model for each of

the problem and control cases used to estimate that model. As the table indicates, 39 of the 381 control cases (10.2 percent) and 13 of the 127 problem cases (10.2 percent) were omitted from the estimation because of missing data.

**Table A-9**  
**Global Model Classification Results**

Country code	Country name	Year of problem or control	Problem indicator	Independent variables, measured two years prior to problem/control							Model score
				Trade openness <i>(imports + exports as Percent of GDP)</i>	Population density relative to world median	Total population relative to world median	Democracy-autocracy	Democracy category <sup>1</sup>	Infant mortality rate relative to world median	Border states with major civil conflict	
<b>Problems classified correctly</b>											
ARM	Armenia	1994	1	101.08	2.58	0.44	7	Partial	0.58	4	0.573
ALB	Albania	1996	1	50.30	2.13	0.36	5	Partial	0.74	0	0.572
SEN	Senegal	1991	1	58.76	0.85	0.88	1	Partial	1.46	0	0.570
PKS	Pakistan (PRE-1971)	1958	1	26.17	2.55	23.23	8	Democracy	1.31	3	0.563
SRI	Sri Lanka	1971	1	62.30	7.69	2.41	7	Partial	0.61	0	0.562
GRC	Greece	1967	1	24.25	3.02	1.85	4	Partial	0.42	0	0.556
RWA	Rwanda	1990	1	24.22	6.38	0.84	-7	Autocracy	2.26	2	0.553
ROK	Korea, South	1979	1	64.99	11.83	5.83	1	Partial	0.41	0	0.550
PAK	Pakistan (PRE-1971)	1971	1	19.45	3.10	11.56	-2	Autocracy	1.45	3	0.548
SRI	Sri Lanka	1983	1	77.00	6.56	2.28	6	Partial	0.56	0	0.533
SAF	South Africa	1976	1	57.21	0.68	4.06	4	Partial	0.89	1	0.532
TUR	Turkey	1980	1	11.08	1.73	6.74	9	Democracy	1.66	2	0.531
ZIM	Zimbabwe	1972	1	59.41	0.53	1.00	4	Partial	1.09	0	0.493
MYA	Burma	1961	1	43.34	1.32	5.07	8	Democracy	1.28	2	0.451
ZAM	Zambia	1968	1	89.39	0.22	0.79	2	Partial	1.15	1	0.444
BUI	Burundi	1963	1	24.14	5.95	0.69		Autocracy	1.27	2	0.425
IRN	Iran	1963	1	36.19	0.70	5.17	-10	Autocracy	1.39	2	0.422
ZAI	Congo-Kinshasa	1984	1	26.11	0.35	4.26	-9	Autocracy	1.70	2	0.416
KEN	Kenya	1991	1	53.50	0.92	2.80	-7	Autocracy	1.44	4	0.415
NIR	Niger	1996	1	43.78	0.13	0.99	8	Democracy	2.89	2	0.410
THI	Thailand	1967	1	34.08	2.73	6.62	-7	Autocracy	0.84	2	0.407
ZAI	Congo-Kinshasa	1977	1	25.15	0.35	3.90	-9	Autocracy	1.61	2	0.401
NIG	Nigeria	1964	1	21.83	2.39	9.84	8	Democracy	1.57	0	0.396



**Table A-9**  
**Global Model Classification Results (continued)**

Country code	Country name	Year of problem or control	Problem indicator	Independent variables, measured two years prior to problem/control							Model score
				Trade openness <i>(imports + exports as Percent of GDP)</i>	Population density relative to world median	Total population relative to world median	Democracy-autocracy	Democracy category <sup>1</sup>	Infant mortality rate relative to world median	Border states with major civil conflict	
INS	Indonesia	1975	1	39.67	2.52	22.22	-7	Autocracy	1.34	0	0.393
CAM	Cambodia	1970	1	19.30	1.56	1.33	-9	Autocracy	1.30	3	0.389
EGY	Egypt	1986	1	58.16	1.20	6.37	-5	Autocracy	1.83	2	0.387
KZK	Kazakhstan	1995	1	79.77	0.12	1.97	2	Partial	0.80	1	0.384
NIG	Nigeria	1980	1	43.31	2.29	10.59	0	Autocracy	1.45	0	0.370
INS	Indonesia	1997	1	51.67	1.90	21.58	-7	Autocracy	1.28	1	0.368
CON	Congo-Brazzaville	1963	1	106.62	0.15	0.24	4	Partial	1.11	1	0.364
TUR	Turkey	1971	1	7.99	1.82	6.77	9	Democracy	1.53	1	0.360
BUI	Burundi	1988	1	34.04	4.75	0.65	-7	Autocracy	2.16	0	0.359
SUD	Sudan	1983	1	32.23	0.23	2.92	-7	Autocracy	1.47	4	0.349
AFG	Afghanistan	1978	1	28.09	0.73	2.36	-7	Autocracy	2.52	1	0.349
INS	Indonesia	1956	1	<55	2.05	22.42	0	Autocracy	1.12	0	0.349
ZAI	Congo-Kinshasa	1992	1	58.71	0.37	4.50	-8	Autocracy	2.22	4	0.348
HAI	Haiti	1991	1	37.36	5.30	0.78	-6	Autocracy	1.88	0	0.347
ZAI	Congo-Kinshasa	1960	1	17.83	0.27	3.52		Autocracy	1.21	2	0.331
BLR	Belarus	1995	1	148.97	0.94	1.20	7	Partial	0.36	0	0.320
PAN	Panama	1968	1	79.22	0.81	0.29	4	Partial	0.51	0	0.316
IRN	Iran	1977	1	76.01	0.70	5.57	-10	Autocracy	1.38	3	0.304
SAL	El Salvador	1977	1	71.26	6.68	0.69	-1	Autocracy	1.20	2	0.302
ROK	Korea, South	1961	1	12.88	9.82	5.55	-4	Autocracy	0.77	0	0.301
ETH	Ethiopia	1961	1	19.41	0.82	5.62	-9	Autocracy	1.49	1	0.298
GUY	Guyana	1978	1	157.08	0.12	0.12	1	Partial	0.92	0	0.294
MOR	Morocco	1975	1	42.94	1.33	2.90	-9	Autocracy	1.44	1	0.288
MLI	Mali	1990	1	50.69	0.16	1.01	-7	Autocracy	3.25	0	0.286
LAO	Laos	1960	1	<55	0.36	0.50	8	Democracy	1.23	4	0.281
SOM	Somalia	1988	1	36.36	0.32	1.07	-7	Autocracy	2.54	1	0.280
RWA	Rwanda	1963	1	21.31	5.89	0.66		Autocracy	1.25	1	0.275

**Table A-9**  
**Global Model Classification Results (continued)**

Country code	Country name	Year of problem or control	Problem indicator	Independent variables, measured two years prior to problem/control							Model score
				Trade openness <i>(imports + exports as Percent of GDP)</i>	Population density relative to world median	Total population relative to world median	Democracy-autocracy	Democracy category <sup>1</sup>	Infant mortality rate relative to world median	Border states with major civil conflict	
MOR	Morocco	1963	1	46.53	1.38	2.79	-5	Autocracy	1.32	0	0.275
MZM	Mozambique	1976	1	53.07	0.46	1.76		Autocracy	1.98	1	0.274
YEM	Yemen	1990	1	52.29	0.50	1.40		Autocracy	2.02	0	0.272
GHA	Ghana	1978	1	31.76	1.45	1.64	-7	Autocracy	1.42	0	0.268
MAG	Madagascar	1972	1	40.75	0.46	1.29	-1	Autocracy	2.02	0	0.266
CYP	Cyprus	1974	1	82.18	2.46	0.11	7	Partial	0.34	0	0.258
SIE	Sierra Leone	1991	1	62.12	1.26	0.48	-7	Autocracy	3.46	0	0.255
THI	Thailand	1957	1	45.31	2.00	5.90	-2	Autocracy	0.86	1	0.251
<b>Problems classified incorrectly</b>											
IRQ	Iraq	1980	1	85.80	0.87	1.93	-7	Autocracy	1.16	2	0.246
MEX	Mexico	1994	1	35.51	0.90	10.31	0	Autocracy	0.79	1	0.227
TAJ	Tajikistan	1992	1	>55	0.74	0.64		Autocracy	1.31	2	0.220
ANG	Angola	1975	1	52.17	0.17	1.03		Autocracy	2.03	1	0.220
SYR	Syria	1981	1	55.14	1.39	1.31	-9	Autocracy	0.92	4	0.219
GAM	Gambia, The	1994	1	153.56	1.98	0.12	8	Democracy	3.07	1	0.218
DOM	Dominican	1961	1	42.58	2.55	0.71	-9	Autocracy	1.02	0	0.214
GUA	Guatemala	1966	1	33.48	1.92	0.98	-5	Autocracy	1.01	0	0.213
SEN	Senegal	1962	1	47.40	0.63	0.76	-1	Autocracy	1.43	0	0.211
ALG	Algeria	1991	1	36.88	0.24	3.01	-2	Autocracy	1.29	1	0.205
SUD	Sudan	1956	1	<55	0.18	2.63		Autocracy	1.31	1	0.194
LBR	Liberia	1989	1	76.77	0.58	0.30	-6	Autocracy	2.74	0	0.180
COL	Colombia	1984	1	26.11	0.78	4.30	8	Democracy	0.65	1	0.179
CHA	Chad	1965	1	45.70	0.12	0.72	-9	Autocracy	1.62	1	0.170
RUM	Romania	1989	1	44.34	2.43	2.98	-8	Autocracy	0.50	0	0.167
JOR	Jordan	1967	1	54.67	0.58	0.24	-9	Autocracy	1.02	2	0.154
YUG	Yugoslavia	1981	1	38.11	2.31	1.50	-7	Autocracy	0.53	1	0.153

**Table A-9**  
**Global Model Classification Results (continued)**

Country code	Country name	Year of problem or control	Problem indicator	Independent variables, measured two years prior to problem/control							Model score
				Trade openness <i>(imports + exports as Percent of GDP)</i>	Population density relative to world median	Total population relative to world median	Democracy-autocracy	Democracy category <sup>1</sup>	Infant mortality rate relative to world median	Border states with major civil conflict	
LES	Lesotho	1994	1	161.55	1.21	0.22	-7	Autocracy	1.89	1	0.153
ARG	Argentina	1973	1	12.62	0.34	4.51	-9	Autocracy	0.57	0	0.135
LES	Lesotho	1970	1	62.24	1.41	0.21	9	Democracy	1.40	0	0.133
IRQ	Iraq	1961	1	67.22	0.59	1.53	-5	Autocracy	1.14	0	0.130
ALG	Algeria	1962	1	102.39	0.20	2.56		Autocracy	1.36	0	0.130
ARG	Argentina	1966	1	11.13	0.38	4.83	-1	Autocracy	0.51	1	0.129
NIC	Nicaragua	1978	1	67.25	0.68	0.41	-8	Autocracy	1.24	1	0.114
URU	Uruguay	1972	1	30.10	0.63	0.54	8	Democracy	0.54	0	0.109
JOR	Jordan	1957	1	72.69	0.68	0.37	-1	Autocracy	1.12	0	0.104
YUG	Yugoslavia	1990	1	65.97	2.00	1.32	-5	Autocracy	0.57	0	0.098
ISR	Israel	1967	1	45.45	5.65	0.55	10	Democracy	0.25	0	0.095
BAH	Bahrain	1975	1	>55	12.43	0.04	-7	Autocracy	0.61	0	0.082
GRG	Georgia	1991	1	87.45	1.58	0.67		Autocracy	0.54	1	0.080
CYP	Cyprus	1963	1	76.74	3.21	0.13	8	Democracy	0.25	0	0.041
<b>Non-problems classified correctly</b>											
GUI	Guinea	1968	0	29.19	0.65	0.77	-9	Autocracy	1.86	0	0.250
EGY	Egypt	1981	0	78.06	1.22	6.18	-6	Autocracy	1.81	1	0.247
GNB	Guinea-Bissau	1984	0	49.13	0.83	0.12	-7	Autocracy	2.59	0	0.244
DOM	Dominican	1972	0	41.82	3.60	0.84	-3	Autocracy	1.10	0	0.244
CAO	Cameroon	1983	0	61.55	0.54	1.36	-8	Autocracy	1.40	2	0.243
MAW	Malawi	1980	0	64.31	1.91	0.91	-9	Autocracy	2.44	0	0.243
TUN	Tunisia	1970	0	31.79	1.33	1.00	-9	Autocracy	1.38	0	0.242
TUN	Tunisia	1975	0	52.47	1.25	0.95	-9	Autocracy	1.41	0	0.242
GHA	Ghana	1970	0	41.11	1.52	1.67	-7	Autocracy	1.16	0	0.241
COM	Comoros	1991	0	54.17	4.35	0.05	-7	Autocracy	1.95	0	0.239
BFO	Burkina Faso	1968	0	17.99	0.84	1.10	-7	Autocracy	1.48	0	0.238

**Table A-9**  
**Global Model Classification Results (continued)**

Country code	Country name	Year of problem or control	Problem indicator	Independent variables, measured two years prior to problem/control							Model score
				Trade openness <i>(imports + exports as Percent of GDP)</i>	Population density relative to world median	Total population relative to world median	Democracy-autocracy	Democracy category <sup>1</sup>	Infant mortality rate relative to world median	Border states with major civil conflict	
TUN	Tunisia	1965	0	29.67	1.38	0.98	-9	Autocracy	1.32	1	0.238
GUI	Guinea	1965	0	26.53	0.68	0.77	-9	Autocracy	1.68	0	0.237
MEX	Mexico	1974	0	14.87	1.05	9.67	-6	Autocracy	0.81	1	0.234
BFO	Burkina Faso	1963	0	22.79	0.89	1.10	-7	Autocracy	1.36	0	0.229
CAM	Cambodia	1958	0	<55	1.23	1.25	-9	Autocracy	1.17	0	0.224
PRK	Korea, North	1957	0	<55	3.32	2.29	-7	Autocracy	0.77	0	0.223
PRK	Korea, North	1961	0	<55	3.32	2.29	-8	Autocracy	0.77	1	0.223
TUN	Tunisia	1956	0	<55	1.09	1.00		Autocracy	1.26	1	0.222
TUN	Tunisia	1961	0	<55	1.09	1.00	-9	Autocracy	1.26	0	0.222
MLI	Mali	1969	0	37.40	0.18	1.03	-7	Autocracy	2.05	0	0.222
SIE	Sierra Leone	1978	0	61.06	1.38	0.49	-6	Autocracy	2.64	0	0.220
MEX	Mexico	1966	0	17.64	1.02	9.12	-6	Autocracy	0.75	1	0.220
MAG	Madagascar	1963	0	34.11	0.48	1.27	-1	Autocracy	1.46	0	0.220
MAG	Madagascar	1966	0	33.23	0.47	1.29	-1	Autocracy	1.46	0	0.220
CAO	Cameroon	1977	0	48.23	0.54	1.25	-8	Autocracy	1.41	1	0.219
GUI	Guinea	1961	0	20.05	0.50	0.73	-9	Autocracy	1.61	0	0.217
JPN	Japan	1958	0	23.06	10.82	23.26	10	Democracy	0.28	0	0.214
CAO	Cameroon	1963	0	49.18	0.60	1.27	-6	Autocracy	1.31	0	0.214
BHU	Bhutan	1995	0	80.51	0.26	0.08	-8	Autocracy	2.72	2	0.213
PRK	Korea, North	1969	0	<55	4.61	2.67	-9	Autocracy	0.63	1	0.212
NIR	Niger	1980	0	50.36	0.13	0.82	-7	Autocracy	2.17	1	0.211
MAW	Malawi	1969	0	58.96	1.90	0.86	-9	Autocracy	1.97	0	0.210
MEX	Mexico	1956	0	28.77	0.73	8.22	-6	Autocracy	0.78	0	0.210
YUG	Yugoslavia	1961	0	<55	3.41	1.94	-7	Autocracy	0.71	0	0.209
COL	Colombia	1977	0	29.88	0.82	4.19	8	Democracy	0.82	0	0.208
GNB	Guinea-Bissau	1976	0	44.27	0.74	0.10	-7	Autocracy	2.15	0	0.208
IVO	Cote d'Ivoire	1994	0	59.95	0.80	1.52	-7	Autocracy	2.12	1	0.207

**Table A-9**  
**Global Model Classification Results (continued)**

Country code	Country name	Year of problem or control	Problem indicator	Independent variables, measured two years prior to problem/control						Model score	
				Trade openness <i>(imports + exports as Percent of GDP)</i>	Population density relative to world median	Total population relative to world median	Democracy-autocracy	Democracy category <sup>1</sup>	Infant mortality rate relative to world median		Border states with major civil conflict
MAG	Madagascar	1960	0	<55	0.36	1.23		Autocracy	1.43	0	0.206
MLI	Mali	1964	0	23.78	0.19	1.04	-7	Autocracy	1.78	1	0.205
CAO	Cameroon	1960	0	<55	0.45	1.25		Autocracy	1.33	0	0.205
ECU	Ecuador	1978	0	52.78	0.85	1.16	-5	Autocracy	1.14	0	0.204
ALG	Algeria	1988	0	30.18	0.24	2.99	-9	Autocracy	1.29	1	0.204
GUI	Guinea	1990	0	57.95	0.53	0.69	-7	Autocracy	2.79	0	0.204
TOG	Togo	1998	0	69.22	1.36	0.46	-2	Autocracy	2.29	0	0.199
ITA	Italy	1968	0	29.03	7.89	11.10	10	Democracy	0.33	0	0.199
GAM	Gambia, The	1989	0	115.76	1.97	0.10	8	Democracy	2.75	0	0.199
BEN	Benin	1997	0	62.87	0.88	0.61	9	Democracy	2.24	1	0.198
POR	Portugal	1970	0	49.79	4.16	1.84	-9	Autocracy	0.60	1	0.192
BOL	Bolivia	1973	0	45.02	0.15	0.80	-7	Autocracy	1.78	0	0.191
IVO	Cote d'Ivoire	1988	0	69.68	0.81	1.37	-9	Autocracy	1.86	0	0.188
TOG	Togo	1995	0	57.34	1.34	0.45	-2	Autocracy	2.11	0	0.188
MAG	Madagascar	1997	0	54.77	0.41	1.48	9	Democracy	2.05	0	0.187
ZAM	Zambia	1978	0	81.72	0.22	0.82	-9	Autocracy	1.30	2	0.185
PRK	Korea, North	1983	0	<55	4.21	2.72	-9	Autocracy	0.51	1	0.184
PRK	Korea, North	1991	0	<55	3.84	2.48	-9	Autocracy	0.53	1	0.184
HON	Honduras	1963	0	44.24	0.92	0.47	-1	Autocracy	1.16	0	0.183
GUI	Guinea	1980	0	59.32	0.55	0.68	-9	Autocracy	2.31	0	0.181
JPN	Japan	1963	0	20.12	12.99	22.20	10	Democracy	0.21	0	0.180
ALB	Albania	1964	0	<55	3.16	0.39	-9	Autocracy	0.84	0	0.180
YUG	Yugoslavia	1968	0	40.93	2.83	1.83	-7	Autocracy	0.60	0	0.180
YUG	Yugoslavia	1971	0	39.52	2.83	1.83	-7	Autocracy	0.60	0	0.180
RUM	Romania	1973	0	27.59	3.40	3.79	-7	Autocracy	0.46	0	0.175
NIR	Niger	1966	0	23.37	0.13	0.80	-7	Autocracy	1.59	0	0.173
NIR	Niger	1963	0	17.83	0.13	0.78	-7	Autocracy	1.59	0	0.172

**Table A-9**  
**Global Model Classification Results (continued)**

Country code	Country name	Year of problem or control	Problem indicator	Independent variables, measured two years prior to problem/control						Model score	
				Trade openness <i>(imports + exports as Percent of GDP)</i>	Population density relative to world median	Total population relative to world median	Democracy-autocracy	Democracy category <sup>1</sup>	Infant mortality rate relative to world median		Border states with major civil conflict
TOG	Togo	1991	0	88.51	1.45	0.42	-7	Autocracy	1.84	0	0.172
CHA	Chad	1963	0	46.13	0.13	0.73		Autocracy	1.62	1	0.171
SIE	Sierra Leone	1961	0	>55	1.32	0.54		Autocracy	1.72	0	0.168
MAA	Mauritania	1996	0	91.41	0.04	0.25	-6	Autocracy	2.34	2	0.166
SAU	Saudi Arabia	1974	0	94.41	0.11	1.13	-10	Autocracy	1.24	2	0.165
ZAM	Zambia	1964	0	95.18	0.23	0.76		Autocracy	1.11	2	0.165
LAO	Laos	1957	0	<55	0.36	0.50	0	Autocracy	1.23	1	0.163
CEN	Central African Republic	1972	0	73.50	0.12	0.35	-7	Autocracy	1.55	2	0.163
GAM	Gambia, The	1976	0	85.06	1.85	0.09	8	Democracy	2.11	0	0.162
MAL	Malaysia	1969	0	73.45	1.31	2.08	10	Democracy	0.49	2	0.162
NIC	Nicaragua	1963	0	47.92	0.66	0.36	-8	Autocracy	1.12	0	0.162
SOM	Somalia	1980	0	81.95	0.31	0.98	-7	Autocracy	2.05	1	0.160
JOR	Jordan	1995	0	134.51	0.83	0.45	-3	Autocracy	0.84	2	0.160
SPN	Spain	1966	0	21.49	2.97	6.97	-7	Autocracy	0.36	0	0.158
BEN	Benin	1984	0	72.30	0.92	0.55	-7	Autocracy	1.70	0	0.157
BEN	Benin	1980	0	64.07	0.92	0.52	-7	Autocracy	1.68	0	0.154
JOR	Jordan	1992	0	154.65	0.80	0.38	-4	Autocracy	0.84	2	0.154
YUG	Yugoslavia	1978	0	41.03	2.31	1.54	-7	Autocracy	0.53	1	0.154
IVO	Cote d'Ivoire	1972	0	64.88	0.68	1.05	-9	Autocracy	1.52	0	0.153
GHA	Ghana	1963	0	62.59	1.61	1.66	-8	Autocracy	1.08	0	0.153
LBR	Liberia	1975	0	115.87	0.57	0.27	-6	Autocracy	2.14	0	0.149
CON	Congo-Brazzaville	1984	0	123.77	0.14	0.26	-8	Autocracy	1.38	2	0.149
GFR	Germany, West	1968	0	36.41	7.34	8.45	10	Democracy	0.23	0	0.148
TAZ	Tanzania	1963	0	60.15	0.61	2.45		Autocracy	1.22	0	0.148
ALG	Algeria	1975	0	56.94	0.23	2.65	-9	Autocracy	1.55	0	0.147
SEN	Senegal	1972	0	59.39	0.85	0.79	-7	Autocracy	1.44	0	0.146

**Table A-9**  
**Global Model Classification Results (continued)**

Country code	Country name	Year of problem or control	Problem indicator	Independent variables, measured two years prior to problem/control						Model score	
				Trade openness <i>(imports + exports as Percent of GDP)</i>	Population density relative to world median	Total population relative to world median	Democracy-autocracy	Democracy category <sup>1</sup>	Infant mortality rate relative to world median		Border states with major civil conflict
CEN	Central African Republic	1961	0	>55	0.09	0.37		Autocracy	1.41	2	0.146
FRN	France	1956	0	26.50	3.59	11.25	10	Democracy	0.25	0	0.146
SOM	Somalia	1976	0	57.45	0.29	0.91	-7	Autocracy	1.82	1	0.145
JPN	Japan	1971	0	19.48	11.12	20.28	10	Democracy	0.16	0	0.142
LES	Lesotho	1978	0	152.65	1.33	0.20	-7	Autocracy	1.66	1	0.141
KEN	Kenya	1970	0	58.70	0.79	2.17	0	Autocracy	1.08	1	0.139
LES	Lesotho	1984	0	152.53	1.32	0.21	-7	Autocracy	1.59	0	0.138
GAM	Gambia, The	1965	0	77.63	1.85	0.08		Autocracy	1.77	0	0.136
IVO	Cote d'Ivoire	1963	0	63.40	0.63	0.91	-9	Autocracy	1.34	0	0.135
TOG	Togo	1962	0	62.68	1.06	0.36		Autocracy	1.45	0	0.135
VEN	Venezuela	1972	0	37.79	0.48	2.04	9	Democracy	0.57	0	0.133
COM	Comoros	1975	0	56.90	3.62	0.05		Autocracy	1.58	0	0.132
KEN	Kenya	1963	0	63.85	0.78	2.01		Autocracy	1.01	1	0.131
IRQ	Iraq	1958	0	69.54	0.59	1.53	-4	Autocracy	1.14	0	0.130
AUS	Austria	1956	0	42.12	3.77	1.80	10	Democracy	0.32	0	0.129
ARG	Argentina	1998	0	18.66	0.22	3.82	8	Democracy	0.58	0	0.129
ITA	Italy	1982	0	46.65	5.53	8.68	10	Democracy	0.20	0	0.129
JPN	Japan	1974	0	18.86	10.58	19.30	10	Democracy	0.14	0	0.127
TUN	Tunisia	1994	0	86.00	1.08	1.01	-5	Autocracy	1.00	1	0.124
SWA	Swaziland	1996	0	170.99	0.92	0.10	-9	Autocracy	1.75	1	0.121
HON	Honduras	1968	0	58.70	0.93	0.50	-1	Autocracy	1.19	1	0.121
HON	Honduras	1971	0	58.85	0.93	0.50	-1	Autocracy	1.19	1	0.121
LIB	Libya	1971	0	88.88	0.04	0.37	-7	Autocracy	1.30	2	0.121
COS	Costa Rica	1956	0	52.46	0.91	0.27	10	Democracy	0.68	0	0.121
GRC	Greece	1978	0	35.67	2.35	1.50	8	Democracy	0.35	1	0.120
LIB	Libya	1967	0	86.15	0.04	0.35	-7	Autocracy	1.30	2	0.118

**Table A-9**  
**Global Model Classification Results (continued)**

Country code	Country name	Year of problem or control	Problem indicator	Independent variables, measured two years prior to problem/control							Model score
				Trade openness <i>(imports + exports as Percent of GDP)</i>	Population density relative to world median	Total population relative to world median	Democracy-autocracy	Democracy category <sup>1</sup>	Infant mortality rate relative to world median	Border states with major civil conflict	
MAS	Mauritius	1972	0	85.14	16.10	0.16	9	Democracy	0.65	0	0.118
DJI	Djibouti	1988	0	110.05	0.45	0.06	-8	Autocracy	2.35	1	0.118
LBR	Liberia	1966	0	92.84	0.56	0.26	-6	Autocracy	1.54	0	0.118
LBR	Liberia	1963	0	73.96	0.57	0.25	-6	Autocracy	1.54	0	0.118
ITA	Italy	1989	0	38.37	4.70	7.36	10	Democracy	0.19	0	0.117
MAS	Mauritius	1976	0	106.80	14.99	0.15	9	Democracy	0.65	0	0.116
LIB	Libya	1963	0	>55	0.04	0.33	-7	Autocracy	1.28	2	0.115
MON	Mongolia	1997	0	105.98	0.03	0.27	8	Democracy	1.38	2	0.115
JPN	Japan	1978	0	26.31	9.88	18.45	10	Democracy	0.12	0	0.114
PNG	Papua New Guinea	1997	0	102.77	0.17	0.48	10	Democracy	1.64	0	0.114
MAA	Mauritania	1963	0	49.64	0.05	0.24	-4	Autocracy	1.45	0	0.111
AUS	Austria	1967	0	49.61	3.99	1.57	10	Democracy	0.26	0	0.111
SWA	Swaziland	1976	0	155.46	0.95	0.08	-10	Autocracy	1.56	0	0.109
NIC	Nicaragua	1970	0	58.52	0.67	0.39	-8	Autocracy	1.13	0	0.105
SWA	Swaziland	1968	0	126.35	0.98	0.08		Autocracy	1.47	1	0.104
NAM	Namibia	1991	0	113.13	0.04	0.16		Autocracy	1.32	2	0.103
LBR	Liberia	1956	0	>55	0.36	0.24	-6	Autocracy	1.44	0	0.102
PNG	Papua New Guinea	1991	0	93.40	0.19	0.46	10	Democracy	1.35	1	0.101
BUL	Bulgaria	1991	0	94.58	1.85	1.10	-7	Autocracy	0.28	2	0.100
JPN	Japan	1983	0	28.65	8.84	17.88	10	Democracy	0.10	0	0.100
SAU	Saudi Arabia	1965	0	79.49	0.10	1.00	-10	Autocracy	1.36	1	0.098
MAL	Malaysia	1965	0	84.70	1.32	1.99	10	Democracy	0.53	1	0.097
MAL	Malaysia	1958	0	83.95	0.95	1.81		Autocracy	0.63	1	0.097
CON	Congo-Brazzaville	1991	0	83.81	0.15	0.27	-8	Autocracy	1.64	1	0.097
BAH	Bahrain	1971	0	>55	12.00	0.04		Autocracy	0.78	0	0.096
SAU	Saudi Arabia	1957	0	>55	0.09	0.93	-10	Autocracy	1.39	0	0.096
ROK	Korea, South	1995	0	58.07	8.42	5.11	9	Democracy	0.25	0	0.095



**Table A-9**  
**Global Model Classification Results (continued)**

Country code	Country name	Year of problem or control	Problem indicator	Independent variables, measured two years prior to problem/control							Model score
				Trade openness <i>(imports + exports as Percent of GDP)</i>	Population density relative to world median	Total population relative to world median	Democracy-autocracy	Democracy category <sup>1</sup>	Infant mortality rate relative to world median	Border states with major civil conflict	
SIN	Singapore	1967	0	269.04	126.62	0.37	-2	Autocracy	0.24	0	0.094
JAM	Jamaica	1973	0	74.76	6.70	0.35	10	Democracy	0.49	0	0.094
URU	Uruguay	1963	0	28.98	0.76	0.60	8	Democracy	0.41	0	0.093
GAB	Gabon	1998	0	96.20	0.08	0.12	-3	Autocracy	2.26	0	0.093
DJI	Djibouti	1980	0	120.93	0.33	0.04	-8	Autocracy	1.97	1	0.093
SAU	Saudi Arabia	1962	0	72.16	0.08	0.97	-10	Autocracy	1.36	0	0.092
CEN	Central African Republic	1975	0	65.10	0.11	0.35	-7	Autocracy	1.55	1	0.092
ISR	Israel	1957	0	43.06	3.77	0.45	10	Democracy	0.27	0	0.091
GAB	Gabon	1994	0	79.87	0.08	0.12	-3	Autocracy	2.19	0	0.091
GRC	Greece	1984	0	38.70	2.11	1.45	8	Democracy	0.24	1	0.091
MAL	Malaysia	1962	0	90.35	0.98	1.93	10	Democracy	0.53	1	0.091
PNG	Papua New Guinea	1983	0	96.98	0.20	0.48	10	Democracy	1.14	1	0.091
JOR	Jordan	1962	0	57.51	0.67	0.20	-9	Autocracy	1.07	0	0.090
MAA	Mauritania	1990	0	113.40	0.04	0.24	-7	Autocracy	2.11	1	0.089
SIN	Singapore	1975	0	256.60	116.14	0.35	-2	Autocracy	0.22	0	0.088
ISR	Israel	1962	0	21.00	3.92	0.50	10	Democracy	0.25	0	0.087
PAR	Paraguay	1970	0	29.13	0.23	0.45	-8	Autocracy	0.58	0	0.087
SAU	Saudi Arabia	1980	0	102.07	0.12	1.33	-10	Autocracy	1.03	1	0.087
PNG	Papua New Guinea	1980	0	87.36	0.20	0.47	10	Democracy	1.06	1	0.086
GAB	Gabon	1991	0	87.05	0.08	0.11	-9	Autocracy	1.98	0	0.085
MAS	Mauritius	1990	0	134.41	12.19	0.13	10	Democracy	0.45	0	0.084
SAU	Saudi Arabia	1983	0	103.42	0.13	1.51	-10	Autocracy	0.92	1	0.083
PNG	Papua New Guinea	1977	0	86.14	0.20	0.46		Autocracy	1.06	1	0.082
SPN	Spain	1996	0	44.47	1.43	4.46	10	Democracy	0.17	0	0.080
LIB	Libya	1980	0	91.02	0.05	0.44	-7	Autocracy	1.48	1	0.078
GAB	Gabon	1983	0	104.06	0.08	0.11	-9	Autocracy	1.78	0	0.077

**Table A-9**  
**Global Model Classification Results (continued)**

Country code	Country name	Year of problem or control	Problem indicator	Independent variables, measured two years prior to problem/control							Model score
				Trade openness <i>(imports + exports as Percent of GDP)</i>	Population density relative to world median	Total population relative to world median	Democracy-autocracy	Democracy category <sup>1</sup>	Infant mortality rate relative to world median	Border states with major civil conflict	
GRC	Greece	1998	0	43.36	1.42	1.14	10	Democracy	0.22	1	0.075
BAH	Bahrain	1995	0	199.98	14.69	0.06	-9	Autocracy	0.47	0	0.074
SAU	Saudi Arabia	1990	0	76.27	0.16	1.82	-10	Autocracy	0.71	1	0.074
MAA	Mauritania	1967	0	67.15	0.05	0.24	-7	Autocracy	1.57	0	0.073
MAA	Mauritania	1970	0	67.15	0.05	0.24	-7	Autocracy	1.57	0	0.073
JAM	Jamaica	1978	0	66.94	6.21	0.33	10	Democracy	0.36	0	0.072
JAM	Jamaica	1981	0	100.44	5.90	0.33	10	Democracy	0.36	0	0.071
CON	Congo-Brazzaville	1972	0	92.50	0.15	0.24	-7	Autocracy	1.12	0	0.071
GAB	Gabon	1964	0	62.48	0.10	0.11	-7	Autocracy	1.39	0	0.068
LIB	Libya	1958	0	>55	0.05	0.29	-7	Autocracy	1.31	1	0.065
NTH	Netherlands	1967	0	83.93	16.72	2.66	10	Democracy	0.14	0	0.062
BEL	Belgium	1981	0	122.14	8.34	1.53	10	Democracy	0.19	0	0.062
BOT	Botswana	1992	0	107.51	0.05	0.15	8	Democracy	1.28	1	0.062
POR	Portugal	1990	0	73.89	2.59	1.26	10	Democracy	0.27	1	0.061
SIN	Singapore	1990	0	397.67	101.31	0.33	-2	Autocracy	0.14	0	0.061
BAH	Bahrain	1986	0	190.33	15.59	0.06	-10	Autocracy	0.35	0	0.060
PAN	Panama	1991	0	149.12	0.73	0.29	-8	Autocracy	0.55	1	0.060
OMA	Oman	1986	0	87.86	0.17	0.19	-10	Autocracy	0.90	0	0.059
COS	Costa Rica	1978	0	63.82	1.31	0.33	10	Democracy	0.42	0	0.059
SIN	Singapore	1986	0	342.03	105.80	0.34	-2	Autocracy	0.13	0	0.059
KUW	Kuwait	1986	0	104.75	2.45	0.23	-8	Autocracy	0.40	1	0.058
FIN	Finland	1956	0	39.36	0.59	1.10	10	Democracy	0.20	0	0.057
FIN	Finland	1961	0	41.49	0.59	1.10	10	Democracy	0.20	0	0.057
KUW	Kuwait	1967	0	90.79	1.20	0.10	-9	Autocracy	0.55	1	0.055
BLR	Belarus	1991	0	>55	1.00	1.26		Autocracy	0.31	0	0.054
SIN	Singapore	1995	0	348.94	88.92	0.33	-2	Autocracy	0.13	0	0.054
NTH	Netherlands	1990	0	101.08	10.35	1.87	10	Democracy	0.14	0	0.053

**Table A-9**  
**Global Model Classification Results (continued)**

Country code	Country name	Year of problem or control	Problem indicator	Independent variables, measured two years prior to problem/control							Model score
				Trade openness <i>(imports + exports as Percent of GDP)</i>	Population density relative to world median	Total population relative to world median	Democracy-autocracy	Democracy category <sup>1</sup>	Infant mortality rate relative to world median	Border states with major civil conflict	
FJI	Fiji	1977	0	86.63	1.07	0.10	9	Democracy	0.51	0	0.053
KUW	Kuwait	1995	0	92.06	1.55	0.17	-7	Autocracy	0.42	1	0.052
FIN	Finland	1966	0	42.29	0.70	1.00	10	Democracy	0.16	0	0.051
LAT	Latvia	1997	0	96.15	0.72	0.28	8	Democracy	0.41	1	0.050
SWD	Sweden	1964	0	42.82	0.93	1.73	10	Democracy	0.13	0	0.050
BOT	Botswana	1976	0	88.65	0.04	0.12	8	Democracy	1.04	1	0.049
LAT	Latvia	1994	0	153.01	0.84	0.31	8	Democracy	0.38	0	0.049
COS	Costa Rica	1992	0	75.96	1.33	0.37	10	Democracy	0.32	1	0.049
SWZ	Switzerland	1972	0	66.53	6.25	1.19	10	Democracy	0.16	1	0.049
SWD	Sweden	1956	0	44.99	0.73	1.88	10	Democracy	0.13	0	0.048
IRE	Ireland	1966	0	71.60	1.95	0.63	10	Democracy	0.24	0	0.047
SWD	Sweden	1968	0	42.88	0.84	1.65	10	Democracy	0.12	0	0.047
DEN	Denmark	1968	0	58.38	5.00	1.01	10	Democracy	0.16	0	0.046
UAE	United Arab Emirates	1991	0	103.75	0.47	0.21	-8	Autocracy	0.46	0	0.045
NEW	New Zealand	1975	0	49.57	0.40	0.52	10	Democracy	0.19	0	0.045
NEW	New Zealand	1963	0	46.95	0.47	0.57	10	Democracy	0.18	0	0.045
SWD	Sweden	1973	0	46.98	0.75	1.50	10	Democracy	0.12	0	0.044
CAN	Canada	1977	0	47.22	0.09	3.89	10	Democracy	0.17	0	0.043
LIT	Lithuania	1991	0	111.58	1.15	0.46		Autocracy	0.28	0	0.043
FIN	Finland	1974	0	50.73	0.57	0.84	10	Democracy	0.14	0	0.041
DEN	Denmark	1973	0	57.04	4.48	0.92	10	Democracy	0.14	0	0.040
UAE	United Arab Emirates	1979	0	100.39	0.27	0.11	-8	Autocracy	0.52	0	0.040
AUL	Australia	1967	0	31.04	0.07	2.46	10	Democracy	0.18	0	0.040
AUL	Australia	1970	0	28.35	0.07	2.42	10	Democracy	0.18	0	0.039
EST	Estonia	1992	0	>55	0.70	0.19		Autocracy	0.35	0	0.039

**Table A-9**  
**Global Model Classification Results (continued)**

Country code	Country name	Year of problem or control	Problem indicator	Independent variables, measured two years prior to problem/control							Model score
				Trade openness <i>(imports + exports as Percent of GDP)</i>	Population density relative to world median	Total population relative to world median	Democracy-autocracy	Democracy category <sup>1</sup>	Infant mortality rate relative to world median	Border states with major civil conflict	
AUS	Austria	1994	0	76.00	1.89	0.94	10	Democracy	0.17	0	0.038
UAE	United Arab Emirates	1975	0	114.91	0.15	0.06	-8	Autocracy	0.67	1	0.038
IRE	Ireland	1980	0	105.66	1.50	0.52	10	Democracy	0.20	1	0.038
DEN	Denmark	1989	0	61.05	2.95	0.67	10	Democracy	0.15	0	0.037
AUL	Australia	1979	0	30.86	0.06	2.27	10	Democracy	0.17	0	0.037
DEN	Denmark	1977	0	61.10	4.06	0.85	10	Democracy	0.13	0	0.036
CYP	Cyprus	1982	0	108.33	1.91	0.09	10	Democracy	0.26	1	0.035
AUL	Australia	1958	0	32.52	0.05	2.38	10	Democracy	0.16	0	0.034
AUL	Australia	1961	0	31.01	0.05	2.38	10	Democracy	0.16	0	0.034
AUL	Australia	1986	0	34.64	0.05	2.18	10	Democracy	0.16	0	0.034
SWZ	Switzerland	1994	0	67.87	3.43	0.82	10	Democracy	0.12	0	0.033
AUL	Australia	1997	0	41.66	0.04	2.01	10	Democracy	0.16	0	0.032
FIN	Finland	1990	0	50.33	0.39	0.63	10	Democracy	0.12	0	0.032
CYP	Cyprus	1992	0	109.04	1.65	0.08	10	Democracy	0.22	1	0.029
IRE	Ireland	1991	0	119.12	1.17	0.43	10	Democracy	0.16	1	0.029
NEW	New Zealand	1979	0	56.80	0.37	0.50	10	Democracy	0.19	0	0.027
NEW	New Zealand	1958	0	55.53	0.36	0.55	10	Democracy	0.18	0	0.026
NEW	New Zealand	1983	0	62.45	0.33	0.48	10	Democracy	0.19	0	0.026
NOR	Norway	1967	0	71.82	0.55	0.80	10	Democracy	0.14	0	0.025
SWD	Sweden	1980	0	54.79	0.63	1.31	10	Democracy	0.11	0	0.023
NOR	Norway	1989	0	67.70	0.33	0.54	10	Democracy	0.15	0	0.023
NEW	New Zealand	1998	0	58.70	0.24	0.39	10	Democracy	0.18	0	0.022
NOR	Norway	1980	0	72.26	0.41	0.64	10	Democracy	0.13	0	0.021
FIN	Finland	1984	0	61.40	0.44	0.72	10	Democracy	0.10	0	0.018

**Non-problems classified incorrectly**

**Table A-9**  
**Global Model Classification Results (continued)**

Country code	Country name	Year of problem or control	Problem indicator	Independent variables, measured two years prior to problem/control						Model score	
				Trade openness <i>(imports + exports as Percent of GDP)</i>	Population density relative to world median	Total population relative to world median	Democracy-autocracy	Democracy category <sup>1</sup>	Infant mortality rate relative to world median		Border states with major civil conflict
NEP	Nepal	1961	0		2.73	2.20	2	Partial	1.54	2	0.872
ZAM	Zambia	1994	0	86.41	0.22	0.98	6	Partial	2.57	3	0.751
PHI	Philippines	1967	0	34.41	4.88	6.92	5	Partial	0.72	0	0.731
MZM	Mozambique	1997	0	87.99	0.39	1.94	6	Partial	2.94	1	0.695
PHI	Philippines	1960	0	23.12	3.64	6.19	5	Partial	0.64	0	0.694
GHA	Ghana	1995	0	59.71	1.34	1.88	1	Partial	1.89	0	0.674
SOM	Somalia	1967	0	37.79	0.31	0.92	7	Partial	1.62	0	0.661
SAF	South Africa	1972	0	47.59	0.70	4.14	4	Partial	0.89	0	0.659
PER	Peru	1966	0	38.33	0.41	2.45	5	Partial	1.16	1	0.657
COL	Colombia	1968	0	26.67	0.83	4.10	7	Partial	0.82	1	0.651
SAF	South Africa	1963	0	53.44	0.75	4.16	4	Partial	0.74	0	0.627
SOM	Somalia	1962	0	29.86	0.24	0.90	7	Partial	1.45	0	0.627
SIE	Sierra Leone	1965	0	71.99	1.59	0.52	6	Partial	1.83	0	0.622
MAL	Malaysia	1975	0	74.08	1.28	2.06	5	Partial	0.50	2	0.578
NEP	Nepal	1995	0	45.73	2.68	2.36	8	Democracy	2.23	2	0.564
GRC	Greece	1961	0	23.08	2.73	2.06	4	Partial	0.43	0	0.560
DOM	Dominican	1994	0	64.04	3.02	0.88	6	Partial	0.98	0	0.558
MAL	Malaysia	1983	0	110.86	1.21	2.14	5	Partial	0.44	2	0.555
CHN	China	1986	0	17.23	2.94	145.62	-7	Autocracy	0.83	5	0.552
NEP	Nepal	1988	0	31.80	2.96	2.25	-2	Autocracy	2.10	2	0.542
SRI	Sri Lanka	1958	0	99.02	6.05	2.26	7	Partial	0.59	0	0.539
SRI	Sri Lanka	1961	0	98.71	6.05	2.26	7	Partial	0.59	0	0.539
CHN	China	1981	0	11.59	3.16	150.36	-7	Autocracy	0.72	4	0.529
NEP	Nepal	1967	0	21.69	3.29	2.23	-9	Autocracy	1.75	2	0.512
EGY	Egypt	1974	0	32.48	1.28	6.17	-7	Autocracy	1.76	2	0.510
FRN	France	1968	0	26.48	3.95	10.39	5	Partial	0.20	0	0.507
NIC	Nicaragua	1996	0	77.02	0.64	0.48	6	Partial	1.22	0	0.490

**Table A-9**  
**Global Model Classification Results (continued)**

Country code	Country name	Year of problem or control	Problem indicator	Independent variables, measured two years prior to problem/control							Model score
				Trade openness <i>(imports + exports as Percent of GDP)</i>	Population density relative to world median	Total population relative to world median	Democracy-autocracy	Democracy category <sup>1</sup>	Infant mortality rate relative to world median	Border states with major civil conflict	
SAF	South Africa	1956	0	61.18	0.59	3.98	4	Partial	0.70	0	0.476
NEP	Nepal	1958	0	<55	2.73	2.20	-7	Autocracy	1.54	2	0.476
GUI	Guinea	1996	0	44.22	0.48	0.73	-4	Autocracy	3.12	3	0.470
VIE	Vietnam	1988	0	25.15	4.62	8.00	-7	Autocracy	0.90	2	0.458
MAW	Malawi	1998	0	48.74	1.86	1.09	8	Democracy	3.78	0	0.453
MYA	Burma	1958	0	47.92	1.32	5.07	8	Democracy	1.28	2	0.451
AFG	Afghanistan	1965	0	26.04	0.79	2.36	-10	Autocracy	1.80	2	0.443
TAZ	Tanzania	1990	0	37.07	0.64	3.03	-7	Autocracy	1.75	3	0.438
NIG	Nigeria	1996	0	43.38	2.16	12.30	-7	Autocracy	1.96	1	0.431
RWA	Rwanda	1988	0	32.74	6.32	0.83	-7	Autocracy	2.26	1	0.392
MAW	Malawi	1988	0	48.08	1.97	0.99	-9	Autocracy	2.96	1	0.391
INS	Indonesia	1971	0	23.45	2.57	22.56	-7	Autocracy	1.24	0	0.379
NIR	Niger	1989	0	44.03	0.13	0.91	-7	Autocracy	2.59	2	0.377
TAZ	Tanzania	1967	0	54.13	0.61	2.54	-7	Autocracy	1.35	2	0.376
CAM	Cambodia	1965	0	38.04	1.60	1.30	-9	Autocracy	1.19	2	0.373
NEP	Nepal	1978	0	24.95	3.03	2.15	-9	Autocracy	1.96	1	0.370
LAO	Laos	1991	0	44.13	0.39	0.49	-7	Autocracy	2.12	2	0.366
MAW	Malawi	1984	0	51.34	1.93	0.97	-9	Autocracy	2.59	1	0.364
TUR	Turkey	1964	0	11.59	1.91	6.63	10	Democracy	1.50	1	0.358
CAM	Cambodia	1962	0	35.87	1.18	1.29	-9	Autocracy	1.19	2	0.357
CAO	Cameroon	1990	0	31.99	0.55	1.37	-8	Autocracy	1.43	2	0.356
LAO	Laos	1986	0	9.11	0.40	0.49	-7	Autocracy	1.94	2	0.351
CAM	Cambodia	1994	0	34.31	1.03	1.10	0	Autocracy	2.69	0	0.345
VIE	Vietnam	1998	0	96.68	4.04	8.18	-7	Autocracy	0.98	2	0.345
CAO	Cameroon	1969	0	43.20	0.56	1.26	-7	Autocracy	1.36	2	0.343
UGA	Uganda	1962	0	49.29	1.10	1.55		Autocracy	1.07	4	0.342
TAZ	Tanzania	1996	0	63.89	0.59	3.28	-6	Autocracy	2.01	3	0.341

**Table A-9**  
**Global Model Classification Results (continued)**

Country code	Country name	Year of problem or control	Problem indicator	Independent variables, measured two years prior to problem/control							Model score
				Trade openness <i>(imports + exports as Percent of GDP)</i>	Population density relative to world median	Total population relative to world median	Democracy-autocracy	Democracy category <sup>1</sup>	Infant mortality rate relative to world median	Border states with major civil conflict	
MAL	Malaysia	1990	0	124.86	1.23	2.15	5	Partial	0.33	1	0.339
VIE	Vietnam	1991	0	57.90	4.59	8.00	-7	Autocracy	0.90	2	0.335
CAM	Cambodia	1991	0	18.76	1.10	1.04	-7	Autocracy	2.49	1	0.333
BUI	Burundi	1984	0	37.12	4.72	0.65	-7	Autocracy	1.86	1	0.331
MON	Mongolia	1992	0	63.82	0.03	0.27	2	Partial	1.38	1	0.331
SUD	Sudan	1977	0	35.70	0.23	2.68	-7	Autocracy	1.34	3	0.329
SYR	Syria	1991	0	53.29	1.47	1.45	-9	Autocracy	0.93	4	0.329
RWA	Rwanda	1972	0	26.74	5.96	0.71	-5	Autocracy	1.67	0	0.327
EGY	Egypt	1965	0	43.88	1.35	6.19	-7	Autocracy	1.49	1	0.326
HAI	Haiti	1966	0	30.13	6.91	0.90	-9	Autocracy	1.45	0	0.319
NIR	Niger	1972	0	28.87	0.13	0.79	-7	Autocracy	1.96	2	0.318
MAL	Malaysia	1998	0	183.27	1.09	2.23	4	Partial	0.29	1	0.316
EGY	Egypt	1958	0	41.09	1.14	6.40	-7	Autocracy	1.41	1	0.309
SLO	Slovakia	1998	0	125.98	1.94	0.58	7	Partial	0.33	0	0.308
BEN	Benin	1994	0	57.32	0.90	0.60	9	Democracy	2.09	2	0.308
BFO	Burkina Faso	1994	0	34.32	0.69	1.13	-5	Autocracy	2.40	1	0.307
MAW	Malawi	1994	0	63.56	1.89	1.07	-9	Autocracy	3.45	1	0.303
ETH	Ethiopia	1956	0	16.44	0.82	5.62	-9	Autocracy	1.49	0	0.298
SAL	El Salvador	1974	0	57.22	6.79	0.69	-1	Autocracy	1.16	2	0.297
NIG	Nigeria	1991	0	57.85	2.37	11.55	-5	Autocracy	1.77	0	0.295
MOR	Morocco	1997	0	61.34	1.05	2.95	-4	Autocracy	1.35	2	0.295
BFO	Burkina Faso	1991	0	35.19	0.74	1.08	-7	Autocracy	2.09	0	0.286
BFO	Burkina Faso	1988	0	41.83	0.74	1.07	-7	Autocracy	2.09	0	0.286
IRN	Iran	1969	0	37.02	0.69	5.39	-10	Autocracy	1.45	1	0.284
MOR	Morocco	1971	0	37.68	1.36	2.93	-9	Autocracy	1.38	1	0.283
CEN	Central African Republic	1988	0	48.29	0.11	0.35	-7	Autocracy	1.98	2	0.280

**Table A-9**  
**Global Model Classification Results (continued)**

Country code	Country name	Year of problem or control	Problem indicator	Independent variables, measured two years prior to problem/control							Model score
				Trade openness <i>(imports + exports as Percent of GDP)</i>	Population density relative to world median	Total population relative to world median	Democracy-autocracy	Democracy category <sup>1</sup>	Infant mortality rate relative to world median	Border states with major civil conflict	
AFG	Afghanistan	1958	0	<55	0.68	2.52	-10	Autocracy	1.69	1	0.280
AFG	Afghanistan	1961	0	<55	0.68	2.52	-10	Autocracy	1.69	1	0.280
MAG	Madagascar	1992	0	43.64	0.45	1.40	-6	Autocracy	2.16	0	0.279
MAW	Malawi	1991	0	55.70	2.01	1.02	-9	Autocracy	2.96	1	0.278
MAG	Madagascar	1989	0	37.21	0.45	1.38	-6	Autocracy	2.15	0	0.278
GNB	Guinea-Bissau	1992	0	53.22	0.77	0.12	-6	Autocracy	3.29	0	0.276
FJI	Fiji	1997	0	115.12	0.77	0.09	4	Partial	0.53	0	0.271
MAG	Madagascar	1983	0	34.32	0.44	1.36	-6	Autocracy	2.06	0	0.269
GUI	Guinea	1972	0	28.80	0.62	0.73	-9	Autocracy	2.08	0	0.263
BRA	Brazil	1973	0	14.55	0.44	18.17	-9	Autocracy	1.06	0	0.262
ZAM	Zambia	1990	0	59.47	0.23	0.93	-9	Autocracy	2.17	2	0.261
CHA	Chad	1960	0	<55	0.09	0.74		Autocracy	1.54	2	0.261
IRN	Iran	1961	0	39.14	0.55	4.93	-10	Autocracy	1.35	1	0.260
MOR	Morocco	1958	0	43.03	1.05	2.62	-5	Autocracy	1.31	0	0.260
KEN	Kenya	1977	0	64.34	0.82	2.30	-7	Autocracy	1.21	2	0.257
DOM	Dominican	1978	0	49.08	3.53	0.85	-3	Autocracy	1.16	0	0.251
<b>Missing data</b>											
BHU	Bhutan	1956	0		0.77	0.21	-8	Autocracy	1.61	1	
CUB	Cuba	1956	1		2.64	1.66	-9	Autocracy	0.54	0	
HUN	Hungary	1956	1		4.82	2.54	-7	Autocracy	0.44	0	
USS	USSR (Soviet Union)	1956	0			22.38	-7	Autocracy		0	
OMA	Oman	1957	0		0.09	0.13	-6	Autocracy	1.70	0	
TAW	Taiwan	1957	0	20.89		1.01	-8	Autocracy		0	
DRV	Vietnam, North	1958	1		4.41	1.60	-9	Autocracy	1.26	1	
LEB	Lebanon	1958	1		7.05	0.42	2	Partial	0.56	0	



**Table A-9**  
**Global Model Classification Results (continued)**

Country code	Country name	Year of problem or control	Problem indicator	Independent variables, measured two years prior to problem/control						Model score
				Trade openness <i>(imports + exports as Percent of GDP)</i>	Population density relative to world median	Total population relative to world median	Democracy-autocracy	Democracy category <sup>1</sup>	Infant mortality rate relative to world median	
MON	Mongolia	1958	0		0.05	0.22	-7	Autocracy	1.04	1
RVN	Vietnam, South	1958	1	<55		1.38	-3	Autocracy		1
YAR	Yemen, North	1958	0	<55		0.42	-6	Autocracy		0
BHU	Bhutan	1960	0		0.77	0.21	-8	Autocracy	1.61	2
OMA	Oman	1960	0		0.09	0.13	-10	Autocracy	1.70	0
MON	Mongolia	1961	0		0.05	0.22	-7	Autocracy	1.04	1
TAW	Taiwan	1961	0	33.16		1.09	-8	Autocracy		0
USS	USSR (Soviet Union)	1962	0	5.18		28.92	-7	Autocracy		1
YAR	Yemen, North	1962	1	<55		0.54	-6	Autocracy		0
BHU	Bhutan	1963	0		0.40	0.09	-8	Autocracy	1.68	2
LEB	Lebanon	1963	0		10.20	0.47	2	Partial	0.53	0
OMA	Oman	1963	0		0.14	0.13	-10	Autocracy	1.77	0
LEB	Lebanon	1965	1		10.16	0.48	2	Partial	0.53	0
OMA	Oman	1965	1		0.14	0.13	-10	Autocracy	1.77	0
MON	Mongolia	1967	0		0.03	0.24	-7	Autocracy	1.08	1
TAW	Taiwan	1967	0	40.42		1.60	-8	Autocracy		0
USS	USSR (Soviet Union)	1967	0	5.73		29.80	-7	Autocracy		1
CUB	Cuba	1968	0		3.21	1.69	-7	Autocracy	0.50	0
CZE	Czechoslovakia	1968	1	32.29		3.06	-7	Autocracy		0
BHU	Bhutan	1970	0		0.35	0.08	-8	Autocracy	1.88	2
TAW	Taiwan	1971	0	54.47		2.06	-8	Autocracy		0
TRI	Trinidad	1971	0	82.62	7.58	0.19	8	Democracy		0
BHU	Bhutan	1975	0		0.33	0.07	-8	Autocracy	2.09	2
MON	Mongolia	1975	0		0.03	0.24	-7	Autocracy	1.15	1

**Table A-9**  
**Global Model Classification Results (continued)**

Country code	Country name	Year of problem or control	Problem indicator	Independent variables, measured two years prior to problem/control						Model score
				Trade openness <i>(imports + exports as Percent of GDP)</i>	Population density relative to world median	Total population relative to world median	Democracy-autocracy	Democracy category <sup>1</sup>	Infant mortality rate relative to world median	
USS	USSR (Soviet Union)	1975	0	6.86		36.92	-7	Autocracy		1
TAW	Taiwan	1977	0	82.56		2.34	-7	Autocracy		0
BHU	Bhutan	1978	0		0.31	0.07	-8	Autocracy	2.28	1
TRI	Trinidad	1981	0	84.41	6.31	0.17	8	Democracy		0
YPR	Yemen, South	1981	0	<55		0.25	-7	Autocracy		0
CUB	Cuba	1982	0		2.55	1.50	-7	Autocracy	0.27	0
GDR	Germany, East	1984	0	75.26		2.01	-9	Autocracy		0
QAT	Qatar	1986	0	83.93	0.79	0.05	-10	Autocracy		0
USS	USSR (Soviet Union)	1986	1	18.39		34.48	-7	Autocracy		4
YAR	Yemen, North	1986	0	<55		0.92	-6	Autocracy		0
YPR	Yemen, South	1986	1	<55		0.26	-8	Autocracy		0
EQG	Equatorial Guinea	1991	0	105.62	0.29	0.04	-7	Autocracy		0
BOS	Bosnia and	1992	1		1.68	0.54		Autocracy	0.35	0
TRI	Trinidad	1992	0	70.85	5.38	0.15	9	Democracy		0
EQG	Equatorial Guinea	1995	0	97.83	0.26	0.04	-5	Autocracy		0
LIB	Libya	1995	0		0.05	0.56	-7	Autocracy	1.59	5
TAW	Taiwan	1995	0	89.88		2.23	7	Partial		0
ERI	Eritrea	1996	0	107.25	0.63	0.40	-2	Autocracy		2
TRI	Trinidad	1996	0	80.34	4.53	0.15	9	Democracy		0
YGS	Serbia/Montenegro	1998	1			1.13	-7	Autocracy		0

<sup>1</sup>PARTIAL = partial democracy; DEMOCRACY = full democracy

## Appendix B

### Sub-Saharan Africa Model

This appendix provides more detail on the analysis used to derive the Sub-Saharan Africa model. Table B-1 lists the state failures occurring in Sub-Saharan

Africa during the period 1955-98 that defined the dependent variable for this analysis.

**Table B-1**  
**State Failures in Sub-Saharan Africa, 1955-98<sup>1</sup>**

Country	Type of Conflict	Began	Ended	Brief Description
Angola	Complex <sup>2</sup>	1/75	— <sup>3</sup>	Post-independence civil war between Mbundu-dominated central government, Bakongo and Cabindan rebels, and UNITA (Union for the Total Independence of Angola), based on Ovimbundu people of south Angola (ETH, REV). <sup>4</sup> Internationally brokered peace plan leads to multiparty elections but UNITA's Savimbi rejects results and establishes rival government in Huambo (REG from 9/92). Both UNITA rebels and government forces perpetrate destructive campaigns and atrocities against civilians throughout conflict (GEN from 11/75). Lusaka protocol ends conflict for a short time but intense fighting erupts again in late 1998.
Benin	Regime transition	10/63	10/72	Labor and ethnic tensions undermine fragile democracy. In attempt to quell political instability, military intervenes twice before finally abolishing democratic institutions and institutionalizing military rule (10/63-12/65). Regional rivalries force military to transfer power to civilian governments. Ethnically diverse civilian triumvirate falls in second successful coup in three years. Marxist-Leninist state announced the following year (12/69-10/72)
Burkina Faso	Regime transition	11/80	11/80	Leader of former military regime, President Lamizana, elected as head of civilian government. Subsequent economic crisis and labor unrest triggers military coup and suspension of Constitution.
Burundi	Complex	2/63	12/73	Unstable political alliance between Tutsis and Hutus produces democratic stalemate. King increases his authority but is unable to resolve ethnic tensions and is overthrown by the Tutsi-dominated military (REG 2/63-11/66). Attempted coup by Hutu units in 1965 results in massacres of Tutsis in countryside, prompting Army to eliminate Hutu leaders. In 1972, militant Hutus massacre Tutsis and Tutsi regime again responds with massive killings (GEN 10/65-12/73).
	Complex	8/88	—	Attempted democratic reforms prompt violence between historically dominant Tutsis and Hutu challengers (ETH 8/88 ongoing). As result of rural violence against local Tutsi officials, Tutsi-dominated army conducts unpremeditated massacres of Hutus (GEN 8/88). In 1993, Hutu opposition forces win first multiparty presidential and legislative elections, provoking disaffected Tutsi military forces to revolt and assassinate the Hutu president (REG 9/91-6/98). Subsequent armed clashes and massacres occur in three waves: Tutsi soldiers against Hutu civilians, Hutus against Tutsis, and Tutsis against Hutus (GEN 10/93-12/93).
Chad	Complex	10/65	3/96	Recurring civil war among Chad's many communal groups with shifting alliances, but mainly along north-south lines (ETH). Failed attempt at national unification in 1978 leads to collapse of governance, intensified conflict, and international intervention (REG 8/78-6/84).

**Table B-1**  
**State Failures in Sub-Saharan Africa, 1955-98<sup>1</sup> (continued)**

Country	Type of Conflict	Began	Ended	Brief Description
Comoros	Regime transition	9/95	3/96	Foreign-led mercenaries and disaffected Comorian troops overthrow elected government of President Djohar. French troops sent to the island one week later arrest mercenaries, reinstall elected prime minister, and arrest Djohar.
Congo-Brazzaville	Regime transition	8/63	12/63	Fragile democracy weakened by ethnic and labor tensions. Military compels President Youlou to resign. Interim government established prior to popular approval of new constitution that creates one-party Marxist-Leninist state.
	Complex	6/97	10/97	Civil war erupts amid preelection tensions when President Lissouba's army attacks the residence of former dictator Sassou-Nguesso (REV). Transition to democracy ends when Sassou-Nguesso rallies supporters, backed by Angolan Troops, and ousts Lissouba (REG).
Congo-Kinshasa	Complex	7/60	11/65	Independence is followed by intense political and tribal factionalism and the emergence of secessionist movements. Mutiny within ranks of military escalates into full-scale civil war. Rebels expel remnants of Belgian colonial apparatus (REV 7/60-8/65). Katanga and South Kasai secede from newly independent Congo (1960) followed by secession of Orientale and Kivu (1961) and rebellions in Stanleyville and Kwilu (1964) (ETH). To consolidate control, rebels massacre counterrevolutionaries, including educated Congolese, missionaries, and other Europeans (GEN 2/64-1/65). Failed attempt at democracy ends in establishment of military dictatorship under General Mobutu (REG 9/60-11/65).
	Complex	3/77	12/79	Independence movement of Lunda/Yeke (FNLC--Zaire National Liberation Front) invades Shaba (Katanga) Province, their traditional homeland (ETH 3/77-5/78). Episodic rebellions and agitation are countered by killings of political opponents, dissident tribesmen, and prisoners (GEN 3/77-12/79)
	Ethnic war	11/84	11/84	Second FNLC invasion of Shaba from bases in Angola, known as Shaba II Rebellion.
	Complex	9/91	—	In reaction to absolute power wielded by Mobutu's military-backed government, pro-democracy opposition pressures him to appoint new prime minister and government (REG 4/92-5/97). Communal violence erupts in Shaba (Katanga) between Luba-Kasai minority and dominant Lunda; regional governments become more autonomous (ETH 3/92 ongoing). Tutsis residing in eastern Zaire form core of rebel army that, with substantial help from Rwanda, defeats government troops and ousts Mobutu's regime (REV 10/96-ongoing). Disaffection with the policies of the nascent Kabila regime leads to the polarization of ethnic-militias and the widening of the conflict to include armed forces from regional states.
Ethiopia	Complex	7/61	12/94	Eritrean secessionists led by ELF (Eritrean Liberation Front) and EPLF (Eritrean People's Liberation Front), joined by Afars, Oromos, and others in mid-1970s, fight civil wars for independence from successive imperial and Marxist regimes in Addis Ababa. Somalis in Ogaden rebel twice between 1961 and 1980 (ETH 7/61-5/91). In 1974, Emperor Selassie is deposed by leftwing military government and Derg establishes repressive one-party socialist state (REG 9/74-11/74). Army, internal security units, and civilian defense squads massacre political and military elites, workers, students, bureaucrats, and others thought to oppose the revolutionary regime (GEN 7/76-12/79). In 1975 Tigrean Liberation Front joins regional separatists in war to seize control of the central government (REV 7/75-5/91). After Eritrean-Tigrean coalition movement defeats military-backed Derg government in May 1991, democratic elections are boycotted by opposition groups as Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Front consolidates power (REG 5/91-12/94).
The Gambia	Regime transition	7/94	7/94	Longstanding multiparty system, dominated by President Dawda, is overthrown in military coup. Military rule reaffirmed with controversial elections of 1996.
Ghana	Regime transition	1/72	1/72	Reformist military regime permits multiparty elections. Inflation, corruption, and ethnic tension trigger military coup and suspension of party politics.

**Table B-1**  
**State Failures in Sub-Saharan Africa, 1955-98<sup>1</sup> (continued)**

Country	Type of Conflict	Began	Ended	Brief Description
	Regime transition	7/78	12/81	Military regime's attempt to establish amnesty for Supreme Military Council prior to democratic elections triggers junior officer coup. Democratic experiment ends with second military coup.
Guinea-Bissau	Complex	6/98	—	Civil war breaks out when President Vieira dismisses General Mane (REV). Rebel soldiers, led by Mane, attempt coup (REG). Peace accord of November 1998 breaks down and fighting continues.
Kenya	Ethnic war	10/91	9/93	Kalenjin and Masai supporters of the government are encouraged in attacks aimed at driving Kikuyu, Luo, and other rival groups from their villages in highlands.
Lesotho	Regime transition	1/70	1/70	Westminster-style democracy brought to abrupt end after opposition wins narrow victory in first post-independence election. Prime Minister Jonathan invalidates vote, imprisons opposition leaders, dissolves parliament, and assumes dictatorial powers.
	Complex	8/94	12/98	Loose coalition of opposition forces involving armed forces, royalists and opposition BNP (Basotho National Party) undermines newly elected BCP (Basotholand Congress Party) government. King Letsie III dissolves government and installs Provisional Council of State (REG 8/94-9/94). Protests against results of May 1998 elections are joined by mutiny of soldiers and shutdown of government by civil servants. Foreign troops impose order, and new elections are proposed (REG 5/98-12/98, REV 8/98-10/98).
Liberia	Complex	12/89	8/97	Repression by military against supporters of Charles Taylor leads to widespread civil war, collapse of Monrovia government, and assassination of President Doe. National Patriotic Forces of Liberia (NPFL) and militias of rival tribally based political groups compete for control of devastated society (REV 12/89-7/93, REG 9/90-8/97).
Madagascar	Regime transition	5/72	6/75	Ethnic tensions and economic crisis undermine fragile democratic institutions. Elected president relinquishes powers to military in order to quell urban unrest. Factional fighting within military leads to reduction in political participation.
Mali	Ethnic war	6/90	2/93	Rebellion by nomadic Tuaregs seeking regional autonomy.
Mozambique	Revolution	7/76	10/92	Anti-Communist RENAMO (Mozambique National Resistance) rebels, supported by Rhodesia and South Africa, challenge Marxist regime; war ends with 1992 peace agreement.
Niger	Regime transition	1/96	7/96	Military coup overthrows democratically elected government and suspends 1992 Constitution. Coup leader Col. Ibrahim Mainassara Barre is elected president in seriously flawed elections.
	Complex	12/64	1/70	Ethnic violence sparked by democratic elections triggers military coup and abandonment of state's federal structure. Countercoup by mostly Muslim officers from north results in reestablishment of federal system (REG 12/64-7/66). Countercoup and retaliatory massacres of Ibos in north precipitate secessionist civil war by Biafra, based on Ibos of eastern region (ETH 1/66-1/70).
	Complex	12/80	8/85	Islamic cults battle government forces in north (REV 12/80-1/81). Ethnic competition, widespread corruption, and electoral malpractice weaken democratic institution of Second Republic. Successive military coups bring to an end Second Republic and expand political role of armed forces (REG 12/83-8/85).
Rwanda	Complex	11/63	11/66	Cross-border incursions by Tutsi rebels prompt local Hutu officials to orchestrate vengeance attacks and massacres by Hutus, leading to flight of 200,000 Tutsi refugees (ETH, GEN 12/63-6/64).

**Table B-1**  
**State Failures in Sub-Saharan Africa, 1955-98<sup>1</sup> (continued)**

Country	Type of Conflict	Began	Ended	Brief Description
	Complex	10/90	—	Tutsi exiles of RPF launch successive invasions from Uganda prompting sporadic violence between Hutu army and Tutsi civilians (ETH). Hutu-dominated military government promises return to democratic rule, and transitional government is established as Tutsi guerrillas invade (REG 6/91-7/94). When President Habyarimana's aircraft is shot down (4/94), Hutu government deploys military and armed gangs to systematically slaughter Tutsis and Hutu moderates (GEN 4/94-7/94). Ethnic-Tutsi RPF (Rwandan Patriotic Front) seizes control of government by 7/94 but is unable to control Hutu militias operating from cross-border sanctuaries.
Senegal	Regime transition	12/62	10/64	Increasing tensions between President Senghor and his prime minister lead to failed coup attempt by Prime Minister Dia. Senghor arrests Dia, strengthens constitutional powers of presidency, and establishes one-party rule.
	Ethnic war	6/91	—	Violence increases in Casamance region as Casamançais (MFDC) rebels intensify separatist campaign.
Sierra Leone	Regime transition	3/67	4/71	Regional factionalism within two-party democratic system triggers series of military coups after Siaka Stevens (a Limba) defeats Albert Margai (a Mende). President Stevens declares himself executive president and systematically restricts democratic opposition (REG 3/67-4/68, REG 9/70-4/71).
	Complex	3/91	—	Revolutionary United Front mobilizes rural peoples, mainly Temne, in armed rebellion that devastates much of country. Peace agreement of 11/96 fails to end conflict (REV). Mutinous soldiers side with RUF guerrillas to overthrow President Kabbah. Junta is defeated by ECOWAS troops in February 1998 but fighting continues (REG 5/97 ongoing).
Somalia	Regime transition	10/69	10/69	Increasingly autocratic style of elected government triggers clan-based violence. Military intervenes and establishes one-party socialist state.
	Complex	5/88	—	Siad Barre regime is challenged by rebellions of Somali National Movement, based on northern Issaq clan, and United Somali Congress, based on southern Hawiye clan (ETH, REV 5/88-8/94). Anti-insurgency operations by Barre forces cause large-scale civilian deaths (GEN 5/88-1/91) but fail to prevent establishment of de facto independent government of northern Somaliland (1988-91). Barre regime collapses but chronic violence among clan-based warlords in south prevents establishment of effective central government (REG 7/89 ongoing).
South Africa	Revolution	6/76	4/77	Violent protests by black workers and students erupt in townships and spread countrywide, then are suppressed.
	Complex	8/84	6/96	Violent protests in black townships over poor economic conditions and lack of political rights lead to dismantling of apartheid policies and democratic elections won by ANC (African National Congress) (REV 8/84-4/94). Zulu Inkatha movement wars with ANC supporters for political control in Natal, initially with clandestine support from Afrikaner government's security forces (ETH 1/87 - 6/96).
Sudan	Complex	10/56	3/72	Anyanya rebellion by non-Muslim population of southern Sudan against Muslim-dominated government ends with 1972 autonomy agreement (ETH). Government uses indiscriminate violence against civilian Southerners thought to support secessionist movement (GEN). Parliamentary democracy overthrown in 1958 military coup. Constitution abrogated and opposition parties banned as General Abbud consolidates political power (REG 11/58). Democratic government reestablished in 1964 but overthrown by leftwing military officers in 1969. Col. Numeiri establishes one-party state after failed coup by Communist elements within ruling military coalition (REG 5/69-10/71).

**Table B-1**  
**State Failures in Sub-Saharan Africa, 1955-98<sup>1</sup> (continued)**

Country	Type of Conflict	Began	Ended	Brief Description
	Complex	7/83	—	Southern rebellion resumes under SPLA (Sudan People's Liberation Army) leadership after Muslim government violates autonomy agreement; in 1991 SPLA's breakup leads to new inter-communal violence within south (ETH 7/83 ongoing). Non-Muslim supporters of secession are targeted for destruction by indiscriminate military attacks, massacres by government-supported tribal militias, and government-induced privation and population displacement (GEN 9/83 ongoing). In 1989 military overthrows democratic government after attempts to reduce the influence of religion in politics. Legislature is dissolved and non-fundamentalist parties banned as Islamic state is established (REG 2/89-6/89).
Uganda	Complex	2/66	—	Allegations of corruption and persistent ethnic tensions within federal democracy leads to suspension of Constitution, centralization of political authority, and creation of de facto one-party state under control of President Obote (REG 2/66-1/71). Gen. Idi Amin seizes power in 1971 and systematically exterminates political opponents and personal enemies. Tribes closely associated with his predecessor also are targeted (GEN 2/72-4/79). After Amin is overthrown by Tanzanian intervention, Obote again takes power. Amid banditry and rebellion by tribal supporters of Amin (ETH 10/80-ongoing), Obote's political and tribal rivals are slaughtered on massive scale (GEN 5/79-1/86). Widespread corruption, repression, and ethnic conflict lead to overthrow of Obote's military-backed civilian regime by General Musaveni's National Resistance Army (REV 1/83-12/85). From 1986, rebellion is dominated by Langi and Acholi peoples at war with government forces dominated by Bagandans.
Zambia	Regime transition	12/68	12/72	Democratic institutions are weakened when political opposition to President Kaunda is restricted. Kaunda consolidates his political authority with formal establishment of one-party state.
	Regime transition	5/96	11/96	Constitutional amendments in May 1996 disqualify main opposition leader; President Chiluba easily wins subsequent elections.
Zimbabwe	Complex	12/72	12/87	White-dominated government fights black nationalists of ZAPU (Zimbabwe African People's Union) and ZANU (Zimbabwe African National Union), leading to negotiated settlement and black majority government (REV 12/72-12/79). Ndebele people initiate rioting and local rebellions against Shona-dominated ZANU governing coalition (ETH 6/81-12/87). Ethnic tensions and crackdown on political opposition weaken Zimbabwe's fragile democratic institutions. Merger of ZAPU with ruling ZANU effectively establishes one-party system (REG 2/82-12/87).

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**Table B-1**  
**State Failures in Sub-Saharan Africa, 1955-98<sup>1</sup> (continued)**

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<sup>1</sup>This list is an updated and enhanced version of earlier versions that first appeared in Esty, Gurr, Goldstone, Surko, and Unger, *Working Papers: State Failure Task Force Report*, Science Applications International Corporation (McLean, VA), Nov. 1995, and subsequently in Esty, Goldstone, Gurr, Harff, Levy, Dabelko, Surko, and Unger, *State Failure Task Force Report: Phase II Findings*, Science Applications International Corporation (McLean, VA), July 1998. Updates and enhancements were undertaken by Keith Jagers and Donna Ramsey Marshall under the direction of Monty G. Marshall in consultation with Ted Robert Gurr and Barbara Harff. Area experts have reviewed the list on several occasions; several cases were added, deleted, or modified on their recommendation.

<sup>2</sup>Complex events are made up of two or more temporally linked wars and crises. If events overlap or if four years or less separate the end of one event and the onset of the next, they are combined into complex events. The specific types of events and their dates, if different from the dates of the complex event, are shown in parentheses after the description.

<sup>3</sup>A dash in place of an ending date indicates a failure that is ongoing as of 31 December 1998.

<sup>4</sup>REG = Adverse Regime Change; ETH = Ethnic War; REV = Revolutionary War; GEN = Genocide or politicide.

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## Control Cases

Table B-2 lists the 131 country-years randomly selected as control cases for estimating the Sub-Saharan Africa model. The countries represented most frequently in this group are Burkina Faso, with seven years, and Gabon, with six. Ten different

countries are represented by five years each, six by four years, seven by three years, six by two years, and 11 countries are represented by just one year each. In all, 42 countries are represented in the control sample.

**Table B-2**  
**Control Cases Used in Estimating the Sub-Saharan Africa Model**

Country Code	Country Name	Years
BEN	Benin	1988, 1996
BOT	Botswana	1966, 1970, 1996
BFO	Burkina Faso	1960, 1965, 1968, 1972, 1976, 1990, 1994
BUI	Burundi	1984
CAO	Cameroon	1962, 1966, 1980, 1990
CEN	Central African Republic	1963, 1969, 1990
CHA	Chad	1963
COM	Comoros	1977, 1988
CON	Congo-Brazzaville	1980
ZAI	Congo-Kinshasa	1972, 1975, 1990
IVO	Cote d'Ivoire	1962, 1967, 1972, 1984
DJI	Djibouti <sup>1</sup>	1983, 1989, 1998
EQG	Equatorial Guinea <sup>1</sup>	1972, 1991, 1994, 1997
ERI	Eritrea	1997
ETH	Ethiopia	1956
ETI	Ethiopia (1993-)	1995
GAB	Gabon	1962, 1967, 1976, 1989, 1995, 1998
GAM	Gambia, The	1965
GHA	Ghana	1961, 1966, 1969, 1990, 1994
GUI	Guinea	1963, 1972, 1983, 1991, 1995
GNB	Guinea-Bissau	1976, 1989, 1992, 1996
KEN	Kenya	1963
LES	Lesotho	1968, 1991
LBR	Liberia	1956, 1963, 1968, 1980, 1984
MAG	Madagascar	1963, 1980, 1983, 1991, 1996
MAW	Malawi	1964, 1976, 1984, 1990, 1994
MLI	Mali	1963, 1967, 1972, 1977, 1980
MAA	Mauritania	1961, 1964, 1988, 1991, 1997
MAS	Mauritius	1970, 1984, 1991, 1996
NIR	Niger	1963, 1975, 1978, 1991, 1994
NIG	Nigeria	1978, 1991, 1994
RWA	Rwanda	1972
SEN	Senegal	1960, 1969, 1976, 1988
SIE	Sierra Leone	1961, 1977

**Table B-2**  
**Control Cases Used in Estimating the Sub-Saharan Africa Model (continued)**

Country Code	Country Name	Years
SOM	Somalia	1960, 1963
SAF	South Africa	1956, 1963
SWA	Swaziland	1970, 1976, 1988
TAZ	Tanzania	1965, 1972, 1975, 1988, 1991
TOG	Togo	1963, 1972, 1978, 1992, 1996
UGA	Uganda	1963
ZAM	Zambia	1964, 1980, 1984, 1992
ZIM	Zimbabwe	1998

<sup>1</sup>Djibouti and Equatorial Guinea were inadvertently included in the set of countries from which control cases were selected, despite falling below our population size cutoff of 500,000

Table B-3 shows coefficients and p-values<sup>1</sup> for the 10-variable Sub-Saharan Africa model.

**Table B-3**  
**Sub-Saharan Africa Model Coefficients (N = 44 problem cases, 131 control cases)**

Variables	Coefficient	P-value
Trade openness (dichotomized, 1 = less than median, 0 = greater)	0.9461	0.0924
Total population (log, normalized, continuous)	0.0561	0.7955
French heritage indicator	-0.6125	0.2321
Partial democracy indicator	3.4037	<0.0001
Full democracy indicator	1.5556	0.0474
Below median urban population indicator	1.1050	0.0651
Above median urban population and below median GDP/cap indicator	1.5772	0.0173
Discrimination indicator	1.5644	0.0058
Leader's years in office, 15 years or more indicator	1.2246	0.0827
Leader's years in office, 4 years or fewer indicator	0.8621	0.1084

<sup>1</sup>"P-value" refers to a test of the statistical significance of an individual variable in multi-variable models. Values close to zero indicate that the variable has a measurable effect on state failure.

As table B-4 shows, this model correctly classified 79.4 percent of the historical cases from which it was estimated. The model classified problem cases (that is, state failures) and controls with equal accuracy.

**Table B-4**  
**Classification Accuracy of the Sub-Saharan Africa Model**

Case Type	Classification Correct		Classification Incorrect		Total
	Number	Percent	Number	Percent	
Problem	35	79.5	9	20.5	44
Control	104	79.4	27	20.6	131
Total Cases	139	79.4	36	20.6	175

Table B-5 provides the model scores for each of the country-years from which the model was derived, as well as the values of the independent variables included in that model. As the table indicates, only one

country-year (Senegal 1960) was omitted from the analysis because of missing data.

**Table B-5**

**Sub-Saharan Africa Model Classification Results**

Country code	Country name	Year	Problem indicator	Independent variables, measured two years prior to problem/control									Model score	
				Trade openness	Total population relative to world median	French colonial heritage Indicator	Discrimination and separatist activity index	Democracy-autocracy score	Democracy category <sup>1</sup>	Urban population percentage relative to world median	GDP/capita relative to world median	Urbanization category		Years leader was in office
<b>Problems classified correctly</b>														
SAF	South Africa	1984	1	54.41	4.23	0	0.83	4	Partial	1.11	1.98	HIGH URB, HIGH GDP/CAP	4	0.939
GHA	Ghana	1972	1	44.02	1.64	0	0.28	3	Partial	0.74	0.59	HIGH URB, HIGH GDP/CAP	0	0.936
GNB	Guinea-Bissau	1998	1	42.15	0.12	0		5	Partial	0.41	0.29	LOWURB	16	0.919
UGA	Uganda	1966	1	53.15	1.69	0		7	Partial	0.16	0.40	LOWURB	2	0.902
ZIM	Zimbabwe	1972	1	59.41	1.00	0	0.97	4	Partial	0.43	0.60	LOWURB	5	0.875
ZAM	Zambia	1996	1	78.62	1.00	0		6	Partial	0.85	0.26	HIGH URB, LOW GDP/CAP	3	0.848
BEN	Benin	1963	1	17.72	0.49	1		2	Partial	0.29	0.86	LOWURB	1	0.823
NIR	Niger	1996	1	43.78	0.99	1	0.14	8	Democracy	0.33	0.27	LOWURB	1	0.785
SIE	Sierra Leone	1967	1	67.38	0.52	0		6	Partial	0.40	0.71	LOWURB	1	0.770
SOM	Somalia	1988	1	36.36	1.07	0	0.25	-7	Autocracy	0.50	0.33	HIGH URB, LOW GDP/CAP	17	0.767

**Table B-5**  
**Sub-Saharan Africa Model Classification Results (continued)**

Country code	Country name	Year	Problem indicator	Independent variables, measured two years prior to problem/control									Model score	
				Trade openness	Total population relative to world median	French colonial heritage Indicator	Discrimination and separatist activity index	Democracy-autocracy score	Democracy category <sup>1</sup>	Urban population percentage relative to world median	GDP/capita relative to world median	Urbanization category		Years leader was in office
SOM	Somalia	1969	1	35.90	0.92	0		7	Partial	0.55	0.59	HIGH URB, HIGH GDP/CAP	0	0.747
SAF	South Africa	1976	1	57.21	4.06	0	0.83	4	Partial	1.21	1.83	HIGH URB, HIGH GDP/CAP	8	0.715
ZAI	Congo-Kinshasa	1960	1	17.83	3.52	0	0.29	0	Autocracy	0.73	0.27	HIGH URB, LOW GDP/CAP		0.710
GHA	Ghana	1978	1	31.76	1.64	0	0.28	-7	Autocracy	0.73	0.36	HIGH URB, LOW GDP/CAP	4	0.701
ETH	Ethiopia	1961	1	19.41	5.62	0	0.14	-9	Autocracy	0.44	0.15	LOWURB	29	0.693
BFO	Burkina Faso	1980	1	37.71	1.05	1		5	Partial	0.15	0.19	LOWURB	12	0.673
RWA	Rwanda	1990	1	24.22	0.84	0	0.19	-7	Autocracy	0.11	0.22	LOWURB	15	0.669
MLI	Mali	1990	1	50.69	1.01	1	0.05	-7	Autocracy	0.45	0.15	HIGH URB, LOW GDP/CAP	20	0.640
SUD	Sudan	1956	1	<=56	2.63	0	0.26	0	Autocracy	0.28		LOWURB		0.600
RWA	Rwanda	1963	1	21.31	0.66	0	0.13	0	Autocracy	0.08	0.39	LOWURB		0.582
ZAI	Congo-Kinshasa	1992	1	58.71	4.50	0	0.09	-8	Autocracy	0.57	0.37	HIGH URB, LOW GDP/CAP	25	0.581
COM	Comoros	1995	1	54.33	0.05	1		4	Partial	0.57	0.55	HIGH URB, HIGH GDP/CAP	4	0.577

**Table B-5**  
**Sub-Saharan Africa Model Classification Results (continued)**

Country code	Country name	Year	Problem indicator	Independent variables, measured two years prior to problem/control									Model score	
				Trade openness	Total population relative to world median	French colonial heritage Indicator	Discrimination and separatist activity index	Democracy-autocracy score	Democracy category <sup>1</sup>	Urban population percentage relative to world median	GDP/capita relative to world median	Urbanization category		Years leader was in office
ZAM	Zambia	1968	1	89.39	0.79	0		2	Partial	0.66	0.65	HIGH URB, HIGH GDP/CAP	2	0.532
GAM	Gambia, The	1994	1	153.56	0.12	0		8	Democracy	0.52	0.37	HIGH URB, LOW GDP/CAP	27	0.528
ZAI	Congo-Kinshasa	1977	1	25.15	3.90	0	0.36	-9	Autocracy	0.71	0.29	HIGH URB, LOW GDP/CAP	10	0.510
SUD	Sudan	1983	1	32.23	2.92	0	0.26	-7	Autocracy	0.46	0.33	HIGH URB, LOW GDP/CAP	12	0.506
SIE	Sierra Leone	1991	1	62.12	0.48	0	0.33	-7	Autocracy	0.58	0.17	HIGH URB, LOW GDP/CAP	4	0.460
ZAI	Congo-Kinshasa	1984	1	26.11	4.26	0	0.36	-9	Autocracy	0.66	0.46	HIGH URB, HIGH GDP/CAP	17	0.423
KEN	Kenya	1991	1	53.50	2.80	0	0.59	-7	Autocracy	0.43	0.28	LOWURB	11	0.389
CON	Congo-Brazzaville	1997	1	127.59	0.29	1		5	Partial	1.10	0.47	HIGH URB, HIGH GDP/CAP	3	0.368
CON	Congo-Brazzaville	1963	1	106.62	0.24	1		4	Partial	1.00	0.86	HIGH URB, HIGH GDP/CAP	1	0.365
NIG	Nigeria	1980	1	43.31	10.59	0	0.17	0	Autocracy	0.56	0.63	HIGH URB, HIGH GDP/CAP	2	0.350

**Table B-5**  
**Sub-Saharan Africa Model Classification Results (continued)**

Country code	Country name	Year	Problem indicator	Independent variables, measured two years prior to problem/control									Model score	
				Trade openness	Total population relative to world median	French colonial heritage Indicator	Discrimination and separatist activity index	Democracy-autocracy score	Democracy category <sup>1</sup>	Urban population percentage relative to world median	GDP/capita relative to world median	Urbanization category		Years leader was in office
NIG	Nigeria	1964	1	21.83	9.84	0		8	Democracy	0.45	0.42	HIGH URB, HIGH GDP/CAP	2	0.347
LES	Lesotho	1970	1	62.24	0.21	0		9	Democracy	0.18	0.28	LOWURB	2	0.334
MZM	Mozambique	1976	1	53.07	1.76	0		0	Autocracy	0.14	0.71	LOWURB		0.235
<b>Problems classified incorrectly</b>														
ANG	Angola	1975	1	52.17	1.03	0		0	Autocracy	0.38	0.60	LOWURB		0.230
BUI	Burundi	1963	1	24.14	0.69	0		0	Autocracy	0.06	0.47	LOWURB		0.226
SEN	Senegal	1991	1	58.76	0.88	1		1	Partial	0.82	0.40	HIGH URB, HIGH GDP/CAP	8	0.207
CHA	Chad	1965	1	45.70	0.72	1		-9	Autocracy	0.21	0.55	LOWURB	3	0.137
BUI	Burundi	1988	1	34.04	0.65	0		-7	Autocracy	0.11	0.21	LOWURB	10	0.109
LES	Lesotho	1994	1	161.55	0.22	0		-7	Autocracy	0.41	0.33	LOWURB	1	0.096
LBR	Liberia	1989	1	76.77	0.30	0		-6	Autocracy	0.85	0.31	HIGH URB, LOW GDP/CAP	7	0.068
MAG	Madagascar	1972	1	40.75	1.29	1		-1	Autocracy	0.36	0.63	LOWURB	10	0.065
SEN	Senegal	1962	1	47.40	0.76	1		-1	Autocracy	1.00	0.84	HIGH URB, HIGH GDP/CAP	0	0.050
<b>Non-problems classified correctly</b>														
GUI	Guinea	1963	0	35.97	0.79	0		-9	Autocracy	0.31	0.46	LOWURB	3	0.227

**Table B-5**  
**Sub-Saharan Africa Model Classification Results** (*continued*)

Country code	Country name	Year	Problem indicator	Independent variables, measured two years prior to problem/control									Model score	
				Trade openness	Total population relative to world median	French colonial heritage Indicator	Discrimination and separatist activity index	Democracy-autocracy score	Democracy category <sup>1</sup>	Urban population percentage relative to world median	GDP/capita relative to world median	Urbanization category		Years leader was in office
ZAM	Zambia	1992	0	72.47	0.94	0		-9	Autocracy	0.85	0.25	HIGH URB, LOW GDP/CAP	26	0.210
ZAM	Zambia	1984	0	64.16	0.91	0		-9	Autocracy	0.92	0.31	HIGH URB, LOW GDP/CAP	18	0.209
GNB	Guinea-Bissau	1976	0	44.27	0.10	0		-7	Autocracy	0.38	0.44	LOWURB	0	0.208
SEN	Senegal	1988	0	58.45	0.87	1		1	Partial	0.82	0.42	HIGH URB, HIGH GDP/CAP	5	0.207
GUI	Guinea	1983	0	64.90	0.69	0		-9	Autocracy	0.44	0.29	HIGH URB, LOW GDP/CAP	23	0.207
NIG	Nigeria	1991	0	57.85	11.55	0		-5	Autocracy	0.66	0.20	HIGH URB, LOW GDP/CAP	4	0.175
GHA	Ghana	1990	0	42.50	1.77	0		-7	Autocracy	0.70	0.36	HIGH URB, LOW GDP/CAP	7	0.172
GHA	Ghana	1966	0	43.76	1.69	0	0.28	-9	Autocracy	0.73	0.59	HIGH URB, HIGH GDP/CAP	7	0.170
LBR	Liberia	1984	0	97.86	0.30	0		-7	Autocracy	0.81	0.37	HIGH URB, LOW GDP/CAP	2	0.148
MAW	Malawi	1994	0	63.56	1.07	0		-9	Autocracy	0.24	0.16	LOWURB	28	0.143
MAW	Malawi	1990	0	57.77	1.01	0		-9	Autocracy	0.22	0.14	LOWURB	24	0.142
MAS	Mauritius	1970	0	82.21	0.16	0		9	Democracy	1.05	1.78	HIGH URB, HIGH GDP/CAP	0	0.141

**Table B-5**  
**Sub-Saharan Africa Model Classification Results** (*continued*)

Country code	Country name	Year	Problem indicator	Independent variables, measured two years prior to problem/control									Model score	
				Trade openness	Total population relative to world median	French colonial heritage Indicator	Discrimination and separatist activity index	Democracy-autocracy score	Democracy category <sup>1</sup>	Urban population percentage relative to world median	GDP/capita relative to world median	Urbanization category		Years leader was in office
MAG	Madagascar	1980	0	41.21	1.31	1		-6	Autocracy	0.39	0.38	LOWURB	3	0.141
CAO	Cameroon	1962	0	52.21	1.26	1		0	Autocracy	0.43	0.51	LOWURB	0	0.141
MAG	Madagascar	1963	0	34.11	1.27	1		-1	Autocracy	0.33	0.90	LOWURB	1	0.141
CAO	Cameroon	1966	0	40.51	1.26	1		-6	Autocracy	0.43	0.43	LOWURB	4	0.140
MAS	Mauritius	1984	0	97.13	0.15	0		10	Democracy	0.98	1.11	HIGH URB, HIGH GDP/CAP	0	0.140
BFO	Burkina Faso	1965	0	22.83	1.09	1		-7	Autocracy	0.15	0.29	LOWURB	3	0.140
BFO	Burkina Faso	1968	0	17.99	1.10	1		-7	Autocracy	0.15	0.23	LOWURB	0	0.140
BFO	Burkina Faso	1972	0	23.19	1.07	1		-4	Autocracy	0.15	0.21	LOWURB	4	0.139
BFO	Burkina Faso	1990	0	37.92	1.08	1		-7	Autocracy	0.25	0.22	LOWURB	1	0.139
BFO	Burkina Faso	1960	0	<=56	1.04	1		0	Autocracy	0.15	<=0.4	LOWURB		0.139
MLI	Mali	1963	0	24.46	1.04	1		-7	Autocracy	0.35	0.40	LOWURB	1	0.139
MLI	Mali	1972	0	32.52	1.02	1		-7	Autocracy	0.36	0.23	LOWURB	2	0.139
NIR	Niger	1963	0	17.83	0.78	1		-7	Autocracy	0.18	0.42	LOWURB	1	0.137
CHA	Chad	1963	0	46.13	0.73	1		0	Autocracy	0.21	0.58	LOWURB	1	0.137
EQG	Equatorial Guinea	1972	0	80.79	0.06	0		-7	Autocracy	0.68	<=0.4	HIGH URB, LOW GDP/CAP	2	0.136
MAA	Mauritania	1964	0	55.65	0.24	1		-4	Autocracy	0.18	0.62	LOWURB	2	0.130
MAA	Mauritania	1961	0	<=56	0.23	1		0	Autocracy	0.13	>0.4	LOWURB		0.129
TAZ	Tanzania	1972	0	54.19	2.61	0		-7	Autocracy	0.17	0.23	LOWURB	9	0.117
TAZ	Tanzania	1975	0	53.50	2.63	0		-7	Autocracy	0.17	0.23	LOWURB	12	0.117
GUI	Guinea	1972	0	28.80	0.73	0		-9	Autocracy	0.35	0.26	LOWURB	12	0.110



**Table B-5**  
**Sub-Saharan Africa Model Classification Results (continued)**

Country code	Country name	Year	Problem indicator	Independent variables, measured two years prior to problem/control									Model score	
				Trade openness	Total population relative to world median	French colonial heritage Indicator	Discrimination and separatist activity index	Democracy-autocracy score	Democracy category <sup>1</sup>	Urban population percentage relative to world median	GDP/capita relative to world median	Urbanization category		Years leader was in office
TAZ	Tanzania	1965	0	58.50	2.47	0		-7	Autocracy	0.15	0.24	LOWURB	2	0.108
KEN	Kenya	1963	0	63.85	2.01	0		0	Autocracy	0.23	0.43	LOWURB		0.107
MAW	Malawi	1964	0	56.42	0.85	0		0	Autocracy	0.14	0.29	LOWURB		0.103
SIE	Sierra Leone	1961	0	>56	0.54	0		0	Autocracy	0.30	>0.4	LOWURB		0.100
MAG	Madagascar	1991	0	39.41	1.40	1		-6	Autocracy	0.45	0.26	HIGH URB, LOW GDP/CAP	14	0.100
GNB	Guinea-Bissau	1992	0	53.22	0.12	0		-6	Autocracy	0.41	0.22	LOWURB	10	0.100
ERI	Eritrea	1997	0	107.71	0.40	0		-2	Autocracy	0.32	<=0.4	LOWURB	2	0.099
LES	Lesotho	1991	0	140.33	0.21	0		-7	Autocracy	0.36	0.31	LOWURB	3	0.096
CEN	Central African Republic	1990	0	41.97	0.35	1		-7	Autocracy	0.78	0.38	HIGH URB, LOW GDP/CAP	7	0.093
BOT	Botswana	1966	0	65.12	0.12	0		0	Autocracy	0.06	0.40	LOWURB		0.093
GAM	Gambia, The	1965	0	77.63	0.08	0		0	Autocracy	0.39	0.46	LOWURB		0.091
SWA	Swaziland	1970	0	145.72	0.08	0		0	Autocracy	0.19	1.08	LOWURB	0	0.091
SOM	Somalia	1960	0	<=56	0.88	0		0	Autocracy	0.52	>0.4	HIGH URB, HIGH GDP/CAP		0.089
CEN	Central African Republic	1969	0	73.20	0.36	1		-7	Autocracy	0.76	0.39	HIGH URB, LOW GDP/CAP	2	0.087
MAA	Mauritania	1988	0	135.80	0.24	1	0.70	-7	Autocracy	0.76	0.45	HIGH URB, HIGH GDP/CAP	2	0.084

**Table B-5**  
**Sub-Saharan Africa Model Classification Results** (*continued*)

Country code	Country name	Year	Problem indicator	Independent variables, measured two years prior to problem/control									Model score	
				Trade openness	Total population relative to world median	French colonial heritage Indicator	Discrimination and separatist activity index	Democracy-autocracy score	Democracy category <sup>1</sup>	Urban population percentage relative to world median	GDP/capita relative to world median	Urbanization category		Years leader was in office
CAO	Cameroon	1980	0	51.78	1.29	1		-8	Autocracy	0.65	0.41	HIGH URB, HIGH GDP/CAP	18	0.072
GUI	Guinea	1991	0	60.88	0.69	0		-7	Autocracy	0.48	0.39	HIGH URB, LOW GDP/CAP	5	0.071
MAG	Madagascar	1983	0	34.32	1.36	1		-6	Autocracy	0.42	0.28	LOWURB	6	0.065
BOT	Botswana	1996	0	83.37	0.16	0		8	Democracy	0.84	2.20	HIGH URB, HIGH GDP/CAP	14	0.065
BFO	Burkina Faso	1994	0	34.32	1.13	1		-5	Autocracy	0.28	0.26	LOWURB	5	0.064
MLI	Mali	1967	0	20.41	1.03	1		-7	Autocracy	0.36	0.28	LOWURB	5	0.064
BFO	Burkina Faso	1976	0	35.22	1.04	1		-4	Autocracy	0.15	0.20	LOWURB	8	0.064
MAS	Mauritius	1991	0	135.73	0.13	0		10	Democracy	0.89	1.60	HIGH URB, HIGH GDP/CAP	7	0.064
MLI	Mali	1980	0	43.93	1.00	1		-7	Autocracy	0.39	0.21	LOWURB	10	0.064
MAS	Mauritius	1996	0	123.23	0.13	0		10	Democracy	0.82	2.39	HIGH URB, HIGH GDP/CAP	12	0.064
MLI	Mali	1977	0	41.27	0.99	1		-7	Autocracy	0.39	0.21	LOWURB	7	0.064
NIR	Niger	1975	0	39.25	0.78	1		-7	Autocracy	0.22	0.29	LOWURB	13	0.063
EQG	Equatorial Guinea	1991	0	105.62	0.04	0		-7	Autocracy	0.64	0.28	HIGH URB, LOW GDP/CAP	10	0.062
EQG	Equatorial	1994	0	94.66	0.04	0		-7	Autocracy	0.73	0.35	HIGH URB,	13	0.062

**Table B-5**  
**Sub-Saharan Africa Model Classification Results (continued)**

Country code	Country name	Year	Problem indicator	Independent variables, measured two years prior to problem/control									Model score	
				Trade openness	Total population relative to world median	French colonial heritage Indicator	Discrimination and separatist activity index	Democracy-autocracy score	Democracy category <sup>1</sup>	Urban population percentage relative to world median	GDP/capita relative to world median	Urbanization category		Years leader was in office
	Guinea												LOW GDP/CAP	
NIR	Niger	1978	0	56.60	0.79	1		-7	Autocracy	0.26	0.24	LOWURB	2	0.058
TOG	Togo	1972	0	88.42	0.38	1		-7	Autocracy	0.33	0.34	LOWURB	3	0.056
TOG	Togo	1963	0	69.47	0.36	1		-6	Autocracy	0.31	0.28	LOWURB	1	0.056
ZIM	Zimbabwe	1998	0	82.25	1.22	0		-6	Autocracy	0.60	0.64	HIGH URB, HIGH GDP/CAP	16	0.053
LBR	Liberia	1968	0	96.30	0.26	0		-6	Autocracy	0.63	0.55	HIGH URB, HIGH GDP/CAP	22	0.049
LBR	Liberia	1963	0	73.96	0.25	0		-6	Autocracy	0.58	0.57	HIGH URB, HIGH GDP/CAP	17	0.048
MAW	Malawi	1976	0	66.98	0.87	0		-9	Autocracy	0.15	0.25	LOWURB	10	0.046
EQG	Equatorial Guinea	1997	0	154.02	0.04	0		-5	Autocracy	0.80	0.69	HIGH URB, HIGH GDP/CAP	16	0.044
GNB	Guinea-Bissau	1989	0	57.47	0.12	0		-8	Autocracy	0.40	0.19	LOWURB	7	0.042
SWA	Swaziland	1976	0	155.46	0.08	0		-10	Autocracy	0.25	1.13	LOWURB	6	0.041
BEN	Benin	1988	0	67.50	0.55	1		-7	Autocracy	0.67	0.32	HIGH URB, LOW GDP/CAP	14	0.039
GUI	Guinea	1995	0	50.12	0.73	0		-4	Autocracy	0.52	0.47	HIGH URB, HIGH GDP/CAP	9	0.039

**Table B-5**  
**Sub-Saharan Africa Model Classification Results** (*continued*)

Country code	Country name	Year	Problem indicator	Independent variables, measured two years prior to problem/control										Model score
				Trade openness	Total population relative to world median	French colonial heritage Indicator	Discrimination and separatist activity index	Democracy-autocracy score	Democracy category <sup>1</sup>	Urban population percentage relative to world median	GDP/capita relative to world median	Urbanization category	Years leader was in office	
MAA	Mauritania	1997	0	112.01	0.25	1	0.35	-6	Autocracy	0.97	0.53	HIGH URB, HIGH GDP/CAP	11	0.037
MAA	Mauritania	1991	0	107.55	0.24	1	0.70	-7	Autocracy	0.76	0.43	HIGH URB, HIGH GDP/CAP	5	0.037
ZAM	Zambia	1964	0	95.18	0.76	0		0	Autocracy	0.54	0.71	HIGH URB, HIGH GDP/CAP		0.036
SWA	Swaziland	1988	0	139.24	0.09	0		-10	Autocracy	0.47	0.65	HIGH URB, HIGH GDP/CAP	0	0.032
IVO	Cote d'Ivoire	1984	0	75.75	1.31	1		-9	Autocracy	0.80	0.54	HIGH URB, HIGH GDP/CAP	22	0.029
TOG	Togo	1996	0	68.52	0.45	1		-2	Autocracy	0.58	0.45	HIGH URB, HIGH GDP/CAP	27	0.028
TOG	Togo	1992	0	78.81	0.42	1		-7	Autocracy	0.58	0.47	HIGH URB, HIGH GDP/CAP	23	0.028
GAB	Gabon	1995	0	83.29	0.12	1		-3	Autocracy	0.90	2.02	HIGH URB, HIGH GDP/CAP	26	0.026

**Table B-5**  
**Sub-Saharan Africa Model Classification Results (continued)**

Country code	Country name	Year	Problem indicator	Independent variables, measured two years prior to problem/control									Model score	
				Trade openness	Total population relative to world median	French colonial heritage Indicator	Discrimination and separatist activity index	Democracy-autocracy score	Democracy category <sup>1</sup>	Urban population percentage relative to world median	GDP/capita relative to world median	Urbanization category		Years leader was in office
GAB	Gabon	1998	0	96.20	0.12	1		-3	Autocracy	0.95	2.06	HIGH URB, HIGH GDP/CAP	29	0.026
GAB	Gabon	1989	0	75.01	0.11	1		-9	Autocracy	0.85	1.60	HIGH URB, HIGH GDP/CAP	20	0.026
DJI	Djibouti	1998	0	99.44	0.07	1		-6	Autocracy	1.55	0.51	HIGH URB, HIGH GDP/CAP	19	0.025
TOG	Togo	1978	0	93.83	0.38	1		-7	Autocracy	0.39	0.27	LOWURB	9	0.025
CAO	Cameroon	1990	0	31.99	1.37	1		-8	Autocracy	0.77	0.62	HIGH URB, HIGH GDP/CAP	6	0.022
SEN	Senegal	1969	0	54.65	0.79	1		-7	Autocracy	0.93	0.65	HIGH URB, HIGH GDP/CAP	7	0.022
IVO	Cote d'Ivoire	1962	0	57.14	0.90	1		-9	Autocracy	0.61	0.90	HIGH URB, HIGH GDP/CAP	0	0.020
CEN	Central African Republic	1963	0	62.25	0.36	1		0	Autocracy	0.71	0.55	HIGH URB, HIGH GDP/CAP	1	0.019
CON	Congo-Brazzaville	1980	0	104.79	0.25	1		-7	Autocracy	0.84	0.73	HIGH URB, HIGH	1	0.019

**Table B-5**  
**Sub-Saharan Africa Model Classification Results (continued)**

Country code	Country name	Year	Problem indicator	Independent variables, measured two years prior to problem/control									Model score	
				Trade openness	Total population relative to world median	French colonial heritage Indicator	Discrimination and separatist activity index	Democracy-autocracy score	Democracy category <sup>1</sup>	Urban population percentage relative to world median	GDP/capita relative to world median	Urbanization category		Years leader was in office
GAB	Gabon	1962	0	66.80	0.12	1		0	Autocracy	0.55	1.43	GDP/CAP HIGH URB, HIGH GDP/CAP	0	0.018
DJI	Djibouti	1983	0	124.65	0.05	1		-8	Autocracy	1.70	0.52	HIGH URB, HIGH GDP/CAP	4	0.017
ZAM	Zambia	1980	0	70.48	0.85	0		-9	Autocracy	0.84	0.42	HIGH URB, HIGH GDP/CAP	14	0.016
SIE	Sierra Leone	1977	0	61.45	0.49	0		-6	Autocracy	0.52	0.55	HIGH URB, HIGH GDP/CAP	7	0.015
LBR	Liberia	1980	0	111.12	0.28	0		-6	Autocracy	0.73	0.43	HIGH URB, HIGH GDP/CAP	7	0.015
LBR	Liberia	1956	0	>56	0.24	0		-6	Autocracy	0.55	>0.4	HIGH URB, HIGH GDP/CAP	11	0.015
IVO	Cote d'Ivoire	1967	0	66.95	0.97	1		-9	Autocracy	0.66	0.89	HIGH URB, HIGH GDP/CAP	5	0.009
IVO	Cote d'Ivoire	1972	0	64.88	1.05	1		-9	Autocracy	0.70	0.89	HIGH URB, HIGH	10	0.009

**Table B-5**  
**Sub-Saharan Africa Model Classification Results** (*continued*)

Country code	Country name	Year	Problem indicator	Independent variables, measured two years prior to problem/control									Model score	
				Trade openness	Total population relative to world median	French colonial heritage Indicator	Discrimination and separatist activity index	Democracy-autocracy score	Democracy category <sup>1</sup>	Urban population percentage relative to world median	GDP/capita relative to world median	Urbanization category		Years leader was in office
SEN	Senegal	1976	0	91.44	0.80	1		-6	Autocracy	0.85	0.54	GDP/CAP HIGH URB, HIGH GDP/CAP	14	0.009
GAB	Gabon	1967	0	80.54	0.11	1		-7	Autocracy	0.59	1.64	HIGH URB, HIGH GDP/CAP	5	0.008
GAB	Gabon	1976	0	100.81	0.10	1		-9	Autocracy	0.63	2.53	HIGH URB, HIGH GDP/CAP	7	0.008
COM	Comoros	1988	0	57.93	0.05	1		-7	Autocracy	0.55	0.52	HIGH URB, HIGH GDP/CAP	8	0.007
DJI	Djibouti	1989	0	114.95	0.06	1		-8	Autocracy	1.67	0.51	HIGH URB, HIGH GDP/CAP	10	0.007
<b>Non-problems classified incorrectly</b>														
SAF	South Africa	1963	0	53.44	4.16	0	0.81	4	Partial	1.46	1.70	HIGH URB, HIGH GDP/CAP	3	0.939
SAF	South Africa	1956	0	61.18	3.98	0	0.81	4	Partial	1.58	1.34	HIGH URB, HIGH GDP/CAP	1	0.856

**Table B-5**  
**Sub-Saharan Africa Model Classification Results (continued)**

Country code	Country name	Year	Problem indicator	Independent variables, measured two years prior to problem/control									Model score	
				Trade openness	Total population relative to world median	French colonial heritage Indicator	Discrimination and separatist activity index	Democracy-autocracy score	Democracy category <sup>1</sup>	Urban population percentage relative to world median	GDP/capita relative to world median	Urbanization category		Years leader was in office
GNB	Guinea-Bissau	1996	0	50.80	0.12	0		5	Partial	0.41	0.28	LOWURB	14	0.770
SOM	Somalia	1963	0	39.08	0.90	0		7	Partial	0.54	0.88	HIGH URB, HIGH GDP/CAP	1	0.747
COM	Comoros	1977	0	57.59	0.05	1		5	Partial	0.51	0.33	HIGH URB, LOW GDP/CAP	0	0.719
ETH	Ethiopia	1956	0	16.44	5.62	0	0.14	-9	Autocracy	0.44	0.16	LOWURB	25	0.693
GHA	Ghana	1994	0	45.99	1.87	0		1	Partial	0.69	0.46	HIGH URB, HIGH GDP/CAP	11	0.565
MAG	Madagascar	1996	0	51.83	1.47	1		9	Democracy	0.48	0.27	HIGH URB, LOW GDP/CAP	1	0.556
ZAI	Congo-Kinshasa	1972	0	34.57	3.86	0	0.36	-9	Autocracy	0.77	0.38	HIGH URB, LOW GDP/CAP	5	0.510
ZAI	Congo-Kinshasa	1975	0	29.77	3.86	0	0.36	-9	Autocracy	0.77	0.34	HIGH URB, LOW GDP/CAP	8	0.510
NIR	Niger	1994	0	31.26	0.97	1	0.14	0	Autocracy	0.33	0.25	LOWURB	1	0.435
NIR	Niger	1991	0	39.87	0.92	1	0.14	-7	Autocracy	0.31	0.25	LOWURB	2	0.434
ZAI	Congo-Kinshasa	1990	0	53.33	4.43	0	0.09	-9	Autocracy	0.60	0.41	HIGH URB, HIGH GDP/CAP	23	0.424
RWA	Rwanda	1972	0	26.74	0.71	0	0.13	-5	Autocracy	0.08	0.36	LOWURB	8	0.371
BUI	Burundi	1984	0	37.12	0.65	0	0.84	-7	Autocracy	0.10	0.18	LOWURB	6	0.370
NIG	Nigeria	1978	0	42.14	10.32	0	0.17	-7	Autocracy	0.56	0.53	HIGH URB,	0	0.349



**Table B-5**  
**Sub-Saharan Africa Model Classification Results** (*continued*)

Country code	Country name	Year	Problem indicator	Independent variables, measured two years prior to problem/control									Model score	
				Trade openness	Total population relative to world median	French colonial heritage Indicator	Discrimination and separatist activity index	Democracy-autocracy score	Democracy category <sup>1</sup>	Urban population percentage relative to world median	GDP/capita relative to world median	Urbanization category		Years leader was in office
LES	Lesotho	1968	0	67.41	0.21	0		9	Democracy	0.18	0.30	HIGH GDP/CAP LOWURB	0	0.334
BOT	Botswana	1970	0	71.52	0.12	0		8	Democracy	0.11	0.44	LOWURB	2	0.327
GHA	Ghana	1969	0	37.31	1.68	0	0.28	-7	Autocracy	0.74	0.52	HIGH URB, HIGH GDP/CAP	1	0.327
GHA	Ghana	1961	0	51.19	1.49	0	0.28	0	Autocracy	0.65	0.53	HIGH URB, HIGH GDP/CAP	2	0.325
BEN	Benin	1996	0	61.08	0.61	1		9	DEMOCRACY	0.70	0.34	HIGH URB, LOW GDP/CAP	3	0.316
NIG	Nigeria	1994	0	72.93	12.11	0	0.20	-5	Autocracy	0.71	0.24	HIGH URB, LOW GDP/CAP	7	0.301
MAW	Malawi	1984	0	51.34	0.97	0		-9	Autocracy	0.21	0.15	LOWURB	18	0.299
ETI	Ethiopia (1993-)	1995	0	25.27	6.18	0		0	Autocracy	0.27	0.13	LOWURB	2	0.248
TAZ	Tanzania	1991	0	45.32	3.05	0		-7	Autocracy	0.38	0.22	LOWURB	4	0.241
TAZ	Tanzania	1988	0	32.33	2.99	0		-7	Autocracy	0.38	0.22	LOWURB	1	0.240
UGA	Uganda	1963	0	46.20	1.58	0		0	Autocracy	0.16	0.44	LOWURB		0.234

**Missing Data**

**Table B-5**  
**Sub-Saharan Africa Model Classification Results** (*continued*)

Country code	Country name	Year	Problem indicator	Independent variables, measured two years prior to problem/control									Model score
				Trade openness	Total population relative to world median	French colonial heritage Indicator	Discrimination and separatist activity index	Democracy-autocracy score	Democracy category <sup>1</sup>	Urban population percentage relative to world median	GDP/capita relative to world median	Urbanization category	
SEN	Senegal	1960	0		0.73	1		0	Autocracy	1.10	>0.4	HIGH URB, HIGH GDP/CAP	

<sup>1</sup>PARTIAL = partial democracy: DEMOCRACY = full democracy

## Appendix C

### Muslim Countries Model

This appendix provides more detail on the analysis used to derive the Muslim countries model.

1955-98 that defined the dependent variable for this analysis.

Table C-1 lists the state failures, occurring in predominantly Muslim countries during the period

**Table C-1**  
**State Failures in Muslim Countries, 1955-98<sup>1</sup>**

Country	Type of Conflict	Began	Ended	Brief Description
Afghanistan	Complex <sup>2</sup>	2/88	6/97	In wake of unrest stemming from assassination of prominent opposition leader, Daoud regime is overthrown in left-wing military coup, followed by political purges of ruling circles and Soviet invasion (REG <sup>3</sup> 4/78-12/79). Widespread insurgency by mujahidin (REV) factions provokes Soviet and Afghan Government tactics of systematic terror, destruction of villages, execution of prisoners (GEN). Soviet-supported Najibullah regime falls after defection of General Dostam and his Uzbek militia. Mujahidin forces enter Kabul and establish interim Taliban-controlled central government (REG 2/92-9/96). Civil war continues among political factions based on Pashtun, Tajik, Uzbek, and Hazara ethnic groups as Taliban attempts to extend its authority (ETH from 5/92, REV from 5/92).
Albania	Complex	5/96	5/97	Third post-Communist parliamentary elections are marked by bloody police repression and electoral fraud; President Berisha uses intimidation, violence, and fraud to consolidate his political power (REG 5/96-5/96). Collapse of pyramid investment schemes ignites simmering dissatisfaction. Capital and southern half of country engulfed in fighting, looting, and rioting. Tension is defused somewhat when Berisha is forced to resign and new elections are called (REV 3/97-5/97); war in neighboring Kosovo diverts attention from internal politics to external events.
Algeria	Complex	7/62	12/62	In wake of independence from France, Algerian militants attack Europeans and Muslim civilians who collaborated with French colonial authorities (REV, ETH, GEN).
	Complex	5/91	— <sup>4</sup>	Efforts by ruling FLN (National Liberation Front) to ensure its electoral success through legislative gerrymandering trigger mass protests. Military increases its political influence in effort to prevent election of Islamic. When Islamic Salvation Front wins elections, government cancels results (REG 5/91-1/92). Islamic militants and military-government initiate intense terror campaigns designed to undermine each other's support bases (REV from 5/91).
Azerbaijan	Complex	2/88	6/97	Armenian rebellion to secure independence of Nagorno-Karabakh enclave checked by 6/97 cease-fire (ETH). Post-Soviet democratic transition undermined by government instability, rebellion, and fraudulent presidential and legislative elections (REG 5/92-6/93).
Bahrain	Regime transition	8/75	8/75	Prime Minister complains of "obstruction" by the newly established National Assembly, which is then dissolved by the Emir. Emir reinstates absolute power and there are no further elections.

**Table C-1**  
**State Failures in Muslim Countries, 1955-98<sup>1</sup> (continued)**

Country	Type of Conflict	Began	Ended	Brief Description
Bahrain	Regime transition	8/75	8/75	Prime Minister complains of “obstruction” by the newly established National Assembly, which is then dissolved by the Emir. Emir reinstates absolute power and there are no further elections.
Bangladesh	Regime transition	12/74	11/75	Floods, famine, and breakdown of law undermine parliamentary democracy. Brief experiment with strong presidential rule ends as anti-Mujib officers stage coup.
Bosnia and Herzegovina	Complex	3/92	9/96	The breakup of the Yugoslav Federation leads to ethno-national conflict among Serb, Croat, and Muslim inhabitants of Bosnia and Herzegovina (REG, ETH 4/92-11/95). Muslim residents of Bosnia are subject to “ethnic cleansing” measures including destruction of property, forced resettlement, and execution mainly by Serb and some Croat forces (GEN 5/92-11/95). Dayton peace accord ends fighting after country has been de facto partitioned along ethnic lines.
Brazil	Regime transition	4/64	10/65	Inflation and radical reforms proposed by new President Joao Goulart trigger overthrow of a weakly institutionalized democratic government by the armed forces. Bureaucratic-authoritarian regime violently represses left-wing opposition.
Burkina Faso	Regime transition	11/80	11/80	Leader of former military regime, President Lamizana, elected as head of civilian government. Subsequent economic crisis and labor unrest triggers military coup and suspension of Constitution.
Chad	Complex	10/65	3/96	Recurring civil war among Chad’s many communal groups with shifting alliances, but mainly along north-south lines (ETH). Failed attempt at national unification in 1978 leads to collapse of governance, intensified conflict, and international intervention (REG 8/78-6/84).
Comoros	Regime transition	9/95	3/96	Foreign-led mercenaries and disaffected Comorian troops overthrow elected government of President Djohar. French troops sent to the island one week later arrest mercenaries, reinstall elected prime minister, and arrest Djohar.
Egypt	Revolution	4/86	—	Terror campaign by militant Islamic groups against secular government; largely suppressed by mid-1996.
The Gambia	Regime transition	7/94	7/94	Longstanding multiparty system, dominated by President Dawda, is overthrown in military coup. Military rule reaffirmed with controversial elections of 1996.
Guinea-Bissau	Complex	6/98	—	Civil war breaks out when President Vieira dismisses General Mane (REV). Rebel soldiers, led by Mane, attempt coup (REG). Peace accord of November 1998 breaks down and fighting continues.
Indonesia	Complex	11/56	7/66	Rebels in Celebes, Sumatra, Java, and Ceram challenge Sukarno regime (REV 11/56-8/61). After Communists attempt coup, rightwing Muslim vigilantes massacre Party members and ethnic Chinese. Government formally bans Party, and military eliminates suspected Communists (GEN 10/65-7/66).
	Complex	11/75	7/92	East Timor rebels fight to regain autonomy lost when Indonesia invaded the former Portuguese colony in 11/75 (ETH 11/75-6/91). Timorese suspected of supporting rebels are killed in warfare, massacres, and famine (GEN 12/75-7/92).
	Complex	2/97	—	Economic decline leads to mass demonstrations and rioting in Jakarta. Suharto resigns and Habibie is named head of transitional government but rioting continues (REV). Fighting in East Timor resumes in 1997. Aceh increase oppositional activity. Anti-Ambonese and anti-Chinese violence takes place under cover of general protest and rioting (ETH 2/97 ongoing).

**Table C-1**  
**State Failures in Muslim Countries, 1955-98<sup>1</sup> (continued)**

Country	Type of Conflict	Began	Ended	Brief Description
Iran	Regime transition	7/52	3/55	Limited democratic rule ends as coup ousts increasingly autocratic prime minister. Shah bans political competition and gradually assumes absolute power.
	Revolution	6/63	6/63	Government land reform laws spur Islamic groups to launch major antigovernment riots in Tehran and other cities.
	Complex	10/77	—	Islamic and political groups stage massive demonstrations against Shah Reza Pahlavi's government, efforts at repression and reform fail, and Ayatollah Khomeini establishes new Islamist Government (REV 10/77-2/79; REG 11/78-6/81). Kurds rebel for regional autonomy, fighting declines after 1984 to sporadic guerrilla activity (ETH 4/79 ongoing). Moderates (National Front) and conservatives (IRP Islamic Revival Party) use terror and repression in competition for political control (REV 6/81-1/83). To consolidate Islamic revolution, Khomeini government violently suppresses dissident Muslims (mujahidin) and rebel Kurds, selectively executes prominent Baha'is (GEN 6/81-12/92).
Iraq	Complex	7/61	3/75	Barzani's Kurdish Democratic Party revolts against General Qassim's regime and its successors in quest for regional autonomy (ETH 7/61-3/70). Fighting resumes in 4/74 as Kurds reject government autonomy plan that falls short of their demands (ETH 4/74-3/75). To suppress repeated rebellions for independent Kurdistan, military engages in large-scale massacres (GEN 6/63-3/75).
	Complex	9/80	—	Some Iraqi Kurds take advantage of Iran-Iraq war and Iranian support to mount new rebellion for autonomy (ETH 9/80-3/88). In 1988, military and security forces launch Al-Anfal campaign of indiscriminate violence to eliminate or neutralize guerrillas and their supporters (GEN 3/88-6/91). Kurdish rebels take advantage of Iraq's defeat in Gulf war to establish a de facto Kurdish state, protected by US- and British-led coalition forces, while Shia rebellion in the south is repressed by Iraqi forces (ETH 3/91 onward).
Jordan	Regime transition	4/57	4/57	King Hussein demands resignation of his prime minister on suspicion of maneuvering to abolish monarchy. Multiparty elections for National Assembly rescinded as King bans all political parties.
	Revolution	6/67	7/71	Palestinian groups challenge government forces in effort to overthrow King Hussein's regime.
Kazakhstan	Regime transition	8/95	8/95	President Nazarbayev dissolves the legislature and rules by decree. Referendum on new Constitution confirms the extension of Nazarbayev's presidency to the year 2000.
Kyrgyzstan	Regime transition	12/95	2/96	Legislature rejects President Akeyev's proposal to extend his term in office through national referendum but nonetheless agrees to hold presidential elections one year early. Akeyev easily wins reelection.
Lebanon	Revolution	5/58	7/58	Muslim opposition groups rebel against Christian-dominated government.
	Complex	7/65	9/92	Palestinian attacks against Israel from Lebanon cause conflict with Lebanese authorities (1965-92). Christian-dominated polity collapses in civil war among Druze, Shia, Maronite, and Sunni forces (ETH 7/65-7/91; REG 5/75 -9/92); civil warfare is further complicated by Israeli invasion and partial occupation from 1985. New power-sharing constitution eventually established as elections are held under Syrian supervision in 1992.
Mali	Ethnic war	6/90	2/93	Rebellion by nomadic Tuaregs seeking regional autonomy.
Morocco	Regime transition	5/63	6/65	King Hassan resumes full legislative and executive powers after brief experiment with limited parliamentary rule.

**Table C-1**  
**State Failures in Muslim Countries, 1955-98<sup>1</sup> (continued)**

Country	Type of Conflict	Began	Ended	Brief Description
	Ethnic war	10/75	11/89	Saharawis seek independence in southwestern part of country annexed by Morocco after Spanish colonial rule.
Niger	Regime transition	1/96	7/96	Military coup overthrows democratically elected government and suspends 1992 Constitution. Coup leader Col. Ibrahim Mainassara Barre is elected president in seriously flawed elections.
Nigeria	Complex	12/64	1/70	Ethnic violence sparked by democratic elections triggers military coup and abandonment of state's federal structure. Countercoup by mostly Muslim officers from north results in reestablishment of federal system (REG 12/64-7/66). Countercoup and retaliatory massacres of Ibos in north precipitate secessionist civil war by Biafra, based on Ibos of eastern region (ETH 1/66-1/70).
	Complex	12/80	8/85	Islamic cults battle government forces in north (REV 12/80-1/81). Ethnic competition, widespread corruption, and electoral malpractice weaken democratic institution of Second Republic. Successive military coups bring to an end Second Republic and expand political role of armed forces (REG 12/83-8/85).
Oman	Revolution	3/65	3/76	Dhofar tribal insurrection escalates to ideological struggle between rebels and autocratic regime; rebels suppressed by 1976.
Pakistan	Complex	10/58	5/61	Decade-long experiment with parliamentary and presidential system ends when democratic constitution is abrogated, political parties dissolved and government handed over to coalition of military officers and bureaucrats (REG 10/58). Sporadic violence erupts as Pashtuns seek autonomy (ETH 9/60-5/61).
	Complex	3/71	7/77	Post-election tensions between East and West Pakistan erupt into massive resistance by Bengali nationalists; intervention by India leads to establishment of independent Bangladesh (ETH 3/71-11/71). Military imposes martial law and uses tanks, airpower, and artillery to indiscriminately attack civilians (GEN 3/71-12/71). Baluchi rebellion against central authority, backed by opposition National Awami Party (ETH 2/73-7/77) is suppressed by military using indiscriminate violence against civilians (GEN 2/73-7/77). Surprise parliamentary elections called by democratic government in 1977, lead to escalating political violence. General Zia leads military coup, dissolves legislature, arrests politicians, and declares martial law (REG 3/77-7/77).
	Ethnic war	/83	—	Violent campaign by Sindhis seeking autonomy; violent attacks on Muhajirs in Karachi.
Senegal	Regime transition	12/62	10/64	Increasing tensions between President Senghor and his prime minister lead to failed coup attempt by Prime Minister Dia. Senghor arrests Dia, strengthens constitutional powers of presidency, and establishes one-party rule.
	Ethnic war	6/91	—	Violence increases in Casamance region as Casamancais (MFDC) rebels intensify separatist campaign.
Sierra Leone	Regime transition	3/67	4/71	Regional factionalism within two-party democratic system triggers series of military coups after Siaka Stevens (a Limba) defeats Albert Margai (a Mende). President Stevens declares himself executive president and systematically restricts democratic opposition (REG 3/67-4/68, REG 9/70-4/71).
	Complex	3/91	—	Revolutionary United Front mobilizes rural peoples, mainly Temne, in armed rebellion that devastates much of country. Peace agreement of 11/96 fails to end conflict (REV). Mutinous soldiers side with RUF guerrillas to overthrow President Kabbah. Junta is defeated by ECOWAS troops in February 1998 but fighting continues (REG 5/97 ongoing).

**Table C-1**  
**State Failures in Muslim Countries, 1955-98<sup>1</sup> (continued)**

Country	Type of Conflict	Began	Ended	Brief Description
Somalia	Regime transition	10/69	10/69	Increasingly autocratic style of elected government triggers clan-based violence. Military intervenes and establishes one-party socialist state.
	Complex	5/88	—	Siad Barre regime is challenged by rebellions of Somali National Movement, based on northern Issaq clan, and United Somali Congress, based on southern Hawiye clan (ETH, REV 5/88-8/94). Anti-insurgency operations by Barre forces cause large-scale civilian deaths (GEN 5/88-1/91) but fail to prevent establishment of de facto independent government of northern Somaliland (1988-91). Barre regime collapses but chronic violence among clan-based warlords in south prevents establishment of effective central government (REG 7/89 ongoing).
Sudan	Complex	10/56	3/72	Anyanya rebellion by non-Muslim population of southern Sudan against Muslim-dominated government ends with 1972 autonomy agreement (ETH). Government uses indiscriminate violence against civilian Southerners thought to support secessionist movement (GEN). Parliamentary democracy overthrown in 1958 military coup. Constitution abrogated and opposition parties banned as General Abbud consolidates political power (REG 11/ 58). Democratic government reestablished in 1964 but overthrown by leftwing military officers in 1969. Col. Numeiri establishes one-party state after failed coup by Communist elements within ruling military coalition (REG 5/69-10/71).
	Complex	7/83	—	Southern rebellion resumes under SPLA (Sudan People's Liberation Army) leadership after Muslim government violates autonomy agreement; in 1991, SPLA's breakup leads to new inter-communal violence within south (ETH 7/83 ongoing). Non-Muslim supporters of secession are targeted for destruction by indiscriminate military attacks, massacres by government-supported tribal militias, and government-induced privation and population displacement (GEN 9/83 ongoing). In 1989 military overthrows democratic government after attempts to reduce the influence of religion in politics. Legislature is dissolved and non-fundamentalist parties banned as Islamic state is established (REG 2/89-6/89).
Syria	Regime transition	2/58	7/63	Government led by pan-Arab, socialist Baa'th party seeks union with Egypt to prevent formation of Communist-led regime. Syria secedes from United Arab Republic after military coup. Second coup establishes one-party state under neo-Baa'thist rule.
	Geno/politicide	4/81	2/82	Military and security forces crush revolt by Muslim Brotherhood centered in cities of Hama and Aleppo.
Tajikistan	Complex	4/92	—	Post-Soviet democratic transition halted as civil war plagues ethnically and regionally diverse country (REV 4/92 ongoing). Ex-Communists gain control of the political arena and restrict democratic participation (REG 5/92-12/92).
Turkey	Regime transition	4/71	4/71	Amid widespread social unrest, military oversees resignation of leftwing civilian government and initiates period of "guided democracy" under "above party" administrators.
	Complex	9/80	—	Parliamentary instability and widespread social unrest triggers military coup. Political activity banned as military lays groundwork for restoration of democracy under military supervision (REG 9/80). Kurds of militant PKK (Kurdistan Workers' Party) engage in protracted conflict with Turkish authorities in quest for independence, provoking deadly counterinsurgency campaigns (ETH 8/84 ongoing).

**Table C-1**  
**State Failures in Muslim Countries, 1955-98<sup>1</sup> (continued)**

Country	Type of Conflict	Began	Ended	Brief Description
Yemen, North	Revolution	9/62	1/70	Royalist and Republican forces battle for control of government. Rival tribes join on opposite sides.
Yemen, South	Revolution	1/86	2/86	Rival factions in the Yemen Socialist Party (YSP) battle for control of government.
Yemen	Regime transition	5/90	10/94	Transition toward unified, democratic Yemen undermined by factional fighting. Northern leaders consolidate authority over southern leaders in aftermath of civil war.

<sup>1</sup>This list is an updated and enhanced version of earlier versions that first appeared in Esty, Gurr, Goldstone, Surko, and Unger, Working Papers: State Failure Task Force Report, Science Applications International Corporation (McLean, VA), Nov. 1995, and subsequently in Esty, Goldstone, Gurr, Harff, Levy, Dabelko, Surko, and Unger, State Failure Task Force Report: Phase II Findings, Science Applications International Corporation (McLean, VA), July 1998. Updates and enhancements were undertaken by Keith Jagers and Donna Ramsey Marshall under the direction of Monty G. Marshall in consultation with Ted Robert Gurr and Barbara Harff. Area experts have reviewed the list on several occasions; several cases were added, deleted, or modified on their recommendation.

<sup>2</sup>Complex events are made up of two or more temporally linked wars and crises. If events overlap or if four years or less separate the end of one event and the onset of the next, they are combined into complex events. The specific types of events and their dates, if different from the dates of the complex event, are shown in parentheses after the description.

<sup>3</sup>REG = Adverse Regime Change; ETH = Ethnic War; REV = Revolutionary War; GEN=Genocide or politicide.

<sup>4</sup>A dash in place of an ending date indicates a failure that is ongoing as of 31 December 1998.



## Control Cases

Table C-2 lists the 161 country-years randomly selected as control cases for estimating the Muslim countries model. Three countries (Libya, Malaysia, and Tunisia) appear seven times in the control set;

five countries appear six times; five countries appear five times; nine countries appear four times; eight countries appear three times; eight countries appear twice; and nine countries appear once.

**Table C-2**  
**Controls Randomly Selected for the Muslim Countries Model**

Country	Years
Afghanistan	1957, 1963, 1967, 1974
Albania	1962, 1965
Algeria	1969, 1980
Bahrain	1971, 1983, 1991, 1995
Bangladesh	1971, 1991, 1995
Burkina Faso	1961, 1965, 1978, 1986, 1990
Chad	1962
Comoros	1990
Cote d'Ivoire	1962, 1965, 1975, 1980, 1992, 1996
Djibouti	1986, 1991, 1996
Egypt	1958, 1963, 1975
Eritrea	1994
Ethiopia	1956, 1958
Ethiopia (1993-)	1995
Gambia, The	1965, 1981, 1986, 1992
Guinea	1958, 1962, 1975, 1980, 1983, 1991
Guinea-Bissau	1977, 1980, 1990, 1996
Indonesia	1971
Iran	1969
Iraq	1956, 1958
Jordan	1965, 1983, 1988, 1991, 1994
Kuwait	1963, 1967, 1981, 1991, 1996
Kyrgyzstan	1991
Lebanon	1963, 1997
Libya	1958, 1961, 1975, 1980, 1990, 1995, 1998
Malaysia	1958, 1962, 1965, 1977, 1980, 1992, 1996
Mali	1962, 1971
Mauritania	1961, 1964, 1967, 1977, 1986, 1994
Morocco	1957, 1961, 1995
Niger	1963, 1974, 1992
Nigeria	1961, 1975, 1978, 1991, 1995
Oman	1957, 1963, 1981, 1990, 1997
Pakistan	1969
Qatar	1971, 1980, 1988, 1991, 1995, 1998

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**Table C-2**  
**Controls Randomly Selected for the Muslim Countries Model (continued)**

<b>Country</b>	<b>Years</b>
Saudi Arabia	1956, 1958, 1962, 1965, 1975, 1991
Senegal	1975, 1978, 1983
Sierra Leone	1962, 1965, 1983, 1988
Somalia	1964, 1967, 1980, 1986
Sudan	1980
Syria	1974, 1992, 1996
Tunisia	1956, 1961, 1964, 1967, 1971, 1990, 1998
Turkey	1956, 1958, 1962, 1965
Turkmenistan	1991, 1995
United Arab Emirates	1975, 1980, 1992, 1997
Uzbekistan	1991, 1995
Yemen, North	1956, 1958, 1986
Yemen, South	1967, 1975, 1980, 1983

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## Model Results

Table C-3 shows coefficients and p-values<sup>1</sup> for the 10-variable Muslim countries model.

**Table C-3**  
**Muslim Countries Model Coefficients (N = 51 problem cases, 156 control cases)**

<b>Variable</b>	<b>Coefficient</b>	<b>P-Value</b>
Indicator for presence of sectarian Islam	1.2287	0.0052
Trade openness (dichotomized, 1 = less than median, 0 = greater than median)	0.3676	0.3870
Total population (log, normalized, continuous)	0.2661	0.0600
Indicator for low religious fractionalization (Herfindahl > 0.75)	1.0053	0.0549
Indicator for high religious fractionalization (Herfindahl <= 0.5)	1.0599	0.0517
Infant mortality (continuous, normalized, log)	1.0584	0.0268
Autocracy indicator	-1.7120	0.0003
Memberships in regional organizations (continuous, normalized)	-0.6871	0.0068
Border states with major armed conflict (continuous)	0.2892	0.0706
Intercept	-1.4703	0.0302

<sup>1</sup>“P-value” refers to a test of the statistical significance of an individual variable in multi-variable models. Values close to zero indicate that the variable has a measurable effect on state failure.

As Table C-4 shows, this 10-variable model correctly classified 72.5 percent of the historical cases from which it was estimated. The model classified problem cases (78.4 percent correct) significantly better than controls (70.5 percent correct). The Muslim countries model classified 11 failures incorrectly. Two of these

11—Tajikistan 1992 and Azerbaijan 1991—represent former Soviet republics shortly after the breakup of the Soviet Union. Of the 46 controls that were incorrectly classified, 13 (28 percent) represent countries in which instability is a chronic problem, such as Afghanistan, Somalia, and Yemen.

**Table C-4**  
**Classification Accuracy of the Muslim Countries Model**

Case Type	Classification Correct		Classification Incorrect		Total
	Number	Percent	Number	Percent	
Problem	40	78.4	11	21.6	51
Control	110	70.5	46	29.5	156
Total Cases	150	72.5	57	27.5	207

Table C-5 provides the model scores for each of the country-years from which the model was derived, as well as the values of the independent

variables included in that model. As the table indicates, only one country year (Senegal 1960) was omitted from the analysis because of missing data.

**Table C-5**  
**Classification Results for the Muslim Countries Model**

Country code	Country name	Year	Problem indicator	Independent variables, measured 2 years prior to problem/control									Model Score
				Trade openness	Total population relative to world median	Democracy-autocracy	Democracy category <sup>1</sup>	Sectarian Islam indicator	Number of regional memberships relative to world median	Number bordering states with major armed conflict	Infant mortality, relative to world median	Religion Herfindahl	
<b>Problems classified correctly</b>													
PKS	Pakistan (PRE-1971)	1958	1	26.17	23.23	8	Democracy	Y	0.50	3.00	1.31	0.56	0.855
BNG	Bangladesh	1974	1	19.41	12.68	8	Democracy	N	0.00	2.00	1.65	0.76	0.844
NIG	Nigeria	1964	1	21.83	9.84	8	Democracy	N	0.00	0.00	1.57	0.30	0.740
SYR	Syria	1958	1	<58	1.03	7	Partial	Y	0.50	0.00	1.12	0.48	0.725
TUR	Turkey	1980	1	11.08	6.74	9	Democracy	Y	1.25	2.00	1.66	0.74	0.708
IRN	Iran	1963	1	36.19	5.17	-10	Autocracy	Y	0.00	2.00	1.39	0.80	0.687
ALB	Albania	1996	1	50.30	0.36	5	Partial	Y	0.00	0.00	0.74	0.35	0.645
TUR	Turkey	1971	1	7.99	6.77	9	Democracy	Y	2.00	3.00	1.53	0.74	0.640
PAK	Pakistan	1983	1	35.78	12.94	-7	Autocracy	Y	0.50	4.00	1.83	0.55	0.633
GNB	Guinea-Bissau	1998	1	42.15	0.12	5	Partial	N	0.73	1.00	3.52	0.41	0.624
GNB	Guinea-Bissau	1998	1	42.15	0.12	5	Partial	N	0.73	1.00	3.52	0.41	0.624
INS	Indonesia	1956	1	<58	22.42	0	Autocracy	Y	0.00	0.00	1.12	0.81	0.590
INS	Indonesia	1997	1	51.67	21.58	-7	Autocracy	Y	0.67	1.00	1.28	0.78	0.581
NIR	Niger	1996	1	43.78	0.99	8	Democracy	N	1.87	2.00	2.89	0.84	0.579
IRN	Iran	1977	1	76.01	5.57	-10	Autocracy	Y	0.80	3.00	1.38	0.80	0.542

**Table C-5**  
**Classification Results for the Muslim Countries Model (continued)**

Country code	Country name	Year	Problem indicator	Independent variables, measured 2 years prior to problem/control									Model score
				Trade openness	Total population relative to world median	Democracy-autocracy	Democracy category <sup>1</sup>	Sectarian Islam indicator	Number of regional memberships relative to world median	Number bordering states with major armed conflict	Infant mortality, relative to world median	Religion Herfindahl	
SIE	Sierra Leone	1967	1	67.38	0.52	6	Partial	N	0.00	0.00	2.03	0.42	0.542
SOM	Somalia	1969	1	35.90	0.92	7	Partial	N	0.50	0.00	1.62	1.00	0.511
INS	Indonesia	1975	1	39.67	22.22	-7	Autocracy	Y	0.80	0.00	1.34	0.78	0.501
AFG	Afghanistan	1978	1	28.09	2.36	-7	Autocracy	Y	0.00	1.00	2.52	0.62	0.478
KYR	Kyrgyzstan	1995	1	74.77	0.52	6	Partial	N	0.00	2.00	0.92	0.46	0.476
KZK	Kazakhstan	1995	1	79.77	1.97	2	Partial	N	0.00	1.00	0.80	0.36	0.456
PAK	Pakistan (PRE-1971)	1971	1	19.45	11.56	-2	Autocracy	Y	0.75	3.00	1.45	0.55	0.452
SYR	Syria	1981	1	55.14	1.31	-9	Autocracy	Y	1.38	4.00	0.92	0.47	0.419
GAM	Gambia, The	1994	1	153.56	0.12	8	Democracy	N	1.13	1.00	3.07	0.78	0.417
ALG	Algeria	1991	1	36.88	3.01	-2	Autocracy	Y	1.76	3.00	1.29	0.98	0.410
YAR	Yemen, North	1962	1	<58	0.54	-6	Autocracy	Y	0.50	0.00	1.87	0.50	0.409
YEM	Yemen	1990	1	52.29	1.40	0	Autocracy	Y	1.20	0.00	2.02	0.50	0.373
COM	Comoros	1995	1	54.33	0.05	4	Partial	N	0.67	0.00	2.13	0.76	0.370
ETH	Ethiopia	1961	1	19.41	5.62	-9	Autocracy	N	0.00	1.00	1.49	0.38	0.358
SEN	Senegal	1962	1	47.40	0.76	-1	Autocracy	Y	0.50	0.00	1.43	0.80	0.350
BFO	Burkina Faso	1980	1	37.71	1.05	5	Partial	N	2.00	0.00	1.75	0.44	0.307
SEN	Senegal	1991	1	58.76	0.88	1	Partial	N	1.47	1.00	1.46	0.83	0.306
IRQ	Iraq	1980	1	85.80	1.93	-7	Autocracy	Y	1.25	2.00	1.16	0.43	0.301
YPR	Yemen, South	1986	1	<58	0.26	-8	Autocracy	Y	1.17	0.00	1.99	0.50	0.278
EGY	Egypt	1986	1	58.16	6.37	-5	Autocracy	N	1.17	3.00	1.83	0.85	0.273
IRQ	Iraq	1961	1	67.22	1.53	-5	Autocracy	Y	0.50	0.00	1.14	0.43	0.272
MOR	Morocco	1975	1	42.94	2.90	-9	Autocracy	Y	2.00	1.00	1.44	0.99	0.269
MOR	Morocco	1963	1	46.53	2.79	-5	Autocracy	Y	1.50	0.00	1.32	0.99	0.261
CHA	Chad	1965	1	45.70	0.72	-9	Autocracy	N	0.00	1.00	1.62	0.37	0.260

**Table C-5**  
**Classification Results for the Muslim Countries Model (continued)**

Country code	Country name	Year	Problem indicator	Independent variables, measured 2 years prior to problem/control									Model score
				Trade openness	Total population relative to world median	Democracy-autocracy	Democracy category <sup>1</sup>	Sectarian Islam indicator	Number of regional memberships relative to world median	Number bordering states with major armed conflict	Infant mortality, relative to world median	Religion Herfindahl	
JOR	Jordan	1967	1	54.67	0.24	-9	Autocracy	Y	1.00	2.00	1.02	0.86	0.260
ALG	Algeria	1962	1	102.39	2.56	0	Autocracy	Y	1.00	0.00	1.36	0.98	0.258
<b>Problems classified incorrectly</b>													
TAJ	Tajikistan	1992	1	>58	0.64	0	Autocracy	Y	0.00	2.00	1.31	0.56	0.229
MLI	Mali	1990	1	50.69	1.01	-7	Autocracy	Y	1.53	0.00	3.25	0.69	0.200
JOR	Jordan	1957	1	72.69	0.37	-1	Autocracy	Y	0.50	0.00	1.12	0.86	0.192
SOM	Somalia	1988	1	36.36	1.07	-7	Autocracy	N	1.50	1.00	2.54	1.00	0.176
SUD	Sudan	1983	1	32.23	2.92	-7	Autocracy	N	1.88	6.00	1.47	0.62	0.157
SIE	Sierra Leone	1991	1	62.12	0.48	-7	Autocracy	N	1.00	0.00	3.46	0.41	0.156
NIG	Nigeria	1980	1	43.31	10.59	0	Autocracy	N	1.63	0.00	1.45	0.31	0.136
OMA	Oman	1965	1	>58	0.13	-10	Autocracy	Y	0.00	0.00	1.77	0.67	0.132
AZE	Azerbaijan	1991	1	>58	0.88	0	Autocracy	N	0.00	2.00	0.67	0.46	0.118
SUD	Sudan	1956	1	<58	2.63	0	Autocracy	N	0.50	1.00	1.31	0.60	0.089
BAH	Bahrain	1975	1	>58	0.04	-7	Autocracy	N	0.60	0.00	0.61	0.47	0.020
BNG	Bangladesh	1995	0	30.66	13.47	6	Partial	N	0.27	2.00	2.11	0.76	0.856
PKS	Pakistan (PRE-1971)	1969	0	22.89	11.48	1	Partial	Y	0.75	3.00	1.45	0.56	0.820
INS	Indonesia	1971	0	23.45	22.56	-7	Autocracy	Y	0.00	0.00	1.24	0.81	0.616
GNB	Guinea-Bissau	1996	0	50.80	0.12	5	Partial	N	0.73	1.00	3.29	0.41	0.607
SOM	Somalia	1967	0	37.79	0.92	7	Partial	N	0.00	0.00	1.62	1.00	0.595
SOM	Somalia	1964	0	40.31	0.90	7	Partial	N	0.00	0.00	1.45	1.00	0.567
IRN	Iran	1969	0	37.02	5.39	-10	Autocracy	Y	0.50	1.00	1.45	0.80	0.551
BNG	Bangladesh	1991	0	25.92	13.37	-5	Autocracy	N	0.18	2.00	2.12	0.76	0.533
SIE	Sierra Leone	1965	0	71.99	0.52	6	Partial	N	0.00	0.00	1.83	0.42	0.515

**Table C-5**  
**Classification Results for the Muslim Countries Model (continued)**

Country code	Country name	Year	Problem indicator	Independent variables, measured 2 years prior to problem/control									Model score
				Trade openness	Total population relative to world median	Democracy-autocracy	Democracy category <sup>1</sup>	Sectarian Islam indicator	Number of regional memberships relative to world median	Number bordering states with major armed conflict	Infant mortality, relative to world median	Religion Herfindahl	
AFG	Afghanistan	1967	0	32.67	2.40	-7	Autocracy	Y	0.00	2.00	2.02	0.62	0.493
AFG	Afghanistan	1963	0	12.55	2.39	-10	Autocracy	Y	0.00	2.00	1.80	0.62	0.461
LIB	Libya	1995	0	<58	0.56	-7	Autocracy	Y	2.00	5.00	1.59	0.99	0.456
AFG	Afghanistan	1974	0	32.87	2.35	-7	Autocracy	Y	0.00	1.00	2.28	0.62	0.451
<b>Non-problem classified incorrectly</b>													
BNG	Bangladesh	1971	0	19.81	12.75	0	Autocracy	N	0.00	2.00	1.40	0.76	0.450
YAR	Yemen, North	1980	0	<58	0.76	-6	Autocracy	Y	1.13	1.00	2.18	0.50	0.436
GAM	Gambia, The	1992	0	150.30	0.11	8	Democracy	N	1.00	1.00	3.07	0.78	0.435
NIG	Nigeria	1961	0	21.83	9.61	0	Autocracy	N	0.00	1.00	1.50	0.30	0.392
YPR	Yemen, South	1980	0	<58	0.25	-7	Autocracy	Y	1.00	1.00	2.18	0.50	0.385
IVO	Cote d'Ivoire	1992	0	58.80	1.44	-7	Autocracy	Y	1.53	2.00	2.12	0.40	0.383
YPR	Yemen, South	1975	0	<58	0.23	-6	Autocracy	Y	1.00	1.00	2.16	0.50	0.379
YAR	Yemen, North	1958	0	<58	0.42	-6	Autocracy	Y	0.50	0.00	1.77	0.50	0.377
YAR	Yemen, North	1956	0	<58	0.41	-6	Autocracy	Y	0.50	0.00	1.77	0.50	0.377
LIB	Libya	1998	0	<58	0.56	-7	Autocracy	Y	2.00	4.00	1.48	0.99	0.370
YAR	Yemen, North	1986	0	<58	0.92	-6	Autocracy	Y	1.08	0.00	1.99	0.50	0.362
IVO	Cote d'Ivoire	1965	0	57.46	0.93	-9	Autocracy	Y	0.50	0.00	1.34	0.42	0.360
ETH	Ethiopia	1958	0	14.18	5.62	-9	Autocracy	N	0.00	1.00	1.49	0.38	0.358
IVO	Cote d'Ivoire	1962	0	57.14	0.90	-9	Autocracy	Y	0.50	0.00	1.34	0.42	0.357
MAL	Malaysia	1965	0	84.70	1.99	10	Democracy	N	0.00	1.00	0.53	0.35	0.354
MAL	Malaysia	1962	0	90.35	1.93	10	Democracy	N	0.00	1.00	0.53	0.35	0.352
NIR	Niger	1992	0	38.04	0.92	-7	Autocracy	N	1.59	4.00	2.89	0.84	0.344
SYR	Syria	1974	0	41.84	1.21	-9	Autocracy	Y	1.20	2.00	1.04	0.47	0.335
IVO	Cote d'Ivoire	1996	0	76.03	1.55	-6	Autocracy	Y	1.87	2.00	2.12	0.40	0.335
LIB	Libya	1990	0	80.48	0.53	-7	Autocracy	Y	1.47	3.00	1.58	0.98	0.315



Table C-5

## Classification Results for the Muslim Countries Model (continued)

Country code	Country name	Year	Problem indicator	Independent variables, measured 2 years prior to problem/control									Model score
				Trade openness	Total population relative to world median	Democracy-autocracy	Democracy category <sup>1</sup>	Sectarian Islam indicator	Number of regional memberships relative to world median	Number bordering states with major armed conflict	Infant mortality, relative to world median	Religion Herfindahl	
MOR	Morocco	1957	0	47.22	2.62	0	Autocracy	Y	1.50	1.00	1.31	0.99	0.315
AFG	Afghanistan	1957	0	<58	2.52	-10	Autocracy	Y	0.00	0.00	1.69	0.62	0.313
ALG	Algeria	1980	0	65.55	2.78	-9	Autocracy	Y	2.13	3.00	1.54	0.98	0.308
GAM	Gambia, The	1986	0	111.73	0.10	7	Partial	N	1.00	0.00	2.45	0.76	0.307
YPR	Yemen, South	1983	0	<58	0.25	-8	Autocracy	Y	1.00	0.00	1.99	0.50	0.299
MAL	Malaysia	1977	0	86.82	2.06	5	Partial	N	0.60	2.00	0.47	0.36	0.297
ETH	Ethiopia	1956	0	16.44	5.62	-9	Autocracy	N	0.00	0.00	1.49	0.38	0.294
MOR	Morocco	1995	0	58.63	2.96	-4	Autocracy	Y	1.73	2.00	1.44	0.99	0.292
IRQ	Iraq	1956	0	77.59	1.53	-4	Autocracy	Y	0.50	0.00	1.14	0.43	0.272
IRQ	Iraq	1958	0	69.54	1.53	-4	Autocracy	Y	0.50	0.00	1.14	0.43	0.272
CHA	Chad	1962	0	43.23	0.73	0	Autocracy	N	0.00	1.00	1.62	0.37	0.261
MAL	Malaysia	1980	0	92.55	2.08	5	Partial	N	0.88	2.00	0.47	0.36	0.260
MOR	Morocco	1961	0	38.61	2.62	-5	Autocracy	Y	1.50	0.00	1.31	0.99	0.256
<b>Non-problems classified correctly</b>													
ALG	Algeria	1969	0	44.23	2.60	-9	Autocracy	Y	1.75	0.00	1.50	0.98	0.249
UZB	Uzbekistan	1995	0	181.82	2.55	-9	Autocracy	Y	0.00	2.00	0.99	0.56	0.243
TUR	Turkey	1965	0	9.57	6.59	10	Democracy	Y	4.50	3.00	1.50	0.74	0.237
SYR	Syria	1992	0	55.14	1.46	-9	Autocracy	Y	1.12	4.00	0.92	0.50	0.233
EGY	Egypt	1963	0	37.89	6.19	-7	Autocracy	N	1.00	1.00	1.49	0.85	0.215
ALB	Albania	1965	0	<58	0.39	-9	Autocracy	Y	0.50	0.00	0.84	0.35	0.214
ALB	Albania	1962	0	<58	0.38	-9	Autocracy	Y	0.50	0.00	0.84	0.35	0.213
TUR	Turkey	1956	0	11.54	6.18	4	Partial	Y	3.50	0.00	1.57	0.74	0.211
TUR	Turkey	1958	0	8.70	6.18	4	Partial	Y	3.50	0.00	1.57	0.74	0.211
EGY	Egypt	1958	0	41.09	6.40	-7	Autocracy	N	1.00	1.00	1.41	0.85	0.206
NIG	Nigeria	1991	0	57.85	11.55	-5	Autocracy	N	1.24	0.00	1.77	0.30	0.206

**Table C-5**  
**Classification Results for the Muslim Countries Model (continued)**

Country code	Country name	Year	Problem indicator	Independent variables, measured 2 years prior to problem/control									Model score
				Trade openness	Total population relative to world median	Democracy-autocracy	Democracy category <sup>1</sup>	Sectarian Islam indicator	Number of regional memberships relative to world median	Number bordering states with major armed conflict	Infant mortality, relative to world median	Religion Herfindahl	
JOR	Jordan	1983	0	140.18	0.34	-10	Autocracy	Y	1.25	3.00	0.86	0.86	0.200
UZB	Uzbekistan	1991	0	>58	2.47	0	Autocracy	Y	0.00	1.00	1.03	0.56	0.198
NIG	Nigeria	1978	0	42.14	10.32	-7	Autocracy	N	1.00	0.00	1.45	0.31	0.193
MLI	Mali	1971	0	32.05	1.03	-7	Autocracy	Y	1.00	0.00	2.05	0.63	0.182
MAL	Malaysia	1992	0	150.62	2.15	5	Partial	N	0.47	1.00	0.30	0.37	0.181
NIG	Nigeria	1995	0	68.08	12.17	-7	Autocracy	N	1.53	1.00	1.96	0.31	0.181
JOR	Jordan	1991	0	133.38	0.38	-4	Autocracy	Y	1.06	2.00	0.85	0.86	0.179
NIG	Nigeria	1975	0	31.27	10.17	-7	Autocracy	N	1.00	0.00	1.31	0.31	0.177
GNB	Guinea-Bissau	1980	0	44.59	0.12	-7	Autocracy	N	0.25	0.00	2.43	0.42	0.174
GNB	Guinea-Bissau	1977	0	31.13	0.11	-7	Autocracy	N	0.25	0.00	2.43	0.42	0.170
JOR	Jordan	1988	0	84.75	0.36	-9	Autocracy	Y	1.17	2.00	0.85	0.86	0.167
GUI	Guinea	1962	0	30.37	0.79	-9	Autocracy	N	0.50	0.00	1.68	0.49	0.167
SEN	Senegal	1983	0	83.56	0.87	1	Partial	N	2.13	0.00	1.38	0.83	0.165
MAL	Malaysia	1996	0	180.41	2.24	5	Partial	N	0.67	1.00	0.30	0.37	0.164
SIE	Sierra Leone	1962	0	>58	0.53	0	Autocracy	N	0.00	0.00	1.83	0.42	0.161
MLI	Mali	1962	0	24.14	1.03	-7	Autocracy	Y	1.00	0.00	1.78	0.63	0.160
SAU	Saudi Arabia	1975	0	101.67	1.16	-10	Autocracy	Y	0.80	2.00	1.24	0.75	0.159
EGY	Egypt	1975	0	33.14	6.13	-7	Autocracy	N	1.80	1.00	1.76	0.85	0.158
GUI	Guinea	1958	0	<58	0.73	0	Autocracy	N	0.50	0.00	1.61	0.49	0.157
JOR	Jordan	1965	0	64.75	0.22	-9	Autocracy	Y	1.00	1.00	1.07	0.86	0.157
SYR	Syria	1996	0	55.74	1.56	-9	Autocracy	Y	1.47	3.00	0.92	0.50	0.155
JOR	Jordan	1994	0	137.26	0.44	-3	Autocracy	Y	1.40	2.00	0.84	0.86	0.150
SIE	Sierra Leone	1988	0	70.56	0.49	-7	Autocracy	N	1.08	0.00	3.46	0.41	0.149
LEB	Lebanon	1997	0	77.11	0.45	-3	Autocracy	Y	1.00	1.00	0.77	0.29	0.144

**Table C-5**  
**Classification Results for the Muslim Countries Model (continued)**

Country code	Country name	Year	Problem indicator	Independent variables, measured 2 years prior to problem/control									Model score
				Trade openness	Total population relative to world median	Democracy-autocracy	Democracy category <sup>1</sup>	Sectarian Islam indicator	Number of regional memberships relative to world median	Number bordering states with major armed conflict	Infant mortality, relative to world median	Religion Herfindahl	
SUD	Sudan	1980	0	24.83	2.78	-7	Autocracy	N	1.88	6.00	1.34	0.62	0.143
GNB	Guinea-Bissau	1990	0	72.05	0.12	-8	Autocracy	N	0.41	0.00	2.91	0.42	0.137
MAA	Mauritania	1964	0	55.65	0.24	-4	Autocracy	N	0.50	1.00	1.45	0.94	0.135
OMA	Oman	1963	0	>58	0.13	-10	Autocracy	Y	0.00	0.00	1.77	0.67	0.132
SIE	Sierra Leone	1983	0	65.09	0.50	-7	Autocracy	N	1.13	0.00	3.01	0.41	0.129
DJI	Djibouti	1991	0	114.95	0.06	-8	Autocracy	N	0.71	2.00	2.35	0.89	0.127
OMA	Oman	1957	0	>58	0.13	-6	Autocracy	Y	0.00	0.00	1.70	0.67	0.126
BFO	Burkina Faso	1990	0	37.92	1.08	-7	Autocracy	N	1.47	0.00	2.09	0.40	0.123
SAU	Saudi Arabia	1956	0	>58	0.93	-10	Autocracy	Y	0.50	0.00	1.39	0.75	0.122
SAU	Saudi Arabia	1958	0	>58	0.93	-10	Autocracy	Y	0.50	0.00	1.39	0.75	0.122
IVO	Cote d'Ivoire	1980	0	73.96	1.20	-9	Autocracy	Y	2.38	0.00	1.61	0.41	0.122
SAU	Saudi Arabia	1962	0	72.16	0.97	-10	Autocracy	Y	0.50	0.00	1.36	0.75	0.122
LIB	Libya	1958	0	>58	0.29	-7	Autocracy	N	0.50	2.00	1.31	0.96	0.121
GAM	Gambia, The	1981	0	94.25	0.10	8	Democracy	N	1.13	0.00	2.30	0.74	0.121
SAU	Saudi Arabia	1965	0	79.49	1.00	-10	Autocracy	Y	1.00	1.00	1.36	0.75	0.117
SOM	Somalia	1986	0	75.67	1.08	-7	Autocracy	N	1.50	1.00	2.27	1.00	0.116
BFO	Burkina Faso	1986	0	42.72	1.08	-7	Autocracy	N	1.42	0.00	1.86	0.40	0.114
KYR	Kyrgyzstan	1991	0	>58	0.53	0	Autocracy	N	0.00	1.00	0.87	0.46	0.105
MAL	Malaysia	1958	0	83.95	1.81	0	Autocracy	N	0.00	1.00	0.63	0.35	0.104
SOM	Somalia	1980	0	81.95	0.98	-7	Autocracy	N	1.50	1.00	2.05	1.00	0.103
SEN	Senegal	1978	0	80.62	0.81	-6	Autocracy	Y	2.60	1.00	1.34	0.81	0.100
DJI	Djibouti	1986	0	130.08	0.05	-8	Autocracy	N	0.50	1.00	2.10	0.89	0.096
MAA	Mauritania	1961	0	>58	0.23	0	Autocracy	N	0.50	1.00	1.41	0.94	0.095
DJI	Djibouti	1996	0	111.13	0.07	-6	Autocracy	N	1.00	1.00	2.67	0.89	0.095
LIB	Libya	1961	0	>58	0.29	-7	Autocracy	N	0.50	1.00	1.31	0.96	0.093

**Table C-5**  
**Classification Results for the Muslim Countries Model (continued)**

Country code	Country name	Year	Problem indicator	Independent variables, measured 2 years prior to problem/control									Model score
				Trade openness	Total population relative to world median	Democracy-autocracy	Democracy category <sup>1</sup>	Sectarian Islam indicator	Number of regional memberships relative to world median	Number bordering states with major armed conflict	Infant mortality, relative to world median	Religion Herfindahl	
LIB	Libya	1975	0	92.01	0.39	-7	Autocracy	N	1.20	2.00	1.38	0.98	0.089
IVO	Cote d'Ivoire	1975	0	68.99	1.10	-9	Autocracy	Y	2.80	0.00	1.52	0.41	0.087
SEN	Senegal	1975	0	67.23	0.80	-7	Autocracy	Y	2.60	0.00	1.44	0.81	0.082
GUI	Guinea	1991	0	60.88	0.69	-7	Autocracy	N	0.76	1.00	2.79	0.54	0.081
MAA	Mauritania	1967	0	67.15	0.24	-7	Autocracy	N	0.50	0.00	1.57	0.94	0.081
TUN	Tunisia	1971	0	34.81	0.99	-9	Autocracy	N	1.50	0.00	1.38	1.00	0.076
QAT	Qatar	1971	0	>58	0.02	0	Autocracy	Y	0.40	0.00	0.79	0.98	0.075
LIB	Libya	1980	0	91.02	0.44	-7	Autocracy	N	1.63	2.00	1.48	0.98	0.074
GUI	Guinea	1975	0	33.83	0.71	-9	Autocracy	N	0.60	0.00	2.08	0.51	0.073
OMA	Oman	1981	0	101.78	0.16	-10	Autocracy	Y	1.00	1.00	1.30	0.62	0.072
TUN	Tunisia	1964	0	32.38	1.00	-9	Autocracy	N	2.00	1.00	1.32	1.00	0.069
BFO	Burkina Faso	1961	0	19.90	1.04	0	Autocracy	N	0.50	0.00	1.63	0.58	0.067
TUN	Tunisia	1956	0	<58	1.00	0	Autocracy	N	2.00	1.00	1.26	1.00	0.066
SAU	Saudi Arabia	1991	0	75.40	1.87	-10	Autocracy	Y	1.18	1.00	0.71	0.75	0.065
MAA	Mauritania	1994	0	90.89	0.25	-6	Autocracy	N	2.33	2.00	2.34	1.00	0.065
NIR	Niger	1963	0	17.83	0.78	-7	Autocracy	N	0.50	0.00	1.59	0.73	0.061
GUI	Guinea	1983	0	64.90	0.69	-9	Autocracy	N	0.63	0.00	2.49	0.54	0.060
BFO	Burkina Faso	1978	0	37.76	1.04	-4	Autocracy	N	2.40	0.00	1.75	0.44	0.057
BFO	Burkina Faso	1965	0	22.83	1.09	-7	Autocracy	N	0.50	0.00	1.36	0.58	0.057
GUI	Guinea	1980	0	59.32	0.68	-9	Autocracy	N	0.63	0.00	2.31	0.51	0.056
TUN	Tunisia	1967	0	33.44	1.00	-9	Autocracy	N	2.00	0.00	1.38	1.00	0.055
TUN	Tunisia	1961	0	<58	1.00	-9	Autocracy	N	2.00	0.00	1.26	1.00	0.050
TUR	Turkey	1962	0	4.91	6.52	0	Autocracy	Y	3.50	0.00	1.50	0.74	0.045
MAA	Mauritania	1977	0	99.37	0.23	-7	Autocracy	N	2.00	1.00	1.72	0.96	0.044
TUN	Tunisia	1990	0	83.68	0.99	-5	Autocracy	N	1.65	1.00	0.94	1.00	0.044
UAE	United Arab	1975	0	114.91	0.06	-8	Autocracy	N	0.20	1.00	0.67	0.45	0.042

**Table C-5**  
**Classification Results for the Muslim Countries Model (continued)**

Country code	Country name	Year	Problem indicator	Independent variables, measured 2 years prior to problem/control									Model score
				Trade openness	Total population relative to world median	Democracy-autocracy	Democracy category <sup>1</sup>	Sectarian Islam indicator	Number of regional memberships relative to world median	Number bordering states with major armed conflict	Infant mortality, relative to world median	Religion Herfindahl	
Emirates													
MAA	Mauritania	1986	0	119.36	0.24	-7	Autocracy	N	2.25	1.00	1.86	0.98	0.041
TUN	Tunisia	1998	0	86.04	0.99	-3	Autocracy	N	1.87	1.00	0.99	1.00	0.040
QAT	Qatar	1988	0	73.91	0.05	-10	Autocracy	Y	1.33	0.00	0.61	0.86	0.040
QAT	Qatar	1991	0	77.37	0.05	-10	Autocracy	Y	1.12	0.00	0.51	0.86	0.038
QAT	Qatar	1980	0	>58	0.03	-10	Autocracy	Y	1.25	0.00	0.61	0.98	0.038
QAT	Qatar	1998	0	77.37	0.07	-10	Autocracy	Y	1.47	0.00	0.52	0.83	0.034
QAT	Qatar	1995	0	77.37	0.07	-10	Autocracy	Y	1.47	0.00	0.51	0.83	0.033
GAM	Gambia, The	1965	0	77.63	0.08	0	Autocracy	N	0.25	0.00	1.77	0.74	0.032
KUW	Kuwait	1963	0	>58	0.07	0	Autocracy	Y	1.00	1.00	0.66	0.53	0.029
OMA	Oman	1990	0	78.64	0.19	-10	Autocracy	Y	1.06	0.00	0.69	0.53	0.029
COM	Comoros	1990	0	59.76	0.05	-7	Autocracy	N	0.41	0.00	1.95	0.74	0.028
OMA	Oman	1997	0	89.20	0.24	-9	Autocracy	Y	1.20	0.00	0.66	0.51	0.027
KUW	Kuwait	1967	0	90.79	0.10	-9	Autocracy	Y	1.00	1.00	0.55	0.53	0.027
BAH	Bahrain	1971	0	>58	0.04	0	Autocracy	N	0.60	0.00	0.78	0.47	0.025
NIR	Niger	1974	0	34.71	0.78	-7	Autocracy	N	2.60	1.00	1.96	0.75	0.025
KUW	Kuwait	1991	0	93.77	0.25	-10	Autocracy	Y	1.24	1.00	0.42	0.52	0.022
KUW	Kuwait	1981	0	106.79	0.20	-10	Autocracy	Y	1.38	1.00	0.47	0.53	0.021
UAE	United Arab Emirates	1980	0	106.32	0.13	-8	Autocracy	N	0.88	0.00	0.52	0.45	0.019
KUW	Kuwait	1996	0	93.58	0.17	-7	Autocracy	Y	1.47	1.00	0.42	0.52	0.017
UAE	United Arab Emirates	1992	0	107.31	0.22	-8	Autocracy	N	1.24	0.00	0.44	0.45	0.014
UAE	United Arab Emirates	1997	0	138.72	0.27	-8	Autocracy	N	1.47	0.00	0.40	0.45	0.012
BAH	Bahrain	1995	0	199.98	0.06	-9	Autocracy	N	1.20	0.00	0.47	0.43	0.011

**Table C-5**  
**Classification Results for the Muslim Countries Model**

Country code	Country name	Year	Problem indicator	Independent variables, measured 2 years prior to problem/control									Model Score
				Trade openness	Total population relative to world median	Democracy-autocracy	Democracy category <sup>1</sup>	Sectarian Islam indicator	Number of regional memberships relative to world median	Number bordering states with major armed conflict	Infant mortality, relative to world median	Religion Herfindahl	
BAH	Bahrain	1991	0	187.70	0.06	-10	Autocracy	N	1.06	0.00	0.40	0.47	0.010
BAH	Bahrain	1983	0	251.14	0.05	-10	Autocracy	N	1.13	0.00	0.35	0.47	0.008
<b>Missing data</b>													
ERI	Eritrea	1994	0	95.91	0.39	0	Autocracy		0.21	2.00	1.82		
ETI	Ethiopia (1993-)	1995	0	25.27	6.18	0	Autocracy		0.86	4.00			
LEB	Lebanon	1963	0		0.47	2	Partial	Y	0.50	0.00	0.53	0.25	
TKM	Turkmenistan	1991	0		0.44	0	Autocracy		0.00	2.00	1.12	0.58	
TKM	Turkmenistan	1995	0		0.50	-9	Autocracy		0.00	2.00	1.33	0.58	
YPR	Yemen, South	1967	0			0	Autocracy	Y	0.75	0.00	2.04	0.50	
BOS	Bosnia and Herzegovina	1992	1		0.54	0	Autocracy	Y	0.00	0.00	0.35	0.32	
LEB	Lebanon	1958	1		0.42	2	Partial	Y	0.50	0.00	0.56	0.25	
LEB	Lebanon	1965	1		0.48	2	Partial	Y	1.00	0.00	0.53	0.25	

<sup>1</sup>PARTIAL = partial democracy; DEMOCRACY = full democracy

## Appendix D

### Ethnic War Model

This appendix provides more detail on the analysis used to derive the ethnic war model.

Table D-1 lists the onsets of ethnic war that defined the dependent variable for this analysis.

**Table D-1**  
**Onsets of Ethnic War, 1955-98**<sup>1</sup>

Country	Began	Ended	Brief Description
Afghanistan	5/92	— <sup>2</sup>	Soviet-supported Najibullah regime falls after defection of General Dostam and his Uzbek militia. Mujahidin forces enter Kabul and establish interim Taliban-controlled central government. Civil war continues among political factions based on Pashtun, Tajik, Uzbek, and Hazara ethnic groups as Taliban attempts to extend its authority.
Algeria	7/62	12/62	In wake of independence from France, Algerian militants attack Europeans and Muslim civilians who collaborated with French colonial authorities.
Angola	1/75	—	Post-independence civil war between Mbundu-dominated central government, Bakongo and Cabindan rebels, and UNITA (Union for the Total Independence of Angola), based on Ovimbundu people of south Angola. Lusaka protocol ends conflict for a short time but intense fighting erupts again in late 1998.
Azerbaijan	2/88	6/97	Armenian rebellion to secure independence of Nagorno-Karabakh enclave checked by 6/97 cease-fire.
Bosnia and Herzegovina	3/92	9/96	The breakup of the Yugoslav Federation leads to ethno-national conflict among Serb, Croat, and Muslim inhabitants of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Dayton peace accord ends fighting after country has been de facto partitioned along ethnic lines.
Burma	8/61	—	Karen, Kachin, Shan, Mon, Chin, and other non-Burman peoples fight for greater regional autonomy.
Burundi	8/88	—	Attempted democratic reforms prompt violence between historically dominant Tutsis and Hutu challengers. In 1993, Hutu opposition forces win first multiparty presidential and legislative elections, provoking disaffected Tutsi military forces to revolt and assassinate the Hutu president. Subsequent armed clashes and massacres occur in three waves: Tutsi soldiers against Hutu civilians, Hutus against Tutsis, and Tutsis against Hutus.
Chad	10/65	3/96	Recurring civil war among Chad's many communal groups with shifting alliances, but mainly along north-south lines.
China	7/88	—	Episodic violent protests by Uyghurs in Xinjiang Province against Han Chinese control escalate by 1996 into terror campaign.
Congo-Kinshasa	7/60	11/65	Independence is followed by intense political and tribal factionalism and the emergence of secessionist movements. Mutiny within ranks of military escalates into full-scale civil war. Katanga and South Kasai secede from newly independent Congo (1960) followed by secession of Orientale and Kivu (1961) and rebellions in Stanleyville and Kwilu (1964). Failed attempt at democracy ends in establishment of military dictatorship under General Mobutu.
Congo-Kinshasa	3/77	12/79	Independence movement of Lunda/Yeke (FNLC—Zaire National Liberation Front) invades Shaba (Katanga) Province, their traditional homeland. Episodic rebellions and agitation are countered by killings of political opponents, dissident tribesmen, and prisoners.

**Table D-1**  
**Onsets of Ethnic War, 1955-98 (continued)**

Country	Began	Ended	Brief Description
Congo-Kinshasa	11/84	11/84	Second FNLC invasion of Shaba from bases in Angola, known as Shaba II Rebellion.
	3/92	—	In reaction to absolute power wielded by Mobutu's military-backed government, pro-democracy opposition pressures him to appoint new prime minister and government. Communal violence erupts in Shaba (Katanga) between Luba-Kasai minority and dominant Lunda; regional governments become more autonomous. Disaffection with the policies of the nascent Kabila regime leads to the polarization of ethnic-militias and the widening of the conflict to include armed forces from regional states.
Croatia	6/91	12/95	Serbs in eastern Croatia and Krajina fight newly independent Croat Government for autonomy, fighting checked in 1992 by UN peacekeeping force.
Cyprus	11/63	6/68	Constitutional amendment proposed by President Makarios is unacceptable to Turkish-Cypriots and the democratic coalition of Greek and Turkish parties collapse. Intense communal fighting in 1963-64 leads to intervention by UN peacekeepers. After a brief flare-up in 1967, ethnic-Turks set up separate administration in northern Cyprus.
Ethiopia	7/61	12/94	Eritrean secessionists led by ELF (Eritrean Liberation Front) and EPLF (Eritrean People's Liberation Front), joined by Afars, Oromos, and others in mid-1970s, fight civil wars for independence from successive imperial and Marxist regimes in Addis Ababa. Somalis in Ogaden rebel twice between 1961 and 1980.
Georgia	6/91	12/93	Abkhaz and South Ossetian regional governments fight for independence with backing from Russian military and political elements, effective autonomy secured in both regions by 1993.
	5/98	—	Fighting erupts in troubled Abkhazia as rebels drive ethnic-Georgians out of contested lands.
Guatemala	1975	1996	Communist insurgents battle military-dominated government forces in protracted revolutionary conflict ended by negotiated settlement in 1996. In 1975, some indigenous Mayans who support populist and revolutionary causes join the insurgency.
Indonesia	11/75	6/91	East Timor rebels fight to regain autonomy lost when Indonesia invaded the former Portuguese colony in 11/75.
	2/97	—	Fighting in East Timor resumes in 1997. Aceh increase oppositional activity. Anti-Ambonese and anti-Chinese violence takes place under cover of general protest and rioting.
Iran	4/79	—	Kurds rebel for regional autonomy, fighting declines after 1984 to sporadic guerrilla activity.
Iraq	7/61	3/75	Barzani's Kurdish Democratic Party revolts against General Qassim's regime and its successors in quest for regional autonomy (ETH 7/61-3/70). Fighting resumes in 4/74 as Kurds reject government autonomy plan that falls short of their demands (ETH 4/74-3/75). To suppress repeated rebellions for independent Kurdistan, military engages in large-scale massacres (GEN 6/63-3/75).
	9/80	—	Some Iraqi Kurds take advantage of Iran-Iraq war and Iranian support to mount new rebellion for autonomy.
	3/91	—	Kurdish rebels take advantage of Iraq's defeat in Gulf war to establish a de facto Kurdish state, protected by US- and British-led coalition forces, while Shia rebellion in the south is repressed by Iraqi forces.
Israel	6/67	—	Palestinians engage in guerrilla warfare and terror against Israel's repressive authority in Israeli-occupied Gaza and West Bank and in Israel proper. Anti-Israeli activity largely shifts away from lethal methods in late 1980s with the <i>intifada</i> and the Middle East Peace process.
Kenya	10/91	9/93	Kalenjin and Masai supporters of the government are encouraged in attacks aimed at driving Kikuyu, Luo, and other rival groups from their villages in highlands.
Laos	7/61	6/79	Hmong (Meo) rebels encouraged fighting Pathet Lao; rebellion is suppressed after Pathet Lao takeover in 1975, no significant guerrilla activity after 1979.
Mali	6/90	2/93	Rebellion by nomadic Tuaregs seeking regional autonomy.



**Table D-1**  
**Onsets of Ethnic War, 1955-98 (continued)**

Country	Began	Ended	Brief Description
Mexico	1/94	2/94	Zapatista (EZLN) rebels begin uprising in Chiapas, protesting treatment of indigenous peoples. Disturbance ignites demonstrations throughout country.
Moldova	10/90	5/97	Russian-backed Slavic minority fights for autonomy in Trans-Dniester Republic.
Morocco	10/75	11/89	Saharawis seek independence in southwestern part of country annexed by Morocco after Spanish colonial rule.
Nicaragua	2/81	6/90	Indigenous Miskitos of Atlantic coast region rebel against Sandinista Government.
Niger	1/96	7/96	Military coup overthrows democratically elected government and suspends 1992 Constitution. Coup leader Col. Ibrahim Mainassara Barre is elected president in seriously flawed elections.
Nigeria	1/66	1/70	Ethnic violence sparked by democratic elections triggers military coup and abandonment of state's federal structure. Countercoup and retaliatory massacres of Ibos in north precipitate secessionist civil war by Biafra, based on Ibos of eastern region.
Pakistan	9/60	5/61	Sporadic violence erupts as Pashtuns seek autonomy.
	3/71	11/71	Post-election tensions between East and West Pakistan erupt into massive resistance by Bengali nationalists; intervention by India leads to establishment of independent Bangladesh. Military imposes martial law.
	2/73	7/77	Baluchi rebellion against central authority, backed by opposition National Awami Party is suppressed by military.
	8/83	—	Violent campaign by Sindhis seeking autonomy; violent attacks on Muhajirs in Karachi.
Papua New Guinea <sup>3</sup>	11/88	1/98	Bougainvillean Revolutionary Army fights PNG forces to end large-scale mining and gain independence for the island of Bougainville.
Philippines	10/72	—	Muslim Moros mount guerrilla war for independence.
Russia	7/90	12/96	Declarations of sovereignty by autonomous national regions in North Caucasus (Chechen, Ingush, others) and Far East (Buryat and others) lead to anti-Russian protest, interethnic clashes, and (in Chechnya) to open rebellion.
Rwanda	11/63	6/64	Cross-border incursions by Tutsi rebels prompt local Hutu officials to orchestrate vengeance attacks and massacres by Hutus, leading to flight of 200,000 Tutsi refugees.
	10/90	—	Tutsi exiles of RPF launch successive invasions from Uganda prompting sporadic violence between Hutu army and Tutsi civilians. Hutu-dominated military government promises return to democratic rule, and transitional government is established as Tutsi guerrillas invade. When President Habyarimana's aircraft is shot down (4/94), Hutu government deploys military and armed gangs to systematically slaughter Tutsis and Hutu moderates. Ethnic-Tutsi RPF (Rwandan Patriotic Front) seizes control of government by 7/94 but is unable to control Hutu militias operating from cross-border sanctuaries.
Senegal	6/91	—	Violence increases in Casamance region as Casamancais (MFDC) rebels intensify separatist campaign.
Somalia	5/88	—	Siad Barre regime is challenged by rebellions of Somali National Movement, based on northern Issaq clan, and United Somali Congress, based on southern Hawiye clan. Barre regime collapses but violence among clan-based warlords continues in south.
South Africa	1/87	6/96	Zulu Inkatha movement wars with ANC supporters for political control in Natal, initially with clandestine support from Afrikaner government's security forces.
Sri Lanka	7/83	—	Ethnic-Tamil grievances against pro-Sinhalese governmental policies erupt into secessionist civil war in the northeast.
Sudan	10/56	3/72	Anyanya rebellion by non-Muslim population of southern Sudan against Muslim-dominated government ends with 1972 autonomy agreement.
	7/83	—	Southern rebellion resumes under SPLA (Sudan People's Liberation Army) leadership after Muslim government violates autonomy agreement; in 1991 SPLA's breakup leads to new inter-communal violence within the south <sup>1</sup>

**Table D-1**  
**Onsets of Ethnic War, 1955-98 (continued)**

Country	Began	Ended	Brief Description
Thailand	7/67	7/83	Malay Muslims engage in sporadic separatist activity against state authorities in southern Thailand.
	8/93	—	Separatist rebellion by Malay Muslims resumes in south <sup>3</sup>
Turkey	8/84	—	Kurds of militant PKK (Kurdistan Workers' Party) engage in protracted conflict with Turkish authorities in quest for independence, provoking deadly counterinsurgency campaigns.
Uganda	10/80	—	Banditry and rebellion by tribal supporters of deposed Gen. Idi Amin. Widespread corruption, repression, and ethnic conflict lead to overthrow of Milton Obote's military-backed civilian regime by General Musaveni's National Resistance Army in 1985. From 1986, rebellion is dominated by Langi and Acholi peoples at war with government forces dominated by Bagandans.
UK <sup>3</sup>	4/69	10/94	Catholic IRA (Irish Republican Army) uses terror against British forces and militant Protestants in quest for union with Republic of Ireland.
USSR (Soviet Union)	12/86	8/91	Georgians, Azerbaijanis, and Kazakhs engage in violent clashes while protesting Soviet rule; popular front movements win control of Baltic republic governments and declare sovereignty.
Vietnam, North	7/58	3/75	Mountain tribal people (Montagnards) rebel against Communist government to gain greater autonomy.
Yugoslavia	3/81	4/81	Ethnic rioting by Kosovar Albanians, leading to attacks on Yugoslav militiamen and federal institutions.
	6/91	1/92	Slovenes and Croats fight wars of independence against Yugoslav federal troops.
	2/98	—	Kosovar Liberation Army (KLA) mobilizes resistance to Serbian control of Kosovo (1996). Crackdown by Yugoslav Army in February 1998 leads to open warfare.
Zimbabwe	6/81	12/87	Ndebele people initiate rioting and local rebellions against Shona-dominated ZANU governing coalition.

<sup>1</sup>This list is an updated and enhanced version of earlier versions that first appeared in Esty, Gurr, Goldstone, Surko, and Unger, Working Papers: State Failure Task Force Report, Science Applications International Corporation (McLean, VA), Nov. 1995, and subsequently in Esty, Goldstone, Gurr, Harff, Levy, Dabelko, Surko, and Unger, State Failure Task Force Report: Phase II Findings, Science Applications International Corporation (McLean, VA), July 1998. Updates and enhancements were undertaken by Keith Jagers and Donna Ramsey Marshall under the direction of Monty G. Marshall in consultation with Ted Robert Gurr and Barbara Harff. Area experts have reviewed the list on several occasions; several cases were added, deleted, or modified on their recommendation.

<sup>2</sup>Complex events are made up of two or more temporally linked wars and crises. If events overlap or if four years or less separate the end of one event and the onset of the next, they are combined into complex events. The specific types of events and their dates, if different from the dates of the complex event, are shown in parentheses after the description.

<sup>3</sup>Ethnic wars of very low magnitude are included in the list but not in the set of conflicts, crises, and transitions analyzed for this report. There are two such cases: Papua New Guinea beginning 11/88 and the United Kingdom beginning 4/69. A third occurred in Thailand beginning in 1993, but it is included as part of a complex crisis that began in 1991.

## Control Cases

Table D-2 lists the country-years randomly selected as control cases for estimating the ethnic war model.

**Table D-2**  
**Control Cases Used in Ethnic War Model**

Country	Years
Afghanistan	1956, 1963, 1983
Albania	1981
Algeria	1967, 1988
Argentina	1975
Australia	1963, 1988
Austria	1969
Bangladesh	1980, 1991, 1997
Belarus	1994
Belgium	1960, 1865, 1987
Bhutan	1963
Bolivia	1958
Botswana	1991
Bulgaria	1965, 1977, 1983, 1991
Burkina Faso	1991
Canada	1983
Central African Republic	1961, 1966, 1975
Chile	1990
China	1981
Comoros	1975, 1992
Congo-Brazzaville	1992, 1998
Costa Rica	1981
Cote d'Ivoire	1963
Cyprus	1960, 1990
Czechoslovakia	1965, 1990
Denmark	1963, 1979
Djibouti <sup>1</sup>	1991
Ecuador	1967, 1988
Egypt	1973, 1981
El Salvador	1972
Equatorial Guinea <sup>1</sup>	1984, 1990
Eritrea	1994
Estonia	1991
Ethiopia	1993
Fiji	1991
Finland	1998
France	1991, 1998
Gabon	1961, 1983

**Table D-2**  
**Control Cases Used in Ethnic War Model (continued)**

<b>Country</b>	<b>Years</b>
Germany, West	1971, 1988
Ghana	1960, 1975, 1988
Greece	1960, 1991
Guatemala	1961
Guinea	1966
Guinea-Bissau	1991
Guyana	1981, 1991
Haiti	1979, 1990
Honduras	1961, 1991
Hungary	1983
Iran	1961, 1971
Ireland	1980, 1988
Israel	1965
Italy	1965, 1984
Jamaica	1962, 1988
Japan	1962
Jordan	1980, 1988
Korea, North	1975, 1984, 1991
Korea, South	1956, 1967, 1992
Kyrgyzstan	1992
Laos	1984, 1991
Latvia	1991
Lesotho	1975, 1992
Liberia	1991
Libya	1961
Madagascar	1992
Malawi	1991
Mali	1967, 1983, 1988
Mauritania	1984, 1991
Mauritius	1998
Mexico	1960, 1980, 1986, 1991
Mongolia	1961, 1994
Mozambique	1979, 1988
Nepal	1977
Netherlands	1965, 1991, 1988
New Zealand	1980
Nigeria	1981, 1991
Oman	1961
Panama	1961, 1983, 1991
Paraguay	1975, 1983
Peru	1975
Philippines	1967
Poland	1977, 1991
Portugal	1987

**Table D-2**  
**Control Cases Used in Ethnic War Model (continued)**

<b>Country</b>	<b>Years</b>
Qatar	1992
Romania	1956, 1975, 1992
Sierra Leone	1961, 1986
Singapore	1966, 1975, 1984
Spain	1960, 1986, 1992
Sri Lanka	1961, 1967
Swaziland	1973
Sweden	1981, 1987
Switzerland	1998
Syria	1988
Taiwan	1988
Tajikistan	1997
Tanzania	1991
Togo	1969, 1991
Trinidad	1981
Tunisia	1958, 1981, 1991
Turkey	1961, 1969
Ukraine	1993
United Arab Emirates	1972, 1983
United Kingdom	1958
Uruguay	1975, 1997
Venezuela	1962, 1973
Yemen	1991
Yemen, North	1963, 1980
Yugoslavia	1975
Zambia	1972, 1990
Zimbabwe	1971, 1993

<sup>1</sup>Djibouti and Equatorial Guinea were inadvertently included in the set of countries from which control cases were selected, despite falling below our population size cutoff of 500,000.

## Model Results

Table D-3 shows coefficients and p-values<sup>1</sup> for the six variables included in the ethnic war model. All six variables were significant at the  $p < 0.05$  level.

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**Table D-3**  
**Ethnic War Model Coefficients (N = 59 problem cases, 172 control cases)**

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Variable	Coefficient	P-value <sup>1</sup>
History of upheaval (dichotomized)	1.24	<0.01
Discrimination present (dichotomized)	2.57	<0.01
High ethnic diversity (Herfindahl <0.25)	1.53	0.02
Moderate ethnic diversity (Herfindahl $\geq 0.25$ and <0.70)	1.17	0.01
Infant mortality (normalized)	0.72	0.02
Few memberships in regional intergovernmental organizations (normalized, dichotomized)	0.99	0.02

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<sup>1</sup>“P-value” refers to a test of the statistical significance of an individual variable in multi-variable models. Values close to zero indicate that the variable has a measurable effect on state failure.

As Table D-4 shows, this model correctly classified 79.2 percent of the cases from which it was estimated. Of the 59 onsets of ethnic war in our data set,

48 (81.4 percent) were classified correctly, and of the 172 control cases selected at random, 135 (78.5 percent) were classified correctly.

**Table D-4**  
**Classification Accuracy of the Ethnic War Model**

Case Type	Classification Correct		Classification Incorrect		Total
	Number	Percent	Number	Percent	
Problem	48	81.4	11	18.6	59
Control	135	78.5	37	21.5	172
Total Cases	183	79.2	48	20.8	231

A closer look at the 11 false negatives—that is, onsets of ethnic war that our model incorrectly classified as stable states—reveals that international forces played a key role in several of them. In Azerbaijan (1991), Georgia (1998), Chad (1965), Burundi (1988), Morocco (1975), and Israel (1967), the actions of parties based outside the country’s boundaries helped to tip the country into ethnic war. Clearly, our model is not capturing the influence of hostile international engagement on the risk of violent ethnic conflict, and we intend to look more closely at this issue in future analyses.

Many of the false positives—control cases incorrectly classified as ethnic conflicts—shared a common bond as well. Laos, Iran, Nigeria, Bangladesh, Cyprus, China, Mexico, and several other of the countries represented in the control set have experienced ethnic war since 1955. This history suggests that these countries had considerable potential for ethnic conflict, despite its absence in the years represented in the control set. Thus, the model appears to be picking up structural vulnerabilities well while missing the kinds of short-term changes or triggering events that may tip vulnerable countries into ethnic war.

**Table D-5**  
**Ethnic War Model Classification Results**

Country code	Country name	Year	Ethnic war indicator	Independent variables, measured two years prior to problem/control					Model score
				Prior upheaval	Infant mortality relative to world median	Discrimination/separatist activity indicator	Number of regional organizations relative to world median	Ethnic Herfindahl	
<b>Problems classified correctly</b>									
ZAI	Congo-Kinshasa	1984	1	4.0	1.70	1	0.83	0.18	0.89
PAK	Pakistan	1983	1	10.5	1.83	1	0.50	0.40	0.85
SAF	South Africa	1987	1	10.0	1.12	1	0.25	0.17	0.85
PAK	Pakistan	1973	1	8.0	1.65	1	0.75	0.37	0.84
PKS	Pakistan (Pre-1971)	1971	1	3.0	1.45	1	0.75	0.36	0.83
IRN	Iran	1979	1	4.0	1.38	1	0.50	0.33	0.83
PHI	Philippines	1972	1	3.0	0.84	1	0.50	0.21	0.83
INS	Indonesia	1975	1	18.5	1.34	1	0.80	0.36	0.82
PKS	Pakistan (Pre-1971)	1960	1	13.0	1.31	1	0.50	0.36	0.82
INS	Indonesia	1997	1	13.0	1.28	1	0.67	0.37	0.82
ZIM	Zimbabwe	1981	1	12.0	1.18	1	0.13	0.52	0.81
ZAI	Congo-Kinshasa	1992	1	5.0	2.22	1	1.12	0.18	0.78
THI	Thailand	1967	1	1.0	0.84	1	1.00	0.36	0.77
THI	Thailand	1993	1	3.0	0.74	1	0.47	0.37	0.75
ZAI	Congo-Kinshasa	1977	1	19.0	1.61	1	1.20	0.17	0.74
UGA	Uganda	1980	1	30.0	1.57	1	1.88	0.16	0.74
YUG	Yugoslavia	1991	1	1.0	0.57	1	0.71	0.26	0.72
SRI	Sri Lanka	1983	1	1.0	0.56	1	0.50	0.59	0.71



**Table D-5**  
**Ethnic War Model Classification Results** (*continued*)

Country code	Country name	Year	Ethnic war indicator	Independent variables, measured two years prior to problem/control					Model score
				Prior upheaval	Infant mortality relative to world median	Discrimination/separatist activity indicator	Number of regional organizations relative to world median	Ethnic Herfindahl	
KEN	Kenya	1991	1	0.0	1.44	1	0.88	0.17	0.67
SUD	Sudan	1983	1	20.0	1.47	1	1.88	0.36	0.65
ZAI	Congo-Kinshasa	1960	1	0.0	1.21	1	0.50	0.18	0.64
TUR	Turkey	1984	1	6.0	1.62	1	0.67	0.84	0.62
NIC	Nicaragua	1981	1	8.0	1.24	1	1.25	0.51	0.62
IRQ	Iraq	1991	1	35.0	1.22	1	1.18	0.62	0.62
IRQ	Iraq	1980	1	28.0	1.16	1	1.25	0.62	0.61
GUA	Guatemala	1975	1	22.0	1.12	1	2.00	0.49	0.61
ALG	Algeria	1962	1	28.0	1.36	1	1.00	0.71	0.59
ETH	Ethiopia	1961	1	0.0	1.49	1	0.00	0.34	0.59
RWA	Rwanda	1963	1	24.0	1.25	1	0.00	0.88	0.58
MLI	Mali	1990	1	0.0	3.25	1	1.53	0.24	0.58
SUD	Sudan	1956	1	0.0	1.31	1	0.50	0.36	0.57
MYA	Burma	1961	1	0.0	1.28	1	0.00	0.60	0.57
LAO	Laos	1961	1	0.0	1.23	1	0.50	0.59	0.56
IRQ	Iraq	1961	1	0.0	1.14	1	0.50	0.66	0.55
CHN	China	1988	1	14.0	0.96	1	0.00	0.92	0.53
SOM	Somalia	1988	1	0.0	2.54	1	1.50	0.68	0.44
AFG	Afghanistan	1992	1	53.0	3.80	0	0.00	0.34	0.43
MLD	Moldova	1991	1	0.0	0.60	1	0.00	0.46	0.43
LEB	Lebanon	1965	1	4.0	0.53	1	1.00	0.91	0.43
GRG	Georgia	1991	1	0.0	0.54	1	0.00	0.54	0.41
ANG	Angola	1975	1	39.0	2.03	0	0.38	0.24	0.41
YUG	Yugoslavia	1981	1	0.0	0.53	1	0.50	0.26	0.41

**Table D-5**  
**Ethnic War Model Classification Results (continued)**

Country code	Country name	Year	Ethnic war indicator	Independent variables, measured two years prior to problem/control					Model score	
				Prior upheaval	Infant mortality relative to world median	Discrimination/separatist activity indicator	Number of regional organizations relative to world median	Ethnic Herfindahl		
RUS	Russia	1991	1	0.0	0.45	1	0.87	0.67	0.38	
RWA	Rwanda	1990	1	0.0	2.26	1	0.65	0.82	0.38	
NIG	Nigeria	1966	1	1.0	1.57	0	0.00	0.19	0.37	
BOS	Bosnia and Herzegovina	1992	1	0.0	0.35	1	0.00	0.33	0.34	
CRO	Croatia	1991	1	0.0	0.26	1	0.00	0.61	0.29	
CYP	Cyprus	1963	1	0.0	0.25	1	1.00	0.64	0.29	
<b>Problems classified incorrectly</b>										
AZE	Azerbaijan	1991	1	0.0	0.67	1	0.00	0.77	0.20	
GRG	Georgia	1998	1	10.0	0.62	0	0.00	0.54	0.17	
CHA	Chad	1965	1	0.0	1.62	0	0.00	0.20	0.14	
BUI	Burundi	1988	1	7.0	2.16	0	0.75	0.75	0.14	
MOR	Morocco	1975	1	3.0	1.44	0	2.00	0.50	0.12	
ISR	Israel	1967	1	0.0	0.25	1	1.00	0.81	0.11	
UK	United Kingdom	1969	1	0.0	0.19	1	4.25	0.70	0.11	
DRV	Vietnam, North	1958	1	40.0	1.26	0	0.50	0.76	0.10	
PNG	Papua New Guinea	1988	1	0.0	1.35	0	0.25	0.67	0.09	
SEN	Senegal	1991	1	0.0	1.46	0	1.47	0.22	0.06	
MEX	Mexico	1994	1	0.0	0.79	0	1.13	0.46	0.03	
<b>Non-problems classified correctly</b>										
GUY	Guyana	1991	0	3.0	1.26	0	0.59	0.37	0.26	
MEX	Mexico	1980	0	0.0	0.78	1	1.25	0.41	0.26	
MEX	Mexico	1960	0	0.0	0.78	1	2.50	0.68	0.25	

**Table D-5**  
**Ethnic War Model Classification Results** (*continued*)

Country code	Country name	Year	Ethnic war indicator	Independent variables, measured two years prior to problem/control					Model score
				Prior upheaval	Infant mortality relative to world median	Discrimination/separatist activity indicator	Number of regional organizations relative to world median	Ethnic Herfindahl	
SPN	Spain	1992	0	0.0	0.17	1	1.00	0.57	0.24
VEN	Venezuela	1962	0	0.0	0.62	1	2.00	0.54	0.22
PAR	Paraguay	1983	0	0.0	0.78	1	1.00	0.91	0.22
GUY	Guyana	1981	0	2.0	0.92	0	0.25	0.38	0.22
VEN	Venezuela	1973	0	0.0	0.57	1	1.25	0.48	0.21
MAW	Malawi	1991	0	0.0	2.96	0	0.82	0.18	0.21
ALB	Albania	1981	0	0.0	0.69	1	0.13	0.90	0.21
GNB	Guinea-Bissau	1991	0	0.0	2.91	0	0.41	0.25	0.21
SIN	Singapore	1984	0	0.0	0.13	1	0.33	0.62	0.20
SIE	Sierra Leone	1986	0	2.0	3.01	0	1.08	0.25	0.19
NIG	Nigeria	1991	0	5.0	1.77	0	1.24	0.18	0.19
GHA	Ghana	1988	0	7.0	1.72	0	1.25	0.17	0.19
MAA	Mauritania	1991	0	0.0	2.11	1	2.12	0.71	0.18
ZAM	Zambia	1990	0	0.0	2.17	0	0.76	0.15	0.17
MAG	Madagascar	1992	0	0.0	2.16	0	0.76	0.20	0.17
SPN	Spain	1960	0	0.0	0.39	1	3.50	0.57	0.17
MLI	Mali	1967	0	0.0	2.05	0	1.00	0.25	0.17
RUM	Romania	1975	0	0.0	0.46	1	0.80	0.74	0.16
BFO	Burkina Faso	1991	0	1.0	2.09	0	1.47	0.34	0.16
TAZ	Tanzania	1991	0	0.0	1.75	0	1.00	0.19	0.15
TUR	Turkey	1961	0	0.0	1.57	1	3.50	0.77	0.15
TUR	Turkey	1969	0	0.0	1.53	1	2.00	0.77	0.15
BEL	Belgium	1960	0	0.0	0.27	1	7.50	0.48	0.14
DJI	Djibouti	1991	0	0.0	2.35	0	0.71	0.29	0.13
TOG	Togo	1969	0	0.0	1.40	0	1.00	0.19	0.13

**Table D-5**  
**Ethnic War Model Classification Results** (*continued*)

Country code	Country name	Year	Ethnic war indicator	Independent variables, measured two years prior to problem/control					Model score
				Prior upheaval	Infant mortality relative to world median	Discrimination/separatist activity indicator	Number of regional organizations relative to world median	Ethnic Herfindahl	
HUN	Hungary	1983	0	0.0	0.32	1	0.50	0.82	0.13
IVO	Cote d'Ivoire	1963	0	0.0	1.34	0	0.50	0.18	0.13
BUL	Bulgaria	1977	0	0.0	0.31	1	0.40	0.71	0.13
BEL	Belgium	1965	0	0.0	0.23	1	8.00	0.48	0.12
CHL	Chile	1990	0	5.0	0.35	0	1.00	0.62	0.12
NEP	Nepal	1977	0	0.0	1.96	0	0.20	0.40	0.12
BUL	Bulgaria	1983	0	0.0	0.28	1	0.50	0.71	0.12
AFG	Afghanistan	1963	0	0.0	1.80	0	0.00	0.36	0.11
ISR	Israel	1965	0	0.0	0.25	1	1.00	0.81	0.11
SIE	Sierra Leone	1961	0	0.0	1.72	0	0.00	0.25	0.11
AFG	Afghanistan	1956	0	0.0	1.69	0	0.00	0.36	0.11
LES	Lesotho	1975	0	1.0	1.53	0	0.20	0.90	0.11
GUI	Guinea	1966	0	0.0	1.68	0	0.50	0.30	0.11
BHU	Bhutan	1963	0	0.0	1.68	0	0.00	0.38	0.11
UK	United Kingdom	1958	0	0.0	0.18	1	5.00	0.70	0.11
ECU	Ecuador	1988	0	1.0	1.10	0	1.25	0.37	0.10
SPN	Spain	1986	0	0.0	0.17	1	1.50	0.57	0.10
JOR	Jordan	1988	0	0.0	0.85	1	1.17	0.98	0.10
GRC	Greece	1991	0	0.0	0.22	1	0.88	0.94	0.10
JPN	Japan	1962	0	0.0	0.21	1	1.00	0.99	0.10
CEN	Central African Republic	1966	0	0.0	1.42	0	0.50	0.39	0.10
CEN	Central African Republic	1961	0	0.0	1.41	0	0.50	0.39	0.10
MON	Mongolia	1994	0	0.0	1.38	0	0.00	0.69	0.10

**Table D-5**  
**Ethnic War Model Classification Results** (*continued*)

Country code	Country name	Year	Ethnic war indicator	Independent variables, measured two years prior to problem/control					Model score
				Prior upheaval	Infant mortality relative to world median	Discrimination/separatist activity indicator	Number of regional organizations relative to world median	Ethnic Herfindahl	
GAB	Gabon	1961	0	0.0	1.38	0	0.00	0.39	0.10
MLI	Mali	1988	0	0.0	3.25	0	1.50	0.24	0.09
NEW	New Zealand	1980	0	0.0	0.19	1	0.63	0.85	0.09
SWZ	Switzerland	1998	0	0.0	0.14	1	1.27	0.60	0.09
MLI	Mali	1983	0	0.0	2.86	0	1.88	0.24	0.09
AUL	Australia	1963	0	0.0	0.17	1	1.00	0.99	0.09
PAR	Paraguay	1975	0	0.0	0.62	1	1.60	0.91	0.08
BOT	Botswana	1991	0	0.0	1.09	0	0.47	0.63	0.08
RUM	Romania	1956	0	0.0	0.60	1	1.50	0.77	0.08
KYR	Kyrgyzstan	1992	0	0.0	0.92	0	0.00	0.39	0.07
TOG	Togo	1991	0	0.0	1.84	0	1.35	0.19	0.06
GRC	Greece	1960	0	0.0	0.43	1	3.50	0.94	0.06
GAB	Gabon	1983	0	0.0	1.78	0	1.75	0.21	0.06
PHI	Philippines	1967	0	0.0	0.72	0	1.00	0.31	0.06
PAN	Panama	1983	0	2.0	0.48	0	1.25	0.42	0.06
UAE	United Arab Emirates	1972	0	0.0	0.67	0	0.20	0.50	0.06
CEN	Central African Republic	1975	0	0.0	1.55	0	2.20	0.25	0.06
ROK	Korea, South	1967	0	3.0	0.57	0	0.50	1.00	0.06
CON	Congo-Brazzaville	1998	0	0.0	2.41	0	1.73	0.33	0.06
ITA	Italy	1965	0	0.0	0.34	1	7.00	1.00	0.05
YEM	Yemen	1991	0	2.0	2.02	0	1.20	1.00	0.05
BUL	Bulgaria	1965	0	0.0	0.31	1	1.50	0.80	0.05
PAN	Panama	1991	0	0.0	0.55	0	1.00	0.42	0.05

**Table D-5**  
**Ethnic War Model Classification Results** (*continued*)

Country code	Country name	Year	Ethnic war indicator	Independent variables, measured two years prior to problem/control					Model score
				Prior upheaval	Infant mortality relative to world median	Discrimination/separatist activity indicator	Number of regional organizations relative to world median	Ethnic Herfindahl	
CON	Congo-Brazzaville	1992	0	0.0	2.06	0	1.29	0.33	0.05
UAE	United Arab Emirates	1983	0	0.0	0.50	0	0.88	0.50	0.05
BUL	Bulgaria	1991	0	0.0	0.28	1	1.24	0.71	0.05
COM	Comoros	1992	0	0.0	2.13	0	0.41	1.00	0.04
MAS	Mauritius	1998	0	0.0	0.41	0	0.60	0.54	0.04
GFR	Germany, West	1971	0	0.0	0.23	1	4.25	0.99	0.04
HAI	Haiti	1990	0	0.0	1.88	0	0.65	0.90	0.04
LES	Lesotho	1992	0	0.0	1.89	0	0.47	1.00	0.04
BLR	Belarus	1994	0	0.0	0.36	0	0.00	0.64	0.04
TUN	Tunisia	1958	0	9.0	1.26	0	2.00	1.00	0.04
OMA	Oman	1961	0	0.0	1.70	0	0.00	0.77	0.04
HAI	Haiti	1979	0	0.0	1.67	0	0.75	0.90	0.04
COM	Comoros	1975	0	0.0	1.58	0	0.25	1.00	0.04
FRN	France	1998	0	0.0	0.18	1	2.00	0.77	0.03
SWA	Swaziland	1973	0	0.0	1.56	0	0.20	0.90	0.03
ROK	Korea, South	1992	0	1.0	0.25	0	0.18	1.00	0.03
GFR	Germany, West	1988	0	0.0	0.16	1	2.67	0.90	0.03
FRN	France	1991	0	0.0	0.15	1	1.71	0.78	0.03
SYR	Syria	1988	0	5.5	0.93	0	1.08	0.83	0.03
LIB	Libya	1961	0	0.0	1.31	0	0.50	0.82	0.03
JOR	Jordan	1980	0	10.0	0.90	0	1.25	0.98	0.03
MON	Mongolia	1961	0	0.0	1.04	0	0.00	0.89	0.03
MEX	Mexico	1991	0	0.0	0.76	0	1.06	0.41	0.03
RUM	Romania	1992	0	3.0	0.55	0	1.06	0.76	0.02

**Table D-5**  
**Ethnic War Model Classification Results** (*continued*)

Country code	Country name	Year	Ethnic war indicator	Independent variables, measured two years prior to problem/control					Model score
				Prior upheaval	Infant mortality relative to world median	Discrimination/separatist activity indicator	Number of regional organizations relative to world median	Ethnic Herfindahl	
URU	Uruguay	1975	0	4.0	0.54	0	2.00	0.88	0.02
ROK	Korea, South	1956	0	0.0	0.77	0	0.00	1.00	0.02
PAN	Panama	1961	0	0.0	0.58	0	2.50	0.53	0.02
CAN	Canada	1983	0	0.0	0.14	0	0.88	0.37	0.02
PRK	Korea, North	1975	0	0.0	0.59	0	0.20	1.00	0.02
PRK	Korea, North	1991	0	0.0	0.53	0	0.00	1.00	0.02
PRK	Korea, North	1984	0	0.0	0.51	0	0.00	1.00	0.02
MAA	Mauritania	1984	0	0.0	1.86	0	2.25	0.71	0.02
JAM	Jamaica	1962	0	0.0	0.46	0	0.00	0.74	0.01
EGY	Egypt	1981	0	0.0	1.81	0	2.00	0.90	0.01
EGY	Egypt	1973	0	0.0	1.76	0	1.50	0.90	0.01
ALG	Algeria	1988	0	0.0	1.29	0	1.75	0.71	0.01
JAM	Jamaica	1988	0	0.0	0.33	0	0.75	0.74	0.01
POL	Poland	1977	0	0.0	0.32	0	0.80	0.96	0.01
TUN	Tunisia	1981	0	0.0	1.21	0	2.00	1.00	0.01
HON	Honduras	1961	0	0.0	1.19	0	2.50	0.84	0.01
SAL	El Salvador	1972	0	0.0	1.16	0	1.25	0.87	0.01
POR	Portugal	1987	0	0.0	0.27	0	0.75	1.00	0.01
HON	Honduras	1991	0	0.0	1.02	0	1.12	0.81	0.01
TUN	Tunisia	1991	0	0.0	0.94	0	1.65	0.97	0.01
BEL	Belgium	1987	0	0.0	0.18	0	1.92	0.54	0.01
AUL	Australia	1988	0	0.0	0.17	0	0.50	0.98	0.01
IRE	Ireland	1988	0	0.0	0.16	0	0.92	1.00	0.01
URU	Uruguay	1997	0	0.0	0.44	0	1.07	0.78	0.01
COS	Costa Rica	1981	0	0.0	0.42	0	1.25	0.83	0.01

**Table D-5**  
**Ethnic War Model Classification Results (continued)**

Country code	Country name	Year	Ethnic war indicator	Independent variables, measured two years prior to problem/control					Model score
				Prior upheaval	Infant mortality relative to world median	Discrimination/separatist activity indicator	Number of regional organizations relative to world median	Ethnic Herfindahl	
POL	Poland	1991	0	0.0	0.33	0	1.29	0.96	0.00
AUS	Austria	1969	0	0.0	0.26	0	2.25	1.00	0.00
IRE	Ireland	1980	0	0.0	0.20	0	1.25	1.00	0.00
ITA	Italy	1984	0	0.0	0.20	0	1.83	0.90	0.00
DEN	Denmark	1963	0	0.0	0.17	0	4.00	0.93	0.00
NTH	Netherlands	1998	0	0.0	0.16	0	1.53	0.93	0.00
NTH	Netherlands	1965	0	0.0	0.14	0	8.00	0.92	0.00
NTH	Netherlands	1991	0	0.0	0.14	0	1.47	0.93	0.00
DEN	Denmark	1979	0	0.0	0.13	0	3.00	0.98	0.00
FIN	Finland	1998	0	0.0	0.13	0	2.40	0.89	0.00
SWD	Sweden	1981	0	0.0	0.11	0	2.75	0.91	0.00
SWD	Sweden	1987	0	0.0	0.12	0	3.33	0.91	0.00
<b>Non-problems classified incorrectly</b>									
GHA	Ghana	1975	0	1.0	1.26	1	0.80	0.17	0.86
LAO	Laos	1984	0	38.0	1.94	1	0.17	0.51	0.86
IRN	Iran	1971	0	3.0	1.45	1	0.50	0.33	0.83
IRN	Iran	1961	0	8.0	1.35	1	0.00	0.33	0.82
NIG	Nigeria	1981	0	14.0	1.45	1	1.63	0.18	0.72
BNG	Bangladesh	1991	0	4.0	2.12	1	0.18	0.94	0.67
BNG	Bangladesh	1980	0	12.0	1.88	1	0.00	0.94	0.65
PER	Peru	1975	0	1.0	1.30	1	2.00	0.37	0.63
ALG	Algeria	1967	0	35.5	1.50	1	1.00	0.71	0.61
CYP	Cyprus	1990	0	2.0	0.22	1	0.29	0.69	0.56
GHA	Ghana	1960	0	0.0	1.06	1	0.00	0.30	0.53



**Table D-5**  
**Ethnic War Model Classification Results** (*continued*)

Country code	Country name	Year	Ethnic war indicator	Independent variables, measured two years prior to problem/control					Model score
				Prior upheaval	Infant mortality relative to world median	Discrimination/separatist activity indicator	Number of regional organizations relative to world median	Ethnic Herfindahl	
ZIM	Zimbabwe	1971	0	0.0	1.00	1	0.25	0.52	0.52
ARG	Argentina	1975	0	5.0	0.57	1	2.00	0.68	0.48
CHN	China	1981	0	38.0	0.72	1	0.00	0.92	0.48
MEX	Mexico	1986	0	0.0	0.75	1	0.83	0.41	0.47
LBR	Liberia	1991	0	2.0	2.74	0	1.00	0.19	0.46
MZM	Mozambique	1988	0	32.0	2.42	0	0.50	0.21	0.44
SRI	Sri Lanka	1967	0	0.0	0.61	1	0.00	0.57	0.43
SRI	Sri Lanka	1961	0	0.0	0.59	1	0.00	0.57	0.43
MZM	Mozambique	1979	0	35.0	2.21	0	0.38	0.21	0.42
YUG	Yugoslavia	1975	0	0.0	0.56	1	0.80	0.26	0.42
FJI	Fiji	1991	0	0.0	0.53	1	0.12	0.50	0.41
AFG	Afghanistan	1983	0	16.0	2.90	0	0.00	0.37	0.39
UKR	Ukraine	1993	0	0.0	0.41	1	0.00	0.60	0.37
BNG	Bangladesh	1997	0	0.0	2.08	1	0.27	0.97	0.37
EST	Estonia	1991	0	0.0	0.35	1	0.00	0.51	0.34
LAO	Laos	1991	0	10.0	2.12	0	0.06	0.51	0.33
BOL	Bolivia	1958	0	0.0	1.31	1	1.50	0.31	0.33
ZAM	Zambia	1972	0	3.0	1.18	0	0.00	0.15	0.32
LAT	Latvia	1991	0	0.0	0.29	1	0.00	0.40	0.31
ECU	Ecuador	1967	0	0.0	1.07	1	4.00	0.37	0.30
ZIM	Zimbabwe	1993	0	21.0	1.63	0	0.41	0.56	0.29
GUA	Guatemala	1961	0	0.0	1.01	1	3.00	0.49	0.29
SIN	Singapore	1966	0	0.0	0.26	1	0.00	0.61	0.29
TAJ	Tajikistan	1997	0	14.0	1.49	0	0.00	0.46	0.28
CYP	Cyprus	1960	0	0.0	0.24	1	1.00	0.64	0.28

**Table D-5**  
**Ethnic War Model Classification Results** (*continued*)

Country code	Country name	Year	Ethnic war indicator	Independent variables, measured two years prior to problem/control					Model score
				Prior upheaval	Infant mortality relative to world median	Discrimination/separatist activity indicator	Number of regional organizations relative to world median	Ethnic Herfindahl	
SIN	Singapore	1975	0	0.0	0.22	1	0.40	0.61	0.27
<b>Missing data</b>									
YAR	Yemen, North	1963	0	0.0		0	0.50	0.98	
CZE	Czechoslovakia	1965	0	0.0		1	1.50	0.53	
YAR	Yemen, North	1980	0	24.0		0	1.13	0.98	
TRI	Trinidad	1981	0	0.0		0	0.50	0.35	
EQG	Equatorial Guinea	1984	0	0.0		0	0.25	0.86	
USS	USSR (Soviet Union)	1986	1	0.0		0	1.83	0.43	
TAW	Taiwan	1988	0	0.0		0	0.17	0.65	
CZE	Czechoslovakia	1990	0	0.0		1	1.24	0.50	
EQG	Equatorial Guinea	1990	0	0.0		0	0.53	0.86	
QAT	Qatar	1992	0	0.0		0	1.12	0.33	
ETI	Ethiopia (1993-)	1993	0	41.0		1	0.86	0.27	
ERI	Eritrea	1994	0	41.5		0	0.21	0.41	
YGS	Serbia/Montenegro	1998	1	0.0		1	0.53	0.43	

## Appendix E

### Genocide/Politicide Model

This appendix provides more detail on the analysis used to derive the genocide/politicide model.

Table E-1 lists the 36 consolidated cases of genocide and politicicide the Task Force used to develop its model.

**Table E-1**  
**Onsets of Genocide or Politicide, 1955-98<sup>1</sup>**

Country	Began	Ended	Description
Afghanistan	4/78	4/92	Widespread insurgency by mujahidin factions provokes Soviet and Afghan Government tactics of systematic terror, destruction of villages, execution of prisoners.
Algeria	7/62	12/62	In wake of independence from France, Algerian militants attack Europeans and Muslim civilians who collaborated with French colonial authorities.
Angola	11/75	— <sup>2</sup>	UNITA rebels and government forces perpetrate destructive campaigns and atrocities against civilians throughout conflict.
Argentina	3/76	12/80	Military declares state of siege, and death squads target suspected leftists in campaign of kidnappings, torture, murder, and “disappearances.”
Bosnia and Herzegovina	5/92	11/95	Muslim residents of Bosnia are subject to “ethnic cleansing” measures including destruction of property, forced resettlement, civilian killings, and execution by Serb and Croat forces.
Burma	1/78	12/78	To secure border region, regular military units supported by militant Buddhist elements depopulate Arakanese Muslim communities in Western Burma by oppression, destruction, torture, and murder.
Burundi	10/65	12/73	Attempted coup by Hutu units in 1965 results in massacres of Tutsis in countryside, prompting Army to eliminate Hutu leaders. In 1972, militant Hutus massacre Tutsis, and Tutsi regime again responds with massive killings.
	8/88	8/88	As result of rural violence against local Tutsi officials, Tutsi dominated army conducts unpremeditated massacres of Hutus.
	10/93	12/93	Subsequent armed clashes and massacres occur in three waves: Tutsi soldiers against Hutu civilians, Hutus against Tutsis, and Tutsis against Hutus.
Cambodia	4/75	1/79	Once in power they initiate restructuring of society leading to massive deaths by starvation, deprivation, executions, and massacres of old regime supporters, city dwellers, and tribal peoples particularly Muslim Chams.
Chile	9/73	12/76	Supporters of former regime and other leftists are arrested, tortured, disappeared, exiled, and summarily executed.
China	3/59	12/59	In 1959, Army and security forces suppress counterrevolutionary elements of society, including Tibetan Buddhists, landowners, and supporters of the former Chiang-Kai Shek regime.
	5/66	3/75	In 1966, Red Guard youth gangs under loose direction of a Party faction target wide spectrum of society for arrest, harassment, reeducation, torture, and execution.
Congo-Kinshasa	2/64	1/65	To consolidate control, rebels massacre counterrevolutionaries, including educated Congolese, missionaries, and other Europeans.
	3/77	12/79	Episodic rebellions and agitation are countered by killings of political opponents, dissident tribesmen, and prisoners.

**Table E-1**  
**Onsets of Genocide or Politicide, 1955-98 (continued)**

Country	Began	Ended	Description
El Salvador	1/80	12/89	In face of widespread insurgency, military, security units, and death squads harass, imprison, and kill suspected leftists among clergy, peasants, urban workers, and intellectuals.
Ethiopia	7/76	12/79	Army, internal security units, and civilian defense squads massacre political and military elites, workers, students, bureaucrats, and others thought to oppose the revolutionary regime.
Guatemala	7/78	12/96	Military dominated governments use severe repression including indiscriminate use of death squads against leftists and indigenous people. Killings become systematic and widespread after July 1978.
Indonesia	10/65	7/66	After an attempted coup allegedly inspired by Communists, Muslim vigilantes massacre Party members and ethnic Chinese. Government formally bans Party, and military eliminates suspected Communists and civilians thought to support leftists.
		12/75	7/92
Iran	6/81	12/92	To consolidate Islamic revolution, Khomeini government violently suppresses dissident Muslims (mujahidin) and rebel Kurds, selectively executes prominent Baha'is.
Iraq	6/63	3/75	To suppress repeated rebellions for independent Kurdistan, military engages in large-scale massacres.
	3/88	6/91	In 1988 military and security forces launch Al-Anfal campaign of indiscriminate violence to eliminate or neutralize guerrillas and their supporters.
Pakistan	3/71	12/71	Military imposes martial law and uses tanks, airpower, and artillery to indiscriminately attack civilians.
	2/73	7/77	Baluchi rebellion against central authority, backed by opposition National Awami Party is suppressed by military using indiscriminate violence against civilians.
Philippines	9/72	6/76	Moro resistance to Christian settlement and support for separatist guerrillas results in military and paramilitary terror tactics in which many Moros die in massacres and napalm bombings.
Rwanda	12/63	6/64	Cross-border incursions by Tutsi rebels prompt local Hutu officials to orchestrate vengeance attacks and massacres by Hutus, leading to flight of 200,000 Tutsi refugees.
	4/94	7/94	When President Habyarimana's aircraft is shot down, Hutu government deploys military and armed gangs to systematically slaughter Tutsis and Hutu moderates.
Somalia	5/88	1/91	Anti-insurgency operations by Barre forces cause large-scale civilian deaths.
Sri Lanka	9/89	1/90	Peoples Liberation Front (JVP) challenges government for second time; government utilizes death squads.
Sudan	10/56	3/72	Government uses indiscriminate violence against civilian Southerners thought to support secessionist movement.
	9/83	—	Non-Muslim supporters of secession are targeted for destruction by indiscriminate military attacks, massacres by government-supported tribal militias, and government-induced privation and population displacement.
Syria	4/81	2/82	Military and security forces crush revolt by Muslim Brotherhood centered in cities of Hama and Aleppo.
Uganda	2/71	4/79	Gen. Idi Amin seizes power in 1971 and systematically exterminates political opponents and personal enemies. Tribes closely associated with his predecessor also are targeted.
	12/80	1/86	After Amin is overthrown by Tanzanian intervention, Obote again takes power. Amid banditry and rebellion by tribal supporters of Amin, Obote's political and tribal rivals are slaughtered on massive scale.
Vietnam, South	1/65	4/75	Government military and paramilitary forces engage in killings, reprisals, and bombardments against villagers supporting Viet Cong.

<sup>1</sup>The cases of genocide and politicide analyzed by the State Failure Task Force were identified in a long-term study by Task Force member Barbara Harff that began in 1984. This list was revised and updated for the Task Force in 1999.

<sup>2</sup>Dash in place of ending date indicates ongoing crisis.

Table E-2 lists the 100 country-years randomly selected as control cases for estimating the genocide/politicide model. Readers should recall that, for the genocide model, control cases were selected from countries experiencing ongoing state failures

that did not result in genocide or politicide. One country, Thailand, is represented in the control sample by three years; 18 countries, half of them in Sub-Saharan Africa, are represented by two years, and 61 countries are represented by a single year.

**Table E-2**  
**Control Cases Used in Genocide Model**

Country	Years
Albania	1996
Algeria	1991
Argentina	1966
Armenia	1994
Azerbaijan	1988
Bahrain	1975
Bangladesh	1974
Belarus	1995
Benin	1963
Brazil	1964
Burkina Faso	1980
Cambodia	1997
Chad	1965
China	1988
Colombia	1984
Comoros	1995
Congo-Brazzaville	1963, 1997
Congo-Kinshasa	1984, 1992
Croatia	1991
Cuba	1956
Cyprus	1963, 1974
Czechoslovakia	1968
Dominican Republic	1961
Ecuador	1970
Egypt	1986
Gambia, The	1994
Georgia	1991, 1998
Ghana	1972, 1978
Greece	1967
Guinea-Bissau	1998
Guyana	1978
Haiti	1991
Hungary	1956
India	1952
Indonesia	1997
Iran	1963

**Table E-2**  
**Control Cases Used in Genocide Model (continued)**

<b>Country</b>	<b>Years</b>
Israel	1967
Jordan	1957, 1967
Kazakhstan	1995
Kenya	1991
Korea, South	1961, 1979
Kyrgyzstan	1995
Laos	1960
Lebanon	1958, 1965
Lesotho	1970, 1994
Liberia	1989
Madagascar	1972
Mali	1990
Mexico	1994
Moldova	1990
Morocco	1963, 1975
Mozambique	1976
Nicaragua	1978
Niger	1996
Nigeria	1964, 1980
Oman	1965
Pakistan	1958, 1983
Panama	1968
Peru	1968, 1982
Romania	1989
Russia	1990
Senegal	1962, 1991
Serbia/Montenegro	1998
Sierra Leone	1967, 1991
Somalia	1969
South Africa	1976, 1984
Sri Lanka	1971
Syria	1958
Tajikistan	1992
Thailand	1957, 1967, 1991
Turkey	1971, 1980
Uruguay	1972
USSR (Soviet Union)	1986
Vietnam, North	1958
Yemen	1990
Yemen, North	1962
Yemen, South	1986
Yugoslavia	1981
Zambia	1968, 1996
Zimbabwe	1972

Table E-3 shows coefficients and p-values for the six-variable genocide/politicide model, which also includes a constant term. The sample used to estimate this logistic regression model comprised 33 genocides/politicides and 97 control cases. Two of the 36 genocides/politicides identified in Table E-1 (Uganda, 1980-86, and Pakistan, 1973-77)

were omitted because they occurred too close in time to another such event to be considered distinct incidents for purposes of statistical analysis. A third genocide/politicide (South Vietnam, 1965-75) and three of the 100 control cases were dropped from the model because of missing data on trade openness.

**Table E-3**  
**Genocide/Politicide Model Coefficients (N=33 genocides/politicides, 97 controls)**

Variable	Coefficient	P-value <sup>1</sup>
Autocracy indicator	0.8824	0.17
Ethnic character of ruling elite indicator	1.5689	0.01
Ideological character of ruling elite indicator	1.0794	0.04
Trade openness (continuous, log)	-1.6774	<0.01
Religious fractionalization indicator (Herfindahl)	1.1883	0.04
Upheaval (sum of max magnitudes of events in prior 15 years)	0.0870	0.01
Constant	1.3998	0.40

<sup>1</sup>“P-value” refers to a test of the statistical significance of an individual variable in multi-variable models. Values close to zero indicate that the variable has a measurable effect on state failure.

**Table E-4**  
**Classification Accuracy of the Genocide/Politicide Model**

Case type	Correctly classified		Incorrectly classified		Total
	Number	Percent	Number	Percent	
Problem	26	78.8	7	21.2	33
Control	77	79.4	20	20.6	97
Total cases	103	79.2	27	20.8	130

To understand better how the model was working, we took a closer look at the false positives, that is, the control cases incorrectly classified as impending genocides. As it happened, many of these cases did exhibit high levels of political violence. One instance is Turkey in 1971, when a military ultimatum led to the resignation of Prime Minister Demirel, and widespread political violence erupted between warring factions on the Left and the Right. Algeria in 1991 provides another example; if that country's Islamic militants had met our definition of a rival authority in a civil-war situation, then the militants' murdering of civilians who opposed them would have been classified as a politicicide. The most intriguing of

the recent false positives is Indonesia in 1997. The state failure in this case was the dissolution of the Suharto Government, and the model gives a strong warning of impending genocide that the violence in East Timor in 1999 nearly fulfilled.<sup>46</sup> A closer look at the false negatives also suggests a common theme for several of them. In three of the seven onsets of genocide and politicicide the model classified incorrectly—Sudan in 1956, Guatemala in 1966, and the Philippines in 1972—relatively few people were killed in the events' early stages. In Sudan and Guatemala, we determined that the killings began in the 1950s and 60s, respectively, but death squads did not claim most of their victims until the late 1970s.

<sup>46</sup>Genocide first began in East Timor at the end of 1975 but ended in mid-1992. The model suggests that the potential for renewed genocide in the late 1990s was high.



Table E-5 provides the model scores for each of the country-years from which the model was derived, as well as the values of the independent

variables included in that model. As the table indicates, four country-years were omitted from the analysis because of missing data.

**Table E-5**  
**Genocide/Politicide Model Classification Results**

Country code	Country name	Composite problem year	Genocide/politicide indicator	Genocide/politicide year	Independent variables, measured one year prior to genocide/politicide problem cases, 4 years after non-genocide problem control cases						Genocide model score
					Ethnic character of ruling elite	Ideological character of ruling elite	Upheaval ( <i>sum of annual maximum event magnitudes over past 15 years</i> )	Trade openness ( <i>imports plus exports as percent of GDP</i> )	Autocracy indicator	Religion fractionalization index	
<b>Geno/Politicides classified correctly</b>											
MYA	Burma	1961	1	1978	1	1	43.0	12.5	1	1	0.996
ANG	Angola	1975	1	1975	1	1	42.0	51.3	1	1	0.960
INS	Indonesia	1956	1	1965	1	1	18.0	15.7	1	1	0.956
IRQ	Iraq	1980	1	1988	2	1	30.5	48.1	1	1	0.907
ALG	Algeria	1962	1	1962	1	1	32.0	58.3	1	1	0.889
CHN	China	1950	1	1966	0	1	18.0	7.4	1	0	0.826
INS	Indonesia	1975	1	1975	1	1	15.5	38.0	1	1	0.796
RWA	Rwanda	1963	1	1963	1	0	28.0	23.4	1	0	0.731
ETH	Ethiopia	1961	1	1976	1	1	17.0	27.5	1	0	0.700
ZAI	Congo-Kinshasa	1960	1	1964	2	0	16.0	14.3	1	0	0.686
CHN	China	1950	1	1959	0	1	9.0	7.4	1	0	0.685
BUI	Burundi	1988	1	1993	2	0	20.0	37.3	1	1	0.670
RWA	Rwanda	1990	1	1994	1	1	12.0	24.7	1	0	0.644
CAM	Cambodia	1970	1	1975	0	0	17.0	13.5	1	1	0.641
SUD	Sudan	1983	1	1983	1	0	16.5	33.7	1	1	0.639
ARG	Argentina	1973	1	1976	0	1	12.0	13.1	0	1	0.599
SOM	Somalia	1988	1	1988	2	1	0.0	32.5	1	1	0.569

**Table E-5**  
**Genocide/Politicide Model Classification Results** (*continued*)

Country code	Country name	Composite problem year	Genocide/politicide indicator	Genocide/politicide year	Independent variables, measured one year prior to genocide/politicide problem cases, 4 years after non-genocide problem control cases						Genocide model score
					Ethnic character of ruling elite	Ideological character of ruling elite	Upheaval ( <i>sum of annual maximum event magnitudes over past 15 years</i> )	Trade openness ( <i>imports plus exports as percent of GDP</i> )	Autocracy indicator	Religion fractionalization index	
BUI	Burundi	1963	1	1965	2	0	2.0	22.0	1	1	0.507
PAK	Pakistan	1971	1	1971	2	0	3.0	23.3	1	1	0.505
SYR	Syria	1981	1	1981	2	1	0.0	51.6	1	1	0.379
IRN	Iran	1977	1	1981	0	1	14.0	42.1	1	1	0.376
AFG	Afghanistan	1978	1	1978	1	0	0.0	27.5	1	1	0.373
ZAI	Congo-Kinshasa	1977	1	1977	2	0	15.0	29.7	1	0	0.370
BUI	Burundi	1988	1	1988	2	0	3.0	33.4	1	1	0.358
UGA	Uganda	1966	1	1971	1	0	6.0	24.2	1	0	0.275
YUG	Yugoslavia	1990	1	1992	1	1	6.0	47.8	1	0	0.262
<b>Non-Geno/Politicides classified incorrectly</b>											
TUR	Turkey	1971	0		1	1	0.0	11.8	0	1	0.749
ALG	Algeria	1991	0		1	1	16.0	46.8	1	1	0.743
PKS	Pakistan (Pre-1971)	1958	0		2	0	14.0	22.5	1	1	0.738
PAK	Pakistan	1983	0		1	1	9.5	34.4	1	1	0.733
INS	Indonesia	1997	0		1	1	10.0	51.3	1	1	0.594
TUR	Turkey	1980	0		1	1	6.0	25.0	0	1	0.589
USS	USSR (Soviet Union)	1986	0		1	1	0.0	15.3	1	0	0.587
BRA	Brazil	1964	0		0	1	1.0	14.2	1	1	0.547
BEN	Benin	1963	0		1	0	3.0	26.1	1	1	0.457
LAO	Laos	1960	0		0	0	10.0	15.2	1	1	0.444
MZM	Mozambique	1976	0		0	1	37.0	65.6	1	0	0.393

**Table E-5**  
**Genocide/Politicide Model Classification Results** (*continued*)

Country code	Country name	Composite problem year	Genocide/politicide indicator	Genocide/politicide year	Independent variables, measured one year prior to genocide/politicide problem cases, 4 years after non-genocide problem control cases						Genocide model score
					Ethnic character of ruling elite	Ideological character of ruling elite	Upheaval ( <i>sum of annual maximum event magnitudes over past 15 years</i> )	Trade openness ( <i>imports plus exports as percent of GDP</i> )	Autocracy indicator	Religion fractionalization index	
NIG	Nigeria	1964	0		1	0	9.0	22.1	1	0	0.364
IND	India	1952	0		0	0	13.0	13.2	0	1	0.352
ARG	Argentina	1966	0		0	0	4.0	14.2	1	1	0.346
JOR	Jordan	1967	0		2	0	9.0	47.2	1	1	0.344
CAM	Cambodia	1997	0		1	0	3.0	35.8	1	1	0.332
BNG	Bangladesh	1974	0		0	0	8.0	18.2	1	1	0.331
IRN	Iran	1963	0		0	1	8.0	35.8	1	1	0.320
CYP	Cyprus	1963	0		1	0	16.0	73.2	1	1	0.316
BLR	Belarus	1995	0		0	0	1.0	13.3	1	1	0.313
<b>Geno/politicides classified incorrectly</b>											
GUA	Guatemala	1966	1	1966	0	1	0.0	32.8	1	1	0.213
SUD	Sudan	1956	1	1956	1	0	0.0	28.5	0	1	0.188
IRQ	Iraq	1961	1	1963	1	0	6.0	66.5	1	1	0.185
SRI	Sri Lanka	1983	1	1989	1	0	12.0	60.5	0	1	0.157
CHL	Chile	1973	1	1973	0	1	0.0	25.1	0	1	0.149
SAL	El Salvador	1977	1	1980	0	1	5.0	72.5	1	1	0.100
PHI	Philippines	1969	1	1972	0	0	5.0	38.5	0	1	0.043
<b>Non-genopoliticides classified correctly</b>											
CRO	Croatia	1991	0		1	1	16.0	105.1	0	1	0.235
RUM	Romania	1989	0		1	1	0.0	41.0	1	0	0.214
CZE	Czechoslovakia	1968	0		0	1	0.0	33.3	1	1	0.209
CYP	Cyprus	1974	0		1	0	22.0	82.6	0	1	0.209

**Table E-5**  
**Genocide/Politicide Model Classification Results** (*continued*)

Country code	Country name	Composite problem year	Genocide/politicide indicator	Genocide/politicide year	Independent variables, measured one year prior to genocide/politicide problem cases, 4 years after non-genocide problem control cases						Genocide model score
					Ethnic character of ruling elite	Ideological character of ruling elite	Upheaval ( <i>sum of annual maximum event magnitudes over past 15 years</i> )	Trade openness ( <i>imports plus exports as percent of GDP</i> )	Autocracy indicator	Religion fractionalization index	
SAF	South Africa	1984	0		2	1	15.0	54.2	0	0	0.207
MOR	Morocco	1963	0		0	0	14.0	37.7	1	1	0.198
SOM	Somalia	1969	0		2	0	0.0	27.9	0	1	0.194
ZAI	Congo-Kinshasa	1984	0		2	0	4.0	29.0	1	0	0.190
ISR	Israel	1967	0		1	1	4.0	67.9	0	1	0.184
CHA	Chad	1965	0		1	0	8.0	36.6	1	0	0.183
EGY	Egypt	1986	0		0	1	8.0	55.8	1	1	0.182
CUB	Cuba	1956	0		0	0	9.0	15.3	1	0	0.180
NIR	Niger	1996	0		1	0	0.0	30.1	0	1	0.175
JOR	Jordan	1957	0		2	0	0.0	51.0	1	1	0.174
CHN	China	1988	0		0	1	5.0	26.5	1	0	0.155
MAG	Madagascar	1972	0		1	0	3.0	33.2	1	0	0.146
DOM	Dominican Republic	1961	0		0	0	12.0	43.4	1	1	0.140
YEM	Yemen	1990	0		1	0	4.0	78.0	1	1	0.128
YGS	Serbia/Montenegro	1998	0		1	1	0.0	62.2	1	0	0.119
SIE	Sierra Leone	1991	0		2	0	10.0	55.9	1	0	0.116
ZAI	Congo-Kinshasa	1992	0		2	0	9.0	56.4	1	0	0.106
AZE	Azerbaijan	1988	0		1	0	2.0	80.3	1	1	0.105
ZAM	Zambia	1968	0		1	0	4.0	91.6	1	1	0.101
LBR	Liberia	1989	0		2	0	14.0	76.8	1	0	0.099
MEX	Mexico	1994	0		0	0	0.0	30.1	1	1	0.096
ECU	Ecuador	1970	0		0	0	2.0	33.7	1	1	0.095

**Table E-5**  
**Genocide/Politicide Model Classification Results** (*continued*)

Country code	Country name	Composite problem year	Genocide/politicide indicator	Genocide/politicide year	Independent variables, measured one year prior to genocide/politicide problem cases, 4 years after non-genocide problem control cases						Genocide model score
					Ethnic character of ruling elite	Ideological character of ruling elite	Upheaval ( <i>sum of annual maximum event magnitudes over past 15 years</i> )	Trade openness ( <i>imports plus exports as percent of GDP</i> )	Autocracy indicator	Religion fractionalization index	
YUG	Yugoslavia	1981	0		1	0	0.0	38.3	1	0	0.094
GRG	Georgia	1998	0		1	0	10.0	78.3	0	1	0.092
KEN	Kenya	1991	0		2	0	6.0	55.7	1	0	0.085
TAJ	Tajikistan	1992	0		1	0	14.0	174.3	1	1	0.083
SAF	South Africa	1976	0		2	1	4.0	57.9	0	0	0.082
ROK	Korea, South	1961	0		0	0	2.0	18.8	1	0	0.078
COL	Colombia	1984	0		0	0	6.0	29.0	0	1	0.073
OMA	Oman	1965	0		0	1	0.0	69.7	1	1	0.071
NIG	Nigeria	1980	0		1	0	7.0	41.6	0	0	0.064
HAI	Haiti	1991	0		0	0	0.0	39.2	1	1	0.064
MOR	Morocco	1975	0		0	0	6.0	54.1	1	1	0.063
NIC	Nicaragua	1978	0		0	0	10.0	68.1	1	1	0.061
ZAM	Zambia	1996	0		1	0	0.0	62.7	0	1	0.058
THI	Thailand	1957	0		0	0	0.0	42.3	1	1	0.057
SYR	Syria	1958	0		0	0	3.0	50.2	1	1	0.055
PER	Peru	1982	0		0	0	7.0	37.0	0	1	0.054
URU	Uruguay	1972	0		0	0	3.0	25.9	1	0	0.051
GRC	Greece	1967	0		0	0	0.0	28.9	0	1	0.045
GRG	Georgia	1991	0		1	0	6.0	101.9	0	1	0.044
SEN	Senegal	1962	0		0	0	2.0	55.3	1	1	0.044
GUY	Guyana	1978	0		2	1	2.0	132.5	1	0	0.043
LEB	Lebanon	1965	0		2	0	12.0	69.7	0	0	0.043
MLD	Moldova	1990	0		1	0	6.0	104.2	0	1	0.043

**Table E-5**  
**Genocide/Politicide Model Classification Results (continued)**

Country code	Country name	Composite problem year	Genocide/politicide indicator	Genocide/politicide year	Independent variables, measured one year prior to genocide/politicide problem cases, 4 years after non-genocide problem control cases						Genocide model score
					Ethnic character of ruling elite	Ideological character of ruling elite	Upheaval ( <i>sum of annual maximum event magnitudes over past 15 years</i> )	Trade openness ( <i>imports plus exports as percent of GDP</i> )	Autocracy indicator	Religion fractionalization index	
GHA	Ghana	1978	0		0	0	6.0	20.2	0	0	0.042
COM	Comoros	1995	0		0	0	3.0	59.6	1	1	0.042
PER	Peru	1968	0		0	0	0.0	33.0	0	1	0.036
THI	Thailand	1967	0		0	0	1.0	37.8	0	1	0.032
MLI	Mali	1990	0		0	0	5.0	48.4	0	1	0.030
ARM	Armenia	1994	0		1	0	2.0	106.9	0	1	0.029
HUN	Hungary	1956	0		0	1	0.0	61.9	1	0	0.028
SIE	Sierra Leone	1967	0		2	0	3.0	58.6	0	0	0.027
ZIM	Zimbabwe	1972	0		2	0	3.0	59.5	0	0	0.026
PAN	Panama	1968	0		0	0	1.0	78.5	1	1	0.023
SEN	Senegal	1991	0		0	0	4.0	54.7	0	1	0.022
SRI	Sri Lanka	1971	0		1	0	0.0	64.3	0	0	0.018
GNB	Guinea-Bissau	1998	0		0	0	0.0	51.4	0	1	0.018
BAH	Bahrain	1975	0		2	1	0.0	232.6	1	0	0.015
THI	Thailand	1991	0		0	0	6.0	78.5	0	1	0.015
LEB	Lebanon	1958	0		2	0	0.0	72.9	0	0	0.014
ALB	Albania	1996	0		0	0	1.0	53.6	1	0	0.013
RUS	Russia	1990	0		0	0	3.0	72.3	0	1	0.013
KYR	Kyrgyzstan	1995	0		0	0	1.0	71.8	0	1	0.011
BFO	Burkina Faso	1980	0		0	0	0.0	39.3	0	0	0.009
KZK	Kazakhstan	1995	0		1	0	0.0	105.6	0	0	0.008
GHA	Ghana	1972	0		0	0	0.0	41.7	0	0	0.008
CON	Congo-Brazzaville	1997	0		1	0	0.0	137.0	0	0	0.005

**Table E-5**  
**Genocide/Politicide Model Classification Results** *(continued)*

Country code	Country name	Composite problem year	Genocide/politicide indicator	Genocide/politicide year	Independent variables, measured one year prior to genocide/politicide problem cases, 4 years after non-genocide problem control cases						Genocide model score
					Ethnic character of ruling elite	Ideological character of ruling elite	Upheaval ( <i>sum of annual maximum event magnitudes over past 15 years</i> )	Trade openness ( <i>imports plus exports as percent of GDP</i> )	Autocracy indicator	Religion fractionalization index	
LES	Lesotho	1970	0		0	0	0.0	62.1	0	0	0.004
ROK	Korea, South	1979	0		0	0	0.0	64.7	0	0	0.004
GAM	Gambia, The	1994	0		0	0	0.0	139.2	0	1	0.003
CON	Congo-Brazzaville	1963	0		0	0	0.0	104.5	0	0	0.002
LES	Lesotho	1994	0		0	0	3.0	134.0	0	0	0.001
<b>Missing values</b>											
RVN	Vietnam, South	1958	1	1965	0	1	37.0		1	0	
DRV	Vietnam, North	1958	0		0	1	39.0		1	0	
YAR	Yemen, North	1962	0		0	0	16.0		1	1	
YPR	Yemen, South	1986	0		0	1	0.0		1	1	





## Appendix F

### State Capacity Survey

This appendix explains the procedures used to identify respondents for the Task Force's state capacity survey, describes the respondents, and includes the survey instrument.

#### Procedures for Identifying Survey Respondents

Three types of survey participants were identified at the outset:

- Academics from the fields of political science, history, economics, sociology, and anthropology familiar with contemporary political affairs and government for the country in question.
- Policy analysts, including current and former government experts and country analysts from leading non-governmental research institutions.
- Journalists with extensive experience in the country in question.

Several procedures were utilized to identify potential survey participants in these three categories:

- An extensive review of articles from relevant academic and policy journals was conducted for the period 1992-99. Authors of articles on the survey countries were identified. First priority was given to authors publishing in peer-reviewed journals. A list of the journals consulted is provided below.
- A diverse array of Internet databases was utilized including the Online Resource Guide to Political Inquiry, the Asian Studies World Wide Web Virtual Library, and Columbia University's International Directory of African Studies Scholars, International Directory of Middle East Scholars, and International Directory of South Asia Scholars. The Internet resources of several policy research

institutions, including the Brookings Institution, the Center for Strategic and International Studies, the Heritage Foundation, and the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, were also used.

- Directors of regional and international studies centers were asked to recommend candidate coders. The centers contacted were taken from a list of those institutions receiving funds from the National Resource Centers (NRCs) Program and the Foreign Language and Area Studies (FLAS) Fellowships Programs.
- State Failure Task Force members were asked to recommend governmental, academic, and other non-governmental country and area experts.
- The Lexis-Nexis electronic database was used to identify journalists. Focusing on articles published in the *Christian Science Monitor*, *Los Angeles Times*, *New York Times*, and *Washington Post* narrowed the search.
- The *Oxford Companion to the Politics of the World* was consulted to identify experts for those countries lacking sufficient numbers of potential survey participants. A targeted book search was also conducted for this purpose.

The following journals were consulted: *African Studies Review*, *American Political Science Review*, *Asian Perspective*, *Asian Survey*, *Brown Journal of World Affairs*, *Central Asian Monitor*, *Comparative Politics*, *Contemporary Southeast Asia*, *Current History*, *Foreign Affairs*, *Foreign Policy*, *International Organization*, *International Security*, *Journal of African Economies*, *Journal of Democracy*, *Journal of Developing Areas*, *Journal of International Affairs*, *Journal of Latin American Studies*, *Latin American Perspective*,

*Mediterranean Politics, Middle East Journal, Middle East Policy, Orbis, Post-Communist Economies, SAIS Review, Security Studies, Southern European Society and Politics, Third World Quarterly, Washington Quarterly, Western European Politics, World Policy, World Politics.*

These procedures generated a list of 765 country experts. Invitations were sent by email to approximately 510 of these experts. About 180 of the experts resided outside the U.S. and were not invited to participate. E-mail addresses could not be located for an additional group of about 70 experts, who received their invitations (and a printed version of the survey) by postal mail.

### **Description of the Survey Participants**

Of the experts who completed the survey, 86 percent were employed in academic departments of universities or colleges, 2.7 percent were journalists, 2.2 percent were government employees, and 9.1 percent were classified as “other.” Virtually all of the “other” categories were from research-oriented think tanks, such as the Brookings Institution or the Rand Corporation. Table F-1 summarizes the level of professional experience of these respondents, and Table F-2 shows the number of respondents by country.

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**Table F-1**  
**Experience of Respondents**

<b>Years of Experience</b>	<b>Number of Respondents</b>
1-5	20 (average = 4.0)
6-10	25
11-15	36
16-20	21
21-25	27
26-30	18
31-35	7
35-54	20

**Table F-2**  
**Responses per Country**

<b>Country</b>	<b>Number of Respondents</b>
Albania	3
Algeria	4
Angola	1
Argentina	1
Australia	1
Azerbaijan	1
Bahrain	1
Bangladesh	2
Benin	1
Botswana	3
Brazil	3
Bulgaria	2
Burkina Faso	1
Burma	2
Burundi	2
Canada	1
Chile	1
China	5
Colombia	2
Congo-Kinshasa	2
Cuba	2
Denmark	2
Egypt	4
El Salvador	3
Eritrea	1
Estonia	2
Ethiopia	1
Fiji	1
Finland	1
France	2
Georgia	2
Germany	3
Guatemala	1
Guinea-Bissau	1

**Table F-2**  
**Responses per Country (continued)**

<b>Country</b>	<b>Number of Respondents</b>
Guyana	2
Haiti	3
Honduras	1
Hungary	2
India	2
Indonesia	2
Iran	4
Iraq	2
Ireland	1
Israel	3
Italy	3
Japan	3
Jordan	4
Kazakhstan	2
Kenya	1
Laos	1
Lebanon	1
Liberia	3
Lithuania	1
Madagascar	1
Malawi	2
Malaysia	1
Mali	2
Mauritania	2
Mauritius	1
Mexico	2
Moldova	1
Mongolia	1
Mozambique	2
Namibia	2
Nepal	2
Netherlands	2
Nicaragua	1
Niger	1
Nigeria	1

**Table F-2**  
**Responses per Country (continued)**

<b>Country</b>	<b>Number of Respondents</b>
North Korea	2
Oman	3
Panama	1
Papua New Guinea	1
Peru	4
Philippines	2
Poland	1
Qatar	1
Romania	2
Russia	6
Rwanda	1
Saudi Arabia	2
Senegal	2
Sierra Leone	2
Slovenia	1
Somalia	1
South Africa	4
South Korea	2
Spain	1
Sri Lanka	4
Sudan	1
Sweden	2
Switzerland	1
Syria	4
Taiwan	4
Tajikistan	1
Tanzania	1
Turkey	4
Uganda	2
United Kingdom	1
Uzbekistan	2
Vietnam	1
Yemen	1
Zambia	1

## Survey Instrument

Table F-3 shows the survey instrument as it was given to the respondents.

<b>Table F-3</b>		
<b>State Capacity Survey Instrument</b>		
<b>SECTION I: POLITICAL CONTEXT</b>		
You may check a box in between named categories (such as the box in between “serious threat” and “modest threat” below) if you are unable to choose between the two named categories.		
<b>1. Assess the degree to which economic decline or disruption posed a threat to political stability in this country.</b>	<b>1999</b>	<b>1990</b>
Negligible Threat		
Modest Threat		
Serious Threat		
Don't know		
<b>2. What is the role of the state with respect to the problem of economic decline or disruption (answer only if the response to the previous question is “serious” or “moderate” threat)?</b>	<b>1999</b>	<b>1990</b>
Concerted efforts to manage or reduce the problem		
Minor or inconsistent efforts to manage or reduce the problem		
State policies contribute to the problem		
Don't know		
<b>3. Assess the degree to which the decline or collapse of central political authority posed a threat to political stability in this country.</b>	<b>1999</b>	<b>1990</b>
Negligible Threat		
Modest Threat		
Serious Threat		
Don't know		
<b>4. What is the role of the state with respect to the collapse of central political authority (answer only if the response to the previous question is “serious” or “moderate” threat)?</b>	<b>1999</b>	<b>1990</b>
Concerted efforts to manage or reduce the problem		
Minor or inconsistent efforts to manage or reduce the problem		
State policies contribute to the problem		
Don't know		
<b>5. Assess the degree to which political protest or rebellion posed a threat to political stability in this country.</b>	<b>1999</b>	<b>1990</b>
Negligible Threat		
Modest Threat		
Serious Threat		
Don't know		

**Table F-3**  
**State Capacity Survey Instrument (continued)**

<b>6. What is the role of the state with respect to the problem of political protest or rebellion (answer only if the response to the previous question is “serious” or “moderate” threat)?</b>	<b>1999</b>	<b>1990</b>
Concerted efforts to manage or reduce the problem		
Minor or inconsistent efforts to manage or reduce the problem		
State policies contribute to the problem		
Don’t know		
<b>7. Assess the degree to which ethno-cultural and/or religious conflict posed a threat to political stability in this country.</b>	<b>1999</b>	<b>1990</b>
Negligible Threat		
Modest Threat		
Serious Threat		
Don’t know		
<b>8. What is the role of the state with respect to the problem of ethno-cultural and/or religious conflict (answer only if the response to the previous question is “serious” or “moderate” threat)?</b>	<b>1999</b>	<b>1990</b>
Concerted efforts to manage or reduce the problem		
Minor or inconsistent efforts to manage or reduce the problem		
State policies contribute to the problem		
Don’t know		
<b>9. Assess the degree to which external military intervention posed a threat to political stability in this country.</b>	<b>1999</b>	<b>1990</b>
Negligible Threat		
Modest Threat		
Serious Threat		
Don’t know		
<b>SECTION II: STATE LEGITIMACY</b>		
<b>10. For the most part, is the state seen as legitimately representing its citizens?</b>	<b>1999</b>	<b>1990</b>
Virtually all citizens consider the state to be legitimate		
Most citizens consider the state to be legitimate, but a significant minority does not		
Few of the state’s citizens consider the state to be legitimate		
Don’t know		
<b>11. To what extent does the state and/or its allied groups engage in repression of its citizens?</b>	<b>1999</b>	<b>1990</b>
Not at all		
To a slight extent		
To a significant extent		
The state engaged in extreme repression		
Don’t know		

**Table F-3**  
**State Capacity Survey Instrument (continued)**

<b>SECTION III: HUMAN RESOURCES AND ORGANIZATIONS</b>		
<b>12. Rate the administrative and technical skills of the country's primary political decision-makers (e.g., chief executive and cabinet members).</b>	<b>1999</b>	<b>1990</b>
Very well suited to the task of governing		
Adequate to the task of governing		
Somewhat deficient for the task of governing		
Seriously deficient for the task of governing		
Don't know		
<b>13. Rate the administrative and technical skills of the country's civil service (occupying middle and higher management roles).</b>	<b>1999</b>	<b>1990</b>
Very well suited to the task of governing		
Adequate to the task of governing		
Somewhat deficient for the task of governing		
Seriously deficient for the task of governing		
Don't know		
<b>14. By what criteria are civil servants in government agencies hired, promoted, and replaced?</b>	<b>1999</b>	<b>1990</b>
Consistently professional criteria, based on training, expertise, and performance		
Mostly professional criteria, based on training, expertise, and performance		
Mostly other criteria, including personal, ideological, patronage considerations, etc.		
Don't know		
<b>You may check a box in between named categories (such as the box in between "severe" and "modest" below) if you are unable to choose between the two named categories.</b>		
<b>15. Rate the severity of corruption within the state</b>	<b>1999</b>	<b>1990</b>
Low		
Modest		
Severe		
Don't know		
<b>16. Rate the efficiency of the country's national bureaucracies overall.</b>	<b>1999</b>	<b>1990</b>
Efficient: most assigned tasks implemented effectively (e.g., tasks are for the most part completed on time and within budget)		
Adequate: some implementation difficulties but no major problems		
Problematic: frequent difficulties in implementing assigned tasks		
Crisis: most tasks not implemented effectively (in addition to overruns and delays, some vital tasks not getting done)		
Don't know		



**Table F-3**  
**State Capacity Survey Instrument (continued)**

<b>17. Rate the efficiency of the country's local-level government bureaucracies overall.</b>	<b>1999</b>	<b>1990</b>
Efficient: most assigned tasks implemented effectively (e.g., tasks are for the most part completed on time and within budget)		
Adequate: some implementation difficulties but no major problems		
Problematic: frequent difficulties in implementing assigned tasks		
Crisis: most tasks not implemented effectively (in addition to overruns and delays, some vital tasks not getting done)		
Don't know		
<b>18. Rate the effectiveness of coordination between the central government and local-level government organizations.</b>	<b>1999</b>	<b>1990</b>
Highly effective: lines of responsibility are clear and well understood, policies are integrated and implementation is coordinated		
Mostly effective		
Problematic: lines of responsibility are not clear and well understood, policies are not integrated and implementation is not coordinated		
Crisis: problems resulting in serious gaps in vital services		
Don't know		
<b>19. Rate the degree of professionalism of the state's military.</b>	<b>1999</b>	<b>1990</b>
High (e.g., systematic promotional patterns and clear delineation of duties)		
Moderate		
Low		
Don't know		
<b>20. In carrying out internal security tasks, to what extent does the state rely on tactics commonly considered illegitimate in the international community?</b>	<b>1999</b>	<b>1990</b>
Never		
Rarely		
Regularly		
Very frequently		
Don't know		
<b>SECTION IV: INSTITUTIONS</b>		
<b>21. Rate the state's ability to formulate and implement national policy initiatives.</b>	<b>1999</b>	<b>1990</b>
Very effective		
Somewhat effective		
Mostly ineffective		
Completely ineffective		
Don't know		

**Table F-3**  
**State Capacity Survey Instrument (continued)**

<b>22. Rate the state's effectiveness at collecting taxes or other forms of government revenue.</b>	<b>1999</b>	<b>1990</b>
Very effective		
Somewhat effective		
Mostly ineffective		
Completely ineffective		
Don't know		
<b>23. Does the central government produce a national budget in a timely manner?</b>	<b>1999</b>	<b>1990</b>
Always		
Mostly		
Seldom		
Never		
Don't know		
<b>24. Do local governments produce budgets in a timely manner?</b>	<b>1999</b>	<b>1990</b>
Always		
Mostly		
Seldom		
Never		
Don't know		
<b>25. Rate the state's adherence to the rule of law, considering the country as a whole.</b>	<b>1999</b>	<b>1990</b>
High		
Moderate		
Weak		
Non-existent		
Don't know		
<b>26. Is there significant variation in how the rule of law is applied across groups within the country?</b>	<b>1999</b>	<b>1990</b>
No		
Yes		
Don't know		
<b>SECTION V: OVERALL ASSESSMENT OF STATE RESPONSE CAPABILITIES</b>		
<b>27. Rate the state's ability to monitor socioeconomic trends, activities, and conditions within its borders</b>	<b>1999</b>	<b>1990</b>
Very effective in most or all parts of the country		
Somewhat effective in most or all parts of the country		
Ineffective in most or all parts of the country		
Don't know		

**Table F-3**  
**State Capacity Survey Instrument (continued)**

<b>28. Rate the state's ability to create, deliver, and maintain vital national infrastructure.</b>	<b>1999</b>	<b>1990</b>
Very effective in most or all parts of the country		
Somewhat effective in most or all parts of the country		
Ineffective in most or all parts of the country		
Don't know		
<b>29. Rate the state's ability to respond effectively to domestic economic problems.</b>	<b>1999</b>	<b>1990</b>
Very effective in most or all parts of the country		
Somewhat effective in most or all parts of the country		
Ineffective in most or all parts of the country		
Don't know		
<b>30. Rate the effectiveness of the state's coercive responses to domestic political crises, including political protest, rebellion, and ethno-cultural or religious conflict. Here effectiveness refers to the states ability to contain or control the crisis.</b>	<b>1999</b>	<b>1990</b>
Very effective in most or all parts of the country		
Somewhat effective in most or all parts of the country		
Ineffective in most or all parts of the country		
Don't know		
<b>31. Rate the state's ability to respond effectively to natural disasters.</b>	<b>1999</b>	<b>1990</b>
Very effective in most or all parts of the country		
Somewhat effective in most or all parts of the country		
Ineffective in most or all parts of the country		
Don't know		
<b>32. Rank the most important challenges to state capacity in this country. Please put your answers in rank order from 1-5, with 1 being the top challenge, 2 being the second most important challenge, and so on.</b>		
1999		
1.		
2.		
3.		
4.		
5.		
1990		
1.		
2.		
3.		
4.		
5.		
<b>33. In your opinion, what will be the greatest challenges to state capacity in this country over the next two years? List as many as five.</b>		

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**Table F-3**  
**State Capacity Survey Instrument (continued)**

---

- 1.
  - 2.
  - 3.
  - 4.
  - 5.
- 

**34. Please list indicators we should look for when evaluating the state's ability to respond to these challenges.**

---

- 1.
  - 2.
  - 3.
  - 4.
  - 5.
-

## Index Values

Table F-4 shows the values of the effectiveness and legitimacy indices in 1990 and 1999 for each of the countries on which we received valid responses.

Higher values indicate greater effectiveness and legitimacy.

**Table F-4**  
**State Capacity Index Values**

	1999		1990	
	Effectiveness	Legitimacy	Effectiveness	Legitimacy
Albania	-1.24	1.02	-0.90	0.12
Algeria	-0.23	-0.96	-0.03	0.47
Angola	-1.11	0.24	-0.97	1.15
Argentina	0.96	1.16	0.10	2.06
Australia	1.29	0.51	1.42	0.50
Azerbaijan	-1.61	-0.73	-1.07	-0.73
Bahrain	0.23	-3.16	0.55	-0.52
Bangladesh	-0.53	0.06	-0.38	-0.37
Benin	0.12	-0.51	0.24	-0.17
Botswana	1.11	-0.37	1.24	-0.02
Brazil	0.47	-0.49	-0.07	0.09
Bulgaria	-0.63	1.61	-0.43	1.65
Burkina Faso	-0.95	-1.49	-0.11	-0.60
Burma	-1.09	-2.13	-0.97	-1.42
Burundi	-1.54	-0.65	-0.15	-1.12
Canada	2.02	-0.17	2.04	0.51
Chile	1.05	0.24	-0.20	-0.80
China	0.08	-1.55	-0.23	-1.85
Colombia	-0.23	-0.53	-0.21	-0.53
Congo-Kinshasa	-1.94	-0.20	-1.28	-0.05
Cuba	0.13	-1.60	0.02	-0.82
Denmark	1.89	0.40	2.03	0.05
Egypt	0.17	-0.23	0.22	0.32
El Salvador	-0.13	0.19	-1.13	0.15
Eritrea	1.00	-2.01	—	—

**Table F-4**  
**State Capacity Index Values (continued)**

	1999		1990	
	Effectiveness	Legitimacy	Effectiveness	Legitimacy
Estonia	0.76	1.09	-0.74	-0.70
Ethiopia	-0.93	-0.91	-0.79	-0.07
Fiji	0.91	0.71	1.08	0.45
Finland	1.85	0.57	1.95	0.90
France	1.43	-0.19	1.53	0.15
Georgia	-0.81	1.87	-0.28	0.91
Germany	1.67	0.02	1.82	0.41
Guatemala	-1.30	1.12	-1.45	-0.49
Guinea-Bissau	-1.24	0.53	-0.76	2.53
Guyana	-0.30	1.21	-0.36	0.22
Haiti	-1.14	0.85	-1.35	0.63
Honduras	-0.57	0.27	-0.62	-0.60
Hungary	0.88	0.80	0.13	1.40
India	0.91	0.08	1.04	0.26
Indonesia	-0.80	0.48	0.04	-1.39
Iran	-0.08	-0.66	-0.33	-0.84
Iraq	-1.13	-1.72	-0.11	-2.03
Ireland	1.87	0.00	1.78	0.53
Israel	0.45	-0.96	0.60	-0.59
Italy	-0.12	1.12	-0.42	1.43
Japan	1.67	0.67	1.80	0.67
Jordan	0.42	-0.60	0.33	-0.22
Kazakhstan	-0.90	0.34	0.17	1.08
Kenya	-0.64	-0.50	-0.35	-0.50
Laos	-0.54	-0.11	-0.29	0.02
Lebanon	-0.67	-0.13	-1.75	0.76
Liberia	-0.42	-0.06	-1.67	0.26
Lithuania	0.15	1.20	0.56	0.18
Madagascar	-0.28	-1.08	0.08	-1.95
Malawi	-0.60	0.35	-1.69	0.26
Malaysia	0.45	-0.94	0.55	0.04
Mali	-0.57	-0.25	-0.85	0.26
Mauritania	-0.60	-0.11	-0.47	0.24

**Table F-4**  
**State Capacity Index Values (continued)**

	1999		1990	
	Effectiveness	Legitimacy	Effectiveness	Legitimacy
Mauritius	1.20	0.08	1.31	0.05
Mexico	-0.08	-0.86	-0.09	-1.07
Moldova	-1.02	1.68	-0.35	-1.03
Mongolia	0.43	0.92	-1.21	0.52
Mozambique	0.44	0.50	-0.09	0.57
Namibia	0.88	0.94	1.50	1.61
Nepal	-0.95	0.96	-1.06	0.35
Netherlands	1.42	0.36	1.51	0.49
Nicaragua	-1.23	0.76	-0.47	0.79
Niger	-0.93	0.23	-0.79	0.55
Nigeria	-0.85	0.48	-1.47	-0.42
North Korea	-0.96	-1.75	-0.09	-1.70
Oman	1.02	-0.01	0.96	-0.25
Panama	-0.74	0.75	-0.95	0.39
Papua New Guinea	-0.60	1.92	0.05	0.93
Peru	0.11	-1.19	-1.00	1.26
Philippines	-0.45	0.94	-0.44	0.90
Poland	0.39	1.64	-0.33	2.59
Qatar	0.68	-0.84	0.65	-1.32
Romania	-0.71	0.98	-1.27	0.74
Russia	-0.90	0.19	-0.56	0.83
Rwanda	0.49	-2.57	0.12	-1.70
Saudi Arabia	0.10	-1.51	0.09	-0.86
Senegal	-0.26	0.77	0.08	1.06
Sierra Leone	-1.01	2.16	-1.58	0.64
Slovenia	1.70	-0.06	1.86	-0.11
Somalia	-1.69	1.08	-1.62	0.37
South Africa	0.48	0.79	-0.09	-1.05
South Korea	1.19	0.63	1.10	-0.66
Spain	1.31	0.50	0.71	1.70
Sri Lanka	-0.20	-0.76	-0.31	-0.28
Sudan	-1.37	-0.89	-1.25	-0.80
Sweden	1.98	0.31	2.08	0.46

**Table F-4**  
**State Capacity Index Values (continued)**

	1999		1990	
	Effectiveness	Legitimacy	Effectiveness	Legitimacy
Switzerland	1.96	0.58	2.01	0.44
Syria	-0.56	-1.18	-0.49	-1.21
Taiwan	0.47	0.03	0.79	-1.02
Tajikistan	-1.56	0.41	0.64	-1.89
Tanzania	0.18	0.82	-0.82	2.14
Turkey	-0.09	-1.23	-0.22	-1.24
Uganda	0.13	-0.47	0.74	-1.08
United Kingdom	2.11	0.26	2.09	0.43
Uzbekistan	0.30	-1.12	0.57	-1.61
Vietnam	-0.28	-1.08	0.08	-1.95
Yemen	-1.10	0.21	-0.56	-0.20
Zambia	-0.52	-0.11	-0.71	-0.63

Note: Based on Factor Scores from Principal Components Analysis, for questions 10-31 in Survey, as explained in text.



## Appendix G

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**Table G-1**  
**Data Source List**

<b>Data Set</b>	<b>Data Set Name</b>	<b>Data Source</b>	<b>Documentation</b>	<b>Contact Information</b>
<b>ADS</b>	AIDS Cases Reported to WHO	The World Health Organization		World Health Organization CH-1211 Geneva 27 Switzerland Phone: +41 22 791 2111; Fax: +41 22 791 0746 www.who.int E-mail: postmaster@who.ch
	AIDS data reported to the World Health Organization (WHO) by country/area. Indicates the number of reported AIDS cases through 1994, by year of diagnosis. Updates discontinued by source.			
<b>AGR</b>	AGROSTAT	Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO)	FAO Production and Trade Yearbook	FAO Economic and Social Policy Department Viale delle Terme di Caracalla 00100 Rome, Italy www.fao.org E-mail: Roberto.Bonsignore@fao.org
	Database of annual FAO food and agricultural statistics including data on production, consumption, trade, and prices of food and other agricultural commodities. Updates discontinued by source.			
<b>BAR</b>	Data Set for a Panel of 138 Countries	Robert J. Barro and Lee Jong-Wha	See also Barro R. and J. Lee, "International Comparisons of Educational Attainment," NBER Working Paper, 1993.	www.nber.org/pub/barro.lee
	A research data set prepared for a national-level panel study. Contains data covering seven broad categories: 1) National Accounts of Income; 2) Education; 3) Population/Fertility; 4) Government Expenditures; 5) PPP Deflators; 6) Political Variables; and 7) Trade Policy and Others. Includes data on black market premiums derived from World Bank sources and Picks Currency Yearbook.			

**Table G-1**  
**Data Source List (continued)**

<b>Data Set</b>	<b>Data Set Name</b>	<b>Data Source</b>	<b>Documentation</b>	<b>Contact Information</b>
<b>BNK</b>	Cross-National Time-Series Data Archive	Arthur S. Banks Center for Social Analysis State University of New York at Binghamton	<i>Cross-National Time-Series Data Archive User's Manual</i>	Computer Solutions Unlimited 29 Riverside Drive Binghamton NY 13905 USA www.databanks.sitehosting.net/www/main.htm E-mail: databanks@sitehosting.net
	Also referred to as the Cross-Polity Survey. Contains annual data on institutions and conflicts of all states. The Cross-National Time-Series Data Archive (CNTS) was a product of the State University of New York (Binghamton), launched in the fall of 1968 by Arthur S. Banks under the aegis of the University's Center for Comparative Political Research (subsequently the Center for Social Analysis).			
<b>BNN</b>	Leadership Duration	Henry S. Bienen, Northwestern University Nicolas van de Walle, Michigan State University	Henry S. Bienen and Nicolas van de Walle, <i>Of Time and Power: Leadership Duration in the Modern World</i> (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1991)	Permissions Department Stanford University Press Stanford, CA 94305-2235 Fax: 415-725-3457 www.sup.org
	This hand-coded database tracks leadership duration across a wide range of countries and time. Earliest data extend from 18th century through 1987. Data from 1955-87 were originally retained for Task Force use; data were updated through 1998 by the State Failure Task Force.			
<b>CAP</b>	National Material Capabilities Data	J. David Singer, University of Michigan Melvin Small, Wayne State University	Singer, J. David and Melvin Small, <i>Resort to Arms</i> . Beverly Hills: Sage Publications, 1982.	J. David Singer and Phil Schafer Correlates of War Project University of Michigan Ann Arbor, MI 48109 313-763-6590 E-mail: jdsinger@umich.edu
	This data set codes demographic, military, and industrial indicators for each country that is a member of the interstate system. These indicators comprise military personnel, military expenditure, iron and steel production, energy consumption, urban population, and total population. The data set also codes the status of each system member for the given year as either a major power or a minor power and the region in which it is located.			

**Table G-1**  
**Data Source List** (*continued*)

<b>Data Set</b>	<b>Data Set Name</b>	<b>Data Source</b>	<b>Documentation</b>	<b>Contact Information</b>
<b>CIO</b>	Connectedness Memberships in Inter-Governmental Organizations	Monty Marshall, Center for International Development and Conflict Management (CIDCM), University of Maryland	Codebook on file	Monty Marshall University of Maryland Tydings Hall College Park, MD 20742 Phone: (301) 314-7710; Fax: (301) 314-9256 www.bsos.umd.edu/cidcm E-mail: mmarshall@cidcm.umd.edu
	<p>This data set concerns external factors, or interventions, that may affect the internal political processes leading to state failure. The term “intervention” is used here in its broadest meaning, as an umbrella concept that subsumes all political factors and actions that are produced or applied by actors operating originally outside the sovereign political domain of the target, or affected, state. Such external factors may contribute (positively or negatively) to the failure processes, or their appearance may otherwise signal an unfolding crisis and impending failure.</p>			
<b>CNS</b>	Infant Mortality Rate	US Bureau of Census, International Programs Center, Population Division	Codebook on file	US Bureau of the Census International Statistical Programs Center (ISPC) Washington Plaza II, Room 207 Washington, DC 20233-3700 USA Phone: (301) 763-4811; Fax (301) 763-7610 www.census.gov
	<p>Number of deaths of infants under one year of age per 1,000 live births in a given year. The data can vary for many reasons. Variation can be due to changes in a country’s sanitation system or public health program, however, abrupt changes may be due to catastrophic events, particularly famine and wars.</p>			

**Table G-5**  
**Data Source List (continued)**

Data Set	Data Set Name	Data Source	Documentation	Contact Information
<b>COW</b>	International and Civil War Data, 1816-1992	J. David Singer, University of Michigan; Melvin Small, Wayne State University	www.umich.edu/~cowproj/index.html	J. David Singer and Phil Schafer Correlates of War Project University of Michigan Ann Arbor, MI 48109 313-763-6590 E-mail: jdsinger@umich.edu
<p>This data series combines the two data sets which comprise the Correlates of War International and Civil War Data, 1816-1992. The Civil War data set is a study of 150 major civil wars involving 204 participants between 1816 and 1988. An internal war is classified as a major civil war if (a) military action is involved, (b) the national government at the time was actively involved, (c) effective resistance occurred on both sides and (d) at least 1,000 battle deaths resulted. The International War Data Set describes the experience of each interstate system member in each war. The unit of analysis is the participant in a particular conflict. The file contains 1,284 logical records for each 428 cases. Each case contains the values for 44 variables that describe the experience of one participant in an international war.</p>				
<b>CUL</b>	Cultural Data Set	Phil Schafer, University of Michigan	www.umich.edu/~cowproj/index.html	J. David Singer and Phil Schafer Correlates of War Project University of Michigan Ann Arbor, MI 48109 313-763-6590 E-mail: jdsinger@umich.edu
<p>This data set records the size of ethnic groups, linguistic populations, and religious bodies in the Correlates of War interstate system for each decade from 1820 through 1990. In addition, it covers all other independent countries and dependencies which have permanent populations. These data have only been collected for 1990 and collected in order to present the user with a current view of the entire world's ethnic, linguistic, and religious makeup. Appendix B contains data covering the new states that previously made up the USSR and Yugoslavia. This data was entered beginning in April 1992. Appendix C contains data for the Czech Republic and Slovakia, which became separate states as of January 1, 1993.</p>				

**Table G-5**  
**Data Source List (continued)**

<b>Data Set</b>	<b>Data Set Name</b>	<b>Data Source</b>	<b>Documentation</b>	<b>Contact Information</b>
<b>DAC</b>	Development Assistance Committee Aid Data	Organization for Economic Co-Operation and Development (OECD)	OECD annual reports (DACAID.DAT): www.oecd.org/dac/htm/online.htm#New subscription options	OECD Washington Center 2001 L Street, NW Washington, DC 20036 Phone: 202-822-3861 (direct): Fax: 202-785-0350 www.oecd.org
	Total bilateral and multilateral aid flows from 16 OECD (Development Assistance Committee) donors.			
<b>DHD</b>	Disaster History Database	US Agency for International Development, Office of US Foreign Disaster Assistance		USAID Office of US Foreign Disaster Assistance The Ronald Reagan Building 1300 Pennsylvania Ave. NW Washington D.C. Phone: 202-647-5582 www.usaid.gov E-mail: suzanne@usaid.gov
	This disaster history database is maintained by the Office of US Foreign Disaster assistance. It includes data on various natural and human-induced disasters including drought, earthquakes, floods, and volcanic eruptions. Variables include the number of people affected or made homeless by a disaster along with estimates of deaths and damage.			
<b>DIS</b>	Group Discrimination and Separatism Indicators	Ted R. Gurr, Center for International Development and Conflict Management (CIDCM), University of Maryland	Codebook on file	Ted R. Gurr University of Maryland Tydings Hall College Park, MD 20742 USA Phone: (301) 314-7710; Fax: (301) 314-9256 www.bsos.umd.edu/cidcm E-mail: tgurr@cidcm.umd.edu
	The data set contains indicators of group discrimination and separatism including group number, country and group names, political and economic discrimination indices, separatism index, and the group population as proportion of the country. The cases in this data set consist of politically significant communal groups, listed by country. The groups listed include all those that at any time between c.1960 and 1998 were either subject to significant discrimination, or that sought greater political autonomy (up to and including independent statehood) from the country in which they were situated.			

**Table G-5**  
**Data Source List** (*continued*)

<b>Data Set</b>	<b>Data Set Name</b>	<b>Data Source</b>	<b>Documentation</b>	<b>Contact Information</b>
<b>DMI</b>	Direct Military Intervention	Monty Marshall, Center for International Development and Conflict Management (CIDCM), University of Maryland	Codebook on file.	Monty Marshall University of Maryland Tydings Hall College Park, MD 20742 Phone: (301) 314-7710; Fax: (301) 314-9256 www.bsos.umd.edu/cidcm E-mail: mmarshall@cidcm.umd.edu
	<p>This compiled data set focuses on identifying what countries or international organizations made the decision to intervene militarily in a specific country in a given year. If an actor was identified as making more than one distinct intervention in a country in a given year, it is only listed once as an actor who decided to intervene in that country in that year. By compiling data from multiple sources, the authors have overcome some of the problems of “selection bias” inherent in the more narrowly defined collections. The resulting definition of “direct military intervention” is an expanded version of the definition used by Tillema. Data on unilateral interventions is considered missing for the years, 1992-98. Data on multilateral interventions is considered complete for the entire time span, 1946-98.</p>			
<b>DOT</b>	Direction of Trade (DOT)	International Monetary Fund	<i>Direction of Trade Statistics Yearbook</i>	WEFA, Inc. 800 Baldwin Tower Eddystone, PA 19022 Phone: 610/490-4000 www.wefa.com
	<p>The complete Direction of Trade (DOT) data set includes approximately 55,000 country and area time series data covering the distribution of exports and imports by partner country for 184 countries. The data contained in the combined data set was created by the SFTF as regionalized subsets of the original data.</p>			



**Table G-5**  
**Data Source List (continued)**

<b>Data Set</b>	<b>Data Set Name</b>	<b>Data Source</b>	<b>Documentation</b>	<b>Contact Information</b>
<b>DSP</b>	Displacement Data Set	Susanne Schmeidl, Swiss Peace Foundation, and J. Craig Jenkins, Ohio State University	Codebook on file	Susanne Schmeidl, Ph.D.  Swiss Peace Foundation, Institute for Conflict Resolution Gerechtigkeitsgasse 12 CH - 3000 Bern 8 Switzerland Phone: +41-31-310-27-31 or 310-27-27 Fax: +41-31-310-27-28 www.swisspeace.ch E-mail: susanne.schmeidl@swisspeace.unibe.ch
	This data set contains estimates of the numbers of internally displaced people based on various sources. These sources include the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, the US Committee for Refugees, the US Department of State, among others.			
<b>EDB</b>	United Nations Energy Statistics Database	United Nations Statistical Division	<i>1994 Energy Statistics Yearbook</i> (IRC, #106150)	Director Statistical Division United Nations, New York 10017 www.un.org
	The database contains comprehensive energy statistics on production, trade, and consumption (end-use) for primary and secondary conventional, non-conventional, new, and renewable sources of energy. In addition, mid-year population estimates are included to enable conversion to a common unit (terajoules) for interfuel comparison and analyses.			

**Table G-5**  
**Data Source List (continued)**

Data Set	Data Set Name	Data Source	Documentation	Contact Information
<b>ELC</b>	Elite Characteristics	Barbara Harff, US Naval Academy	Codebook on file	Barbara Harff US Naval Academy Department of Political Science Annapolis, MD 21402 Phone: 410-293-6863 E-mail: harff@arctic.nadn.navy.mil
<p>The coding on this set of variables is based on the class affiliations of the chief executive and, if information is available, on his/her immediate associates. Variables coded are the Ethnic Character of Ruling Elite, the Religious Character of Ruling Elite, and the Class Character of Ruling Elite. The latter includes dichotomous variables for no distinct class basis; large landowners; ruling clan/family; entrepreneurial (merchants, bankers, industrialists); professionals/intelligentsia; military; bureaucratic (used for entrenched Communist Party regimes as well as some others); and revolutionary leadership (used for revolutionary leaders and parties that recently seized power).</p>				
<b>FAO</b>	FAOSTAT	Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) of the United Nations	<a href="http://apps.fao.org/page/collections">http://apps.fao.org/page/collections</a>	FAO Economic and Social Policy Department Viale delle Terme di Caracalla 00100 Rome, Italy <a href="http://www.fao.org">www.fao.org</a> E-mail: Roberto.Bonsignore@fao.org
<p>Database of annual FAO food and agricultural statistics including data on production, consumption, trade, and prices of food and other agricultural commodities.</p>				

**Table G-5**  
**Data Source List (continued)**

<b>Data Set</b>	<b>Data Set Name</b>	<b>Data Source</b>	<b>Documentation</b>	<b>Contact Information</b>
	Freedom in the World	Freedom House	<i>Freedom in the World: The Annual Survey of Political and Civil Liberties</i>	Freedom House 120 Wall Street New York, NY 10005 USA www.freedomhouse.org
<b>FHS</b>	This data set comprises indices of political rights and civil liberties published by Freedom House in its annual <i>Freedom in the World</i> publication. The survey rates political rights and civil liberties separately on a seven-category scale, 1 representing the most free and 7 the least free. Under the newly modified methodology, the team assigns initial ratings to countries by awarding from 0 to 4 raw points per checklist item, depending on the comparative rights or liberties present. Freedom House is a non-profit organization based in New York that monitors political rights and civil liberties around the world. Freedom House was established in 1941.			
	Global Development Finance	The World Bank, International Bank for Reconstruction and Development	www.worldbank.org/data	The World Bank 1818 H Street, NW Washington, DC 20433 www.worldbank.org
<b>GDF</b>	<i>Global Development Finance</i> is the World Bank's review of the external debt and finance flows of developing countries. It examines recent developments in flows from international capital markets to developing countries as well as debt burden indicators, official and commercial debt, restructuring, privatization activities, and external financing and debt of geographic regions.			
	Mortality Database	The World Health Organization	<i>World Health Statistics Annual</i>	World Health Organization CH-1211 Geneva 27 Switzerland Phone: +41 22 791 2111; Fax: +41 22 791 0746 www.who.int E-mail: postmaster@who.ch
<b>HOM</b>	The WHO Mortality database contains statistics on cause of death for human populations by country, year, sex, and age. The cause-of-death coding follows the International Classification of Diseases and Causes of Death (ICD). Approximately 150 causes of death are covered. Data are geographically coded by WHO Region, UN Subdivision, and Country or Area. Mortality data are based on actual death certificates, which are reported only by countries that require legal certification of death. The original data are collected at country level in the Central Statistical Offices or in the Ministries of Health from approximately 80 countries.			

**Table G-5**  
**Data Source List** (*continued*)

<b>Data Set</b>	<b>Data Set Name</b>	<b>Data Source</b>	<b>Documentation</b>	<b>Contact Information</b>
<b>IDB</b>	International Data Base	International Statistical Programs Center (ISPC), U.S. Bureau of the Census	www.census.gov/ipc/www/idbnew.html	US Bureau of the Census International Statistical Programs Center (ISPC) Washington Plaza II, Room 207 Washington, DC 20233-3700 USA Phone: (301) 763-4811; Fax (301) 763-7610 www.census.gov
	<p>This data set contains demographic and socioeconomic data for all countries of the world. It includes a variety of demographic data on births, deaths, mortality rates, life expectancies, total and age-specific fertility rates, marital status, and population by age and sex. It also includes data on literacy, contraceptive use, labor force by occupation and industry, and religious and ethnic group affiliation, among others. The data are generally available by country and year, by age and sex in many cases, and by urban/rural residence in some cases.</p>			
<b>IFL</b>	Islamic Family Law	State Failure Task Force (SFTF)	Codebook on file	Created for and by the SFTF
	<p>In principle Islamic Law (<i>Sharia</i>) is all encompassing, regulating all aspects of social, economic, ritual and personal life. However, identical principles apply at all times and places. This data set explores these differences. The data included in this data set were derived from sources including national constitutions, English and French translations of personal status codes, historical and ethnographic studies, and in cases where no other data were obtainable, interviews.</p>			

**Table G-5**  
**Data Source List (continued)**

<b>Data Set</b>	<b>Data Set Name</b>	<b>Data Source</b>	<b>Documentation</b>	<b>Contact Information</b>
<b>IFS</b>	International Financial Statistics and IMF Standby Agreements	International Monetary Fund	International Financial Statistics reports	Statistics Department International Monetary Fund Washington, D.C. 20431 USA Phone: (202) 623-6180 Editorial Division Phone: (202) 623-6579 www.imf.org
	International Financial Statistics (IFS) is the International Monetary Fund's principal statistical publication, published on CD-ROM monthly since January 1948. The CD-ROMs provide users with time series data covering approximately 27,000 economic concepts covering more than 200 countries. They include data on the following topics: balance of payments, banking and financial systems, employment, exchange rates, Fund position, government finance, interest rates, international liquidity and banking, national accounts, population, prices, production, and trade.			
<b>ING</b>	Cultural Zone, Modernization and Wellbeing Data	Ronald Inglehart, Center for Political Studies, Institute for Social Research, University of Michigan		Ronald Inglehart, Program Director Center for Political Studies, Institute for Social Research, University of Michigan Ann Arbor, MI 48106-1248 USA Phone: 313-936-1767 E-mail: rfi@umich.edu
	This data set includes several variables from the World Values Surveys. Cultural zone codes identify major world cultural regions based on the 1990-1991 World Values Survey. Modernization and post-modernization codes provide indicators of the levels of modernization and post-modernization values prevalent in individual countries. Subjective well-being scores for 43 societies are based on the 1990-93 World Values Survey. T. Gurr of the University of Maryland provided additional updates for selected countries not covered in the original data set.			
<b>INS0</b>	<i>1995 Statistical Yearbook of the Immigration and Naturalization Service</i>	US Immigration and Naturalization Service	<a href="http://www.ins.usdoj.gov/graphics/aboutins/statistics/1997YB.pdf">www.ins.usdoj.gov/graphics/aboutins/statistics/1997YB.pdf</a>	<a href="http://www.ins.usdoj.gov">www.ins.usdoj.gov</a>
	The Yearbook provides immigration data for 1995. Types of data included are as follows: immigrants admitted for legal permanent residence; refugees approved and admitted; nonimmigrant arrivals; aliens naturalized; and aliens apprehended and expelled.			

**Table G-5**  
**Data Source List (continued)**

<b>Data Set</b>	<b>Data Set Name</b>	<b>Data Source</b>	<b>Documentation</b>	<b>Contact Information</b>
<b>INT</b>	International Crime Statistics	International Criminal Police Organization	<i>International Crime Statistics Vols (1959-60, 1961-62, 1963-64, 1965-66, 1967-68, 1969-70, 1971-72, 1973-74, 1975-76, 1977-78, 1979-80, 1981-82, 1983-84, 1985-86, 1989-90, 1991-92, 1993-94).</i>	General Reference Department ICPO-Interpol General Secretariat 50, Quai Achille Lignon, 69006 Lyon, France www.interpol.int
	The International Criminal Police Organization—Interpol (ICPO-Interpol)— has been publishing international crime statistics since 1950. The statistics are based on data collected by the police in ICPO-Interpol member countries and are, therefore, police statistics and not judicial statistics. The statistics cover 86 countries. The information contained in these statistics is presented in a uniform manner and classified under headings relating to major categories of crimes.			
<b>ITU</b>	World Telecommunication Indicator Database	International Telecommunication Union (ITU)	www.itu.int/ti/publications/world/world.htm	Telecommunication Development Bureau International Telecommunication Union Place des Nations CH - 1211 Geneva 20, Switzerland Fax: +41 22 730 6449 E-mail: infs@itu.int
	The World Telecommunication Indicators Database contains time series data for the years 1960, 1965, 1970, and annually from 1975-97. The total data set covers approximately 100 communication statistics including telephone network size and dimension, mobile service, quality of service, traffic, staff, tariffs, revenue and investment. Selected demographic, macro-economic, broadcasting, and information technology statistics are also included. The data were collected with an annual questionnaire sent out by the Telecommunication Development Bureau of the International Telecommunication Union (ITU).			

**Table G-5**  
**Data Source List (continued)**

<b>Data Set</b>	<b>Data Set Name</b>	<b>Data Source</b>	<b>Documentation</b>	<b>Contact Information</b>
<b>MAC</b>	Major Armed Conflicts	Monty Marshall, Center for International Development and Conflict Management (CIDCM), University of Maryland	Codebook on file.	Monty Marshall University of Maryland Tydings Hall College Park, MD 20742 Phone: (301) 314-7710; Fax: (301) 314-9256 www.bsos.umd.edu/cidcm E-mail: mmarshall@cidcm.umd.edu
	This data set contains data on major armed conflicts and conflict regions from 1946-97.			
<b>NSF</b>	Science and Engineering Indicators 1996	National Science Foundation, Division of Science Resources Studies	<a href="http://www.nsf.gov/sbe/srs/seind96/start.htm">www.nsf.gov/sbe/srs/seind96/start.htm</a>	National Science Foundation Division of Science Resources Studies 4201 Wilson Blvd., Suite 965 Arlington, VA 22230 Phone: 703-306-1777 x6928 www.nsf.gov
	The Science and Engineering Indicators data set is compiled from a quantitative study of scientific manpower resources. The data include scientific and technical specialties, as well as degrees of proficiency, years of experience, and age brackets.			
<b>PND</b>	<i>Protocol for the Analysis of Nonviolent Direct Action (PANDA)</i>	Center of Nonviolent Sanctions at Harvard University	<a href="http://data.fas.harvard.edu/cfia/pnscs/DOCS/contents.htm">http://data.fas.harvard.edu/cfia/pnscs/DOCS/contents.htm</a>	Prof. Doug Bond Center for International Affairs, Harvard University 1737 Cambridge Street Cambridge, MA 02138 Phone: 617-495-5580 <a href="http://data.fas.harvard.edu/cfia/pnscs/panda.htm">data.fas.harvard.edu/cfia/pnscs/panda.htm</a> E-mail: dbond@cfia.harvard.edu
	The Protocol for the Assessment of Nonviolent Direct Action (PANDA) was designed to identify acute conflict interaction events reported in a global news wire service and track their development. The PANDA program is premised in part upon the idea that nonviolent direct action may serve as a functional substitute for the violent prosecution of conflict. This data set contains data on state and non-state interaction events, including threats from 1984 through April 1995.			

**Table G-5**  
**Data Source List (continued)**

<b>Data Set</b>	<b>Data Set Name</b>	<b>Data Source</b>	<b>Documentation</b>	<b>Contact Information</b>
<b>POL</b>	Polity Democracy/ Autocracy Indicators	Keith Jagers, University of Colorado; and Ted R. Gurr, Center for International Development and Conflict Management (CIDCM), University of Maryland	<a href="http://www.bsos.umd.edu/cidcm/polity">www.bsos.umd.edu/cidcm/polity</a>	Ted R. Gurr University of Maryland Tydings Hall College Park, MD 20742 USA Phone: (301) 314-7710; fax: (301) 314-9256 <a href="http://www.bsos.umd.edu/cidcm/polity">www.bsos.umd.edu/cidcm/polity</a> E-mail: <a href="mailto:tgurr@cidcm.umd.edu">tgurr@cidcm.umd.edu</a>
	The Polity IV database includes annual data on authority characteristics of all states in the international system, 1800-1998. These data include autocracy and democracy indicators based on an 11-point scale (0 to 10) and the competitiveness of the election process.			
<b>PRS</b>	Time Series of International Country Risk Guide Data, 1982-95	Institute for Reform and the Informal Sector (IRIS), University of Maryland The Political Risk Services (PRS ) Group	<a href="http://www.prsgroup.com/icrg/icrg.html">www.prsgroup.com/icrg/icrg.html</a>	The Political Risk Services (PRS) Group 6320 Fly Road, Suite 102 P.O. Box 248 East Syracuse, NY 13057-0248 Phone: 315-431-0511 <a href="http://www.prsgroup.com">www.prsgroup.com</a> E-mail: <a href="mailto:crisr@polrisk.com">crisr@polrisk.com</a>
	The International Country Risk Guide (ICRG), a monthly publication of Political Risk Services Group (PRS), evaluates economic, political, and financial risk. Each variable's value for a given country and year is a simple average of the two values for the months April and October.			
<b>PTS</b>	Purdue University Political Terror Scale (PTS)	Purdue University Global Studies Program	<a href="http://www.ippu.purdue.edu/info/gsp/govern.htm">www.ippu.purdue.edu/info/gsp/govern.htm</a>	<a href="http://www.ippu.purdue.edu/info/gsp/govern.htm">www.ippu.purdue.edu/info/gsp/govern.htm</a>
	The Purdue University Political Terror Scale (PTS) is a graded scale for measuring human rights violation and was adapted from work originally published by Raymond Gastil of Freedom House in 1979. The raw information comes from the US Department of State and Amnesty International Annual Reports on country Human Rights practices. The scale requires ordinal judgments—distances between levels are not equal but a country at level 1 is doing better than a country judged to be at level 2.			



**Table G-5**  
**Data Source List (continued)**

<b>Data Set</b>	<b>Data Set Name</b>	<b>Data Source</b>	<b>Documentation</b>	<b>Contact Information</b>
<b>PWT</b>	Penn World Tables 5.6	Alan Heston and Robert Summers, University of Pennsylvania Daniel A. Nuxoll, Virginia Polytechnic Institute Bettina Aten, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign	Robert Summers and Alan Heston, "The Penn World Table (Mark 5): an Expanded Set of International Comparisons, 1950–1988," <i>Quarterly Journal of Economics</i> (May 1991).	<a href="http://pwt.econ.upenn.edu">http://pwt.econ.upenn.edu</a>
	<p>Also known as the Summers-Heston data, the Penn World Table displays a set of national accounts economic time series covering many countries. Its expenditure entries are denominated in a common set of prices in a common currency so that real quantity comparisons can be made, both between countries and over time. It also provides information about relative prices within and between countries, as well as demographic data and capital stock estimates. The Penn World Table is produced by the Center for International Comparisons at the University of Pennsylvania.</p>			
<b>REF</b>	Refugee Data Set	Susanne Schmeidl, Swiss Peace Foundation, and J. Craig Jenkins, Ohio State University	Codebook on file	Susanne Schmeidl, Ph.D.  Swiss Peace Foundation Institute for Conflict Resolution Gerechtigkeitsgasse 12 CH - 3000 Bern 8 Switzerland Phone: +41-31-310-27-31 or 310-27-27 Fax: +41-31-310-27-28 <a href="http://www.swisspeace.ch">www.swisspeace.ch</a> E-mail: <a href="mailto:susanne.schmeidl@swisspeace.unibe.ch">susanne.schmeidl@swisspeace.unibe.ch</a>
	<p>This data set contains annual totals of international refugees by country of origin based on various sources. These sources include the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, the US Committee for Refugees, the US Department of State, among others.</p>			

**Table G-5**  
**Data Source List (continued)**

<b>Data Set</b>	<b>Data Set Name</b>	<b>Data Source</b>	<b>Documentation</b>	<b>Contact Information</b>
<b>SFT</b>		Members of the State Failure Task Force (SFTF)	www.bsos.umd.edu/cidcm/stfail/sfcodebook.htm	Created for and by the SFTF
	Data created or collected for the SFTF including that created using publicly available data.			
<b>SID</b>	Social Indicators of Development 1996	The World Bank, International Bank for Reconstruction and Development	<i>Social Indicators of Development 1996</i> , ID # 106514	The World Bank 1818 H Street, NW Washington, DC 20433 www.worldbank.org
	This is the World Bank's most detailed data collection for assessing human welfare to provide a picture of the social effects of economic development. Data are presented for over 170 economies, omitting only those for which data are inadequate. Indicators include: size, growth, and structure of population; determinants of population growth; labor force; education and illiteracy; natural resources; income and poverty; expenditure on food, housing, fuel and power, transport and communication; and investment in medical care and education. The database contains information for a range of 209 countries for years 1965-93. Updates discontinued by source.			
<b>SO2</b>	Emissions of Sulphur Dioxide from Man-Made Sources	United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) Environmental Data Report, Fourth Edition, 1993/94.	<i>UNEP Environmental Data Report, Fourth Edition, 1993/94</i> , Table 1.8	United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) GEMS Monitoring and Assessment Research Centre London, United Kingdom
	Data in this set generally represent official country emission estimates (with the exception of selected countries in Asia) as reported in "state of the environment"-type reports or as reported to the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP).			

**Table G-5**  
**Data Source List (continued)**

Data Set	Data Set Name	Data Source	Documentation	Contact Information
	Overt Foreign Military Interventions	Herbert Tillema, University of Missouri	Codebook on file. See also "Paths to War in the Nuclear Age: Foreign Overt Military Interventions, 1945-1988" 1990 APSA paper	Herbert Tillema University of Missouri Phone: (314) 882-3777; Fax (314) 884-5131 E-mail: <a href="mailto:tillema@mizzou.1.missouri.edu">tillema@mizzou.1.missouri.edu</a>
<b>TLL</b>	<p>This data series describes 690 foreign overt military interventions (OMI) initiated between 9/02/45 and 12/31/91. It is extracted from the "Overt Military Interventions" data set that includes all instances of intervention confirmed by review of public information sources. OMI are operationally defined as combatant or combat-ready military operations conducted by units of a foreign state's regular military forces. They include conventional deployments of ground combat units that involve such actions as alert patrol, offensive maneuver, riot quelling, armed occupation of territory, and battle. They also include other, usually less intense, combatant military operations such as: commando or other small unit raids; aerial bombing, strafing and rocketry; ground-based artillery or rocketry; and naval gunnery and rocketry. Incidents confined to small arms fire across borders and engagements among vessels at sea or among aircraft in flight are excluded.</p>			
<b>UNC</b>	UNCTAD: Trade and Development Statistics	United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD)	<i>Handbook of International Trade and Development Statistics 1993</i>	UNCTAD Palais des Nations CH-1211 Geneva 10 Switzerland Fax: 41-22-907-0051 <a href="http://www.unctad.org/en/enhome.htm">www.unctad.org/en/enhome.htm</a>
	<p>This handbook provides a complete basic collection of statistical data relevant to the analysis of world trade and development. It was created for the use of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), government officials, university, and other research specialists. UN Publication Sales No. E/F.94.II.D.24. The data generally cover 1960-92.</p>			

**Table G-5**  
**Data Source List (continued)**

<b>Data Set</b>	<b>Data Set Name</b>	<b>Data Source</b>	<b>Documentation</b>	<b>Contact Information</b>
<b>UND</b>	World Population Prospects 1950-2050 (The 1996 Revision)	Population Division, United Nations Department for Economic and Social Information and Policy Analysis	<i>World Population Prospects 1950-2050</i> (The 1996 Revision)	Population Division, Department for Economic and Social Information and Policy Analysis United Nations, New York 10017 www.undp.org/popin
	World Population Prospects 1950-2050 (The 1996 Revision) contains demographic estimates for 1950-90 and four variants of projections for 1990-2050 for countries, regions and major areas of the world. Most data are presented quinquennially, however, population data by age and sex for the medium variant and total population figures for all variants are presented annually. Estimates and projections have been prepared for population by sex and five-year age groups, population by sex and one-year age group for ages 5-24, and 27 major demographic indicators.			
<b>UNJ</b>	United Nations Surveys of Crime Trends and Operations of Criminal Justice Systems	United Nations Crime and Justice Information Network	First through Fifth United Nations Surveys of Crime Trends and Operations of Criminal Justice Systems (1970-1994)	Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice Branch, United Nations Office at Vienna P.O. Box 500 A-1400 Vienna, Austria Fax: 43-1-232156 www.uncjin.org
	This country-year formatted data set tracks a number of variables related to crime trends and the operation of the criminal justice system.			
<b>UNM</b>	The United Nations Demographic Yearbook Data Records (as of 8/97)	United Nations Statistical Division	United Nations Demographic Yearbook	Statistical Division United Nations New York, NY 10017 Phone: 212-963-4996 www.un.org/Depts/unsd
	These data are compiled from Table 15, Infant Deaths and Infant Mortality Rates, by urban/rural residence: 1991-95 of the <i>UN Demographic Yearbook 1995</i> and updated through 1996. The United Nation's Statistical Division compiles data on infant mortality by urban/rural residence on an annual basis. The official demographic statistics are provided with the cooperation of national statistical services. In certain instances, estimates prepared by the United Nations Population Division for Economic and Social Information and Policy Analysis have been used to supplement official national statistics. Data exclude fetal deaths. Rates are given only when there are at least 100 infant deaths total for an area or country in a given year.			

**Table G-5**  
**Data Source List (continued)**

<b>Data Set</b>	<b>Data Set Name</b>	<b>Data Source</b>	<b>Documentation</b>	<b>Contact Information</b>
<b>UNP</b>	Road Networks	United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) Environmental Data Report, Third Edition 1991/92	UNEP Environmental Data Report, Third Edition 1991/92, Table 7.1	United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) GEMS Monitoring and Assessment Research Centre London, United Kingdom www.unep.org
	This data set contains road networks in 1978 and 1988 by country. Included are road density and total road length. Note that the definitions of roads vary from country to country.			
<b>UNS</b>	UNESCO Statistical Databank (population, education, and newspaper data)	United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO)	UNESCO Statistical Yearbook 1994	Division of Statistics United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization 7, place de Fontenoy 75352 PARIS 07 SP France Phone: 33 1 45 68 10 00 www.unesco.org
	Data included in this data set are from tables: 3.2, 3.11, 7.9, and 7.10 of the <i>1994 UNESCO Statistical Yearbook</i> . These data include the following: 1) pupils, both sexes and females for pre-primary and first-, second-, and third-level education; 2) daily and non-daily newspapers (number and circulation); and 3) population by single age for 1950, 1955, 1960, 1965, and 1970-93.			
<b>UNU</b>	World Urbanization Prospects 1996	The United Nations Population Division	<i>World Urbanization Prospects</i> (1996 revision)	Population Division, Department for Economic and Social Information and Policy Analysis United Nations, New York 10017 www.undp.org/popin
	The World Population Prospects 1996 revision (1950-2050) includes data for urban populations and urban agglomerations with 750,000 or more inhabitants in 1995.			

**Table G-5**  
**Data Source List (continued)**

<b>Data Set</b>	<b>Data Set Name</b>	<b>Data Source</b>	<b>Documentation</b>	<b>Contact Information</b>
<b>WBT</b>	World Tables	The World Bank, International Bank for Reconstruction and Development	World Tables 1994 and World Tables 1995	The World Bank 1818 H Street, NW Washington, DC 20433 www.worldbank.org
	<p>This data set contains information for a range of 220 countries for a period of 25 years 1970-94. <i>The World Tables</i>, published annually, provides the most detailed collection of economic data and socioeconomic indicators published by the World Bank. The data provide a consistent set of economic and social data for low-, middle-, and high-income countries. As far as practical, the economic indicators conform to the UN System of National Accounts (SNA) and the social indicators to the methodologies of UN agencies. Where possible, efforts were made to harmonize related data sets drawn from diverse sources. Updates discontinued by source.</p>			
<b>WDI</b>	World Development Indicators 1998	The World Bank, International Bank for Reconstruction and Development	World Development Indicators	The World Bank 1818 H Street, NW Washington, DC 20433 www.worldbank.org
	<p>World Development Indicators (WDI) provides an expanded view of the world economy for almost 150 countries with populations of over one million. It contains data on the people who live and work in these countries, the environment, and the structural development of developing and high-income economies.</p>			
<b>WDT</b>	World Debt Tables 1993-94	The World Bank, International Bank for Reconstruction and Development	World Debt Tables: External Finance for Developing Countries, 1996 (Volumes 1 and 2)	The World Bank 1818 H Street, NW Washington, DC 20433 www.worldbank.org
	<p>The 1996 edition of World Debt Tables (WDT) contain data on public and publicly guaranteed long-term debt, private non-guaranteed debt, short-term debt, use of IMF credits, and major economic aggregates. The World Bank is the sole repository for statistics on the external debt of developing countries. Loan-by-loan data are gathered by the Bank's Debtor Reporting System [DRS], and supplemented by creditor data from the Bank for International Settlements (BIS) the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), and estimates from the International Monetary Fund (IMF). Updates discontinued by source.</p>			

**Table G-5**  
**Data Source List (continued)**

<b>Data Set</b>	<b>Data Set Name</b>	<b>Data Source</b>	<b>Documentation</b>	<b>Contact Information</b>
	World Event/Interaction Survey, 1965-1992	Rodney G. Tomlinson, International Behavior Attributes Data Set	World Event/Interaction Survey	Rodney G. Tomlinson PSC 804 Box 10 FPO AE 09409-1010 E-mail: RandJTomli@aol.com
<b>WE3</b>	<p>The World Event/Interaction Survey (WEIS) is one of several approaches devised in the 1960s for recording and classifying the bilateral interactions of nations, inter-governmental organizations, regional groups, and other significant actors on the international stage. In the case of WEIS, these “event/interactions” (referred to as “events”) are non-routine, discrete, “newsworthy” happenings that involve explicit, cross-national communications between governmental officials and/or official spokesmen. The data set was provided by Rodney G. Tomlinson in April 1999. New variables have been added to identify the actors and targets according to standard State Failure project alpha and numeric codes.</p>			
	World Handbook of Political and Social Indicators III: 1948- 1982	Charles Lewis Taylor, Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University	<i>World Handbook of Political and Social Indicators III, 1948-1982</i>	Charles Taylor Dept. of Political Science Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University Blacksburg, VA 24061-0130 USA Phone: (703) 231-6571 Fax (703) 231-6078 E-mail: clt@vt.edu
<b>WHB</b>	<p>This edition of the World Handbook comprises four files: aggregate data, daily political events, annual political events, and quarterly political events. The aggregate data file presents political, economic, and social data and their rates of change for 155 countries and 359 variables. The annual events series file consists of summations of the occurrences of each type of event within each country on a year-to-year basis. The 38 types of events coded in the daily event file have been collapsed to 17 broader categories to maintain comparability with earlier editions of the handbook. The annual events file contains 21 variables for 156 countries for 35 years.</p>			

**Table G-5**  
**Data Source List (continued)**

<b>Data Set</b>	<b>Data Set Name</b>	<b>Data Source</b>	<b>Documentation</b>	<b>Contact Information</b>
<b>WHP</b>	FAMINDEX 1950-92	Alan Shawn Feinstein World Hunger Program, Brown University	The Hunger Report	ASF World Hunger Program Box 1831 Brown University Providence RI 02912 USA Phone: (401) 863-2700; Fax (401) 863-2192 <a href="http://www.brown.edu/Departments/World_Hunger_Program/hungerweb/WHP/overview.html">www.brown.edu/Departments/World_Hunger_Program/hungerweb/WHP/overview.html</a>
	This data set comprises an indicator of famine as reported by the New York Times since 1950. Famine is operationally defined as a widespread absence of food over an extended period. Reports of famine are usually indexed under famines but are also listed under food in the New York Times Index.			
<b>WR2</b>	World Resources 1996-97 Database (water data)	World Resources Institute	<i>World Resources 1996– 1997: A Guide to the Global Environment</i>	World Resources Institute 1709 New York Avenue NW, Washington, DC 20006 <a href="http://www.wri.org">www.wri.org</a>
	The World Resources Database (WRD) looks at the current state of the environment as it relates to population and human well-being, consumption and waste, and resources at risk. The database also contains the latest core country data from 157 countries and information on poverty, inequality, and food security. Included in this data set is an extract of Table 22.1 on Freshwater Resources and Withdrawals.			
<b>WRD</b>	World Resources 1998-99	World Resources Institute	<i>World Resources 1998– 1999: A Guide to the Global Environment</i>	World Resources Institute 1709 New York Avenue NW, Washington, DC 20006 <a href="http://www.wri.org">www.wri.org</a>
	The World Resources Database (WRD) looks at the current state of the environment as it relates to population and human well-being, consumption and waste, and resources at risk. The database also contains the latest core country data from 157 countries and information on poverty, inequality, and food security. Included in this data set are extracts from various data tables within WRD.			



**Table G-5**  
**Data Source List (continued)**

Data Set	Data Set Name	Data Source	Documentation	Contact Information
	Overt Foreign Military Interventions	Herbert Tillema, University of Missouri	Codebook on file. See also “Paths to War in the Nuclear Age: Foreign Overt Military Interventions, 1945-1988” 1990 APSA paper	Herbert Tillema University of Missouri Phone: (314) 882-3777; Fax (314) 884-5131 E-mail: tillema@mizzou.1.missouri.edu
<b>TLL</b>	<p>This data series describes 690 foreign overt military interventions (OMI) initiated between 9/02/45 and 12/31/91. It is extracted from the “Overt Military Interventions” data set that includes all instances of intervention confirmed by review of public information sources. OMI are operationally defined as combatant or combat-ready military operations conducted by units of a foreign state’s regular military forces. They include conventional deployments of ground combat units that involve such actions as alert patrol, offensive maneuver, riot quelling, armed occupation of territory, and battle. They also include other, usually less intense, combatant military operations such as: commando or other small unit raids; aerial bombing, strafing and rocketry; ground-based artillery or rocketry; and naval gunnery and rocketry. Incidents confined to small arms fire across borders and engagements among vessels at sea or among aircraft in flight are excluded.</p>			
<b>UNC</b>	UNCTAD: Trade and Development Statistics	United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD)	<i>Handbook of International Trade and Development Statistics 1993</i>	UNCTAD Palais des Nations CH-1211 Geneva 10 Switzerland Fax: 41-22-907-0051 <a href="http://www.unctad.org/en/enhome.htm">www.unctad.org/en/enhome.htm</a>
	<p>This handbook provides a complete basic collection of statistical data relevant to the analysis of world trade and development. It was created for the use of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), government officials, university, and other research specialists. UN Publication Sales No. E/F.94.II.D.24. The data generally cover 1960-92.</p>			

**Table G-5**  
**Data Source List (continued)**

<b>Data Set</b>	<b>Data Set Name</b>	<b>Data Source</b>	<b>Documentation</b>	<b>Contact Information</b>
<b>UND</b>	World Population Prospects 1950-2050 (The 1996 Revision)	Population Division, United Nations Department for Economic and Social Information and Policy Analysis	<i>World Population Prospects 1950-2050</i> (The 1996 Revision)	Population Division, Department for Economic and Social Information and Policy Analysis United Nations, New York 10017 www.undp.org/popin
	World Population Prospects 1950-2050 (The 1996 Revision) contains demographic estimates for 1950-90 and four variants of projections for 1990-2050 for countries, regions and major areas of the world. Most data are presented quinquennially, however, population data by age and sex for the medium variant and total population figures for all variants are presented annually. Estimates and projections have been prepared for population by sex and five-year age groups, population by sex and one-year age group for age 5-24, and 27 major demographic indicators.			
<b>UNJ</b>	United Nations Surveys of Crime Trends and Operations of Criminal Justice Systems	United Nations Crime and Justice Information Network	First through Fifth United Nations Surveys of Crime Trends and Operations of Criminal Justice Systems (1970-1994)	Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice Branch, United Nations Office at Vienna P.O. Box 500 A-1400 Vienna, Austria Fax: 43-1-232156 www.uncjin.org
	This country-year formatted data set tracks a number of variables related to crime trends and the operation of the criminal justice system.			
<b>UNM</b>	The United Nations Demographic Yearbook Data Records (as of 8/97)	United Nations Statistical Division	United Nations Demographic Yearbook	Statistical Division United Nations New York, NY 10017 Phone: 212-963-4996 www.un.org/Depts/unsd
	These data are compiled from Table 15, Infant Deaths and Infant Mortality Rates, by urban/rural residence: 1991-95 of the <i>UN Demographic Yearbook 1995</i> and updated through 1996. The United Nations' Statistical Division compiles data on infant mortality by urban/rural residence on an annual basis. The official demographic statistics are provided with the cooperation of national statistical services. In certain instances, estimates prepared by the United Nations' Population Division for Economic and Social Information and Policy Analysis have been used to supplement official national statistics. Data exclude fetal deaths. Rates are given only when there are at least 100 infant deaths total for an area or country in a given year.			

**Table G-5**  
**Data Source List (continued)**

<b>Data Set</b>	<b>Data Set Name</b>	<b>Data Source</b>	<b>Documentation</b>	<b>Contact Information</b>
<b>UNP</b>	Road Networks	United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) Environmental Data Report, Third Edition 1991/92	UNEP Environmental Data Report, Third Edition 1991/92, Table 7.1	United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) GEMS Monitoring and Assessment Research Centre London, United Kingdom www.unep.org
	This data set contains road networks in 1978 and 1988 by country. Included are road density and total road length. Note that the definitions of roads vary from country to country.			
<b>UNS</b>	UNESCO Statistical Databank (population, education, and newspaper data)	United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO)	UNESCO Statistical Yearbook 1994	Division of Statistics United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization 7, place de Fontenoy 75352 PARIS 07 SP France Phone: 33 1 45 68 10 00 www.unesco.org
	Data included in this data set are from tables: 3.2, 3.11, 7.9, and 7.10 of the <i>1994 UNESCO Statistical Yearbook</i> . These data include the following: 1) pupils, both sexes and females for pre- primary and first-, second-, and third-level education; 2) daily and non-daily newspapers (number and circulation); and 3) population by single age for 1950, 1955, 1960, 1965, and 1970-93.			
<b>UNU</b>	World Urbanization Prospects 1996	The United Nations Population Division	<i>World Urbanization Prospects</i> (1996 revision)	Population Division, Department for Economic and Social Information and Policy Analysis United Nations, New York 10017 www.undp.org/popin
	The World Population Prospects 1996 revision (1950-2050) includes data for urban populations and urban agglomerations with 750K or more inhabitants in 1995.			

**Table G-5**  
**Data Source List (continued)**

<b>Data Set</b>	<b>Data Set Name</b>	<b>Data Source</b>	<b>Documentation</b>	<b>Contact Information</b>
<b>WBT</b>	World Tables	The World Bank, International Bank for Reconstruction and Development	World Tables 1994 and World Tables 1995	The World Bank 1818 H Street, NW Washington, DC 20433 www.worldbank.org
	This data set contains information for a range of 220 countries for a period of 25 years 1970-94. <i>The World Tables</i> , published annually, provides the most detailed collection of economic data and socioeconomic indicators published by the World Bank. The data provide a consistent set of economic and social data for low-, middle-, and high-income countries. As far as practical, the economic indicators conform to the UN System of National Accounts (SNA) and the social indicators to the methodologies of UN agencies. Where possible, efforts were made to harmonize related data sets drawn from diverse sources. Updates discontinued by source.			
<b>WDI</b>	World Development Indicators 1998	The World Bank, International Bank for Reconstruction and Development	World Development Indicators	The World Bank 1818 H Street, NW Washington, DC 20433 www.worldbank.org
	World Development Indicators (WDI) provides an expanded view of the world economy for almost 150 countries with populations of over one million. It contains data on the people who live and work in these countries, the environment, and the structural development of developing and high-income economies.			
<b>WDT</b>	World Debt Tables 1993-94	The World Bank, International Bank for Reconstruction and Development	World Debt Tables: External Finance for Developing Countries, 1996 (Volumes 1 and 2)	The World Bank 1818 H Street, NW Washington, DC 20433 www.worldbank.org
	The 1996 edition of World Debt Tables (WDT) contain data on public and publicly guaranteed long-term debt, private non-guaranteed debt, short-term debt, use of IMF credits, and major economic aggregates. The World Bank is the sole repository for statistics on the external debt of developing countries. Loan-by-loan data are gathered by the Bank's Debtor Reporting System [DRS], and supplemented by creditor data from the Bank for International Settlements (BIS) the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), and estimates from the International Monetary Fund (IMF). Updates discontinued by source.			

**Table G-5**  
**Data Source List (continued)**

Data Set	Data Set Name	Data Source	Documentation	Contact Information
<b>WE3</b>	World Event/Interaction Survey, 1965-92	Rodney G. Tomlinson, International Behavior Attributes Data Set	World Event/Interaction Survey	Rodney G. Tomlinson PSC 804 Box 10 FPO AE 09409-1010 E-mail: RandJTomli@aol.com
<p>The World Event/Interaction Survey (WEIS) is one of several approaches devised in the 1960s for recording and classifying the bilateral interactions of nations, inter-governmental organizations, regional groups, and other significant actors on the international stage. In the case of WEIS, these “event/interactions” (referred to as “events”) are non-routine, discrete, “newsworthy” happenings that involve explicit, cross-national communications between governmental officials and/or official spokesmen. The data set was provided by Rodney G. Tomlinson in April 1999. New variables have been added to identify the actors and targets according to standard State Failure project alpha and numeric codes.</p>				
<b>WHB</b>	World Handbook of Political and Social Indicators III: 1948- 82	Charles Lewis Taylor, Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University	<i>World Handbook of Political and Social Indicators III, 1948-82</i>	Charles Taylor Dept. of Political Science Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University Blacksburg, VA 24061-0130 USA Phone: (703) 231-6571 Fax (703) 231-6078 E-mail: clt@vt.edu
<p>This edition of the World Handbook comprises four files: aggregate data, daily political events, annual political events, and quarterly political events. The aggregate data file presents political, economic, and social data and their rates of change for 155 countries and 359 variables. The annual events series file consists of summations of the occurrences of each type of event within each country on a year-to-year basis. The 38 types of events coded in the daily event file have been collapsed to 17 broader categories to maintain comparability with earlier editions of the handbook. The annual events file contains 21 variables for 156 countries for 35 years.</p>				

**Table G-5**  
**Data Source List (continued)**

<b>Data Set</b>	<b>Data Set Name</b>	<b>Data Source</b>	<b>Documentation</b>	<b>Contact Information</b>
<b>WHP</b>	FAMINDEX 1950-92	Alan Shawn Feinstein World Hunger Program, Brown University	The Hunger Report	ASF World Hunger Program Box 1831 Brown University Providence RI 02912 USA Phone: (401) 863-2700; Fax (401) 863-2192 <a href="http://www.brown.edu/Departments/World_Hunger_Program/hungerweb/WHP/overview.html">www.brown.edu/Departments/World_Hunger_Program/hungerweb/WHP/overview.html</a>
	This data set comprises an indicator of famine as reported by the New York Times since 1950. Famine is operationally defined as a widespread absence of food over an extended period. Reports of famine are usually indexed under famines but are also listed under food in the New York Times Index.			
<b>WR2</b>	World Resources 1996-97 Database (water data)	World Resources Institute	<i>World Resources 1996– 1997: A Guide to the Global Environment</i>	World Resources Institute 1709 New York Avenue NW, Washington, DC 20006 <a href="http://www.wri.org">www.wri.org</a>
	The World Resources Database (WRD) looks at the current state of the environment as it relates to population and human well-being, consumption and waste, and resources at risk. The database also contains the latest core country data from 157 countries and information on poverty, inequality, and food security. Included in this data set is an extract of Table 22.1 on Freshwater Resources and Withdrawals.			
<b>WRD</b>	World Resources 1998-99	World Resources Institute	<i>World Resources 1998– 1999: A Guide to the Global Environment</i>	World Resources Institute 1709 New York Avenue NW, Washington, DC 20006 <a href="http://www.wri.org">www.wri.org</a>
	The World Resources Database (WRD) looks at the current state of the environment as it relates to population and human well-being, consumption and waste, and resources at risk. The database also contains the latest core country data from 157 countries and information on poverty, inequality, and food security. Included in this data set are extracts from various data tables within WRD.			

