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Strategy and performance evaluation of low-frequency variant calling for SARS-CoV-2 in wastewater using targeted deep Illumina sequencing — Source link

Laura A. E. Van Poelvoorde, Thomas Delcourt, Wim Coucke, Philippe Herman ...+4 more authors

Institutions: Ghent University

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22 **Abstract**

23 The ongoing COVID-19 pandemic, caused by SARS-CoV-2, constitutes a tremendous global
24 health issue. Continuous monitoring of the virus has become a cornerstone to make rational
25 decisions on implementing societal and sanitary measures to curtail the virus spread.
26 Additionally, emerging SARS-CoV-2 variants have increased the need for genomic
27 surveillance to detect particular strains because of their potentially increased transmissibility,
28 pathogenicity and immune escape. Targeted SARS-CoV-2 sequencing of wastewater has
29 been explored as an epidemiological surveillance method for the competent authorities. Few
30 quality criteria are however available when sequencing wastewater samples, and those
31 available typically only pertain to constructing the consensus genome sequence. Multiple
32 variants circulating in the population can however be simultaneously present in wastewater
33 samples. The performance, including detection and quantification of low-abundant variants,
34 of whole genome sequencing (WGS) of SARS-CoV-2 in wastewater samples remains
35 largely unknown. Here, we evaluated the detection and quantification of mutations present at
36 low abundances using the SARS-CoV-2 lineage B.1.1.7 (alpha variant) defining mutations
37 as a case study. Real sequencing data were *in silico* modified by introducing mutations of
38 interest into raw wild-type sequencing data, or by mixing wild-type and mutant raw
39 sequencing data, to mimic wastewater samples subjected to WGS using a tiling amplicon-
40 based targeted metagenomics approach and Illumina sequencing. As anticipated, higher
41 variation, lower sensitivity and more false negatives, were observed at lower coverages and
42 allelic frequencies. We found that detection of all low-frequency variants at an abundance of
43 10%, 5%, 3% and 1%, requires at least a sequencing coverage of 250X, 500X, 1500X and
44 10,000X, respectively. Although increasing variability of estimated allelic frequencies at
45 decreasing coverages and lower allelic frequencies was observed, its impact on reliable
46 quantification was limited. This study provides a highly sensitive low-frequency variant
47 detection approach, which is publicly available at <https://galaxy.sciensano.be>, and specific
48 recommendations for minimum sequencing coverages to detect clade-defining mutations at
49 specific allelic frequencies.

50 **1 Introduction**

51 Severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2) is the causative agent of
52 the ongoing COVID-19 pandemic [1]. To limit the spread of disease, governments were
53 forced to take drastic measures due to the high potential for human-to-human transmission
54 and the lack of immunity in the population [2]. SARS-CoV-2 spreads very easily during close
55 person-to-person contact [3]. Consequently, the individual diagnostic testing for SARS-CoV-
56 2 on respiratory samples using reverse transcription quantitative polymerase chain reaction
57 (RT-qPCR) is essential for the diagnosis of patients presenting COVID-19 symptoms for
58 appropriate clinical treatment and isolation, as well as for tracing potential contact
59 transmissions, including asymptomatic individuals. Systematic individual SARS-CoV-2
60 diagnostics are also used to test certain population cohorts, such as primary caregivers, to
61 avoid transmission of the virus to vulnerable people, such as the elderly.

62 Data from individual diagnostics are also collected and analysed for surveillance by National
63 Reference Centres to assist governments to monitor the epidemiological situation. The
64 efficiency of this strategy for epidemiological monitoring depends greatly on the extent of
65 testing the complete population. Additionally, it may be biased by the willingness of
66 individuals, covering all population ages, to get tested, whether individuals are aware of
67 being infected, and visitors to a certain country not always being included in the testing
68 strategy. Moreover, despite having a relatively low per-sample cost, the high volume of
69 required tests incurs substantial costs for public health systems for which testing capacities
70 can be exceeded during periods of intense circulation of the virus [4]. The detection of newly
71 emerging SARS-CoV-2 strains may be delayed by the lack of testing during such periods. As
72 SARS-CoV-2 viral particles and mRNA have been isolated from faeces of COVID-19
73 patients [5, 6], monitoring of wastewater for SARS-CoV-2 has been explored as a
74 complementary and independent alternative for epidemiological surveillance for the
75 competent authorities [7]. Various studies have observed an association between an
76 increase in reported COVID-19 cases and an increase of SARS-CoV-2 RNA concentrations

77 in wastewater [8–10]. Wastewater-based monitoring could therefore be a cost-effective, non-
78 invasive, easy to collect, and unbiased approach to track circulating virus strains in a
79 community [11]. Compared to clinical surveillance, wastewater surveillance could also
80 provide opportunities to estimate the prevalence of the virus and assess its geographic
81 distribution and genetic diversity [12, 13], and can be used as a non-invasive early-warning
82 system for alerting public health authorities to the potential (re-)emergence of COVID-19
83 infections [14]. Alternatively, the absence of the virus in wastewater surveillance could
84 indicate that an area can be considered at low risk for SARS-CoV-2 infections [7].

85 Although the mutation rate of SARS-CoV-2 is estimated as being low compared to other
86 RNA viruses [15], several new variants carrying multiple mutations have already emerged.
87 Some of these variants are characterized by a potential enhanced transmissibility, and can
88 cause more severe infections and/or potential vaccine escape [16–20]. Consequently,
89 monitoring current and potential future variants, is crucial to control the epidemic by taking
90 timely measures because these variants can affect epidemiological dynamics, vaccine
91 effectiveness and disease burden.

92 To monitor SARS-CoV-2 variants, RT-qPCR methods were designed to detect a selection of
93 the mutations that define specific variants of concern (VOCs). VOCs are however defined by
94 a combination of multiple mutations and only few mutations can be targeted by RT-qPCR
95 assays, but many VOCs are characterized by a high number of specific mutations. This
96 approach is also not sustainable because it is likely that the ongoing vaccination and
97 increased herd immunity will result in the selection of new mutations and emergence of new
98 VOCs [21], as has been observed with other viruses [22, 23]. Since only a few mutations can
99 be targeted by a RT-qPCR assay, an additional step of whole genome sequencing (WGS) is
100 required to fully confirm the variant's sequence [24].

101 WGS has been used to understand the viral evolution, epidemiology and impact of SARS-
102 CoV-2 resulting in, as of July 2021, more than 2,000,000 publically available SARS-CoV-2
103 genome sequences, mainly derived from respiratory samples that are frequently submitted

104 to the Global Initiative on Sharing Avian Influenza Data (GISAID) database [25]. Most of
105 these sequences were obtained using amplicon sequencing in combination with the Illumina
106 or Nanopore technology, with Illumina still being the most commonly used method [25, 26].
107 This large amount of genomes allows reliable detection of variants based on the consensus
108 genome sequence in patient samples [27–30]. The European Centre for Disease Prevention
109 and Control (ECDC) has defined several quality criteria for clinical samples depending on
110 the application. For most genomic surveillance objectives, a consensus sequence of the
111 (near-)complete genome is sufficient and a minimal read length of 100 bp and minimal
112 coverage of 10X across more than 95% of the genome is recommended. To reliably trace
113 direct transmission and/or reinfection, a higher sequencing coverage of 500X across more
114 than 95% of the genome is recommended for determining low-frequency variants (LFV) that
115 can significantly contribute to the evidence for reinfection or direct transmission. In-depth
116 genome analysis, including recombination, rearrangement, haplotype reconstruction and
117 large insertions and deletions (indel) detection, should be investigated using long-read
118 sequencing technologies with a recommended read length of minimally 1000 bp and a
119 sequencing coverage of 500X across more than 95% of the genome [31]. Due to the high
120 cost of sequencing large quantities of samples from individual patient, samples that tested
121 positive for a selection of mutations related to VOCs using RT-qPCR and have a sufficiently
122 high viral load are typically sequenced. Consequently, only a subset of all circulating variants
123 is detected during routine clinical surveillance. Since wastewater samples contain both
124 SARS-CoV-2 RNA from symptomatic and asymptomatic individuals, sequencing wastewater
125 samples can provide a more comprehensive picture of the genomic diversity of SARS-CoV-2
126 circulating in the population compared to individual clinical testing and sequencing.
127 Wastewater surveillance of SARS-CoV-2 may therefore be of considerable added value for
128 SARS-CoV-2 genomic surveillance by providing a cost-effective, rapid and reliable source of
129 information on the spread of SARS-CoV-2 variants in the population.

130 Sequencing of wastewater samples is however currently mainly used to reconstruct the
131 consensus genome sequence of the most prevalent SARS-CoV-2 strain in the sample and

132 LFV are often not investigated. This consensus sequence can be useful to demonstrate that
133 the detected strain in wastewater corresponds to the dominant strain that circulates in
134 individuals within the same community [32]. However, in contrast to clinical samples, only
135 limited quality criteria are in place when sequencing wastewater samples and those
136 available often only apply for consensus sequence construction. The EU recommends the
137 generation of one million reads per sample and a read length of more than 100 bp [7]. A few
138 studies evaluated LFV in wastewater samples, by using local haplotype reconstruction with
139 ShoRAH [33] or iVar using a minimum coverage of 50X, Phred score of ≥ 30 and a minimal
140 allelic frequency (AF) of 10% [34]. However, none of these studies evaluated their approach
141 on well-defined populations nor determined detection thresholds for retaining LFV. Since
142 multiple VOCs may co-circulate in a given population, their relative abundance is expected
143 to vary and potentially be very low in wastewater samples. While genome consensus variant
144 calling workflows can only identify mutations present at high AFs, LFV calling methods have
145 been specifically designed to call mutations at lower-than-consensus AFs, and are required
146 to detect VOCs in wastewater samples that are present at an AF below 50%. Appropriate
147 tools and statistical approaches should be provided to ensure reliable and comparable
148 collection and analysis of data, because the detection of LFV is challenging due to the drop
149 in confidence of called mutations at low AFs and sequencing coverages [35–37]. High-
150 quality sequencing reads are required to ensure that single nucleotide variants (SNVs) and
151 indels can be reliably called and quantified. Most LFV calling algorithms therefore consider
152 multiple sequencing characteristics such as strand bias, base quality, mapping quality,
153 sequence context and AF [38] to delineate true variants from sequencing errors. Although
154 the viral diversity in multiple WGS-based studies has been explored using several variant
155 calling methods [39–41], they are often not benchmarked against defined viral populations,
156 rendering the feasibility of using these methods for detecting SARS-CoV-2 VOCs in mixed
157 samples for wastewater surveillance largely unknown.

158 In this study, we evaluate the performance of LFV detection based on targeted SARS-CoV-2
159 sequencing to detect and quantify mutations present at low abundances. This approach


160 mimics wastewater deep sequencing by means of the Illumina technology. We used
161 mutations that define the B.1.1.7 lineage as a proof-of-concept. Using two real sequencing
162 datasets that were *in silico* modified by either introducing mutations of interest into raw wild-
163 type sequencing datasets or mixing wild-type and mutant raw sequencing data, we provide
164 guidelines for minimum sequencing coverages to detect clade-defining mutations at specific
165 AFs.

166 **2 Methods**

167 **2.1 Employed sequencing data and generation of consensus genome** 168 **sequences**

169 SARS-CoV-2 raw sequencing data from 316 samples was downloaded from the Sequence
170 Read Archive (SRA) [42]. A random selection of samples was done on the 27th of January
171 2021 from the COVID-19 Genomics UK (COG-UK) consortium (PRJEB37886) including only
172 samples with a submission date in January 2021, sequenced with Illumina Novaseq 6000
173 and using an amplicon-based enrichment strategy (Supplementary File S1).

174



175

176 **Figure 1: Schematic representation of the workflow.**

177 To ensure correct pairing of fastq files, all samples were re-paired using BMap v38.89
178 repair.sh with default settings [43] (Figure 1: Step 1). The consensus genome sequences
179 were generated for all these samples (Figure 1: Step 2). The workflow was built using the
180 Snakemake workflow management system using python 3.6.9 [44]. Next, the re-paired
181 paired-end reads were trimmed using Trimmomatic v0.38 [45] setting the following options:
182 ‘LEADING:10’, ‘TRAILING:10’ ‘SLIDINGWINDOW:4:20’, and ‘MINLEN:40’. As reference
183 genome, the sequence with GISAID [25] accession number EPI_ISL_837246 was used for
184 the wild-type samples, while EPI_ISL_747518 was used for the mutant samples. These
185 reference genomes were indexed using Bowtie2-build v2.3.4.3 [46]. Trimmed reads were
186 aligned to their respective reference genomes using Bowtie2 v2.3.4.3 [46] using default
187 parameters. The resulting SAM files were converted to BAM files using Samtools view v1.9
188 [47] and sorted and indexed using the default settings of respectively Samtools sort and
189 Samtools index v1.9 [47]. Using the sorted BAM file, a pileup file was generated with
190 Samtools mpileup v1.9 [47] using the options “--count-orphans” and “--VCF”. Next, the
191 variants were called with bcftools call v1.9 [47] using the options “-O z”, “--consensus-caller”,
192 “--variants-only” and “ploidy 1”, and converted and indexed to uncompressed VCF files with
193 respectively bcftools view v1.9 [47] using the options “--output-type v” and bcftools index
194 v1.9 [47] using the option “--force”. Lastly, a temporary consensus sequence was generated
195 using bcftools consensus v1.9 [47] with default settings, providing the reference genome and
196 produced VCF file as inputs. Afterwards, the previous steps were repeated once with the
197 same options using the generated temporary consensus sequence as fasta reference to
198 generate the final consensus sequence. These sequences were used to confirm either the
199 presence or absence of the clade-defining mutations of the B.1.1.7 mutant for both the
200 mutant and wild-type samples respectively (Table 1). To extract the sequencing coverage for
201 each position and subsequently calculate the median coverage for each sample, Samtools
202 depth v1.9 [47] was used on the BAM files. Additionally, bamreadcount v0.8.0
203 (<https://github.com/genome/bam-readcount>) was run on all samples using the BAM files to
204 determine the coverage at each position.

205 **Table 1: Mutations linked to SARS-CoV-2 lineage B.1.1.7 [48].**

Gene	Nucleotide-level mutation	Amino Acid-level mutation	Number of amplicons covering the position?
ORF1ab	C913T	Synonymous	1
	C3267T	T100I	1
	C5388A	A1708D	1
	C5986T	Synonymous	1
	T6954C	I2230T	1
	11288-11296 deletion	SGF 3675-3677 deletion	1
	C14676T	Synonymous	1
	C15279T	Synonymous	1
	C16176T	Synonymous	2
S	21765-21770 deletion	HV 69-70 deletion	1
	21991-21993 deletion	Y144 deletion	2
	A23063T	N501Y	1
	C23271A	A570D	1
	C23604A	P681H	1
	C23709T	T716I	1
	T24506G	S982A	1
	G24914C	D1118H	2
M	G26801C*	Synonymous	1
Orf8	C27972T	Q27stop	WT: 2; B.1.1.7: 1**
	G28048T	R52I	1
	A28111G	Y73C	2
N	G28280C	D3L	2
	A28281T		
	T28282A		
	C28977T	S235F	1

206 The first, second, and third columns present respectively the gene name, cDNA-level mutation and protein-level
 207 mutation. The last column describes whether the position is covered by one or two amplicons from the
 208 enrichment panel (Supplementary Table S1). (*) One adaptation was observed for position 26 801. In the wild-
 209 type strains a G was observed in contrast to Rambaut et al. where a T was observed. (**) Due to the tiled
 210 amplicon approach used to amplify the samples prior to sequencing, the regions where amplicons overlapped
 211 resulted in a double coverage. Mutation C27972T was positioned in such an overlap in the wild-type, but not in
 212 the mutant. (WT = wild-type).

213 From the initial 316 samples, ten mutant samples were selected that presented similar
 214 coverage depth at the positions of interest after normalization (see below). These samples
 215 contained the mutations assigned to the B.1.1.7 variant. Ten wild-type samples were also
 216 chosen that did not contain any of these mutations (Table 1, Table 2) and also presented
 217 similar coverage depth at the positions of interest after normalization. Lineage B.1.1.7,
 218 termed Variant of Concern (VOC) 202012/01 by Public Health England (PHE) [49],

219 20I/501Y.V1 by Nextstrain [50] and alpha variant by the World Health Organisation [51], was
220 first reported in the United Kingdom but its prevalence continues to rise in many European
221 countries [52]. This variant was found to be more transmissible [17] and may cause more
222 severe infections [18, 19]. Lineage B.1.1.7 is defined by multiple spike protein changes,
223 including deletion 69-70 and deletion 144 in the N-terminal domain, amino changes N501Y
224 in the receptor-binding domain, and amino acid changes A570D, P681H, T716I, S982A,
225 D1118H, as well as mutations in other genomic regions [53]. More recently PHE has
226 reported B.1.1.7 cases with an additional mutation, E484K [49]. Median coverages of the
227 selected samples were consistently high (minimum 13,848; maximum 36,255) and median
228 read lengths were always 221 and 201 for the forward and reverse reads respectively (Table
229 2). Additionally, as suggested by ECDC, more than 95% of the genome was covered by
230 reads with a minimal coverage of 500X [31].

231 **Table 2: List of SRA accession numbers used for employed wild-type and lineage B.1.1.7 samples in this**
232 **study.**

Sample	WT/lineage B.1.1.7	Median coverage
ERR5058968	lineage B.1.1.7	13,848
ERR5059033	lineage B.1.1.7	21,874
ERR5059072	lineage B.1.1.7	14,628
ERR5059092	lineage B.1.1.7	16,106
ERR5059123	lineage B.1.1.7	17,349
ERR5059204	lineage B.1.1.7	18,149
ERR5059226	lineage B.1.1.7	22,194
ERR5059238	lineage B.1.1.7	27,681
ERR5059260	lineage B.1.1.7	23,975
ERR5059282	lineage B.1.1.7	27,349

ERR5039162	WT	20,071
ERR5040499	WT	24,440
ERR5059083	WT	18,220
ERR5059114	WT	14,580
ERR5059133	WT	19,866
ERR5059154	WT	28,295
ERR5059253	WT	23,798
ERR5059257	WT	25,894
ERR5059283	WT	36,255
ERR5059286	WT	29,847

233 Sample IDs, categorized as WT or mutant and the median coverage calculated using Samtools depth v1.9 [47].

234 (WT = wild-type)

235 **2.2 LFV detection**

236 The absence of pre-existing wild-type and mutant LFV at the positions defining lineage
237 B.1.1.7 (Table 1) was verified in both the mutant and wild-type samples (Figure 1: Step 3),
238 respectively, by calling all LFV in these samples and subsequently checking the positions of
239 interest. Python 3.6.9 was used with the packages pysam 0.16.0.1 [54] and numpy 1.19.5
240 [55]. Each generated (final) consensus FASTA file was used as reference for its respective
241 sample and indexed using Samtools faidx v1.9 [47] and Bowtie2-build v2.3.4.3. Bowtie2
242 v2.3.4.3 was then used to align the reads of each sample to its reference sequence,
243 producing a SAM file that was converted into BAM using Samtools view v1.9. Next, reads
244 were sorted using Picard SortSam v2.18.14 (<https://github.com/broadinstitute/picard>) with
245 the option “SORT_ORDER=coordinate” and Picard CreateSequenceDictionary v2.18.14 [56]
246 was used to generate a dictionary of the reference FASTA file. Picard
247 AddOrReplaceReadGroups v2.18.14 [56] was afterwards run on the reads with the flags
248 “LB”, “PL”, “PU” and “SM” set to the arbitrary placeholder value “test”. The resulting BAM

249 files were indexed using Samtools index v1.9 and used as input for GATK
250 RealignerTargetCreator 3.7 [57], which was followed by indel realignment using GATK
251 IndelRealigner v3.7 [57]. Next, generated BAM files were indexed using Samtools index
252 v1.9. The call function of the LoFreq v2.1.3.1 package [36] was used to call LFV in the BAM
253 files and generate a VCF file using the options "--call-indels" and "--no-default-filter" and
254 using the consensus sequence as reference to call LFV. Next, the unfiltered VCF file was
255 filtered using the filter function of the LoFreq v2.1.3.1 package, setting the strand bias
256 threshold for reporting a variant to the maximum allowed value by using the option "--sb-
257 thresh 2147483647" to allow highly strand-biased variants to be retained, to account for the
258 non-random distribution of reads due to the design of the amplification panel. All employed
259 scripts are available in Supplementary File S2. Additionally, the workflow is also available at
260 the public Galaxy instance of our institute at <https://galaxy.sciensano.be> as a free resource
261 for academic and non-profit usage. The presence of the nucleotides assigned to the B.1.1.7
262 lineage or the wild-type (Table 1) was verified for the mutant and wild-type samples,
263 respectively. Additionally, it was checked that there were no LFV at these positions, so that
264 the wild-type nucleotide or mutant nucleotide was always present at 100% for the retained
265 10 WT and 10 mutant samples.

266 **2.2.1 Dataset 1: *In silico* insertion of mutations of interest into raw** 267 **sequencing datasets**

268 For the first dataset (Figure 1: Step 4), all low-frequency single nucleotide polymorphisms
269 (SNPs) were removed from the raw sequencing data of all samples. SNPs were removed
270 using Jvarkit employing biostar404363 [58] by converting all nucleotides to the consensus
271 fasta sequence. Next, all ten WT samples were down-sampled using "seqtk sample" with
272 argument "-s100" (<https://github.com/lh3/seqtk>) to 14 different (median) coverages (100X,
273 250X, 500X, 750X, 1000X, 1500X, 2000X, 2500X, 3000X, 3500X, 4000X, 4500X, 5000X
274 and 10,000X). The 22 SNP mutations characteristic for the B.1.1.7 lineage (Table 1) were
275 introduced at 26 different AF (mutant: 0%, 0.5%, 1%, 1.5%, 2%, 2.5%, 3%, 3.5%, 4%, 4.5%,

276 5%, 5.5%, 6%, 6.5%, 7%, 7.5%, 8%, 8.5%, 9%, 9.5%, 10%, 20%, 30%, 40%, 50%, 100%) at
277 the various coverages mentioned above employing biostar404363. This resulted in 10
278 samples at 364 conditions (i.e. combination of coverage and AF). Next, all reads containing
279 indels were removed from these samples using samtools view v1.9. Finally, the three
280 deletions associated with the B.1.1.7 lineage were introduced at the 26 AF mentioned above
281 using BAMSurgeon 1.2 [59], which was adapted to decrease runtime, with the options “-p
282 10”, “--force”, “-d 0”, “--ignorepileup”, “--mindepth 1”, “--minmutreads 1”, “--maxdepth
283 1000000”, “--aligner mem”, “--tagreads”. A minority of reads that were lacking a mate in the
284 targeted regions were removed by using an in-house script making use of Python 3.6.9 and
285 the package pysam 0.16.0.1. Samples in BAM format were then converted back to FASTQ
286 format using bedtools bamtofastq v2.27.1 [60]. Finally the LFV detection workflow (Figure 1:
287 Step 3) described in section 2.2 was used on these 10 samples for all 364 conditions using
288 the FASTA file of the wild-type sample as reference with LoFreq.

289 **2.2.2 Dataset 2: Introduction of mutations of interest by mixing wild-type** 290 **and mutant raw sequencing read datasets**

291 For the second dataset (Figure 1: Step 5), the coverage of all 20 samples (Table 2) was
292 normalized to 5000X using BMap v38.89 bbnorm.sh [43] with the options “target=5000”,
293 “mindepth=5”, “fixspikes=f”, “passes=3”, “uselowerdepth=t”. However, due to the tiled
294 amplicon approach used to amplify these samples prior to sequencing, regions where
295 amplicons overlapped subsequently had double coverage resulting in two coverages, i.e.
296 5000X and 10,000X, after normalization (Supplementary Table S1). *In silico* datasets were
297 then generated by mixing the appropriate number of reads for every combination of the ten
298 wild-type and ten mutant samples, resulting in a total of 100 mixed samples, which were
299 down-sampled using “seqtk sample” (with option “-s100”) to the appropriate fractions for the
300 required combination of 13 final coverages (100X, 250X, 500X, 750X, 1000X, 1500X,
301 2000X, 2500X, 3000X, 3500X, 4000X, 4500X and 5000X) and 26 AF (mutant: 0%, 0.5%,
302 1%, 1.5%, 2%, 2.5%, 3%, 3.5%, 4%, 4.5%, 5%, 5.5%, 6%, 6.5%, 7%, 7.5%, 8%, 8.5%, 9%,

303 9.5%, 10%, 20%, 30%, 40%, 50%, 100%). This resulted in 100 mixed samples at 338
304 conditions (i.e. combination of coverage and AF). Finally, the LFV detection workflow (Figure
305 1: Step 3) described in section 2.2 was used on these samples for all conditions using the
306 FASTA file of the wild-type sample as reference, except for samples mimicking 100% AF for
307 the mutant positions where the FASTA file of the mutant sample was used.

308 Although the second dataset was normalized for total coverage at every genomic position,
309 the tiled amplicon approach resulted in some genomic positions being covered by two
310 overlapping amplicons. Two groups of mutations were therefore obtained for every coverage
311 (Table 2), i.e. for a targeted coverage of 5000X, 17 mutations were present at ~5000X
312 (C913T, C3267T, C5388A, C5986T, T6954C, 11288-11296 deletion, C14676T, C15279T,
313 21765-21770 deletion, A23063T, C23271A, C23604A, C23709T, T24056G, G26801C,
314 G28048T, C28977T) and 7 mutations were present at ~10,000X (T16176C, 21991-21993
315 deletion, G24914C, A28111G, G28280C, A28281T, T28282A). Mutation C27972T was
316 excluded from further analysis, because this position in the wild-type samples was located in
317 a region where amplicons overlapped resulting in a coverage of approximately 10,000X,
318 while in mutant samples it was in a region with no overlap and where a coverage of 5000X
319 was therefore observed (Supplementary Table S1). For further analysis, the results were
320 pooled together per theoretical coverage resulting in 24 mutations per coverage but only 17
321 and 7 mutations at the lowest (i.e. 100X) and highest (i.e. 10,000X) coverage, respectively
322 (Supplementary Table S2). The actual median coverage was calculated per theoretical
323 targeted coverage using the output of bamreadcount v0.8.0 of each sample. Using this
324 output, the coverage of each position of interest was extracted (Supplementary Table S2).

325 **2.3 Qualitative evaluation of detection of B.1.1.7 at different abundances**

326 Since samples of Dataset 1 were normalized for the total median coverage, different
327 individual positions of interest could exhibit deviating coverages. For the qualitative
328 evaluation of LFV detection (i.e. can mutant positions of interest be correctly detected?), the
329 number of false negatives were counted per condition (i.e. combination of AF and coverage)

330 and divided by the total number of observations (i.e. the number of samples ($n=10$) and
331 number of mutations considered for that condition ($n=25$)). A mutant position of interest was
332 considered as correctly detected as soon as it was detected by LoFreq, irrespective of its
333 estimated AF.

334 Dataset 2 was subjected to the same qualitative evaluation as described for Dataset 1. The
335 number of false negatives per condition was divided by the number of observations (i.e. the
336 number of samples ($n=100$) and number of mutations considered for that condition (either
337 $n=7$, $n=17$ or $n=24$)).

338 The visualisation of the qualitative evaluation was performed using a contour plot from the R
339 package plotly (RStudio 1.0.153; R3.6.1) [61]. The false negative (FN) proportion in the
340 qualitative evaluation plots ranged from 0 to 1 with a step size of 0.1.

341 **2.4 Quantitative evaluation of detection of B.1.1.7 at different abundances**

342 For the quantitative evaluation of LFV detection (i.e. is the estimated AF of correctly detected
343 mutant positions of interest close to the true AF?) of both datasets, FN values were
344 considered as 'below the quantification limit' with the quantification limit equal to the lowest
345 recorded value for that condition (i.e. combination of AF and coverage). Outliers were
346 identified for each condition using the Grubbs test that was sequentially applied by first
347 searching for two outliers at the same side, followed by a search for exactly one outlier. If the
348 p-value of the Grubbs test was below 0.05, outliers were excluded. The standard deviation
349 (SD) and mean value of AF for every condition were estimated by a maximum likelihood
350 model based on the normal distribution that took the FN into account as censor data. Data
351 were modelled according to a normal distribution. If the percentage of FN results was above
352 75%, the condition was however excluded from quantitative evaluation. Finally, a
353 performance metric describing closeness to the true AF was calculated for each targeted AF
354 individually by dividing each pooled squared SD by the maximal pooled squared SD. This
355 metric will range between 0, relatively the closest to the targeted AF, and 1, relatively the
356 furthest from the targeted AF.

357 As described for the qualitative evaluation, contour plots from the R package plotly (RStudio
358 1.0.153; R3.6.1) were used for the visualisation of the quantitative evaluation. The
359 performance metric in the quantitative evaluation plots ranged from 0 to 1 with a step size of
360 0.1.

361 **3 Results**


362 **3.1 Qualitative evaluation demonstrates that B.1.1.7 clade-defining mutations** 363 **can be reliably detected at low AF when sequencing coverage is** 364 **adequately high**

365 To mimic targeted SARS-CoV-2 sequencing with a VOC present at low abundances in the
366 viral population, B.1.1.7 clade-defining mutations were first *in silico* introduced at well-
367 defined AFs and coverages in real sequencing data ('Dataset 1') of ten wild-type samples,
368 without however using any coverage normalization so that individual mutations could be
369 present at higher or lower coverages compared to the total median genomic coverage due to
370 unevenness of coverage. To assess whether introduced mutations were correctly detected,
371 or alternatively missed as FN, samples of this dataset were analysed using a LFV calling
372 workflow based on LoFreq.

373 Figure 2A depicts the proportion of FN observations, and corresponding values are
374 presented in Table 3, for all evaluated coverages and targeted AFs until 20%. Results for all
375 targeted AFs (including higher values) are presented in Supplementary Figure S1 and
376 Supplementary Table S3. All LFV could be detected at an AF of 1% at a median coverage of
377 10,000X. As the coverage decreased, the AF threshold at which no single FN occurred (i.e.
378 perfect sensitivity) increased to 1.5% at 5000X, 3% at 1000X, 5% at 500X, 9.5% at 250X,
379 and 20% at 100X. When allowing a maximum of 10% FN (i.e. sensitivity of 90%), the AF
380 thresholds decreased substantially to 1% at 5000X, 1.5% at 1000X, 2.5% at 500X, 4% at
381 250X, and 7.5% at 100X. No false positive mutations related to the mutant and wild-type
382 were observed at respectively 0% and 100% AF.

383 A second approach was also considered for mimicking targeted SARS-CoV-2 virus
384 sequencing with a VOC present at low abundances, by *in silico* mixing real raw sequencing
385 reads from ten B.1.1.7 samples into ten wild-type samples ('Dataset 2') for a total of 100
386 mixes at well-defined AFs and coverages, while applying coverage normalization so that
387 individual mutations were present at approximately similar coverages for all B.1.1.7 clade-
388 defining positions.

389 Figure 2B depicts the proportion of FN observations, and actual values are presented in
390 Table 4, for all evaluated coverages and targeted AF until 20%. Results for higher targeted
391 AF are presented in Supplementary Figure S2 and Supplementary Table S4. All LFV could
392 be detected at an AF of 1% at a median coverage of 9792X. As the coverage decreased, the
393 AF thresholds at which no single FN occurred (i.e. perfect sensitivity) increased to 1.5% at
394 4851X, 3.5% at 969X, 4% at 482X, 7% at 237X, and 20% at 97X. However, when allowing a
395 maximum of 10% FN (i.e. reducing the sensitivity to 90%), the AF thresholds decreased
396 substantially to 1% at 4851X, 2% at 969X, 3% at 482X, 4% at 237X, and 7% at 97X. No
397 false positive mutations related to the mutant and wild-type were observed at 0% and 100%.
398 Overall, the results for Dataset 1, using the median coverages, and Dataset 2, using the
399 coverages at the positions of interest, were qualitatively similar.



400

401 **Figure 2: Qualitative evaluation of Dataset 1 (A) and Dataset 2 (B) based on false negative proportions**

402 **per condition until a targeted mutant AF of 20%.** Orange and red dots represent conditions with a FN

403 proportion between 0 and 0.1, and between 0.1 and 1, respectively. The percentage of FN is coloured ranging

404 from 0 (dark) to 1 (light) in intervals of 0.1 as extrapolated using a contour plot in the R package plotly [61] (actual

405 FN proportions are presented in Table 3 for Dataset 1 and Table 4 for Dataset 2). Results for targeted mutant AF

406 values >20% are presented in Supplementary Figure S1 for Dataset 1 and Supplementary Figure S2 for Dataset
 407 2. Both the x- and y-axis follow a logarithmic scale.

Coverage → AF ↓	100	250	500	750	1000	1500	2000	2500	3000	3500	4000	4500	5000	10,000
20.00%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%
10.00%	5%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%
9.50%	4%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%
9.00%	7%	1%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%
8.50%	4%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%
8.00%	9%	2%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%
7.50%	8%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%
7.00%	10%	1%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%
6.50%	15%	2%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%
6.00%	15%	1%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%
5.50%	19%	3%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%
5.00%	22%	3%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%
4.50%	26%	4%	2%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%
4.00%	31%	6%	1%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%
3.50%	45%	12%	4%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%
3.00%	47%	18%	4%	1%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%
2.50%	62%	21%	7%	2%	2%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%
2.00%	70%	32%	14%	7%	3%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%
1.50%	84%	52%	24%	16%	9%	5%	1%	2%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%
1.00%	96%	77%	54%	35%	28%	15%	8%	6%	6%	3%	2%	2%	2%	0%
0.50%	98%	95%	85%	77%	70%	57%	46%	41%	33%	29%	22%	22%	16%	7%
0.00%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%

408 **Table 3: Qualitative evaluation of Dataset 1 based on false negative proportions per condition until a**
 409 **targeted mutant AF of 20%.** The percentage of FN is coloured ranging from 0 (dark) to 1 (light) according to the
 410 gradient depicted in Figure 2A.

Coverage → AF ↓	97	201	237	482	728	969	1454	1937	2413	2904	3383	3872	4358	4851	5855	6834	7801	8790	9792	
20.00%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%
10.00%	2%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%
9.50%	3%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%
9.00%	5%	1%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%
8.50%	6%	1%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%
8.00%	8%	1%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%
7.50%	8%	1%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%
7.00%	9%	34%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%
6.50%	18%	35%	1%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%
6.00%	28%	38%	1%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%

5.50%	31%	47%	3%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%
5.00%	35%	56%	3%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%
4.50%	43%	57%	4%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%
4.00%	51%	59%	6%	0%	1%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%
3.50%	58%	63%	18%	4%	1%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%
3.00%	68%	73%	23%	8%	2%	1%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%
2.50%	77%	82%	40%	21%	4%	3%	1%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%
2.00%	81%	84%	55%	33%	11%	6%	4%	1%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%
1.50%	89%	86%	69%	53%	24%	21%	12%	8%	4%	2%	1%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%
1.00%	92%	86%	91%	80%	57%	52%	34%	22%	8%	15%	6%	7%	6%	4%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%
0.50%	100%	98%	98%	92%	92%	89%	80%	70%	55%	62%	34%	41%	24%	35%	62%	55%	46%	35%	28%
0.00%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%


411 **Table 4: Qualitative evaluation of Dataset 2 based on false negative proportions per condition until a**
 412 **targeted mutant AF of 20%.** The percentage of FN is coloured ranging from 0 (dark) to 1 (light) according to the
 413 gradient depicted in Figure 2B.

414 **3.2 Quantitative evaluation demonstrates that the resulting AFs for B.1.1.7**
 415 **clade-defining mutations are close to their target values**

416 To evaluate the possibility of quantifying LFV in both datasets, the SDs of available
 417 observations were first evaluated for each condition (i.e. combination of AF and coverage).
 418 This provisional analysis indicated that for both Dataset 1 (Supplementary File S3) and
 419 Dataset 2 (Supplementary File S4), the SD systematically decreased per target AF as
 420 coverage increased. This provisional analysis also indicated that for both datasets,
 421 irrespective of coverage, the SD generally increased between a targeted AF of 1% to 10%,
 422 after which it plateaued for targeted AFs above 20%. We therefore employed the squared
 423 SD per AF divided by the maximal squared SD per target AF to describe closeness of
 424 observed AF to the true AF, for which results are presented in Figure 3A for Dataset 1. As
 425 expected, the variation in AF estimates fluctuates in function of the median coverage and
 426 targeted AF, with variation decreasing per target AF as coverage increased, but also
 427 variation being generally more pronounced at low AFs irrespective of coverage.
 428 Notwithstanding, even for regions in Figure 3A exhibiting high variation, the variability overall
 429 remained small (Supplementary File S3). The interquartile range (IQR) (Supplementary File
 430 S3D) of the observed AF was still limited at the various targeted AF ranging from 0.62%-

431 6.26% at an AF of 50%, 0.36%-3.49% at an AF of 10% and 0.27%-2.07% at an AF of 5%
432 with the highest IQR observed at lower coverages.

433 Results for the quantitative evaluation of Dataset 2 are presented in Figure 3B, and are in
434 accordance with the trends observed for Dataset 1 with the variation decreasing per target
435 AF as coverage increased, and lower target AFs exhibiting increasing variation irrespective
436 of coverage. Notwithstanding, similarly to Dataset 1, the observed total variation remained
437 small (Supplementary File S4). The IQR (Supplementary File S4D) of the observed AF was
438 limited at the various targeted AF ranging from 0.73%-3.93% at an AF of 50%, 0.41%-3.93%
439 at an AF of 10% and 0.29%-2.27% at an AF of 5% with the highest IQR observed at lower
440 coverages.



441

442 **Figure 3: Quantitative evaluation of Dataset 1 (A) and Dataset 2 (B) using the squared SD divided by the**
443 **maximal squared SD per targeted AF.** The figure is coloured ranging from 0 (dark) to 1 (light) in intervals of 0.1
444 as extrapolated using a contour plot in the R package `plotly` [61] (actual values are presented in Supplementary
445 File S3 for Dataset 1 and Supplementary File S4 for Dataset 2). Both the x- and y-axis follow a logarithmic scale.
446 Conditions with a FN proportion higher than 75% were excluded and correspond to the white plane in the lower
447 left corner.

448 **4 Discussion**

449 Wastewater surveillance has been recommended to be used in the EU for improving the
450 epidemiological surveillance of SARS-CoV-2 [7]. WGS is a more suitable approach than RT-
451 qPCR to track both existing and newly emerging SARS-CoV-2 variants. Wastewater
452 sequencing is currently however mainly used to construct the consensus genome sequence
453 and determine the most prevalent strain in communities, but interest exists in its potential for
454 detecting LFV and consequently determining all circulating variants, in particular VOCs [7].

455 To evaluate the potential of targeted amplicon-based SARS-CoV-2 WGS to detect and
456 quantify VOCs present at low abundances in mixed samples, we assessed the performance
457 of a workflow designed for LFV detection in WGS data of wastewater samples. Mutations
458 defining lineage B.1.1.7 were employed as a proof-of-concept using an approach based on
459 *in silico* modifying real sequencing data to construct two datasets, mimicking wastewater
460 deep sequencing with the Illumina technology. For the first dataset, lineage B.1.1.7-defining
461 mutations were introduced *in silico* into raw wild-type sequencing datasets. For the second
462 dataset, the same mutations were introduced by mixing wild-type and B.1.1.7 raw
463 sequencing datasets. In Dataset 1, the coverage profile of the samples corresponded to a
464 typical real dataset including large fluctuations in sequencing coverage at certain positions.
465 In Dataset 2, sequencing coverages were normalized, which allowed evaluating with high
466 precision how reliable AF detection is at specific coverages. Afterwards, the ability to both
467 detect and quantify LFV was evaluated. Results demonstrated that WGS enabled detecting
468 LFV with very high performance. As expected, lower coverages and AFs resulted in lower
469 sensitivity and higher variability of estimated AFs. We found, employing the most
470 conservative thresholds from either Datasets 1 or 2, that a sequencing coverage of 250X,
471 500X, 1500X, and 10,000X is required to detect all LFV at an AF of 10%, 5%, 3% and 1%,
472 respectively (Table 3 and Table 4). For quantification of variants, the variability remained
473 overall small for all conditions respecting the above thresholds, resulting in reliable
474 abundance estimations, despite the variability of estimated AF increasing at lower coverages

475 and AF. Of note, it was observed that the profile of the genome coverage differed at some
476 positions between wild-type and mutant samples indicating that the amplicon-based
477 enrichment approach could possibly introduce a bias. Consequently, this should be
478 considered when examining and quantifying the proportion of mutants in the sample.

479 Obtaining high coverages for wastewater samples may however be challenging under real-
480 world conditions. In contrast to clinical samples in which viral loads are typically high,
481 ranging from 10^4 to 10^7 copies/mL [62], viral RNA loads in wastewater samples are often
482 low, ranging from 10^{-1} to $10^{3.5}$ copies/mL [63]. This renders it more challenging to sequence
483 samples with a low viral load. Additionally, variants circulating at low frequencies in a
484 community are expected to be present at a low AF in wastewater samples. Nevertheless,
485 employing the most conservative thresholds from either Datasets 1 or 2, 90% of LFV present
486 at an AF of 10%, 5%, 3% and 1% were still detected at a sequencing coverage of 100X,
487 250X, 500X, and 2500X respectively (Table 3 and Table 4). This study focussed on the
488 sensitivity of LFV detection and did not explore the false positive rates (i.e. specificity).
489 Although our recommendations for AFs and coverages ensure high sensitivity, often an
490 inverse relationship exists between sensitivity and specificity and we can therefore not
491 exclude that false positives occur for AF and coverage combinations considered as providing
492 qualitative results in this study. A false positive detection is however typically less
493 problematic compared to a false negative result as the former can still be discovered in
494 follow-up investigation in contrast to the latter. Additionally, false positive observations
495 typically occur randomly over the genome [38] and it is unlikely that all VOC-defining
496 mutations would be simultaneously falsely detected, even at low AFs and coverages. The
497 issue of low viral load, low expected AF and potential false positives can be mitigated by
498 sequencing wastewater samples in duplicate when necessary. Possible false positive results
499 could be investigated using RT-qPCR or RT-ddPCR assays that target that specific
500 positions.

501 Our results can serve as a reference for the scientific community to select appropriate
502 thresholds for the AF and coverage. These could also be context-specific as a smaller or
503 larger degree of false negatives might be warranted for specific applications, and can also
504 be used as a baseline for determining the number of samples that can be multiplexed per
505 run to optimize cost-efficiency of WGS. Our findings highlight the feasibility of using targeted
506 amplicon-based metagenomics approaches for wastewater surveillance, as such samples
507 comprise a collection of different strains, among which the dominant strain will define the
508 consensus sequence of the sample and the detected LFV will represent the circulating
509 strains present at lower frequencies. Other studies that investigated LFV in wastewater
510 provided limited quality criteria regarding the coverage and AF. Furthermore, the quality
511 criteria in these studies were not evaluated using a defined population [33, 34]. ECDC has
512 provided limited quality criteria regarding the sequencing coverage, namely 500X across
513 95% of the genome to detect LFV, but has not indicated the corresponding AF thresholds
514 this corresponds to for reliable LFV detection [31]. Based on the results obtained in this
515 study, a coverage of 500X allowed to detect LFV until an AF of 5% with perfect sensitivity
516 and would therefore be less suited to detect LFV at lower AFs. Lythgoe et al. recommended
517 a depth of at least 100 reads with an AF of at least 3% to detect the LFV in clinical samples
518 with high viral loads (50,000 uniquely mapped reads) [64]. Based on the results in this study,
519 these recommendations appear not sufficiently strict, since we observed that an AF of 3%
520 requires at least a sequencing coverage of 1500X to detect all LFV or 500X to detect 90% of
521 LFV.

522 In the presence of multiple VOCs, the VOCs can be identified by composing all possible
523 combinations of LFV as a conservative strategy, although multiple VOCs in one sample will
524 also make the estimation of the relative abundance of each VOC more complicated. If
525 multiple VOCs with partially overlapping defining mutations would be present in a
526 wastewaters sample, some mutations of interest would consequently be present at different
527 AFs. Haplotyping reconstruction methods could be used in such situations to delineate
528 VOCs. However, most haplotype reconstruction programmes perform poorly under higher

529 levels of diversity, and haplotype populations with rare haplotypes are often not recovered
530 [65]. Although haplotype reconstruction has been described for short reads, Nanopore
531 sequencing might offer a substantial advantage for such cases due to its longer reads,
532 despite their higher error rate, to perform haplotype estimation to delineate actual VOCs.

533 In conclusion, there exists a pressing need for recommendations for detecting LFV for
534 wastewater surveillance. Although further work is still required to investigate the specificity
535 and possibility to detect VOCs instead of just mutations, including for other existing and
536 employed methodologies such as probe-based capture and/or Nanopore sequencing, this
537 study demonstrates the feasibility of a targeted metagenomics approach for highly sensitive
538 LFV detection with acceptable relative abundance estimations using a tiled-amplicon
539 enrichment based on the Illumina technology. This approach enables the detection of
540 mutations associated with specific VOCs. Our approach could also be used to evaluate the
541 potential occurrence of co-infections with other SARS-CoV-2 variants with different strains in
542 clinical samples. In future work this approach should be evaluated on real wastewater data,
543 as in this study high-quality data from clinical specimens was used and modified *in silico* to
544 mimic wastewater data. In light of the pandemic urgency, and the multiple SARS-CoV-2
545 wastewater surveillance initiatives that are being established and also being integrated into
546 coordinated overarching coordination and preparedness initiatives such as the recently
547 announced European Health Emergency Preparedness and Response Authority [7], we
548 hope that our results will help establishing guidance and recommendations for wastewater
549 surveillance and other relevant applications.

550 **Contributions**

551 Conceptualization: Nancy Roosens, Kevin Vanneste, Xavier Saelens; Project Administration:
552 Nancy Roosens; Data Curation: Laura Van Poelvoorde; Methodology: Laura Van
553 Poelvoorde, Thomas Delcourt, Wim Coucke, Sigrid De Keersmaecker, Nancy Roosens,
554 Kevin Vanneste; Software: Laura Van Poelvoorde, Thomas Delcourt, Wim Coucke; Formal
555 Analysis: Laura Van Poelvoorde, Thomas Delcourt, Wim Coucke; Investigation: Laura Van
556 Poelvoorde; Visualization: Laura Van Poelvoorde; Validation: Laura Van Poelvoorde,
557 Thomas Delcourt; Writing – Original Draft Preparation: Laura Van Poelvoorde, Thomas
558 Delcourt, Nancy Roosens, Kevin Vanneste; Writing – Review & Editing: all authors; Funding
559 Acquisition: Nancy Roosens, Philippe Herman; Supervision: Nancy Roosens, Kevin
560 Vanneste

561 **Ethical disclaimer**

562 Not applicable.

563 **Conflicts of interest**

564 The authors declare that there are no conflicts of interest.

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