Taxes, Agglomeration Rents and Location Decisions of Firms

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Abstract

The goal of this paper is to analyze the impact of tax rates and agglomeration rents – and more in particular their interaction - on location decisions of firms within Belgium. In the literature it is argued that both location determinants may enhance or rather weaken each other's impact. Using the number of new firms at the sector level for 43 Belgian districts, we show that local effective tax rates either have no or a negative impact on location decisions. Before the Belgian corporate tax reform in 2003, demand-side induced agglomeration rents – market potential- have a positive impact on location decisions. Supply-side induced agglomeration rents - in terms of the number of existing firms – only increase entry within the same sector. However, the interaction effect between taxes and agglomeration rents on firm entry is significant. We observe that a higher effective tax rate in a district weakens the positive impact of the agglomeration rents on location decisions of firms.

Keywords: agglomeration rents, corporate taxes, firm entry

JEL codes: H71, F21, R30

1. Introduction

Location decisions of firms have been studied extensively – both theoretically and empirically – especially since the development of the New Economic Geography (NEG) theory at the beginning of the nineties. Different models developed in this NEG literature (a.o. Krugman (1991), Venables (1996)) state that there are forces pulling firms towards a centre of economic activity and forces pushing them away.

The forces pulling firms towards the centre are what we call *agglomeration forces*. According to the Krugman-model, the main agglomeration force is the market access. The closer one is to the centre of economic activity; the better is the access to a market in order to sell the firm's goods. The intuition is that firms want to locate close to their workers - as workers constitute firms' consumers and therefore markets - and workers want to locate close to firms - as they will get a higher (real) wage in the firms' vicinity. According to the Venables-model, the main agglomeration force is not the closeness to consumers but rather the closeness to other firms that supply or demand intermediate goods. In case a firm is a final producer, it prefers to be close to its intermediate suppliers. If a firm is an intermediate supplier, on the other hand, it prefers to be close to final producers.

One force pulling firms away from the centre is the *competition effect*. Indeed, the closer firms are to each other in a certain region, the more they will suffer from severe competition and the less attractive that region will be. Crucial is therefore whether the competition effect (pushing firms away) outweighs the agglomeration effect (attracting firms) or rather the inverse[1] (De Bruyne (2006)).

Next to the determinants of location decisions of firms discussed in the NEG theories, there are many other location determinants. Government policy, for instance, also plays a large role. One such instrument of government policy is the corporate tax rate. De Mooij and Ederveen (2003) show that a decrease of 1 percentage point in the corporate tax rate leads to an increase in FDI by 3.3%. Within Belgium, different effective tax rates across regions or districts are possible. Vandenbussche, Crabbé and Janssen (2006) provide empirical evidence that the effective tax rate of firms located in Belgium is significantly different across regions after taking into account firm and sector characteristics.

The aim of this paper is to determine the individual impact and the interaction of both corporate taxes ánd agglomeration rents on location decisions of firms in Belgium. Especially the interaction between these factors is recently a new research field. We would like to contribute to the limited empirical studies by taking into account two different measures of agglomeration rents: a supply- and a demand-

[1] According to the NEG literature, this will depend on the level of transportation costs.

induced agglomeration rent. We count the number of new firms in two periods, one before the Belgian tax reform, 1999-2001, and one after the Belgian tax reform, 2004-2006. Using a Poisson estimation model, the results indicate that demand-side induced agglomeration rents play an important role for location decisions in Belgium before the tax reform. The presence of other firms as such (supply-induced agglomeration rents) is not a significant location determinant, the presence of firms within the same sector however is. More importantly, taxes and agglomeration rents interact. Taxes weaken the positive agglomeration rent effect and agglomeration rents in their turn can ease the impact of high taxes.

The structure of the paper is as follows. We start with a literature overview in Section 2, focusing on both taxation and location literature on the one hand and the Belgian tax system on the other hand. Section 3 deals with the data sources and the descriptive statistics while section 4 tackles the methodology. Section 5 reports the empirical results and section 6 concludes.

2. Literature Overview

2.1 Tax Competition and Agglomeration Rents

In the taxation literature, several empirical studies have shown that corporate taxes have a negative impact on attracting FDI. According to a meta-study of De Mooij and Ederveen (2003), a decrease in the corporate tax rate with 1 percentage point leads to an increase in FDI by 3.3 percent. Also the impact of taxes on entrepreneurship - the formation of new businesses - has been studied before, although less than FDI. These studies find that a 10 percentage point decease in the tax rate increases the entry rate in a country by 0.88 to 1.3 percentage points (Da rin et al., 2008; Djankov et al., 2008; Konings and Nursky, 2008). This negative correlation between taxes and FDI leads to countries lowering their corporate taxes in order to attract firms. However, a clear race-to-the-bottom in corporate taxes in Europe has not been found in empirical research (Devereux e.a., 2002; Vandenbussche and Crabbé, 2005)

A possible reason why a universal lowering of tax rates is not observed is provided by the NEG literature. This strand of literature argues that increasing returns to scale and imperfect competition combined with transport costs may cause agglomeration. If firms locate in a few regions, this agglomeration generates benefits such as spillovers and the presence of suppliers and buyers of intermediate goods, market access and so on (De Bruyne (2006)). The importance of market access for a firm's location decision was first put forward by Krugman (1991). Crucial in his model are the firm-consumer linkages. Venables (1996) argued that not market access, but rather the presence of other firms is important to a location

decision. The idea is that intermediate suppliers want to be close to the firms that buy their goods and vice versa. Therefore, his model emphasis the firm-firm linkages.

Summarizing, the literature states that corporate taxes deter firms and that agglomeration rents - caused by either market access or the presence of other firms - attract firms. Combining both insights, one might conclude that more agglomerated regions will be able to tax agglomeration rents without driving firms away. Several authors provided theoretical support for the existence of taxable agglomeration rents. Ludema and Wooton (2000) show indeed that as trade costs decrease, integration will attenuate tax competition. Andersson and Forslid (1999) show that mobile factors will not move if tax rates change only marginally, thus again indicating the existence of agglomeration rents. Kind, Midelfart-Knarvik and Schjelderup (2000) also show that tax competition depends on trade costs and pecuniary externalities. Baldwin and Krugman (2004) and Borck and Pflüger (2006), finally, developed a core-periphery model with taxation. The first paper is based on the core-periphery network, while the second one uses a model yielding partial stable agglomeration in addition to the core-periphery outcome. Both papers show that the tax differential between alternative locations is explained by the difference in their agglomeration patterns. The tax differential turns out to be a bell-shaped function of trade integration since agglomeration rents are a bell-shaped function of trade costs. Indeed, for respectively high and low trade costs one finds fairly low agglomeration rents. For intermediate trade costs, agglomeration rents turn out to be highest. Therefore, it is expected that the tax differential between the core of economic activity and the periphery is highest for intermediate trade costs. In other words, for these intermediate trade costs agglomeration rents in the centre are higher implying that taxes can be set at a higher level in the centre compared to the periphery. Charlot and Paty (2007) confirm this theory empirically. They estimate a derived tax-setting equation for French municipalities. The authors confirm a positive and significant relationship between the tax rate and market access, which suggests there is a taxable agglomeration rent in French municipalities.

The central question in this paper is whether agglomeration rents, taxes and their interaction have an impact on the location decisions of firms in Belgium. From the basic tax competition models, we know that higher corporate taxes as such act as a push factor for firms. In contrast, the NEG states that agglomerated regions have agglomeration rents that may act as a pull factor for firms - pulling firms to the centre of economic activity. Finally, theory indicates that taxes and agglomeration rents may mitigate each other.

Several empirical studies have tackled the impact of tax levels ánd agglomeration rents on the location decision of firms. Devereux, Griffith and Simpson (2007) also studied the impact of agglomeration economies on the sensitivity to local fiscal

incentives of firms' location choices in the UK. More specifically, the authors dig into the effect of grants on location decisions of firms. They find that grants have a small effect in attracting plants to specific geographic areas, but that firms are less responsive to subsidies in areas where there are fewer existing plants in their industry - again confirming the importance of agglomeration rents. Solé-Ollé and Jofre-Monseny (2007) show for Catalonia that taxes have a negative impact on location. They observe that omitting agglomeration variables leads to a severe underestimation of the negative effect of business taxes on location decisions. But the first paper to study the interaction effect of agglomeration rents and taxation on location decisions of firms is however by Brülhart, Jametti and Schmidheiny (2009). They find empirical evidence that firm births in Swiss municipalities on average react negatively to corporate tax burdens, but that the deterrent effect of taxes is significantly weaker in sectors that are more spatially concentrated.

Our study contributes to this literature by analyzing the interaction of agglomeration rents and taxes for Belgian new firms and thus providing more insights in this topic. Moreover, we split up the agglomeration rents in a demand-induced agglomeration rent (Krugman) and a supply-induced agglomeration rent (Venables). We take into account the impact of taxes and both agglomeration rents simultaneously on firms' location decisions. In addition, the interaction between taxes and both types of agglomeration rents are included in order to determine whether they mutually mitigate or rather reinforce each other.

2.2 The Belgian Tax System

In Belgium, the corporate profit tax is a federal tax responsibility. This means that the nominal or statutory tax rate (STR) and the taxable income are set at the federal level and are therefore equal for companies in every district or region. The tax rate itself is progressive according to the taxable income of the firm. Since 2003, Belgian corporate tax rates decreased so that for Belgian companies with a taxable income up to 322500 euro, the following progressive tax system is applied[2]:

	STR before 2003	STR since 2003
0<=taxable income<25000	28.84%	24.98%
25000<=taxable income<90000	37.07%	31.98%
90000<=taxable income<322500	42.23%	35.54%

Companies with a taxable income of more than 322500 euro are subject to a uniform tax rate of 40.17% before 2003 and 33.99% since 2003 (Van Kerckhove and Heirewegh (2006)). While the tax rates and rules are independent of a firm's location, the effective tax rate (ETR) can differ across firms. The ETR is defined as

[2] For example a company that has a taxable base equal to 100000 will pay: (24000*24.98%)+((89000-25000)*31.98%)+((100000-90000)*35.54%)=30016.4

the ratio of firm level `tax liabilities' in a particular year over the `reported profits' in that same year. This definition is widely used and known as the micro-backward method based on firm-level, archival data (Nicodème (2001); Nicodème (2002); Collins and Shackelford (2002); Vandenbussche, Crabbé and Janssen (2006)). In contrast to the STR, the ETR or real tax burden of a firm differs across districts because of several reasons such as more tax evasion in districts with a less efficient local tax administration (Moesen et al., 1994), tax rulings[3] or differences in deductible local taxes[4]. The most important local tax is the surcharge on the regional property tax (the base of this regional tax is, however, defined at the federal level). This surcharge can be freely set by all 589 municipalities in Belgium. Although it is only a surcharge, this source of tax revenue accounts for 40 percent of municipal tax revenues (Heyndels and Vuchelen (1998); Smolders and Goeminne (2009)) and varies quite substantially across municipalities (see Figure and Example Appendix 2). Since this extra tax can be deducted from the corporate taxes (Van Kerckhove and Heirewegh (2006)), the average ETRs at the district level vary as well. Vandenbussche, Crabbé and Janssen (2006) provide empirical evidence that the effective tax rate of firms located in Flanders is significantly higher than the ETR of firms in Wallonia and Brussels when holding all other firm or sector characteristics constant. Their study was carried out using large Belgian firms for the period 1993-2002 (before the Belgian tax reform of 2003).

Despite the reduction in the statutory tax rate in 2003, Belgium still has an ETR in 2003 that is 3 percentage points higher than the EU-25 average (Vandenbussche and Crabbé (2005)). Belgium indeed lowered the statutory tax rate but at the same time enlarged the taxable base in that way causing only a minor decrease at the actual tax burden.

3. Data and Descriptives

3.1 Data

We study the impact of taxes and agglomeration rents on location decisions within Belgium. Belgium has 43 districts - 22 in Flanders (Northern part of the country), 20 in Wallonia (Southern part of the country) and the last one is Brussels. Figure 1 illustrates the location of all Belgian districts[5].

For the purpose of our study, we use data from three different sources. First, we consult the Belfirst database which comprises annual accounts of 250 000 Belgian

[3] Firms can ask for a formal tax ruling. This means that they can negotiate with the Belgian government about a particular element in their tax liability.
[4] For a list of local taxes see Smolders et al. (2005) and Jonckheere (2008).
[5] See Appendix 1 for a list of the different districts

firms for various years. From this database, we collect the number of new firms in each Belgian district for the years 1999-2001 (before the tax reform) and 2004-2006 (after the tax reform). This set of new firms contains both small and large firms. We however select the large firms because these firms are assumed to be more footloose and thus deal with location decisions. We choose only firms that have profits before tax larger than or equal to 322500 euro in the year following their set up. Hereby, we make the assumption that new firms will not generate normal profits in their year of set up due to large investments and the introduction time of their product or service, but the new firms will reach normal profits in the following year. This selection rules out any effect due to the progressive tax system since all firms in the dataset apply the same nominal tax rate as explained above in Subsection 2.2. From Belfirst, we also collect information about the pre-existing stock of firms in the 43 Belgian districts.

Figure 1: A map of Belgium

The second source of data are the regional accounts of the National Bank of Belgium (NBB) providing information on GDP per capita and gross investment for the districts. Finally, we assemble data on prices of building lots per squared meter from the federal government (Economics Service; FOD Economie).

3.2 Descriptives

This section discusses the dependent and explanatory variables with a special focus on the taxation and agglomeration variables. For all variables we report on their mean, standard deviation, minimum and maximum. As far as the key variables (count of new firms, tax, agglomeration rents) are concerned, we pay special attention to their variation as well. Note that we use two indicators of agglomeration rents. The first one is demand-induced and refers to the Krugman (1991) model focusing on the market access. The second one is supply-induced and refers to the Venables (1996) model with intermediate suppliers. The number of firms per squared kilometer is an indicator of the closeness to other firms that may act as intermediate suppliers or that may spillover knowledge.

Tables 1 and 2 summarize the statistics of the dependent and explanatory variables for both time periods. Comparing both tables, we observe that the average number

of new firms has increased while the average effective tax rate has decreased over the years. The decrease in ETR was to be expected given the 2003 tax reform mentioned in Subsection 2.2. The number of firms per squared kilometer (Aggl (S)), the market potential (Aggl (D)), the price per m² and investments on the other hand have increased.

Table 1: Descriptive Statistics 98-00

	New firms	ETR	Aggl (S)	Aggl (D)	Price m²	Investments
Mean	2.477	0.313	10.291	10841.06	35.664	1146.005
Std dev	7.037	0.047	29.402	4075.962	29.652	1429.124
Min	0	0.002	0.384	6144	8.3	135.8
Max	68	0.485	210.106	27099	209.9	8289.4

Table 2: Descriptive Statistics 03-05

	New firms	ETR	Aggl (S)	Aggl (D)	Price m²	Investments
Mean	4.651	0.275	14.385	12704.79	66.802	1317.135
Std dev	10.804	0.025	37.760	4674.035	51.705	1676.781
Min	0	0.160	0.744	7400	9	147.4
Max	74	0.344	268.603	30749	350	9324.1

Special attention goes to the variation in the key variables, namely the number of new firms, the ETR and the agglomeration indicators. Figures 2 to 4 illustrate for each variable the values for all districts in the period 03-05. The Figures for period 98-00 are not included because they show the same variation in the variables considered. The absolute values are lower though as became clear from Tables 1 and 2.

As far as the number of new firms is concerned, Figure 2 shows a large variation between the different districts. A district like Brussels or Antwerp - with the harbour – attracts most firms while districts in the South of the country like Aat and Aarlen only attract a very small number of firms.

Figure 2: Number of New Firms by District in Belgium 2003-2005



Figure 3: ETR by District in Belgium 2003-2005



Looking at Figure 3 we can indeed conclude that the ETR varies quite remarkably between the districts going from a high 33% (Virton) to a low 22% (Philippeville).

Figures 4 and 5 show that both supply- and demand induced agglomeration indicators vary substantially between the districts. The most agglomerated regions are situated in the North of the country (Flanders) while the least agglomerated regions are situated in the South (Wallonia). Note that in contrast to the theory, Belgian districts with a high number of firms per squared kilometer or a high market potential are not necessarily the districts with higher effective tax rates. This is also clear from the correlation matrix in Appendix 4 where both agglomeration rents show a negative correlation with the effective tax rates. In other words, Belgium does not follow the core-periphery theory like for example Charlot and Paty (2007) found for France.

Figure 4: Number of Firms per km² by District in Belgium 2003-2005 (Aggl (S))



Figure 5: Market Potential by District in Belgium 2003-2005 (Aggl (D))



In order to obtain a first glance of the relationship between the number of new firms and the ETR, we plot both against each another. Figure 6 illustrates that the effective tax rate on average has a negative effect on the location decision of firms. However, if we look at the district Halle-Vilvoorde for example, we observe from Figure 2 that this district attracts a lot of new firms, although it is amongst the districts with the highest ETR according to Figure 3. Therefore, we expect that other factors such as agglomeration rents can compensate for a high ETR.

Figure 6: New Firms versus ETR by District in Belgium, averages for 2003-2005



Calculating the correlation coefficient between the ETR and the agglomeration indicators gives us a first insight in the possible impact of both types of variables on each other. The correlations between the ETR on the one hand and market potential and the number of firms per squared kilometer on the other hand are respectively -0.11 and -0.28 (cfr. Correlation matrix Appendix 4). This indicates that in determining their taxes, Belgian districts do not appear to take agglomeration effects into account. A district with higher agglomeration rents will in other words not necessarily opt for a higher ETR. There must be other factors influencing the ETR like for instance budgetary reasons. Similar graphs are found for frour important sectors in Belgium, the results are reported in Appendix 3.

4. Methodology

To analyze our research question in a multivariate setting, we estimate the following regression (1).

$$number\ of\ new\ firms_{d,s,t} = \beta_0 + \beta_1 ETR_{d,t-1} + \beta_2 aggl(D)_{d,t-1} + \beta_3 aggl(S)_{d,(s),t-1} + \beta_4 (ETR * aggl(D))_{d,t-1} + \beta_5 (ETR * aggl(S))_{d,(s),t-1} + \beta_6\ price\ building\ lots_{d,t-1} + \beta_7\ gross\ investment_{d,t-1} + \alpha_d + \varepsilon_{d,s,t} \quad (1)$$

where the dependent variable is the count of new firms in a certain Belgian district d in sector s at year t. Two time periods are considered to evaluate the effects over time. This allows us to concentrate on regional tax differences and not on tax shocks over time which is not the research question of this paper. The independent variables are all lagged one year to rule out any potential endogeneity problem. This means that the number of new firms in the period 1999-2001 are assigned to control variables of 1998-2000 and new firms in the period 2004-2006 are assigned to control variables of 2003-2005. The average effective tax rate is, as stated before, the amount of taxes paid divided by the profit before tax. We argue that the effective tax rate paid by the pre-existing stock of firms in a district may be a good indication of the tax rate that new firms might have to pay. Agglomeration is measured in two ways. First, we measure the presence of firm-consumer linkages by looking at the market potential of a district. Harris (1954) was the first to introduce the concept of market potential. He stated that the market potential of a region is the weighted sum of the income of all regions – where the weights are a negative function of the distance. More in particular, he divided the income of each district by the distance to that district. The income of a region close by therefore obtains a higher weight than the income of a region further away. Hanson (2005) in his market potential weighted the incomes by a negative exponential function of distance. Problem with this index is that the weights go to zero very quickly. A region that is 100 km further has a weight of only 3,7 E-44. We therefore opt for the Harris (1954) definition of market potential. More in particular, we calculate market potential as follows:

$$aggl(D)_{d,t-1} = Y_{d,t-1} + \sum_{j \neq d} \frac{Y_{j,t-1}}{distance_{dj}} \quad (2)$$

with $Y_{j,t-1}$ district j's disposable income at time t-1 and dist the distance in kilometers between the capital cities of district d and j. This definition includes the market potential of the own district d and neighboring districts because especially in a small country like Belgium, residents of neighboring districts can also be potential customers. Note that the own income has a weight of one while the other districts

have a weight smaller than 1. Besides all Belgian districts, we also included the foreign neighbors of Belgium (France, Germany and the Netherlands) as more than 65% of Belgian exports goes to these markets.

Second, agglomeration in terms of firm-firm linkages is measured as the number of firms per squared kilometer in a district. This agglomeration measure is also calculated at the three-digit sector level. Both market potential and the presence of firms are interacted with the effective tax rate in the analysis.

A first control variable is the average price of building lots per squared meter and reflects the cost of setting up a new firm. Note that this variable also captures the popularity of a district such as its geographic location. It might therefore be higher for locationally speaking more interesting districts. A second control variable is the gross investment in assets in the district which accounts for the current industrial development of a district. Finally, district specific effects are included. These effects will take into account the size, the fact that some districts already have build up a large infrastructure network, fiscally assisted regions in the years before 2002[6] and other district related unobservable elements that explain firm entry in that area.

Since our dependent variable exists of counts of new firms in a sector in a district, the appropriate approach is a Poisson model. However, there are three particular estimation problems to take into account. First, we observe that the variance is larger than the mean for all estimations we conduct[7] and second there are a lot of zero's for the dependent variable. As Brülhart and Schmidheiny (2009) suggest, we tackle these problems by clustering the standard errors. Third, we want to take into account the district fixed effects. It is obvious that besides the explanatory variables we take into account, there are other unobserved district specific effects that may play a large role in the location decisions. We therefore want to correct for this by either introducing fixed effects or by using district dummy variables.

To summarize, we first estimate the Poisson fixed effects (tackling our third problem) and then we estimate a Poisson with dummy variables and clustered standard errors – tackling all problems at the same time.

[6] Since 2002, the European Commission has forbidden these fiscal stimuli for particular areas.

[7] 3-digit 98-00: mean=0.04; variance=0.35
3-digit 03-05: mean=0.06; variance=0.52

5. Results

Table 3 summarizes the estimation results of equation (1). We first discuss the results from the **fixed effects Poisson estimation** (columns 1-4).

Columns (1) and (2) show the results with supply-side agglomeration (Aggl(S)) measured at the district level, while columns (3) and (4) use supply-side agglomeration measured at the 3-digit sector level. First, we find that the ETR is only significant in the second time period. This might indicate that regional competition for firms became stronger since 2004 which is also observed in the rest of Europe (Crabbé & Vandenbussche, 2008). The negative impact of the ETR is however mitigated by both types of agglomeration rents. The positive interaction effects illustrate that a larger market potential and a larger presence of firms in a district weaken the negative impact from a higher effective tax rate.

Before the tax reform, the sample period 1999-2001, market potential as such seems to be an important location determinant. The presence of firms in a district does not attract firms, although the presence of firms in the same sector does increase firm entry in that sector in a district. However, this positive agglomeration effect is weakened by higher effective tax rates (negative interaction effect).

As far as the control variables are concerned, we observe a positive impact of investments in the previous period. Furthermore, the price per squared meter for building lots is positive and significant indicating that (ceteris paribus) firms invest in districts where prices are high. At first sight, this seems contradictive, but it is possible that prices are correlated with the district-specific effects[8].

The second part of Table 3 reports the results of the **Poisson estimation with district dummy variables and clustering** of standard errors at the district level (columns 5-8)[9]. Using district dummy variables, we have the risk of an incidental parameters problem but we will not interpret the coefficients of the dummy variables. The coefficients considered are not 'affected' by our estimation method, only the standard errors are more conservative.

For the first time period we obtain the same effects as in the Poisson estimation with fixed effects. Demand-side induced agglomeration rents positively influence location decisions. Moreover, at the 3-digit level supply-side induced agglomeration rents are also positively significant. The presence of other firms within the same

[8] Brüllhart et al. (2009) also find this odd positive effect of housing prices in Switzerland on firm entry.

[9] Since it is not possible in Stata to perform a Poisson estimation with fixed effects and clustered standard errors at the same time. We therefore estimate the Poisson regression with district dummies and clustered standard errors.

sector is therefore attractive. The positive spillover effects from firms apparently outweigh the negative competition effects.

As far as the second time period is concerned, we find hardly any significant variables anymore. This is however not surprising given the high Loglikelihood. Using district clustered standard errors, we conclude that taxes and agglomeration rents do not appear to influence location decisions in the period 2004-2006. Once a firm decides to set up activity in Belgium, agglomeration rents as such will no longer determine the location outcome within the country. There will be other factors playing a role in determining the location outcome. A recent study by Ernst and Young (2010) indeed shows the importance of other location determinants within Belgium. They find that Wallonia starts attracting more firms than Flanders or Brussels and argue that this is mainly because of subsidies and the space available to set up or expand a plant.

Table 3: Estimation results for firm-agglomeration (Aggl(S)) at the district level and at the sector level for both time periods; Poisson fixed effects and Poisson with dummies and clustering

	Poisson with fixed effects				Poisson with dummy variables and clustering			
	(1) 99-01 district	(2) 04-06 district	(3) 99-01 3-digit	(4) 04-06 3-digit	(1) 99-01 district	(2) 04-06 district	(3) 99-01 3-digit	(4) 04-06 3-digit
Etr_{t-1}	37.40 (49.69)	-37.25** (18.67)	47.07 (48.50)	-36.57*** (18.04)	37.40 (30.98)	-37.26 (47.54)	47.07	-36.57 (47.63)
$Aggl(D)_{t-1}$	0.003** (0.001)	0.0001 (0.0003)	0.004*** (0.001)	0.00009 (0.0004)	0.003** (0.001)	0.0001 (0.001)	0.004***	0.00009 (0.001)
$Aggl(S)_{t-1}$	0.118 (0.521)	-0.054 (0.036)	14.85*** (6.67)	1.31 (1.14)	0.118 (0.431)	-0.054 (0.039)	14.85*	1.308 (1.517)
$(etr*Aggl(D))_{t-1}$	-0.004 (0.005)	0.003* (0.002)	-0.005 (0.004)	0.003** (0.001)	-0.004 (0.003)	0.003 (0.004)	-0.004 (0.003)	0.003 (0.004)
$(etr*Aggl(S))_{t-1}$	-0.047 (1.668)	0.267** (0.136)	-51.94*** (23.15)	-5.28 (4.58)	-0.047 (1.376)	0.267 (0.173)	-51.94* (29.91)	-5.283 (6.119)
$Price_{t-1}$	0.002 (0.031)	0.004* (0.002)	-0.012 (0.025)	0.007*** (0.002)	0.002 (0.025)	0.004 (0.003)	-0.012 (0.019)	0.007*** (0.003)
$Infr_{t-1}$	0.001 (0.002)	0.001*** (0.0004)	0.002 (0.002)	0.001*** (0.0004)	0.001 (0.002)	0.002 (0.001)	0.002 (0.002)	0.001* (0.0007)
Observations	7995	8450	8026	8484	9097	9061	9139	9101
Loglikelihood	-818.75	-1923.58	-827.31	-1943.04	-869.99	-1989.90	-878.54	-2009.37

Note: standard errors are reported between brackets. Stars indicate the level of significance, *** is significant at the 1% level ** is significant at the 5% level and * is significant at the 10% level.

6. Conclusion

This paper tackled the location determinants of new firms setting up activity in 43 different Belgian districts in the period 99-01 and 04-06. Literature has shown that taxes and agglomeration rents play a large role in a firm's location decision. Higher effective tax rates tend to deter firms while agglomeration rents are a centripetal force.

We investigated the impact of both taxes and agglomeration rents separately as well as their interaction. The effective tax rate shows a strong negative relation with firm entry after the tax reform while it is not significant in the period 1999-2001. This might indicate that regional competition for firms became stronger since 2004. The results also show that the presence of firms or a high market potential can soften this negative effect of high taxes on firm entry.

As far as the agglomeration rents are concerned, we took both supply- and demand-induced indicators into account. Both the market access effect and the supply-side induced variable turn out to be important – depending on the level of (sector) disaggregation and the period considered. The market access effect is only significant in the first time period. Supply-side induced agglomeration rents attract firms at the regional and 3-digit sector level in the first time period. We can therefore conclude that agglomeration rents have a positive impact on location decisions of firms when they are measured at the sector level. In other words, the presence of firms as such is not an important location determinant, the presence of firms within the same sector however is.

Finally, looking at the interaction between both location determinants, we note that a better market access can mitigate the negative impact of a high ETR on the location decisions of firms. As far as the supply-side induced agglomeration rents are concerned, we conclude that a higher effective tax rate weakens the impact of the agglomeration rents. Effective tax rates on their own therefore (partially) influence the location outcomes of firms within Belgium, but especially either mitigate or rather strengthen the impact of agglomeration rents in the first time period. In the second time period, effective tax rates and agglomeration rents appear not to play a significant role anymore. Indeed, over time other location determinants must have become more important such as the availability of land. A firm now deciding to set up activity within Belgium will no longer be influenced by the presence of other firms or the tax rate.

Appendices

Appendix 1: Belgian Regions and Districts

Belgium has an area of 30 528 squared kilometers and a population of 10.4 million. It exists of 589 municipalities which have representative democracies taking care of their own expenditures and revenues. Municipalities levy on average 20 different taxes that account for more than 40 percent of local revenues where the surcharges on the federal income and property tax are the most important ones (Heyndels and Vuchelen (1998)). These municipalities are grouped into 43 districts for administrative and election reasons. Again these districts are grouped into ten provinces with their own provincial governor and the provinces themselves are divided into three regions with their own regional parliament: Flanders, Brussels and Wallonia. The analysis in this article focuses on the 42 districts in Flanders and Wallonia as illustrated in the following table as well as the district of Brussels.

Region	District
Flanders	Aalst Antwerpen Brugge Dendermonde Diksmuide Eeklo Gent Halle-Vilvoorde Hasselt Ieper Kortrijk Leuven Maaseik Mechelen Oostende Oudenaarde Roeselare Sint-Niklaas Tielt Tongeren Turnhout Veurne
Wallonia	Aarlen Aat Bastenaken Bergen Borgworm Charleroi Dinant Doornik Hoei Luik Marche-en-Famenne Moeskroen Namen Neufchateau Nijvel Philippeville Thuin Verviers Virton Zinnik

Appendix 2: Regional Surcharges on Property Tax in Belgium, 2003-2005

The ETR or real tax burden of a firm differs across districts because of several reasons such as more tax evasion in districts with a less efficient local tax administration (Moesen et al., 1994), tax rulings or differences in deductible local taxes.

In this appendix we will give an example on how the surcharges on property tax can influence the ETR. The general property tax in Flanders is 2.5%, while the property tax in Wallonia and Brussels is 1.25%. Both the province and the municipality can ask a surcharge on this percentage. Our example is for the Flemish and Walloon municipalities with the highest and lowest surcharge in 2006. We assume the cadastral income of a building (2600 m^3) to be for example 7000 euro and calculate the difference in taxes paid. Note that the taxes that are paid can be deducted from the firm's taxable profit.

Flanders:

Regional property tax: 7000x2.5%= 175 euro

Lowest surcharge = 1250 in for example Diksmuide → 175x 12.50= 2188 euro
Highest surcharge = 2250 in for example Mol → 175x22.5= 3938 euro

Wallonia:

Regional property tax: 7000x1.25%= 87.5 euro

Highest surcharge in for example Huy= 3100 → 87.5x31=2713 euro

Lowest surcharge in for example Lasne =1200 →87.5x12= 1050 euro

These amounts can be substracted from the taxable base for the corporate tax calculation and thus lowers the ETR.

The average variation in surcharges across districts is large according to Figure A1. Note that on average the surcharges in Flanders are lower than in Wallonia. Because of the higher property tax in Flanders however this does not automatically imply a lower total property tax cost in Flanders.

Figure A1: Surcharges on property tax in 2006 in Belgium at district level



Appendix 3: Scatterplots for the 5 Sectors with the largest Number of New Firms

Figure A2: New Firms versus ETR by District in Belgium 2003-2005 for the business service sector



Figure A2: New Firms versus ETR by District in Belgium 2003-2005 for the financial services sector



Figure A3: New Firms versus ETR by District in Belgium 2003-2005 for the real estate sector



Figure A6: New Firms versus ETR by District in Belgium 2003-2005 for the chemical sector



Appendix 4: Correlation matrix 98-00 and 03-05

	N° of new firms	Etr_{t-1}	$Aggl(D)_{t-1}$	$Aggl(S)_{t-1}$	$(etr*Aggl(D))_{t-1}$	$(etr*Aggl(S))_{t-1}$	$Price_{t-1}$	$Infr_{t-1}$
N° of new firms	1							
Etr_{t-1}	-0.015	1						
$Aggl(D)_{t-1}$	0.081	-0.092	1					
$Aggl(S)_{t-1}$	0.096	-0.237	0.589	1				
$(etr*Aggl(D))_{t-1}$	0.078	0.057	0.977	0.503	1			
$(etr*Aggl(S))_{t-1}$	0.097	-0.142	0.564	0.999	0.507	1		
$Price_{t-1}$	0.073	-0.158	0.692	0.753	0.643	0.754	1	
$Infr_{t-1}$	0.083	-0.142	0.956	0.659	0.926	0.661	0.802	1

	N° of new firms	Etr_{t-1}	$Aggl(D)_{t-1}$	$Aggl(S)_{t-1}$	$(etr*Aggl(S))_{t-1}$	$(etr*Aggl(D))_{t-1}$	$Price_{t-1}$	$Infr_{t-1}$
N° of new firms	1							
Etr_{t-1}	-0.046	1						
$Aggl(D)_{t-1}$	0.137	-0.092	1					
$Aggl(S)_{t-1}$	0.160	-0.137	0.589	1				
$(etr*Aggl(D))_{t-1}$	0.124	0.086	0.981	0.509	1			
$(etr*Aggl(S))_{t-1}$	0.161	-0.228	0.594	0.999	0.516	1		
$Price_{t-1}$	0.130	-0.236	0.701	0.667	0.671	0.644	1	
$Infr_{t-1}$	0.149	-0.141	0.943	0.666	0.670	0.906	0.793	1

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