Technical Report 1080

Tacit Knowledge in Military Leadership: Evidence of Construct Validity

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14. ABSTRACT (Maximum 200 words):

Army officers within the command structure of 44 CONUS battalions were administered tests developed to measure the tacit leadership knowledge of platoon leaders, company commanders and battalion commanders. Tests at each level consisted of a series of scenarios derived from actual experiences with a set of possible responses to the leadership situation described. In addition, the 562 officers were also administered a test of verbal reasoning ability, a related test of tacit knowledge developed for business managers, and a criterion measure of leadership effectiveness. Analyses were performed to determine if the tacit knowledge for military leadership inventories predicted leadership effectiveness and if they predicted better than the other measures. The inventories predicted leadership effectiveness ratings at each level and did so better than verbal reasoning ability, tacit knowledge for managers, or experience. A complex relationship emerged between tacit leadership knowledge and leadership effectiveness ratings at the three command levels, supporting the use of a multi-level approach in assessing tacit knowledge.

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A primary mission of the U.S. Army Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences (ARI) is to enhance military readiness through programmatic research that supports the effective performance of Army leaders. To accomplish this, ARI and the United States Military Academy (USMA) established the Center for Leadership and Organizations Research (CLOR) at USMA to conduct research as part of ARI's research program in the areas of organizational leadership and leader development, education, and training. The research reported here is part of the ARI exploratory development research program formulated and undertaken by the CLOR.

This report is the fourth product of a project jointly undertaken by researchers at USMA and at Yale University. The overall objective of the project is to test the applicability of a theory of tacit knowledge to military leadership. Previous research has shown that tacit knowledge, acquired through practical on-the-job experiences, is related to executive and managerial effectiveness in civilian organizations.

A rigorous methodology has been followed in identifying tacit leadership knowledge at three levels of command and in developing the actual test items at each level. This report describes the construct validation of these instruments developed to test the tacit leadership knowledge of platoon leaders, company commanders, and battalion commanders. The results show a relationship between our measures of tacit leadership knowledge and ratings of leadership effectiveness. The next step will be to assess the practical implications this has for leader development.

ZITAM. SIMUTIS Technical Director

TACIT KNOWLEDGE IN MILITARY LEADERSHIP: EVIDENCE OF CONSTRUCT VALIDITY

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Research Requirement:

To establish the construct validity of instruments developed to assess the tacit knowledge for military leadership of officers at platoon, company, and battalion levels. This involved showing (a) that tacit knowledge predicts leadership effectiveness, and (b) that tacit knowledge predicts better than traditional measures of leadership.

Procedure:

A battery of instruments was adminstered to a representative sample of Army officers at the platoon, company, and battalion levels. This test battery included the Tacit Knowledge Inventories for Military Leaders, the Tacit Knowledge Inventory for Managers, the Concept Mastery Test, and the Leadership Effectiveness Survey. Statistical analyses were performed on these data to test the construct validity of the Tacit Knowledge Inventory for Military Leaders.

Findings:

At each level, tacit knowledge for military leaders predicted ratings of leadership effectiveness. In addition, the Tacit Knowledge Inventory for Military Leaders predicted better than measures of verbal reasoning ability, tacit knowledge for managers, and experience. Different relationships between tacit knowledge and the criterion of leader effectiveness were observed across levels. At all three levels, tacit knowledge for military leaders related to how officers were seen by their superiors. Additionally, at the company level, tacit knowledge predicted how officers were rated by their subordinates and peers, reflecting the complexity of the company commander role. At the battalion level, tacit knowledge about management was informative about how subordinates viewed their battalion commanders, reflecting the types of activities that are most likely to be observed by subordinates.

Utilization of Findings:

Findings from the current study add further support to the validity of tacit knowledge for military leadership. Tacit knowledge makes a difference in the effectiveness of Army leaders at the platoon, company, and battalion levels. These findings highlight the complexity of the tacit knowledge construct, emphasizing the importance of using a multi-level approach to identifying and assessing tacit knowledge. These results will be used, along with previous findings, to develop recommendations for promoting the acquisition of tacit knowledge for military leadership in a subsequent report.

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TACIT KNOWLEDGE IN MILITARY LEADERSHIP: EVIDENCE OF CONSTRUCT VALIDITY

Introduction

The Tacit Knowledge for Military Leadership project is a collaborative research effort between the U.S. Army Research Institute, the U.S. Military Academy, and Yale University. The purpose of this research has been to discover what makes some officers more successful leaders than others, and to use this information to identify ways in which the Army can develop effective leaders. In any environment, successful leaders pick up tacit and even hidden clues as to what strategies and tactics will be effective for leadership. The approach we have taken is to identify and assess tacit knowledge for effective military leadership. Our work to date has sought to identify the knowledge held by successful Army officers that can be defined as tacit (Horvath, Forsythe, Sweeney, McNally, Wattendorf, Williams, & Sternberg, 1994), and to develop inventories to assess the level of tacit knowledge exhibited by officers (Horvath, Sternberg, Forsythe, Sweeney, Bullis, Williams, & Dennis, 1996). The purpose of this report is to present results from a preliminary study designed to validate the construct of tacit knowledge for military leadership.

The question of what leaders know in terms of how to effectively lead has received little attention in research and theorizing on leadership (Bass, 1988). Previous approaches to studying leadership effectiveness have produced inconclusive or contradictory results (Yukl & Van Fleet, 1992). One approach has been to assess leaders on general cognitive ability. There are mixed findings regarding the relationship between IQ and leadership. For example, Fiedler has shown that IQ is positively correlated with leadership success under conditions of low stress, but it is actually negatively correlated with leadership success under conditions of high stress (Fiedler, 1995). A second approach involves using tests of personality, an approach which has also had limited success (Lord, DeVader, & Alliger, 1986). Although leaders seem, on average, to be more open to experience than nonleaders, other personality traits fail to predict across situations. A third approach addresses the more formalized knowledge and experience of leaders. Obviously, expertise and experience are crucial for leadership success. Fiedler found that the relationship between experience and performance was greater under conditions of high stress than low stress. But it is arguably what one learns from experience, rather than the experience itself, that is most important. Our approach is to measure what one has learned from experience, that is, knowledge we define as tacit.

One reason that more conventional approaches have had limited success in predicting leadership effectiveness is related to a distinction between academic and practical types of tasks. Academic tasks tend to be well-defined, circumscribed, unmotivating, decontextualized, abstract, and irrelevant to many people's lives. In contrast, practical tasks tend to be ill-defined, open, motivating, contextualized, concrete, and relevant to many people's lives. This distinction is also reflected in the differentiation between academic and practical intelligence (Sternberg, 1996). That is, the abilities needed to be successful on academic tasks are not necessarily the same ones required for success in real-world, practical situations. Measures of general cognitive ability and formalized knowledge are more relevant indicators of performance on academic

tasks. Measures of practical intelligence, of which tacit knowledge is an example, will likely provide a better entree to understanding who will be a successful leader.

Another reason why traditional methods of assessing leadership are limited is that academic tasks, and even many practical tasks, involve only adaptation to the environment-changing oneself to suit the environment. Leadership, however, involves modification of the environment--shaping the environment in order to accomplish one's leadership goals. More specifically, military leadership can be characterized as the process of exerting interpersonal influence to accomplish organizational goals by providing purpose, direction, and motivation (Department of the Army Field Manual 22-100). The ability to shape is clearly important for successful leadership and, therefore, measures that primarily address adaptive abilities will not necessarily be informative about those who effectively shape their environment.

We have taken an alternative approach to studying leadership that seeks to understand the rich, contextualized knowledge that is an important component in the practical ability for shaping environments. According to the Army's own analysis, its future operating environment will be characterized by heightened speed and complexity, wider dispersion of units, and increasing reliance upon fewer systems and people. When the environment is characterized by such features, people are more likely to rely on implicit modes of learning and informal means of acquiring knowledge. Therefore, it is important to understand the role of tacit knowledge in leadership in order to support the Army's ability to develop successful leaders.

Because we believe that tacit knowledge is (for these and other reasons) critical to understanding and supporting the performance of Army officers, the Tacit Knowledge for Military Leadership project has aimed to discover the knowledge, above and beyond that which is taught explicitly, that relates to successful leadership. This work not only extends the tacit knowledge approach to the domain of military leadership, but also explores qualitative differences in tacit knowledge at different organizational levels and examines different perspectives as to what represents good tacit knowledge. The construct validation of our measures of tacit knowledge for military leadership (the Tacit Knowledge Inventories for Military Leaders) presented here is a key element in our effort to apply the lessons of tacit knowledge research to improving leader development and organizational learning within the Army.

In the material that follows, we provide a brief summary of theory and research on the tacit knowledge construct. Then, we review the major phases of our research project leading up to the current validation effort. The method used to validate the tacit knowledge is discussed, followed by a presentation of the results which are organized by level of military service. Finally, we draw some conclusions from our findings and make some general recommendations for leadership development in the Army. These recommendations are elaborated upon in a subsequent report.

Tacit Knowledge

Tacit knowledge¹ is most commonly defined as knowledge that resists introspection and articulation. That is, it is defined as knowledge that people do not know they have and/or find difficult to articulate. As its currency has increased, the term "tacit knowledge" has devolved into something of an ad hoc category, with quite different kinds of knowledge being lumped together. To better understand the senses in which the term is used, it is helpful to consider several reasons why useful knowledge might remain tacit or unspoken.

Pattern irreducibility.

Some knowledge remains tacit because it concerns information patterns that cannot be reduced to rules or generalizations. For example, certain battlefield configurations may signal to the commander an opportunity but such configurations may be easier to recognize than to define concisely.

Context dependence.

Some knowledge remains tacit because it is highly dependent upon the context in which it was acquired. For example, knowledge of a senior officer's moods and personality quirks may be quite useful but only narrowly applicable.

Routinization.

Some knowledge (particularly knowledge of action sequences) remains tacit because it becomes compiled into routines or procedures that "run" without conscious attention. For example, the coordination of hand- and foot-driven controls becomes "second nature" to experienced vehicle operators.

Distribution.

Some knowledge remains tacit because it is distributed among individuals as a consequence of the division of labor. When knowledge is distributed, no one person possesses the total knowledge of the group and, unless a concerted effort is made to capture and codify the knowledge of the group, it will remain tacit.

¹ The term "tacit knowledge" has roots in works on the philosophy of science (Polanyi, 1966), ecological psychology (Neisser, 1976), and organizational behavior (Schön, 1983). The adaptation of the term to account for individual differences in practical intelligence reflects an intellectual debt to all of these sources.

Operational Definition of Tacit Knowledge

The operational definition of tacit knowledge that guided our research focused less on why knowledge remains tacit than on how tacit knowledge can be distinguished from more explicit, formal knowledge. This emphasis was necessary, given our desire to capture the leadership-related tacit knowledge of Army officers for purposes of measurement and validation. For these purposes, we defined tacit knowledge as that which is

- Grounded in personal experience
- Intimately related to action
- Not well supported by formal training and doctrine

The criterion of being "grounded in personal experience" was intended to distinguish tacit knowledge from second-hand knowledge or "received wisdom." We restricted our study to knowledge based (as best we could determine) on first-hand experience or on vicarious experience through direct observation. The criterion of being "intimately related to action" was intended to distinguish tacit knowledge from "inert" knowledge. We restricted our study to knowledge that was instrumental (as best we could determine) to the attainment of goals that Army leaders cared about. Finally, the criterion of being "not well supported by formal training and doctrine" was intended to distinguish tacit knowledge from knowledge that is explicitly taught or espoused. We restricted our study to knowledge that (as best we could determine) had to be acquired in the absence of support--knowledge that an officer might or might not acquire.

Finally, we applied an additional criterion in order to restrict our study to knowledge that pertained to <u>leadership</u> per se (i.e., rather than tactical or technical aspects of job incumbency). Thus, we classified as tacit knowledge for military leadership only that knowledge which pertains to the influence of others toward the attainment of the organization's legitimate goals.

Research on Tacit Knowledge

Social science research on tacit knowledge issues from a single, simple observation--that learning from experience often occurs without conscious intention to learn or conscious awareness of having learned. Rather, such learning is experienced as something that happens "behind the scenes" as people pursue goals on the job. The common language of the workplace reflects an awareness of this fact as people speak of "learning by doing" and "learning by osmosis." When learning occurs implicitly, behind the scenes, the knowledge that results has a tacit quality--people may be unaware of what they know and may have difficulty articulating it, even when prompted. Again, the language of the workplace is instructive. Terms such as "professional intuition" and "professional instinct" seem intended to denote the opaque or tacit quality of knowledge gained from job experience. In this section, we briefly describe research that supports the psychological reality and practical importance of tacit knowledge in professional competence.

The opaque quality of expert knowledge is, of course, well documented in the literature on human expertise (see Chi, Glaser, and Farr, 1988). Research on experts in a variety of knowledge-intensive domains has shown that reasoning and problem solving in such domains

depend upon proceduralized skills and schematically-organized knowledge, both of which may operate outside of focal awareness. Further, expert knowledge may reflect the structure of the operating environment or situation more closely than it does the structure of formal, disciplinary knowledge (Groen & Patel, 1988)--making a focus on such formal knowledge a relative "blind alley" in efforts to understand expert performance. Experts queried about what they know often have great difficulty articulating the knowledge that underlies their decisions or capabilities on the job.

Further support for the psychological reality of implicit learning and tacit knowledge comes from research, conducted in the laboratory, focusing on the phenomena of learning without intention or awareness. The foundational research in this area was conducted in the late 1960s by Arthur Reber and colleagues (Reber, 1967; Reber & Millward, 1968; Reber, 1969). Their work on the acquisition of stochastic grammars and of event sequences suggested that human subjects are capable of acquiring knowledge of a very complex nature without conscious intention or awareness of learning. Later researchers applied the paradigm to study learning of meaningful information (e.g., information about other people, information about the behavior of an economic system) and replicated the basic pattern of results (Broadbent & Aston, 1978; Broadbent, Fitzgerald, & Broadbent, 1986). Laboratory work on implicit learning suggests that subjects are able to exploit the structure inherent in a stimulus display in order to gain useful knowledge of the regularities in their environment. Importantly, this knowledge seems to be acquired in the absence of awareness or intention to learn--it is knowledge of a hidden or tacit nature.

In addition, tacit knowledge has been shown to lie at the root of knowledge creation and innovation in civilian business enterprises. Research in civilian setting has shown that tacit knowledge, when properly mobilized, can be an engine of continuous innovation and sustained competitive advantage (Davenport & Prusak, 1997; Leonard-Barton, 1995; Nonaka & Takeuchi, 1995). Conversely, Szulanski (1996) and Kogut & Zander (1992) have shown how the tacitness of organizational knowledge, when left unmanaged, can impede the replication of process innovations and, more generally, the transfer of best practices within the firm. Together, these findings suggest that the cultivation and sharing of tacit knowledge is an important consideration in knowledge-based or "learning organizations."

Research on Practical Intelligence and Tacit Knowledge

In the program of research which influenced our current work most directly, Sternberg and colleagues have used the tacit-knowledge construct to elucidate practical intelligence and performance in domains as diverse as high-technology manufacturing, bank management, academic psychology, and sales. In what follows, we briefly recount major findings of the tacit-knowledge research program.

Research by Sternberg and colleagues has shown that tacit knowledge can be effectively measured (Wagner, 1987; Wagner & Sternberg, 1985; Sternberg, Wagner, Williams, & Horvath, 1995). The measurement instruments employed in this research typically consisted of a set of work-related situations, each with between five and twenty response items. Each situation posed a problem for the subject to solve, and the subject indicated how he or she would solve the

problem by rating the various response items. For example, in a hypothetical situation presented to a business manager, a subordinate whom the manager does not know well has come to him for advice on how to succeed in business. The manager is asked to rate each of several responses (usually on a 1 = low to 9 = high scale) according to its importance for succeeding in the company. Examples of responses might include (a) setting priorities that reflect the importance of each task, (b) trying always to work on what you are in the mood to do, and (c) doing routine tasks early in the day to make sure you get them done. The set of ratings the subject generates for all the work-related situations is used to measure his or her tacit knowledge for that domain. The procedure for scoring tacit-knowledge tests has undergone evolution across several studies, and a detailed description is beyond the scope of this report. In general, tacit-knowledge tests have been scored in one of three ways: (a) by correlating subjects' responses with an index of group membership (i.e., expert, intermediate, novice), (b) by judging the degree to which subjects' responses conform to professional "rules of thumb," or (c) by computing the difference between subjects' responses and an expert prototype. Scores on the tacit knowledge inventories have been used to examine the relationship of tacit knowledge with other constructs.

Tacit knowledge has been found to increase, on average, with job experience, but it is not a direct function of job experience (Wagner, 1987; Sternberg, Wagner, & Okagaki, 1993). What matters most is not how much experience a person has, but how well the person utilizes the experience to acquire and use tacit knowledge. Tacit knowledge is not a proxy for IQ. Scores on tacit knowledge tests seldom correlate with measures of IQ,² and when such correlations are found, tacit knowledge generally predicts job performance better than IQ (Sternberg et al., 1993; 1995). Finally, tacit knowledge does not appear to be a proxy for measures of personality, cognitive style, or interpersonal orientation. When managers were assessed on such measures, tacit knowledge for management was found to be the best single predictor of performance on a managerial simulation when all measures were entered into a simultaneous regression (Sternberg et al., 1993). Furthermore, the contribution of tacit knowledge to the prediction of simulation performance was significant after controlling for the effects of all other variables.

In addition to predicting performance on a managerial simulation, tacit knowledge has been found to predict other indices of job performance, correlating between .3 and .5 with measures of rated prestige of business or institution, salary, performance appraisal ratings, number of publications, etc. (Wagner, 1987; Wagner & Sternberg, 1985; Sternberg et al., 1993; Sternberg et al., 1995). These correlations, uncorrected for attenuation or restriction of range, compare favorably with those obtained for IQ within the range of abilities we have tested. Tacit knowledge also predicts both academic performance and self-reported adjustment in a college setting (Sternberg et al., 1993). Its prediction of the academic performance is comparable to that

² It should be noted that these correlations involved selected samples and thus may have suffered from range restriction and elevated means. It can be argued, however, that the ranges tested actually represent the true populations of interest. The decreasing positive manifold effect at higher ability levels (Detterman & Daniel, 1989; Legree, Pifer, & Grafton, 1996) does not necessarily have to be viewed as a limitation to the generalizability of such findings, but rather an indication that the Potential Classification Efficiency (Brogden, 1959) of using multiple predictors may be greater in such populations.

of conventional academic-ability tests (with a multiple R of about .6), whereas its prediction of adjustment is better (with a multiple R of about .8).


In summary, a program of empirical research has shown that tacit knowledge can be measured and that it can predict performance in a variety of contexts. In general, tacit knowledge increases with experience, but is unrelated to traditional measures of intelligence and personality. More importantly, tacit knowledge has been shown to be a better predictor than many traditional measures such as IQ and personality.

Overview of the Project

The goals of the Tacit Knowledge for Military Leadership Project have been to identify, validate, and recommend ways to leverage the tacit knowledge of Army officers at three leadership levels within the U.S. Army. Our approach has been (1) to identify tacit knowledge, (2) to develop means of measuring it, (3) to validate those measures against indices of leader effectiveness, and (4) to recommend ways in which the Army might make more efficient use of this hidden asset. The approach we have taken to the first three of these goals may best be described by analogy to a production process. That is, we extracted "raw materials" in the form of stories and insights obtained from Army officers during interviews. We processed these materials in order to refine them, using analysis and further data collection to narrow down and polish our sample of officers' tacit knowledge. We then used these refined materials to construct a line of "products" (i.e., inventories for measuring the tacit knowledge of Army officers). Finally, we tested our products against "industry" performance standards--standards for the reliability and validity of psychological tests. Figure 1 shows, in schematic form, the steps involved in the production of tacit-knowledge inventories. The boxes in Figure 1 represent major phases of the research project and the arrows represent important intermediate products from each phase.

Figure 1.

Phases of the Tacit Knowledge for Military Leadership Project



Identifying the Tacit Knowledge of U.S. Army Officers

In the first phase of the research project, we conducted a series of interviews with 81 Army officers to elicit the experience-based tacit knowledge of Army leaders at three organizational levels: platoon, company, and battalion. We employed a semi-structured interview format in which Army officers were asked to "tell a story" about a personal experience from which they learned something important about leadership at their current level. Interviewers and the interviewee worked together to clarify and capture the important features of these experiences. From the transcripts of these interviews we compiled a set of story summaries which formed the basis for further analysis and refinement.

The content of these summaries was reviewed by a panel of military experts to identify those that met the criteria for the operational definition of tacit knowledge. That is, knowledge

was identified as tacit if it was grounded in personal experience, intimately related to action, not well supported by formal training or doctrine, and pertained to military leadership. Once the sample of tacit knowledge had been identified, members of the expert panel were asked to sort the remaining knowledge items into categories of their own devising. By aggregating and cluster analyzing the sort data, we derived content-based categories of tacit knowledge at the platoon, company, and battalion levels. The categorical framework that resulted from these analyses provided early insight into developmental challenges, unique to each organizational level, that serve as stimuli for tacit knowledge acquisition (see Horvath et al., 1994). This framework also served as an important source of input to the inventory-development process.

Preparing for Inventory Development

In the next phase of the research, we sought to further narrow and refine our sample of officer tacit knowledge. Specifically, we sought to identify those items that best embodied the tacit-knowledge construct and, thus, were most promising for purposes of inventory development. We conducted a large-scale survey study in which we asked Army officers to rate the tacit-knowledge items on a number of dimensions and used discriminant analysis to identify those items that best discriminated between experienced and novice officers at each level. Those items with the most discriminating power were, by virtue of their demonstrated relationship to "experience," judged to be the most promising for purposes of instrument development (see Horvath et al., 1996).

Inventory Development

The goal of the next phase was to develop the tacit knowledge inventories for each organizational level. Separate inventories were deemed appropriate since the tacit knowledge elicited from officer interviews indicated that different developmental challenges existed at each level. In other words, the tacit knowledge for effective leadership at the platoon level may not be relevant to the company or battalion levels. In developing the inventories, we sought to embody the refined set of tacit-knowledge items in a test that could be administered to Army officers in order to assess the relationship between measured tacit knowledge and measured effectiveness. We used item statistics to select tacit-knowledge items that were (individually) construct relevant, and we used the category framework to select sets of items that were (collectively) construct representative. Finally, we used the original summaries and transcripts to expand each of the selected tacit-knowledge items into a scenario that posed a leadership problem, along with a set of 5 to 15 response options for each scenario, which subjects rated for their quality.

Once preliminary inventories were constructed for each of the three levels under study, we sought to further refine the inventories. We convened focus groups composed of recent job incumbents and explained to these officers the goals of our research and the nature of tacit knowledge as we defined it in our study. We then asked them to judge the "fit" of our inventory questions to the tacit-knowledge construct as well as to offer suggestions for the refinement of the inventories. We then revised the inventories to accommodate the judgments and suggestions of the focus group members. The resulting Tacit Knowledge Inventories for Military Leaders

were then reproduced for purposes of further validation. A study designed to empirically validate the tacit knowledge construct is described next.

Methods

Once we established the existence of tacit knowledge for military leadership within the U.S. Army officer corp and developed instruments to measure that tacit knowledge, we proceeded to test the proposition that tacit knowledge makes a difference in the effectiveness of Army leaders. This prediction is based directly on our definition of tacit knowledge and the process by which we developed our inventories (see Horvath et al., 1996). It also follows from a body of prior research on the nature and role of tacit knowledge in the workplace. Thus, the major hypotheses tested in the validation study were the following:

H1: Scores on the Tacit Knowledge Inventories for Military Leaders will predict rated leadership effectiveness.

H2: Scores on the Tacit Knowledge Inventories for Military Leaders will provide a significant increment of prediction beyond that provided by a traditional measure of verbal ability.

In order to show that measured tacit knowledge predicts leader effectiveness, we administered our Tacit Knowledge Inventories for Military Leaders (TKML), along with a number of other measures, to active-duty Army officers across the continental United States. In this section, we describe the procedures for gathering evidence of construct validity, including the sample, instruments, data collection procedures, and data analyses.

<u>Sample</u>

We administered our battery of tests (each described in detail below) to a representative sample of Army officers at the three levels under study. Our sample was drawn from 44 battalions stationed at six posts around the United States.³ Table 1 shows the distribution of battalions across these six posts. Table 2 shows the total numbers of subjects on whom complete sets of validation data were obtained.⁴ Although we gathered data in 44 battalions, we only have complete data on 31 battalion commanders. This loss of data is primarily due to the fact that unit operational requirements often precluded us from gathering complete data.

³ A battalion is composed of approximately 700 soldiers, and is commanded by an officer in the grade of lieutenant colonel. On the average, battalions have approximately five companies, each of which has three to four platoons. By sampling intact battalions, we were able to administer the TKML at all three levels of interest (battalion, company, and platoon) and simultaneously obtain multiple judgments of leadership effectiveness.

⁴ Note that brigade commanders participated in our study only as raters of battalion commander effectiveness. Because brigade commanders were not themselves objects of study, they are not represented in Table 2.

Table 1. Number of Battalions Sampled by Post.

Post	Battalions Sampled		
Campbell	. 10		
Drum	5		
Carson	4		
Bragg	10		
Lewis	5		
Hood	10		

Table 2.

Number of Officers in the Validation Study by Level

Level	Total Number of Subjects
Platoon	368
Company	163
Battalion	31

Instruments

Tacit knowledge for military leadership inventories.

Tacit knowledge inventories of the type developed in our research are intended to measure the experience-based, practically-oriented knowledge of individuals. An inventory consists of a series of problems or scenarios, briefly described. Each scenario is accompanied by a set of possible responses to the situation that it describes. Respondents were asked to rate the quality or advisability of each response option using a nine-point Likert scale. There were three

version of the Tacit Knowledge for Military Leaders (TKML) inventory corresponding to each of the organizational level studied: platoon, company, and battalion. Figure 2 shows a sample question taken from the company commander inventory.

Figure 2.

Sample Question from the Tacit Knowledge Inventory for Military Leaders

1	2	3	4	5 ,	6	7	8	9
Extremely		Somewhat		Neither		Somewha		Extremely
Bad		Bad		Bad		t Good		Good
				Nor Good				

You are a company commander, and your battalion commander is the type of person who seems always to "shoot the messenger"--he does not like to be surprised by bad news, and he tends to take his anger out on the person who brought him the bad news. You want to build a positive, professional relationship with your battalion commander. What should you do?

Speak to your battalion commander about his behavior and share your
perception of it.
Attempt to keep the battalion commander "over-informed" by telling him
what is occurring in your unit on a regular basis (e.g., daily or every other day).
Speak to the sergeant major and see if she/he is willing to try to influence
the battalion commander.
Keep the battalion commander informed only on important issues, but
don't bring up issues you don't have to discuss with him.
When you bring a problem to your battalion commander, bring a solution
at the same time.
Disregard the battalion commander's behavior: Continue to bring him
news as you normally would.
Tell your battalion commander all of the good news you can, but try to
shield him from hearing the bad news.
Tell the battalion commander as little as possible; deal with problems on
your own if at all possible.

Inventory scoring procedures.

Procedures for scoring tacit knowledge inventories pose unique challenges in establishing a "correct" answer for test items. Unlike questions on traditional achievement or intelligence tests, less certainty can be attached to the correctness of specific responses on tacit-knowledge tests (Legree, 1995). As the sample question in Figure 2 illustrates, a respondent's ratings depends on his or her interpretation of the problem, an interpretation that is assumed to rely

upon knowledge gained through experience. Therefore, an appropriate standard for response quality is that provided by a group of highly experienced and successful practitioners.

In our study of officer tacit knowledge, expert response profiles were obtained for each of the three versions of the TKML (battalion, company, and platoon) as shown in Table 3. In each case, highly select groups of officers who had recently demonstrated outstanding performance (as defined by the Army's performance evaluation, promotion, and selection system) completed the TKML inventories, providing us with the raw data to construct expert profiles. Students at the Army War College (AWC) served as an expert group for the battalionlevel inventory. AWC students are lieutenant colonels and colonels who were selected to attend this school based primarily on their demonstrated excellence as battalion commanders. This is a very select group of officers. Majors and lieutenant colonels attending the Pre-Command Course (PCC) served as an expert group for the company-level inventory. This is also a very select group of officers who, based primarily on their success as company commanders, have been chosen to command battalions. Selection for battalion command is an extremely competitive process. Finally, captains selected "below the zone" for major attending the Command and General Staff College (CGSC) served as an expert group for the platoon-level inventory--a very select group based on their performance at the platoon and company level. By virtue of their experience and accomplishments at the levels in question, these three groups of officers were deemed to represent the experienced and knowledgeable practitioner.

Table 3.

Expert Samples for Scoring the Tacit Knowledge Inventories for Military Leaders.

	Source	n
Battalion Inventory	AWC	59
Company Inventory	PCC	29
Platoon Inventory	CGSC	50

For each TKML inventory, an expert profile was constructed which represents the mean of the experts' ratings for each response option within a question. The level of agreement among the experts was considered acceptable with the standard deviations among experts generally between 1 and 2 on a nine-point scale.

Using the expert profile as a basis for scoring, the performance of each respondent on the TKML was assessed relative to the expert group for his or her current level in the chain-of-command. Scores on the inventory were computed using a distance measure that quantified the

degree of agreement between the subject's responses and that of the expert group. These distance scores reflect the squared deviations from the expert mean for each response summed across all response options within a question. To ensure that options about which the experts did not agree received less weight in the measurement of leaders' tacit knowledge, the distance scores for each response option were weighted by the reciprocal of the standard deviation among experts. In other words, respondents were not penalized for being farther from the expert mean when the experts themselves exhibited disagreement as to the appropriate response.

The distance scores were then summed across all questions in the inventory to obtain an overall score for tacit knowledge. We adjusted the summary scores to compensate for different rating style on the part of respondents (use of scale-range and response bias). Some respondents had a tendency to use more of the scale than others when they rated the quality of response options. These rating styles produced artificially larger distance scores (less expert-like ratings). For example, with an expert mean rating of 8, a respondent who uses a 9 will receive a larger distance score than a respondent who uses an 8. But this may simply reflect the fact that the former uses the entire rating scale (ranging from 1 to 9), while the latter responds more conservatively (ranging from 2 to 8). In order to compensate for artificially larger distances, created simply by differences in rating style, we divided each respondent's overall score on the inventory by the mean standard deviation in their ratings across response options within questions.⁵

Concept Mastery Test.

In addition to the TKML inventories, we administered two other tests to obtain evidence of discriminant validity. The Concept Mastery Test (CMT) is a measure of verbal ability which allowed us to assess the relationship between verbal intelligence and TKML scores and the relative contribution of verbal ability to leadership effectiveness. The test consists of two sections, synonym/antonym problems and analogy problems, and is scored using an answer key. The CMT has been found to correlate highly (.75 to .85) with measures of nonverbal intelligence (Jensen, 1983), and therefore was viewed as a proxy measure of general cognitive ability. Consistent with previous research, we expected scores on the CMT to be uncorrelated or marginally correlated with scores on the TKML, and that score on the TKML would contribute above and beyond scores on the CMT to the prediction of leadership effectiveness.

Tacit Knowledge Inventory for Managers.


We also administered the Tacit Knowledge Inventory for Managers (TKIM), designed to measure the experience-based knowledge of civilian managers, to further explore the

⁵ A z transformation of the raw data before computing distances was deemed a less desirable method of correcting for response biases because, unlike many Likert-type scales, the ratings on our tacit knowledge questions only acquire meaning with respect to the expert responses. The formula used to compute z scores involves subtracting each rating from the mean rating across response options, then dividing by the standard deviation across all responses. Since the mean rating lacks substantive meaning, we chose only to correct for the standard deviation and to do so after the distance scores were computed.


discriminant validity of the tacit knowledge for military leadership construct. Like the TKML, the TKIM consists of scenarios and response options which the respondents rate for quality. A sample question from the TKIM is shown in Figure 3. The TKIM has been validated in earlier research and found to be a significant predictor of managerial success (Wagner, 1987; Sternberg et al., 1993). Responses to the TKIM were scored using an expert profile developed by Wagner (1987). The expert group consisted of 13 executives employed by Fortune 500 companies who were at levels above vice-president. As with the TKML inventories, scores on the TKIM were computed using a distance measure that quantified the degree of agreement between the subject's responses and that of the expert group. These distance scores reflect the squared deviations from the expert mean for each response summed across all response options within a question. The distance scores were then summarized across all questions within the inventory. Consistent with Sternberg's concept of practical intelligence, we assumed some underlying ability to acquire tacit knowledge to be reflected in scores on the TKIM, but we expected that scores on the domain-specific TKML would better predict the leadership effectiveness of Army officers.

Figure 3.

<u>Sample Question from the Tacit Knowledge Inventory for Managers</u>



You have been assigned to revise the policy manual for your division of the company. You have six weeks to complete this assignment. The old policy manual was too vague, resulting in several individuals attending to matters only one need handle, and other important matters receiving the attention of no one. Responsibility for the new policy manual is completely yours. The assignment is somewhat of a "hot-potato" because of the effects of division policy on the importance of particular management positions in the division. You believe that how this assignment turns out could have important positive or negative consequences for your career.



Subject Variables.

In order to assess the generalizability of our findings across types of jobs within the Army, we asked each subject to report his or her unit designation, from which we inferred the subject's branch category as either combat arms, combat support, or combat service support. That is, based on the type of unit to which an officer was assigned (e.g., 3-325 Infantry Battalion), we

estimated post hoc the general branch category in which they served. Table 4 shows the distribution of officers across the three branch categories for each organizational level. In addition to unit designation, we asked each subject to report his or her time in service and time in current position so that we could assess the relationship between job experience and tacit knowledge. We did not collect data on the racial, ethnic, or gender composition of our sample. Earlier research, employing comparable sampling methods and comparable sample sizes, has produced percentages of females and racial minorities which approximate those observed in the U.S. Army officer corp as a whole (Horvath et al., 1996).

Table 4. <u>Distribution of Officers by Branch Category.</u>

	Battalion	Company	Platoon
Combat Arms	55%	65%	73%
Combat Support	30%	22%	16%
Combat Service Support	15%	13%	11%

Leadership Effectiveness Survey.

We developed a Leadership Effectiveness Survey (LES) to measure the criterion of leadership effectiveness. The LES consisted of single-item measures that asked respondents to rate the effectiveness of other officers on a seven-point scale. An example question from the LES is shown in Figure 4. The survey called for separate judgements of effectiveness in the interpersonal and task-oriented domains of leadership as well as an overall assessment of leadership effectiveness. The format for the LES questions was modeled after the normative process used by senior level raters on the Officer Evaluation Report (OER). In addition to rating different dimensions of effectiveness, respondents rated officers at multiple levels based on the suggested 360-degree approach to performance feedback (Tornow, 1993; Church & Bracken, 1997). According to this approach, differences in rater perspectives are viewed as potentially informative rather than simply error variance. In other words, multiple ratings can represent significant and meaningful sources of variation about perceptions of performance (e.g., Salam, Cox, & Sims, 1997).

In order to obtain multiple perspectives of an officer's leadership effectiveness in our study, respondents were asked to rate the effectiveness of their immediate supervisor, their subordinate officers, and peers in their unit.⁶ By administering the LES to intact chains-of-command, we also obtained multiple ratings of effectiveness from each perspective, with the

⁶ At some levels, a less than complete 360-degree profile was obtained because raters were unavailable, for various reasons, to assess the ratee. Specifically, we did not obtain ratings from the subordinates of platoon leaders or the peers of battalion commanders.

exception of supervisors since each officer only has one immediate supervisor. For those cases in which multiple ratings were obtained (e.g., subordinates, peers), a mean rating was computed for each of the effectiveness dimensions (overall, task, and interpersonal). For the data analysis, ratings on the LES were reverse coded so that higher ratings corresponded to greater perceived effectiveness.

Figure 4.			
Sample Question from	the Leadership	Effectiveness	Survey.

 	 _

Rate your Battalion Commander:

Think about your battalion commander. Compared to all other battalion commanders you have known, how effective is your battalion commander, overall, as a leader? Please circle the number under the statement that best corresponds to your rating.

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
The Best	One of the Best	Better than Most	As Good as Most	Not Quite as Good as Most but still gets the job done	Well Below Most	The Worst

Data Collection Procedures

We obtained access to battalions under the auspices of the U.S. Army Research Institute and visited each during its "umbrella weeks" -- periods when the units were not deployed on training exercises and were available to participate in research efforts. Selection of units for participation was made by division, corp, or brigade staff. Scheduling and pre-shipment of surveys was coordinated by a point-of-contact at each post. At the appointed time, the entire available officer chain-of-command for each battalion (approximately 25-30 officers) met at a central location, usually in their battalion conference room, where they completed the test battery including the TKML, TKIM, CMT, and the LES as described above.

Data-collection sessions began with an introductory briefing by the visiting researchers. Subjects were introduced to the study as follows:

We're here as part of a joint Yale/USMA research project under contract to the Army Research Institute. They've asked us to examine the role of informal or "tacit" knowledge in Army leadership. Tacit knowledge is practical knowledge, grounded in personal experience, that is not explicitly taught and is often difficult to articulate. The

goal of this research is to improve the process of leader development through job assignment by understanding the hidden or tacit knowledge that makes leaders effective.

Today we are going to ask you to fill out some questionnaires. Some of these will draw on your knowledge of Army leadership and some will draw on more general knowledge. We are also going to ask you for some ratings of the people you work with. Some of this you may find difficult, but we are going to strictly protect your anonymity and confidentiality, as I'll describe in a moment, so we hope that you will answer candidly.

All of the data we collect today will help us to answer the questions that the Army has asked us to answer—basically about the relationship between informal knowledge, experience, effectiveness, and other variables. We need your best effort here today—your most thoughtful and candid judgments—in order to ensure that the Army gets its money's worth out of this research.

Subjects were assured of the absolute confidentiality of their responses and their informed consent was obtained. Subjects, working at their own pace, then completed the instruments in the test battery. Each session ended when all officers in the battalion had completed the test battery, typically after three to four hours. Completed surveys were inventoried, coded to preserve the subjects' anonymity and to facilitate later analysis, and shipped to Yale University.

Data Analytic Procedures

Since there were three different versions of the TKML, one for each level under study, we analyzed the data separately by level. The same procedures were followed at each level of analysis: platoon, company, and battalion.

The first step at each level was to examine the psychometric properties of the TKML instrument. The reliability of the TKML was assessed using coefficient alpha, an index of the internal consistency of the questions composing the inventory. We examined item-total correlations (correlations between individual questions and the entire inventory) and inter-item correlations (correlations among individual questions) to identify any questions that did not conform to the inventory as a whole. Questions that exhibited a low correlation with the overall inventory and either nonsignificant or negative correlations with a majority of questions were examined more closely and considered for removal before computing an overall score for the TKML.

The next step was to examine the intercorrelations among the dimensions of the LES (overall, task, interpersonal) for each type of rater (subordinate, peer, superior). The degree of association within raters and within dimensions was examined using a multimethod-multitrait (MTMM) analysis (Campbell & Fiske, 1959). A MTMM analysis is typically used to provide evidence of convergent and discriminant validity. Ratings of the same trait (e.g., leadership dimension) are expected to correlate more highly (converge) using different methods (e.g., raters) than ratings across traits using a single method. In our study, we obtained ratings from multiple perspectives based on the assumption that different raters would have different perceptions of leadership effectiveness. Therefore, we expected the correlations to be lower

across raters for the same leadership dimensions than across dimensions for a single rater perspective. Within each rater perspective, we also examined the correlations between task, interpersonal, and overall ratings for evidence that these aspects of leadership effectiveness represented distinct constructs.

After examining properties of the TKML and LES, we computed the intercorrelations among the predictor variables--TKML, TKIM, the two CMT subtests, and time-in-job. These intercorrelations were examined to assess the discriminant validity of the TKML. That is, to what extent is the TKML related to other potential predictors of leadership effectiveness. Then we examined the correlations between the predictor variables and ratings on the LES. This allowed us to compare the association between scores on the TKML and LES ratings relative to the other variables we measured. Finally, based on the results of the correlational analyses, hierarchical regression analyses were performed to test the incremental validity of the TKML over the CMT and the TKIM.

Results

The objective of this study was to provide preliminary evidence of the construct validity of the Tacit Knowledge Inventory for Military Leaders (TKML). We had two main hypotheses: (1) our measure of tacit knowledge for military leadership would predict leadership effectiveness, and (2) tacit knowledge for military leadership would contribute to the prediction of effectiveness beyond a traditional measure of intellectual ability. Since the TKML instruments were developed uniquely for each level, the results are presented separately for platoon, company, and battalion.

Platoon Leaders

The Tacit Knowledge for Military Leaders inventory.

The TKML for platoon leaders initially consisted of 16 questions (Appendix A). The reliability of the overall TKML, measured by coefficient alpha, was .68. The final versions of comparable instruments are generally considered to have good reliability if their coefficient alphas are .80 or higher. Therefore, since this is the initial version of the TKML, we felt that the reliability obtained was quite promising in regards to the internal consistency of our instrument. An examination of the item-total and inter-item correlations confirmed that the questions generally measured the same construct--most questions correlated significantly with one another. There was one question (P1) that exhibited a low correlation with the overall inventory. An examination of the content of this question suggested that it may have been too narrow in focus (referring to chemical platoon leaders). Therefore, this question was removed before computing a summary score for the overall inventory. The final inventory contained 15 questions and had a reliability of .69.

Ratings of leadership effectiveness.

Ratings of leadership effectiveness for platoon leaders were obtained from peers and superiors on the three dimensions of effectiveness (overall, interpersonal, task). We did not obtain ratings from subordinates (platoon sergeants and squad leaders) because mission requirements precluded gathering data from noncommissioned officers in each battalion. On average, platoon leaders were rated by one supervisor and two peers (Table 5). The pattern of intercorrelations among all six effectiveness ratings (3 dimensions X 2 rater perspectives) were examined using the multitrait-multimethod (MTMM) approach described above. As shown in Table 6, we obtained the expected pattern of correlations. The intercorrelations across rater perspectives for the same dimension (shown in bold) are lower than the intercorrelations across leadership dimensions for a single rater perspective (shown in italics). The correlation between peer and superior ratings was .39 for overall effectiveness, .26 for interpersonal effectiveness, and .34 for task effectiveness. The average intercorrelation among peer ratings was .73 and for superiors it was .80. Within raters, the correlations between task and interpersonal ratings were generally lower (.64 for peers and .75 for superiors), suggesting that these are related but potentially distinct constructs. These results suggest that peers and superiors rate effectiveness differently, leading us to include all six effectiveness ratings in subsequent analyses.

Table 5.

Mean Number of Raters per Platoon Leader.

Dimension	Peer	Superiors
Overall	2	1
Interpersonal	2	1
Task	2	1

Table 6. <u>Intercorrelations Among Effectiveness Ratings for Platoon Leaders.</u>

					Peer (n=385)			Superior (n=277)			
		M	SD	Over	Interp	Task	Over	Interp	Task		
	Over	3.25	.86			· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·					
Peer	Interp	3.44	.89	.71							
	Task	3.17	.87	.84	.64						
	Over	3.05	1.20	.39	.33	.38			٠		
Superior	Interp	3.16	1.17	.31	.26	.30	.79				
_	Task	3.05	1.19	.33	.25	.34	.85	.75			

Note: All correlations are significant with p < .05.

Discriminant validity of the TKML for platoon leaders.

Table 7 presents the means, standard deviations, and intercorrelations for the TKML, the TKIM, the CMT subscale scores, 7 and job experience. Scores on the TKML correlated significantly with the TKIM and the CMT-Analogy scores. Specifically, tacit knowledge for military leadership was associated with greater tacit knowledge for managers (r = .36, p < .01) and greater verbal ability (r = -.18, p < .01). Experience, as measured by months in current job, did not correlate significantly with tacit knowledge for military leadership. As noted earlier, it is not the amount of experience one has, but what one learns from that experience that counts. Therefore, the absence of a correlation between experience and TKML does not necessarily challenge the underlying assumptions of tacit knowledge acquisition. The moderate correlation between tacit knowledge for military leadership and tacit knowledge for managers is consistent with Sternberg's conception of an underlying ability to acquire tacit knowledge. The finding of a relationship between tacit knowledge for military leadership and verbal ability differs from previous work on tacit knowledge. However, this result is consistent with an extensive body of research that reveals a moderate association between intelligence and leadership (correlation coefficients averaging approximately .28) (Bass, 1981, p. 50). The more important question in this study is how these variables contribute to our understanding of leadership effectiveness.

Table 7.

<u>Means, Standard Deviations, and Intercorrelations Among Predictor Variables for Platoon</u>
Leaders.

	n	M	SD	1	2	3	4	5
1. TKML ^a	353	156.44	51.71					
2. TKIM ^a	348	148.50	56.64	.36**				
3. CMT-Analogy	346	35.11	8.81	18**	16**			
4. CMT-Synonym	344	43.80	20.07	02	03	.41**		
5. Months in Job	344	7.20	5.83	.02	02	06	.00	

^{*} p < .05 ** p < .01

^a A smaller value on the TKML and TKIM reflects greater tacit knowledge.

⁷ Although there are no known norms for the CMT, the means and standard deviations are comparable to those found by Hocevar (1980) using an undergraduate sample. For the Analogy portion he obtained a mean of 40.76 and a standard deviation of 9.72. For the Synonym portion the mean was 39.65 and the standard deviation was 19.12.

⁸ A negative correlation reflects the fact that lower scores on the TKML correspond to greater tacit knowledge (smaller distances between respondent and experts), while higher score on the CMT correspond to greater verbal ability.

Predictive validity of the TKML for platoon leaders.

Table 8 shows the zero-order correlations between the predictor variables and ratings of leadership effectiveness. Scores on the TKML correlated significantly with overall, interpersonal, and task effectiveness as rated by superiors (r = -.14, -.20, and -.14 respectively, p < .05). These findings suggest that tacit knowledge is associated with leadership effectiveness as perceived by superiors. Verbal ability exhibited a significant relationship only with ratings of task-oriented leadership by superiors (r = .16, p < .01 for the analogy test). Neither tacit knowledge for managers or experience related to perceived effectiveness. Again, this reinforces our claim that more experience does not insure that one will become an effective leader.

Table 8.

Correlations Between Predictor Variables and Effectiveness Ratings for Platoon Leaders.

		Peer		Superior				
	Overall	Interp	Task	Overall	Interp	Task		
TKML ^a	08	03	03	14*	20**	14*		
	(286)	(285)	(284)	(278)	(279)	(275)		
TKIM ^a	09	.00	07	.06	03	.02		
	(282)	(281)	(280)	(274)	(275)	(271)		
CMT-Analogy	05	06	02	.10	.09	.16**		
	(279)	(278)	(277)	(272)	(273)	(269)		
CMT-Synonym	.04	.12	.05	.04	.03	.05		
	(278)	(277)	(276)	(270)	(271)	(267)		
Months in Job	.03	.01	.03	.05	.07	.06		
	(276)	(275)	(274)	(270)	(272)	(267)		

^{*} p < .05 ** p < .01

Note: Sample sizes are indicated in parentheses.

For those zero-order correlations between TKML and LES that were significant, a more rigorous test was performed to assess the predictive validity of the TKML for platoon leaders and examine its contribution to the understanding of leadership effectiveness above measures of verbal ability and tacit knowledge for managers. Hierarchical regression analysis was used to test the incremental validity of the TKML above the CMT and TKIM scores in predicting leadership effectiveness. In the regression, scores on the CMT subtests and the TKIM were entered in the first step and scores on the TKML entered in the second. A significant change in R^2 in the second step indicates that leadership effectiveness can be explained by the TKML beyond verbal ability and tacit knowledge for managers. Table 9 presents values for the multiple R, R^2 , and regression coefficients for each of the variables in the regression. A significant change in the R^2 is indicated by an asterisk in the second column. For all three effectiveness ratings made by superiors, tacit knowledge for military leadership provided a significant

^a A smaller value on the TKML and TKIM reflects greater tacit knowledge.

increment in prediction above CMT and TKIM scores. The multiple Rs for the entire model were .19, .20, and .19 for overall, interpersonal, and task effectiveness respectively.

Table 9. Incremental Validity of the TKML on Ratings of Platoon Leaders' Effectiveness by Superiors.

,	Overall (n=270)			Ir	nterperso (n=271		Task (n=267)		
Step 1.CMT-Analogy	R	R^2	b .10	R	\mathbb{R}^2	b .08	R	R^2	b .18*
CMT-Synonym			.00			.00			.01
TKIM ^a	.13	.02	.13*	.10	.01	.06	.18*	.03*	.10
2. TKML ^a	.19*	.04*	15*	.21*	.05**	19*	.21*	.05*	12*

^{*} p < .05 ** p < .01

Additional analyses were conducted to determine if the TKML for platoon leaders represented multiple dimensions of tacit knowledge. In developing the tacit knowledge inventories, efforts were made to capture a representative sample of the tacit knowledge domain identified in our earlier studies. This earlier work also suggested possible categories of tacit knowledge. In order to investigate more fully the structure of the TKML inventory, we explored the possibility of developing subscales and testing their predictive potential. An initial examination of the intercorrelations among individual questions in the TKML for platoon leaders did not suggest different patterns of correlations among questions. This was confirmed by a principal components factor analysis of the TKML. A single factor solution was determined to best represent the data based on an analysis of the scree plot and the factor solution. An examination of the factor pattern matrix for alternative solutions did not reveal any readily interpretable factors. Therefore, we concluded that the overall measure of tacit knowledge for platoon leaders best represented the data.

Finally, we explored differences in the predictive validity of the TKML across branch categories. As discussed earlier, branches of service were categorized as either combat arms, combat support, or combat service support. Moderated regression analyses revealed no significant differences in the relationship between tacit knowledge and leadership effectiveness across branch categories. Since the majority of platoon leaders were categorized as combat arms officers (73%), the relatively smaller representation of combat support and combat service support officers may have limited our ability to detect branch differences.

To summarize, at the platoon level there is evidence that tacit knowledge for military leadership is relevant to interpersonal, task, and overall effectiveness as seen by superiors. The results also suggest that our measure of tacit knowledge predicts the effectiveness of platoon leaders beyond a traditional measure of verbal ability and a measures of tacit knowledge for managers.

^aA smaller value on the TKML and TKIM reflects greater tacit knowledge.

Company Commanders

The Tacit Knowledge for Military Leaders Inventory.

The initial TKML for company commanders consisted of twenty questions (see Appendix B). The reliability of the overall TKML for company commanders, measured by coefficient alpha, was .75, suggesting that the questions in the TKML inventory measured tacit knowledge with reasonable consistency. An examination of the item-total and inter-item correlations revealed two questions (C4 and C5) that exhibited low correlations with the overall inventory and generally correlated poorly with the other inventory questions. A closer examination of question C4 revealed that it only consisted of four response options and may not have adequately tapped differences in tacit knowledge. An examination of question C5 suggested that the knowledge it represented may have been widely held among officers, and may not have reflected knowledge that was truly tacit. Therefore, these questions were removed before computing an overall score on the inventory. The final version of the TKML used in subsequent analyses consisted of 18 questions with a reliability of .76.

Ratings of leadership effectiveness.

Ratings of leadership effectiveness for company commanders were obtained from peers, superiors, and subordinates on three dimensions of leadership (task, interpersonal, overall). On average, company commanders were rated by two subordinates, three peers, and one superior (Table 10). The MTMM matrix of the intercorrelations among all nine effectiveness ratings (3 dimensions X 3 rater perspectives) is presented in Table 11. As with platoon leaders, the intercorrelations across rater perspectives for the same dimension (shown in bold) are lower than the intercorrelations across leadership dimensions for a single rater perspective (shown in italics). The average intercorrelation across rater perspectives was .28 for overall effectiveness, .32 for interpersonal effectiveness, and .28 for task effectiveness. The average intercorrelation among dimensions was .81 for subordinate ratings, .71 for peer ratings, and .73 for subordinate ratings. Within raters, the correlations between task and interpersonal ratings were generally lower, ranging from .64 to .77. These results suggests that peers, superiors, and subordinates perceive effectiveness differently. Furthermore, raters appear to make distinctions between ratings of task and interpersonal effectiveness. Therefore, we included all nine ratings of leadership effectiveness in subsequent analyses.

Table 10.

Mean Number of Raters per Company Commander.

Dimension	Subordinates	Peer	Superiors
Overall	2	3	1
Interpersonal	2	3	1
Task	2	3	1

Table 11.

Intercorrelations Among Ratings of Leadership Effectiveness for Company Commanders.

Note: All correlations above .20 are significant at $p < .05$.	T	Superior Ir	0	H	Peer In	0	H	Subordinate In	0			
lations	ask	iterp	ver	Task	iterp	ver	Task	ıterp	ver			
above.	2.86	3.12	2.94	3.09	3.33	3.17	3.08	3.32	3.19	Z		
.20 are sig	1.32	1.19	1.23	.73	.85	.73	1.22	1.37	1.25	SD		
nificant a	.16	.37	.26	.27	.32	.35	.85	.86	1	Over		50
at p < .05	.09	.39	.25	.19	.31	.30	.77	i i		Interp	(n=140)	Subordinate
		.31	.27	.33	.27	.35	ł			Task		le
	.25	.26	.25	.77	.79	!				Over		
	.24	.31	.23	.64	1					Interp	(n=157)	Peer
	.34	.22	.29	1						Task		
•	.83	.79	1							Over	(n=115)	
	.67	1								Interp	(n=115)	Superio
	!									Task	_	r

Discriminant validity of the TKML for company commanders.

Table 12 presents the means, standard deviations, and intercorrelations among the TKML, the TKIM, the CMT scores, and job experience for company commanders. As with the platoon leaders, scores on the TKML correlated significantly with the TKIM and the CMT-Analogy subtest. Specifically, tacit knowledge for military leadership was associated with greater tacit knowledge about managing (r = .32, p < .01) and greater verbal ability (r = -.25, p < .01). Again, experience, as measured by months in current job, did not correlate significantly with tacit knowledge for military leadership.

Table 12.

<u>Means, Standard Deviations, and Intercorrelations Among Predictor Variables for Company</u>

Commanders.

	n	M	SD	1	2	3	4	5
1. TKML ^a	163	132.19	48.39					
2. TKIM ^a	159	138.71	52.45	.32**				
3. CMT-Analogy	157	37.19	9.02	25**	17*			
4. CMT-Synonym	156	47.69	20.67	13	14	.61**		
5. Months in Job	154	8.80	5.55	.08	02	.00	03	

^{*} p < .05 ** p < .01

Predictive validity of the TKML for company commanders.

Table 13 presents the zero-order correlations between the predictor variables and all nine ratings of leadership effectiveness. Scores on the TKML correlated significantly with overall and task effectiveness as rated by peers (r = -.19 and -.20 respectively, p < .05). Scores on the CMT subtests correlated significantly with subordinate ratings of effectiveness on all three dimensions and with peer ratings of overall and interpersonal effectiveness. In all cases, the direction of these correlations indicated that greater verbal ability was associated with lower ratings of effectiveness. Neither tacit knowledge for managers nor experience correlated significantly with any of the effectiveness ratings. The finding that higher scores on the CMT were associated with lower effectiveness ratings suggests that tacit knowledge for military leadership is more relevant to effective leadership than verbal ability.

^a A smaller value on the TKML and TKIM reflects greater tacit knowledge.

Correlations Between Predictor Variables and Effectiveness Ratings for Company Commanders. Table 13.

	S	ubordinate			Peer			Superior	
	Overall	Interp	Task	Overall	Interp	Task	Overall	Interp	Task
TKML	02	04	80	*61	11	20*	11	01	03
	(140)	(140)	(140)	(157)	(157)	(157)	(115)	(115)	(115)
TKIMª	.11	.12	80.	.05	.04	.04	.13	.15	60:
	(137)	(137)	(137)	(154)	(154)	(154)	(112)	(112)	(112)
CMT-Analogies	18*	16	12	18*	20*	05	.00	.01	04
	(136)	(136)	(136)	(153)	(153)	(153)	(112)	(112)	(112)
CMT-Synonyms	22**	21*	17*	14	12	07	.07	90:	00.
	(135)	(135)	(135)	(152)	(152)	(152)	(111)	(111)	~ (111)
Months in Job	13	07	90	08	07	.03	07	90.	90
	(136)	(136)	(136)	(151)	(151)	(151)	(114)	(114)	(114)

* p < .05 ** p < .01 and TKIM reflects greater tacit knowledge. A smaller value on the TKML and TKIM reflects greater tacit knowledge.

Note: Sample sizes are indicated in parentheses.

In order to further assess the contribution of tacit knowledge for military leadership over and above verbal ability and tacit knowledge for managers, hierarchical regression analyses were conducted for peer ratings of effectiveness. Table 14 presents values for the multiple R, R², and regression coefficients for each of the variables in the regression. Again, a significant change in the R² is indicated by an asterisk in the second column. For all three effectiveness ratings by peers, tacit knowledge for military leadership provided a significant increment in prediction over verbal ability and tacit knowledge for managers, even when these variables contributed a significant prediction in the first step of the regression analysis. The multiple Rs for the overall models are .32, .27, and .25 for overall, interpersonal, and task effectiveness respectively.

Table 14.

<u>Incremental Validity of the TKML on Ratings of Company Commanders' Effectiveness by</u>

Peers.

		Overal (n=157		In	terperso (n=157			Task (n=15	
Step 1.CMT-Analogy	R	R^2	b 21*	R	R ²	b 23*	R	\mathbb{R}^2	b 08
CMT-Synonym			02			01			04
TKIM ^a	.20	.04	.13	.21	.04	.05	.09	.01	.13
2. TKML ^a	.32**	.10**	27**	.27*	.07*	19*	.25*	.06*	25**

^{*} p < .05 ** p < .01

Additional analyses were conducted to explore the structure of the TKML for company commanders. The initial examination of the intercorrelations among inventory questions suggested certain patterns of relationships among the questions. That is, higher correlations were observed among some subsets of questions than others. In order to identify possible subscales of the TKML, a principal components factor analysis was performed on the company data. The initial solution confirmed our observations based on the pattern of intercorrelations-the TKML for company commanders appeared to consist of multiple factors. An examination of the scree plot suggested the possibility of either a four or seven factor solution (i.e., we observed breaks in the plot at two points, following four and seven factors). We then rotated the factors using an oblique rotation and examined the factor pattern matrices for these alternative solutions. We determined that the four-factor solution provided a better representation of the data based on the factor loadings and the number of questions loading on each factor. A content analysis of these factors suggested that two of the factors could be labeled conceptually. The first consisted of seven questions that represented tacit knowledge about dealing with the boss ($\alpha = .61$), and the second consisted of five questions that represented tacit knowledge for motivating and developing subordinates ($\alpha = .60$). The remaining two factors consisted of four and two questions respectively and were not labeled. The two interpretable factors were consistent with findings from earlier phases of the project where experts were asked to sort the tacit knowledge according to developmental challenges (Horvath et al., 1994; Forsythe et al., 1995).

^aA smaller value on the TKML and TKIM reflects greater tacit knowledge.

Scores were constructed for these two subscales using the questions that loaded on each factor. The predictive validity of these subscale scores was then examined. Subscale scores representing tacit knowledge about managing the boss correlated significantly with ratings of overall effectiveness by superiors (r = -.17, p < .05) and provided significant incremental prediction beyond verbal ability and tacit knowledge for managers ($\Delta R^2 = .06$, p < .05). The overall model R for superior ratings of overall effectiveness was .28. Subscale scores representing tacit knowledge for motivating and developing subordinates correlated significantly with ratings of task effectiveness by subordinates (r = -.15, p < .05) and provided a significant increment in prediction beyond verbal ability and tacit knowledge for managers ($\Delta R^2 = .03$, p < .05). The overall model R for subordinate ratings of task effectiveness was .25.

Finally, we explored the effects of branch category on the relationship between tacit knowledge and leadership effectiveness. As with the platoon leaders, the majority of company commanders were categorized as combat arms officers (65%). Again, we did not find any significant differences in predictive validity based on branch category.

To summarize, the findings at the company level suggest that tacit knowledge for military leadership is associated with how peers view the effectiveness of their fellow company commanders. Furthermore, questions that tap into tacit knowledge about relationships with the boss are those that predict ratings of overall effectiveness by superiors. Questions that deal with motivating and developing subordinate relationships are the ones that predict judgments by subordinates of the task-oriented effectiveness of their company commanders. These results also suggest that tacit knowledge for military leadership predicts the effectiveness of company commanders above a traditional measure of verbal ability and a measure of tacit knowledge for managers.

Battalion Commanders

The Tacit Knowledge for Military Leaders inventory.

The initial TKML for battalion commanders consisted of 16 questions (see Appendix C). The reliability of the overall TKML, measured by coefficient alpha, was .59. The lower reliability of the battalion inventory relative to the platoon and company inventories may be attributable to the size of the battalion sample. This index is only based on the 31 battalion commanders for which we obtained TKML data. However, as with the platoon and company data, we also examined the item-total and inter-item correlations to identify questions that potentially contributed to the lower reliability. Five questions were identified that correlated poorly with the overall inventory and did not correlate with the majority of other questions. An examination of these questions offered some indication as to why they may have exhibited such low correlations with the rest of the inventory. Two questions (B1 and B16) were deemed to represent knowledge that was widely recognized and thus did not adequately fit our definition as being tacit. For two other questions (B4 and B12) it was determined that the questions may not have clearly defined the problem and that respondents may have misinterpreted the question. The remaining question (B15) was considered to be too narrow in focus (referring to military intelligence). After closer examination of these questions, we decided to remove them from the

inventory before computing an overall score. The final inventory containing 11 questions had a reliability of .66.

Ratings of leadership effectiveness.

Ratings of leadership effectiveness for battalion commanders were obtained from superiors and subordinates on the three dimensions of leadership (task, interpersonal, overall). Peer ratings would have been difficult to obtain and of less value because battalion commanders have much less contact with one another on a daily basis. On average, battalion leaders were rated by three subordinates and one superior (Table 15). A MTMM matrix of the intercorrelations among the six effectiveness ratings (3 dimensions X 2 rater perspectives) is presented in Table 16. Once again, the intercorrelations across rater perspectives for the same dimension (shown in bold) are lower than the intercorrelations across leadership dimensions for a single rater perspective (shown in italics). In fact, none of the correlations between rater perspectives are significant. The intercorrelation between subordinate and superior ratings was .03 for overall effectiveness, .03 for interpersonal effectiveness, and -.15 for task effectiveness. For subordinate ratings, the average intercorrelation between dimensions was .74 and for superior ratings it was .44. Within raters, the correlations between task and interpersonal ratings were .66 for subordinates and .16 for superiors. Clearly, there are differences in how superiors and subordinates view the effectiveness of battalion commanders. These results also suggest that raters distinguish between task and interpersonal dimensions of leadership. Therefore, we included all six ratings of leadership effectiveness in subsequent analyses.

Table 15.

Mean Number of Raters per Battalion Commander.

Dimension	Subordinates	Superiors
Overall	3	1
Interpersonal	3	1
Task	3	1

Table 16.

Intercorrelations Among Ratings of Leadership Effectiveness for Battalion Commanders.

				S	ubordina (n=31)	tes		Superior (n=24)	*
		M	SD	Over	Interp	Task	Over	Interp	Task
	Over	2.97	1.09						
Subordinates	Interp	2.91	1.26	.88*					
	Task	2.81	.85	.85*	.66*				
	Over	2.42	.83	.03	09	09			
Superior	Interp	2.43	.84	07	.03	20	.59*		
•	Task	2.29	.81	21	37	15	.59*	.16	

^{*} p < .05 ** p < .01

Discriminant validity of the TKML for battalion commanders.

Table 17 presents the means, standard deviations, and intercorrelations among the TKML, the TKIM, the CMT scores, and job experience for battalion commanders. Unlike the platoon and company officers, there were no significant correlations between the TKML and any other predictor variable. A significant correlation was found between months in job and scores on the CMT-Synonym subtest indicating that more experience was associated with lower scores on the CMT (r = -.48, p < 05).

Table 17.

<u>Means, Standard Deviations, and Intercorrelations Among Predictor Variables for Battalion Commanders.</u>

	n	M	SD	1	2	3	4	5
1. TKML ^a	31	72.12	20.78					
2. TKIM ^a	31	137.31	42.92	06				
3. CMT-Analogy	30	37.17	9.93	19	08			
4. CMT-Synonym	30	36.63	21.72	.02	25	.67*		
5. Months in Job	22	15.36	5.77	19	02	13	48*	

^{*} p < .05 ** p < .01

Predictive validity of the TKML for battalion commanders.

Table 18 presents the zero-order correlations between the predictor variables and the six ratings of leadership effectiveness. Scores on the TKML correlated significantly with ratings of overall effectiveness by superiors (r = -.42, p < .05). Scores on the TKIM related significantly to ratings of task effectiveness by subordinates (r = -.36, p < .05). There were no significant relationships between scores on the CMT scales or experience and any of the effectiveness ratings.

^a A smaller value on the TKML and TKIM reflects greater tacit knowledge.

Table 18.

<u>Correlations Between Predictor Variables and Effectiveness Ratings for Battalion Commanders.</u>

	S	ubordinat	e		Superior	
	Overal 1	Interp	Task	Overal 1	Interp	Task
TKML	.02	.15	.02	42*	13	19
	(31)	(31)	(31)	(24)	(24)	(24)
TKIM	24	23	36*	.07	.03	03
	(31)	(31)	(31)	(24)	(24)	(24)
CMT-Analogy	.20	.26	.05	.18	.27	04
	(30)	(30)	(30)	(23)	(23)	(23)
CMT-Synonym	.19	.31	.08	.07	.30	22
	(30)	(30)	(30)	(23)	(23)	(23)
Months in Job	.23	.18	.13	32	17	07
	(22)	(22)	(22)	(17)	(17)	(17)

^{*} p < .05 ** p < .01

Note: Sample sizes are indicated in parentheses.

The limited sample size for the battalion commanders precluded us from testing the incremental validity of the TKML using hierachical regression analysis. However, the pattern of correlations suggests that the TKML should predict leadership effectiveness better than the CMT in view of the fact that the CMT was not significantly related to any of the effectiveness ratings. Although these results are preliminary and tentative based on the sample size, they do suggest that tacit knowledge for military leadership is associated with how superior officers view the overall effectiveness of battalion commanders. Furthermore, from the subordinate's perspective, task-oriented leadership effectiveness appears to be more associated with tacit knowledge for management than-tacit knowledge for leadership. This finding may be explained post hoc by considering the battalion commander's role. Both Army doctrine and our previous research suggest that a major challenge for battalion commanders is in fact managing a complex system.

Summary of Results

Across the three levels of analysis we obtained some consistent results and some findings that were unique to particular levels. At all three levels, we found that some aspect of tacit knowledge for military leadership was associated with perceptions of leadership effectiveness by superiors. In particular, the dimension of overall leadership effectiveness was most consistently predicted by tacit knowledge for military leadership across the three levels. Since the method for evaluating performance in the Army relies heavily on ratings by superiors, this finding speaks directly to the importance of tacit knowledge in leadership effectiveness. Furthermore, we consistently found that tacit knowledge for military leadership predicted superior ratings of

^aA smaller value on the TKML and TKIM reflects greater tacit knowledge.

effectiveness beyond alternative measures such as verbal ability and tacit knowledge for managers.

In terms of differences that emerged across levels, the primary one was the multiple dimensions of tacit knowledge represented in the company commander inventory. This led to findings that certain aspects of tacit knowledge were more associated with perceptions of leadership effectiveness than others. In particular, we identified different tacit knowledge about dealing with superiors and about dealing with subordinates. These aspects of tacit knowledge corresponded to ratings of effectiveness by superiors and subordinates respectively. The reason why similar dimensions of tacit knowledge did not emerge at the platoon level may reflect differences in the amount of role differentiation at each level. At the battalion level the sample size was insufficient to explore the dimensionality of the tacit knowledge inventory.

The company level was also unique in that tacit knowledge for military leadership related to effectiveness ratings for all three of the perspectives obtained. Again, this may reflect the specific nature of the company commander role or the opportunity for raters to observe the performance of company commanders. Alternatively, company commanders may have more experience assessing the leadership of fellow officers, which may explain why peer ratings related to tacit knowledge scores at the company but not the platoon level. At the battalion level, we found that subordinate ratings were associated with tacit knowledge for managers, indicating possibly unique requirements associated with the role of battalion commanders.

Overall, the results offer preliminary evidence at all three levels that tacit knowledge for military leadership is related to perceived effectiveness. Furthermore, they provide us with some insight as to the developmental challenges and unique nature of the leadership role at three levels in the Army. In the final section of this report, we discuss these findings further and offer some general suggestions regarding potential applications to leadership development.

Discussion

We set out in this study to address two primary questions: (1) Can tacit knowledge be reliably measured? and (2) Does the possession of tacit knowledge make a difference in the leadership effectiveness of Army officers? The results of our preliminary effort to validate the construct of tacit knowledge for military leadership suggest affirmative answers to both these questions. The reliability of the initial versions of our TKML inventories appear to be very promising. At all three organizational levels, there was a reasonable level of internal consistency among the questions that composed the tacit knowledge inventories. Through further refinements of these inventories we expect that the reliability of our measures will increase.

With regards to the question of whether tacit knowledge makes a difference, we found evidence at each of the three levels that it does. For platoon, company, and battalion officers, our measure of tacit knowledge for military leadership predicted ratings of leadership effectiveness as viewed from one or more perspectives. For every case in which the TKML was significantly related to effectiveness ratings, it also predicted leadership effectiveness above and beyond measures of verbal ability and tacit knowledge for managers.

In addition to confirming our hypotheses, the findings provided insights about the nature of tacit knowledge for military leadership at each organizational level. At all three levels, our TKML inventories were predictive of effectiveness as rated by superiors. For platoon leaders and battalion commanders, the overall score on the TKML predicted how they were perceived by their superiors. For company commanders, scores on the TKML subscale about managing the boss predicted effectiveness as seen by their superiors. The finding that officers who possess tacit knowledge are consistently viewed by their superiors as more effective leaders is not surprising in view of the way we scored the TKML. The expert profile we developed to score the TKML inventories was based on the responses of officers who were highly successful leaders, as reflected in their performance evaluations rendered by their superiors. Therefore, we would expect that respondents who exhibited greater tacit knowledge, (i.e., officers whose responses more closely resembled the experts') would be perceived as more effective by their superiors. Furthermore, these findings suggests that tacit knowledge makes a difference in perceptions of effectiveness that potentially have an important influence on professional success in the Army.

Another insight we obtained is that leaders may be rated differently depending on who is rating their effectiveness. We obtained ratings from multiple perspectives based on the 360-degree approach to performance feedback suggested in the literature (Tornow, 1993; Church & Bracken, 1997) and our expectation that raters would differ in their perceptions of effectiveness. Our results confirmed these expectations. We found that tacit knowledge was not necessarily related to perceived effectiveness for all raters. At the platoon level, peer ratings of effectiveness did not reflect the possession of tacit knowledge although superior ratings did. At the battalion level, scores on the TKML did not predict subordinates' ratings of effectiveness, but instead their ratings reflected the influence of tacit knowledge for managers. We obtained the most complete profile of effectiveness ratings at the company level, which is where we also found the most revealing data about the relationship between tacit knowledge and leadership effectiveness.

At the company level, tacit knowledge for military leadership predicted leadership effectiveness as viewed by peers and subordinates as well as superiors. We also found that different aspects of tacit knowledge may factor into those ratings of effectiveness. Peer ratings reflected the influence of scores on the overall TKML inventory. But subordinate and superior ratings were related to subsets of the TKML questions. Tacit knowledge about motivating and developing subordinates predicted how company commanders were perceived by their subordinates, while tacit knowledge about managing the boss predicted how they were perceived by their superiors. These results are consistent with the way in which we characterized the challenges associated with leadership at the company level (Horvath et al., 1994; Forsythe et al., 1995). The company commander is "caught in the middle," and must learn how to motivate and develop subordinates, cooperate with peers, and simultaneously perform as part of a larger complex organization (a battalion). Officers who possess tacit knowledge at this level are perceived as more effective in the ways that are most relevant to those with whom they interact.

Taken together, our results offer promising evidence regarding the validity of the tacit knowledge for military leadership construct and the instruments we have developed to measure it. Along with the findings from earlier studies in this project, we have identified and reliably

measured a subset of the domain of military leadership expertise that represents tacit knowledge. Possessing this knowledge makes a difference in leadership effectiveness on the job--officers who possess it are perceived as more effective than those who do not.

Tacit Knowledge Theory and Methodology

In addition to supporting the goals of our research project, our work also contributes to the broader tacit knowledge literature. We have expanded the study of tacit knowledge to a new domain, that of military leadership, and in the process made some refinements to our methodology.

The domain of military leadership posed a number of interesting research challenges. First, unlike many other professions, the features of successful leadership in the Army change as one transcends the organizational hierarchy. Our previous work found that the tacit knowledge for leadership varies as a function of the developmental challenges officers face at each level in the chain-of-command. Consequently, we identified and assessed tacit knowledge at three different levels: platoon, company, and battalion.

Second, as with most leadership research, we faced the challenge of selecting a valid criterion for measuring leadership effectiveness. Drawing on recent work in the area of performance appraisal, we obtained ratings of perceived effectiveness from multiple, independent sources. Our findings support the use of a 360-degree approach to measuring performance and are consistent with other research that has found notions of leadership effectiveness to depend on the point of view of the rater (Salam et al., 1997). Using these ratings, we established a relationship between tacit knowledge and leadership effectiveness, and thus provided preliminary evidence of construct validity. Future research might consider additional criteria for assessing leadership effectiveness such as organizational performance or officer career success and attempt to obtain more complete rating profiles at each organizational level.

Methodologically, this study represents a more rigorous test of the tacit knowledge framework than previous work. We used independent samples to identify the tacit knowledge, validate the content, build the expert profiles, and validate the TKML instruments. Unlike much of the previous research by Sternberg and colleagues, we did find a relationship between tacit knowledge and our measure of verbal intelligence at two of the three levels of analysis. As discussed earlier, this finding is consistent with research on the relationship between intelligence and leadership (Bass, 1981). Even with a more rigorous methodology, and the finding of a relationship between tacit knowledge and verbal intelligence, we still found that tacit knowledge predicted leadership effectiveness above and beyond verbal intelligence.

Limitations and Recommendations

Although our findings present preliminary yet convincing evidence for the validity of the tacit knowledge construct in the domain of military leadership, this study has limitations that should be addressed in subsequent research. First, the TKML instruments should be refined in light of our findings to improve internal consistency reliability. We briefly characterized some

of the problems we identified when examining questions that did not adequately "fit" with the overall inventories. Some of these questions might be removed from the instrument while others may be revised to better fit with the inventory. Second, in order to test the predictive validity of the TKML for battalion commanders we would need to obtain a larger sample. Many of the questions we were interested in could not be adequately addressed with a sample size of 31 officers. Third, since this was the first attempt to validate the construct of tacit knowledge for military leadership, additional research should be conducted to confirm these results. Subsequent studies might also include other relevant variables, such as measures of formal knowledge about military leadership (to test the relative contribution of formal versus tacit knowledge) and additional criterion variables. Finally, one could explore the 360-degree rating process further by examining the relationship between one's score on the TKML and how one judges the leadership effectiveness of other officers.

Implications for Leadership Development

Our research has identified tacit knowledge that appears to make a difference in the leadership effectiveness of military officers. These findings suggest that efforts to support the acquisition of tacit knowledge would be valuable to leadership development. These efforts might include compiling the tacit knowledge we have elicited and using it to develop materials for case-based teaching or self-guided learning. We also gained a number of insights about the key developmental challenges at each organizational level which can be used to guide subordinates through their experiences to insure that they acquire the relevant tacit knowledge. The differences we observed by obtaining effectiveness ratings from multiple perspectives suggest that officers might need to consider that their actions are not necessarily viewed similarly by all their constituents. More in-depth examinations of the data might reveal how the different perspectives characterize leadership effectiveness. There were cases in which individual tacit knowledge questions exhibited the opposite relationship with the criterion suggesting that those who responded more like the experts were actually viewed as less effective. These questions could be explored further in case-based instruction to better understand the influence of one's behaviors on officer's perceptions at different levels. These findings also have implications for inventory development in that respondents may be asked to answer questions with certain perspectives in mind. Finally, the tacit knowledge methodology can be applied to understanding other aspects of military expertise such as tactical decision making. Tacit knowledge may be even more relevant to effectiveness in jobs which are characterized by greater uncertainty, complexity, and volatility.

As the Army faces a future operating environment characterized by increasing uncertainty and complexity, and as information continues to expand while the learning cycle contracts, it will become increasingly difficult to capture the lessons of experience in codified doctrine. Formalized instruction will no longer be an efficient nor effective way of sharing knowledge. The challenge is to help officers learn more rapidly and effectively from their experiences. Under these conditions, knowledge that we have characterized as tacit will likely become increasingly important to effective performance in all aspects of military service.

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Appendix
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Unit Code:	
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
Tacit Knowledge for Military Leadership Project

PLATOON LEADER QUESTIONNAIRE

INSTRUCTIONS AND OVERVIEW OF TASK

The Tacit Knowledge for Military Leadership Project seeks to identify the practical, action-oriented knowledge that Army leaders acquire on the job. By uncovering these lessons of experience, we hope to be able to teach officers these lessons and enhance leadership development. To help us identify how military leaders solve problems on the job, the members of the research team developed this survey.

This survey consists of descriptions of typical situations encountered by military leaders. After each situation, there are several options for how to handle the situation. For each option listed, your task is to rate the quality of the option on the following 1-to-9 scale:



Select the number corresponding to your answer, and write it in the blank preceding the option. Remember that some or all of the options listed for a particular question may be good, some or all of the options may be bad, or some or all of the options may be neutral (neither bad nor good). There is no one "right answer," and in fact there may be no "right answers." The options are simply things an officer at this level might do in the situation described. Please rate each individual option for its quality in achieving the goal or solving the problem described in the question. Do not try to "spread out your ratings" just for the sake of doing so--if you think all of the options are good, bad, or whatever, rate them accordingly. DO NOT BE CONCERNED if the numbers are all 9s, all 5s, all 1s, one 9 and the rest 1s, or any other mix. Your answers should reflect your opinions about the quality of the options.

Research on leadership would not be possible without your generous assistance. Thank you for your help!

Privacy Act of 1974:

- a. Principal Purpose--The data collected from this survey will be used for research only.
- b. <u>This Survey is Confidential</u>—Only persons involved in collecting or preparing information for analysis will have access to completed surveys. Reports generated from results of this survey will be based on responses from groups of participants. Individuals or units will not be identified in any report.
- c. <u>Participation is Voluntary but Needed</u>--Your participation in this survey is important for the success of this project and will contribute to furthering the Army's understanding of leadership.

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
Extremely Bad	·	Somewhat Bad	t Ne	either B Nor Goo		Somewha Good	+- t	Extremely Good
P1. You are Your overall asked to prov what they are mission. What	mission ride shov trained	is to conduct wers to soldie to do. You	t Personn ers station	nel Decontained in the re	mination egion. T	. However, y hus, your sol	ou hav diers ar	e instead been e not doing
Demar	nd that s	oldiers regula	arly meet	an even hig	gher-thai	n-usual fitness	test st	andard.
		ge of opportu your soldiers.		r training of	fered by	other units if	this tra	nining would
Cross-	-train yo	our personnel	on Milita	ary Occupat	tional Sp	ecialty (MOS)-relate	ed skills.
Challer	nge and	encourage yo	our soldie	ers to stay p	hysically	/ fit.		
		or their sugge and implement				night relieve t	he mon	otony of the
Speak	to your	commander	about yo	ur worries	and ask	for his or her	advice.	
Conduc	et physic	cal fitness tra	ining on a	a daily basis	S.			
Train	your per	rsonnel on sk	ills from	other branc	hes.			


Explain to your soldiers why they are being utilized in this manner (providing showers).

± 2				+
Extremely Bad	Somewhat Bad	++- Neither Bad Nor Good	Somewhat Good	Extremely Good
move. You assemble the move that same r that your soldiers hav	e your platoon an night. When you we not packed the	he battalion you supported tell everyone to start personne back to inspect the equipment and are talk area. What should you	packing equipment eir movement prep ing to personnel fro	in preparation for aration, you find
Order the solo	liers from other p	platoons to leave the area	a.	·
Take charge of chain of com		et your unit moving, the	n talk to the NCOs	to bring the
Tell the soldi	ers exactly what	you want done and when	n you will return to	reinspect.
Assemble you	ur entire platoon	and tell them that their v	work priorities are	not on target.
	ers of the time ur or the night move	gency and the need to g	et many things don	e quickly in
Use verbal le	adership and com	nmands to influence you	r soldiers.	
Wait and see	if the soldiers do	the task later on their ov	wn.	
Assemble you	ır squad leaders a	and talk about the situati	on.	
Speak to the leader.	soldiers in a frien	ndly manner without emp	phasizing your auth	ority as their
	-	t you will consider using		as an Article 15)

1	2	3	4	5	6 	+	8	9
Extremely Bad		Somewhat Bad	•	either Ba Nor Good	đ	Somewhat Good		Extremely Good

P3. You are a platoon leader, and your unit is training at the National Training Center. Your battery commander makes your howitzer sections dig individual positions every time you stop, even in the offense. The other batteries do not dig in as much as you do. The Observer Controllers (OCs) tell you that your sections dig good positions, but they question why you do this so much in the offense. The battery commander's order is making a big problem for you because your sections are under-strength, and digging in so much burns everyone out and has a bad effect on morale. What should you do?

	Explain your view to the battery commander by talking in terms of Mission-Enemy-
•	Terrain-Troops-and-Time (METT-T) and the effect of the decision on the unit's mission.
	Tell the battery commander that his directive adversely impacts the unit's morale.
	Go to the battery commander alone and ask him why he issued the directive.
	Try to figure out on your own why the battery commander issued the directive and explain it to your soldiers.
	Speak to the company first sergeant for advice and assistance.
	Enlist the support of one or two other platoon leaders and go together to speak to the battery commander.
	Based on the position of your troops, make a decision not to comply with the
	commander's directive on the basis of "mission first," then explain your actions after the fact.
	Get together with the other platoon leaders and agree on a common position, get the support of senior NCOs, and then go as a group and together state your case to the battery commander.



Go to the first sergeant and/or executive officer and ask for suggestions about what to do

Ask the battery commander often what you can do to help and to relieve his task burden.

about the commander's management style.

Assume this is just the way he is and do your best to get along.

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
Extremely Bad	•	Somewhat Bad	Ne	ither Ba Nor Good	đ	Somewhat Good	-+-	Extremely Good

P5. During the live fire attack at the National Training Center, your tank platoon is in an overwatch position, as part of the observation post (OP) plan. You are supposed to wait to be called forward into the attack. From your position, you watch the artillery come in on the enemy positions. The smoke from the artillery obscures the enemy's view. At this point, you should move out--you should call your commanding officer and tell him you are moving while the enemy is blinded. Instead, you wait to be told to move out, as the OP plan called for. Consequently, you move after the smoke lifts, and you lose three tanks, including your own. You are angry with yourself and ashamed; you believe you should have known better. How should you deal with this situation?

 Think about this negative performance feedback from the NTC as a way to identify and repair your weaknesses.
Try to understand other people's roles in the decision, if any.
 During the After Action Review, admit to your soldiers that you made a mistake; take responsibility for what happened.
 Reflect on the decision and determine what you should have done, in order to derive the lessons learned.
 Remind yourself that you will do better on the next mission.
 During the After Action Review, describe your mistake to your subordinate leaders in order to develop and train them.
 Put the decision behind you; try not to dwell on it.
 During the After Action Review, try to explain the reasons for your decision to your soldiers.
Don't let the soldiers get down on themselves because of your decisionbuild up their confidence and encourage them.
 Discuss the issue with your company commander and convince your company commander to allow you the freedom to exercise initiative at certain times, like this one.

1	2	3	4	5	6	7 +	8	9
Extremely Bad		Somewhat Bad	-	Weither Bac Nor Good	_	Somewhat Good		Extremely Good

P6. You are a platoon leader, and one day your driver has a motivational problem while out in the field. He starts mouthing off to you while standing on top of the turret in front of the rest of the platoon. Everyone in the platoon is listening to what he's saying about you, and it is extremely negative and harsh. What should you do?

In front of the platoon, order your driver to do an unpleasant task as puinsubordination.	nishment for his,
Pull him aside and read him his rights: really chew his butt.	
Go to the PSG and tell him to take care of this problem.	
Order your driver to be quiet and get back to his job.	
Pull him aside and tell him to come speak to you in one hour.	
Answer your driver back immediately and defend yourself by arguing you	our position.
Tell your driver you are recommending him for an Article 15.	
Do nothing; walk away and wait for your driver to blow off steam.	
Speak to your company commander about the problem and get his/her	advice.
Speak to another platoon leader and get his/her advice.	
Pull him getde talk to him in private and ask what's wrong	

<u>.</u>		4 5			J	
Extremely Bad	Somewhat Bad	Neither Nor Goo		omewhat Good	Extreme Good	ely
him and stating ye going to change h	commander makes our position as effect his position. Other p that should you	tively as you car platoon leaders a	n, but his mind	l is made up	and he is not	
	st sergeant or execu state your opinions			r your idea	s: Convince one	е
Speak to t	he battalion commar	nder and ask for	advice.			
Tell only y	our NCOs that you	support the batt	ery commande	er's decision	n.	

Tell your platoon that you support the battery commander's decision, and they must

for their help in implementing the decision anyway.

their cooperation in implementing the decision anyway.

out the battery commander's wishes.

opinions and advice on how to handle the situation with the troops.

Tell only your NCOs that you do not support the battery commander's decision, but ask

Tell the NCOs that you do not support the battery commander's decision, and ask for their

Tell your platoon that you do not support the battery commander's decision, but ask for

Formulate the best possible argument that you can in support of the battery commander's decision, and then explain the decision to the platoon while asking for their support.

Go back to the battery commander and tell him/her that because you do not agree with the decision, it will be very hard for you to gain the support of the NCOs and troops to carry


Wait an hour after the meeting, then approach the battery commander with an alternative

implement it.

solution.

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
Extremely Bad	+	Somewhat Bad	. N	Weither Nor G	_	Somewha Good	t	Extremely Good
lengthy comba	at deplo In add	yment. All m lition, you fai	nembers led to g	of the pla graduate fi	atoon are com Rang		but you	turn from a did not serve oncerned about
Do no	t chang	e procedures	that wo	rk.				2
		ers of the plant n help the pla		share the	ir combat	experience: A	sk wha	t they learned
Work l	nard to	get into excel	llent phy	ysical shap	e so that	you excel in P	Γ.	
	ain goo	-	ring by	wearing a	pressed	uniform, shined	l boots.	, and having
Speak	to you	r soldiers with	h a tone	of voice	that conv	eys respect for	them.	
Study		anuals and mi	llitary h	istory in o	rder to g	ain technical an	d tactio	cal
		ers on matters			combat ex	xperience, thus	acknov	wledging that
Tell yo	ur NC	Os about all o	f the stu	adying yo	u have do	ne to increase	your co	mpetence.
Listen	freque	ntly to your s	oldiers;	hear their	views, o	pinions, comm	ents, an	nd suggestions.
	_	nt up front than appropriate			ge and th	e soldiers must	accept	this fact and

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
Extremely Bad	+- -	Somewhat Bad	. N	either E Nor Goo		Somewh Good		Extremely Good
expecting a loeverything. To officers are weether the second control of the second contr	ot of you There is yorking	latoon leader u, and there n a lot of comp as hard as you nage your stre	ever see etition for a are. A	m to be end or key awar	ugh hou ds and p	ers in the day positions in t	to accor he future	mplish
frustr		orthy military nd problems ance.						
Ask a	senior i	military leade	r whom	you respect	for spe	cific advice a	and sugge	estions.
frustr		orthy military nd problems ance.						
Try n	ot to tak	ke problems h	ome from	m work.				
	pted to intil tom	take work ho	me, ask	yourself wh	nether it	is really crit	ical, or w	hether it can
Find a	a trustw	orthy military	person	to talk to w	ho will	give you pos	itive rein	forcement.
Put yo	ur prob	lems in perspe	ective by	reflecting	on peop	le who are w	orse off	then you are.
		elf of your lor between the c						for
Take ι	ıp a hob	by of interest	to you a	and do it ev	en thou	gh you are ti	red.	
		place your ca er in addition			y focus	ing on the m	any aspe	cts of your
	to your s advice	commander a	about yo	ur stress, fr	ustratio	ns, and prob	lems, and	l request



P10. You are an engineer platoon leader training with your soldiers. One squad is given the mission to put in a minefield for the Infantry battalion. You pick the second squad because they are good soldiers, have better equipment, and are better trained to do the job. But the squad is exhausted and the soldiers really complain. They note that it is nearing the end of the exercise and they are very tired. You tell them what you want done and you make the standards clear. When you return to check, the minefield is not up to standard and the squad is sitting around eating. You talk to the squad leader, and point out that the minefield is not up to standard. He tells you in front of the squad that the squad is not interested in your standards and that what they have done is the best you are going to get. What should you do?

 Relieve the squad leader, put a team leader in charge, and provide him with your guidance to complete the task.
 Recognize that the soldiers have reached their limit and tell them you recognize this and will take steps to ensure they are not pushed too far in the future.
 Try to convince the squad leader and soldiers that you will not give them another mission until they have had a chance to rest, but that they must bring the minefield up to standard.
 Assume that the soldiers are overworked and let them off the hook this timedo not make them complete the task.
 Punish the squad leader by recommending him for an Article 15 for mouthing off to you about the soldiers not caring about your standards.
Order the soldiers to stop eating immediately and complete the task, and threaten punishment if they do not comply.
 Say that you recognize they are tired, but tell the soldiers that the task must be completed and ask what assistance you can arrange for to help them get the task done.

-	~	3	-	•	6	•	•	•
Extremely Bad	•	Somewhat Bad	Nei	ther B	ad	Somewhat Good	-+-	Extremely Good

P11. You are a platoon leader, and your battalion requires the company to turn in training schedules six weeks in advance. But the battalion does not give you six weeks notice on requirements. Thus, there are a lot of changes to the training schedule. The battalion tells you six weeks out is too far in the future to assign projects, yet they expect you to plan training six weeks out! The soldiers think that these changes in the schedule jerk them around and sometimes cause morale problems. What should you do?

	Tell your soldiers to stop griping and worrying about the changes in the scheduleremind them that they always prepare their classes the night before anyway.
,	Let the soldiers know the changes to the schedule are not your fault, and that you appreciate their need to be able to plan.
	Buffer the platoon from changes that take place higher up by filtering the information you give them about these changesprovide soldiers with as much stability and predictability as possible.
	Submit all required paperwork to change the schedule to the battalion, but for your own platoon, publish a special calendar that is more short term but is always accurate.
	Tell your platoon to ignore the training schedule, since it changes so much.
	Speak to your company commander about the disruptions caused by the changes in the schedule, and solicit his advice and assistance.
	Let the soldiers know that you agree with them that sometimes it seems that the battalion and company don't know what they are doing.
	Don't publish your own short-term schedule because then soldiers will think with too short-term a focus and won't take the necessary time to prepare for classes, etc.

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9			
Extreme Bad	+- ely	Somewha Bad	t N	either B Nor Goo		Somewhat Good		Extremely Good			
P12. Your platoon has been working on building a range for 17 months. The assignment has been unpleasant. One reason for this is that the range site is more than an hour's drive away from the Army post. Suddenly, you are told that your platoon has to finish the project in the next three weeks. This will mean that you will have to stay out at the range and work nights, all in the summer heat of Georgia. What should you do to keep your soldiers motivated?											
Tell the soldiers what to expect so they can plan ahead, even when you know the work will be unpleasant.											
E	xpose your em in the l	rself to many hot sun, stayi	of the sai	me hardships hem even wh	as you nen it is	r soldiers by sp unpleasant, etc	ending	; time with			
		efforts on prove e field, for ex		their basic	needs§	get them hot m	eals, w	eekends off,			
C	o everything mplete an orked.	ng you can to d they are bac	get publ	ic recognitio basemake	n for yo	our soldiers wh eryone knows l	en the now ha	task is rd they			
fo	llow this u	ar company connpleasant one look forwar	e, and the	er and try to en let your so	arrange oldiers k	for a more ple know what is to	asant a	ssignment to to give them			
R	eward the	soldiers for g	good wor	k; let them k	now the	ey are apprecia	ted.				
F	ind out who show the	y the project m why their e	is import effort is m	ant, and then neaningful.	ı comm	unicate these p	oints to	o your soldiers			
	ve the solo	diers a reward	l to look	forward to,	such as	extra time off	when tl	ne project is			
		vith the soldie ortable, such a				o take steps to	make	themselves			

1 2	2 3	4	5	6	7 1	- -	9		
Extremely Bad	Somewhat Bad		ither Ba		Somewhat Good	.	Extremely Good		
platoon, he says to and the Chaplain. relevant profession the soldier is not	platoon leader, and that he wants to ke . Soon after, you onal training to he religious. In gene him. You are very	ill himself learn that lp the sole eral, you h	f. You refeat the medical dier. The Chave doubts	r the so il cente Chaplair about	oldier to the M r has not assign is not having the qualificati	ledical legical legical approach to the control of	Health Center person with effect because the people		
On your own, confer with the mental health officials and ask their opinion.									
	e you speak with t r misinterpretation					to pro	tect yourself		
	situation de-escal and establish frien					ing exe	rcise where he		
working t	members of the platogether to keep a e if they help out.	atoon to h	nelp the new himlet the	soldie m knov	r by not makir w that they ca	ng fun o n make	of him and by a big		
Speak wit	h your commandi	ng officer	rs, inform th	em of	the situation, a	and ask	their opinion.		
Call the s	oldier's parents an	nd ask for	their advic	e and a	ssistance.				
	concerns and a list order to protect y		ctions you h	ave tak	en in writing t	to your	commanding		

Take immediate action yourself by sitting down and talking with the soldier and giving

him 24 hours to decide if he wants to stay in the Army.

Tell the private that he has to pull his weight and do his job.

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
Extremely Bad		Somewhat Bad		either Ba Nor Good	d	Somewhat Good		Extremely Good

P14. You are a new second lieutenant. Due to numerous inactivations you have been assigned to the battalion staff until a platoon becomes available. You are somewhat intimidated about working with people who outrank you by such an extent--your direct boss is the battalion executive officer. However, as an officer, you know you have a job to do. Rate the quality of the following strategies for establishing yourself as an effective officer in your new position:

 Do not try to act like you know it all.
 Be assertive; do not be afraid of using your rank.
 Do not worry about upsetting people, even higher ranking officers, when you are doing your duty.
 Be careful not to use words or say things that might offend people who outrank you.
 Check with other lieutenants or captains and hear their opinions and get their input on an issue before taking the issue to the boss.
 Be respectful when you speak to officers who outrank you.
 Approach competent officers directly, and ask frequently for their advice and help.
 Find out who the competent officers are by reputation, then seek out these individuals and use them as mentors and sources of advice.
 Concentrate on the facts you are trying to communicate when you speak to high-ranking officers—present the facts accurately and do not change what you are saying to avoid upsetting higher-ranking officer.

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
Extremely Bad	+	Somewhat Bad		Neither Ba Nor Good		Somewhat Good	+-	Extremely Good
you do, he us you rarely kn generally just	ually blo ow exactells you performa	ows up and chartly what your u what he war ance or develo	ews your composits, and	r don't talk abo ou out, but ne any commande d that's it: He t. What should	ver expla er thinks never co	ains what you of you or whommunicates	did wa at he e with yo	rong. In fact, expects. He ou concerning
	a friend progress	-	with	the other plate	on lead	ers in order to	set go	oals and judge
Speak	to anoth	her company o	comma	ander about yo	ur prob	lem and ask fo	r his a	dvice.
		to other office out for yourse		out your complest you can.	laints ab	out your com	pany c	ommander
		y talking with s style and exp		s about the bo	ss's likes	and dislikes,	in orde	er to
		ow lieutenants h that of your		eedback group	to dete	rmine how yo	ur peri	formance
		ergeant if your		rdinates are hausel them.	ving pro	blems with th	e com	pany
Accep	ot the fa	ct that this is j	ust the	e way your coi	npany c	ommander is,	and dr	rive on.
Ask th	ne XO or	r senior lieutei information.	nant q	uestions about	the bos	s's opinion of	you as	a way of
				ng the lieutenar at you coopera				e success of a ders.
		w lieutenants pany command		ocial support g e normal.	roup to	determine if y	our ex	periences
Assur		when your bos	ss is no	ot chewing you	out, it	basically mear	ıs that	he is
	stress.	w lieutenants	as a so	ocial support s	tructure	to vent your f	eeling	s and reduce

Approach your company commander, explain that your goal is to do and be your best tactfully ask him for detailed performance feedback and developmental counseling.	t, and
Speak to platoon leaders in other companies about your performance and frustration	S.
Ask the first sergeant what the company commander says about you behind your bac	k.

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
Extremely Bad	+	Somewhat Bad		Neither Nor Go	Bad	Somewhat Good		Extremely Good

P16. You are a medical service platoon leader, and you have been in the unit for several months. You have frequently seen your peers yelling at soldiers when the soldiers make a mistake. You do the same thing when one of your squads does not follow the platoon's standardized load planand you really lose control. You believe you were out of line, and you did not achieve the desired results. You also believe that yelling at people is demeaning and wrong. What should you do now?

 Recognize that it is not appropriate to scream at people, and that there are other, more effective ways to handle situations.
 Think about how your superior officers' anger has or would affect youtry to put yourself in the shoes of the sergeant and the other soldiers.
Apologize with sincerity to the squad.
 Write a note to yourself on your camouflage notebook that says "Control My Temper," in order to remind you to stay in control.
Ask yourself how other effective leaders at your level would have handled the situation, and make plans to modify your behavior accordingly in the future.
 Speak to the chaplain or a counselor about how you might better control your temper.
 Next time you are about to lose your temper, practice a technique like counting to ten several times to delay and hopefully stifle your outburst.
 Sit down with your soldiers and explain why you felt so strongly about the ambulances' standardization; try to make them see why you felt this was worth yelling about.
 Take deliberate action to reward soldier initiatives in the future to encourage them to be more forward.
 Ask your company commander for ideas about how you should have handled the situation.
 Accept that even though you may not like to do it, being in the Army sometimes means yelling at others.

P16, Continued

_____ Ask other platoon leaders whom you admire for their advice about handling similar situations in the future.

Appendix
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Unit	Code:	 		
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Tacit Knowledge for Military Leadership Project

COMPANY COMMANDER QUESTIONNAIRE

INSTRUCTIONS AND OVERVIEW OF TASK

The Tacit Knowledge for Military Leadership Project seeks to identify the practical, action-oriented knowledge that Army leaders acquire on the job. By uncovering these lessons of experience, we hope to be able to teach officers these lessons and enhance leadership development. To help us identify how military leaders solve problems on the job, the members of the research team developed this survey.

This survey consists of descriptions of typical situations encountered by military leaders. After each situation, there are several options for how to handle the situation. For each option listed, your task is to rate the quality of the option on the following 1-to-9 scale:

1	2	3	4	5	6	, 7	8	9
+	-+	+	-+		+-	+	+-	+
Extremely		Somewhat	N	either	Bad	Somewhat		Extremely
Bad		Bad 🕠		Nor G	oođ	Good		Good

Select the number corresponding to your answer, and write it in the blank preceding the option. Remember that some or all of the options listed for a particular question may be good, some or all of the options may be bad, or some or all of the options may be neutral (neither bad nor good). There is no one "right answer," and in fact there may be no "right answers." The options are simply things an officer at this level might do in the situation described. Please rate each individual option for its quality in achieving the goal or solving the problem described in the question. Do not try to "spread out your ratings" just for the sake of doing so--if you think all of the options are good, bad, or whatever, rate them accordingly. DO NOT BE CONCERNED if the numbers are all 9s, all 5s, all 1s, one 9 and the rest 1s, or any other mix. Your answers should reflect your opinions about the quality of the options.

Research on leadership would not be possible without your generous assistance. Thank you for your help!

Privacy Act of 1974:

- a. Principal Purpose--The data collected from this survey will be used for research only.
- b. <u>This Survey is Confidential</u>—Only persons involved in collecting or preparing information for analysis will have access to completed surveys. Reports generated from results of this survey will be based on responses from groups of participants. Individuals or units will not be identified in any report.
- c. <u>Participation is Voluntary but Needed</u>--Your participation in this survey is important for the success of this project and will contribute to furthering the Army's understanding of leadership.

1	2	3	4	5	6	7 +	8	9
Extremely Bad	+	Somewhat Bad	· · · · · · · · ·	Neither Nor Go	Bađ	Somewhat Good	•	Extremely Good

C1. You take over a newly-formed company as a company commander. At the same time, the company also receives a new first sergeant, two new platoon leaders, two platoon sergeants, and a supply sergeant. You quickly begin to perceive that the soldiers in the company have a bad attitude regarding training. A few weeks after taking command, you deploy the unit to the field for a 21-day Field Training Exercise (FTX). There, you again observe (on the second day of the FTX) that the soldiers' performance is poor. For example, their stand-to procedures don't meet your standards. What should you do?

Call your key company's M	leaders together and communicate.	icate your training standards	in terms of the
Sit down with	your first sergeant, discuss the	e situation, and ask for his o	pinion.
demonstrated	formal leaders in the company knowledge gained by reading oldiers have a negative attitude	field and training manuals) 1	o have privately to find
	ny meeting and communicate c ssion-essential task list.	learly your training standard	ls in terms of the
	platoon leaders as a group, but show them how to deal with t		ll them your
Speak with ea deal with the	ch of your platoon leaders indi problem.	vidually and privately and to	ell each one to
	on leaders several more days to observe and interact with the s		so that you can
Personally ins	spect the stand-to procedures	inspect each fighting position	on and range card
	ny meeting, tell the platoon lea formance is poor, and listen to		ask the soldiers
Get the first s	ergeant and the platoon leader	s together to discuss the situ	uation with you.
performed we	plinary action to the entire corell during your next inspection.		ures are not
C1, Continued		14	

 Conduct an After Action Review on stand-to and define your criteria for success.
Speak to the battalion commander and get his advice and direction regarding the best way to handle the problem.
 Call a company meeting fully involving the platoon leaders, ask the soldiers why their performance is poor, and listen to their reasons.
 Investigate where the soldiers got their prior ideas about what constituted acceptable standards.
 Bring in the entire chain of command, all at once, for a group discussion about the

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
Extremely Bad	+ r	Somewhat Bad	No	either Ba		Somewhat Good		Extremely Good
company con a task force. platoon) who have reason t teams, you ar	mander Before had bee o believe	any commando. Your compayou deployed en transferred to be to provide send this new	any is create to the N from an actically a platoc	ross-attached NTC, you we tother compa when the on to an infan	I to a me re given my in or task for atry com	echanized infa a new platoo der to get a so ce is organize pany. You h	on leade econd con dinto cond cond cond cond condition c	ttalion to form or (and his chance. You company on advised by
Give t	he weak	lieutenant spe	ecific ste	ep-by-step in	struction	ns regarding l	now to	do his job.
		est sergeant, as closely before		~	reasons	for his opini	on, and	listen to
Send	your bes	st tank platoor	over to	o the infantry	y compa	ny.		
_	-	ur strongest a fantry compan		cest platoons	and sen	d an average-	-perforr	ning platoon
Send t	he new	platoon leader	and his	s platoon ove	er to the	infantry comp	pany.	
their a	ability to	oldiers in the perform well	, and tha	at to display	your lev	el of confider	ice you	
Send t	he plato	on you would	normal	ly send.				
		c platoon leade y responsibility		rith a strong	compan	y to observe a	and lear	n, without
	here, and	-door talk with d he should do						
prepa	red plate	r battalion con oon leader befolecision.			-	_		

C2, Continued

 Speak to the platoon leader; try to uncover the reasons for his weaknesses, these issues as best you can.	and deal	with
 Tell your platoon sergeant to look out for the weak lieutenant.		

1	2	3	4	5		6	7	8 +-	9
Extremely Bad		Somewhat Bad	t N	Weither Nor G		•	Somewha Good	t	Extremel Good
C3. You are seems always tends to take positive, prof	to "sho his ange	ot the messe or out on the	nger"h person	e does no who broug	t like to ght him	o be	surprised by bad news. Y	bad nev ou war	ws, and he nt to build a
Speak	to your	battalion co	mmand	er about h	is beha	vior	and share yo	ur perc	eption of it:
Attempt to keep the battalion commander "over-informed" by telling him what is occurring in your unit on a regular basis (e.g., daily or every other day).									
	to the sander.	sergeant maj	or and s	ee if she/h	e is wil	lling	to try to influ	ence th	ne battalion
		lion commar			on im	port	ant issues, bu	t don't	bring up
When time.	you brin	ig a problem	to your	battalion	comma	ande	r, bring a solu	ition at	the same
	ard the		nmande	r's behavio	or: Con	ntinu	e to bring him	n news	as you
		alion command news.	ınder all	of the goo	od new	s yo	u can, but try	to shie	ld him from
Tell ti		ion comman	der as li	ttle as pos	sible; d	leal v	with problems	s on you	ur own if at

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
Extremely Bad	+	Somewhat Bad	No.	either E Nor Goo	_	Somewhat Good	+-	Extremely Good
C4. You are a to go home. I						ve had a full da	y, and	l you are ready
Leave	the in-b	ox until tomo	orrow.					
Go thr	ough the	e items and a	ct only	on the time-	-sensitive	e and soldier-re	lated	items.
		ergeant that h I immediate a				ze your work by n wait.	y sepa	rating those
Go thro	nugh the	contents of	the in-b	ox now and	act on a	all of the issues.		

1 4	.	4 5	• /	
Extremely Bad	Somewhat Bad	•	Somewhat Good	• •
just completed a n that a weapon is m he knows where th	ight move and has nissing. The platon ne weapon is becau	on a battalion-level fi been in position for a on sergeant with respo use he saw it during the s due to brigade at 040	bout two hours. At nsibility for weapon e sensitive-items ch	t midnight, you learn ns is confident that neck completed after
	confident the weap t all weapons are a	oon will be found at fir ccounted for.	st light, submit a se	nsitive-item report
due; at this		commander until sho and honestly report a	•	•
Immediate	•	ne in the unit, and con	duct a 100% invent	ory followed by a
Before the situation in	•	ort deadline, notify the	battalion executive	e officer of the
Consult the correctly.	e standing operatin	g procedures manual	to ensure that you f	follow the rules
	y notify the battalion of the inc	on commander and tellident.	him your plans for	finding the
If the weapo		vithin one hour, notify	the entire chain of	command of the

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
Extremely Bad		Somewhat Bad	Ne	either Ba	ađ	Somewhat Good		Extremely Good

C6. You are a company commander. Your battalion is training for gunnery. Currently, all of the companies are well-prepared to pass gunnery. There is a great deal of competition among the companies and all of the commanders have Officer Evaluation Reports (OERs) due in the next few months. You have an NCO (platoon sergeant) in your unit who just arrived from teaching gunnery at the branch school. He tells you about some advanced training techniques using available equipment that have significantly improved gunnery scores in other units. This information has not been made available to units in the field. After some practice with the techniques, you find that they significantly improve the scores of your sections. What should you do?

 Do nothingallow the information about the training techniques to be passed through NCO channels if it comes up.
 Share the information about the training techniques with the battalion commander, then tell all of the other company commanders.
 Train your company using the information, execute gunnerypresumably beating all of your fellow company commandersthen tell everyone how you did it after the fact.
Initiate a meeting with all company commanders, platoon leaders, first sergeants, and platoon sergeants, and have your new platoon sergeant present and describe the techniques.
 Tell the platoon sergeant to keep close hold over the information about the training techniques so that only your company possesses this information.

T	4		4		•	,				
Extremely Bad	·-+·	Somewhat Bad		ither Ba		Somewhat Good	+-·	Extremely Good		
C7. You are a and the brigade Training Cente Your battalion you to focus or	comm	nander whom you are also ander is interest	you suppo prepara	oort. Duringing for a Ba	g prepar ttle Cor	ration time for nmand Training	the Na ng Prog	ational		
Find out from the battalion commander what his priority is: Get your battalion commander's guidance and act accordingly.										
Focus of	on BC7	TP regardless.								
	-	ority on the tra	_			enefit your sol mmanders.	diers (NTC),		
Focus e	equally	on the two tra	aining ev	ents.						
		g events have commander (_	nining value	, then su	ipport the ever	nt sche	duled by		
Focus of	on NTC	C regardless.								
Focus o	n your	weakest area.		•						
If both wishes	•	-	equal tra	ining value	, then su	apport the brig	ade co	mmander's		

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
Extremely Bad		Somewhat Bad	-	either Bad Nor Good	-	Somewhat Good	-+-	Extremely Good

C8. You are a new company commander. There are a lot of things you want to fix in the company. You have quickly become overwhelmed by the many pressures you face and the many demands on your time. You realize that you cannot possibly do everything. What should you do to better manage your key leaders and your time so that you are able to accomplish more in the same amount of time? Rate the following strategies:

 Have your key leaders execute the alternative <u>after</u> you select it.
 Allow key leaders on their own to select alternatives to solve problems and implement these strategies.
 Use key leaders to solve problems by having them research alternatives in their area of responsibility that would solve the problems and report these alternatives to you.
 Try to report earlier in the morning and/or stay later at night to get more done.
Give your key leaders more specific directions when it comes to solving problemstell them what to do to get the job done.
Learn to spot check by walking around the company area and getting a general idea of

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
+	-+	+	-+	+	+	+	-+-	+
Extremely Bad		Somewhat Bad	N	either I Nor Goo	_	Somewhat Good		Extremely Good

C9. You are a new company commander who has just taken over your unit. One of your soldiers is leaving the army. The supply sergeant brings you a Report of Survey and a \$250 Statement of Charges for the soldier's missing TA-50 and asks you to sign one or the other. You talk to the soldier and learn that the equipment was lost on re-deployment and that the chain of command had not taken appropriate action. The soldier had notified the old commander three times in writing, saying that his equipment was missing--but the commander took no action because he did not want to submit a late Report of Survey. (The Battalion Commander also did not want any late reports of survey.) The soldier says he will sign the Statement of Charges because he just wants to get out. What should you do?

initiating a late report of survey on the soldier's lost TA-50.
 Have the supply sergeant validate the statements made by collecting relevant information from the soldier and other sources, put this information together, and bring it to the battalion commander.
 Initiate a late report of survey without first informing the battalion commander.
 Point out to the battalion commander that the chain of command failed to properly uphold its responsibility and failed the soldier, and explain that this situation must be rectified now.
 Allow the soldier to sign the Statement of Charges so that he can leave.
 If the battalion commander is hard on company commanders who initiate late Reports of Survey, do not initiate the report.
 Attempt to contact the past company commander to find out why, exactly, he did not take care of the situation.

1	2	3	4		•	, h		.
Extremely Bad	+ У	Somewhat Bad	. Ne	ither Nor Go	Bad	Somewhat Good		extremely Good
establish you program, and	urself qui d you be standard	ickly as an effective it could	ective leaduse a tota	der. You I overhaů	have asses I in order t	ommander, and seed the current to ensure that display master fitness	nt physic the comp	al training pany will
Ask f	for a volu	unteer from the sindividual ve	e entire c ry closely	ompany t ⁄.	o take cha	rge and run the	e PT pro	gram, and
Talk	to your i	first sergeant a	and get hi	s/her adv	ice.			
Ask charg	for a vol ge and ru	lunteer from a un the PT prog	mong you gram, and	ır platoor l supervis	sergeants this indiv	and platoon le	eaders to sely.	take
		d or incentive T program.	to any so	ldier who	comes up	with the best	idea for	how to
Publi prog		e and reward	soldiers w	vho demo	nstrate init	iative in revan	nping the	PT
	ult a fellegestions.	ow commande	er who ha	s a solid t	fitness prog	gram for guida	ance and	
Ask char	for a vol	lunteer from a un the PT prop	mong you	ur platoor I give this	sergeants person the	and platoon lee authority to	eaders to do it his/	take her way.
		mpany's other on the PT pro			which of th	ne goals is mos	st import	ant before
App	oint the	most compete	nt person	to work	with you i	n revamping th	ne PT pr	ogram.
	the sold		eaders for	their idea	as and sugg	gestions before	e decidin	g on a
		lunteer from to son the author				arge and run tl	he PT pr	ogram, and
over	haul bef	our battalion of			n.	gestions regar		
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9

Extremely Bad	Somewhat Bad	Neither Bad Nor Good	Somewhat Good	Extremely Good
individual was ext the platoon leader commander noted called the entire p commander was v	remely detail-orienters when even the slight one day that one of latoon a disgrace. There years hard on the plater oblems. Your goal	ander. The previous co ed, gave very little posi ghtest infraction occurre f the platoon leaders wa This behavior on the par oon leaders. Several de l is to create a more pos	tive feedback and of ed. For example, the as wearing a dirty so at of the outgoing co eveloped nervous co	ften tore down e old company ft-cap, and he ompany onditions such as
Give all un accountab		sponsibility than they ha	ad before, and hold t	hem
	ut specific areas that	feedback to your platoo t need improvement and		
	platoon leaders and onclusions.	their soldiers the benef	it of the doubtdon	't jump to
Assign wo	ork goals with clear i	milestones to all officer	S.	
Involve se	nior NCOs in the de	ecision-making process.		
Give the pl	atoon leaders freque	ent, specific positive fee	edback.	
	_	ement style since it is c lieutenants who cannot	_	he company,
Let your su	ibordinates know yo	our intent and then let th	nem develop their ov	wn plans.
Recognize	soldiers' achieveme	ents with awards.		
		tate often that you belie e or she applies himself		

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
+	-+	+	-+	+	+	+	-+-	+
Extremely		Somewhat	N	either Ba		Somewhat		Extremely
Bađ		Bad		Nor Good	i	Good		Good

C12. You are a company commander with a new brigade commander. Before the new brigade commander took over, the battalion conducted After Action Reviews by critiquing each training task according to the Mission Training Plan. The new brigade commander asks to see how AARs are conducted in the brigade--he wants to find someone who does AARs improperly so he can use this individual as an example to show what needs to be improved. When the brigade commander observes you he says he does not like your AAR format and he feels you are critiquing instead of letting the soldiers talk. Thus, you must now develop a system for listening more to your soldiers while still maintaining an effective command. Rate the quality of the following strategies.

	optimally benefit your unit.
Listen m agendas	nost to soldiers who have the best interest of the unit at heart and have no hidden s.
	und among the soldiers to discover the informal leaders in the group, then seek our en to these soldiers.
Try liste	ning at moments when you would customarily talk.
When s	oldiers' safety is at risk, use directive leadership instead of listening.
	ver you have time, seek out your soldiers, ask them questions, and listen to their s and views.
Do not	listen to soldiers when they lack the knowledge necessary to make a decision.
	e regular meetings with your NCOs when you just sit and talk about the unitand less meetings times when you do less talking and more listening.
Listen r	nost to soldiers who are squared away and who command the respect of other.
Listen to	soldiers who are willing to express their opinions before a group.

1	2	3	4		6 		8	9
Extremely Bad	- - -	Somewhat Bad	•	either Ba	ađ	Somewhat Good	•	Extremely Good

C13. You are a company commander, and there has been an ongoing problem in your unit with alcoholism and especially with soldiers driving under the influence of alcohol. Two soldiers in the unit who previously had bad problems have since joined Alcoholics Anonymous groups and are now recovered. One other soldier is now in jail because of a car accident he caused while intoxicated which resulted in the death of a civilian. You are extremely concerned about this ongoing problem, and you would like to do something to get through to the soldiers about its seriousness and impact upon your unit. What should you do?

Regularly pull a soldier out of formation, at random, and ask him about why driving under the influence is a bad idea.	Mher to speak to the unit
Encourage soldiers to form their own informal peer support gro	up to combat alcoholism.
Provide incentives to soldiers for going three consecutive weeks other milestones of good behavior.	without drinking and for
Present in detail the story of the soldier who is now in jail to the	whole unit.
Have the reformed alcoholics give presentations stating how the drum up peer support.	y beat their problem to
Use different approaches from day to day when you talk to the tr for example, one day mention the soldier who is in jail; the next of the Alcoholics Anonymous groups.	• •
Prepare an analysis of what driving under the influence costs a so fines, and make this information readily available to all soldiers.	oldier in lost pay and
Conduct frequent health and welfare inspections to search for alc	ohol.
Call in Alcoholics Anonymous sponsors to give a talk about the	langers of alcoholism.
Be tough on the soldiers: Threaten the most extreme punishment slightest infraction of the rules.	possible for even the

1	2 3	3 4 5 6 7		8	9	
Extremely Bad	Somewhat Bad	Neither Nor G		Somewhat Good	+ E	xtremely Good
	a company comman eutenants. Rate the		• •		_	
Involve	the lieutenants in e	very administrati	ve action in	the company.		
	g early on, encoura	•	s to determi	ne their own g	oals, and	l use this
Involve	the lieutenants only	in those decisio	ns that affec	t their platoon	s.	
Explain	the big picture to the	he lieutenants reg	garding upco	ming missions	3.	
When go	oing on a mission, e	explain only their	portion to t	he lieutenants.		
Tell the l	ieutenants when the	ings in the battali	ion are bothe	ering you.		
Involve platoon.	the lieutenants in ac	dministrative acti	vities only w	ith soldiers fr	om their	own
Don't sha	are ideas with the li	eutenants; make	your own de	ecisions and in	plement	them.
	lieutenants presentes allow it.	for administrati	ve punishme	nts (Article 15	s, etc.) o	nly if their
Start a pr	rofessional develop	ment program to	assist the lie	eutenants in th	eir growt	th.
Involve t	he lieutenants in all	decisions.				

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
Extremely Bad	+ ?	Somewhat Bad		ither l Nor Goo		Somewha Good	t	Extreme1 Good
Once he was Another time ask him to do situation before	cleaning the was to This in the The	pany commang his weapon late to a rang is a new proble behaviors ar linate. What	on the maige. He free lem for your re continuit	il loading quently år ur first se ng and gr	dock and gues with rgeanth	he pointed in you and do e has never e	t at a cives not dexperience	vilian. o what you ced this
	-	severe instance miliating the p				-		
Use a	ıll assets	available to	youbut de	o not inv	olve your	boss (the bar	ttalion c	ommander).
Deal v	with the	situation imm	nediatelyc	do not let	it fester.			
Coun	sel the p	olatoon leader	only when	n his/her j	performar	nce warrants	it.	
Ask t	he batta	lion command	der to give	him a let	ter of rep	rimand.		
		tance of insub n and deal wi			occurs in p	oublic, dismis	ss the pl	atoon leader
Before behave	_	action, find o	out if the pl	latoon lea	der has b	een counsele	d before	for his bad
Talk v	vith the	platoon leade	r and work	k out the	problem.			
	lish regu rmance.	ılar sessions o	during whi	ch you co	ounsel the	platoon lead	ler abou	t his
vario	_	or counseling rios for dealir	_		-	_		
Wait a	while to	see if the sit	uation imp	roves on	its own.			
		of insubordin			between	the two of yo	ou in pri	vate,

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
Extremel Bad	.у	Somewhat Bad		ither E		Somewhat Good	;	Extremely Good
you believe directives, b unreasonab	are unreaction are unreaction to the detection are unreaction are unreacted are unreac	npany commanasonable. You so not listened to situation is commanded?	n have trice o your in causing you	ed to give put. The lou consider	your com NCOs and rable stres	mander input soldiers also ss. You have	regard feel th genera	ing these ese orders are illy lost
		sergeant major to improve the			vill use he	r/his influence	with t	he battalion
Let	your key	subordinates !	know this	s is not you	ır directiv	e but rather t	he com	mander's.
		to gain the NO ler's orders, be			-		g the ra	tionale for
	lone to the	he battalion co	mmandei	r and tell h	im/her yo	u believe the	order is	5
Keep	trying to	o give your ba	ttalion co	mmander	input rega	rding his unr	easonal	ole directives.
Rep	resent the	e orders as you	ur own to	your key	subordina	tes.		
Say t	that the s	ystem is to bla	me for th	e unreasor	nable orde	er.		
Let y	our sold	iers know that	this is no	ot your dire	ective but	rather the co	mmand	er's.
Assi	_	reasonable or	der a low	er priority	and acco	mplish it in th	e mann	er you
-		leaders togeth nreasonable.	er and go	as a grou	p to the b	attalion comr	nander	and say that

1	2	3 +	4	5	6	7	8	9
Extremely Bad	+	Somewhat Bad	•	either Ba	ađ	Somewhat Good	· -	Extremely Good

C17. You are a company commander with both military and civilian personnel in your unit. You have no E5 sergeants--instead, you have civilians doing supervisory jobs with soldiers working under them. You are experiencing problems in maintaining group cohesion: For example, civilians see soldiers taking off for training and wonder why they have to keep working; soldiers see civilians getting cash awards for good performance and wonder why they can't have similar awards; and so on. You must deal with these problems to keep your unit running smoothly. What should you do?

 Try to develop cohesion separately in the civilians and military members by having separate social functions.
Educate the soldiers and the civilians about the differing requirements of their jobs: Tell your soldiers that they have contractual obligations and they must accept their situation; tell the civilians that their situation is different from the soldiers' situation.
Have both civilian and military members of the unit draw up a poster of your organization (an organization chart) and post it where everyone can see it.
 Form a morale committee composed of both civilian and military personnel to plan company social functions.
 Create a sign-out roster, and have people sign out when they leave their place of duty, stating where exactly they are going and why.
 Study your own procedures to ensure that you are being fair and equitable to both the civilian and the military personnel.
 Schedule outings, pot luck dinners, parties, and dining outs that include all members of the unit and their families

1	2	3	4		6 	7 	8	9 -
Extremely Bad	-+	Somewhat Bad	Ne	ither B	ad	Somewhat Good		Extremely Good

C18. You are a company commander, and your unit is dispersed and is assigned to various garrison commands. Thus, you cannot possibly exercise direct control over your troops. The garrison commanders have non-judicial authority over your soldiers. You want to develop a good relationship with the garrison commanders. What should you do to take care of your soldiers under these conditions?

 Talk to the garrison commanders whenever there is a problem with one of your subordinate leaders.
 Visit the local garrison commanders on a regular basis.
 Request extra resources (and do what you can to expedite the request) to help the garrison commanders provide for your soldiers, if necessary.
 Have your boss contact the garrison commanders to inquire about soldier support issues.
 Do not talk to the garrison commanders unless one of your subordinate leaders comes to you and tells you that there is a problem.
 Coordinate with the garrison commanders whenever possible to ensure that your soldiers needs are being met.
 Speak to your soldiers individually as often as you can to check up on how they are being treated.
 Check with the garrison commanders about the quality of support being provided to your soldiers.

		+++-	+	++
Extremely Bad	Somewhat Bad		Somewhat Good	Extremely Good
commander. This is	ncompetence is bo	r, and you believe that yeth technical and tactical ion. What should you d	. Often this person	etent battalion issues directives
		the directive, go to your erlying intent and the ste		
	and try to help dir	unworkable directive, go rect the commander's th		
	st sergeant to help the troops.	you develop ways to m	nake the directive w	ork well and
	sergeant major an their opinions.	nd the executive officer,	ask for any relevan	t information,
Confront the incompetent	-	provide specific example	es of why his direct	ives are
	brigade command incompetent direct	ler about the problem, a	rming yourself with	n specific
Continue to	follow directives a	and let the chips fall whe	ere they may.	
	our subordinates the cause it is not his p	hat the battalion comma orimary specialty.	nder does not unde	erstand the area in
	derlying intent of the achieve the missi	the directive and develop on.	p your own strategy	y to solve the
Communica ensure that i		mmander's intent (rathe	r than his specific d	lirective) and

± .	-		-		,		•
Extremely Bad		Somewhat Bad	Neither Ba Nor Good		mewhat Good		reme1
operations. Yo	ou are f	eeling the stres	er on deployment. It is sof the many demand readiness. What	ınds upon yo	our time, bu		
Sleep.				·			
Take tir	ne alon	e each day to re	ead inspirational bo	oks or mate	rials.		5
Use yo	ur peer	s as a sounding	board and support	group.			
		act with family a	and friends back ho job.	me to keep	you centere	d and remi	ind you
Take ti	me alor	ne each day to t	hink, regroup, and	work throug	gh what's or	ı your mind	d .
	_	ive by remember current job.	ering that you have	other talents	s and skills t	that are no	t
Work as		•	ou can: Have as you	ur goal getti	ng to tomoi	rrow's wor	k as
Mentor	or cou	nsel troubled so	ldiers regularly to k	ceep your ov	vn problem:	s in perspe	ctive.
Each da a positi	-	-	esses and on what y	you can do b	etter in the	futurema	aintain

C

Tacit Knowledge for Military Leadership Project

BATTALION COMMANDER QUESTIONNAIRE

INSTRUCTIONS AND OVERVIEW OF TASK

The Tacit Knowledge for Military Leadership Project seeks to identify the practical, action-oriented knowledge that Army leaders acquire on the job. By uncovering these lessons of experience, we hope to be able to teach officers these lessons and enhance leadership development. To help us identify how military leaders solve problems on the job, the members of the research team developed this survey.

This survey consists of descriptions of typical situations encountered by military leaders. After each situation, there are several options for how to handle the situation. For each option listed, your task is to rate the quality of the option on the following 1-to-9 scale:

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
Extremely Bad	=	Somewhat Bad		+ either F Nor Goo	Bad	Somewhat Good	+-	Extremely Good

Select the number corresponding to your answer, and write it in the blank preceding the option. Remember that some or all of the options listed for a particular question may be good, some or all of the options may be bad, or some or all of the options may be neutral (neither bad nor good). There is no one "right answer," and in fact there may be no "right answers." The options are simply things an officer at this level might do in the situation described. Please rate each individual option for its quality in achieving the goal or solving the problem described in the question. Do not try to "spread out your ratings" just for the sake of doing so--if you think all of the options are good, bad, or whatever, rate them accordingly. DO NOT BE CONCERNED if the numbers are all 9s, all 5s, all 1s, one 9 and the rest 1s, or any other mix. Your answers should reflect your opinions about the quality of the options.

Research on leadership would not be possible without your generous assistance. Thank you for your help!

Privacy Act of 1974:

- a. Principal Purpose--The data collected from this survey will be used for research only.
- b. This Survey is Confidential—Only persons involved in collecting or preparing information for analysis will have access to completed surveys. Reports generated from results of this survey will be based on responses from groups of participants. Individuals or units will not be identified in any report.
- c. <u>Participation is Voluntary but Needed</u>--Your participation in this survey is important for the success of this project and will contribute to furthering the Army's understanding of leadership.

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
Extremely Bad	+	Somewhat Bad		either E Nor Goo		Somewha Good	+- t	Extreme1
		pattalion comm llowing strate						
and in	sisting	er and the prop that soldiers we with you.						
		nate officers a ish them for b				of the bad ne	ws they	bring you,
		iled records of e of what is g				nd soldiers' ac	ctivities	so that you
		ompelled to dinave to compe					enceof	ficers at your
When	you pui	nish a soldier y	your goal	l should be	to make	an example o	of him/h	er.
Allow	room f	or honest mist	akes by y	your subor	dinate le	aders.		
Be will necess	_	support your s	soldiers b	y disagree	ing with	your brigade	comma	nder, if
		n personal reso ur soldiers.	ources (su	ich as you	r persona	ıl telephone li	ne) to e	nhance the
	lifferen	ntly to problem o your attention		ling on you	ır level o	of trust in the	subordi	nate who
Recogn	nize tha	at, during train	ing, nega	ative emoti	onal read	ctions are app	ropriate	e at times.
Lead l	oy exan	nple by follow	ing the r	ules you m	ake.			
Be see	n expos	sing yourself t	o the san	ne risks yo	u expect	your soldiers	to take	•

B1, Continued

 Encourage officers and soldiers to reflect on their decisions and on the appropriateness of these decisions.
 When you punish a soldier your goal should be to reduce future occurrences of the behavior.

1 4	3	4 3	O			
Extremely Bad	Somewhat Bad	•	Bad	Somewhat Good	•	emely
strengths and wea	w battalion comm knesses of each of ness in helping you	f your company co	mmanders			
	to talk to the sold to talk directly to t					r your
	ompany, direct a s er present in order	•		ompany with t	the company	
Ask the co	mmand sergeant nat.	najor, battalion XC), and open	rations officer	for their	
	ose to talk to the s formation you will					er to
	company comman and then report be					of
	ly (in private) with and weaknesses.	n the soldiers and a	isk them to	comment on	the command	ders'
	tly (in private) with ing, what they are				bout the qua	lity of
	company comman and report back to)wn
	attalion staff memloldiers and report			-	nders to spea	ak
Rely on his	storical statistical i	ndicators of perform	rmance.			•
	tly (in private) wit					ir

Speak to the company commanders individually and ask each of them to comment on strengths and weaknesses of the other company commanders and units.	the
Ask the brigade commander for his/her assessment.	

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
Extreme Bad	+-· ely	Somewhat Bad	+ : N	either B Nor Goo	_	Somewhat Good		Extremely Good
evaluated the After the negati	training ex Action Rev	alion command xercise, during view, the Chie your unit did the rell that the ba	g which y of Evalua hat day.	your unit revotor is highly You careful	ealed son critical of lly record	me major shor of the battalion I all of the neg	tcoming and continued to the continue of the c	ngs. During lwells on all
		ter Action Revaluator said.	view and	l return to yo	our units	; once there, c	ommu	nicate exactly
		a good relation and feelings w			I or othe	r similar perso	n, disc	cuss your
ne	gative feed	trying to get adback, say you nything more f	ı will de	al with the p	c: Thanl roblems	the Evaluato immediately, a	r direc and do	tly for the so without
		ot to vent your our junior offi		ions with the	e Evalua	tor's feedback	in fron	nt of the
As	k the Chie	ef Evaluator if	he has a	nything else	he would	d like to say.		
		or two succes			l, and asl	the Evaluato	r if he	would like to
m	eave the A ake sure to cortcoming	After Action Resource the success.	eview an cesses th	d return to y at occurred	our unitathat day	s, but when yo as well as the	u repo failure	ort to them s and
S	peak to the egative fee	e Evaluator at dback so that	another you kno	time, and sta w what the	ate your units are	desire to recei doing right an	ve pos d wro:	sitive as well as ng.
		eelings with a negative feeli		r confidante	at your o	own level to he	elp you	ı work

1	4	5	4	5	•	,		
Extremely Bad	+	Somewhat Bad		ither Bac Nor Good		Somewhat Good	· — — • — -	Extremel Good
B4. You are a priorities for y accomplishing	our un	it. Rate the fo		-	-			
Study t	he brig	gade's training	schedule.					
		rigade S-2, S-3 training focus		M to verify	your und	lerstanding o	of the b	rigade
Schedu week o		etings to discus	ss training	g with each o	of your s	taff member	s durin	g your first
Explain	your g	goals and your	plans for	the battalio	n very cl	early to you	r office	rs and staff.
		tical and techr formal tests.	nical comp	petence of yo	our soldi	ers individua	ally by	giving them
Rely on	the as	sessments mad	de by the	previous bat	talion co	mmander.		
Select t soldier		o five upcomingy on.	g mission	is (based on	the briga	de training	plan) to	focus your
Before	doing	anything, make	e sure you	understand	the com	mander's in	tent two	o levels up.
Soon at operati		ting command,	, visit each	h staff sectio	on's shop	and get a fu	ıll briefi	ing on their
Talk to	the bi	rigade commar	nder to de	etermine his	training _]	priorities.		

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
+	+	+	-+	+	+	+	-+-	+
Extremely		Somewhat	Ne	either B	ađ	Somewhat	•	Extremely
Bađ		Bad		Nor Good	4	Good		Good

B5. You are a battalion commander. Your brigade commander has made it clear that he does not wish to speak with you about pressing issues that arise in your battalion. Also, he expects perfection from your battalion at all times, and he seems to view your battalion's poor performance at the JRTC as unforgivable—he keeps harping on past failures. The brigade commander does not provide you with feedback on your strengths and how to improve your weaknesses. His communication style is formal, abrupt, and in your opinion, ineffective. He begins every conversation by reminding you that you are only an 0-5. You are frustrated because you never know where you stand, performance wise, in your brigade commander's eyes and you lack a person from whom to receive performance feedback. In general, you find your situation with the brigade commander to be intolerable, and morale in your unit seems dangerously low. What should you do?

	Speak to the Assistant Division Commander, explain your need for extra feedback, and request feedback on your performance.
	Deal with the brigade commander as best you can, but hold regular sessions with the members of your unit to air concerns and voice problems in the hope of improving morale.
	Remain loyal to the brigade commander so you do not model disloyalty in front of the members of your unit.
	Seek a formal appointment with the brigade commander, state that you and he seem to have a problem, and ask him why.
	If you choose to speak with the Assistant Division Commander and your officers are critical of your decision, then explain your reasons for your actions to them and let them know they are welcome to voice concerns about how you are leading the unit.
·	Speak to your family members, the chaplain, or other friends from outside the military in order to deal with your personal frustrations.
	Jump the chain of command and speak to the Assistant Division Commander about the problem with the brigade commander.
	If you speak to the Assistant Division Commander, prepare yourself for the possibility of

B5, Continued

 _ Talk to your fellow battalion commanders about the problem and try to develop a joint solution.
 Request advice from one of your brigade commander's superiors whom you already know and trust.
 Talk to the brigade XO and the brigade S3 and try to get some information.


1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
Extremely Bad	+	Somewhat Bad		ither F Nor Goo		Somewhat Good	+	Extremel Good
B6. You are following stra			-	_	-		_	. Rate the
		s and their fonths out).	amilies wi	ith a copy	of an ext	ended training	g schedu	ıle (for
	op specific ge training	•	procedure	s that you	r battalio	n uses regular	ly in ord	ler to
Go to	the brigad	de S-3 and d	lemand th	at the train	ning sche	dule not be cl	nanged.	
Give so	oldiers th	ree or four-	day holida	ıy weeken	ds whene	ever possible.		
Take	into consi	ideration scl	hool vacat	tions and e	events wh	nen planning t	raining.	
	family d	•			_	lule once it ha hen go over t		-
	ling to ch tunities.	ange the tra	ining sche	dule in or	der to ca	pitalize on un	planned	training
	egular me attalion i	•	your brig	ade comm	nander to	keep him/her	focused	l on what
		ates the train person for	_			ity, and witho	out good	l cause,
		specified ti en distribute		do not ma	ke chang	es to the sche	dule onc	e the
	•	y a soldier's other trainin		for a train	ing exerc	eise, make sur	e he or s	she gets it
Try to	dissuade	your superi	ors from n	naking suc	dden cha	nges to the tra	uining sc	hedule.
Comm	-	our training	g goals and	d your visi	ion to yo	ur subordinate	s and ye	our


1 4	4 5	44 5	•	,	•	
Extremely Bad	Somewhat Bad	Neither Nor G		Somewhat Good	+	Extremely Good
concerned about have a regular far	attalion commande the special needs a nily life. Your goa following strategie	and problems un al is to ensure h	married sol	ldiers may have	e, since	they do not
	ial pains to ensure meals or outings f	•		•	on holi	idaysby,
	e single soldiers fro aties so that marrie	•	•	•		take on
family me	procedures and fac mbers back home- arage the soldiers t	-provide access	to telephor	nes, writing sur		
Encourag special oc	e married soldiers casions.	to invite single	soldiers to 1	their homes for	holiday	ys or other
soldiers to	sures (for example, o decorate the way nore like home to t	they like) that				
Allow sold living qua	liers from other un rters.	its to share in th	ne improver	ments you mak	e to you	ır soldiers'
Keep sing	ele soldiers busy wi	th training and	company sp	orts so they w	on't get	bored.
Spend time	e with the single so	oldiers in their d	ining facilit	y and gym.		

1 4		4 5		,		•
Extremely Bad	Somewhat Bad	Neither E Nor Goo		Somewhat Good		tremely Good
B8. You are a batta officers share your vocammunicating your	rision for the batta	alion. Rate the e		•		•
Distribute yo	ur command philo	osophy in writing	to all so	ldiers in your l	attalion.	
Reinforce you of your comm	ur vision in all dai mand.	ly activities and i	nteractio	ns, and do so	for the enti	ire term
	re to a single pers ing needs of the t	-	ng to cha	nge your visio	n as neces	sary to
	asis, visit company s and the progress					
Communicate	e your vision start	ing on the first d	ay of you	r command.		
Reward those	who support you	ur vision, and pu	nish those	who don't.		
Solicit feedb ways to impr	ack and ideas from	m your junior off	icers rega	arding your vis	ionbe ale	ert for

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
Extremely Bad	+	Somewhat Bad	t N	Weither F		Somewha Good	 t	Extremely Good
commander is occasions, the difficulties. Fryour comman between the t	s a light e differi for exar ider is u wo of y	llery battalion t infantryman, ing perspectiv mple, you are used to movin you. Your go should you do	while your while you will be used to ag at a slopal is to it	our backgro u and your l moving on to ow pace. In	und is morigade contact the battle if act, co	echanized art commander re efield at a very mmunication	illery. (sult in c y fast pa problen	On several communication ace, whereas arise often
Ask a proble	•	your brigade	commar	nder, such a	s a divar	ty commande	r, for he	elp with the
	-	gade command sh a friendship			ise to wa	atch a sporting	g event	or movie and
		brigade comr ave trouble co						
		ort to think fro performance		rigade comr	nander's	point of view	about y	your unit's
		brigade comr communication					of you s	ometimes
interes	st to de	est or hobby y evelop analogi talk in terms	ies to hel	lp you comn	nunicate	with him mor		
		mpt to interac , in a wide var		•	ommande	er as a person	outside	e of the work
Speak	to you	r brigade com	mander's	s superior al	bout the	problem and	ask for	his advice.

Extremely Bad	Somewhat Bad	Neither Bad Nor Good	Somewhat Good	Extremel Good
with your job. Yo	ur goal is to manago tivation to perform	ander and you are feeling e your stress effectively at your best. Rate the	so that it does not i	nterfere with
Budget tim	e for inspirational r	eading.		3
Develop a n frequently.	nutual support grou	p with other battalion c	commanderstalk to	them
Realize that	dealing with stress	is important to your pr	omotion, and soldies	r on.
-		and work harderrecog	•	faction will
Combat str	ess by engaging in I	physical exercise or an a	activity you enjoy.	
Use your sp	ouse or other close	friend from outside of	the military as a sour	nding board.
Use your ju	nior officers to bour	nce ideas off of.		·
Talk over yo	our feelings with the	e brigade commander.		
Take up a h	obby that is unrelate	ed to your job demands		
Budget time	e for personal reflec	ction and relaxation.		
Keep a journ things on pa		ideas in order to organiz	ze your thoughts and	l work through
▼		attalion commanders exill resolve themselves in	•	gs and that
	ch leave as you are out the transfer of the characters of the char	entitled to, and while or	ı leave, do not think	about work or
Realize that	it is your job to tou	igh things out for 24 mo	onths.	
Renew you	r vision and remind	yourself of why you wa	anted to be a battalic	on commander.






B12. You are a battalion commander. You have one company commander who is particularly intense. He sets extremely high--even unrealistic--standards for himself. His expectations are so high that he never can meet them, and this situation is hindering his professional development as an officer. He is scheduled for a major training exercise next month. Your goal is to communicate to the company commander that he is hurting himself by maintaining unreasonable standards. Rate the quality of the following strategies for achieving your goal.

 Talk to all of your company commanders as a group about potential roadblocks to their development, mentioning too-high standards as one potential problem and describing examples to illustrate your point.
 Wait to speak to the company commander until after he goes to the training exercise, using examples based on his experiences there to illustrate your points.
 Do nothing: Allow him to learn from his own mistakes that no one can successfully maintain too-high standards forever.
 Ask another company commander to have a friendly chat with the obsessive company commander about the need to have realistic goals.
Have a discussion with the company commander about his potential problem before he leaves for the training exercise, using examples you are aware of from your daily interactions with him in your unit.
 Warn the company commander before he goes to the training exercise that you believe he has a serious problem that requires his immediate attention and that may ultimately derail

his career.



B13. You are a battalion commander, and you notice early in your command that your guidance often becomes distorted when it reaches the lower ranks. For example, one day you comment that you want the line companies at 100% personnel strength for aircraft mechanics before you will start to assign them to headquarters. A few days later, the headquarters maintenance tech asks you why you are going to fill the line units at 150% of authorized mechanics before assigning them to headquarters! Your goal is to ensure that your guidance is communicated accurately to all levels of the organization. Rate the quality of the following strategies for achieving your goal.

Hold meetings with your platoon leaders to verify what they know.
When you must communicate important information verbally, try to speak directly to as many officers and soldiers as you can.
Hold the chain of command responsible for accurately passing information down to lower ranks.
Work on your relationship with your senior NCOs.
Conduct periodic discussions with your soldiers to correct misperceptions, clarify your intent, and locate sources of information loss.
Ask your company commanders to conduct periodic discussions with the soldiers so that the company commanders can verify that the lower levels are receiving accurate information.
Whenever possible, post and distribute written statements outlining your objectives.
Encourage your junior officers to be on the lookout for soldiers' statements about your orders that are not completely accurateand ask the junior officers to correct these misperceptions immediately.
Develop an NCO professional development program that stresses how to pass down information properly.
Spend more time leading by walking around the unit and talking to people.
Look for breaks in the chain of command.
Use multiple means of communicating the same message.

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
Extremely Bad		Somewhat Bad	Ne	ither Ba	ad	Somewhat Good		Extremely Good

B14. You are a battalion commander. Reluctantly, you gave your S-1 a company command for his professional development, even though you had questions about his abilities. He was a loyal S-1, but not a very good one: He had problems with organization, and his workstyle was a bit "helter-skelter." In conversations with lieutenants you have learned that they are having a hard time with this individual. Also, as you walk around the battalion, you see other indications that confirm your doubts about this person's abilities. In general, you are concerned and you have doubts about this officer's ability to command effectively. What should you do?

Ask your sergeant major to spend more time coaching the former S-1.
Ask a competent company commander to mentor the problematic officer.
Provide the former S-1 specific help with organization such as hints and strategies you and others have found useful.
Set the former S-1 up with a strong 1SG and company XO.
Explain to the former S-1 specifically why it is important for him to change his behavior for the soldiers' benefit.
Help the lieutenants you spoke with to work through their direct superiors to solve problems.
Communicate regularly with the officer and encourage him to use you as a resource whenever he has problems.
Come down hard on the former S-1 about his shortcomings and threaten to take disciplinary action if he does not improve.
Conduct sessions with the former S-1 during which you talk to him about aspects of his behavior you want changed.
Talk to the S-1's first sergeant to get a better feel for what's going on.

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
Extremely Bad		Somewhat Bad		Weither Bad Nor Good	-	omewhat Good		Extremely Good

B15. You are a battalion commander in charge of a military intelligence battalion. You perceive that the soldiers in your unit sometimes know more about the operations of the companies than do the company commanders. In one company, the commander appears to be at the mercy of a few NCOs who know a great deal about the company's business, and therefore hold considerable informal power. The commander has been giving in to these NCOs in ways he should not have (for example, with regard to scheduling decisions). What should you do about this problem?

action against them if they do not behave more appropriately in the future.
Tell the company commander to give the NCOs the message that they must improve and to threaten disciplinary action to the NCOs if they do not.
Encourage the company commander to work at developing his junior NCOs.
Wait for the problematic NCOs to leave the unit by attrition.
Involve the command sergeant major in the assessment and solution of the problem.
Order the company commander to relieve the problematic NCOs.
Meet with the company commander and encourage him to develop his own plan to remedy the situation with your assistance.
Transfer the too-powerful NCOs to other companies, and attempt to place them in companies where they will no longer be working side by side with one another.
Order the company commander to deal with the situation in whatever way he deems appropriate, and then let him solve the problem on his own

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
+	-+	+	-+	+	+	+	+	+
Extremely		Somewhat	N€	either B	ađ	Somewhat		Extremely
Bad		Bad		Nor Goo	đ.	Good		Good

B16. You are a battalion commander, and your primary goal is to mentor your officers and help them develop as professionals. Rate the quality of the following strategies for achieving your goal.

Ask young officers to brief you on their range plans (for example) and then evaluate their thought processes.
Model your own decision-making processes for your junior officers by talking aloud through the problem solving process.
Be positive and encouraging in private counseling sessions with your officers.
Empower others to do their jobs.
Discuss junior leaders' mistakes in public in front of other officers.
Before giving a directive, be sure that you yourself know exactly what you want the soldiers to do.
Ensure that you provide truthful, honest assessments in your counseling.
Point out junior leaders' mistakes in public, immediately and on the spot, whenever a mistake is made.
Do not single out an officer in public to provide recognition for good performance.
Involve your junior officers in your decision-making process and give them a real say in your decisions.
Look for opportunities to give authority away.
Encourage young officers to think about the consequences of their actions.
Monitor your junior officers' participation in a professional reading program.
Allow junior officers to fail.