

ucational problems. It was my aim, in the just-mentioned chapter and elsewhere, to make explicit certain aspects of Bode's philosophy as the standpoint from which he discussed educational problems. In the sense that I made explicit something which was implicit in most of Bode's educational writings, therefore, I have done something that Bode did not do.

164 Although Bode was gifted in his ability to put his notions in "common-sense terms," the fact remains that he was not writing for the common man in his philosophical essays. Surely, in part at least, it is the work of a philosopher, *as philosopher*, to try to gain insights into ideas that may give direction to the life men share in common. In doing so, a technical language is developed, an "uncommon" language. And, like other philosophers, Bode sometimes wrote in uncommon terms.

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TAXONOMY OF EDUCATIONAL OBJECTIVES  
HANDBOOK II: AFFECTIVE DOMAIN

by DAVID R. KRATHWOHL,  
BENJAMIN S. BLOOM, and  
BERTRAM B. MASIA

David McKay Company, New York, 1964.

With the publication of *Handbook II: Affective Domain*, the *Taxonomy of Educational Objectives* nears completion. Only one volume of the projected three volume series now remains undone. When it is finished, if everything goes as planned, we will have at our disposal three systematic schemes for rationally classifying those propositions in educational discourse which function as objectives for student behavior. Respectively labeled "Cognitive," "Affective," and "Psychomotor," each of these schemes or domains, then, will have appeared as a separate publication in this broad classification venture. Although presently incomplete, the project already shows promise of becoming the most

comprehensive and detailed study of categories for ordering educational goals yet made available to the professional educator. If this promise is fully realized, the *Taxonomy* should be of considerable aid in selecting, organizing, or evaluating almost any set of instructional activities.

Needless to say, such a project is worthy of every educator's attention. As the authors themselves point out, all too frequently our descriptions of the behavior we want our students to achieve are stated as nothing but meaningless platitudes and empty clichés. (p. 4) If our educational objectives, they continue, are actually to give direction to the activities of both students and teachers, we must "tighten" our language by making the terminology with which we express our aims more clear and meaningful. Certainly, to the extent that the *Taxonomy* contributes to the achievement of such an outcome, it possesses much that is of worth. Any criticisms I may have of the *Affective Domain*, then, are to be looked upon as my attempt to join with its authors and share in this task of clarifying the language of education. 165

## I

### Ontology without logic

Following the format established with the *Cognitive Domain*, the *Affective Domain* is divided into two major sections or parts. The first is largely devoted to describing the nature of the affective taxonomy, explaining its development, and examining various assumptions upon which it rests. The second is composed of the classification scheme itself, together with numerous sets of illustrative objectives and test items. This classification scheme, or taxonomy, is made up of five hierarchically arranged categories which provide individual descriptions of different changes that occur in behavior as values or attitudes are learned. Each of these categories, then, is partitioned into several subdivisions that contain groups of sample test items and educational objectives. In all, the five categories furnish a total of thirteen separate subdivisions.

In contrast with the first handbook, this one devotes considerably more space to the business of introducing and explaining its system of classification. No doubt, this is partially due to the fact that the authors found it necessary to carefully relate it to the former taxonomy as well as clearly describe some of the

unique problems involved in investigating its often ignored subject matter. However, one gets the further impression that it is also due to a desire on the part of these writers to respond to various criticisms that may have been brought against the earlier volume and, unless countered now, may well be raised again to plague this one.

166 The opening sections of the fourth chapter contain one of these apparent responses. I call attention to it because it functions as an important part of the rationale currently used by the authors to support their entire triparted taxonomic project. Here, they point out that when distinguishing between affective and cognitive objectives, they are *not* to be interpreted as suggesting that there exists a parallel distinction built into the basic fabric of behavior. ((p. 45) They assert that the *Taxonomy* is purely an analytic abstraction. Its division into three domains, cognitive, affective, and psychomotor, is an arbitrary arrangement that seems to best reflect the way in which educators have traditionally classified teaching objectives. (p. 47) It does not reflect intrinsic separations within behavior.

If there are any who would wish to take serious issue with the adequacy of this stance, I am certainly not one of them. I find it to be quite acceptable. What I do have difficulty with, however, is the fact that the authors — without apparent concern — weave a contradictory theme into their position as they go about fashioning it. After emphasizing that behavior cannot be dissected into cognitive and affective segments, they immediately turn about and assert that, in order to properly study it, they must “tease” it apart into cognitive and affective components. (pp. 45-46) When they tell us that there is a fundamental cognitive-affective unity to behavior, they follow by contending that *cognitive behavior* is involved in *affective behavior*. This contradiction is affirmed time and again as the terms ‘cognitive behavior’ and ‘affective behavior’ are repeatedly employed in describing human conduct. Its presence strongly indicates that on ontological characterization of behavior has been substituted for a taxonomic description of educational objectives. A domain composed of a certain kind of goal statements has been converted into a domain composed of an alleged species of behavior. Certainly, any study said to be rooted in a scientific behaviorism has no room in it for any such category mistakes. The propositions used to describe various separations among certain objectives, or goal statements, cannot be automatically applied to the subject matter of those objectives without bringing about a serious methodological error.

II

The

"official doctrine"

again

In order to establish a true taxonomy, descriptions of various categories or classes must be ordered and related to one another in some systematic manner. Otherwise, the descriptions will follow in an accidental or random fashion precluding any but chance possibility that they will ever form an identifiable scheme. As a means of providing such unity to the various affective objectives they were considering for inclusion in their taxonomy, the *Affective Domain* authors elected to employ the concept of "internalization" as their central regulative device. Objectives then could be systematically organized along a hierarchical continuum according to the degree that a learner could be said to have internalized attitudes, values, or affective responses. For these writers, this concept appeared suitable not only because it permitted the construction of a "meaningful continuum," but also because it was compatible with certain theories of how affective learning takes place and it was consistent with the behavioral point of view. (p. 28) Thus, they probably felt that as long as they confined the content of their affective categories to descriptions of behavioral phenomena their affective taxonomy would rest on a reasonably secure methodological foundation. Upon close inspection, however, this does seem to be the case. 167

By using the notion of "internalization" as their principal classification tool, the authors seem to have infused the *Affective Domain* with a mind-body dualism. Unless 'internalization' is given a non-inventive stipulative definition, it is generally taken to be a word that is used in referring to a process whereby something, in one way or another, is transferred from an external state or location to one that is internal. Thus, an internal-external or inner-outer division of something is clearly implicated. In fact, it cannot be logically avoided.

Such an implication is present in the *Affective Domain*. Although its authors have attempted to give the term 'internalization' a non-inventive stipulative definition by linking it with such expressions as 'socialization' and 'adopted behavior,' they also have characterized its use by repeatedly falling back upon theories, phrases, and words that implicate or suggest an internal-external dichotomy. We find them speaking of "inner growth,"

“inner control,” “outward behavior,” “inner compulsion,” and “external-to-internal control transition.”

Of course, the use of these terms and phrases, alone, does not implicate a concept of man that necessarily represents a Cartesian dualism. It might be the case, for example, that the authors have employed such expressions merely to indicate the location of various stimuli sources relative to the outer surface or epidermis of an organism. Thus, the behavior described by an affective objective could be considered internalized if the stimuli source leading to its occurrence were located inside of an organism rather than outside of it.

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Initially, this appears to be exactly what the authors are saying. In speaking of internalization as growth, they assert that external or environmental control progressively yields to internal control so that, in the case of acquiring affective responses, there is a gradual decrease of the former and increase of the latter. (p. 30) External control is successively replaced by internal control. However, when we attempt to find out explicitly what constitutes these controls, the entire matter begins to take on a distinctly different form. Although there is considerable discussion of individuals responding to stimuli, that which is described as being internalized and is said to control behavior is not considered to be a stimulus source. Instead, it appears to be a value or set of values. Values, the authors say, are successively internalized by the learner. (p. 35) As the internalization process unfolds, these values are absorbed more and more into an individual's internal controlling structure. (pp. 27-28) At the outset of the process, they merely capture the student's attention while at the end they are accepted into his interrelated view of the world. (p. 33)

From this it is difficult not to get the impression that the authors are saying that the process of internalization begins when a given value is selected from someplace exterior to the surface of the organism and then is gradually brought into its interior. Their heavy reliance upon psychoanalytic theory, as an aid in explaining their position, further supports this. They assert that the major aspect of internalization is the process of *incorporating* something within one's mind or body. (p. 29) To internalize values, they indicate, is to *incorporate*, as one's own various moral standards. (p. 39)

Clearly, at this point, these writers cannot be talking about the origins of stimuli. That is, they cannot be treating values as either external or internal stimuli sources. External stimuli

sources — unless, of course, they are objects such as food or knives actually being injected into organisms — cannot be incorporated into individuals. They may give rise to various responses on the part of the individual but, certainly, they are not incorporated into him. Internal stimuli sources, on the other hand, are sources of stimuli located within organisms. They are internal by definition. What sense, then, would it make to speak of them as being *incorporated* within an organism? They are already inside it. Consequently, it appears that the authors of the *Affective Domain*, no matter what they assert to the contrary, do not consistently subscribe to an operational behaviorism. Their occasional reliance upon a mentalistic use of the terms “willing,” “consciousness,” “superego,” and “conscience,” lends further credence to this conclusion. Their brand of behaviorism, therefore, takes on the appearance of a mask. It seems to be applied as though those who fashioned it were not yet quite convinced that modifications of behavior could be adequately explained without postulating the existence of a mind allegedly located someplace in the body. 169

### III

#### Is a taxonomy without metaphysics possible?

Lack of space prohibits any further probing at this time. Before concluding, however, I would like to make one final observation. Thus far, my comments have been directed at only the first part of the *Cognitive Domain*. The second part, which is largely confined to the presentment of the taxonomy proper, has been almost totally ignored. The reason for this is that I think it has been rather well done and there is little to be said about it in the absence of a broad empirical investigation into its general usefulness. Nevertheless, I do have one problem with it. I have considerable difficulty in locating any extensive connection between it and the rationale used in the first half of the book to support it. In this respect, the two sections appear to be logically independent. The metaphysical overtones pervading much of the first section, are completely lacking in the second. All implied reference to a class of affective behaviors has disappeared and any implication that values are allegedly incorporated into either a mind or an organism is totally absent. A behavior-

istic language has been substituted for the earlier dualistic one while the notion of conditioning has apparently replaced the concept of internalization. Thus, I feel as though I must end with a question. Why did the authors of the *Affective Domain* find it necessary to construct a metaphysical support for their venture when it can stand very well without such a crutch?

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A POCKET  
FULL OF POESIES

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You are beginning to read an arbitrary and personal selection and review of last year's periodical literature in which there was reference to philosophy and education.

Last year — P. E. of '64 — was nicely summed by Arthur H. Moehlman in the January, 1965 *Newsletter* of the Department of History and Philosophy of Education, The University of Texas. Professor Moehlman's summation was not intended as such. He was pointing the future for the spirited young and the "young in spirit." He signalled, "diversity in philosophy of education," which, "helps to guarantee a perpetual renaissance, or new take-off phases for philosophy directly involved in the field of vital common human experience and oriented toward humankind's vast future."

In the pot-pourri of non-rhyming poesies to follow, I shall carefully dissect bits of *blank* verse masquerading as philosophy *in* or *and* or *of* or *for* or *beyond* education. In wielding my knife of abstracting, I shall lift out — when this action seems possible — those bits which seem to be the *raison d'être* of the whole. In my cutting, quotations will be taken out of context and the organic wholeness of the pieces reviewed might be seriously impaired. It is quite possible that with such maltreatment an organism might die. If such should happen: *corpus requiescat malis*.