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AN ABSTRACT OF THESIS OF Carlos R. Rivera for the Master of Arts in History presented November 4, 1988.

- Title: The American Naval Nightmare: Defending the Western Pacific, 1898-1922.
- APPROVED BY MEMBERS OF THE THESIS COMMUTTEE:)

Bernard V. Burke, Chairman	
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The subject of this work is the strategic problems faced by the United States Navy in the Western Pacific following the acquisition of the Philippine Islands as a result of the Spanish-American War. Using primary materials from the National Archives, Naval War College, and Library of Congress Manuscript Division, some of which have only recently been declassified, the rarely publicized works of the United States Navy in regards to strategic planning and national interests are detailed. Secondary accounts, along with contemporary periodical literature, supplement the previously classified documents.

Of particular use were the extensive records of the General Board found in the Archives, as well as in the Naval College, that repeatedly stressed the problems of defending the newly acquired territories in the Western Pacific without adequate facilities, a handicap that would continue throughout the period in question. A lack of support reduced mission capabilities. Any deployment of naval forces from home waters to the Philippines, a distance of over 7,000 miles, meant that upon arrival those forces would require extensive replenishment, re-supply, and quite possibly damage repairs.

The challenge faced by the U. S. Navy during the period of 1898-1922 was: How would it carry out an undefined national policy related to defending American territory in the Far East? The nation as a whole never attempted to define the role of the navy vis-á-vis the defense of American interests in the Western Pacific, instead dealing with emerging contingencies. Naval planners routinely pointed out that a lack of a definite policy hamstrung the navy as they could never be sure that planning studies and ship building programs would be supported by the nation.

The previously unavailable material thoroughly refutes the oft repeated claim that Theodore Roosevelt, Alfred Thayer Mahan, and Henry Cabot Lodge conspired to lead the United States into war with Spain, so as to acquire territory and naval bases. Declassified papers document the evolution of naval planning in preparation for a "possible" war, well before Roosevelt's tenure as Assistant Secretary of Navy.

THE AMERICAN NAVAL NIGHTMARE: DEFENDING THE WESTERN PACIFIC,

1898-1922

by

CARLOS R. RIVERA

A thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of


MASTER OF ARTS in HISTORY

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1988

TO THE OFFICE OF GRADUATE STUDIES:

The members of the Committee approve the thesis of Carlos R. Rivera presented November 4, 1988.



Bernard Ross, Vice Provost for Graduate Studies

TABLE OF CONTENTS

		PAGE
ACKNOWLE	DGEMENTS	iii
CHAPTER		
I	INTRODUCTION	1
	The Need for Naval Bases	1
	Mahan, Sea Power and Bases	3
	Impact on Foreign Navies	7
	Acquisition of Bases in Asia, 1897-1898	16
II	THE UNITED STATES NAVY IN THE PHILIPPINES	28
	Planning, 1896-1898	28
	Preparations: January-May, 1898	35
	Results of Victory	43
III	DEFENDING THE WESTERN PACIFIC, 1898-1913	61
	Naval Base Problems, 1898-1908	61
	Japan as the Enemy	81
IV	W.W. I AND THE WESTERN PACIFIC, 1919-1922	104
	Strategic Problems, 1914-1919	104
	End of the Dream for a Far East Base, 1919-1922	118
WORKS CO	NSULTED	131

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

THE NEED FOR NAVAL BASES

The recent turmoil surrounding the unsettled political situation in the Philippine Islands has, in a strategic sense, threatened the United States with the potential loss of her ability to protect our national interests in the Western Pacific. The deprivation of naval facilities at Subic Bay and Cubi Point would force the withdrawal of American naval forces to either our most distant facility in the region, Guam, or, in a worse case scenario, Hawaii. Such a retirement eastward would concurrently bring with it a reduction in the ability of the United States to project its military power in the Western Pacific. This inability to project power in order to defend national interests, whether political or economic, is not one of a recent origin in American history. At this moment the United States has possession of or access to the following major naval support facilities in the Western Pacific: (1) Guam, (2) Subic Bay and Cubi Point in the Philippines, and (3) Yokosuka and Sasebo in Japan. Additional limited facilities are available in Singapore and American Samoa. Prior to 1899 The United States Navy had no overseas bases or facilities and limited access to an American owned coal depot in Yokohama, Japan and docking privileges in Hong Kong.

Other than a desire for access to Asian markets, the United States had slight interest in the Western Pacific before the 1890's. During that decade, however, the military planning philosophies of Alfred Thayer Mahan, in conjunction with the threatened partition of China by the major European powers, forced the United States to reconsider her western hemispheric concerns in favor of protecting its long term interests in the Western Pacific. There existed no broad policy planning or "conspiracy" to expand territorially into Asia, but a confluence of personalities and events led to an intimate American involvement thus necessitating the ability to respond and react to incidents in a timely manner. The U.S. Navy was able to carry out this mission in a limited sense, limited because it was only at the convenience of the major powers possessing support facilities in the region and who at an inopportune moment could deny their use to American naval forces as did actually occur after the beginning of the Spanish-American War when both Japan and Britain refused access to the belligerents in compliance with international law.

Commodore Dewey's startling victory at Manila Bay in 1898 presented a major problem. Defeat of the Spanish required him to remain on "station" to protect his position amidst lack of any major support facilities. This situation, along with the influence of strong naval power adherents pushed the Nation into the realm of "Realpolitik". A large navy required facilities, both foreign and domestic, to support wide-ranging commitments and interests in the Western Pacific. Thus, the Philippines (and Guam) were considered ideal locations for protecting such interests.

The bulk of this work deals with the Navy's attempts between 1898 and 1921 to secure for itself the major support facilities it felt would be needed to sustain any missions overseas. The inability of the nation as a whole to spell out realistically a national policy and the Navy's role in it (beyond just responding to emergencies) meant that eventually Naval planners would be left in frustration as to whether or not to push for their agenda, specifically, overseas naval bases, for in the late 1800's naval forces were the most effective and sometimes only available method of advancing national interests. Three components are required to carry out successfully national policy and missions (national interests)²: National will, Congressional support and Executive direction. Rarely were those three in synchronization and thus, like an old three legged stool, planning suffered from one imbalance or another.

MAHAN, SEA POWER AND BASES

Naval strategy and policy planning grew to be based on the expressions of Alfred Thayer Mahan and his pivotal work, <u>The Influence of Sea Power upon History, 1660-1783</u>, almost exclusively dealing with the historical and strategic success of the British Navy.³ Using this platform Mahan wanted his own nation to aspire to a more expanded role for itself in international affairs, a task requiring a large navy and support facilities to sustain its missions. It has to be noted that Mahan did not invent nor discover naval strategy, but he was one of the earliest historians to collate the lessons of Britain's success upon the sea and widely publicize them. His endeavor served to inspire

others, with William E. Livezey noting:

All in all, Mahan's facts were so freshly and powerfully presented against the background of naval history in its wider bearings and in such a popular nonprofessional style that both from the manner of treating and resulting creation of interest, he may rightly be called the father of naval historiography.

Most of Mahan's <u>The Influence of Sea Power Upon History</u> dealt with how Britain grew powerful by dominating commercial trade routes with her navy. As the subject of this work deals primarily with naval bases, we should examine some of the views that Mahan espoused, as they applied to the Pacific.⁵

Though most of the advocates of the "Large Policy" (calling for a larger navy and a more involved international participation by the United States) held that the Pacific Ocean was to be "the theatre of the great events of the coming century" and cognizant of "the beginning of momentous issues in China and Japan" their "vision reached not past Hawaii."⁶ Mahan himself never advocated offensive action against the Philippines or acquisition of territory beyond Hawaii until after the Spanish-American War began, although he has been credited with such ambitions.⁷ His work on naval power dealt with how a nation flexed its forces overseas, indeed, how its effectiveness depended on strong bases and naval stations, particularly distant colonial points d'appui. He had recognized this as the strength of Britain's primacy on the world's sea-lanes, as ships sailing from and to England and points in between needed safe home ports to ensure that commercial shipping was protected. Mahan noted that colonies, and naval bases by extension, "...facilitate and enlarge the operations of shipping and tend to protect it by multiplying points of safety...."⁸ Strong interconnected overseas stations allowed the Royal Navy to project power worldwide and with few exceptions controlled vital choke points that provided them effective control of the seas. Mahan saw this as "the maintenance of suitable naval stations in those distant parts of the world..." which allowed the projection of naval power. Mahan's definition of command or control of the seas⁹ is also intertwined with the question of national policy, as he clearly recognized that the ultimate purpose of military and naval force is to enforce the will of the government, whether a democratic institution or a coercive regime:

Before hostile armies or fleets are brought into contact (a word which better perhaps than any indicates the dividing line between tactics and strategy), there are a number of questions to be decided, covering the whole plan of operations throughout the theatre of war. Among these are the proper function of the navy in war; its true objective; the points or points upon which it should be concentrated; the establishment of depots of coal and supplies; the maintenance of communications between these depots and the home base; the military value of commerce-destroying as a decisive or a secondary operation of war; the system upon which commerce-destroying can be most efficiently conducted, whether by scattered cruisers or by holding in force some vital centre through which commercial shipping must pass. All these are strategic questions....

The strategic questions not only required the three components of national policy previously discussed but also required a military and naval force prepared for contingencies and the necessary support facilities, whether training, repair, docking or supplies. Another facet was the distant stations that not only allowed the nation control of the sea but permitted the interdiction of hostile or neutral shipping that could be a disadvantage to the nation.¹¹ Even more importantly, and holding implications for the future, the theorist

noted, "The protection of such stations must depend upon either direct military force... or upon a surrounding friendly population."¹² Mahan foresaw that failure to secure such a base against hostile forces would nullify its ability to support naval missions. Without a secure base warships would be unable to refuel, repair or even sortie, thus degrading fleets and national policy alike. Mahan, in 1890, felt that the United States would not likely acquire colonies as the social and political framework of the nation and population was not conducive to colonialism. By July, 1898, however, Mahan felt the time was ripe for America to acquire overseas territory and along with that, naval bases and stations.¹³

Mahan's influence on American Naval policy planners has to be measured in regard to the era. A Navy previously dwelling in the doldrums because of a lack of funding and national concern was now growing with increasing naval power and appropriations, and facing heightened international tensions (Britain and Venezuela, the question of the Samoan Islands, Japan and Hawaii, the Sino-Japanese War, the Cuban insurrection and the probable disintegration of China).¹⁴ It was a military force looking for a direction and Mahan provided the compass. His <u>Influence of Sea Power upon History</u> volume convinced naval policy makers that a "large" navy would not only support national interest but also provided them with a raison d'etre:

Fellow officers were "delighted" and "proud" of him. They congratulated him for having written an "admirable book" filled with "astonishing and convincing truths," and they thanked him for having aided them in crystallizing what before was "rather nebulous" in their minds regarding "the proper way to carry on war." Civilian observers further noted that "the results of the inquiry are used...for the benefit of the authors fellow citizens" and that Mahan had "the circumstances of his own country in view;... to rekindle in the hearts of his fellow-countrymen some desire to contest the supremacy of the seas."¹⁶

Mahan wanted to awaken his country to the dangers of complacency and the possible losses to the United States if it failed to change its ways and recover from what was considered the "folly of false economy" and "the stupidity of non-preparedness" and "the impossibility of preparation on the spur of the moment."¹⁷ To connect Mahan to the imperialist movement is incorrect, because he did not see imperialism in itself a great adventure; rather the furtherance of the nation as a whole required that America "look outward", beyond continental barriers, to enhance, and sustain the nation as a powerful entity:

The profound influence upon the wealth and strength of countries was clearly seen long before the true principles which governed its growth and prosperity were detected. To secure to one's own people a disproportionate share of such benefits, every effort was made to exclude others, either by peaceful legislative methods of monopoly or prohibitory regulations, or, when these failed, by direct violence. The clash of interests, the angry feelings roused by conflicting attempts thus to appropriate the larger share, if not the whole, of the advantages of commerce, and of distant unsettled commercial regions, led to wars.

Naval officers did not see imperialism per se as an antidote for a less than respectable Navy, because while Mahan called for the nation to "acquire suitable bases, enlarge its merchant marine, complete the proposed Isthmian [Panama] Canal" and to build an "adequate Navy" their primary interest was on the last item, basically, what should the Navy do in this overall scenario?¹⁹

IMPACT ON FOREIGN NAVIES

Mahan's influence of American naval planners was strong as on foreign navies and world opinion. While his work was primarily devoted to British hegemony at sea and designed to influence domestic policy, the translation of The Influence of Sea Power upon History into many languages spread the Mahan gospel far and wide. The volume was rendered into French, German, Japanese, Russian, Italian and Spanish, as well as English, and went through fifteen editions between 1890 and 1898.20 Drawing praise from all corners of the world for his "adept handling of the tangled thread of causation and his substantiated evidence" of the importance of sea power, many governments used the philosophy to begin strengthening their navies and to justify the advancement of their own national interests, whether in close proximity or the distant overseas regions.²¹ Mahan cannot be held accountable for the many uses of his work by policy planners, foreign and domestic, and although many try to blame him for the rise of imperialism in the 1890's, for the most part he only wrote and preached strategy, he did not create a widespread movement. Mahan did not lead the imperialist forces nor did he authorize or legislate any such action, because he was an influential naval officer not a politician.²² No one was under any obligation to accept or believe his philosophy, but that does not negate his widespread effect on other powerful and responsible leaders, here and abroad.²³

As the subject of this work deals primarily with the problem faced by the United States Navy in regard to the unsettled situation of the naval base question in the Western Pacific, a look at the German, Japanese and British navies in regard to Mahan's effect is in order. Since Germany was considered a potential military opponent as early as 1897 in the Pacific (and would be until 1905), an overview provides a good example of Mahan's influence. Prior to 1897, Germany, under William II, longed for a navy strong enough to challenge Britain's so as to achieve the same accomplishments in the international realm. In the late 1880's German influence and power had spread to the Central Pacific with trading firms in the fore providing a foothold leading to the eventual annexation of the Marshall Islands and challenging Spanish claims to the Caroline Islands.²⁴ William E. Livezey noted:

The German Colonial Office threw their support behind acquisitions and enlarged naval appropriations. There can be no doubt but that German trade interests and increased dependence on overseas food supplies definitely contributed to German Naval and Colonial policies.

By 1897 the German Admiralty, under the strong leadership of Minister of Marine, Alfred von Tirpitz, and the German nation were ready to involve themselves in international politics (and in fact had already done so in 1895, in an incident related below), using sea power with Mahan as a guide and overseas acquisitions, something that the Kaiser referred to as "maritime fulcra" upon which the German Empire could assert itself in the expected Great Power competition.²⁶ Germany did not want to be left out of the Great Power race:

In the last century we were too late to partake of the general partition [Asia, South America and Africa]. But a second partition is forthcoming. We need only consider the . . . isolation of China, that new India of the Far East, the unstable condition of South American states to see what rich opportunities await us. In order not to miss them this time we require a fleet. We must be so strong at sea that no nation which feels itself safe from our military [land] power may dare to overlook us in partition negotiations, and there is no time to be lost.

The author was a captain on the German Grand General Staff doing a study of national power, and his views represented the essence of "Realpolitik" for in that short quote he captured the definition of not only sea power but the question of projection of power in which a nation utilizes superior assets to achieve national interests. Germany had coalesced as a nation far too late to partake of the imperialist triumphs of the 1600, 1700 and 1800's, thus using sea power the German nation could align with and influence events that served to benefit the nation as a whole, with the rewards to be gained later. As an example, in April, 1895, Germany along with France and Russia participated in what is commonly called the "Tripartite Intervention" and forced Japan to return the Liaotung Peninsula, which China had relinquished as part of the Treaty of Shimonoseki following her defeat in the 1894 - 1895Sino-Japanese War. The peninsula held one of the more strategic harbors (Port Arthur) in the area and the Europeans used the excuse that China's territorial integrity would be threatened by Japan control of Port Arthur and would be a perpetual obstacle to peace, using the diplomatic language of the day that conveying the message that hostilities were deemed possible if the appropriate response was not Japan attempted to gain allies to counter the pressure by provided. requesting American and British support but neither was prepared to assist the beleaguered Japanese, thus they capitulated.²⁸ Within three years all three European powers had grabbed pieces of continental China for themselves (and all used them as naval bases) and Japan was left. standing to plot her revenge.

Germany pursued what Livezey called a "distorted" Mahan policy in which there was no distinction made between sea power and battle fleet strength. Germany wanted to be a great land and naval power, but note that Britain's strength was not based on her land power but rather on her control of important areas and the ability to deliver or project her naval and limited land power to troubled remote regions and Mahan had "repeatedly pointed out the whip hand which a superior strategic position" Britain had over Germany vis-a-vis insular positions and fulcra."²⁹ worldwide control of "maritime Nonetheless Germany continued unabated with its ambitious program to expand and flex its muscle in any geographic location where she could benefit, encountering her next opportunity in November, 1897. Using as a pretext the murder of missionaries by Chinese bandits in the Shantung area, William II ordered a naval squadron, under the command of Vice Admiral Diederichs, to proceed to the harbor of Kiaochou at the southern base of the Shantung Peninsula. Once there the Admiral was to threaten reprisals and "if, necessary, with the most brutal ruthlessness."³⁰ Not planning to occupy the harbor at that time, William preferred to wait, declare the Chinese response to German demands unsatisfactory and take Kiaochou as compensation. After a short interlude the naval force was ordered to occupy the position and China was forced to negotiate a convention (6 March, 1898) ceding the harbor and a surrounding neutral area to Germany for ninety-nine years.³¹

International opinion over the seizing of Chinese territory and converting it into a "sphere of influence" and a naval base varied, from a noncommittal reply by Nicholas II of Russia, in which he only noted that Russia had occupied the harbor before but held no title to it now, to a subdued diplomatic concern by American consuls in China with regard to the effects of the increasing commercial interests in the North China area.³² Japan sat and fumed, plotting her next move over the "threat to peace" that the German occupation presented and Britain came to the realization that the delicate balance holding China together was now gone and it would only be a matter of time before the scramble for pieces of China would begin.³³ Thus by the time of the Spanish-American War Germany was established in not only the Central Pacific but on the Asiatic mainland ready to exert its policy of "Realpolitik", especially towards the crumbling Pacific colonial possessions of Spain.

Japan is the next player to be examined. Japan earned the suspicion of the United States Navy following the 1897 protest of the non-related annexation movement in Hawaii, but was not seen as а serious enemy until 1905 when the almost complete destruction of Russian military power in the Far East tipped the scales in favor of Japan's ability to exercise political and economic control in the area. Even before Mahan's 1890 sea power study Japan had begun to exhibit expansionist tendencies, gradually acquiring island territories to the south and southeast and putting pressure on the frail Spanish possessions in the Pacific.³⁴ By the time Mahan's work was translated into Japanese the nation was subconsciously prepared for putting into effect Mahan's blueprint for success. Japan, in the same strategic position as Britain, could not help but adopt the Mahan philosophy and even went as far as making it required reading in its military and naval schools.³⁵ Its first post-Mahan strategic move was in Hawaii following the January revolution when she attempted to prevent any movement of the islands closer to American control. Unable to deter the action she withdraw and began to look elsewhere for opportunities to exercise her own form of "Realpolitik."³⁶

Between 1890 and 1895 a large number of Japanese authors published a substantial number of tracts encouraging not only overseas expansion but a "large" navy to support the supposedly unstoppable movement of territorial acquisition. Akira Iriye has written about the large number of these pro-imperialist authors, who needed no outside encouragement, but still could foresee the requirement for a strong Japanese naval presence to protect expanding commercial interests and the increasing number of Japanese immigrants throughout what the Japanese called "Nanyo" or the South Sea Islands. These were German and Spanish colonies and considered prime real estate due to the negligible white population and the hospitable climate.³⁷ Most of the writers stressed that a majority of the desired territories were in close proximity to Japan and that Japan should take the lead in civilizing that region of the world. Many others saw Hawaii and South legitimate points for expansion of trade contacts, America as immigration and eventual domination by either Japanese or subjects loyal to Japan.³⁸ By the beginning of the Spanish-American War Japan (through peaceful expansion or as the fruit of victory in war) occupied positions between the home islands and the Philippines, and from the China coast to just north of the Spanish colony of the Mariana's.

The publication of Mahan's book did not inspire the British to become sea power adherents because they were the prime example used in <u>The Influence of Sea Power upon History</u>. Livezey noted the impact of the book as follows:

The special import of Mahan's writing for the English was well brought out by their press. The English had done great deeds of which they were not unaware, but Mahan's analysis brought them angadded understanding of the significance of these deeds.

Britain benefited from Mahan pointing out and analyzing any shortcomings of their own policy and how they could learn from the lessons of their own history. The British also begin to see where threats to their position could arise, from the continent or from The Royal Navy had been in somewhat of a decline following overseas. the Crimean War and pressure from French and German imperial dreams and new naval programs forced the British to begin to revitalize their own capabilities. The impact of Mahan was immeasurable coming as it did at time when British policy makers as well as average citizens а questioned the place of the nation in world affairs. International complications in Samoa, the Marshall Islands, New Guinea and Africa began to provide an impetus for a rejuvenated navy second to none and Mahanís "interrelation of geographical factors, commerce, colonial expansion and navy" as a requirement for greatness was а "godsend."40

In one way Mahan's work helped to end Britain's period of "splendid isolation" and to begin to face two serious rivals nearby and abroad, who challanged her dominant position on the seas. One rival was Germany with her desire to dominate the continent; and the other, Russia, was relentless in her push for a warm water port. German policy was to assemble a naval force in the North Sea so as to challenge Britain in her home waters, where due to colonial obligations the Royal Navy was not expected to assemble enough capital ships to counter the German challenge, a "doctrine of risk" which ultimately collapsed following the signing of the 1902 Anglo-Japanese Alliance which permitted Britain to withdraw from the Far East and gather a stronger naval force in the British Isles.⁴¹

Russian threats to British power arose from the conflicting interests in the Mediterranean, the Middle East and Asia. Constant pressure on the "old man of Europe", the Ottoman Empire, to gain access through and ultimately control of the Bosporus Straits would jeopardize British sea lanes between the home islands and the colonies to the east.⁴² Russian pressure also extended to Persia, where she sought an outlet through that strategic position amid British sea lanes for the nation that controlled the Gulf could effectively interdict East-West shipping and the lifeline to India, and beyond. ⁴³ The establishment of a strong Russian naval presence in Asia coupled with the slow encroachment into Chinese territory only meant that Britain would eventually lose its influence in the area, unless she took advantage of her superior asset, the Royal Navy. 44 Thus to the British overseas bases were an important ancillary segment of power projection and the protection of its overseas colonies, because only with the forward deployment of her naval strength to the Far East could interests be protected. Britain, and eventually all the major powers, would have another reason for acquiring multiple bases and positions: the advent

of steam power, requiring "coaling and coaling stations," and some bases were considered "insignificant save as a convenient coaling spot." All of the major naval powers would constantly be reminded of the fact that steam ships would have to continually refuel at a coal depot of some sort to finish a voyage of any substantial length.⁴⁵

ACQUISITION OF BASES IN ASIA, 1897-1898

Following the German occupation of Kiaochou and the British view that the fragile Chinese Empire and its waiting markets was ready to crumble, it appeared that there was no safety valve to prevent the seizing or "negotiating" bases from China. The next power to move into Chinese territory was Russia. After a considerable amount of maneuvering and applied pressure, China was persuaded to lease, for twenty-five years, the Liaotung Peninsula with the strategic harbor of Port Arthur and an extensive neutral "sphere of influence" stretching quite a distance up the peninsula.⁴⁶

Others scrambled to try to acquire a piece of China. In May 1897 the United States, sensing the impending partition, considered the question of acquiring a coal depot at Chefoo in Fukien province but decided against it "on the grounds that the vessels of [the Asiatic] squadron could not coal efficiently from a single point on the China Coast."⁴⁷ Britain was able to profit from this scramble beginning negotiations with China (February, 1898) over the extension of British interests in the Yang-Tze River valley region and gaining a naval base concession at the port of Wei-Hai-Wei directly opposite the Russian presence at Port Arthur. Britain also began to pressure China into

ceding additional land area neighboring Hong Kong at Kowloon but delayed negotiations so as to avoid complications with the U.S. Navy need for a temporary refuge at the beginning of the Spanish-American War.⁴⁸ Japan coerced China into signing a non-alienation agreement for the province of Fukien, directly opposite the island of Taiwan, which China had ceded to Japan following the Sino-Japanese War of 1894-1895. The conclusion of the agreement would later create problems for the United States Navy as the Fukien area was one of interest to planners.⁴⁹ The final actors in the scramble for territory were France with the occupation of the South-east China port of Kwangchau Bay, and Italy with an unsuccessful attempt to acquire a coaling station near Shanghai.⁵⁰ By the time Commodore Dewey descended on the Philippines, the coast of China had already been divided among the other powers, with the United States now left in the position of having to defend its commercial and political interests without a nearby stronghold to support any missions.

The threatened decline of American influence and commercial interests was the outcome of a contest in which the United States either had to defend long term interests with the limited assets it possessed and what opportunities might appear on the horizon. No one plotted to start a war so that America could acquire colonies and penetrate the China market with its supposed teeming millions of consumers ready to buy whatever goods were produced for their benefit.⁵¹ The context of this work is not the China question but rather what role the Navy assumed to support an ambiguous national policy and what price the Navy paid. The Philippine acquisition

question did not hinge primarily on the needs of the Navy because the final decision on annexation was made by the President of the United States, just as the decision to go to war in 1898 was not based on naval or military requirements, but on political grounds determined in the White House and approved by the Congress of the United States. The "failure" of the Navy to acquire a base in Asia before the Spanish American War did not cause the war, only determined one of many potential scenarios to occur during the war, the lack of a secure base in <u>near</u> proximity being the paramount strategic problem.⁵² The acquisition of naval bases/spheres by the other powers allowed them to exert their influence in the Far East, but it cannot be assumed to have led American policy makers to plan and start a war to achieve a parity of sorts.

Failure to acquire a base determined the effectiveness of any contemplated military commitments and increased commercial investments in the Far East area in terms of projection of power, because a nearby position allowed a power to moniter the activities of other power.⁵³ As an example, for the most part the three major naval powers encroaching in China, Britain, Germany and Russia, all had their ceded territories situated within a day's sail of the others, and thus were not remote and isolated vacuums in which actions could always be carried out in the greatest secrecy. The control of a strategic location permitted the powers to keep an eye on each other as well as respond to threatening situations such as the Boxer Rebellion.⁵⁴ Internationally, the "prestige" of a base in China was connected with what the actual purpose of the base was. Macau, a Portuguese

territory, was not an immediate and long term threat to China's territorial integrity. But the same was certainly not true of the powers concessions, for in all practicality they had in mind the penetration and control of real estate that would be closed off into exclusive spheres. The Russian and Japanese eventual goal was the complete domination of China (and Korea) which ultimately led to a clash of interests and to war.⁵⁵ German interests, while not benign, were not as far-reaching while Britain seemed to be reacting to the major powers, although it can not be said that China's own national interests were paramount in British planning.⁵⁶

The desire to access and protect the assumed consumer market of China guided American civilian planning, but the U.S. Navy had to defend the policy of the government. The point here is that civilians did the planning for expansion without actually consulting the navy as to what it would take to protect the expanded interests. The nightmare of attempting to create or plan a strategic concept for the nation was made much more difficult when the government assumed burdens that it could not wholly commit to and was unwilling to define the national policy for the military or worst, support the military planners when national policy failures led to threatened hostilities. It is the job of the military, under civilian control, to plan for contingencies and optimistically before trouble arises. It would appear to be a more correct policy to make plans for all contigencies including the worst and hope for the best. But usually Government hopes for the best and ends up with the worst, wondering why the armed forces have not been able to respond to the challenge effectively. When naval planners were

not part of the national policy planning preliminaries it required the Navy to use its best judgment on what the policy was and how best to defend it. It would not be until 1947 with the creation of the Department of Defense and the institution of the Joint Chiefs of Staff that military planning would effectively work with national policy planning. But from 1898 on, the Navy used its own planners to systematically create contingency policies.⁵⁷

One final strategic problem for the American Navy vis-a-vis the Far East was the long distance between the coasts of the United States and China. Facing a voyage of almost 8000 nautical miles and no territory further west than Midway Island, vessels steaming to the Orient had to sail at very low speeds so as to conserve the coal in the bunkers, or would have to make periodic stops at points with coal depots to refuel. The problem is that these points were almost always under the control of a foreign power who could provide or deny coaling rights at their discretion. West of Midway the island groups passed by enroute to the Western Pacific and China were controlled by the British, French, Germans, Spanish, Japanese, Dutch and Portuguese forces. The threat that at any moment a government could decide to prohibit American ships, and most importantly, warships, from entering to refuel was possible and did occur. In times of possible trouble in Asia each nation ensured that its vessels received highest priority for coal. At the beginning of the difficulties between the United States and Spain stocks of coal in the Far East were monopolized and after the declaration of war in April, 1898 international neutrality conventions prohibited the coaling of belligerent war ships that were capable of

returning to the scene of hostilities. In 1898 coal was the primary fuel for steam ships, as liquid fuels were as yet not used for propulsion and would not be for approximately ten years. Overseas coal stocks require secure positions to service the vessels of each particular nation. No secure bases meant limited refueling opportunities and a reduced mission capability. George Dewey's mission in the Far East was at the mercy of such a condition.⁵⁸

NOTES

¹ Seward W. Livermore, "The American Naval Base Policy in the Far East, 1880-1914," <u>Pacific Historical Review</u> 13 (June, 1944), 120. For the use of Hong Kong see R.G. Neale, <u>Great Britain and United States</u> Expansion: 1896-1900 (East Lansing, 1966), 65-67.

² "National interest asserted itself in many ways and paraded under many banners; it was couched in a variety of terms, such as 'self-defense,' 'self-interest,' 'self-development,' 'natural growth,' and 'paramount.'"; William E. Livezey notes that interests also "assert the right of acquisition of strategic bases at certain points", <u>Mahan</u> <u>on Sea Power</u> (Norman, Oklahoma, 1947), 283-284.

³ Alfred Thayer Mahan, <u>The Influence of Sea Power Upon History</u>, 1660-1783 (Boston, 1890).

⁴ Livezey, <u>Mahan</u>, 28.

⁵ William J. Pomeroy calls him "one of the architects of American Naval Policy in the Pacific", <u>American Neo-Colonialism</u> (New York, 1970), 165. See Howard K. Beale, <u>Theodore Roosevelt and the Rise of</u> <u>America to World Power</u> (Baltimore, 1984), 57-58; Foster Rhea Dulles, <u>America in the Pacific</u> (Boston, 1932), 187-188, 233; John A.S. Grenville and George B. Young, <u>Politics, Strategy and American</u> <u>Diplomacy</u> (New Haven, 1966), 220-221; Walter R. Herrick, Jr., <u>The</u> <u>American Naval Revolution</u> (Baton Rouge, 1966), 197-198; Akira Iriye, <u>Pacific Estrangement</u> (Cambridge, 1972), 71; Livermore, "American Naval Base Policy", 116; Louis Morton, "War Plan Orange," <u>World Politics</u> 11 (January, 1959), 221; Julius W. Pratt, <u>Expansionists of 1898</u> (Baltimore,1936), 15-17.

⁶ For more on the "Large Policy" see Walter LaFeber, <u>The New</u> <u>Empire: An Interpretation of American Expansionism, 1860-1898</u> (Ithaca, 1971); Beale, <u>Theodore Roosevelt</u>; A. Whitney Griswold, <u>The Far Eastern</u> <u>Policy of the United States</u> (New York, 1938); Dulles, <u>America in the</u> <u>Pacific</u>; Julius W. Pratt, "The Large Policy of 1898," <u>Mississippi</u> <u>Valley Historical Review</u>, 19 (1932); Herrick, <u>Naval Revolution</u>; Alfred Thayer Mahan, <u>The Problem of Asia and Its Effect upon International</u> Policy 1900. (New York, 1970), 7; Livezey, Mahan, 194.

⁷ Beale wrongly credits Mahan, <u>Theodore Roosevelt</u>, 62; see Dulles' <u>America in the Pacific</u>, 233 and <u>America's Rise to World Power</u>, <u>1898-1954</u> (New York, 1954), 33, 39; Oscar M. Alfonso, <u>Theodore</u> <u>Roosevelt</u> and the Philippines, 1897-1909 (Quezon City, 1970), 21.

^o Mahan, <u>Sea Power</u>, 124. Mahan discusses "Strategic Positions" of naval bases in <u>Naval Strategy Compared and Contrasted with the</u> <u>Principles of Military Operations on Land (London, 1911), 132-163.</u> ⁹ Mahan, <u>Sea Power</u>, 28.
¹⁰ Mahan, <u>ibid</u>., 8.

¹¹ Mahan, <u>ibid</u>., 83. Mahan wrote "Colonies attached to the mother-country afford, therefore, the surest means of supporting abroad the sea power of a country.", <u>ibid</u>.; Livezey noted that Mahan's historical studies led him to "illustrative substantiation that national power, national security and national prosperity were dependent upon foreign commerce, which in turn called for a marine, bases, and naval protection. the sea became 'a link, a bridge, a highway'; and to the navy able to occupy it in adequate force, it conferred the all-important military attributes of interior lines, central position, and assured communications.", Livezey, <u>Mahan</u>, 229.

¹² Mahan, <u>ibid</u>., 82.

¹³ Mahan, <u>ibid</u>., 83; Mahan, <u>Naval Strategy</u>, 195, 314; Livezey, Mahan, 201.

¹⁴ Livezey, <u>Mahan</u>, 206, 225, 242; George T. Davis, <u>A Navy Second</u> to None (New York, 1940), 86-100.

¹⁵ Livezey, <u>Mahan</u>, 57. For other views of naval officers and the rising star of the U.S. Navy see Peter Karsten's <u>The Naval Aristocracy</u>: <u>The Golden Age of Annapolis and the Emergence of Modern Navalism</u> (New York, 1972) and Robert Seager II "Ten Years Before Mahan: The Unofficial Case for the New Navy." <u>Mississippi Valley Historical</u> <u>Review</u>, 40 (December, 1953), 491-512; Davis, <u>Navy</u>, 72-85, 135-149; Herrick, <u>Naval Revolution</u>, 86-107, 173-181; Vincent Davis, <u>The Admirals</u> <u>Lobby</u> (Chapel Hill, 1967), 19, 111-117; Harold and Margaret Sprout, <u>The</u> <u>Rise of American Naval Power</u>, 1776-1918 (Princeton, 1939), 205; Robert Seager II, <u>Alfred Thayer Mahan</u>: <u>The Man and His Letters</u> (Annapolis, 1977), 191-326; William R. Braisted, <u>The United States Navy in the</u> <u>Pacific</u>, 1897-1909 (New York, 1969), 5-7; Edmund Morris, <u>The Rise of</u> <u>Theodore Roosevelt</u> (New York, 1979), 572-575.

¹⁶ <u>Ibid</u>. See A. Whitney Griswold, <u>Far Eastern Policy</u>, 9, 11; Sprout, American Naval Power, 205-222.

¹⁷ ibid., 58.

¹⁸ Mahan, <u>Sea Power</u>, 1.

¹⁹ "However the term 'adequate' be defined", Mahan, <u>Naval</u> <u>Strategy</u>, 106; Ronald Spector, <u>Professors of War</u> (Newport, 1977), 44; Grenville and Young, <u>Politics</u>, 24.

²⁰ Livezey <u>Mahan</u>, 55.

²¹ <u>Ibid.</u>, 55-56, 59-60; Seager, <u>Mahan</u>, 214-215, 218; Griswold, <u>Far</u>

Eastern Policy, 9.

²² Harold and Margaret Sprout, <u>Toward a New Order in Sea Power</u> (Princeton, 1946), 32. Following orders to return to sea duty in 1893, Mahan and many of his devotees tried to cancel them as it would "interfere" with his continuing work on sea power. Captain Ramsey, Chief of the Bureau of Navigation responsible forassignments reportedly said "It is not the business of a Naval Officer to write books." The affair is apparently related to Mahan's unofficial letter about unsettled racial problems after the January, 1893 revolt in Hawaii and questioning the future policy of United States in Hawaii, Seager, <u>Mahan</u>, 147-148, 253. LaFeber called Mahan an "arm chair sailor", <u>New</u> <u>Empire</u>, 85.

²³ Livezey, <u>Mahan</u>, 335-336. For a particularly thorough study of the imperialism question and Mahan's role in the issue see William Langer, <u>The Diplomacy of Imperialism, 1890-1902</u>, (New York, 1951), 177, 418-419, 423-426, 431-441, 517, 519. Chapter 13 is entitled "The New Navalism."

²⁴ Dulles, <u>America in the Pacific</u>, 103; Paul H. Clyde, <u>Japan's</u> <u>Pacific Mandate</u> (New York, 1935), 17–18; Sprout, <u>New Order</u>, 29; Josefa M. Saniel, <u>Japan and the Philippines</u>, 1868–1898 (Quezon City, 1969), 146.

²⁵ Livezey, <u>Mahan</u>, 68; see Beale, <u>Theodore Roosevelt</u>, 390 and Lawrence Battistini, <u>The Rise of American Influence in Asia</u> (Lansing, 1960), 171.

²⁶ Clyde, <u>Pacific Mandate</u>, 18.

²⁷ Livezey, <u>Mahan</u>, 69. For other views of German expansion efforts see William R. Braisted, <u>U.S. Navy</u>, 1897-1909, 20; Davis, <u>Admirals</u>, 118; Davis, <u>Navy</u>, 120-121. Also see Holer H. Herwig, <u>"Luxury Fleet": The Imperial German Navy, 1888-1918</u> (London, 1980), <u>Politics of Frustration</u> (Boston, 1976) and <u>Germany's Vision of Empire in Venezuela</u>, <u>1871-1914</u> (Princeton, 1986).

²⁸ John V.A. MacMurray, ed., <u>Treaties and Agreements With and</u> <u>Concerning China, 1894-1919</u> (New York, 1973), 1: 50-53; United States, <u>Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, 1898</u> (Washington D.C., 1899), 1:199-203, hereafter <u>FRUS</u>. A thorough study of the intervention is found in Morinosuke Kajima, <u>The Diplomacy of</u> <u>Japan, 1894-1922</u> (Tokyo, 1976), 1: 293-294, 303-304, 306-307, 346, 349-350.

²⁹ Livezey, <u>Mahan</u>, 75; Dulles, <u>America's Rise</u>, 34. A good study of Britain and strategic positions is the work by Harvey Sicherman, Aden and British Strategy: 1839-1968 (Philadelphia, 1972). ³⁰ Philip Joseph, <u>Foreign Diplomacy in China, 1894–1900</u> (New York, 1928), 200.

³¹ MacMurray, <u>Treaties and Agreements</u>, 1: 112-116; Thomas F. Millard, <u>Our Eastern Question</u> (New York, 1916), 434-435; Pauline Tompkins, <u>American-Russian Relations in the Far East</u> (New York, 1949), 54-55; Leonard K. Young, <u>British Policy in China</u>, 1895-1902 (Oxford, 1970), 44-56; Kajima, <u>Diplomacy of Japan</u>, 2: 23; John M. Dobson, <u>America's Ascent: The United States becomes a Great Power</u>, 1880-1914 (Dekalb, 1978), 177; Davis, <u>Admirals</u>, 118; Herrick, <u>Naval Revolution</u>, 203; Theodore Roosevelt expressed some apprehension over German ambitions, Roosevelt to Long, 30 September, 1897, in E.E. Morison, ed., <u>The Letters of Theodore Roosevelt</u> 8 vols., (Cambridge, 1951), 1: 830.

³² Joseph, <u>China</u>, 200; <u>FRUS 1898</u>, 1xxii.

³³ Great Britain, <u>British Parliamentary Papers: Diplomatic</u> <u>Affairs: China: Sessions, 1860–1899</u>, 69: 21–22. British fears were expressed thus, "This event will perhaps form a starting point for a decision in Far Eastern Question.", <u>ibid</u>., 25.

³⁴ Saniel, <u>Japan and the Philippines</u>, 4, 6, 60-65, 73, 82, 87, 96, 100-101, 153-154. Saniel wrote that the opening of the Suez Canal in 1869 accelarated Japanese intentions regarding the Spanish territories to the south, <u>ibid.</u>, 42. Iriye, <u>Pacific Estrangement</u>, 35, 38.

³⁵ Livezey, Mahan, 76.

³⁶ For the 1893 incident at Hawaii see Thomas A. Bailey, "Japan's Protest Against the Annexation of Hawaii," <u>Journal of Modern History</u> 3 (March, 1931), 46-61.

³⁷ Iriye, <u>Pacific Estrangement</u>, 36-49; Saniel, <u>Japan and the</u> <u>Philippines</u>, 2.

³⁸ Iriye, <u>Pacific Estrangement</u>, 34-62; Saniel, <u>Japan and the</u> Philippines, 145-193.

³⁹ Livezey, <u>Mahan</u>, 60.

40 Ibid., 60-62.

⁴¹ Ibid., 70.

⁴² Sicherman, <u>British Strategy</u>, 6-7, 9. The Russian view was "that England, now establishing herself in the Persian Gulf and the Read Sea, would want control of Egypt for her lines of communication with India," ibid., 15.

⁴³ Mahan, Asia, 24-61.

<u>1010</u>., //

Interest of America in International Conditions (Boston, 1910), 143.

⁴⁵ Sicherman, <u>British Strategy</u>, 5, 23; Pratt, <u>Expansionists</u>, 13; Sprout, <u>American Naval Power</u>, 166-167, 238, 378; John van Duyn Southworth, <u>War at Sea: The Age of Steam: The Story of Engined-powered</u> Naval Warfare, 1783-1936 (New York, 1970), 1: 6-23.

⁴⁶ Tompkins, American-Russian Relations, 62-64; Victor A. Yakhontoff, Russia and the Soviet Union in the Far East (Westport, 1973), 45-47; A.L.P. Dennis, Adventures in American Diplomacy (New York, 1928), 179-182; Richard Olney, "Growth of American Foreign Policy," Atlantic Monthly 85 (March, 1900), 301; Outten J. Clinnard, Japan's Influence on American Naval Power, 1897-1917 (Berkeley, 1947), 20-21; Germany, German Diplomatic Documents, 1876-1914 (New York, 1929) 7: 506-507; Livezey, Mahan, 205; Britain, Parliamentary Papers: China, 61: 343, 359, and 69: 60, 128, 139-140, 194, 203; Scott Nearing and Joseph Freeman, Dollar Diplomacy (New York, 1925), 35; Young, British Policy, 67-69; FRUS 1898, 182-183; Braisted, U.S. Navy, 1897-1909, 18; Tyler Dennett, Americans in Eastern Asia (New York, 1922), 604; Griswold, Far Eastern Policy, 41, 57; John H. Latane, America as a World Power, 1897-1907 (New York, 1907), 101; Livezey, Mahan, 206. In regard to the Russian occupation of Port Arthur British planners were quoted as saying "that 'the public' will require some territorial or cartographic consolation in China. It will not be useful and will be expensive; but as a matter of pure sentiment, we shall have to do it", Griswold, Far Eastern Policy, 41.

⁴⁷ Livermore, "Naval Base Policy", 117-118, Iriye, <u>Pacific</u> <u>Estrangement</u>, 63; Braisted, <u>U.S. Navy, 1897-1909</u>, 19; Grenville and Young, <u>Politics</u>, 289; Richard D. Challener, <u>Admirals, Generals, and</u> <u>American Foreign Policy, 1898-1914</u> (Princeton, 1973), 179, 182, 186-187. Following the German occupation of Kiaochou the Commander in Chief of the United States Asiatic Squadron (George Dewey) was asked for his opinion regarding what would be the best ports in China in case of an American bid for a sphere, Secretary of the Navy to the Bureau of Navigation, 1 February, 1898, Area 10, RG45. There is an unconfirmed report that the United States was interested in acquiring the port of Wei-Hai-Wei, but that following the victory at Manila Bay there would be no need for a base on the continent, found in Livermore, "Naval Base Policy", 117 and in the London <u>Times</u>, 5 May, 1898.

⁴⁸ Young, <u>British Policy</u>, 69-99; Britain, <u>Parliamentary Papers</u>, <u>China</u>, 69: 110, 140, 203; <u>FRUS 1898</u>, 190; MacMurray, <u>Treaties and</u> <u>Agreements</u>, 1: 152-153. Hong Kong had been acquired following the conclusion of the 1839-1841 Opium Wars. The question of Kowloon and the U.S. Navy regarded the decision by Britain to proclaim neutrality in the Spanish-American War and the need by Dewey to have a "safe" place to finish prepartations for his attack on the Philippines. The British purposely delayed taking final action on the territory so as to avoid a violation of <u>British</u> neutrality by Dewey. See Neale, <u>Great</u> Britain and United States, 66-67; Young, <u>British Policy</u>, 87-88. ⁴⁹ MacMurray, <u>Treaties and Agreements</u>, 1: 126; Britain, Parliamentary Papers: China, 69: 140

⁵⁰ MacMurray, <u>Treaties and Agreements</u>, 128-130; FRUS 1898, 191; Braisted, <u>U.S. Navy, 1897-1909</u>, 77-78, 126-129.

⁵¹ Challener, <u>Admirals</u>, 180; Dobson, <u>America's Ascent</u>, 119; <u>FRUS</u> <u>1898</u>, lxii-lxiii; <u>FRUS 1899</u>, xviii; <u>FRUS 1900</u>, ix.

⁵² Livermore, "Naval Base Policy", 116.

⁵³ Challener, <u>Admirals</u>, 179; Dobson, <u>America's Ascent</u>, 120.

⁵⁴ Challener, Admirals, 182; Dobson, America's Ascent, 185.

⁵⁵ Kajima, Diplomacy of Japan, 2: 57-235.

⁵⁶ Neale, <u>Great Britain and United States</u>, 66-67; Young, <u>British</u> <u>Policy</u>, 52-56, 85-87.

⁵⁷ Albert C. Stillson, "Military Policy without Political Guidance: Theodore Roosevelt's Navy," <u>Military Affairs</u> 24 (Spring, 1961), 18-31; Henry P. Beers, "Development of the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations," 10 (Spring, Fall, 1947), 40-68 and 11 (Summer, Winter, 1947), 88-99, 229-237.

⁵⁸ Braisted, U.S. Navy, 1897-1909, 57.

CHAPTER II

THE UNITED STATES NAVY IN THE PHILIPPINES

PLANNING, 1896-1898

The year 1958 is pivotal in any reassessment of the history of the United States involvement in the Philippines. 1958 was the year in which the naval records relevant to the period of the Spanish American War were finally made public. The belief shared by historians, such as Walter Lafeber and Julius Pratt, after 1958¹, that Alfred Thayer Mahan and Theodore Roosevelt (assisted by Henry Cabot Lodge) conspired to seize and permanently occupy the Philippines before the Spanish-American War has been most difficult to dispel, regardless of the fact that the pertinent records and documents, opened for public inspection during the years 1954 to 1958, disprove the allegations.²

The excellent pioneering work done by William R. Braisted, utilizing records of the Navy held by the National Archives and the Naval Historical Division, is the definitive study of the period and firmly refutes any conspiracy theory. Braisted disclosed, for the first time, that the original idea for offensive operations against the Philippines was conceived two years before the start of the war.³

Quiet simply, American naval strategists had been drawing up contingency plans in the event of an outbreak of war with Spain over the troublesome and recurring Cuban question: . . . the outbreak of a new insurrection in the island of Cuba early in 1895, obliged the naval planners to turn their attention to the possibility of complications with Spain.

It is important to note that among the naval planners, Mahan was never consulted, and neither Roosevelt nor Lodge were included. Who, then, were these naval planners? During the period prior to the Spanish-American War there were two groups involved with naval planning and neither was connected to the formulation or the development of a broad national war policy. The first group was the Naval War College in Newport, Rhode Island, under the auspices of Captain Henry C. Taylor, and the second was the Office of Naval Intelligence, under the direction of Lieutenant Commander Richard Wainwright.⁵

Following a Cuban insurrection in 1895 (there had been periodic trouble dating from 1867), the Naval War College staff took the opportunity to assign the officer student class of 1895 a "special problem" dealing with Spain and Cuba.⁶ Taylor and his staff compiled the students work into a draft war plan, and in January, 1896, forwarded it to the Navy Department for review, comment and revision. This draft plan dealt solely with a naval campaign against Spain and its possessions in the Caribbean and made no mention of the Philippines. How then did the Philippines get into the planning picture? Ronald Spector noted:⁷

Perhaps inspired by the War College example, the Office of Naval Intelligence . . , soon produced its own plan for war with Spain . . .

The plan, "General Scheme of War with Spain, 1896," was completed through the work of Staff Intelligence Officer, Lieutenant William W. Kimball.⁸ Kimball, though not working or consulting with Mahan, was nonetheless a Mahan disciple.⁹ Strongly favoring the concept of a "purely naval war," Kimball's plan called for offensive operations against Spanish forces and possessions in the the Caribbean, the Spanish mainland, and in the Pacific.¹⁰

Kimball's completed plan (dated 1 June, 1896) was originally deemed unsatisfactory after it was reviewed by the War College staff. The staff saw no reason to violate the doctrine of concentrated strength by dividing the limited American naval forces throughout three areas (the Asiatic Squadron, a mobile Flying Squadron, and the rest assembled in Caribbean waters) and favored their own earlier 1895 plan as the best one in existence. Kimball's suggestion regarding the Philippines, to which the staff objected as not being a feasible target, revealed his belief in and admiration of Mahan's philosophies, advocating the extension of operations to the enemy. Kimball perceived that by extending offensive operations to Spain's Pacific colonies it would provide the United States with leverage in any future peace negotiations. The planner considered Manila's usefulness primarily as a "hostage."¹¹

In late 1896 a special board was convened by the Secretary of the Navy, Hilary A. Herbert, to review the contingencies in case of war with Spain. Both the War College and Kimball plans were studied and the board accepted Kimball's plan minus the Philippine "sideshow."¹² Following Cleveland's defeat in the 1896 election, Secretary Herbert decided not to seek President Cleveland's approval of the Kimball plan so as not to commit the incoming McKinley appointees to a policy. He passed on to the incoming Secretary, John D. Long, the plans for operations against Spain. Long and his vigorous Assistant Secretary, Theodore Roosevelt, also inherited all of the previous War College planning studies and war problems held by the Office of Naval Intelligence.¹³ Desiring clearer alternatives to the contradictions of the various plans and proposals, in Spring of 1897 Long ordered the above mentioned special board to reconvene with a new membership and reconsider the plans.¹⁴

With Roosevelt "cheerleading," what finally emerged in July, 1897 was basically a modified Kimball plan.¹⁵ Spector pointed out the interpretation involved in any such planning:¹⁶

Although the Board's plan of July, 1897 was dubbed the "Official Plan", it by no means represented administration policy.

Indeed, Roosevelt himself could not persuade President McKinley and Secretary Long to initiate any action on the plan to make it official policy.¹⁷ William R. Thayer wrote of the situation:¹⁸

. . the young Roosevelt had to act with circumspection. In the first place the policy of the Department was formulated by Secretary Long. In next place the Navy could not come into action until President McKinley and the Department of State gave the word.

This is the point where the evidence that many historians cite as proof of Roosevelt's conspiracy to acquire the Philippines begins to accumulate. Much of it can be found in his correspondence to acquaintances in which he confidently tells them that the American Asiatic Squadron was "quite competent" and capable of capturing the Philippines and pinning down the Spanish forces there.¹⁹ Furthermore, the move by Roosevelt to get Commodore George Dewey appointed as Commander-in-Chief of the Asiatic Squadron only added credence to the distortion. Roosevelt wanted Dewey because he respected professionalism and came to the conclusion that Dewey's rival, senior by one lineal number, was incapable of carrying out any of the provisions of the Kimball war plan. Unaware of the planning, Mahan pointedly urged Roosevelt to find the best person for the command, feeling that the Pacific would be the next scene of conflict.²⁰ The duty of Roosevelt, as he himself saw it, was to perform a job well, and his job was to prepare the Navy for any contingency, including war. This appears to have been misconstrued by historians, based on letters Roosevelt sent to several acquaintances in which he advocated preparations and offensive operations against Spain in case war broke out.²¹ Roosevelt respected a man of forcefulness and decisiveness, qualities he felt Dewey possessed, qualities that the Commodore could utilize to ensure the Navy's readiness. In September, 1897, the normal rotation date for relief of the Commander-in-Chief of the Asiatic Squadron came up, and Roosevelt persuaded Dewey to use political connections to get the position.²² Theodore Roosevelt's decision to bypass the Navy's seniority system was not designed to advance any jingoist ambitions attributed to him but to properly prepare for any and all contigencies that might lead to war.²³ Between the date of his appointment (21 October, 1897) and his departure for Asia (7 December, 1897) Dewey, previously unaware of the particulars of the Kimball plan,

32

was briefed and prepared by Roosevelt so as to be ready to take action following his assumption of command.²⁴

The final nail in the conspiracy theory is the "infamous" preparatory message Roosevelt sent to Dewey on 25 February, 1898, nine days after the <u>Maine</u> blew up in Havana Harbor:²⁵

Secret and Confidential Order the squadron to . . . Hong Kong. Keep full of coal. In event of declaration of War, Spain, your duty will be to see that the Spanish Squadron does not leave the Asiatic Coast, and then offensive operations in Philippine Islands Roosevelt

All Roosevelt had done was to pre-position Dewey's forces in case of war and had not unleashed him for immediate action against Spanish naval forces in the Philippines. Dewey assembled his command (four units in Hong Kong and two enroute) in Hong Kong to await further orders while the United States continued negotiations with Spain to avoid war.²⁶ Roosevelt had:²⁷

... simply implement[ed] regular Navy Department policy following the schedule already worked out in conjunction with the Kimball war plan, a plan that was not only followed by Theodore Roosevelt, but by John Long, and the commander in chief [of American military forces], President William McKinley.

Between the date of Roosevelt's telegram and the start of the Spanish-American War (April 21, 1898) the United States Navy prepared for possible war as Roosevelt concerned himself with normal administrative duties at the Department. Alfred T. Mahan, retired and on vacation, did not return from Europe until after the outbreak of war, having no role in the actual decision to "declare" war, a decision that was beyond the ascribed powers of Roosevelt, Mahan and Lodge.²⁸ James A. Field has rejected the notion of such interpretation by historians who fail to utilize the sources available to them. He noted: 29

Much of [American history texts on imperialism] is wrong and most of it irrelevant to 'imperialism' and the events of 1898.

The proof only supports Field's contention that historians have overblown the participation of the three men in the Philippine issue.³⁰ What was the role of each and how did the legend get its start? In not one of his many works prior to the start of the war did Mahan mention the Philippines. His direct contribution to operations during the war is his service on the Naval War Board, set up by Secretary Long (March, 1898) to advise him on strategy.³¹ Mahan's inclusion in the conspiracy is due mainly to his influential writings and worldwide "notoriety." George T. Davis noted:³²

The naval advocates of the period stated their case for sea power largely in the terms of the Mahan dialectic.

Having previously disposed of Roosevelt and Mahan in the conspiracy, that leaves only Lodge. He had no direct role in the planning or implementation of the Kimball plan, but he was with Roosevelt on the day that the preparatory telegram was sent to Dewey. 33 Lodge's primary role in the alleged conspiracy occurred after the war. Lodge wanted to document for an article the events prior to the war, and being privy to some of them, had to avoid specifics that would embarrass the Navy because of the success of its planning.34 The desire to downplay and neglect the actual role of navy planners was motivated in fact, to protect the Navy and keep it out of any fight

between the imperialists and anti-imperialists, as the prior preparations carried out by the Navy could be viewed by the anti-imperialists as having caused the war. By shifting the responsibility from the Navy to Roosevelt it served the dual purpose of avoiding the disclosure of the Navy's efforts and promoting Roosevelt as a national hero, with Mahan and Lodge carried along on his coattails.

It is the Lodge article along with the private papers of the three men that contributed to the legend of the conspiring imperialists. Protecting the Navy and advancing their national images only added to the theory of plots and schemes.³⁵ The events involved in the actual conduct of the war in the Philippines were out of the hands of the three and under the control of the on-the-scene commanders.

PREPARATIONS: JANUARY-MAY, 1898

Theodore Roosevelt's 25 February telegram to Dewey has been characterized as impulsive and impetuous behavior:³⁶

Even though a subordinate official in the Navy Department [Roosevelt] has choreographed the first step in the seizure of a Pacific Empire, his supervisors either intentionally or carelessly neglected to cancel his orders. In this, as in so many other instances associated with the Spanish-American War, major policy just seemed to materialize in an ad hoc manner.

The assertion that Roosevelt's telegram was just a whimsical misadventure ignores the body of evidence available, attributing more to the action and repeating fallacies that the administration was dragged into war because of the telegram.

Roosevelt's vigorous and foresighted actions during his short

tenure at the Navy Department is given such a major role in history but for the wrong reason, because he was successful.³⁷ His intention was to prepare and upgrade the Navy in many areas, including personnel, materiel, gunnery, ship-building, logistics and strategic planning. The last aspect is frequently overlooked as was his influence upon the Department. He looked upon strategic planning as a most important facet and preparedness as an essential element. In the period of June, 1897 to March, 1898 his long term goal of a strong Navy, as evidenced by his letters and professional actions, was predicated on the perception that it was necessary to be prepared for any foe.³⁸ Even before the Cuban situation had reached a crisis level Roosevelt was equally concerned that the United States would have to deal with Japan in the eastern half of the Pacific over the Hawaiian Islands annexation question and asked the staff at the Naval War College to develop a plan for such a contingency.³⁹ Following the December, 1897 withdrawal by Japan of their diplomatic protest over the annexation efforts, Roosevelt and the Navy, were able to focus their undivided attention on the Spanish.⁴⁰ Preparation was Roosevelt's key concern and the extent of his influence and efforts leads to an examination of other individual's actions.

Notwithstanding Roosevelt's telegram to Dewey on 25 February, 1898, Secretary Long himself had quite a large part in the Navy's preparations for conflict. Long, through the Department, ordered the overseas stations (January, 1898) to retain until further notice all seamen whose enlistments had expired.⁴¹ The George Dewey Papers provide a rewarding glimpse of Secretary Long's actions regarding preparations for war with Spain and offensive operations in the From 26 February, 1898 to 24 April, Philippines. 1898, Long telegraphed Dewey on at least fifteen occasions, regarding preparations, logistics and the Philippines.⁴² The fact that Secretary Long, and not Roosevelt, authorized and originated the telegrams seems to escape the scrutiny of many historians. The telegrams themselves do, however, tend to attest to the influence Roosevelt had on his superior, spurring Long into more vigorous and decisive action. Roosevelt was in effect carrying out duties that the Secretary himself should have been performing. Those efforts went far in assuring that Dewey was ready for the possible outbreak of hostilities.

The preparations of both the American and Spanish Naval forces in the Pacific are themselves a study of comparisons and contrasts. Within six weeks of Commodore Dewey's assumption of command of the Asiatic Squadron the Maine was destroyed and Dewey began his own preparations. From the scattered units of the Squadron he began requesting and receiving information as to the movements of foreign warships and, most importantly, inquiries as to the availability and reliability of his most precious and least expendable commodity, coal.⁴³ The distance between the nearest American port and Dewey's command was over 7,000 miles. Lacking a naval base in the area, Dewey's small fleet was dependent on, and at the mercy of the local support system, often under the control of third parties. This major difficulty, the inability to secure supplies in a timely manner, and having to compete for naval stores with other foreign naval vessels in the Orient, created an intolerable situation for the squadron, one that

threatened its ability to effectively execute its assigned mission against the Spanish naval forces in the Philippines.⁴⁴ The priority of the issue was raised by Long with his 26 February telegram to Dewey ordering the squadron to "keep full of coal, the best that can be had."⁴⁵ Dewey replied on 27 February he was faced with a "Great scarcity of coal" and requested that coal and ammunition be transported from San Francisco, reiterating the request on 11 March, stressing "Other governments have bought all good coal."⁴⁶ That same day Long gave Dewey authorization to contract for delivery of coal from third parties and ordered him to obtain English coal, if possible.47 Dewev was caught in a race for time and in competition with other naval forces buying up large amounts of naval stores in anticipation of war.48 The squadron's problem was temporarily solved by Long's authorization to purchase two British auxiliaries with 3,000 tons of coal and the acquisition of 1,900 tons of coal from a supplier in Shanghai.⁴⁹ The last item, coal from Shanghai, presented the possibility that Chinese neutrality would have to be violated after the outbreak of war, with a Dewey observation of "international complications receiving consideration", noting the possible dilemma. 50

The danger of being cut off from supplies, and the threat that a declaration of war would deny Dewey's force the opportunity to utilize repair facilities and logistical support located in non-belligerent ports, would play a major role in American naval planning for the next two decades. Dewey's purchase of the two auxiliaries permitted the squadron to transport a supply train with it, but "military necessity" forced Dewey to willfully plan the violation of Chinese neutrality in the event that Britain followed international conventions to the letter and forced the Asiatic Squadron out of Hong Kong following any declaration of war.⁵¹

Preparations for war were also being undertaken by the Spanish, and their naval forces in the Philippines were in a worse situation than the American forces. As a weak empire, Spain's military capabilities were inconsequential and incapable of assuring the safe transportation of the necessary logistical support to the Philippines. The senior Spanish naval commander, Admiral Patricio Montojo y Pasaron, was forced to utilize whatever meager resources were held by the Spanish in the islands. The Spanish had quessed as early as January that the Philippines would be a logical target in a war with the United States and confirmation was received in March when the German consul in Hong Kong cabled Berlin a summary of his conversation with the American consul, Rousenville Wildman, supposedly relating the contents of the 25 February telegram Roosevelt sent to Dewey. The Kaiser then informed the Spanish who notified her outpost in early March.⁵² Montojo's command of 37 vessels was scattered throughout various islands, defeating the doctrine of concentrated strength, and significantly contributing to the defeat of the Spanish.⁵³ Montojo had given consideration to raids upon American shipping in the Pacific and even to attacks on locations along the California coast, but lacking a secure system of supply lines and a naval base, in fact no safe refuge east of the Marianas Islands, abandoned the idea.54 Unable to undertake offensive operations against the United States, Montojo was left with five options for defending the Philippines:⁵⁵

(1) Meeting Dewey's fleet on the open sea for a traditional naval battle,

(2) repositioning his forces and assembling them at an incomplete naval base north of Manila (Subic Bay), awaiting Dewey's advance towards Manila and then striking from the rear,

(3) anchoring under the protection of Manila's batteries and using them as supporting firepower,

(4) anchoring near Cavite, southwest of Manila, and utilizing the batteries of the naval arsenal there or,

(5) dispersing his forces throughout the islands making Dewey waste vital coal supplies tracking down the vessels.

The first option was not seriously considered because of the unseaworthiness of many of the vessels.⁵⁶ Option three was not supported by Governor General Basilio Augustin y Davila because it would make the city a legitimate military target for naval bombardment.⁵⁷ Option five, considered the best plan, was also vetoed by Augustin as the civilian population of Manila feared being abandoned by the navy.⁵⁸

The Subic Bay option presented some interesting strategic advantages. A holding action at the bay would have led to a drawn out encounter for Dewey, a dilemma which could have forestalled his victory. A very good natural harbor, Subic Bay is approachable from the sea by only one narrow entrance at the southern end of the bay guarded by a small island (Grande Island) and surrounded by high hills on the western, northern and eastern sides. The Asiatic Squadron was not supported by any land forces and thus, until reinforced from the continental United States, could not "permanently" hold any positions ashore they might attempt to occupy, particularly Manila and Subic Bays. The Asiatic Squadron could only effectively face other naval units and maritime vessels. With the Spanish ensconced in Subic Bay, safely behind any batteries on Grande Island, Dewey would have been forced to divide his small force to guard both bays and would have been at the mercy of hit and run tactics. Split into two components, one to secure Manila Bay and the other to prevent a breakout of Montojo, the Asiatic Squadron could have been overwhelmed and defeated in detail.⁵⁹

As early as the 1850's, the Spanish had considered relocating their main naval base from Manila Bay to Subic Bay, recognizing the difficulties of defending the large expanse of Manila Bay, but the project was fought by uncooperative Army officials, who loathed the idea of giving up the secure and social life of Manila for an isolated and primitive area.⁶⁰ After 1885 the bay was connected to Manila by a trunk rail line and a telegraphic link, but that failed to persuade the army to support the navy's desire to relocate the base from Cavite.⁶¹ The Japanese victory in the Sino-Japanese War in 1895 and the fear of a southward thrust by Japan forced the Spanish to increase expenditures of funds for building a base at Subic, eventually spending several millions of dollars by 1898. 62 The work done at the naval base by the start of the Spanish-American War was insufficient to support combined operations, lacking substantial fortifications and coastal batteries on Grande Island. The base facilities were for the most part incomplete and only a small amount of landscaping (damming and rerouting creeks and rivers) had been completed. Montojo did withdraw to Subic on the 25th of April, but upon his arrival discovered that the Army had not completed the fortifications at Grande, the batteries laying on the beach instead of on their mounts. Following a council of war, Montojo decided that the incomplete defenses and the forty fathom depth of the harbor meant his force would suffer heavy casualties in men and materiel. Left with little opportunity to defeat Dewey and wishing to salvage some honor for Spain, Montojo accepted the fourth option and withdrew on the 29th of April, returned to Cavite and anchored at Canacao Bay under the protection of the batteries at the Cavite naval arsenal to await Dewey's advance.⁶³

Following the British declaration of neutrality in Hong Kong on 24 April, requiring belligerents to depart the colony within forty eight hours, Dewey ordered his units to complete preparations and then left Hong Kong, assembling in Mirs Bay, thirty miles east of Hong Kong and in Chinese territorial waters. Rationalizing the action as one of military need, Dewey also recognized that China was in no position to protest the violation of her neutrality.⁶⁴ Despite the fact that he was in a remote position, Dewey was constantly informed of the Spanish preparations in the Philippines, using the American Consul-General, Oscar F. Williams, as a conduit of information. Williams' last message to Dewey informed him that Montojo had moved his units to Subic Bay. The diplomat reluctantly left the Philippines following the declaration of war and sailed to Hong Kong on a British steamer.⁶⁵

Dewey's forces got underway on 27 April, arriving in the Subic Bay vicinity three days later. Dewey entered the bay, found no enemy forces, then headed towards Manila Bay. The squadron entered the large bay at midnight, suffering no casualties from the few batteries on Bataan that fired upon the American ships. At 5:30 A.M. the squadron began its attack on the anchored Spanish forces, breaking off once to count the amount of ammunition left. This break during the engagement

has caused much controversy, but in fact it was caused by a miscount of shells and Dewey hauled out to take stock of his situation. He signaled the other ships in the squadron to break for breakfast, thus starting a legend that Dewey contemptuously had pulled out of action.⁶⁶ By noon the Spanish had, for all intents and purposes, no naval forces left in the Philippines capable of evicting the American Navy. The strategy and tactics of the Battle of Manila Bay followed traditional warfare concepts in which Dewey used a line formation to steam back and forth five times, bombarding the hapless Spanish forces, totally destroying them.⁶⁷ The most important question following the victory on 1 May, 1898, was "what next?" What was the next course of action and what limited the extent? The Kimball plan called for holding Manila as a hostage. Naval planners had never envisioned territorial acquisition as the result of a victory. Only Dewey could shape the events because he was cut off from the outside world and the official report of victory took five days to reach the United States.⁶⁸

RESULTS OF VICTORY

In dramatically demonstrating that Spain was far too weak to defend it's islands the United States had threatened to disturb the balance of power in the Far East. The Philippines suddenly became the hottest item the current imperial market had to offer. Like Brer Rabbit, the United States was stuck like a Tar Baby; it could not simply order its navy to steam out of Manila bay and leave a power vacuum behind.

Dewey's victory at Manila presented the United States and the Navy with unforseen problems. What should the next step be and how much should America involve herself in Asian affairs at the end of the war? The first question was exacerbated by Dewey's position in Manila Bay, and the second was influenced by almost purely economic and political events, the almost complete division of China's coast by the other powers.⁷⁰

The destruction of the Spanish naval forces on the first of May did not automatically extend American control throughout the Philippine Islands, much less the city of Manila. Dewey's small squadron still had to subdue the batteries in Manila and Cavite. After the destruction of the remaining afloat units the squadron anchored within range of the guns of the city and Dewey conveyed the message to the Spanish military commander in the city that he would spare the city a bombardment as long as the batteries remained inactive.⁷¹ Another demand, or request, that Dewey sought was the joint use of the Manila to Hong Kong cable so as to keep in touch with his superiors in Washington. The Spanish authorities refused to share the cable and Dewey ordered the cable severed, the act, completed by nightfall, left Dewey isolated from his leaders. In Dewey's mistaken opinion, and due largely to a lack of information, he believed that the Spanish were also cut off from any contact with Spain, but as it turns out there were two additional cable lines, one originating further North ending in Hong Kong and the second originating in the South, terminating in Singapore. The act of cutting the cable is one of the most criticized acts that Dewey had carried out, as it would provide ammunition to the Anti-Imperialists that he had done so that the Philippine annexation question would be carried out in a political vacuum. Dewey's decision to sever the cable was understandable, however, because in his position a functional cable would have allowed the Spanish to telegraph Madrid, detail his rather weakened and exposed position, and request additional support. It would be about two weeks before Dewey discovered the other working cables. Note that shortly thereafter Dewey was constantly on edge regarding the disposition of a fleet that had been sent eastward through the Suez Canal with the intention of relieving the Spanish forces in the islands. As further justification for Dewey's action, the Naval War Board in Washington D.C., composed of three senior naval officers (Mahan was a member) advising the Secretary of the Navy on strategy in the war, recommended just the same action in regard to the blockade of Cuba when it was discovered that the cable between the island and Jamaica was providing information back to Madrid.⁷²

The first word regarding the events of the Battle of Manila came from the Spanish themselves. During a lull in the battle, a telegram to Madrid gave details of the battle and stated that the enemy had been driven off, (actually the Americans took a break for meals and conferences). Following the complete destruction of the Spanish fleet a second telegram was sent in which the damage estimates to the Spanish ships were provided. The inconsistencies, regarding damage suffered, of the two telegrams were too obivious and 2 May, second of May, planners in the United States determined that Dewey had won the battle, much to the relief of the Navy department and the White House. Dewey, ignorant of the Spanish communications, waiting for his situation to stabilize, did not send out an official report until he released one of his ships to return to Hong Kong with two telegrams containing the good His reports indicated that he would require "land forces" to news.

capture the city of Manila and requested additional support, including ammunition. He also added that there were a large number of foreign warships in the harbor and that complications might arise over the German ships in the area.⁷³

By the second of May foreign interest in the activities of Manila Bay manifested itself with the arrival of a British warship, followed within days by warships of Germany, Japan and France. It was the German arrival that was to present problems because Dewey tended to exaggerate his difficulties and he mislead the Navy Department regarding German intent and on occasion failed to report incidents to his superiors. Whatever may have started the bad feelings between Dewey and the Germans, and they appear to have begun before 1 May, 1898, the period of heightened tension would led to a bias on the Navy's part vis-a-vis Germany, especially as Dewey would be in a position to influence planning for about twenty years. Within days of the Battle of Manila Dewey was promoted to Admiral of the Navy, the senior position in the navy and eventually became the senior planner among the armed forces of the United States.⁷⁴

Within days of Dewey's victory and influenced by his report, the Naval War Board suggested, and President McKinley agreed, that support should be sent to the American forces in the Philippines. Another suggestion recommended the capture of a coaling station between San Francisco and the Philippines so as to provide a way station for the navy in case of trouble with other Spanish forces, which were suspected of heading towards the Philippines. Guam was selected as the best location and on 23 May a convoy of volunteers troops, escorted by the Navy, left San Francisco for Guam. Arriving on 20 June the island was captured with no fight on the part of the uninformed Spanish forces. The convoy left and arrived in Manila Bay on 30 June. The importance of Guam served to intensify Dewey's isolated and weak position, because if he was forced to withdraw from the Philippines the nearest safe American refuge would be the west coast, a distance of 7,000 nautical miles, as Britain, France, Japan, and Germany had declared neutrality. Coal supplies were also insufficient to provide service to all the naval warships in the Far East. There existed a threat that Spain would be sending part of its naval forces through the Suez Canal to relieve the city and destroy the American squadron, and in fact a Spanish force did go through the Suez Canal and got as far as the Red Sea before turning back following the defeat of Spanish forces in the This victory not only relieved any Spanish pressure on Caribbean. the Atlantic coast of the United States but also freed up units of the Navy to threaten Spain itself and possibly to reinforce Dewey.75

Immediate national and international interest in the fate of the Philippines and other Spanish possessions in the Pacific caused much speculation. There was an increasing desire on the part of many Americans not to withdraw after such a glorious defeat of the Spanish. The "large Policy" clique saw this as the opportunity to extend the benefits of American culture and commerce into the Far East, concurrent with the increase in American power and influence in a region where other powers had carved up the coast of China. The United States acquisition of the island permanently would give the country a marketplace and a window overlooking Asia, an American "Hong Kong." The Naval viewpoint was that if the United States planned on keeping the islands and extending commercially throughout the region, then a naval base would be required in the Far East as well as any ancillary bases between the United States and the Far East to support the national policy in that regard. Guam fit this category as well as some of the other Spanish possessions in the Pacific.⁷⁶

Of all of the foreign powers interested in the Philippines, Germany and Japan had more than a passing interest. The German decision to send a strong force to Manila Bay was not designed to challenge Dewey, but rather to try to stake a claim to the islands in case he did withdraw. The Germans, consistent with its "Realpolitik" policy, hoped to gain territories in the event of any division of the Spanish territories. The Japanese were also interested in staking a territorial claim but her actions in the Philippines were not as threatening and Japan was too concerned with the scramble for chunks of China to challenge the United States, a nation with which just months before she had done just that with regard to the Hawaii annexation issue. Japanese and German desires were that the islands not go back to Spanish control and both nations were just biding their time. Incidents between the U.S. Navy and the German naval forces intensified Dewey's personal stress levels because of the unknown quality of the German interest, and were further heightened by the unknown intentions and postion of the Spanish fleet suspected of being enroute to the Philippines. The few British vessels in the harbor observed all diplomatic and military protocols and somewhat alleviated Dewey's tension. The British presence there was based on also finding out what

intentions the American government had regarding the islands and to keep watch on German actions there, as the British were intent that any American withdrawal would not create a vacuum filled by Germany, a situation that Japan also wished to avoid.⁷⁷

Notwithstanding Dewey's discomfort, the American decision regarding the islands was slow in coalescing. President McKinley, unsure of what action to take, eventually came to agree with advisors and popular opinion that the United States must maintain some presence there and decided to keep the island of Luzon with its harbor at Manila. By August 13, 1898 following the defeat of all the Spanish naval forces in Caribbean waters and the lessening of the threat against Dewey, an armistice was declared and a peace conference was scheduled for September. By the time the American commissioners arrived in Paris for the conference, McKinley had decided that the only appropriate action would be to take all of the Philippine Islands. Careful consideration determined that the United States could not withdraw from the islands, nor could it just take a portion of the islands and leave the others to the mercy of the Spanish, or worse yet, have the other major powers control them. That predicament would have possibly endangered the American position in Manila, economically and politically, thus the only logical choice for McKinley was to demand the entire archipelago and the island of Guam as part of the peace process. Following the completion of negotiations in Paris between the United States and Spain the Treaty of Paris brought peace between the two belligerents. The United States received the Philippines, Guam, and Puerto Rico for a price of twenty million dollars. Cuba received a nominal independence under American supervision. The remaining Spanish possessions in the Pacific were sold to Germany with the United States and Germany now hostile neighbors. The final act between Spain and the United States regarding the Pacific came after the discovery that not all of the islands of the Philippines had been transferred to the United States. Germany tried to take advantage of the situation but within a year the islands were effectively under American control. Although there would never be open hostilities between the two nations in the Pacific, the mutual suspicions caused American Naval planners to expect warfare between the nations in the Pacific.⁷⁸ ¹ See Walter LaFeber, <u>The New Empire: An Interpretation of</u> <u>American Expansionism, 1860–1898</u> (Ithaca, New York, 1971), 360–361; Howard K. Beale, <u>Theodore Roosevelt and the Rise of America to World</u> <u>Power</u> (Baltimore, 1984), 55, 70–71; A. Whitney Griswold, <u>The Far</u> <u>Fastern Policy of the United States</u> (New York, 1938), 11–13; Foster Rhea Dulles, <u>America in the Pacific</u> (Boston, 1932), 202–203; Julius W. Pratt, "The Large Policy of 1898," <u>Mississippi Valley Historical</u> <u>Review</u>, 19 (1932): 220–221; Walter R. Herrick, Jr., <u>The American Naval</u> <u>Revolution</u> (Baton Rouge, 1966), 205.

² See William R. Braisted, <u>The United States Navy in the Pacific</u>, 1897-1909 (New York, 1958), 21-32.

³ Braisted noted "Even before Roosevelt arrived at the Navy Department, plans had been completed for an assault on the Philippines ..., <u>U.S. Navy, 1897-1909</u>, 22. See Richard H. Collin, <u>Theodore</u> <u>Roosevelt, Culture, Diplomacy and Expansion: A new view of American</u> <u>Imperialism</u> (Baton Rouge, 1985), 111-117; J. A. S. Grenville, "Diplomacy and War Plans in the United States, 1890-1917," in Paul M. Kennedy, ed., <u>The War Plans of the Great Powers, 1880-1914</u> (Boston, 1979), 25; J. A. S. Grenville and George B. Young, <u>Politics, Strategy</u> and American Diplomacy (New Haven, 1966), 269-270, 273.

⁴ Ronald Spector, <u>Professors of War</u> (Newport, 1977), 89-90; Grenville and Young, <u>Politics</u>, 272; David F. Trask, <u>The War with Spain</u> <u>in 1898</u> (New York, 1984), 73-76; Edmund Morris, <u>The Rise of Theodore</u> <u>Roosevelt</u> (New York, 1979), 572-573; Richard E. Welch, Jr., <u>Response to</u> <u>Imperialism</u> (Chapel Hill, 1979), 4.

⁵ Spector, <u>Professors</u>, 91; Collin, <u>Theodore Roosevelt</u>, 113; Trask, War with Spain, 73.

⁶ Spector, <u>Professors</u>, 90; Trask, <u>War with Spain</u>, 74; "Plan of Operations Against Spain", Office of Naval Intelligence to the Secretary of the Navy, 17 December, 1896, RG 80, National Archives.

⁷ Spector, Professors, 91.

⁸ The original is in the <u>Records of the Naval Operating Forces</u>, RG 313, National Archives. Hereafter cited as Kimball Plan.

⁹ Braisted called Kimball "an exponent of Mahan's theories." Braisted, <u>U.S. Navy 1897-1909</u>, 22. LaFeber noted Kimball "was a vigorous exponent of Mahan's ideas", <u>New Empire</u>, 360. Collin observed "... Mahan may have created the theoretical foundations ..., but Kimball created a practical blueprint" in <u>Theodore Roosevelt</u>, 117. ¹⁰ Examples include "utilization of . . . superior sea power . . . "; "of harassing trade and cutting off revenue"; "With Manila in our hands it would be an easy matter to control the trade", Kimball Plan, 1, 4, 31.

¹¹ Kimball Plan, 4; Spector, <u>Professors</u>, 93; Collin, <u>Theodore</u> <u>Roosevelt</u>, 114-115. The appendices proved valuable, with information on American and Spanish forces, available merchant shipping and harbors.

¹² Spector, <u>Professors of War</u>, 93; Collin, <u>Theodore Roosevelt</u>, 113-114; Spector, "Who Planned the Attack on Manila Bay?," <u>Mid-America</u>, 52 (1971): 96-97; Spector, <u>Admiral of the New Empire</u> (Baton Rouge, 1974), 33.

¹³ Assistant Secretary of the Navy William McAdoo advised his successor, Roosevelt, in March, 1897, that "in case of war or any foreign trouble it [the Office of Naval Intelligence] is the first place to get accurate information; the war college problems are deposited there." Spector, <u>Professors</u>, 96; Grenville and Young, Politics, 273; Morris, Theodore Roosevelt, 572.

¹⁴ Spector, <u>Professors</u>, 94; Morris, <u>Theodore Roosevelt</u>, 572; Trask, <u>War with Spain</u>, 77; Grenville, "American Naval Preparations for War with Spain, 1896–1989," <u>Journal of American Studies</u> 2 (1968), 36.

¹⁵ Spector, <u>Professors</u>, 94; Morris, <u>Theodore Roosevelt</u>, 576-577; Grenville, "Naval Preparations," 36-37. The provision for an attack on the Canary Islands was deleted and the Philippine attack scenario was re-instituted, Collin, Theodore Roosevelt, 113.

¹⁶ Spector, <u>Professors</u>, 94.

¹⁷ Spector, <u>Professors</u>, 95; Roosevelt to Long, 20 September, 1897, Roosevelt to Lodge, 21 September, 1897, Roosevelt to Long, 30 September, 1897, Elting E. Morison, ed., <u>The Letters of Theodore</u> <u>Roosevelt</u>, 8 vols., (Cambridge, 1951), 1: 683-686, 695-697. Hereafter <u>MRL</u>.

¹⁸ William R. Thayer, <u>Theodore Roosevelt</u> (New York, 1919), 116. Some historians have taken the opportunity to blame Roosevelt and Mahan without reviewing all of the facts. Using personal letters and comments to acquaintances, not having access to or failing to use records, the assumption continued for an long period of time that Roosevelt, Lodge and Mahan conspired to take the Philippines. See LaFeber's <u>New Empire</u>, 360-361, written four years after the release of Braisted's <u>U.S. Navy, 1897-1909</u>. Others sharing the conspiracy theory include Beale, <u>Theodore Roosevelt</u>, 58-63; Griswold, <u>Far Eastern Policy</u>, 10-26; Dulles, <u>America in the Pacific</u>, 202-204; Pratt, "Large Policy," 220-221; Pratt, <u>Expansionist of 1898</u> (Chicago, 1964), 221-232; William J. Pomeroy, American Neo-Colonialism (New York, 1970), 30-31; Harold and Margaret Sprout, <u>Rise of American Naval Power</u>, <u>1776-1918</u>, (Princeton, 1939), 224-230.

¹⁹ Roosevelt to Long, 20 September, 1897, Roosevelt to Lodge, 21 September, 1897, Roosevelt to Long, 30 September, 1897, Roosevelt to Kimball, 19 November, 1897, in <u>MRL</u>, 1: 683-686, 695-697, 716-718, 759-763; Roosevelt to Lodge, 21 September, 1897, in Henry Cabot Lodge, <u>Selections from the Correspondence of Theodore Roosevelt and Henry</u> Cabot Lodge, 1884-1918, 2 vols., (New York, 1925), 1: 291.

²⁰ William E. Livezey, <u>Mahan on Sea Power</u>, (Norman, OK., 1981), 133. Mahan was later familiarized with portions of the Kimball plan, "Naval Officers in Washington gave little further attention to developments in the Far East . . . Mahan contributed detailed proposals for . . . Cuba", Grenville and Young, <u>Politics</u>, 276; "It can be surmised that Mahan had not previously known of the existence of the Kimball plan", Grenville and Young, <u>Politics</u>, 292.

21 Collin, Theodore Roosevelt, 119. "Traditionally the administrative burden [including personnel] of the Navy Department fell upon the Assistant Secretary . . . ", Collin, ibid., 119. "Roosevelt and the Navy Department contrived to implement the details of the Kimball war plan. Roosevelt at no time took over any additional powers that previous assistant secretaries had not expected", Collin, ibid., "... he pushed on preparations for war at full speed, 124. determined to make the utmost of the existing resources", regarding active preparations for war, "you find him [TR] vigorously assisting", Thayer, Theodore Roosevelt, 120-121. Also see Roosevelt to Long, 14 Jan, 1898, in MRL, 1: 759-763; Roosevelt to Long, 22 January, 1898, Roosevelt to Long, 16 February, 1898, Roosevelt to Long, 15 April, 1898, in Gardiner Welch Allen, ed., Papers of John Davis Long, 1897-1904, (Boston, 1939), 41-42, 53-55, 93-95.

²² Although Dewey had attracted Roosevelt's attention as early as 1891 (because of Dewey's initiatives in an impending crisis), "Any Officer [who took action] . . . before a crisis - at his own expense could be trusted in wartime", the two did not meet until June, 1897. Recognizing a man of action Roosevelt preferred Dewey over his rival, Commodore John Howell, a desk Admiral, to command a fleet Roosevelt felt was destined for action, Morris, <u>Theodore Roosevelt</u>, 577-578.

²³ Morris, <u>Theodore Roosevelt</u>, 578. Roosevelt was occupied "with Naval affairs and plans for the coming war (whose certainty he never questioned). . . .", Morris, <u>ibid</u>., 578. Roosevelt considered Commodore Howell, "extremely afraid of responsibility" and that "the prospect of such an officer leading an attack upon Manila was depressing to contemplate", Morris, ibid., 587.

²⁴ Grenville and Young, <u>Politics</u>, 269. Roosevelt "appears to have valued Dewey's opinion in technical matters but there is no evidence that Dewey knew of . . . [the ambitions] of Roosevelt and his circle",

referring to the "Large Policy" clique, Spector, Admiral, 36.

²⁵ Confidential Telegrams Feb[ruary] 26th to December 30, 1898, George Dewey Papers, Library of Congress. "This telegram has been widely misinterpreted. Although Long had not authorized the sending of the telegram . . ., the sending of the cable was in line with the department's long-standing plans and preparations for war with Spain. Long neither disapproved the telegram nor made any attempt to rescind it", Spector, <u>Admiral</u>, 44.

²⁶ After the <u>Maine</u> explosion Mahan, scheduled for a European trip, queried Roosevelt as to whether he should go. Roosevelt responded "... I think you unwise to give up going; moreover, I fear the president does not intend that we shall have war if we can possibly avoid it." Mahan further questioned the wisdom of dividing the small United States Naval forces in three theaters to which Roosevelt wrote "... the one important thing to my mind would be to disregard minor punishment, and devote our attention to smashing Spain in Cuba." The small punishment was the Philippines operation. Roosevelt to Mahan, 14 March, 1898, in Alfred Thayer Mahan Papers, Library of Congress.

²⁷ Collin, <u>Theodore Roosevelt</u>, 127.

²⁸ Collin noted "The Roosevelt 'plot' to precipitate war can be found in its most blatant form" in Griswold, <u>Far Eastern Policy</u>, 11-16; Walter Millis, <u>The Martial Spirit</u> (Cambridge, MA., 1931), 112; and Foster Rhea Dulles, <u>The Imperial Years</u> (New York, 1966), 132, Collin, <u>Theodore Roosevelt</u>, 106.

²⁹ Richard A. Fields, "American Imperialism: The Worst Chapter in any Book," <u>American Historical Review</u>, 83 (1978): 644-683; also in Collin, <u>Theodore Roosevelt</u>, 107; Spector noted that "to assign to them [American Naval Officers] full responsibility for the . . . Philippines is as short sighted as to attribute it to the intrigues of Theodore Roosevelt and Henry Cabot Lodge", Spector, "Manila Bay," 102.

³⁰ Collin concurs with Fields, Collin, <u>Theodore Roosevelt</u>, 106.

³¹ Mahan's work with the Naval War Board is documented in Naval War Board Records, 2 vols., RG 80 and RG 45, National Archives.

³² George T. Davis, <u>A Navy Second to None</u> (New York, 1940), 84.

³³ Lodge did not think that "his day with Roosevelt would have special historical significance", Collin, <u>Theodore Roosevelt</u>, 128.

³⁴ Henry Cabot Lodge, "The War with Spain," <u>Harper's New Monthly</u> Magazine, 98 (1899): 512-525.

³⁵ Collin did an outstanding job of documenting Lodge's preparation for his article, an effort that other historians have

frequently failed to match. See Collin, <u>Theodore Roosevelt</u>, 128-130.

³⁶ John M. Dobson, <u>America's Ascent: The United States becomes a</u> <u>Great Power, 1880-1914</u> (Dekalb, IL., 1978), 87.

³⁷ Morris, <u>Theodore Roosevelt</u>, 566-567; Herrick, <u>Naval Revolution</u>, 196-198.

³⁸ Roosevelt to Long, 14 January, 1898, <u>MRL</u>, 1: 759-763; Roosevelt to Long, 22 January, 1898, Roosevelt to Long, 16 February, 1898, Roosevelt to Long, 15 April, 1898, Allen, <u>Long Papers</u>, 41-42, 53-55, 93-95; Roosevelt to Long, 30 September, 1897, Roosevelt to Long, 6 January, 1898, Roosevelt to Lafarge, 16 February, 1898, found in Memos and Letters of the Assistant Secretary of the Navy, RG 80, National Archives.

³⁹ Morris, <u>Theodore Roosevelt</u>, 572-573; Herrick, <u>Naval Revolution</u>, 199-201; Spector, <u>Professors</u>, 95-96; "Plan of Campaign against Spain and Japan", Office of Naval Intelligence to the Secretary of the Navy, 30 June, 1897, RG 80, National Archives; also see Thomas A. Bailey's "Japan's Protest against the Annexation of Hawaii," <u>Journal of Modern</u> <u>History</u>, 3 (1931): 46-61.

⁴⁰ See Payson J. Treat, <u>Diplomatic Relations Between the United</u> States and Japan, 1853-1905 (Gloucester, MA., 1963 [1938]), 3: 25-54.

⁴¹ Spector, <u>Admiral</u>, 43; Grenville and Young, <u>Politics</u>, 277.

⁴² Found in Telegrams, Dewey Papers.

⁴³ Braisted, <u>U.S. Navy, 1897–1909</u>, 24; Dewey to Commanding Officer <u>Boston</u>, 19 February, 1898, in Telegrams, Dewey Papers. Dewey to Long, 27 February, 1898, Dewey to Long, 1 March, 1898, Dewey to Long, 11 March, 1898, in Telegrams, Dewey Papers; Laurin Hall Healy and Luis Kutner, <u>The Admiral</u> (Chicago, 1944), 159–161; Dewey to Long, 1 March, 1898, Dewey to Long, 1 March, 1898, Area 10, RG 45, National Archives.

⁴⁴ Braisted, <u>U.S. Navy, 1897-1909</u>, 24; Dewey to Long, 2 April, 1898, in Telegrams, Dewey Papers; #58-S, #82-S, #86-2, in Larrabees Cipher Code (Received), Military Papers, Dewey Papers; Trask, <u>War with Spain</u>, 92; Grenville and Young, <u>Politics</u>, 275; Admiral George Dewey U.S.N., <u>The Autobiography of George Dewey</u>, Admiral of the Navy (New York, 1913), 180; Spector, <u>Admiral</u>, 47-48.

⁴⁵ Long to Dewey, 26 February, 1898, in Telegrams, Dewey Papers.

⁴⁶ Dewey to Long, 11 March, 1898, ibid.

⁴⁷ Long to Dewey, 11 March, 1898, <u>ibid</u>.

⁴⁸ Braisted, U.S. Navy, 1897-1909, 24; Spector, Admiral, 48; Healy

and Kutner, The Admiral, 157-161.

⁴⁹ Dewey to Long, 4 April, 1898, Long to Dewey, 5 April, 1898, Dewey to Long, 5 April, 1898, Dewey to Long, 6 April, 1898, Long to Dewey, 6 April, 1898, in Telegrams, Dewey Papers.

⁵⁰ Dewey to Commanding Officer <u>Monocacy</u>, 5 April, 1898, Dewey to Commanding Officer Monocacy, 6 April, 1898, in Telegrams, Dewey Papers.

⁵¹ For an excellent study of Dewey's problems with the neutrality issue at Hong Kong see R. G. Neale, <u>Great Britain and United States</u> <u>Expansion: 1896-1900</u> (East Lansing, MI., 1966), 58-101; Richard West, Jr., <u>Admirals of American Empire</u> (Indianapolis, 1948), 198-200; Trask, <u>War with Spain</u>, 92; Dewey <u>Autobiography</u>, 189-194; Dewey to Long, 23 April, 1898, Dewey to Long, 23 April, 1898, Dewey to Long, 25 April, 1898, in Telegrams, Dewey Papers; Herrick, <u>Naval Revolution</u>, 231.

⁵² James A. LeRoy, <u>The Americans in the Philippines</u> (Boston, 1914), 151; Trask, <u>War with Spain</u>, 68; Grenville and Young, <u>Politics</u>, 282-283.

⁵³ The dispersion was due to the insurrection that had broken out in 1896. See Josefa M. Saniel, <u>Japan and the Philippines</u>, <u>1868-1898</u> (Quezon City, Philippines, 1969), <u>145-207</u>; Trask, <u>War with Spain</u>, <u>106</u>; Rear Admiral French E. Chadwick U.S.N., <u>The Relations Between the</u> <u>United States and Spain: The Spanish-American War</u> 2 vols., (New York, 1911), 1: 90.

⁵⁴ Chadwick, <u>Spanish-American War</u>, 1: 90-91; Trask, <u>War with</u> Spain, 69-70.

⁵⁵ Chadwick, <u>Spanish-American</u>, 1: 91-92; LeRoy, <u>Philippines</u>, 151-156; Trask, War with Spain, 69-71.

⁵⁶ For the condition of the vessels see Chadwick, <u>Spanish-American</u> War, 1: 90, 92.

⁵⁷ <u>Ibid., 1: 92-93</u>. This could have been the best choice if Montojo and Augustin had coordinated their planning. The batteries at Manila numbered 226 and, although many were ancient fieldpieces, those guns could have provided extensive support. Chadwick is supported by Trask, <u>War with Spain</u>, 101 and LeRoy, <u>Philippines</u>, 153, 168-170. Both give excellent descriptions of the Manila batteries and their conditions. See Dewey, Autobiography, 200.

⁵⁸ Chadwick, <u>Spanish-American War</u>, 1: 92; Trask, <u>War with Spain</u>, 69, 97, 101.

⁵⁹ LeRoy, <u>Philippines</u>, 152-153; Trask, <u>War with Spain</u>, 69-70; Dewey, Autobiography, 200-201; Admiral Patricio Montojo y Pasaron, "Official Report" in Dewey, <u>Autobiography</u>, 301-302; Chadwick, <u>Spanish-American War</u>, 92, 161-164. Chadwick quoted a naval officer's assessment of the Subic Bay option, "The real problem was that of finding the enemy's ships. However defective they might be in offensive power and in mobility, they had their choice of a dozen harbors within a day's run of their naval base", 172. The differences as to the spelling (Subig or Subic) arise from the pronunciation, "Subik" with "g" being used in the beginning. Since documents use both it is to be understood to refer to the same geographic area.

60 LeRoy, Philippines, 152.

⁶¹ Dewey, <u>Autobiography</u>, 201.

⁶² Saniel, <u>Japan and Philippines</u>, 179; "Establishment of a Naval Station in the Philippines", House Document #140, 17 December, 1900, 57th Congress, 1st Session, (Washington D.C., 1900), 17, 22-23.

⁶³ Montojo, "Official Report" in Dewey, <u>Autobiography</u>, 301-302; Trask, War with Spain, 69-70, 96-97; Dewey, Autobiography, 201.

⁶⁴ Dewey to Long, 23 April, 1898, Dewey to Long, 23 April, 1898, Dewey to Long, 25 April, 1898, in Telegrams, Dewey Papers; Dewey, Autobiography, 189-194; LeRoy, Philippines, 156.

⁶⁵ LeRoy, <u>Philippines</u>, 150, 156; Trask, <u>War with Spain</u>, 96; Dewey, <u>Autobiography</u>, 179-180, 186, 194-196; Chadwick, <u>Spanish-American War</u>, 157-158; Dewey to Williams, 27 February, 1898, Williams to Dewey, 28 February, 1898, Dewey to Williams, 15 March, 1898, Williams to Dewey, 17 March, 1898, Williams to Dewey, 18 March, 1898, Williams to Dewey, 13 April, 1898, Dewey to Williams, 15 April, 1898, Williams to Dewey, 16 April, 1898, Dewey to Williams, 17 April, 1898, Williams to Dewey, 18 April, 1898, Dewey to Williams, 18 April, 1898, Dewey to Long, 23 April, 1898, Dewey to Long, 25 April, 1898, in Telegrams, Dewey Papers.

⁶⁶ Dewey to Long, 27 April, 1898, in Telegrams, Dewey Papers; Dewey, <u>Autobiography</u>, 204-205; Montojo, "Official Report" in Dewey, <u>Autobiography</u>, 303; LeRoy, <u>Philippines</u>, 157; Trask, <u>War with Spain</u>, 97-98; Chadwick, Spanish-American War, 172-173; Joseph L. Stickney, War in the Philippines (Chicago: n.p., 1899), 30-57. Another myth regarding the American attack on the Philippines involve the role of Emilio Aquinaldo, the exiled leader of Filipino insurrectionists. The rebel was put in contact with Dewey representatives by consular officials, R. Wildman in Hong Kong and S. Pratt in Singapore. Deciding to use the rebels in the Philippines to pin down Spanish forces, Dewey gave permission for a representative of the Filipino Junta to join the American squadron enroute to the battle in Manila Bay. Aquinaldo did not join his peers in the Philippines until 19 May, 1898. There exists no "smoking qun" documentation that Dewey or any other American representative gave Aguinaldo official recognition. Military necessity meant that Dewey was willing to use whatever assets were available for

the defeat of the Spanish, including keeping the rebels in the dark about the post-war political settlement. Using ambiguous statements, Dewey only provided arms to the the rebels to pin down Spanish troops with no intention of recognizing an insurgent government. Dewey was under specific orders to avoid any act that would provide a stamp of approval by any official representative, see Laurin Healy and Luis Kutner, <u>The Admiral</u>, 222-227, 242-244; Spector, <u>Admiral</u>, 44-45, 85-88, 90, 92-94.

⁶⁷ See Stickney, <u>War</u>. Stickney was a newspaperman who accompanied Dewey from Hong Kong to the Philippines. He appears to be the only person on the scene to have had the foresight to bring along, and use a camera. Throughout his book there are scattered a large number of photographs of the actual battle, and the aftermath, including several of the Spanish ships either burning or in various stages of destruction.

⁶⁸ Dewey to Long, 1 May, 1898 in Telegrams, Dewey Papers.

⁶⁹ Dobson, <u>America's Ascent</u>, 110, 117.

⁷⁰ Dulles, <u>America in the Pacific</u>, 207-208; Herrick, <u>Naval</u> <u>Revolution</u>, 237; Collin, <u>Theodore Roosevelt</u>, 104, 136. Kimball's original plan was drafted as a strategic document, with no political ideology, Collin, Theodore Roosevelt, 135.

⁷¹ LeRoy, <u>Philippines</u>, 171.

⁷² Edwin P. Hoyt, <u>Pacific Destiny</u> (New York, 1981), 51; Trask, <u>War</u> with Spain, 105, 373-377; Braisted, <u>U.S. Navy, 1897-1909</u>, 28; Dulles, <u>America in the Pacific</u>, 212-213; Braisted, "The Philippine Naval Base Problem, 1898-1909," <u>Mississippi Valley Historical Review</u> 41 (June, 1954), 21; Livezey, <u>Mahan</u>, 141; Earl Pomeroy, <u>Pacific Outpost: American</u> <u>Strategy in Guam and Micronesia</u> (Stanford, 1951), 7; LeRoy, <u>Philippines</u>, 172; 4 May, 1898, 10 May, 1898, 11 May, 1898, 16 May, 1898, 20 May, 1898, Records of Naval War Board, RG 45, National Archives.

⁷³ Collin, <u>Theodore Roosevelt</u>, 138-139, Saniel, <u>Japan and</u> <u>Philippines</u>, 145-146; John H. Latane, <u>America as a World Power</u>, <u>1897-1907</u> (New York, 1907), 38; Outten J. Clinnard, <u>Japan's Influence</u> <u>on American Naval Power</u>, 1897-1917 (Berkeley, 1947), 22-23; Archibald C. Coolidge, <u>The United States as a World Power</u> (New York, 1909), 149-150; Thomas Bailey, "Dewey and the Germans at Manila Bay," <u>American</u> <u>Historical Review</u> 45 (October, 1939), 59-66; Dewey to Long, 1 May, 1898, in Telegrams, Dewey Papers. William Langer noted of German intentions, "The German government had begun with the project of establishing a protectorate, then reduced it to neutralization or partition," <u>The Diplomacy of Imperialism</u>, 519.

⁷⁴ Spector, Admiral, 103, 131-136, Collin, <u>Theodore Roosevelt</u>,

139; Beale, <u>Theodore Roosevelt</u>, 391; Trask, <u>War with Spain</u>, 378-381; Bailey, "Dewey and Germans", 65-66; Braisted, <u>U.S. Navy</u>, <u>1897-1909</u>, 33-42; Lodge, "War with Spain", 513; Akira Iriye, <u>Pacific Estrangement</u> (Cambridge, 1972), 59; Vincent Davis, <u>The Admirals Lobby</u> (Chapel Hill, 1967), 118-121; James K. Eyre Jr., "Japan and the American Annexation of the Philippines," <u>Pacific Historical Review</u> 11 (March, 1942), 55, 57-59.

⁷⁵ Grenville and Young, <u>Politics</u>, 292-293; LeRoy, <u>Philippines</u>, 173. The text of the first Spanish cable from Manila can be found in Healy and Kutner, <u>The Admiral</u>, 192. The Spanish intent for sending a fleet to the Pacific was to forestall and contest any American claim to effective occupation of the Philippines, Sprector, <u>Admiral</u>, 69-72.

⁷⁶ Collin, Theodore Roosevelt, 139-140; Braisted, U.S. Navy, 1897-1909, 29; William J. Pomeroy, American Neo-Colonialism (New York, 1970), 35; Richard D. Challener, Admirals, Generals, and American Foreign Policy, 1898-191 (Princeton, 1973), 183; Livezey, Mahan, 193-194; Grenville and Young, Politics, 288-289; Healy and Kutner, The Admiral, 195; Clinnard, Japan's Influence, 18-19; Dobson, America's Ascent, 85-94, 111-112, 118-119, 180-181; Tyler Dennett, Americans in Eastern Asia (New York, 1922), 622, 631; Seward W. Livermore, "The American Naval Base Policy in the Far East, 1850-1914," Pacific Historical Review 13 (June, 1944), 116-117; "It is well understood that Japan would like to have the Philippine Islands added to her possessions. . . . ", American Consul (Tokyo) to the State Department in Treat, Diplomatic Relations, 3: 55-58; Iriye, Pacific Estrangement, 56; Richard E. Welch Jr., Response to Imperialism (Chapel Hill, 1979), 3-5, 10, 14, 151.

77 Saniel, Japan and Philippines, 216-221, 258-260; Dobson, America's Ascent, 115; Healy and Kutner, The Admiral, 203-211; Trask, War with Spain, 382-385; Welch, Response, 152; Braisted, U.S. Navy, 1897-1909, 33-42; Dennett, Americans, 619-620; Pomeroy, Pacific Outpost, 8-9; LeRoy, Philippines, 173-174, 210-216; Treat, Diplomatic 92, 391; Pratt, Relations, 3: 55-58; Beale, Theodore Roosevelt, Expansionist, 342-343; Iriye, Pacific Estrangement, 38-39, 46, 48-49; LeRoy, "Japan and the Philippines," Atlantic Monthly 99 (June, 1907), 25-31; Paul H. Clyde, Japan's Pacific Mandate (New York, 1935), 18; Nikolai Golovin, The Problem of the Pacific in the Twentieth Century (London, 1922), 22, 27; Davis, Navy, 114-117; Dulles, America in the Pacific, 213-215; Dewey, <u>Autobiography</u>, 264-265; Pomeroy, Neo-Colonialism, 48-49; A.L.P. Dennis, <u>Adventures in American Diplomacy</u> (New York, 1928), 76-79; Neale, Great Britain and United States, 112-117; Elbert J. Berton, International Law and Diplomacy of the Spanish American War (Gloucester, 1908, 1968), 217.

⁷⁸ Saniel, <u>Japan and Philippines</u>, 265; Herrick, <u>Naval Revolution</u>, 112; Grenville and Young, <u>Politics</u>, 293-294; Livezey, <u>Mahan</u>, 200-204; Clinnard, <u>Japan's Influence</u>, 19-20; Scott Nearing and Joseph Freeman, Dollar Diplomacy (New York, 1970), 198-200; Trask, <u>War with Spain</u>, 450-469; Dennis, <u>Adventures</u>, 83-85, 93-100; Coolidge, <u>World Power</u>, 151-152; Henry W. Morgan, ed., <u>Making Peace with Spain: The Dairy of</u> <u>Whitelaw Reid</u>, <u>September-December</u>, 1898 (Austin, 1965), 122-169; Braisted, "Naval Base", 22; Moorfield Storey and Marcial Lichanco, <u>The</u> <u>Conquest of the Philippines</u> (New York, 1926), 70-86.

CHAPTER III

DEFENDING THE WESTERN PACIFIC, 1898-1913

NAVAL BASE PROBLEMS, 1898-1904

The acquisition of the Philippines by the United States did not automatically create a base in the Western Pacific for the Navy. А purpose, a location and the funding for the base had to be established. The first was simply the protection of American commercial and political interests in the Far East, as the general scramble for chunks of the Chinese Empire had from the start threatened to pre-empt the tenuous America position in the Orient. Not even the policy statements of the "Open Door" notes¹, issued by the United States, could solidly ensure the retention of an economic position, significantly if the American government was unwilling to use all options, including the military, to back up its public declarations. American military intervention in the Far East between 1898 and 1918 amounted to a single episode, the participation in the relief of the Peking Legations during the Boxer Rebellion (August, 1900). That service was carried out with Marines diverted from the campaign against the Philippine insurrection (1899-1902), presenting a hardship to the military commander in the islands, General Arthur MacArthur. The decision to participate in the relief expedition only served to demonstrate to the Navy the need for a Far East naval base to support missions in near proximity, a search

that had begun years earlier.²

The dust had barely settled in Manila Bay following the American victory on 1 May, 1898, when the Naval War Board reviewed the conduct of the war in the Pacific and Dewey's exposed position. The uncertainty regarding German intentions in the islands and the possibility of the arrival of a superior Spanish naval fleet in the Pacific led the Board to recommend that two heavily armed moniters, three battleships and a cruiser be sent to the Far East to reinforce Dewey. Dewey's position was so precarious that even though he was limited in coaling opportunities and supplies the department ordered him to remain on station in the Manila area, and specifically ordered him not to attack or undertake the military occupation of the Caroline Islands, 1700 nautical miles to the east of the Philippines, where Naval Intelligence had reported a 5,000 pound stockpile of coal. Dewey, plain and simple, could not afford the luxury of military activity outside the area of Manila until he received sufficient reinforcements. By the beginning of the armistice (13 August, 1898) the original vessels involved in the Battle of Manila Bay had been on station long enough to worry Dewey as to the ability of his command to maintain combat readiness, a concern which would require dry-docking facilities to determine the wear and tear on the hulls of the vessels. Those facilities were not easily found in the Philippines (one of the reasons for the poor condition of the Spanish fleet at Dewey's arrival), but in the ports of neutral powers, Britain (Hong Kong) and international conventions Under regarding Japan (Yokohama). belligerents, neutral nations were prohibited from supporting the

upkeep and repair of combatants belonging to the parties at war other than those needed to return home. Dewey was concerned enough about his position and readiness that he planned, as a contingency, to withdraw to Subic Bay in case of a successful Spanish sortie to the Philippines, a movement that Admiral Montojo had attempted to do prior to 1 May, 1898. The Admiral's view (as well as Dewey's) of Subic was that it was the most defensible naval position in the islands. Following the defeat of the Spanish navy in the Caribbean the threat was almost totally negated and there was no need for a withdrawal.³

Following the start of the armistice, the Naval War Board in its final official report, written by Mahan, pondered the future of the Philippines and the American role there, specifically in what capacity the U.S. Navy would serve. The report recommended the retention of either Manila or Subic Bay in the event the United States kept any or all of the Philippines upon the conclusion of the peace negotiations in Paris. The report did not concern itself with the question of national policy regarding the annexation question, but rather the post war period and the need for naval bases in strategic points to permit the Navy to support any national interests deemed necessary by the government. In fact, on the day the armistice took effect, the department queried Dewey as to what he considered the best harbor for a naval base in the Philippines. Dewey replied that both Manila and Subic were suitable, with Subic the superior position. And in September, 1898, Oscar F. Williams, consul in Manila, telegramed Secretary of State John Hay to report that Subic was the best choice in "valueless." the islands for a base and that Manila was William R.

Braisted noted somewhat incorrectly:

Without constant supplying and without the haven at Manila, Dewey's ships could not have remained in the Far East without perishing. The war in the Pacific and the peace settlement were designed in large part to make certain that American forces would be assured ample shore facilities in the future.

Braisted's comment is somewhat incorrect because the war in the Pacific was in large part to cripple Spanish military capabilities and not to provide a naval base. His comment is all the more surprising because of his pioneering work in the records of the navy covering that time. Those records do not support a navy conspiracy to fight a war against Spain to gain a base in the Philippines. The two actions were not connected until 1 May, 1898.⁴

The American search for bases in the Far East was matched by the Germans. Beginning secret talks with Spain at about the same time of the Paris peace negotiations, Germany bought from Spain, for \$4.5 million, the remaining colonial possessions not acquired by the United By December, 1898 the island group of the Carolines and the States. remaining Marianas Islands (Guam was acquired by the United States, and had been the headquarters of the Spanish colonial government) were under effective German control, and soon became the focus of American naval fears. The war had hastened the annexation of the Hawaijan Islands (August, 1898), and along with the Philippines, provided a string of way stations from the American west coast and the Orient, part of Mahan's vision in which an isthmian canal would link the Atlantic coast with the Far East. The German control of the Carolines and Marianas meant that a foreign power straddled the sea lanes of communication and supply between American outposts, theoretically

threatening interdiction of those sea lanes. This served to demonstrate the need for sea power (naval forces) and sea control (bases) in the Western Pacific, for although the German possessions were in the Central Pacific, any outbreak of hostilities between the two nations would force the United States Navy to sortie though a gauntlet of possibly fortified positions to relieve pressure on the Philippines and Guam.⁵

The search for <u>the</u> American Far East naval base involved two areas: (1) the coast of China and offshore positions, and (2) the Philippine Islands. The 1897 and 1898 attempts at a concession on the coast of China failed but the Navy was not dissuaded from further tries in the endeavor. Procuring help from the State Department, the Navy queried American consuls in various Chinese ports for information about facilities, tides, geography, trade, and the population so as to be able to determine which port would best serve American naval interest. This search would continue of and on until 1915 and ultimately would fail, in part because of Japanese hostility to the spread of American influence, and the concurrent sea power and sea control that would accompany such an expansion.⁶

Between January, 1899 and February, 1904 (the start of the Russo-Japanese War) the following sites were examined by either American naval vessels or consular officials: San-Tu-Ao, Sam sah Bay, Tei Shei-shan, Ketsu Island, Chusan Islands, Nam Kwan, Canton, Nam Ki, Bullock Harbor, Kiachou, Long Beach, Murray Sound, St. Johns Harbor, West Harbor, Makan Island, Ko Kuntan Islands, Sylvia Basin, Thornton Harbor, Hai Chu Bay, Tsu Sun Islands, Newchang, Tung Sung, Hung Wha, Liu Kiu, Swatow, Wei-Hai-Wei and the Blonde Islands. In almost every case the position was either controlled by a third party, or a veto was exercised by a third party, or the position was unsuitable.⁷

The issuance of the "Open Door" notes in September, 1899 and July, 1900 by the United States eventually put the State Department, and Secretary Hay, in an embarrassing position as Hay was the leading advocate of maintaining the territorial integrity of the Chinese Empire, not so much for China's interest but for the maintenance of American commercial interests. Hay was discomforted by his request to the Japanese for their approval in acquiring a naval base in the Fukien province area, which by an earlier (1898) non-alienation agreement between China and Japan was under the latter's realm of influence. The Japanese response to Hay was an emphatic negative, and pointed out the hypocrisy of Hay's request in light of his advocacy for the integrity of China. This was the first and last attempt by Hay to intercede on the Navy's behalf in the search for bases, although the Navy would continue to ask for State Department assistance in the search.8

The search for a major base in the Philippines would continue from the years 1898 to 1922 and would never be satisfactorily solved, for а variety of reasons, from appropriations to international and intraservice bickering. Dewey had reported in August, 1898 that Subic Bay was the best and strongest point for a base in the Philippines, and that was the earliest known assessment of the bay during the search for location by the United States. Because of the Philippine а insurrection the Navy did not take actual control of the bay until September, 1899, although it had sent vessel there on at least three

occasions. The first was on 30 April, 1898 when Dewey reconnoitered the bay, searching for Admiral Montojo's forces prior to the American descent upon Manila. The second visit was on 7 July, 1898 when Dewey sent two of his ships to Subic on a bombardment mission at Grande Island, which guarded the mouth of the bay and was the last remaining Spanish outpost in the area. A German vessel had evacuated the non-combatants (women and children) off of the island and was met at the entrance by the American vessels. This was reported by Dewey to his superiors as an attempt by the Germans to "interfere" with the conduct of the war, an example of misrepresentation of German actions, because although there was no requirement to do so the Germans merely performed a humanitarian act. This was just another episode in the hostile German-American relationship at Manila, which would bias Dewey for years. The last visit by the United States prior to effective occupation took place in March, 1899 with a naval vessel checking on the extent of rebel activity in the bay. 9

The first detailed survey of sites in the Philippines, in regard to the naval base question was, was completed in Fall 1899, by Lieutenant John M. Ellicott from the Office of Naval Intelligence. Normally billeted onboard the U.S.S. Baltimore, for this survey he took command of a small craft and set out to visit the potential sites for a naval base. His completed report would provide ammunition for the future anti-Subic Bay opponents, for Ellicott wrote that a thorough search should be made before a site was selected, and that he considered Manila Bay "the least fit place that I have seen" placing Subic in the same category. He made the assessment based on the lack of natural defensible positions in either, the scarcity of docking facilities, and shoal waters. Ellicott suggested additional sites be examined but his strongest recommendation was reserved for the harbor of Ilo-Ilo on Panay Island, 300 miles south of Manila. The position had "tactical topographical characteristics which are almost ideal" and two deep channels to open water with the mouth of the harbor masked by a large island. The position would have required little improvement (according to Ellicott) and attacking forces would have to have a fleet twice as large as the defenders possessed.¹⁰

The Ellicott report was taken into consideration by the Office of Naval Intelligence, and then in April, 1900, forwarded to the General Board of the Navy, a recently created (March, 1900) unofficial advisory body for the Secretary of the Navy. The body was unofficial because it was never sanctioned by the Congress and served as a subordinate policy board with no power to enforce its recommendations. The President of the Board was Admiral George Dewey, who would remain in the position until his death in 1916. Much of the material for this work comes from the records of the General Board and as such provides an excellent glimpse into the problems that challenged the Navy in the first quarter of the twentieth century. With regard to the Ellicott report, the General Board recommended in June, 1900 that the department accept Ilo-Ilo as the location of the U.S. Navy's Far East naval station and called for a rapid development. The Board's desire for fast action was based on their perceived need for support facilities in the Western Pacific as U.S. Navy warships still had to use the docks in Japan and Hong Kong to get repaired and refurbished. The additional factors of a continuing China problem (the Boxers) and the German acquisition of the Spanish colonies in the Pacific sparked the Board's wish that a major naval presence be established in the Far East. That required a strong "modern fleet and a first class base" to support it.¹¹

In October, 1900, Secretary Long, in no way obligated to accept any Board recommendations, appointed the Commander-in-Chief of the Asiatic Station, and Dewey's successor in that job, Rear Admiral George C. Remey, to chair a commission on the "Establishment of a Naval Station in the Philippine Islands." Following a comparative study of Ilo-Ilo and Subic the Remey Commission report (January, 1901) recommended the latter for development as a major base, declaring "that it was in all respects suitable for a naval station complete in all facilities for repair of vessels and assembling and storing supplies of all kind" and that Ilo-Ilo did not possess the advantages Subic did, primarily the ability to defend itself in the absence of the fleet. The commission also wished to obtain whatever draft plans the Spanish had accumulated for the work already completed on Subic prior to 1 May, 1898. A query through Secretary Hay brought the response that all of the pertinent documents had been destroyed in May, 1898, following Dewey's destruction of the Spanish fleet at Manila. There has yet to be found a reasonable explanation as to the difference of opinion between the Ellicott Report and the Remey Commission, in regard to Subic Bay. Secretary Long, with great haste, promptly submitted to the House Committee on Naval Affairs an appropriations request for \$1,000,000 to be included in the fiscal year 1902 budget. The money was to be spent on dredging, building piers and docks, and providing storage for coal stockpiles. The speed with which Long acted makes one suspect that the earlier support of Subic by Dewey and O.F. Williams, plus the amount of work already completed by the Spanish in Subic Commission persuaded him to approve the Remey recommendation. Unfortunately, Congress was not in any haste to spend money on a facility so distant from the continental United States, partly because creating a naval facility in a congressional district provided for votes but a facility in a territory (where there were no eligible voters) provided no incentives. After demurring on the appropriations request Congress ordered the establishment of yet another body to study locations for naval bases in the Philippines. Naval historians noted that fear regarding the lack of Congressional support:

was based on a realistic assumption that the U.S. government policy makers were unlikely to support the whole dream [of worldwide naval bases]... and that anything less than the whole dream would be a military nightmare... This assumption was realistic and [a] nightmare was the result...

Of all our overseas bases only Cavite [in Manila Bay] received an appropriation of any significant amount. Strangely enough this was done at a time when the Navy had definitely decided upon Olongapo in Subic Bay as our main Philippine Base [as well as the Far East] rather than the Manila Bay location.

The whole question of battle-fleet support-especially the issue of bases-demonstrated the political limits to naval planning. In sum, the Navy had too many bases in the United States and too few abroad, but Congress regarded base[s] as attractive patronage. The Navy's search for bases abroad was frustrated by the. . .Congress which thought base building bad business [unless it was in a congressional district].

Notwithstanding a lack of Congressional support, the Navy continued with plans for building its major facility at Subic. The Department felt that it could continue preliminary work for Subic so that when funding was made available construction could begin immediately. Throughout the rest of the year correspondence between various Navy officials seemed to carry an air of confidence, believing that their long sought for naval station in the Far East would be built, especially in view of the increasing tension in North China between the Russians and the Japanese. There was a concern that the outbreak of hostilities would find the Navy in the same position as it had been prior to 1 May, 1898, with no bases or secure strongpoints in the Far East. Confidence was so high in the belief of the ultimate establishment of a naval base that the General Board began to analyze the naval base facilities of the other powers in Asia in preparation for producing war plans. The Board also began to prioritize its own lists of desired points in Asia, with Subic, the Chusans and Guam listed as being of the first importance. The Board also recommended the abandonment of the coal depot held by the Navy in Yokohama, believing it useless in case of a war with Japan as an allv and untenable with Japan as an enemy. Between the date of Theodore Roosevelt's assumption of the presidency following McKinley's assassination (September, 1901) and the Spring of 1902, various boards and committees continued the work of preparation for Subic. Repeated pleas to Congress for additional appropriations for work at Subic went unheeded and the Department had to order a temporary halt to work in progress. The only funding Congress would provide was for the construction of the floating drydock "Dewey", intended to be used in the Philippines but not available for approximately two years.¹³

During the search for funding for a base in the Philippines the Navy continued its quest for an "advanced" position on the Chinese coast or near periphery but repeatedly ran into difficulties, particularly when other powers were adamant that their "spheres of influence" would not be shared territorially with another party. The State Department also demurred in further assistance to the Navy, believing that a successful acquisition by the United States would lead to another scramble for Chinese territory.¹⁴

William R. Braisted noted that a significant problem in the Navy's desire for a major base in the Philippines was the lack of intraservice coordination between the Army and Navy leadership. From the start, the Navy's planning for Subic had failed to include any Army input, seeing the entire question as one of sea power. The Army questioned whether the Navy was the appropriate organization to handle coastal fortifications and shore defense. In January, 1902 the War Department complained to Roosevelt that the Navy was assuming additional duties not authorized or assigned to them. Deliberations between the two departments eventually led to an executive order by Roosevelt in November, 1902, providing for a joint defense of Subic. Ultimately, the creation of the Joint Army and Navy Board in July, 1903, alleviated some of the problems between the two services. Admiral Dewey was made the senior member of the Joint Board as well as remaining as the senior member of the General Board of the Navy. For its lifetime the Joint Board was never as powerful as the General Board, as a look through the records of the Joint Board will reveal that very little was actually accomplished as each service tended to pursue its own interests. This was probably a factor in the inability of the Navy to persuade Congress to appropriate funds for Subic in the Fiscal Year 1903 Budget.¹⁵

It was the outbreak of hostilities between Japan and Russia in February, 1904 that prodded Congressional action and brought forth funding for a major naval facility to be based at Subic. The amount, \$1,200,000, was far short of the \$4,500,000 considered appropriate by the General Board. In any case Congress had at last made an effort to fund the building of Subic and the Navy could go ahead with its plans. But it was at this critical juncture that the confluence of three related events threatened to end the search for a base in the Philippines. The first was the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, the second was the Russo-Japanese War itself, and the third was the split between the Army and Navy over the Subic location.¹⁶

Tirpitz' "doctrine of risk" had forced Britain to reconsider its role vis-a-vis European power politics, and with the concentration of the German battlefleet in the North Sea, there was no recourse but to relinquish or degrade naval power in Asia so as to be able concentrate the Royal Navy in home waters. Doing so meant that the dominions and colonial territories would be stripped of available naval protection leaving them, especially India, subject to external pressure from not only Germany but Russia as well. The search for a solution coincided with Japan's increasing problems with Russian goals in China. At the end of the Boxer Rebellion in 1900, Russia took the opportunity to effectively occupy all of Manchuria, threatening Northern China and Korea, an area of primary interest to Japan. After unsuccessful attempts by both Britain and Japan to flesh out their differences with Russia they came to view each other's aims as compatible. The two agreed to a bilateral arrangement, the Anglo-Japanese Alliance of 1902

which served to free up assets of the Royal Navy so as to counter German ambitions in Europe. The agreement allowed Japan to harden its position in negotiations with Russia over the latter's withdrawal from The main features of the alliance called for recognition of Manchuria. the territorial status quo between the signatories and required that if one party was involved in a war with a third party, the second would remain neutral, unless a fourth power threatened to, or did, intervene. Significantly the alliance was designed to counter Russian movement in Asia, but some American planners could interpret it as also aimed at the United States, while others had worried that any reconciliation between Russia and Japan would leave Japan free to turn its attention south, towards the defenseless Philippines. For the most part the signing of the agreement brought relief not only to Tokyo and London, but to Washington as well. Any moves taken to quell immediate hostilities protected American commercial interests in Asia as well as provided time to build a powerful naval base in the Philippines. There is no indication in official Japanese records of contemplated moves against the Philippines and points south during that time but the lack of a base caused concerns for naval planners, who foresaw that an expanded theater of operation for the conduct of the war might involve violations of the neutrality of American territory in the Western Pacific. Roosevelt, not particularly fond of Germany at the time, was concerned with the extent of their activity in Europe and their ambitions in the Caribbean, taking into account previous diplomatic difficulties in Samoa, Manila Bay, the Spanish colonial possessions, the China scramble, the Danish West Indies, Venezuela, and Santo

74

Domingo (the Dominican Republic). Roosevelt also saw the unfettered movements of Russia in Asia as a definite threat to American interests and perceived that a balance of power in Asia was possible as long as no power was thoroughly deprived of the ability to project power, an act which would cause obvious concern to Roosevelt and discomfort to the American forces in the Philippines.¹⁷

The opening of hostilities by Japan in February, 1904 was carried out with a sneak attack on surface forces anchored at the major Russian naval facility in the Far East, Port Arthur, and was viewed by both Roosevelt and Mahan with some pleasure. Russia, in conjunction with Germany and France, had forced Japan to retrocede Port Arthur to China in April,1895 and then grabbed the strategic harbor for itself in March, 1898, thus earning the enmity of Japan, and of Britain. American naval planners began to worry over the conduct of the war, for while maintaining neutrality the Navy had to protect American commerce crossing the Pacific to Asia, and the possible expansion of the theater of operations would mean possible American involvement, particularly to avoid violations of territorial waters in the Philippines. The rapidity with which Japan began to assault Russian positions caused concern among American planners, as the destruction of Russian naval power at Port Arthur and the extended siege of the harbor by the Japanese vividly demonstrated to them the shortcomings in the defense of the Philippines. By late October, 1904 the Russians had decided to deploy the Baltic Fleet 12,000 nautical miles to the Far East, with the hope that the arrival of that force would tip the balance in Russia's The fall of Port Arthur in January, 1905 meant that upon its favor.

arrival that Russian fleet would have possess no base in near proximity, having to go into battle upon its arrival in a horrendous condition, with fouled hulls, low coal levels, exhausted crews and no hope for a respite. The destruction of the Baltic Fleet at the May, 1905 Battle of Tsushima Straits ended Russian naval power in Asia for The Russian violations of sea power principles were quite decades. vivid. They had divided up their fleet units, thus depriving themselves of concentrated strength. The failure of Port Arthur to withstand the siege and falling before the arrival of the Baltic Fleet also served to concern American planners. The biggest lesson learned was that the Philippines were in no way ready to be defended. The Philippines were over 7,000 miles from the continental United States, there was no base in the islands, the fleet was divided into several components with a large part of it in the Atlantic. The ability of Japan to use shorter lines of communications as well as a large merchant marine meant that her forces could occupy positions in the Western Pacific well before a threatened power could react. Japan could move against the Philippines in a week with at least 100,000 fully armed men while the United States, would have to assemble its forces then sail a great distance, in this case around the tip of South America (the Panama Canal was opened in 1914) finally reaching the Western Pacific 90 days after the outbreak of hostilities. That was predicated upon there being a naval base in the Philippines that could hold out for that amount of time, but as demonstrated in the Russo-Japanese War, the probable use of high-powered artillery and mortars would be the reason for an Army challenge to the naval base.¹⁸

76

As Roosevelt (as well as Britain and Germany) watched the slow destruction of Russian capabilities, the balance of power was definitely swinging toward Japan's favor, with the concurrent international prestige, increased domestic (and inflamed) nationalism, all somewhat unanticipated and with consequences not yet evident in western capitals. While Roosevelt had hoped that the two belligerents would wear themselves down and maintain the balance of power in Asia, the ineptitude of the Russian military system, coupled with rising dissent at home only served to insure that Japan would achieve tremendous victories on the battlefield. The day to day advances by Japan in the Far East brought concern to the west, as Japan was the first Asian nation to defeat a white nation in combat. The implications could not be overlooked, as Roosevelt understood that following the end of the war Japan would be in strong position to carry out almost any policy that her national interests called for. The concern for post-war developments, as they concerned the United States in Asia, drove Roosevelt to try, from the beginning, to bring the combatants together. Failing this he then attempted to mediate their differences. It was only after the destruction of the Baltic Fleet in May, 1905 that both nations were amenable to discussing an end to the war. Japan had almost exhausted her forces and materiel in the land battles against Russian strongholds in Manchuria, while suffering economic difficulties at home. The Russians faced not only battle field defeats but revolt at home, and thus both nations agreed to meet with Roosevelt at Portsmouth, New Hampshire in the summer of 1905. The result was the Treaty of Portsmouth in September, 1905 in which the

strong international position of Japan was recognized, awarded most of her demands, which consisted of the cession of Port Arthur to Japan, and half of Sakhalin Island, recognition of Japanese primacy in the Korean peninsula, Russian withdrawal of her forces from Manchuria and of major naval forces from the eastern coast of China. In spite of their victory the Japanese were angry at Roosevelt because he had intervened to see that Japan failed to gain all of Sakhalin Island, and to prevent the payment of an indemnity from Russia. Roosevelt used his influence to persuade the Japanese delegation to accept those two concessions because he did not want to back Russia into a corner, or into a resumption of hostilities. Roosevelt had an additional reason for not wanting Japan to receive an indemnity. Any monies received by Japan would most probably be used to finance her military forces and naval shipbuilding, something that had occurred earlier when Japan used indemnities gained from China (1895) to build up her naval strength. In his view that kind of post-war activity by Japan had to be avoided.¹⁹

The Navy's perception of Japanese victories was that now a potential and strong enemy was near at hand. This was an enemy that not only had a powerful navy but an enemy that possessed the ability to transport <u>land</u> forces in a rapid and efficient manner, possessing a considerable merchant marine able to support mission requirements. To those assets this enemy added the considerable advantage of possessing strong naval bases throughout the theater of operations (the western Pacific), and of being in close proximity to her interests, unlike the United States whose interests in the Far East were over 7000 nautical

miles from her west coast. These factors played a role in the Army's decision to dispute the location of the naval base in the Philippines. The Army had never wholeheartedly supported the Subic decision, and with the Japanese advances against the Russians at Port Arthur, and the similar geographic and topographic characteristics of the American and Russian base locations, the Army liked it even less. Although the services had earlier agreed upon Subic as the location for the main American naval base in the Far East the war itself caused a split among senior officials and this was in part the reason for the eventual failure of the Navy's search for the Far East naval base. The first visible sign of a split came in a personal letter in June, 1904 to Roosevelt by Major-General Leonard Wood, previously the President's physician and Spanish-American War commanding officer now stationed in the southern Philippines. Wood's letter appealed to Roosevelt to move the base from Subic to Manila Bay as the former was indefensible while the latter was the commercial, political and strategic center of the The General was afraid that the U.S. Navy would be bottled up islands. in Subic as had happened to the Russian forces in Port Arthur. He further recommended that the United States fortify Manila Bay with an increased number of shore batteries. Wood was joined in this dissent by the commander of the American Philippine squadron, Rear Admiral William Folger, who suggested that the U.S. Navy could serve as an adjunct to the shore defenses in Manila Bay. Roosevelt referred the Subic matter to the General Board, whose response was that the Bay location was sound, could be easily defended with American assets in the Philippines supported by a deployment of the United States Navy

79

from the west coast, and that the use of naval assets as support for fixed shore defenses was an absurd mission for a navy. Roosevelt informed Wood (and the Navy informed Folger) that the General Board's reasoning was impressive, and that he would stick with Subic as the location of the American base in the Far East. While both officers were obliged to obey the directives of their superiors they informed them that they still considered Subic to be a trap. Wood's objections were in part based on the Navy decision to use Marines as the shore defense forces in Subic instead of regular Army troops, thus "offending" the sensibilities of Wood. The Navy argued further that it could effectively protect Manila Bay from Subic Bay, and that the loss of Manila would not in itself mean the loss of the entire archipelago, in contrast to the American argument in 1898 that Dewey's capture of Manila Bay meant the effective occupation of the Philippines and the end of Spanish authority. Wood continued to agitate the situation eventually involving the Secretary of War William Taft, previously the Governor-General of the Philippines. The intervention worked because Congress deferred any more funding for Subic until a final and ultimate decision could be made on the location of the base.²⁰

The outcome of the war eventually served effectively to end the Navy's dream for Subic. Moreover after span of three years the question was reopened for debate and reconsideration. The result was a series of acrimonious exchanges between the services, a presidential rebuke to the services for the embarrassment it caused Roosevelt who had been the leading advocate of funding for Subic in repeated appearances before Congress, where he stated that senior officers of both services were as one in proposing Subic. By January, 1908 the final decision was made that Manila Bay would be the main base in the Western Pacific, in part because of the Russian experience at Port Arthur, but Congress for whatever reasons chose to defer funding the development of the base as the services would have liked. Additionally, the Navy decided that it would prefer to have its largest major facilities at Pearl Harbor, Hawaii. In this the President, and the Army, concurred and appealed to the Congress for funds to build facilities there. Congress, more amenable to a less distant location, still took its time in funding the base at Pearl Harbor and it was not until 1919 that the Navy could truly claim that it had a major base outside of the continental United States.²¹

JAPAN AS THE ENEMY

The post war period in the Pacific brought about a realignment of power, with the Russians excluded from the Western Pacific, Germany and Britain engaged in increasing hostilities in European waters, and Japan emerging as the major power in the Far East. This emergence was to cause American planners difficulties, as there appeared to be no power in the East that could stop a determined Japan from continuing a program of expansion, peaceful or otherwise. The outbreak of war between Russia and Japan forced military planners into adding Japan to the possible "enemies" list, joining Germany and a thoroughly defeated Russia. Up to 1905 naval policy makers had viewed Germany as the more potentially dangerous opponent because of her bombastic Kaiser, a large deep water navy, and expansionist desires. Naval planners postulated

the probability of hostilities with Germany, due to violations of the "Monroe Doctrine" triggered by possible German expansion into the Caribbean, Central and South America. The fear of such activity by Germany was, in part, the creation of Dewey, Mahan and Roosevelt. There were some planning studies by the German General Staff that called for moves against the east coast of the United States and seizures of strategic points in the Caribbean, but only in the case of open hostilities. There is no evidence that these were first strike plans, only offensive contingencies, that were abandoned after 1906. This was caused by the realignment of power in the Far East. as а defeated Russia posed no open threat to Britain, and Britain was able to keep the majority of her fleet in home waters. The Anglo-Japanese Alliance was renewed in the spring of 1905, before the Portsmouth Conference, thus ensuring that Japan was given further protection in the conduct of war against intervention by third parties, leaving Japan as the protector of the East and relieving Britain of responsibilities in the region.²²

The United States began to study Japan as a potential opponent after the start of the Russo-Japanese War in February, 1904. It was the rapid advances and significant Japanese victories that did much to alarm American military men (and one of the reasons for the eventual decision to forego Subic as the Far East naval station), but it was not until the summer of 1906 that serious war planning was instituted. This was not caused by any presidential order or by an international crises, rather by domestic policies that "threatened" to escalate into warfare, or so the planners, politicians, and the President, thought. The effect of victory in the Russo-Japanese War did much to increase the nationalistic emotions of the Japanese, the defeat of a white nation by an Oriental nation not easy to overlook. Friction between the United States and Japan occurred following the devastating San Francisco earthquake of April, 1906. Long held racial prejudices, labor tensions and general discrimination against hard working, low paid Oriental workers spilled into acrimony, with attacks upon Japanese nationals living in the state of California. Exhausted by the Russo-Japanese War Japan could do very little, but eventually the situation in California cooled down. By the summer of 1906 the Californians had again inflamed passions to such a point that the military, and Roosevelt, envisioned that war might break out. The episode was caused by inflammatory editorials printed in a San Francisco newspaper, brutally insulting, regarding the work habits of Japanese workers, followed in October, 1905 by a legislative act in the city that called for racial segregation of Oriental students, supposedly because they were unable to assimilate into American society, and they had unusual traits, such as thrift and language. The effect in Japan was immediate, with anti-American riots breaking out Tokyo. Roosevelt was unaware of the situation until informed by consular officials in Japan that the legislation was a point of contention, especially in view of the fact that the Japanese blamed Roosevelt for the failure of the Japanese delegation to receive any indemnity from Russia. Added to this was the increased nationalism brought about by the shocking defeat of Russia, and the unhappy reaction in Japan was understandable.²³

83

But it was not the outbreak of the riots in October that caused the navy to begin to consider serious war plans for dealing with Japan. It was a combination of the defeat of Russia, suspicion of Japanese ambitions in Asia, the arrogant behavior of Japanese officials toward foreigners in Manchuria, and the reaction to mistreatment of Japanese in California after the San Francisco earthquake, that the Naval War College assigned a problem to its students in the 1906 summer session. The problem was based on the possibility of hostilities between the United States and Japan. The result of the class work was compiled and submitted to the General Board for comment, revision and approval. This scenario had also occurred in 1894 when the War College accomplished the same task regarding possible hostilities between the United States and Spain over Cuba. The General Board used the student problems and solutions to come up with a tentative plan in September, 1906. Entitled "In Case of Strained Relations with Japan", the General Board document envisioned offensive operations against the Japanese in the Far East. The plan called for the American fleet to assemble in Atlantic waters, then sail to the East. The whole scenario was seen as one of a naval conflict with a blockade of Japan leading to an American victory. The plan was too simple, as there was no base in the Far East The Philippines capable of sustaining prolonged operations in Japan. limited military forces were expected to hold out until the navy came to the rescue but in light of the vivid Japanese offensive capabilities against Port Arthur, it was certain that the islands would fall.²⁴

It was at this point that Roosevelt asked the Navy about the status of preparations for war against Japan, to which the General Board replied that it possessed a "plan" that would provide for the concentration of American naval strength in the Far East within ninety days of the outbreak of war. Fortunately Roosevelt did not have to depend on the use of military force to bring about a resolution of the problem. He used diplomacy instead to placate the Japanese. А "Gentlemen's Agreement" limiting Japanese immigration to the continental United States was signed by the two nations, and San Francisco softened its offensive legislation. Existing records do not reveal any proof of Japan's intention to go to war over the mistreatment of Japanese in America; but the talk of war appears to have originated with Roosevelt. He invited а delegation of representatives from California to the White House, and explained to them that the nation was not in such a strong position to participate in a war with Japan, and that their careless and thoughtless actions had the possibility of embroiling the United States in hostilities. The delegation returned to California, impressed by Roosevelt's reasoning, but not before newspapers published the subject of the White House discussion. A war scare hysteria began with many citizens now fearful of the "Yellow Peril", and forced the military to consider the possiblity of hostilities.²⁵

Roosevelt had succeeded in quietening the situation but was now intrigued by the possibility of a war with the Japanese. He did not actively desire to go to war; he only wanted to determine the readiness of the Navy to handle such an occurrence. Roosevelt was still more suspicious of German intentions, and wanted to maintain peaceful relations with Japan. He decided in late 1907 to test the fleet by sending a large force of available battleships (16) on a round-the-world cruise, to show the flag, to let the Japanese know that the Pacific was not a closed ocean, and to test the combat readiness of the fleet. Departing in October of 1908, the force headed toward Brazil, plagued by reports that the Japanese were planning to ambush the ships enroute Rio de Janeiro, and destroy the remnants in the central Pacific. Naval Attaches in Europe traced the origins of the rumors to German sources, reinforcing Roosevelt's imagery of Germany as an enemy.²⁶

The force safely made it to South America and assembled off of the California coast for training and re-supply. There were calls for the retention of the fleet in Pacific waters, for fear of Japan still permeated the minds of many Californians, but Roosevelt decided to continue the circumnavigation of the globe with the fleet, much to the concern of Congress, fearful of losing the only protection against invasion by determined foes. The fleet worked its way across the Pacific, visiting Hawaii, New Zealand, Australia, the Philippines, Japan and China before heading back to the United States via the Suez Canal. The stops in Australia and New Zealand served to alleviate concerns of waves of Japanese heading in a southernly direction. Both dominions had voiced concerns over the renewing of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance as "White Australia" and "White New Zealand" did not wish to accept increased numbers of Japanese immigrants. The alliance between the mother country and the Far East nemesis left them feeling rather naked. The United States appeared to be the only savior they could count on in the Pacific. Roosevelt, not anxious to go to war with

Japan, could only smile in response to the outbreak of anti-Japanese violence in British Columbia, demonstrating to the Japanese that racism was not endemic to the United States but the English dominions as well. The visit to Japan was a success, with no undue incidents occurring to mar the harmonious atmosphere. A diplomatic struggle of sorts occurred when the Japanese tried to persuade Roosevelt to cancel the fleet visit to China, to avoid difficulties, following recent anti-American riots against American policy regarding tariffs and immigration. Roosevelt also perceived that China wished to use the visit as a ploy to gain international acceptance of her stature, and to bring pressure on Japan to cease her economic penetrations of China. As a compromise, the fleet visit was dropped and a smaller squadron visit was scheduled, pleasing Japan more than China. The only way that Roosevelt was going to get involved in a war over China was if American interests were directly threatened, and then only if the fleet was strong.27

That concern was one reason for the cruise of the "Great White Fleet." The ability to respond to crisis situations was dependent on naval force. The lack of a naval base in the Far East was a conspicous missing asset. When the fleet visited the Philippines, facilities were far and few to be found. Voyage repairs had to be accomplished haphazardly and steam engines suffered from manufacturer defects or maintenance deficiencies. On top of this the Roosevelt administration had to face another battle. Congress had not only failed to fund a base in the Philippines, but had not been persuaded to increase the size the Navy at a faster pace. Led by peace adherents, a concern was raised that navies (using Mahan principles) would only lead to armed conflict, thus Congress would not strongly support a deep water navy, depending more on shore fortifications and coastal battleships to protect the shores of America. While Roosevelt and the military thought of wars being fought in distant theaters, Congress thought of hostilities happening nearer the American coastline. Long range warfare concepts based on emerging technology and strategic principles were just beginning to be developed, and the disastrous attempt by Russia to project her naval power at Tsushima, even though the attempt was made near contiguous territory, made the Congress wary of supporting what they considered a policy of folly. Congress went SO far as to threaten a cutoff of funds halfway through the round the world cruise, but Roosevelt's wonderful threat of unfavorable publicity worked to persuade Congress to continue funding. "Congress let your boys rot overseas" would not have been a popular refrain, especially in the election year of 1908.²⁸

Regardless of Roosevelt's reasons, the trip was not without rewards, or lessons learned. The first lesson was that the United States merchant fleet was terribly obsolete and could not service the navy at all. Colliers, tenders, and repairs ships had to be leased or rented along the route of the journey, providing visual proof of the need for a strong national maritime service able to support fleet missions throughout the world. The most important lessons learned proved to be almost fatal to the argument of the need for a Far East naval base. The condition of the fleet and its combat readiness did not suffer from fatal wear and tear, and the previously predicted ninety day voyage across the Pacific was now seen as possible to be

accomplished in sixty days. The need for a base was predicated on the condition of the fleet arriving in the Western Pacific after a contested voyage of three months. Lessons learned good and bad served to point out defects in the system and the "uselessness" of a large and expensive base in Asia. In addition Roosevelt had managed to acquire agreements with Japan that supposedly preserved the status quo. In July, 1905, shortly before the Portsmouth Conference started, Secretary of War William Taft made a visit to the Far East and while in Japan completed a "Memorandum of Agreement", the Taft-Katsura conversations, in which Roosevelt recognized Japanese predominance over Korea as а result of the Russo-Japanese War. It was later touted by Japanese newspapers, after leaks by unnamed Japanese officials, that the United States had agreed to a protectorate of Korea by Japan in exchange for a Japanese pledge not to move against the Philippine Islands. Roosevelt tartly noted that the agreement was not such an arrangement, while correctly noting that Japanese pledges not to move against the Philippines were a promise not to make war against the United States, something which Roosevelt felt was a superfluous issue, in light of previous Japanese sneak attacks against China and Russia.29

The increased hostility to Germany after the spreading of the rumors during the course of the world cruise, forced Roosevelt seriously to contemplate potential German military action in the Atlantic. Any hostilities between Germany and Britain that ended in a German victory threatened American interests not only in the Atlantic but in exposed positions around the world. Roosevelt recognized that only Britain's Royal Navy stopped the Kaiser from carrying out his

ambitions. The cruise served to provide a political arrangement with Japan in November, 1908. The Root-Takahira agreement recognized the territorial status quo of each power in the Pacific. Noticeably missing was any statement about maintaining the territorial integrity of the unstable Chinese Empire. The agreement allowed Roosevelt to withdraw major fleet units from the Pacific and reposition them in the Atlantic, where they would send a diplomatic sign of support to Britain, as well as a sign of displeasure to Germany. Following the arrival of the fleet in the United States (February, 1909), and shortly before Roosevelt was succeeded by William Taft, relations between Japan and the United States were rather cordial with most of the racial difficulties in the background. Though there was peace between the two nations, the Navy was continuing work on an acceptable war plan in case of future turmoil with Japan. Following the 1906 immigration crisis and war scare, the Navy attempted to find a plan that would maximize its limited resources while preventing "Orange", as Japan came to be called in war plans, from carrying out any successful execution of offensive operations in the Far East, and particularly the Philippines. The lack of a major naval facility in the Western Pacific would continue to plaque the U.S. Navy, as every study required that the United States would have to maintain prolonged on station time in blockading Japan. That would require the regular upkeep, repair and re-supply of those vessels, but no creditable answer was found. The island of Guam, only 1500 nautical miles from Manila, was then put forward by the Navy, and Mahan, as the most important strategic point near the Western Pacific as it commanded major shipping sea lanes to

90

the Far East, as well as routes that ran between Japan and the Indian Ocean. The base funding issue was never adequately solved and the problem continued. 30

Another outbreak of racial tensions occurred in California in 1911, over perceived violations of the 1907 "Gentlemen's Agreement." Japanese nationals were restricted in coming from Japan directly to the United States, but received generous rights for artist and student The problem arose over the increase of non-students visas. and non-artists coming into the continental United States. Renewed diplomatic conversations brought the issue to a peaceful conclusion, but a war hysteria swept the general population, as would occurr again in 1913, following another outbreak of racial troubles in California. Throughout this period there exists no proof of Japanese intention to go to war with the United States, but the hysteria persuaded many that war was imminent. The second renewal of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance in 1911 was seen American planners as an attempt by Japan to forestall British intervention in a war between the United States and Japan. But the two parties had substantial reasons in renewing the alliance, for Britain was in a naval race with Germany, and Japan was attempting to strengthen her position in China, not trying to divide the Anglo-Saxon Japan also wished to increase immigration to the white nations. dominions of Australia and New Zealand by the renewal of the agreement with Britain. This failed to achieve the goal, as the two dominions argued they should not be bound by immigration agreements without their consent. Australia and New Zealand now began to feel alone and isolated as a general European war would mean the total withdrawal of

Royal naval protection in the Pacific, leaving Japan as the defender of British interests. The United States was seen as the only friend in the region, thus the two dominions were not enthusiastic about the second renewal. By the beginning of World War I, the British fleet, for all intents and purposes was in European waters and the first question was what would Japan do, for she was not yet a party to the European war.³¹

NOTES

¹ United States, <u>Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the</u> <u>United States, 1899</u> and <u>1900</u> (Washington D.C., 1900, 1901), 244-260, 299. Hereafter <u>FRUS</u>. Also see William R. Braisted, <u>The United States</u> <u>Navy in the Pacific, 1897-1909</u> (New York, 1958), 78; <u>Richard D.</u> <u>Challener, <u>Admirals, Generals, and American Policy, 1898-1914</u> (Princeton, 1973), 180-181; A. Whitney Griswold, <u>The Far Eastern</u> <u>Policy of the United States</u> (New York, 1938), 36-86.</u>

² Braisted, <u>U.S. Navy, 1897-1909</u>, 80, 104-113; <u>FRUS 1900</u>, x-xv; Gerald E. Wheeler, <u>Prelude to Pearl Harbor: The United States Navy and</u> <u>the Far East, 1921-1931</u> (Columbia, MO., 1963), 49; John V.A. MacMurray, ed., <u>Treaties and Agreements With and Concerning China, 1894-1919</u> 2 vols., 1921 (New York, 1973), 278-281; Challener, <u>Admirals</u>, 182-183, 198-199; John M. Dobson, <u>America's Ascent: The United States becomes a</u> <u>Great Power, 1880-1914</u> (Dekalb, IL., 1978), 191. On 8 June, 1898 Congress appropriated \$150,000 for torpedo defense at Manila Bay, United States, <u>Statutes at Large</u> vol. 30, 55th Congress, 2nd Session, Chapter 395. Dewey felt that the United States was in danger of losing the growing trade in China and suggested the use of diplomacy for the acquisition of an "advanced naval position" on the Chinese coast, Dewey to Long, 27 June, 1900, in the Records of the General Board, GB 408-1, RG 80, National Archives.

Braisted, U.S. Navy, 1897-1909, 27-41, 50; Braisted, "The Philippine Naval Base Problem, 1898-1909," Mississippi Valley Historical Review 41 (June, 1954), 21-22; Memo by Bulow, 14 March, 1899, Germany, German Diplomatic Documents, 1871-1914 (New York, 1969), 53; Rear Admiral French E. Chadwick, U.S.N, The Relations between the United States and Spain: The Spanish-American War 2 vols. (New York, 1911), 2: 88-89; Lester B. Shippee, "Germany and the Spanish-American War," American Historical Review 30 (July, 1925), 764; Thomas A. Bailey, "Dewey and the Germans at Manila Bay," American Historical Review 45 (October, 1939), 59-66; Anderson to Adjutant General, U.S. Army, 14 July, 1898, United States, War Department, Adjutant General's Office, Correspondence Relating to the War with Spain and Conditions Growing Out of Same, Including the Insurrection in the Philippines and the China Relief Expedition (Washington, D.C., 1902), 2: 273; Walter R. Herrick, Jr., The American Naval Revolution (Baton Rouge, 1966), 237; Chandler to Long, 19 May, 1898, Gardiner W. Allen, The Papers of John Davis Long, 1897-1904 (Boston, 1939), 126; Richard H. Collin, Theodore Roosevelt, Culture, Diplomacy and Expansion: A new view of American Imperialism (Baton Rouge, 1985), 136, 138-139; Dewey to Long, 1 May, 1898, Naval War Board to Long, 16 May, 1898, Dewey to Long, 20 May, 1898, Naval War Board, 20 May, 1898, Long to Dewey, 24 May, 1898, Dewey to Long, 17 June, 1898, Long to Dewey, 28 June, 1898, Long to Dewey, 11 July, 1898, Allen to Dewey, 13 August, 1898, Naval War Board to Long, 13 August, 1898 in Records of the Naval War Board, RG 80, National Archives; 9 May, 1898, 10 May, 1898, 11 May, 1898, 11 May 1898, 5 July,

1898, Long to Dewey, 19 July, 1898 in Records of the Naval War Board, Letters, RG 45, National Archives.

⁴ Braisted, <u>U.S. Navy, 1897-1909</u>, 29, 72-73; Braisted, "Naval Base", 22; Challener, <u>Admirals</u>, 183; John A.S. Grenville and George B. Young, <u>Politics, Strategy and American Diplomacy</u> (New Haven, 1966), 294-296; Dewey to Long, 29 August, 1898, in <u>Papers of John Davis Long</u>, 188-190; Allen to Dewey, 12 August, 1898, Allen to Dewey, 13 August, 1898 in Records of the Naval War Board, RG 80, National Archives, National Archives; Williams to Hay, 5 September, 1898, PS File, RG 45, National Archives; Allen to Dewey, 13 August, 1898, Records of the Naval War Board, RG 45, National Archives.

Braisted, U.S. Navy, 1897-1909, 50-56; Pearle E. Quinn, "The Diplomatic Struggle for the Carolines, 1898," Pacific Historical Review 14 (September, 1945), 290-302; Memo by Bulow, 14 March, 1899, Germany, Diplomatic Documents, 53; Akira Iriye, From Nationalism to Internationalism: U.S. Foreign Policy to 1914 (London, 1977), 313-316. War plans were based on a European enemy until 1904 and Subic was considered safe because the most probable enemy, Germany, had no significant land forces in the Far East, Grenville, "Diplomacy and War Plans in the United States, 1890-1917," in Paul M. Kennedy, ed., The War Plans of the Great Powers, 1881-1914 (Boston, 1979), 30. During the negotiations between Spain and the United States, there was an American desire to acquire the Carolines, with Spain asking 50 million for half of the Philippine Islands and Kusaie in the Carolines. The United States eventually got all the Philippines and Guam, in the Marianas for 20 million, H. Wayne Morgan, ed., Making Peace with Spain: The Dairy of Whitelaw Reid, September-December, 1898 (Austin, 1965), 151, 158-167.

6 Vincent Davis, The Admirals Lobby (Chapel Hill, 1967), 118; Braisted, U.S. Navy, 1897-1909, 19; Braisted, "Naval Base", 23-25; Challener, Admirals, 179, 184-193; Seward W. Livermore, "The American Naval Base Policy in the Far East, 1880-1914," Pacific Historical Review 13 (June, 1944), 117-118, 122-125; Long to Bureau of Navigation, 1 February, 1898, RG 45, Area 10; Hay to Long, 10 December, 1900, Long to Hay, 16 September, 1901, Evans to Moody, 23 April, 1903, GB 405, RG 80; Gracey to Cridler, 13 June, 1899, Hay to Long, 21 October, 1901, General Board to Long, 27 November, 1901, Long to Hay, 2 December, 1901, Bureau of Navigation to the Office of Naval Intelligence, 12 July, 1900, Office of Naval Intelligence, 15 August, 1900, Naval War College to the Office of Naval Intelligence, 24 July, 1900, --- to Taylor, 3 September, 1901, Evans to Moody, 20 November, 1903, General Board to Moody, 23 November, 1903, General Board minutes, 12 June, 1903, General Board to Moody, 13 June, 1903, GB 408-1, RG 80; General Board Letter Endorsement, 24 July, 1902, GB 409, Records of the General Board, RG 80, National Archives.

[']R.G. Neale, <u>Great Britain and United States Expansion: 1896-1900</u> (East Lansing, 1966), 60, 66; Grenville and Young, Politics, 292; Gracey to Cridler, 13 June, 1899, Hay to Long, 10 December, 1900, Hay to Long, 21 October, 1901, Hay to Long, 2 December, 1901, --- to Taylor, 3 September, 1901, Evans to Moody, 20 November, 1903, GB 408-1, RG 80; Dewey to Long, 10 October, 1900, Long to Remey, 23 October, 1900, --- to ---, 31 March, 1902, Letter-press Wilmington, 1 February, 1902, Letter endorsements by Commander-in-Chief, United States Asiatic Fleet, 4 December, 1901, 28 January, 1902, 1 February, 1902, 31 March, 1902, 22 May, 1902, 26 June, 1902, 24 July, 1902, 6 February, 1903, 17 June, 1903, 29 July, 1903, 30 July, 1903, 30 October, 1903, GB 409, Records of the General Board, RG 80, National Archives. Note that place names are as they appear in official documents and in many cases there were no Chinese equivalences.

⁸ <u>FRUS 1899</u>, 244-260; <u>FRUS 1900</u>, 299; Grenville and Young, <u>Politics</u>, 312, Griswold, <u>Far Eastern Policy</u>, 36-86; Braisted, <u>U.S.</u> <u>Navy</u>, 1897-1909, 78, 127-128; Dobson, <u>America's Ascent</u>, 189, MacMurray, <u>Treaties and Agreements</u>, 2: 126. The direct response to Hay was delivered at the State Department by the Japanese Ambassador, using as a reason for the refusal to agree to an American naval facility in Fukien Hay's own words about the territorial integrity of China, <u>FRUS</u> <u>1915</u>, 113-115. The origninal communications date from December, 1900 but were published in 1915.

⁹ Bailey, "Dewey and Germans", 65-66; Braisted, <u>U.S. Navy</u>, <u>1897-1909</u>, 26, 38-39; Dewey to Long, 13 August, 1898, Records of the Naval War Board, RG 45, National Archives; Dewey to Long, 29 August, 1898, Allen, <u>Papers of John Davis Long</u>, 188-190; Serial 4331, House Document #140, 17 December, 1900, 57th Congress, lst Session, (Washington D.C., 1900), 22-23; Sperry to Commander-in-Chief, United States Asiatic Station, 1899, Sperry Papers, Library of Congress. This is one of the first official documents demonstrating regarding the spelling of "Subic", with the "c" crossed out and "g" substituted. Dewey felt that Montojo could have performed much better if Subic had been properly fortified, "The Battle of Manila: Official Report of Rear Admiral Montejo [sic] R[oyal] S[panish] Navy and Admiral George Dewey U.S. Navy," n.d., in Dewey Papers, Library of Congress.

¹⁰ Richard Olney, "Growth of American Foreign Policy," <u>Atlantic</u> <u>Monthly</u> 85 (March, 1900), 296; Braisted, <u>U.S. Navy, 1897-1909</u>, 119; Lt. G.F. Cooper reported Subic as "infinitely preferable" to Manila, #N134, Attache Reports, RG 38; Office of Naval Intelligence to Bureau of Navigation, 18 October, 1899, PS File, RG 45. The establishment of a naval base at Subic was recognized as a potential threat to Japan, General Board endorsement on Ellicott Report, 12 May, 1900, Miscellaneous, RG 80, National Archives. A civilian opinion was that Subic was the best harbor in the Philippines, United States Philippine Commission, <u>Report of the Philippine Commission to the President of the</u> <u>United States, January 31, 1900</u> (Washington D.C., 1900), 1:127.

11 Grenville and Young, Politics, 299-300; Braisted, "Naval Base", 24; Henry P. Beers, "The Development of the Office of the Chief of

Naval Operations," 10 (Spring, 1947), 54-55; Braisted, U.S. Navy, 1897-1909, 69, 70, 74, 119-120; Outten J. Clinnard, Japan's Influence of American Naval Power, 1897-1917 (Berkeley, 1947), 40. The establishment order for the creation of the General Board charged the board with preparation of war plans in the "dependencies" and the study of the naval base issue, especially in the Philippines, Long to Stockton, 30 March, 1900, Area 11, RG 45; General Board Memo to the Office of Naval Intelligence, 12 July, 1900; Naval War College to Office of Naval Intelligence, 24 July, 1900; Dewey to Long, 27 June, 1900, Dewey to Long, 29 June, 1900, GB 408-1, Records of the General Board, RG 80. The General Board determined that war problems should be based "on the supposition that Germany" would be the enemy in the Pacific, General Board Minutes, GB 405, RG 80, National Archives. Mahan called the sneak attack by Japan on Port Arthhur a "brillant success", Seager, Mahan, 470 and Roosevelt was "delighted" with the Japanese attack, Seager, Mahan, 472.

¹² Robert Seager II and Doris D. Maguire, editors, <u>Letters and</u> <u>Papers of Alfred Thayer Mahan</u> (Annapolis, 1975), 3: 660; Braisted, "Naval Base", 24; Clinnard, <u>Japan's Influence</u>, 40; Davis, <u>Admirals</u>, 115; Gordon C. O'Gara, <u>Theodore Roosevelt and the Rise of the Modern</u> <u>Navy</u> (Princeton, 1943), 28-29; Braisted, <u>U.S. Navy, 1897-1909</u>, 119-120; Challener, <u>Admirals</u>, 193, 234; Reminiscences of Geo[rge] C. Remy", 92, n.d., n.p., Remey Papers, Library of Congress; Long to Dewey, 26 October, 1900, PS File, RG 45; Bureau of Navigation to Long, 9 June, 1901, PS File, RG 45; Long? to ---, 26 October, 1900, Bureau of Navigation to Long, 9 January, 1901, GB 408-1, RG 80; Hay to Long, 16 September, 1901, GB 405, RG 80; Long to Foss, 10 January, 1901, 11406-3, RG 80, National Archives; Naval Appropriations Act, Statutes at Large, vol. 31, 56th Congress, 2nd Session, Chapter 852, 3 March, 1901, this provided funds for a search for a naval station in the Philippines.

¹³ Braisted, <u>U.S. Navy, 1897-1909</u>, 121; 2nd endorsement to Rodgers letter, 3 November, 1901, 3rd endorsement to Remey letter, 16 November, 1901, Attache Reports, RG 38; Taylor to Bureau of Navigation, 24 May, 1901, Rodgers to Long, 12 June, 1901, General Board to Long, 1 November, 1901, Long to Remey, 3 December, 1901, Roosevelt to Long, 9 November, 1901, PS File, RG 45; Niblack to Long, 25 June, 1901, General Board minutes, 25 September, 1901, General Board to Long, 26 September, 1901, General Order #67, Department of the Navy, 14 November, 1901, Taylor to Long, 13 December, 1901, GB 408-1, RG 80, National Archives; General Board minutes, 4 November, 1901, "Gov't. Coaling Depots in Order of Strategic Importance", November?, 1901, Executive Committee Report to the General Board, November?, 1901, Dewey Papers, Library of Congress.

¹⁴ Braisted, <u>U.S. Navy, 1897-1909</u>, 124-153; Dewey to Long, 7 October, 1901, Area 10, RG 45; Hay to Long, 21 October, 1901, General Board to Long, 27 November, 1901, Hay to Long, 2 December, 1901, GB 408-1, RG 80, National Archives; General Board minutes, 4 November, 1901, "Gov't. Coaling Depots", Executive Committee Report to the General Board, Dewey Papers, Library of Congress. \$233,000 was allocated for Cavite on 1 July, 1902, <u>Navy Yearbook</u> (Washington D.C., 1921). "Owing to the rapid growth of our power and our interests in the Pacific, whatever happens in China must be of the keenest national concern to us", Roosevelt's 1st annual message, 3 December, 1901, Fred Israel, ed., <u>The State of the Union Messages of the Presidents</u>, 1790-1966 (New York, 1966), 3: 2050.

¹⁵ Braisted, <u>U.S. Navy, 1897-1909</u>, 122-123; Implementing Order, 17 July, 1903, JB 301, RG 225, National Archives. \$300,000 was allocated for Cavite on 3 March, 1903, <u>Navy Yearbook</u>. "The establishment of a naval base in the Philippines ought not to be longer postponed. Such a base is desirable in time of peace; in time of war it would be in indispensable, and its lack would be ruinous. Without it our fleet would be helpless. Our naval experts are agreed that Subig Bay is the proper place for the purpose. The national interest require that the work of fortification and development of a naval station at Subig begin at an early date; for under the best of conditions it is a work which will consume much time", Roosevelt's 3rd annual message, 7 December, 1903, Israel, <u>State of the Union Messages, 3: 2095.</u>

16 Challener, Admirals, 239; Dobson, America's Ascent, 192-193; Clinnard, Japan's Influence, 42-43; Louis Morton, "War Plan Orange," World Politics 11 (January, 1959), 222; Braisted, U.S. Navy, 1897-1909, 154-179; Roosevelt to Burton, 23 February, 1904, Elting E. Morison, ed., The Letters of Theodore Roosevelt (Cambridge, 1951), 4: 735-737, hereafter MRL; General Board to Moody, 7 November, 1903, GB 405, RG 80; General Board to Moody, 25 November, 1903, GB 408-1, RG 80, Records of the General Board, National Archives; Joint Board minutes, 18 December, 1903, RG 225; Joint Board to Moody, 19 December, 1903, JB 305, RG 225; War Department to Joint Board, 13 December, 1903, JB 205, RG 225; Moody to Dewey, 11 November, 1903, JB 305, RG 225; Griffin to Joint Board, 12 February, 1904, JB 325, RG 225. Griffen's letter is the basis for war plans in the Joint Board that included Japan as an enemy. Serial 4675, House Document #435, 19 January, 1904, 58th Congress, 2nd Session; Serial 4673, House Document #282, 4 January, 1904, 58th Congress, 2nd Session; 27 April, 1904, Navy Yearbook; 27 April, 1904, Statutes at Large 33: part 1, 58th Congress, 2nd Session.

¹⁷ Livezey, <u>Mahan</u>, 70; Braisted, "Naval Base", 27; Young Hum Kim, <u>East Asia's Turbulent Century</u> (New York, 1966), 45-49; Foster Rhea Dulles, <u>America's Rise to World Power</u>, 1898-1954 (New Yearbook, 70-71; Payson J. Treat, <u>The Far East</u> (New York, 1928), 360-385; Raymond A. Eusthus, <u>Theodore Roosevelt and the International Rivalries</u> (Claremont, 1970), 41-42; Eusthus, <u>Theodore Roosevelt and Japan</u> (Seattle, 1966), 3-39; Victor A. Yakhontoff, <u>Russia and the Soviet Union in the Far East</u> (Westport, 1931), 45-61; Iriye, <u>Pacific Estrangement</u> (Cambridge, 1972), 70-73, 80, 144-146; David J. Dallin, <u>The Rise of Russia in Asia</u> (Hamden, 1949), 20-22; Ivo N. Lambi, <u>The Navy and German Power</u> Politics, 1862-1914 (Boston, 1984), 226-231; <u>FRU]</u> 1902, 329-333; <u>FRUS</u>

1903, 46-77, 615-622, 708-711; FRUS 1904, 118-146, 411-430; FRUS 1905, 581-591; Roosevelt's 4th annual message, 6 December, 1904, Israel, Messages of the President, 2136; Follette to Naval War College, 14 April, 1905, GB 403, RG 80; General Board Memo, 26 June, 1911, GB 404, RG 80; Joint Board to Moody, 26 May, 1904, GB 405, RG 80; Train to Morton, 5 April, 1905, GB 405, RG 80; Bonaparte to Train, 19 July, 1905, GB 405, RG 80; General Board to Bonaparte, 27 July, 1905, GB 405, RG 80; Dewey to Morton, 30 March, 1905, GB 408-1, RG 80; Bureau of Equipment to Morton, 11 April, 1905, GB 408-1, RG 80; Dewey to Moody, 20 February, 1904, GB 408-4, RG 80; Joint Board to Root, 26 May, 1904, JB 305, RG 225; Joint Board to Root, 19 December, 1903, JB 305, RG 225; Moody to Dewey, 11 November, 1903, JB 305, RG 225; Memo read by Taylor, 31 May, 1904, JB 325, RG 225; Joint Board to Moody, 24 June, 1904, JB 325, RG 225; Alusna Tokyo to Bureau of Navigation, 29 July, 1903, GB 409, RG 80; McCormick to Hay, 23 December, 1903, GB 409, RG 80; Naval War College to General Board, 11 February, 1904, GB 420, RG 80; Moody to Cooper, 4 April, 1904, Letters Sent Relating to Naval Stations, RG 80; Morton to Train, 25 April, 1905, 11406-76, RG 80; Train Memo, 31 May, 1905, PS File, RG 45, National Archives. Excellent studies about the Anglo-Japanese Alliance can be found in Morinosuke Kajima, The Diplomacy of Japan, 1894-1922 (Tokyo, 1976) and R.P. Dua, Anglo-Japanese Alliance, (New Delhi, 1972).

18 Frederick W. Marks III, Velvet on Iron (Lincoln, 1979), 65-66; Homer Lea, The Valor of Ignorance (New York, 1909), 227, 245, 328-330; William J. Pomeroy, American Neo-Colonialism (New York, 1970), 157-160; Dulles, America's Rise, 70-71; Kajima, Diplomacy of Japan, 1: 293-294, 303-304, 306-307, 346, 349-350; John H. Latane, America World as а Power, 1897-1907 (New York, 1907), 117-119; FRUS 1899, 1: 199-203; Braisted, U.S. Navy, 1897-1909, 99, 105-114, 154-180; Livezey, Mahan, 206-208; Seager, Alfred Thayer Mahan: The Man and His Letters (Annapolis, 1977), 469-476; Seager and Maguire, Letters and Papers, 3: 101, 102, 107, 153; Howard K. Beale, Theodore Roosevelt and the Rise of America to World Power (Baltimore, 1956), 280-334; Griswold, Far Eastern Policy, 118-122; Eusthus, Roosevelt and Japan, 40-96; Roosevelt to Hall, 16 March, 1905; Roosevelt to Taft, 31 May, 1905, MRL, 4: 1140-1141, 1198; Roosevelt's 4th annual message, 6 December, 1904, Roosevelt's 5th annual message, 5 December, 1905, Israel, State of the Union Messages, 3: 2136, 2171; Roosevelt address at Naval Academy, 30 January, 1905, Presidential Address and State Papers (New York, 1970), 2: 212. For the effects of the Japanese artillery and mortar fire at Port Arthur see W (Naval Attache, Tokyo) # 173 and #178, 12 December, 1904; W #183, 22 December, 1904; W #187, 27 December, 1904, Area 10, RG 45; Joint Board to Moody, 26 May, 1904, GB 405, RG 80; Train to Morton, 4 April, 1905, GB 405, RG 80; General Board to Morton, 28 April, 1905, GB 405, RG 80; General Board to Bonaparte, 28 April, 1905, GB 405, RG 80; Moody to Cooper, 4 April, 1904, Morton to Train, 25 April, 1905, Letters Sent Relating to Naval Stations, RG 80, National Archives. Mahan noted the strategic implications for the U.S. Navy because of the similarities between Russia and the United States as they both occupied extended positions on two oceans, George T. Davis, A <u>Navy Second to None</u> (New York, 1940), 189. An excellent pictorial work on the Russo-Japanese War is by J.N. Westwood, <u>The Illustrated History</u> of the Russo-Japanese War (Chicago, 1974). The volume contains invaluable pictures of not only the effects of Japanese gunfire on the besieged harbor of Port Arthur but of the damage suffered by the Russian vessels entrapped there.

19 Braisted, <u>U.S. Navy, 1897-1909</u>, 154-180; Davis, <u>Navy</u>, 174-175, 189; Eusthus, International Rivalries, 29-30; Kajima, Diplomacy of Japan, 2: 201-235; Yakhontoff, Russia, 56-61; Clinnard, Japan's Influence, 50-51; Iriye, Pacific Estrangement, 93, 103, 145-146; Dallin, Rise of Russia, 21-22; Dobson, America's Ascent, 194-195; Kim, Turbulent Century, 48-49; Elmer B. Potter and Fleet Admiral Chester W. Nimitz, Sea Power: A Naval History, (Englewood Cliffs, N.J., 1960), 353, 355; Roosevelt's 6th annual message, 6 December, 1906, Israel, Messages of the President, 2225, 2237; Gerald E. Wheeler, Prelude to Pearl Harbor: The United States Navy and the Far East, 1921-1931 (Columbia, M.O., 1963), 49; Olney, "Growth of American Foreign Policy", 296-297; Nikolai Golovin, The Problem of the Pacific in the Twentieth Century (London, 1922), 45-47; Roosevelt to Spring-Rice, 27 December, 1904, Roosevelt to Hall, 16 March, 1905, Roosevelt to Taft, 31 May, 1905, Roosevelt to Hale, 27 October, 1906, Roosevelt to Grey, 18 December, 1906, MRL, 4: 1082-1088, 1140-1141, 1198, 5: 435-437, 527-529; FRUS 1905, 807-827.

20 Beale, Theodore Roosevelt, 292-311; Eusthus, International Rivalries, 30-37; Iriye, Pacific Estrangement, 163; Braisted, U.S. Navy, 1897-1909, 176-178; Griswold, Far Eastern Policy, 91-132; Clinnard, Japan's Influence, 42-49; Challener, Admirals, 231-240: Latane, World Power, 117-119; Grenville and Young, Politics, 312-314; Grenville, "Diplomacy and War Plans", 30-31; Morton, "War Plan Orange", 222; Albert C. Stillson, "Military Policy without Political Guidance: Theodore Roosevelt's Navy," Military Affairs 24 (Spring, 1961) 19, 26-27; Braisted, "Naval Base", 27-30; Roosevelt to Wood, 4 August, 1904, Roosevelt to Burton, 23 February, 1904, MRL, 4: 735-737, 881; W#173/#178, 12 December, 1904, W#183, 22 December, 1904, W#187, 27 December, 1904, Area 10, RG 45; Follette to Naval War College, 14 April, 1905, GB 403, Roosevelt speech, 5 March, 1906, GB 403; Dewey to Morton, 30 December, 1904, GB 404; General Board to Morton, 28 April, 1905, GB 405, Bonaparte to General Board, 3 October, 1905, GB 405, RG 80; PD112-1, Bonaparte to Commanding Officer, Naval Station, Olongapo, P[hilippine] I[slands], 20 March, 1906, Secret and Confidential Correspondence of the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, RG 80; Memo read by Admiral H.C. Taylor, 31 May, 1904, JB 325, Joint Board to Bonaparte, 18 June, 1907, JB 325, RG 225; Commander Nathan Sargent, "Admiral Dewey and the Manila Campaign," 10 November, 1904, Dewey to Foss, 19 June, 1905, Foss to Dewey, 20 June, 1905, Dewey to Foss, 20 June, 1905, Dewey to Foss, 26 June, 1905, Sargent to Dewey, 26 June, 1905, Dewey Papers, Library of Congress.

²¹ Braisted, U.S. <u>Navy</u>, 1897-1909, 216-223; Braisted, "Naval

Base", 30-38; Davis, Navy, 155-156; "Congress however was not easily easily convinced [about funding Subic], especially in view of the capture of Port Arthur the fortifications of which had been considered impregnable," Clinnard, Japan's Influence, 47; Committee 1 to the General Board, 6 February, 1907, GB 403, Joint Board to Department of Navy, 11 March, 1907, GB 403, Naval War College to Department of Navy, 16 March, 1907, GB 403, General Board to Bonaparte, 27 October, 1905, GB 405, Bonaparte to Root, 4 November, 1905, GB 404, MacKenzie to Taft, 16 November, 1905, GB 404, Chief of Ordinance to Taft, 18 November, 1905, GB 404, Board of Officers on Naval Station Olongapo, 16 January, 1906, GB 405, General Board to Bonaparte, 4 March, 1907, GB 405, General Board to Bonaparte, 8 April, 1907, Commander Third Squadron to Bonaparte, 21 June, 1907, GB 405, Commandant, United States Marine Corps to Dewey, 26 June, 1907, GB 405, General Board to Bonaparte, 26 September, 1907, GB 405, Joint Board to Bonaparte, 3 October, 1907, GB 405, Roosevelt to Bonaparte, 11 February, 1908, GB 405, General Board to Philips, 2 October, 1908, GB 405, Taft to Bonaparte, 21 January, 1908, GB 405, Smith to Commanding Officer Cavite Naval Station, 10 May, 1904, Joint Board to Moody, 26 May, 1904, Bureau of Docks and Yards to Bonaparte, 25 May, 1906, Peters to Assistant Secretary of the Navy, 27 July, 1906, Records of the General Board, Bonaparte to Naval Station Olongapo, 2 February, 1906, Bonaparte to Naval Station Olongapo, 20 March, 1906, General Board Records, 2 July, 1906, Bonaparte to Commanding Officer Cavite Naval Station, 12 December, 1906, Letters sent Relating to Naval Stations, General Board Letterpress, 4: 131, 3 October, 1907, Miscellaneous, RG 80; Joint Board minutes, 6 November, 1907, Joint Board Letter, 29 January, 1908, Roosevelt to Joint Board, 3 March, 1908, JB 304, Roosevelt to Taft, 26 October, 1907, JB 305, Wood to Adjutant Generals Office, JB 305, RG 225; Dewey to Brownson, February, 1907, Metcalf to Root, 4 March, 1907, General Board 1 to Metcalf, 4 March, 1907, General Board to Bonaparte, 8 April, 1907, Metcalf to Root, 18 February, 1908, Metcalf to All Bureaus, 19 February, 1908, Foss to Dewey, 25 March, 1908.

22 Braisted, "Naval Base", 29-30; Clinnard, Japan's Influence, 38-43, 45, 45-49; Grenville and Young, Politics, 312-314; Challener, Admirals, 227-229; Beale, Theodore Roosevelt, 391-395; Morton, "War Plan Orange", 222; Seager, Mahan, 490-517; Wheeler, Prelude to Pearl Harbor, 49-50; Livermore, "Naval Base Policy", 130-131; Ronald Spector, Admiral of the New Empire (Baton Rouge, 1974), 185-186; Spector, Professors of War (Newport, 1977), 103-104; Lambi, German Power Politics, 233-234, 3 war plans for dealing with the United States were created after 3 December, 1899 but all such studies were dropped after 9 May, 1906 when Germany realized she could not sustain operations in the Western Hemisphere and the return of the Royal Navy to home waters invalidated the "doctrine of risk", Lambi, ibid., 226-231; Memo read by Admiral H.C. Taylor, 31 May, 1904, JB 325, RG 225; Dewey to Griffith, 7 December, 1912, GB 420, RG 80, National Archives. Edward Miller, War Plan Orange (Annapolis, 1989), 8-9, 11, 14-15. Additional material for war plans comes from Mr. Miller, who was kind enough to share insights about war planning and many items below were located either through his

prompting or from chapter drafts of his soon to be published book.

²³ Braisted, U.S. Navy, 1897-1909, 191-201; Davis, Admirals, 128; Iriye, Pacific Estrangement, 84-87, 151; Clinnard, Japan's Influence, 49-50; Grenville and Young, Politics, 317-318; Dobson, America's Ascent, 196; Challener, Admirals, 231-232; Eusthus, Roosevelt and Japan, 128-145; Seager, Mahan, 477-480; Miller, War Plan Orange, 8-9, 11; Miller to Rivera, 7 October, 1988; Thomas A. Bailey, Theodore Roosevelt and the Japanese-American Crisis: An Account of the International Complications Arising from the Race Problem on the Pacific Coast (Stanford, 1934), 47-83; Bailey, "The World Cruise of the American Battleship Fleet," Pacific Historical Review 1 (December, 1932), 390-391; Gordon C. O'Gara, Theodore Roosevelt and the Rise of the Modern Navy (Princeton, 1943), 18, 64, 69-88; Dewey to Brownson, 15 January, 1907, Dewey Papers; Griffen to Joint Board, 12 February, 1904, JB 325; Memo read by Taylor, 31 May, 1904, JB 325; Joint Board to Morton, 24 June, 1904, JB 325; Pillsbury to Joint Board, 29 November, 1904, JB 325, RG 225, National Archives; Roosevelt to Spring Rice, 27 December, 1904, Roosevelt to Taft, 31 May, 1905, Roosevelt to Stone, 26 July, 1907, Roosevelt to Root, 26 July, 1907, MRL, 4: 1082-1088, 1198, 5: 727-730; Bigelow to Roosevelt, 25 October, 1906, Kaneko to Roosevelt, 26 October, 1906, Newberry to Roosevelt, 30 October, 1906, to Theodore Roosevelt Papers, Library of Congress.

²⁴ Challener, <u>Admirals</u>, 235; Clinnard, <u>Japan's Influence</u>, 50-54; Eusthus, <u>Roosevelt and Japan</u>, 181-195; Roosevelt to Hale, 27 October, 1906, Roosevelt to Grey, 18 December, 1906, <u>MRL</u>, 4: 473-475, 5: 527-529; Miller, <u>War Plan Orange</u>, 11, Chapter 2: 1, 4; Michael Vlahos, <u>Blue Sword: The Naval War College and the American Mission</u>, 1919-1941 (Newport, 1981), 116; Navy Department, General Board, <u>War Plan:</u> <u>Orange-Blue Situation</u>, <u>assumed September</u>, 1906 June, 1907, RG 8; Conference of 1906, "Solution of Problem," RG 12; General Board of the Navy, "In Case of Strained Relations with Japan," RG 12, Naval Historical Division, Naval War College, Newport RI.

²⁵ Clinnard, Japan's Influence, 59; Bailey, <u>Theodore Roosevelt</u>, 150-167, 228-259; O'Gara, <u>Theodore Roosevelt</u>, 60-62; Iriye, <u>Pacific</u> Estrangement, 144-150; Eusthus, <u>Roosevelt and Japan</u>, 140, 146-166, 197-228; Miller, <u>War Plan Orange</u>, Chapter 2: 8, 17; Roosevelt to Hale, 27 October, 1906, Roosevelt to Grey, 18 December, 1906, <u>MRL</u>, 4: 473-475, 5: 527-529.

²⁶ Braisted, <u>U.S. Navy, 1897-1909</u>, 223-232; Bailey, <u>Theodore</u> <u>Roosevelt</u>, 261; O'Gara, <u>Theodore Roosevelt</u>, 89-122; Beale, <u>Theodore</u> <u>Roosevelt</u>, 391-395; Clinnard, <u>Japan's Influence</u>, 38-43, 55-56, 58; Challener, <u>Admirals</u>, 243-270; Dobson, <u>America's Ascent</u>, 197; Miller, <u>War Plan Orange</u>, 8-9, Chapter 2: 17-18; Roosevelt to Lodge, 10 July, 1907, Roosevelt to Sternburg, 16 July, 1907, Roosevelt to Newberry, 24 July, 1907, roosevelt to Taft, 3 August, 1907, Roosevelt to Newberry, 6 August, 1907, <u>MRL</u>, 5: 709-710, 720-722, 725-726, 742-744; Office of Naval Intelligence to Alusna (Tokyo and Peking), 6 June, 1908, War Portfolio #2; --- to Office of Naval Intelligence, 5 December, 1907, War Portfolio #2; Alusna to Office of Naval Intelligence, 12 December, 1907, War Portfolio #2, RG 80, National Archives; Roosevelt's 7th, 3 December, 1907, 8th, 8 December, 1908, Taft's 1st, 6 December, 1910, 2nd, 20 December, 1911, Israel, <u>State of the Union Messages</u>, 2: 2284, 2334, 2357, 2903; Bailey, "World Cruise", 390-423; Charles E. Neu, <u>An</u> <u>Uncertain Friendship: Theodore Roosevelt and Japan</u> (Cambridge, 1967), 225-226; Bailey, "The Root-Takahira Agreement," <u>Pacific Historical</u> Review 9 (March, 1940), 19.

²⁷ Challener, <u>Admirals</u>, 243-270; Bailey, "World Cruise", 407-415, 417; Bailey, <u>Theodore Roosevelt</u>, 79, 211-227, 281-291; Neu, <u>Uncertain</u> Friendship, 229-233; Beale, <u>Theodore Roosevelt</u>, 211-252; Dua, Anglo-Japanese Alliance, 43-83.

²⁸ Bailey, "World Cruise", 400-401; Wheeler, <u>Prelude to Pearl</u> <u>Harbor</u>, 81; Neu, <u>Uncertain Friendship</u>, 237-240; <u>Clinnard</u>, <u>Japan's</u> <u>Influence</u>, 57-58, 61-64; Challener, <u>Admirals</u>, 238-241, 253-254; Robert <u>A. Hart</u>, <u>The Great White Fleet</u> (Boston, 1965), 160-162, 204-264; Dewey to Brownson, 1 February, 1907, Dewey Papers; Metcalf to Root, 4 March, 1907, GB 405; General Board to Metcalf, 4 March, 1907, GB 405; General Board to Metcalf, 8 April, 1907, GB 405; Metcalf to Root, 18 February, 1908, GB 405; Foss to Dewey, 25 March, 1908, GB 404, RG 80, National Archives; Roosevelt to Lodge, 10 July, 1907, Roosevelt to Sternburg, 16 July, 1907, RRL, 5: 709-710, 720-722, 725-726, 742-743.

²⁹ Challener, <u>Admirals</u>, 253-254, 261-262; Dobson, <u>America's</u> <u>Ascent</u>, 195-196; Grenville and Young, <u>Politics</u>, 314-315; Clinnard, <u>Japan's Influence</u>, 43-44; Bailey, "World Cruise", 418-419; O'Gara, <u>Theodore Roosevelt</u>, 80-81; Beale, <u>Theodore Roosevelt</u>, 157-158, 235; Eusthus, <u>Roosevelt and Japan</u>, 102-107; Seager, <u>Mahan</u>, 480-482; Roosevelt to Taft, 13 July, 1908, Roosevelt to Hobson, 16 April, 1908, Roosevelt to Fairbanks, 21 February, 1908, Roosevelt to Warren, 17 January, 1908, <u>MRL</u>, 6: 912-914, 950-952, 1008-1009, 1127-1128; Lea, <u>Valor</u>, 227, 245, 328-330; Earl Pomeroy, <u>Pacific Outpost: American</u> Strategy in Guam and Micronesia (Stanford, 1951), 31-32.

³⁰ Kim, <u>Turbulent Century</u>, 53, 58-59; Bailey, <u>Theodore Roosevelt</u>, 83, 292-293; Pomeroy, <u>Pacific Outpost</u>, 34-38; Bailey, "Root-Takahira", 19-35; Eusthus, <u>Roosevelt and Japan</u>, 266-286; Bailey, "World Cruise", 416, 422; Spector, <u>Professors</u>, 104-107; Davis, <u>Admirals</u>, 128-129; Seager, <u>Mahan</u>, 482-489; Seager and Maguire, <u>Letters and Papers</u>, 3: 352-358, 380-395; Challener, <u>Admirals</u>, 272-275; Iriye, <u>Pacific Estrangement</u>, 223-224; Vlahos, <u>Blue Sword</u>, 118; Livermore, "Naval Base Policy", 131-133; Dobson, <u>America's Ascent</u>, 198; Braisted, <u>U.S. Navy</u>, <u>1909-1922</u>, 30-35, 58-76; Edwin P. Hoyt, <u>Pacific Destiny</u> (New York, 1981), 83; Clinnard, <u>Japan's Influence</u>, 59-60, 107; Beale, <u>Theodore</u> <u>Roosevelt</u>, 391-395; Spector, <u>Admiral</u>, 185-188; Commander A.W. Hind, U.S.N., "The Island of Guam as a Naval Base," United States Naval Institute Proceedings 41 (March-April, 1915), 449-455; Miller, <u>War Plan</u>

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CHAPTER IV

W.W. I AND THE WESTERN PACIFIC, 1914-1922

STRATEGIC PROBLEMS, 1914-1919

Observers viewed a World War as unexpected. The outbreak of an Austro-Serbian conflict had been likely but the expanded European war was a surprise to nearly everyone. The concern of American planners was on avoiding getting dragged into the war, for the nation was going to maintain its neutrality in what was not originally considered an expanded theater of operations conflict. Recalling that it was called World War I much later, the expectation of global warfare was just beginning to develop in military men. The Anglo-Japanese Alliance had originally been created to combat an imbalance Britain suffered in the unlimited worldwide responsibilities imposed on her naval power. The alliance allowed Britain to withdraw most of her naval units to European waters in response to the increased naval ship building programs of Germany, which had concentrated her forces in the North Japan benefited from the alliance, gaining a strong naval Sea. power as her ally, and the recognition of her position in East Asia. This was one problem that was to plaque American naval authorities. What would Japan do in case of a war between Germany and Britain? Would Japan remain neutral or would she join the war? The alliance obligated Japan to assist Britain in case of difficulties in Asia, not Europe or

the Pacific. Germany possessed only one colony on the Asian mainland, Kiachou on the Shantung Peninsula and she possessed territories in the Central Pacific, comprised of the Marshalls, the Carolines and Marianas, the last two bought from Spain in December, 1898.¹

American leadership tried to forestall the spread of hostilities to Asia with attempts at neutralizing the area, receiving vague responses from Britain, and a more positive answer from Germany. The concern over the spread of the war to the Far East was based on the threat to commercial interests in the region, for the United States would remain neutral, and the belligerents would attempt to interdict the commerce of their opponents, and thus probably interfere with American shipping. Britain was notorious for adding items to contraband lists after wars had begun, and the United States wished to continue selling goods to all parties, with no intention of providing contraband, previously listed as such before the outbreak of war. Another concern was the possible participation of Japan in the war. А role for her would mean difficulty, because by default she would become the strongest belligerent in Asia, with no power in position to restrain her ambitions. China was seen as the most probable victim of Japanese participation in the war.²

The concern over Japanese entry into the war was realized in late August, 1914 when Britain was unable to effectively protect her shipping, colonies, and sea lanes of communication between Asia and the European theater of operations. Britain had drafted Australians and New Zealanders for duty in Europe and their convoys had to be protected. Thus limited assets had to be re-positioned, reducing mission capabilities. German units in Asia were negligible but strong enough to pose a threat against un-escorted convoys, defenseless shipping, or colonies stripped of their protective naval units. Britain had at first informed Japan that the terms of the a European Anglo-Japanese alliance would not be invoked as this was conflict, and that British interests in Asia would not be disturbed. With the fears over the activities of the German naval forces in the Pacific, and demands for protection by the dominions, Britain was forced to reconsider her position and request Japanese assistance. This request was tempered with a geographic limitation, calling for Japan to restrict her operations to the China Seas. Japan acceded to the request for assistance but disdained any restrictions on the scope of her activities, or her freedom of action. Japan issued an ultimatum to Germany in early August 1914, calling for the unconditional surrender of Kiaochou to Japan, with the view to the eventual restoration of the territory to China. The note made no mention of German islands in the Pacific, but Britain had already made plans for the capture of the islands, using Australians and New Zealanders. Germany failed to respond to the ultimatum and Japan declared that hostilities existed between the two nations, because of the danger to the peace of the Far East that continued German occupation of the Shantung Peninsula posed, the same langauge used by the Germans to Japan in 1895, following the Tripartite Intervention, stripping Japan of the strategic harbor of Port Arthur. The humiliating experience was now repaid, with Germany the target. Japanese forces, with a small detachment of English troops (only taken along at the insistence of the British government), moved against the Germans at Kiaochou, but not directly. Using the excuse of military necessity, Japan violated China's neutrality by invading a position over 100 miles away from Kiaochou. The force captured a railhead running between Tsingtao and Tsinan-fu, with Japan responding to Chinese protests that the rail-line was a legitimate target. China did not agree on that point, but Japan ignored the protests and continued the assault, completed the task in November, 1914.³

The acquisition of the German Pacific islands brought Japan deeper into the Pacific Ocean. Australia and New Zealand failed to proceed rapidly in earlier opportunities to capture the islands themselves, either through fear of German raiders in the area, or through a lack of haste to move into the territories. The continued threat of German naval activity and the slowness of commonwealth forces provided the excuse for the Japanese occupation of the islands north of the equator, while the islands south of the equator had already been taken within weeks of the declaration of war. Mistakes by the dominions included believing that occupation of the German half of New Guinea gave them effective control of the islands north of the equator. Britain had also asked Japan to provide assistance in containing the operating area of the German vessels, which Japan took as a blank check to move against those islands not already under British control. By the end of October 1914 all German territory in the Pacific was under the occupation of one or the other of the belligerents, and Japan began to effectively seal off her areas from the outside world.⁴

The new near proximity of Japan not only frightened the dominions

but forced the United States Navy to recognize the weakened position it held in the Western Pacific, and the Philippines. Instead of а potentially hostile power straddling the sea lanes of communications between Hawaii and the Philippines, a probable hostile power was situated amidst those lanes. Japan was a potential opponent that possessed not only naval power but the ability to deliver land forces with efficiency to areas of hostilities. Even before the outbreak of the war, the Navy had been investigating and surveying the German islands in preparation for a trans-Pacific crossing of the United States Navy should warfare involve American interests in the Western Pacific, those interests being the Philippine Islands, as well as Guam. Rising tensions over continued racial trouble in California in May, 1913 pushed the Navy to recommend the strengthening of Naval forces in the Philippines, with a further recommendation that the Army be augmented, just in case Japan did decide to open hostilities. The German islands were seen as possible way stations that would allow the fleet to refuel enroute to the theater of operations and for the relief of the forces supposedly holding out in the Philippines. Naturally, using the islands without prior permission would violate German territorial integrity if she remained neutral in such a war, or the fleet would probably incur damage in any attempt to appropriate territory in any conflict that involved the Germans. Thus the Navy could not look with favor at the Japanese advance and the threat to the security of American positions along the route to the Philippines.⁵

Fears about Japanese ambitions after the capture of German territory were proven justified with her secret presentation of the "21

Demands" on China in January, 1915. Chinese acceptance of the demands would have made her a protectorate of Japan, but the list of demands (Japanese control of the military, navy, arsenals and naval bases) was made public by the Chinese in order to bring international pressure to bear on Japan, especially from the United States. It was the United States, in fact, that had played a role in the issuance of the demands. Japan professed justification in issuing the demands for it felt that American commercial interests in China were going to be used by the Chinese, and the United States Navy, to acquire a long sought for naval base in Fukien Province, which was prohibited by the terms of the 1895 Non-alienation agreement between Japan and China. China was desirous of American naval assistance, in part to thwart such expected Japanese parries in China. The pressure exerted by the United States was enough to get modification of the demands dealing with Chinese armed forces, but the sinking of the Lusitania in May, 1915 served to distract the State Department and Japan took advantage of the moment to force China to accede to the remaining demands. Later that year Japan, with the threat of military intervention, persuaded China to sign additional agreements that provided for the ultimate disposition of the Shantung Peninsula. Evidence indicates that Japan never had any intention of returning the territory to China, using the excuse instead that blood had been spilled in the capture of Kiaochou and national honor called for the price to be recovered.⁶

This was the situation facing the United States Navy in the years 1914-1915. Japan had expanded territorially and was threatening to swallow more of China; her military was strong, well funded, and in

American military strength was neutralized, conservatively use. funded, and un-tested, unless duty in hemispheric turmoil was counted. The Navy did benefit from the war because of the Wilson Administration's suspicion of Germany. A German victory would strip away the protection of the Royal Navy, leaving the United States to face the Germans alone. Other factors came into play: the continued rise of Japan and the post war intentions of Britain. Naval planners correctly noted that the ongoing struggle between Germany and Britain was based on economics and now Germany had threatened British economic Using historical examples, the planners dramatically well being. demonstrated that past competitors such as Spain, Holland, France, and now Germany, were eventually defeated by the British following challenges to her interests globally. An expanded American commercial role was a natural consequence of the war, following the decision to remain neutral. A British defeat of Germany would leave her dominant in Europe, and with a tested battle fleet as well as a larger merchant flæt. Japan figured in the picture because of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance and her known propensity for sneak attacks.

In August, 1916 Congress finally supported a large naval ship building program, in part because of the May, 1916 Battle of Jutland between Germany and Britain. Both combatants had claimed victory but in fact Britain had gained a strategic victory for the German navy would never again venture out for battle. The victory was tempered by the tactical defeat suffered by Britain because of the large number of capital ships lost by the Royal Navy. The appropriations act was designed to build "a Navy second to none", which openly challenged

British primacy on the world's oceans. The bill was not aimed at Britain but rather at the strengthening of the American Navy in case Germany managed to effect a complete victory. The Navy had its own reasons for pushing for larger naval appropriations, reasons that were tied into the lack of a definite policy regarding the eventual disposition of the Philippine Islands. Continued failure in acquiring a major naval base in the Philippines, in conjunction with the Japanese expansion into the Central Pacific, meant that the American territory in clear and present danger. A lack of national policy, was Presidential direction, or Congressional appropriations meant that the Navy had to plan for contingencies without the most important facet of international relations, strong direction from the elected leadership, and the status of the Philippines was one of the problems that should have received more consideration from the leadership. The urgent need to defend the islands was never matched by equivalent action on the part of the President, the Congress, or from a mandate of popular opinion. Plans for war were required for protection of the territory and to implement those plans in emergencies direction from above was needed but so was manpower, a larger naval force, and a major naval base in the Far East. Until 1916 none of these had been provided.

The disposition of the Philippines was taken up in the 1916 Jones Act that called for greater autonomy for the islands, and provided for eventual independence. The Navy's perception of the disposition of the islands was to provide protection if possible for them, and called for the permanent retention of several naval facilities in the Philippines in connection with the proposed independence. If no base was acquired, the Navy recommended that the United States not guarantee the integrity and safety of the islands from aggression. In this regard, lacking any strong direction, the Navy was forced to make its own statement of policy: that the mission of the United States Navy in the Far East was to protect the Philippines at Manila. Along with Army forces, the islands, in time of war, were to hold out for 60-90 days and await the arrival of the combined American naval forces. This was the policy in effect at the time of the 1941 Pearl Harbor attack. Note that the forces held out for almost six months, even with the destruction of naval assets at Pearl Harbor.9

With the Congressional passage of a large navy bill, a challenge from Britain was then experienced. Britain, in a fight for her life and facing the German submarine threat, expected that the United States would eventually join the war on the side of the Entente. The battle to defeat the submarines was taking a toll on the over-extended Royal Navy's anti-submarine forces. Britain pushed for an increased American building program of smaller ships, that could assist in the hunt for submarines, but that was just one reason, for if Britain could get the United States Navy to use its appropriations for smaller vessels it would not be able to finance the building of large capital ships that could challenge Britain after the end of the war when American commercial interests would be a powerful competitor. American navy men fought this suggestion, even after the American entry into the war in April, 1917. The need for a strong navy in place following the end of the war was viewed as more important than assisting Britain in the hunt for submarines. Since the nation was not at war it made strategic

112

sense to ensure the Navy was able to build up the size of the fleet and not succumb to British desires, the decision was more sound during the American participation in the war, for the loss of assets in battle could interfere with post war planning strategy.¹⁰

Japanese interests in post war affairs led to an exchange of secret notes between Britain, France, Russia, Italy and Japan in February, 1917 in which the latter sought to insure the retention of her territorial gains in the Pacific after the end of the war and the conclusion of a peace treaty. Japan was given affirmative answers in regard to that request, partly as a price for use of Japanese cruisers in Mediterranean waters. The secret notes between the Allies were not made public, nor revealed to the United States. American naval planners had already made plans for the eventual disposition of the German islands should the United States enter the war, which occurred two months later with the declaration of war with Germany. The planners answer to the Japanese control of the German islands was to offer Japan a free hand in Northern Asia as a way to divert her path, away from the Philippines, as well as remove the threat to the trans-Pacific route from Hawaii. As it was most certain that Japan would object to being relieved of her war gains it was considered important that the United States plead her case most strongly at post war peace negotiations. The Department of Navy tried to ensure that the State Department was informed about this proposal, but it appears that the British may have previously informed American officials about the secret arrangement with Japan, and that it would be impossible to break the promise of the islands to Japan, significantly because as а

quid pro quo Britain would retain territory south of the equator captured by Imperial forces in 1914. Other parts of the secret arrangements between members of the Entente included Russian control of the Bosporus Straits, Italian control of former Austro-Hungarian territory, and French control of former German territories. Thus а move to renege on the promise to Japan would most certainly have caused a schism among the United States and the Entente, threatening any hope of unity that Woodrow Wilson needed for his dream of the creation of a League of Nations, a major plank in his announced "Fourteen Points", his post war vision for ensuring peace. One of the points involved the issue of secret treaty arrangements, and called for covenants openly arrived at, which conflicted with the previous arrangements.¹¹

The entry of the war by the United States in April, 1917 did little to change the situation in the Pacific as all German territory in the area had been occupied, and what remained of German raiders was slowly dwindling in numbers. A majority of the Navy's efforts were in the Atlantic, combatting the submarine menace and performing convoy duty. The British continued to push for the American abandonment of capital ship construction and to increase the number of smaller escort vessels, but again the pressure failed to achieve its goal, in part because there was a fear of American naval planners that a defeat of Germany, with her fleet intact, meant a division of those fleet units among the victor's with Britain getting the lions share, who could justifiable argue that the Royal Navy had suffered the heaviest burden and the highest losses. An already large Royal Navy was anticipated to increase its ratio size over the United States Navy. Britain had a

bountiful amount of bases around the world, and had managed to control large amounts of fuel supplies. Thus there was no advantage in an American decision to cut back on the construction of capital ships.¹²

The opening of the post-war peace conference at Versailles found the European participants in a vindicative mood towards Germany, forcing Wilson to compromise on some issues dealing with the Far Fast in order to gain Allied support for the League of Nations. The question of the Pacific Islands was discussed but after a brief exchange of views Japan was not forced to give them up, rather the American delegation, in conjunction with Jan Smuts of South Africa, worked out an arrangement for the territories. The islands were set up as mandates with Japan being the mandatory power. The Wilson-proposed League of Nations would be the governing body for the eventual disposition of the territories, but until that decision was made the mandatory power was to ensure the preparation of the territory for independence. Not all parties were pleased with this arrangement. Japan felt the United States had robbed her of the war gains by not permitting the permanent occupation of the islands, while the United States Navy had hoped for another power to occupy the islands, or for the permanent neutralization of the islands. Japan had reason for anger at the United States, for in all of her previous wars, Western powers had intervened to deprive Japan of territory gained at the expense of the vanquished. The 1895 Tripartite Intervention prevented the retention of Port Arthur, the 1905 Portsmouth Treaty prevented the cession of the entire island of Sakhalin, and now the United States was trying to deprive Japan of the islands. Additionally, as part of the terms of the mandate the islands could neither be fortified nor offensive materiel put in place. The Japanese were upset about this restriction because it applied to the islands captured during the war by Japan, but did not apply to the Philippines, Guam, or pre-1914 British islands, all in near proximity of Japanese territory. The question of racism or offensive plans against Japan were not the cause of the restrictions, rather the need to insure that Japan would not use the islands as offensive staging grounds against the Philippines, or against the exposed Central Pacific route from Hawaii to the Philippines. Japan saw it as just another attempt by the western white powers to corral Japan and contain her in the over-populated home islands.¹³

War planning strategy for the Western Pacific was realistically based on a hard fight across the Pacific. After the Japanese occupation of the Pacific islands none of the plans changed in regard to the strategy and tactics of the trans-Pacific trek. It was the end of the trek that now concerned American planners, for Germany had had no ground forces to speak of in the islands, while the home land was а continent away. Japanese territory was now within visual sight of American territory. The Japanese held island of Rota was about sixty miles from Guam, and only 200 miles separated the Philippines from Taiwan. The shortened lines of communication gave Japan a numerical advantage over the United States in terms of armed forces and naval units, while the United States envisioned a period of 60-90 days before the fleet could arrive in the Western Pacific. In wartime the fleet was scheduled to arrive in Philippine waters with the expectation that

the American forces in Manila would have been able to hold out, so as to be able to provide the fleet support facilities as well as ensure the ability to contest any occupation. To support the Navy it was expected Congress would approve another large naval appropriations bill designed to overcome the ratio advantage enjoyed by Japan, and the the base advantage held by Britain. Such legislation was drafted in late 1918, containing provisions that established a greater role for naval aviation, as far-sighted naval thinkers had envisioned a Japanese invasion in the Philippines being repelled by bomber aircraft. Submarines were also viewed as an acceptable method of providing defensive support to exposed positions. Some funding was provided for the building of larger naval facilities in Guam and Manila Bay, but the amount would never be enough to sufficiently construct what was needed, a truly major Far East naval base. It was this type of funding that Japan feared, for the restrictions on the mandates specifically forbade this kind of activity, but the United States and Britain were free to build up their pre-war territories. American naval paranoia about Japanese intentions in the mandates were never proved unjustified until after World War II. From the moment Japan took possession of the islands in 1914 the possibility of the positions being transformed into little Gibraltars was constantly on the mind of naval planners. Those planners feared the construction of submarine bases, air bases, major facilities for fleet surface units and communications facilities. Constant attempts at surveys, overt and surreptitious, only made the planners more and more suspicious because it could never be definitely proved that Japan had not fortified the islands. Interrogation of

senior Japanese officials after 1945 proved the fears of such activity for the years 1914-1922 were unjustified. Japan had not attempted to fortify the islands until after 1935, with her withdrawal from the League of Nations. The interrogation brought out the fact the such activity faced the same challenges that the Americans did in fortifying the Philippines and Guam. The tremendous amount of funds needed to build such facilities was never appropriated by the legislative bodies of either country, and thus each naval service had to do the best it could with limited assets. Japan faced additional problems in the islands, for the positions were almost all hard lava or coral rock. Dredging was expensive and time consuming. After 1935, the Japanese simply began to take advantage of the natural terrain to build almost impregnable positions. That was what awaited the United States in 1944.14

END OF THE DREAM FOR THE FAR EAST BASE, 1919-1922

The years between 1919 (the Versailles Conference) and 1921 (the Washington Conference) were peaceful in so far as the Pacific territories were concerned. Civil war raged in Russia, extending to Siberia, and threatened to spill over the border into China. Ά decision was made in 1918 by the major powers (Britain, France, Japan and the United States) to intervene in the civil war. The attempt proved to be inconclusive but it left Japan entrenched in Russian territory for several years. American participation in the intervention had in part been intended to forestall such a Japanese occupation of Russian territory. Relations between the two nations

were formal at best, and animosity was the rule. Japanese officials acted in what was considered an arrogant manner and did their best to ensure that cooperation was difficult. The installation of a puppet government in the Siberian break-away state of the Far East Republic did little to calm fears of Japanese expansion in Asia.¹⁵

It was in this atmosphere that the Congress of the United States considered the large naval bill desired by the Navy, to which Japan's Diet, pressured by her own navy, responded with legislation for a long sought after "8-8" program. Designed to achieve local superiority over the U.S. Navy in the Western Pacific, the program called for the building of three squadrons with forty-eight battleships and battlecruisers. These two bills were seen as the start of another naval race that could plunge the world into a second world war. Woodrow Wilson had envisioned using the threat of а larger American naval force to encourage the allies to support the League of Nations proposal. His goal was either the creation of the league, or the creation of an American navy second to none. The British and Japanese would have to match such an increase because each could reasonably see such a larger American navy as destined to threaten their post war ambitions.

It was this determination to gain parity that threatened the peace just signed. Calls for moderation grew and peace movements pressed for a halt to naval races. Eventually the calls for such a halt led to a joint resolution by Senator Borah (Idaho) in December, 1920 calling for a conference that would stop the race. Pressure grew on the American leadership, while in Britain calls increased for such a conference. The result was an invitation by Secretary of State Charles Evans Hughes to assemble interested naval powers in Washington D.C. in November, Eventually Britain and Japan decided to attend, with each 1921. naturally having its own agenda to promote, and the scope of the conference was expanded to deal with issues other than naval programs. The Far East and the unsettled China picture were also to be discussed, including the American (and Canadian) hope for the abandonment of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance. Australia and New Zealand expressed the view to the British that American friendship was desired over Japanese support. Britain wanted to retain its numerical advantage over the United States, while Japan was desirous of receiving equal treatment as a great power, and wanted a halt to the construction of fortifications in the Philippines, Guam, Hong Kong, Singapore and British New Guinea. The United States Navy provided its own service agenda, calling for no limitation of fortifications construction in the Far East and the retention of the numerical naval advantage over Japan. Hughes shocked the conference on the first day (12 November, 1921) by announcing that the United States was willing to scrap entire building programs, destroy existing vessels and agree to a naval shipbuilding holiday. The proposals included the curtailment of the American 1916 bill and a reduction in the Japanese "8-8" bill, as well as British programs. This was totally unexpected by the participants at the conference, who had no real desire to give up existing advantages. Hughes had counted on world opinion to influence home governments into accepting the program put forward. By the end of the conference (February, 1922) the resulting naval limitation treaty seemed to have stopped the naval

race, but naval leaders in Japan, the United States and Britain were left with a bitter taste. Japan was forced to accept a lesser numerical fleet percentage (the 5-5-3 concept) which was designed to give her only superiority in home waters. In laymen's terms 5-5-3 meant that for every 500,000 tons of capital ships possessed by the United States and Britain the Japanese would be allowed 300,000 tons. In exchange for accepting the lower percentage Japan was able to get inserted into the treaty a specific clause (Article 19) that prohibited any further fortification of the territories of the Philippines, Guam, Hong Kong, and her own island territories captured from the Germans. The United States Navy had attempted from the beginning to ensure that such a proposal would never make it into the final draft of the treaty, as it would permanently kill any opportunities for the United States to effectively defend the Philippines and the Western Pacific. The acceptance of this article along with the 5-5-3 ratio meant that the United States possessed "zero" offensive and negligible defensive capabilities in the Far East. Japan would have all the advantages, in terms of local superiority, shorter lines of communications, the ability to fortify its positions before the United States could effectively respond to threats and the ability to deliver its forces in an unopposed fashion.

The United States Navy had hoped for a much more favorable treaty, but protests regarding "unacceptable" proposals failed to persuade American negotiators not to compromise too much. Forced to publicly accept the treaty, direction from above, though vague, gave the "order" that the Washington Conference Treaty on Naval Limitations was acceptable by all naval planners. It was not acceptable to all in the United States Navy, but the treaty was now national policy, and all that remained was to abide by it. That meant the end of the dream of a naval base in the Western Pacific. Other results from the conference dealt with the recognition of China's precarious stability, leading to the signing of the Four Power and Nine Power Treaties providing for the recognition of the status quo in Asia and the return of the Shantung Peninsula to China, the end of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance.¹⁶

From the start naval men had never given up hope of being able to defend American interests in the Far East. Limited assets prevented a much stronger program of defense. Whether from a lack of direction, or a lack of funds, a service without either cannot carry out its missions. The Navy's mission in the Far East, after 1898, was to protect American interests. The most important American interests were the Philippines but the leadership of the nation could never quite come to terms with the needs for defending the islands. Whether it was financial austerity, political patronage, or oversight, the civilian leadership of the United States would not truly support the establishment of a major Far East facility for the navy until 1947, ironically at Subic Bay. The Navy's role was, and still is, not to create a policy but rather to defend or protect such interests that policy may call for, and usually it is the job of the leadership to determine the interests. The Navy rightly surmised that the nation would be in turmoil over any threat to the Philippines, it just could never convince the electorate of a need for a strong and stable The was no mischievous reason for the desire to gain a base defense.

in the Philippines, rather the need to protect the islands and the Western Pacific required, in the Navy's view, the facilities to service and repair fleet assets. Without a strong base in the Western Pacific, the fleet would have to live with a very reduced combat readiness upon arriving in the region. Franklin D. Roosevelt, Assistant Secretary of the Navy during the Wilson Administration understood only too well the handicap and "the technical problems of sea warfare." During his tenure as President of the United States Roosevelt "advised his Cabinet that a fleet loses about ten percent of its efficiency for every thousand miles it steams away from its home base." The distance from San Pedro, California, home base of the fleet in 1941, to the Philippines is over 7,000 nautical miles, thus a fleet deploying to the Western Pacific in war time would, in theory, arrive there at a combat readiness of less than 50%, and that only if it did not suffer any battle damage enroute. That appeared to be an unlikely event as the Japanese control of the German islands prevented an unchallenged sortie. Such a scenario meant that the islands would be lost. A loss of the islands to invaders was seen as damaging to the international position and national interests of the nation and efforts by the services, while occasionally self-serving, were designed to protect the position and interests.¹⁷

Thaddeus D. Tuleja summed up the problem faced by the Navy in fulfilling national security requirements by noting that in 1919 Assistant Secretary Roosevelt:

asserted in a letter to the Secretary of State [Robert Lansing] that the Department of State ought to know what its policies might cost, and the Navy ought to know what it might be called upon to uphold by force. The coordination of strategic and political considerations, he conclude, could be achieved through a Joint Plan Making Body. The letter, of course, was drafted by naval strategist, and it is particularly significant, in view of what was to come later in the feeble unfolding of our Far Eastern policy, that they were greatly concerned whether or not they could carry a naval war into Asian waters. . . The formulation of a concise naval policy was often the subject of a frustrating debate within the naval service, especially when the Government itself vacillated in the pursuit of its own national aspirations. . . But a vigorous naval policy, as viewed through the eyes of [planners], was the victim of more than government idealism and Congressional thrift. The strange ferment. . . was concocted of isolationism, naval limitations. . .peace societies. . . and these forces working together seemed to make permanent the eclispe of American sea power [in the Western Pacific].

The American naval nightmare started when the policies of the nation and its vital interests were never clearly defined but the military was expected to react to threats involving those undefined interests. The defense of the Western Pacific was clearly such an example.¹⁸

NOTES

¹ Edwin P. Hoyt, <u>Pacific Destiny</u> (New York, 1981), 85; Morinosuke Kajima, <u>The Diplomacy of Japan, 1894-1922</u> (Tokyo, 1976), 2: 457-499, 3: 27-32, 35-58, 61-63; Ian H. Nish, <u>Alliance in Decline: A Study in</u> <u>Anglo-Japanese Relations, 1908-1923</u> (London, 1972), 115-131; Raymond L. Buell, <u>The Washington Conference</u> (London, 1970), 53-54; Harold and Margaret Sprout, <u>Toward a New Order in Sea Power</u> (Princeton, 1946), 34-37; Earl Pomeroy, <u>Pacific Outpost: American Strategy in Guam and</u> <u>Micronesia</u> (Stanford, 1951), 44; Charles N. Spinks, "Japan's Entrance into the World War," <u>Pacific Historical Review</u> 6 (December, 1936), 297-311; Peter Lowe, <u>Great Britain and Japan, 1911-1915</u>: A Study of British Far Eastern Policy (New York, 1969), 177-219; Malcolm D. Kennedy, <u>The Estrangement of Great Britain and Japan, 1917-1935</u> (Berkeley, 1969), 41.

² Nish, <u>Alliance</u>, 116, 118; Spinks, "Japan's Entrance", 297-311; Lowe, <u>Britain and Japan</u>, 177-219; United States, <u>Papers Relating to the</u> Foreign Policy of the United States: The Lansing Papers, 1914-1920 (Washington D.C., 1939-1940), 1: 1-6, 113-329, hereafter <u>Lansing</u> <u>Papers</u>; R.P. Dua, <u>Anglo-Japanese Relations During the First World War</u> (New Delhi, 1972), 108-226; William R. Braisted, <u>The United States Navy</u> in the Pacific, 1909-1922 (Austin, 1971), 153-170; George T. Davis, <u>A</u> <u>Navy Second to None</u> (New York, 1940), 200-206; A. Whitney Griswold, <u>The</u> <u>Far Eastern Policy of the United States</u> (New York, 1938), 176-184; Thomas F. Millard, <u>Our Eastern Question</u> (New York, 1916), 87-389. Also see George Gleason, <u>What Shall I Think of Japan</u> (New York, 1921), Millard, <u>Democracy and the Eastern Question</u> (New York, 1919); Gerald E. Wheeler, <u>Admiral William Veazie Pratt</u>, <u>A Sailor's Life</u> (Washington D.C., 1974), 86.

³ William Roger Louis, <u>Great Britain and Germany's Lost</u> Colonies, 1914-1919 (Oxford, 1967), 36-49; Kajima, Diplomacy of Japan, 3: 27-32, 35-58, 181-185, 346-347, 385; Nish, Alliance, 115-131, 140-157; Sprout, New Order, 35-36; Pomeroy, Pacific Outpost, 45, 49, 51; Spinks, "Japan's Entrance", 297-311; Lowe, Britain and Japan, 201-207; Outten 201-207; Outten J. Clinnard, Japan's Influence on American Naval Power, 1897-1917 (Berkeley, 1947), 118-127; Paul H. Clyde, Japan's Pacific Mandate (New York, 1935), 21-26; Holger H. Herwig, "Luxury Fleet": The Imperial German Navy, 1888-1918 (London, 1980), 108-110, 154-159; John Buchan, History of the Great War (1980), 1: 409; Roger C. Thompson, Australian Imperialism in the Pacific: The Expansionist Era, 1820-1920 (Melbourne, Australia, 1980), 202-221; Davis, Navy, 205-206; Dua, Anglo-Japanese Relations, 108-226; Griswold, Far Eastern Policy, 184; C. Brunsdon Fletcher, The Problem of the Pacific (New York, 1919), 26-34, 138-148, 188-198; RN#15921 December, 1922, Attache Reports, RG 38, National Archives; Richard Storrey, Japan and the Decline of the West in Asia, 1894-1943 (New York, 1979), 106; United States, Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, 1914 (Washington D.C. 1915), Supplement 1: 183-185, 205-207, hereafter FRUS.

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5 Nish, Alliance, 166-170; Clinnard, Japan's Influence, 104-114, 145-147; Pomeroy, Pacific Outpost, 38-39; Louis Morton, " Orange," World Politics 11 (January, 1959), 222-223; Morton, "War Plan "Military and Naval Preparations for the Defense of the Philippines during the War Scare of 1907," Military Affairs 12 (Summer, 1949), 134; Roy W. Curry, Woodrow Wilson and Far Eastern Policy, 1913-1921 (New York, 1957), 43-64; Richard D. Challener, Admirals, General, and American Foreign Policy, 1898-1914 (Princeton, 1973), 367-378; John A.S. Grenville and George B. Young, Politics, Strategy and American Diplomacy (London, 1966), 322-323; Grenville, "Diplomacy and War Plans in the United States, 1890-1917," in Paul M. Kennedy, ed., The War Plans of the Great Powers, 1881-1914 (Boston, 1979), 32-38; Paul R. Schratz, "The Orient and U.S. Naval Strategy," in Joe C. Dixon, ed., The American Military and the Far East (Washington D.C., 1980), 130-132; Braisted, U.S. Navy, 1909-1922, 125-140; General Board to Daniels, 6 June, 1913, GB 403; General Board to Daniels, 10 May, 1913, GB 409; Ellis to Commandant U.S.M.C., 27 July, 1914, GB 409; General Boards to Daniels, 25 April, 1914, GB 409; General Board to Daniels, 30 December, 1914, GB 422, RG 80; "Prepared Routes Between the Pacific Coast and the Philippines", October, 1913, War Portfolio #3, RG 80, National Archives.

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⁷ Clarence B. Davis, "Limits of Effacement: Britain and the Problem of American Cooperation and Competition in China, 1915-1917," <u>Pacific Historical Review</u> 47 (March, 1979), 47-63; Braisted, <u>U.S. Navy</u>, <u>1909-1922</u>, 419-420.

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⁹ Clinnard, <u>Japan's Influence</u>, 166-172; Curry, <u>Woodrow Wilson</u>, 65-100; Braisted, <u>U.S. Navy, 1909-1922</u>, 248-253; Ingraham to Daniels, 10 October, 1916, GB 403; Navy Members to Joint Board, 14 November, 1916, GB 403; General Board 1st endorsement Baker to Daniels, 22 May, 1918, GB 405; General Board to Daniels, 26 June, 1918, GB 405, RG 80, National Archives.

¹⁰ Nish, <u>Alliance</u>, 212-219; B.H. Williams, <u>The United States and</u> <u>Disarmament</u> (New York, 1931), 132-139; Harold W. Bradley, "Observations Upon American Policy in the Philippines," <u>Pacific Historical Review</u> XX (March, 1942), 50; Braisted, <u>U.S. Navy, 1909-1922</u>, 293-309; Davis, <u>Navy</u>, 236-237; LCDR L.A. Cotten, USN, "Our Naval Problem," <u>North</u> <u>American Review</u> 205 (March, 1917), 371; Mary Reno Frear, "Did President Wilson Contradict Himself on Secret Treaties," <u>Current History and</u> <u>Forum</u> 30 (June, 1929), 435-443; Ligget Report, 17 April, 1917, GB 405, RG 80; PD196-1, General Board to Daniels, 15 January, 1917, Secret and Confidential Correspondence of the Offices of the Chief of Naval Operations and the Secretary of Navy, RG 80; PD200-1, Daniels to All Bureaus, 14 March, 1919, Secret and Confidential Correspondence of Offices of the Chief of Naval Operations and the Secretary of Navy, RG 80; PD200-1, Naval members to Joint Board, 14 November, 1916, Secret and Confidential Correspondence of Offices of the Chief of Naval Operations and the Secretary of Navy, RG 80, National Archives.

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¹³ Kajima, <u>Diplomacy of Japan</u>, 3: 343-353, 388-393; Levi, "Pacific Islands", 55-64; Nish, <u>Alliance</u>, 266-269; Buell, <u>Washington Conference</u>, 54-58; Clyde, <u>Pacific Mandate</u>, 27, 32-33; United States, <u>Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, 1919; The Paris Peace Conference</u> (Washington D.C., 1942-1947), 1: 71-74, 492-495, 512-515, 3: 736-792, 4: 466, 5: 109, 126-133, 9: 20-21, 168-169, 226, 640-665, 570, 601, 640-665, 854-855; Braisted, <u>U.S. Navy</u>, 1909-1922, 409-453; Griswold, <u>Navy</u>, 241-268; General Board memo to Coontz, 6 December, 1918, GB 438, RG 80; RN#4669, 1919, Attache Reports, RG 38, National Archives; David Hunter Miller, <u>The Drafting of the Covenant</u> (New York, 1928), 1: 106-114; Office of Naval Intelligence Study, 1914-1919, WA-5, RG 45, National Archives.

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¹⁵ Nish, <u>Alliance</u>, 237-239; Curry, <u>Woodrow Wilson</u>, 213-248; Braisted, <u>U.S. Navy, 1909-1922</u>, 343-406; Griswold, <u>Far Eastern Policy</u>, 226-239.

¹⁶ Kajima, <u>Diplomacy of Japan</u>, 3: 447-501; Nish, <u>Alliance</u>, 282-287, 307-318, 354-389; Morton, "War Plan Orange", 226-228; Wheeler, "The United States Navy and the Japanese Enemy', 1919-1931," <u>Military</u> Affairs 21 (Summer, 1957), 62-63; Dingman, <u>Power in the Pacific</u>,

122-135, 178-211; Curry, Woodrow Wilson, 249-284; Buell, Washington Conference, 41-171; Williams, U.S. and Disarmament, 140-159; Pomeroy, Pacific Outpost, 75-109; Golovin, Problem of the Pacific, 214-235; Sprout, New Order, 130-139; 161-181; 241-271; Wheeler, Pratt, 169-185, Albion, Naval Policy, 223-227; Braisted, U.S. Navy, 1909-1922, 452-462, 467-475, 491-627, 639-647; see Bywater, Sea Power in the Pacific (New York, 1921); Bywater, "Japanese and American Naval Power," Monthly 128 (November, 1921), 710-711; Davis, <u>Navy</u>, 213-232, Atlantic 270-332; Thaddeus V. Tuleja, Statesman and Admirals: Quest for a Far Eastern Policy (New York, 1921), 27-30; see Arthur Bullard, The ABC's of Disarmament and the Pacific Problems (New York, 1921); see Yamato Ichihasi, The Washington Conference and After (Stanford, 1928); FRUS 1921 2: 313-319, 591-603; General Board to Denby, 23 September, 1921, GB 438, Theodore Roosevelt Jr. Papers, Library of Congress; Roosevelt Jr. to General Board, 27 July, 1921, Disarmament Conference, RG 80; Coontz to War Plans Distribution List, 10 January, 1921, GB 425; Coontz to Daniels, 26 February, 1920, PD198-2, RG 80; Williams to General Board, 19 October, 1921, GB 425, RG 80; Yarnell Lecture, "Strategy of the Pacific", 8 September, 1919, GB 425, RG 80; Joint Board to Daniels, 18 December, 1919, JB 325, RG 80; Williams to Benson, 22 October, 1919, RG 80, National Archives. Secretary of Navy Denby issued a press memo to quell public rumors of the dissatisfaction of naval officers with the Hughes proposals on the opening day of the conference. It would appear to be a subtle "general order" of obedience to those officers, Denby memo, 28 November, 1921, Theodore Roosevelt Jr. Papers, Library of Congress; "What the Anglo-Japanese Alliance means to us," Literary Digest (2 July, 1921); Buel W. Patch, "American Naval and Air Bases," Editorial Research Reports (18 February, 1939), 112-123; Robert E. Harkavy, Great Power Competition for Overseas Bases: The Geopolitics of Access Diplomacy (New York, 1982), 14-47; Alusna Tokyo to Office of Naval Intelligence, 10 September, 1921, Disarmament Conference Serial 1, RG 80; Alusna Peking to Naval Committee, 9 September, 1921, Disarmament Conference Serial 1, RG 80; General Board memo, 20 August, 1921, Disarmament Conference Serial 1, RG 80; Hughes to Denby, 1 September, 1921, Disarmament Conference Serial 1, RG 80; Roosevelt Jr. to General Board, 27 July, 1921, Disarmament Conference Serial 1, RG 80; Final Action of the General Board, July, 1921 to January, 1922, Disarmament Conference Serial 1, RG 80; General Board to Denby, 20 October, 1921, Disarmament Conference Serial 1, RG 80; General Board to Denby, 22 October, 1921, Disarmament Conference Serial 1, RG 80; General Board to Denby, 27 October, 1921, Disarmament Conference Serial 1, RG 80; Joint Board to Secretary of War, 15 July, 1920, JB 304, RG 225; RN#4627, 1922, Attache Reports, RG 38; RN#11345, W nr 415, 4 December, 1919, Attache Reports, RG 38, National Archives; Kennedy, Great Britain and Japan, 43-59; Buckley, Washington Conference, 48-74, 90-103; Wheeler, Pratt, 169-186; Pomeroy, "American Policy Concerning the Marshalls, Carolines and Marianas, 1898-1941," Pacific Historical Review 17 (February, 1948), 49; Knox to General Board, 8 February, 1921, Knox Papers; Knox outline, n.d., Correspondence, Knox Papers; Knox memo, 8 February, 1922, Knox Papers, Library of Congress; United States, Congressional Record, 67th Congress, 2nd Session, 2064-2069,

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¹⁸ Tuleja, <u>Statesmen and Admirals</u>, 10-11.

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