

The Athenian 'Politicians', 403–322 B.C.

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I

THE TITLE of this paper may seem innocent and straightforward. It presents a historical problem, but does not seem to raise a semantic question. We believe we know what a politician is and we are used to reading about Athenian politicians. Two outstanding examples will suffice. Twenty years ago S. Perlman published an excellent article entitled "The Politicians in the Athenian Democracy of the Fourth Century B.C." (*Athenaeum* 41 [1963] 327–55), and in 1971 W. R. Connor published his seminal study *The New Politicians of Fifth-Century Athens*. It is characteristic of these and similar studies¹ that they are based on two tacit assumptions: (a) that the term politician/*Politiker/politicien* covers a sufficiently clear and well-defined concept; and (b) that this concept can be applied in descriptions of ancient societies. I will open my account of the problem by questioning both these assumptions.

It is surprisingly difficult to find out what a politician is and to come up with a definition that can be generally accepted. This word, which is used every day in parliaments, in the newspapers, and in broadcasting, is largely disregarded by students of political science. For example, in the *International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences* there is no entry "politician," and in the article "Political recruitment and career," the author seems cunningly to avoid it.² Similar works of reference in German and French are equally unhelpful. There are scores of books and articles about political parties, and the definition of 'party' is a battle that has been fought among scholars for almost three generations.³ But it is impossible to find a book or an article defining the concept 'politician' or asking the simple question, Who

¹ Cf. A. H. M. Jones, *Athenian Democracy* (Oxford 1957) 128–33; R. Sealey, "Callistratos of Aphidna and His Contemporaries," *Historia* 5 (1956) 178–203; M. H. Hansen, *The Sovereignty of the People's Court* (Odense 1974), and *Eisangelia* (Odense 1975); J. Tolbert Roberts, "Athens' So-called Unofficial Politicians," *Hermes* 110 (1982) 354–62.

² The article is by Dwaine Marvick. The same observation applies to the entry "Political Participation" by Herbert McClosky.

³ Cf. most recently G. Sartori, *Parties and Party Systems I* (Cambridge 1976).

are 'politicians'? Nevertheless the word is very important in political debates. The 'politicians' are regularly made responsible for a decision or a disaster, and they are often opposed *e.g.* to civil servants, to trade-union leaders, or to the people. So at least students of political terminology in the manner of Weldon⁴ ought to pay some attention to the problem and to discuss, if not the meaning, then the uses of the word 'politician'. One exception is the article "Politician" by G. C. Moodie in *A Dictionary of the Social Sciences* (New York 1964): "The term 'politician' is most commonly used to refer to a person actively engaged in the struggle for governmental power and/or office, whose success largely depends upon the favour of others and who, to achieve success, must therefore be skilled in the arts of persuasion, negotiation and compromise. In any given society . . . 'politician' will or will not be generally used in a pejorative sense." Developing this definition, Moodie states, *i.a.*, the following modifications: "(a) the term does not normally apply to professional full-time administrators; (b) it does not apply to those who, for all their concern with political power, are neither members of a governing body nor openly aspiring to such office." This is the only definition of 'politician' I have seen,⁵ and one swallow does not make a summer. If we turn to the general lexica and dictionaries, we are confronted with much vaguer and broader definitions of the word. A typical definition is "person taking part in politics or much interested in politics; (in a bad sense) person who follows politics as a career, regardless of principle."⁶ In 1982 I conducted a poll of the 179 members of the Danish parliament, asking two questions: (a) What is a politician? (b) Who are politicians? I had 62 replies and the definitions ranged from "a person who takes part in politics, *i.e.* all politically active citizens," to "representatives of the people elected by the

⁴ T. D. Weldon, *A Vocabulary of Politics* (London 1953).

⁵ A sociological approach to the problem can be found in Max Weber's paper of 1918 "Politik als Beruf": *Gesammelte politische Schriften* (Tübingen 1958) 493–548. Weber distinguishes between 'Gelegenheitspolitiker' (all politically active citizens) and 'Berufspolitiker' (sometimes living *for* politics but in contemporary societies mostly *by* politics). As Berufspolitiker living 'von der Politik' Weber singles out politische Beamte, Journalisten, Parteibeamte, and Parlamentarier, who however may be Gelegenheitspolitiker or rather 'nebenberufliche' Politiker.

⁶ *Oxford Advanced Learner's Dictionary of Current English* (1974); *The Oxford English Dictionary* (1933), "2b One keenly interested in politics; one who engages in party politics, or in political strife, or who makes politics his profession or business; also (esp. in US) in a sinister sense, one who lives by politics as a trade"; *Webster's New International Dictionary* (1937), "(2) one versed or experienced in the science of government; one devoted to politics; a statesman. (3) one addicted to, or actively engaged in, politics as managed by parties . . . In modern usage *politician* commonly implies activity in party politics, esp. with a suggestion of artifice or intrigue (versus *statesman*)."

people, comprising ministers, members of the parliament, and (in local government) mayors and councilmen.”

The present status of the concept ‘politician’ seems to be that no one, apart from Moodie, has made a serious attempt to define it, and that there is no agreement about what a politician is and who the politicians are, not even when we strip the word of its pejorative nuance and its metaphorical uses. But this is not in itself a sufficient reason for avoiding it in descriptions of ancient societies. Our word *soul*, for example, as opposed to *body*, is even vaguer and more difficult to grasp; nevertheless it is an obvious and irreproachable word to use in discussions of Greek philosophy and in translations of Plato and Aristotle. With this in mind, we must ask whether the word ‘politician’ can be used in descriptions of fourth-century Athens, either in the vaguer or in the narrower sense.

In the wider sense, ‘politician’ denotes all politically active citizens, *i.e.*, in Athens all citizens who attended the *ecclesia*, who took the heliastic oath in order to serve as *nomothetai* or *dicastai*, and who volunteered as candidates in the election or sortition of magistrates. ‘Politician’ in this sense would be a good translation of *ho politeuomenos* in its wider meaning,⁷ and it squares well with the Greek concept of the active citizen. But when scholars speak of the Athenian politicians, it is certainly not this meaning they have in mind. They envisage invariably a much smaller group of ‘political leaders’ explicitly to be set off against the larger group of active citizens.

So we must turn to the narrower and more technical use according to which politicians are (or aspire to be) members of a governing body elected by the people. But when we transfer this concept to the ancient world we are faced with four problems. (a) A distinguishing mark of the modern politician is that he is elected or at least is a candidate at elections. In Athens election was a condition only for becoming a *strategos*, whereas political leadership was open to any citizen who would address and could persuade the people. (b) In a modern society the (elected) politicians are essentially decision-makers, whereas in Athens the group of citizens called politicians by modern historians never made decisions. On the contrary, they initiated policy by making proposals but left all decisions to the bodies of active citizens.⁸ (c) Today the politicians are professionals who make a living by politics, whereas in Athens to be paid for politics was a

⁷ Lys. 16.18, Isoc. 8.76, Andoc. 2.1, etc.

⁸ Cf. M. H. Hansen, “Initiative and Decision: the Separation of Powers in Fourth-Century Athens,” *GRBS* 22 (1981) 359–65.

criminal offence. Admittedly, the Athenians often turned a blind eye to perquisites and 'gifts' to a 'political leader', but as soon as he fell from favour with the people, the profit he had made might result in a death-sentence.⁹ (d) To be a politician today almost necessarily entails party affiliation. Most historians tend to believe that there were no 'parties' in Athens with which a 'politician' could be affiliated.¹⁰

These four problems, of course, only reflect the essential difference between direct and representative democracy. But the inference seems to be that the modern concept 'politician' is too closely connected with representative government to be transferred to ancient societies. It is worth noting that Finley in his study "Athenian Demagogues" tends to avoid the word 'politician'. Instead he uses the (rare) Greek word 'demagogue' (in a neutral sense) or simply refers to (political) 'leaders',¹¹ a term often used by students of political theory. Since political leaders do not have to be politicians, Finley's terminology points to a different formulation of the historical problem.

Etymologically, of course, 'politician' is, *via* the Latin *politicus*, derived from the Greek adjective *πολιτικός*. It is worth noting, however, that the meaning of *πολιτικός* is 'statesman' and not 'politician'. It is used by philosophers in a complimentary sense about a true political leader. It never occurs as a legal term, and in the orators it is a *haraχ*. The neuter *τὰ πολιτικά* may be used about 'politics', but the masculine *πολιτικός* occurs only once in some 3000 Teubner pages of Attic rhetoric (Aeschin. 2.184) in a flattering reference to the 'statesman' Euboulos. Another reason for avoiding the word 'politician' for Athenian political leaders: by contrast with 'statesman', which is invariably a complimentary term, 'politician' is at best neutral and regularly pejorative in meaning. In 1968, for example, a Norwegian editor suggested the following definition: "a politician is a man who is so thick-skinned that he can stand up although he is spineless." In accounts of Athenian history, 'politician' is often used as a rendering of the Greek words *ρήτωρ*, *πολιτευόμενος*, or *σύμ-*

⁹ Cf. Hyp. 3.7–8 (public action against paid political leaders), 1.24–25 (perquisites and gifts to political leaders are tolerated by the Athenians); for political trials cf. Hansen, *Eisangelia* (*supra* n.1) 58–65.

¹⁰ O. Reverdin, "Remarques sur la vie politique d'Athènes au V^e siècle," *MusHelv* 2 (1945) 201–12; Jones (*supra* n.1) 130–31; M. I. Finley, "Athenian Demagogues," *Past & Present* 21 (1962) 15; Connor (*supra* p.33) 5–9.

¹¹ Finley (*supra* n.10), esp. 12–23; only on 14, 18, and 22 is the word 'politician' (cautiously) used. In selecting 'demagogue' as his preferred term for political leader, Finley may have been influenced by Weber, who states (*supra* n.5): "Der 'Demagoge' ist seit dem Verfassungsstaat und vollends seit der Demokratie der Typus des führenden Politikers im Okzident" (513).

βουλος, all of which may be used pejoratively but far more frequently occur in a neutral sense and sometimes even as a compliment. In the United States no member of the Congress would boast, "I am a politician,"¹² but in the speech *On the Crown* Demosthenes states with outspoken pride, ὁ σύμβουλος καὶ ῥήτωρ ἐγώ (18.212), and earlier in the same speech he says μόνος τῶν λεγόντων καὶ πολιτευομένων ἐγώ (173).¹³

Summing up: nowadays most historians agree that the term 'political party' is bound up with representative government and is better avoided in accounts of politics in ancient Greece. I suggest that precisely the same warning applies to the word 'politician', and I shall avoid it hereafter. So both questions posed above must be answered in the negative: (a) 'politician' is a vague concept with no clear meaning and several uses; (b) in its narrower sense, referring to a group of 'political leaders', it cannot be applied to ancient Greek society, unless one explicitly acknowledges 'politician' as an artificial historical term (*i.e.* a convenient translation of *politeuomenos*, *symbolos*, *rhetor*, *strategos*, etc.) which bears little or no relation to the meanings and uses of the word 'politician' in contemporary societies.

II

What language is used by the Athenians themselves when they refer to their political leaders? The most comprehensive expression found in the sources is not a word but a phrase, ῥήτορες καὶ στρατηγοί. This point is best substantiated by quoting some passages from the orators:

Dem. 2.29 = 13.20: πρότερον μὲν γάρ, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, κατὰ συμμορίας εἰσεφέρετε, νυνὶ δὲ πολιτεύεσθε κατὰ συμμορίας. ῥήτωρ ἡγεμῶν ἐκατέρων καὶ στρατηγὸς ὑπὸ τούτῳ καὶ οἱ βοησόμενοι τριακόσιοι. οἱ δὲ ἄλλοι προσενέμησθε οἱ μὲν ὡς τούτους, οἱ δὲ ὡς ἐκείνους.

Dem. 18.170: πολλάκις δὲ τοῦ κήρυκος ἐρωτῶντος οὐδὲν μᾶλλον ἀνίστατ' οὐδεὶς, ἀπάντων μὲν τῶν στρατηγῶν παρόντων, ἀπάντων δὲ τῶν ῥητόρων, καλούσης δὲ τῆς πατρίδος τὸν ἐροῦνθ' ὑπὲρ σωτηρίας.

Dem. 18.205: οὐ γὰρ ἐζήτουν οἱ τότε Ἀθηναῖοι οὔτε ῥήτορ' οὔτε στρατηγὸν δι' ὅτου δουλεύουσιν εὐτυχῶς . . .

¹² Cf. H. Sperber and T. Tritschuh, *American Political Terms. An Historical Dictionary* (Detroit 1962) 329.

¹³ All three terms are used in a positive sense in Dem. 18.94: καὶ μὴν ὅτι μὲν πολλοὺς ἐστεφανώκατ' ἤδη τῶν πολιτευομένων ἅπαντες ἴσασι δι' ὄντινα δ' ἄλλον ἢ πόλις ἐστεφάνωται, σύμβουλον λέγω καὶ ῥήτορα, πλὴν δι' ἐμέ, οὐδ' ἂν εἰς εἰπεῖν ἔχοι.

Dem. 22.66: πολλῶν μὲν στρατηγῶν ἡδίκηκότων τὴν πόλιν, πολλῶν δὲ ῥητόρων . . . οὐδενὸς πάποτ' ἐξητάσθης κατήγορος (sc. Androtion; in 24.173 the reference is to both Androtion and Timokrates).

Dem. 23.184: οὐ γὰρ . . . χάριν ἐστὶ δίκαιον ὀφείλῃν . . . ὧν μίκρ' ἀναλίσκων ἰδίᾳ καὶ τοῖς στρατηγοῖς καὶ τοῖς ῥήτορσιν διαπράττεται πρὸς ὑμᾶς ἐπαίνους αὐτοῦ γράφεσθαι.

Dem. Ep. 1.8: φημί δὴ χρῆναι μῆτε στρατηγῶ μῆτε ῥήτορι μῆτ' ἰδιώτη μηδενὶ τῶν τὰ πρὸ τοῦ γε δοκούντων συνηγωνίσθαι τοῖς καθεστηκόσι μῆτε μέμφεσθαι μῆτ' ἐπιτιμᾶν μηδένα μηδὲν ὄλως, ἀλλὰ συγχωρῆσαι πᾶσιν τοῖς ἐν τῇ πόλει πεπολιτεῦσθαι τὰ δέοντα . . .

Din. 1.90: καὶ πότερα κάλλιον ἐστὶ πρὸς δὲ δικαιοτέρον, ἅπαντ' ἐν τῷ κοινῷ φυλάττεσθαι ἕως ἄν τι δίκαιον ὁ δῆμος βουλευσῆται, ἢ τοὺς ῥήτορας καὶ τῶν στρατηγῶν ἐνίους διηρπακότας ἔχειν;

Din. 1.112: εἰ δὲ ῥήτωρ ἢ στρατηγός (ἀναβαίνει συνηγορήσων) . . . οὐ προσεκτέον ὑμῖν ἐστὶ τοῖς τούτων λόγοις.

Din. 2.26: καίτοι, ὦ Ἀθηναῖοι, τί ἂν οἴεσθ' ἐκείνους τοὺς ἄνδρας (our ancestors) ποιῆσαι λαβόντας ἢ στρατηγὸν ἢ ῥήτορα πολίτην ἑαυτῶν δῶρα δεχόμενον ἐπὶ τοῖς τῆς πατρίδος συμφέρουσιν, οἱ τὸν ἀλλότριον (Arthmios of Zeleia) . . . οὕτω δικαίως καὶ σωφρόνως ἐξήλασαν;

Din. 3.19: οὐ συνδιέφθαρται τὸ τοῦ δήμου πλῆθος τῶν ῥητόρων καὶ τῶν στρατηγῶν τισιν . . .

Hyp. 1.24: [ο]ὕδ[έ] γ' ὁμοίως [ἀδ]ικουῖσιν οἱ ἰδιῶται [οἱ λαβ]όντες τὸ χρυσίον [καὶ] οἱ ῥήτορες καὶ οἱ [στρατ]ηγοί. διὰ τί; ὅτι τοῖς [μὲν] ἰδιώταις Ἄρπαλος ἔδωκεν φυλάτ[τειν τ]ὸ χρυσίον, οἱ δὲ [στρατ]ηγοὶ καὶ οἱ ῥήτο[ρες πρ]άξεων ἔνεκα [εἰλή]φασιν.

Hyp. 3.27: καίτοι σε ἐχρῆν, ἐπεὶ περ προήρησαι πολιτεῦεσθαι, . . . μὴ τοὺς ἰδιώτας κρίνειν μῆδ' εἰς τούτους νεανιεῦεσθαι, ἀλλὰ τῶν ῥητόρων, ἑάν τις ἀδικῆ, τοῦτον κρίνειν, στρατηγός ἑάν τις μὴ τὰ δίκαια πράττη τοῦτον εἰσαγγέλλειν.

Other passages could be added to this list, both from the orators and from other fourth-century authors,¹⁴ and the inference seems to be that the two words formed a pair denoting one group. Moreover, the frequent juxtaposition of ῥήτορες and στρατηγοί is attested not only in political speeches; the Athenian law code also included at least one *nomos* explicitly referring to ῥήτορες καὶ στρατηγοί and binding on them only. The law is paraphrased by Dinarchus (1.71): καὶ τοὺς μὲν νόμους προλέγειν τῷ ῥήτορι καὶ τῷ στρατηγῷ, <τῷ> τὴν παρὰ τοῦ δήμου πίστιν ἀξιοῦντι λαμβάνειν, παιδοποιεῖσθαι κατὰ τοὺς νόμους, γῆν ἐντὸς ὄρων κεκτῆσθαι, πάσας τὰς δικαίας

¹⁴ Isoc. 5.81, 15.30; Dem. 9.38 (οἱ λέγοντες = ῥήτορες), 24.135 (πολιτευόμενος = ῥήτωρ); Aeschin. 2.184 (πολιτικοί = ῥήτορες), 3.7, 3.146; Din. 1.76 (σύμβουλοι = ῥήτορες); Ar. Eccl. 244–47; Xen. Mem. 2.6.15; Pl. Euthyd. 290C–D (πολιτικοί = ῥήτορες); Arist. Rh. 1388b18, Probl. 916b36.

πίστεις παρακαταθέμενον, οὕτως ἀξιούν προεστάναι τοῦ δήμου.¹⁵ We do not know whether this *nomos* was strictly enforced. I tend to doubt it. But it shows that the combined group of *ρήτορες* and *στρατηγοί* was not only acknowledged as a political fact but also endorsed in the laws so as to form a part of the democratic constitution.

Thus, in fourth-century Athens the phrase *ρήτορες καὶ στρατηγοί* is the nearest equivalent of what we with a much vaguer and less formal term call ‘politicians’ or ‘political leaders’. The Athenians of course had other less comprehensive and less technical words for political leaders; these will be discussed after a closer examination of the two terms *ρήτωρ* and *στρατηγός*.

The board of ten annually elected *strategoí* has been studied frequently and needs no further presentation; but what does *ρήτωρ* mean in a political context? An examination of all preserved speeches shows that *rhetor* denotes a citizen who moves a *psephisma* in the *ecclesia*¹⁶ or in the *boule*¹⁷ or a *nomos* before the *nomothetai*¹⁸ or brings a public action before the *dicasteria*.¹⁹ In a wider sense a *rhetor* is a speaker addressing the *ecclesia*²⁰ or the *boule*²¹ (either supporting

¹⁵ In the sections leading up to the paraphrase Deinarchos is attacking Demosthenes, who was a *rhetor* but never a *strategos*. So *strategos* was probably juxtaposed with *rhetor* in the paraphrase because the two words appeared together in the law. If the requirement for *rhetores* had been mentioned in one part of the law code and the requirement for *strategoí* in another, Deinarchos’ paraphrase is inexplicable. Admittedly, he refers to *τοὺς νόμους* and not *τὸν νόμον*, but it is well known that the orators made no distinction here between singular and plural, often using them indiscriminately in references to one law, sometimes running for a few lines only: cf. e.g. Dem. 24.20 and 24, 41–43, 105 and 114; 43.50–51. The requirement to own land and to have legitimate children is also mentioned in the spurious Draconian constitution as binding on *strategoí* and *hipparchoi* (Arist. *Ath. Pol.* 4.2) and in the much-disputed decree of Themistocles as binding on trierarchs (Meiggs/Lewis 23.20–22). So the paraphrase by Deinarchos is the only reliable source we have for the requirement.

¹⁶ Aeschin. 3.55 ὁ αὐτὸς οὗτος *ρήτωρ* ἔγραψε τὸν πόλεμον. Cf. Lys. 13.72; Dem. 3.22; 18.219; 22.70; 23.201; 59.43, 105; Aeschin. 1.188; 3.16, 31, 203–04.

¹⁷ Lys. 22.2 ἐπειδὴ γὰρ οἱ *πρυτάνεις* ἀπέδοσαν εἰς τὴν *βουλήν* περὶ αὐτῶν, οὕτως ἀργίσθησαν αὐτοῖς, ὥστε ἐλεγόν τινες τῶν *ρήτόρων* ὡς ἀκρίτους αὐτοὺς χρῆ τοῖς ἔνδεκα παραδοῦναι θανάτῳ ζημῶσαι.

¹⁸ Dem. 24.142 οἱ δὲ παρ’ ἡμῖν *ρήτορες* . . . πρῶτον μὲν ὅσοι μῆνες μικροῦ δέουσι νομοθετεῖν τὰ αὐτοῖς συμφέροντα . . . , cf. 123–24.

¹⁹ Din. 1.100 τί γὰρ ἐστὶ *ρήτορος* δημοτικοῦ καὶ μισοῦντος τοὺς κατὰ τῆς πόλεως λέγοντας καὶ γράφοντας; . . . οὐ κρίνειν ἀλλήλους; οὐκ εἰσαγγέλλειν; οὐ γράφεσθαι *παρανόμων*; Dem. 58.62, 59.43; Aeschin. 1.34; Lycurg. 1.31; Isoc. 8.129.

²⁰ Aeschin. 2.74 ἀνιστάμενοι δὲ οἱ συντεταγμένοι *ρήτορες*, περὶ μὲν τῆς σωτηρίας τῆς πόλεως οὐδ’ ἐνεχείρουν λέγειν . . . ; Lys. 12.72; Dem. 12.14; 18.170; 19.23; *Prooem.* 53.1; *Ep.* 2.10; Aeschin. 1.28, 30, 186; 2.161; 3.2, 4; Hyp. 3.1, 4, 8, 9, 29; Isoc. 14.4; 15.138.

²¹ Lys. 30.22 ἡ *βουλή* ἢ <αἰ> *βουλευούσα* . . . ἀναγκάζεται . . . τῶν *ρήτόρων* τοῖς <τὰ> *πονηρότατα* λέγουσι πείθεσθαι; Dem. 22.37, 24.147, 51.2.

or opposing a *psephisma* moved by another *rhetor*) or a *synegoros* addressing the court (either for the prosecution or for the defence).²² Moreover, in opposition to the modern terms 'politician' or 'political leader', *rhetor* was a legal technical term occurring not only in the law on *ρήτορες καὶ στρατηγοί* quoted above but also in several others explicitly aimed at *rhetoires*:

(a) Most important is the law regulating the *dokimasia* of *rhetoires*, quoted by Aischines (1.28–32): δοκιμασία, φησί, [ὁ νομοθέτης] ρητόρων· εἴαν τις λέγη ἐν τῷ δήμῳ τὸν πατέρα τύπτων ἢ τὴν μητέρα, ἢ μὴ τρέφων, ἢ μὴ παρέχων οἴκησιν . . . ἢ τὰς στρατείας . . . μὴ ἐστρατευμένος, ὅσαι ἂν αὐτῷ προσταχθῶσιν, ἢ τὴν ἀσπίδα ἀποβεβληκῶς . . . ἢ πεπορνευμένος . . . ἢ ἡταιρηκῶς . . . ἢ τὰ πατρῶα . . . κατεδηδοκῶς, ἢ ὧν ἂν κληρονόμος γένηται, . . . δοκιμασίαν . . . μὲν ἐπαγγειλάτω Ἀθηναίων ὁ βουλόμενος οἷς ἕξεστιν.²³

(b) Next comes ὁ εἰσαγγελτικὸς νόμος, quoted by Hypereides (3.7–8): an εἰσαγγελία has to take place εἴαν τις . . . ρήτωρ ὧν μὴ λέγη τὰ ἄριστα τῷ δήμῳ τῷ Ἀθηναίων χρήματα λαμβάνων.

(c) Third, we have two important lexicographical notes referring to a *ρητορικὴ γραφή*. The first is in Harpokration: *ρητορικὴ γραφή*· Ἰσαῖος ἐν τῷ πρὸς Εὐκλείδην. ἔοικε *ρητορικὴ γραφή* καλεῖσθαι ἢ κατὰ *ρήτορος* γράψαντός τι ἢ εἰπόντος ἢ πράξαντος παράνομον, ὥσπερ λέγεται καὶ *πρυτανικὴ* ἢ κατὰ *πρυτάνεως* καὶ *ἐπιστατικὴ* ἢ κατ' *ἐπιστάτου*. The second note comes from the *Lexicon Rhetoricum Cantabrigiense*: *ρητορικὴ*· Ἰσαῖος ἐν τῷ πρὸς Εὐκλείδην περὶ χωρίου. τὰς γνώμας ἅς εἰσῆγον εἰς τὸ δικαστήριον μετὰ ψηφίσματος. καὶ Ὑπερείδης ἐν τῷ κατὰ *Αὐτοκλέους* προδοσίας, '*ρητορικῆς* ἐκ δήμου'. ἔστι γὰρ καὶ ἐκ βουλῆς, οἷον εἰ τὰ αὐτὰ ἔδοξε τῷ δήμῳ καὶ τῇ βουλῇ. Harpokration, quoting Isaeus, obviously refers to the law regulating the *graphe paranomon*, and so does the *Lex. Cant.*, in which I follow Sauppe in emending *γνώμας* to *γραφάς*. And I take the obscure phrase *μετὰ ψηφίσματος* to be a reflection of the fact that, in a *graphe paranomon*, the *psephisma* was quoted *verbatim* in the indictment (*cf.* Aeschin. 3.199–200).

(d) Finally, Aischines (1.34–35) quotes τούτους νόμους τούτους περὶ τῆς εὐκοσμίας κειμένους τῶν ρητόρων. The document inserted in the speech may be spurious,²⁴ but Aischines' reference to the law indicates that the word *rhetor* was used.

In (a) and (b) *rhetor* denotes any citizen who addresses the *ecclesia* and so, *a fortiori*, any citizen who moves a decree (*cf. infra*). In (c)

²² Lycurg. 1.43 τίς ἂν ἢ δικαστὴς φιλόπολις καὶ εὐσεβεῖν βουλόμενος ψήφῳ ἀπολύσειεν, ἢ ρήτωρ κληθεὶς τῷ προδότῃ τῆς πόλεως βοηθήσει; Isae. 1.7; Dem. 20.74, 21.190, 48.36; Din. 1.112; Lycurg. 1.43. (In notes 16–22 I have confined myself to references to the orators. References to other sources and more references to the orators can be found in Hansen [*supra* n.8] 369.)

²³ *Cf.* further Aeschin. 1.186, Lys. fr.86–88, Lycurg. fr.18 Conomis.

²⁴ *Cf.* E. Drerup, "Über die bei den attischen Rednern eingelegten Urkunden," *NJbb* Suppl. 24 (1898) 307–08.

the defendant in a *graphe paranomon* is *per definitionem* a *rhetor* moving a *psephisma*,²⁵ and that is undoubtedly the reason why the *graphe paranomon* was also called a *ρήτορικὴ γραφή*. It is worth noting that the reference in the preserved laws is primarily to the *rhetores* in the *ecclesia*, and not to *rhetores* addressing the *boule*, the *nomothetai*, or the *dicasteria*. In the third law, however, the implication is that *rhetores* comprise speakers in the *boule*, since a *graphe paranomon* could be brought not only against decrees of the people, but also against decrees of the *boule*.²⁶ So I have little doubt that, if more laws were preserved, we would also have evidence of *rhetor* as a legal term denoting a speaker addressing one of the other bodies of government.

If we turn from laws to decrees, a first impression is that we have disappointingly little evidence of *ρήτωρ* as the official designation of the citizen who addresses the *ecclesia* or the *boule*. The one example I can cite is an entrenchment clause in the Brea decree of *ca* 445: ἐ]ὰν δέ τις ἐπιφσεφίξει παρὰ τὲ[ν στέλεν ἔ ρρέ]τορ ἀγορεύει . . . [ἄτιμον] εἶναι . . . (IG I³ 46.24ff). But it is idiomatic in Attic decrees to use verbs rather than nouns. ἐγραμμάτευε, ἐπρυτάνευε, ἐπεστάτει are obvious examples. Now the verb corresponding to *ρήτωρ* is λέγειν/εἰπεῖν/ρήθηναί. The obligatory reference, in the preamble, to the proposer of a decree is ὁ δεῖνα εἶπε, where, in my opinion, the aorist εἶπε is the verbal equivalent of the noun *ρήτωρ*. The present tense λέγειν is also used about a *ρήτωρ*, for example in IG II² 223A.4 κρίσιν ποιῆσαι τῶν λεγόντων ἐν τῇ βουλήι.

So the *rhetores* formed an integral and constitutionally recognized part of the Athenian democracy. Admittedly, a *rhetor* was neither elected nor selected by lot, but was volunteering: but he was officially invited to do so. All decisions were made by the large political bodies—the *ecclesia* (assisted by the *boule*), the *nomothetai*, and the *dicasteria*. But all initiatives were left to ὁ βουλόμενος Ἀθηναίων οἷς ἔξεστιν.²⁷ A *rhetor* was a citizen who took it upon himself to address the *ecclesia*, the *boule*, the *nomothetai*, or the *dicasteria*, and consequently to perform the rôle of ὁ βουλόμενος. Like being an ἐκκλησιασστής or a νομοθέτης or a δικαστής, to be a *ρήτωρ* was essentially a one-day business. A citizen was *rhetor* insofar as he mounted the *bema* and addressed his fellow citizens and insofar as he was responsible for the speech he made. Beyond that he was, constitutionally

²⁵ Arist. *Pol.* 1255a8 *ρήτορα γράφονται παρανόμων*.

²⁶ Dem. 47.34 *γενομένου τοίνυν τοῦ ψηφίσματος τούτου ἐν τῇ βουλήι, καὶ οὐδενὸς γραφομένου παρανόμων, ἀλλὰ κυρίου ὄντος . . .*

²⁷ The rôle of ὁ βουλόμενος is discussed and the sources are collected in Hansen (*supra* n.8) 359–60.

speaking, no longer a *rhetor* when he had descended from the *bema*. In recognition of his official position he, like the *archai*, had to wear a crown while addressing the assembly.²⁸ Admittedly, he was subjected neither to an initial *dokimasia* nor to *euthynai* in consequence of his speech. But he was certainly not irresponsible, as maintained by some historians.²⁹ On the contrary, the Athenians had forged much more dangerous weapons against the *rhetores* than against *archai* or *presbeis*. Apart from the *δοκιμασία ῥητόρων*, which was rarely used, the Athenians had created a whole series of public actions directly and often exclusively applying to *rhetores*. As a proposer of a *psephisma* (of the *demos* or of the *boule*), a *rhetor* was liable to be prosecuted by a *γραφὴ παρανόμων*. As the proposer of a *nomos* he might be put on trial by a *γραφὴ νόμον μὴ ἐπιτήδειον θεῖναι*. As a prosecutor in a public action he risked a fine of 1000 drachmas plus partial *atimia* if he withdrew his action before the hearing or if he obtained less than 1/5 of the votes of the jurors.³⁰ It was less dangerous to support or oppose a proposal made by another citizen, but a *rhetor* who made a profit from addressing his fellow citizens could be indicted by an *εἰσαγγελία εἰς τὸν δῆμον* or a *προβολή* or a *γραφὴ* to the *thesmothetai*.³¹ We know of more than one hundred applications of these public actions against the relatively small group of *rhetores*, whereas the sources provide us with only some ten examples of the *euthynai* resulting in a public action, although every year some 1200 Athenian *archai*, in addition to an unknown number of *presbeis*, had to submit to *euthynai*.³²

²⁸ Ar. *Eccl.* 131, *Eq.* 1227, *Av.* 463.

²⁹ E.g. C. Hignett, *A History of the Athenian Constitution* (Oxford 1952) 263. For further references see Roberts (*supra* n.1) 355–56.

³⁰ For the *graphe paranomon* and the *graphe nomon me epitedeion theinai* cf. Hansen (*supra* n.1: 1974); for the fine of 1000 drachmas and partial *atimia*, Hansen (1975) 29–30.

³¹ *Eisangelia*, Hyp. 3.7–8; *probolē*, Arist. *Ath. Pol.* 43.5; *graphe* to the *thesmothetai*, Dem. 46.26.

³² Known applications of *euthynai* are: Kallias in 449 (Dem. 19.273); Phormion in 428 (schol. Ar. *Pax* 347); Paches in 427 (Plut. *Nic.* 6); Polystratos in 410 (Lys. 20); Eratosthenes in 403 (Lys. 12); Epikrates in 394–392 (Lys. 27.1); Pamphilos in 388 (Xen. *Hell.* 5.1.2; schol. Ar. *Plut.* 174; Dem. 40.20, 22); Melanopos before 361 (Arist. *Rh.* 1374b 25f); Melanopos before 353 (Dem. 24.127); Timarchos in 348 (Aeschin. 1.113); Theodoros in 347 (Din. fr. xxx Conomis); Aischines in 343 (Dem. 19, Aeschin. 2); Lykourgos in 336–324 (Din. fr. viii); Demosthenes ca 330 (Plut. *Mor.* 845F); Hermias ca 325 (Din. fr. xlii). In several cases we have no precise information about the type of action applied, and some of the trials listed above may not be *euthynai*, but e.g. an application of a *graphe klopes*. Roberts (*supra* n.1) argues that the politicians were responsible *qua* being *archai* and accordingly subjected to *euthynai*. She is right in stressing the responsibility of the political leaders, but she overrates the *euthynai* and does not discuss the far more important types of public action aimed directly at *rhetores* and *stratego*.

III

Thus far I have concentrated on the constitutional aspect of the term *rhetor*. By law, any citizen is a *rhetor* in so far as he acts as *ho boulomenos* and addresses the *ecclesia*, the *boule*, the *nomothetai*, or the *dicasteria*. Since democracy in principle involved the participation of all citizens, the inference is that, in an ideal democracy, all *rhetores* combined would constitute the entire *demos*. But in Athens citizenship did not entail an obligation to act as *ho boulomenos* and to become a *rhetor*.³³ There was a considerable gap between the ideal and the real democracy, and according to their political participation, Athenian citizens may be divided into four groups:

(a) Citizens who never attended the *ecclesia* and never joined the panel of 6000 jurors (from which *nomothetai* and *dicastai* were appointed) and never presented themselves as candidates at the annual sortition of *bouleutai* and other *archai*. They are the passive citizens censured by Perikles in the funeral speech (Thuc. 2.40.2), but praised by Plato, if they are philosophers: λέγωμεν δὴ . . . περὶ τῶν κορυφαίων (τί γὰρ ἄν τις τοὺς γε φαύλως διατρίβοντας ἐν φιλοσοφίᾳ λέγοι;) οὗτοι δὲ που ἐκ νέων πρῶτον μὲν εἰς ἀγορὰν οὐκ ἴσασι τῆν ὁδόν, οὐδὲ ὅπου δικαστήριον ἢ βουλευτήριον ἢ τι κοινὸν ἄλλο τῆς πόλεως συνέδριον. νόμους δὲ καὶ ψηφίσματα λεγόμενα ἢ γεγραμμένα οὔτε ὀρώσιν οὔτε ἀκούουσι· σπουδαὶ δὲ ἑταιριῶν ἐπ' ἀρχὰς καὶ σύνοδοι καὶ δείπνα καὶ σὺν ἀνλητρίσι κῶμοι, οὐδὲ ὄναρ πράττειν προσίσταται αὐτοῖς.³⁴ It is surprising, however, even in the forensic speeches to find prosecutors and defendants who almost take a pride in telling the jurors that they have never (before) visited the *agora* and never been to the *bouleuterion* or the *dicasteria*:

Pl. *Ap.* 17D: νῦν ἐγὼ πρῶτον ἐπὶ δικαστήριον ἀναβέβηκα, ἔτη γεγωνῶς ἐβδομήκοντα· ἀτεχνῶς οὖν ξένως ἔχω τῆς ἐνθάδε λέξεως.

Lys. 19.55: περὶ δ' ἑμαντοῦ βραχέα βούλομαι ὑμῖν εἰπεῖν. ἐγὼ γὰρ ἔτη γεγωνῶς ἤδη τριάκοντα οὔτε τῷ πατρὶ οὐδὲν πώποτε ἀντεῖπον, οὔτε τῶν πολιτῶν οὐδεῖς μοι ἐνεκάλεσεν, ἐγγύς τε οἰκῶν τῆς ἀγορᾶς οὔτε πρὸς δικαστηρίῳ οὔτε πρὸς βουλευτηρίῳ ὤφθην οὐδεπώποτε, πρὶν ταύτην τὴν συμφορὰν γενέσθαι.

Is. 1.1: καὶ τότε μὲν οὕτως ὑπ' αὐτοῦ σωφρόνως ἐπαιδευόμεθα, ὥστ' οὐδὲ ἀκροασόμενοι οὐδέποτε ἦλθομεν ἐπὶ δικαστήριον, νῦν δὲ ἀγωνιούμενοι περὶ πάντων ἤκομεν τῶν ὑπαρχόντων.

³³ Dem. 19.99 οὐδένα γὰρ τὰ κοινὰ πράττειν ὑμεῖς κελεύετε οὐδ' ἀναγκάζετε· ἀλλ' ἐπειδὴν τις ἑαυτὸν πείσας δύνασθαι προσέλθῃ, . . . εὐνοϊκῶς δέχεσθε καὶ οὐ φθονερώς, ἀλλὰ καὶ χειροτονεῖτε καὶ τὰ ὑμέτερον αὐτῶν ἐγχειρίζετε.

³⁴ *Thi.* 176C–D; cf. *Ap.* 17D, 32A.

Isoc. 15.38: ἐμὲ δ' οὐδεὶς πάποθ' ἑώρακεν οὔτ' ἐν τοῖς συνεδρίοις οὔτε περὶ τὰς ἀνακρίσεις οὔτ' ἐπὶ τοῖς δικαστηρίοις οὔτε πρὸς τοῖς διαιτηταῖς, ἀλλ' οὕτως ἀπέχομαι τούτων ἀπάντων ὡς οὐδεὶς ἄλλος τῶν πολιτῶν.

In a court, to admit frankly to political inactivity would, in my opinion, amount to an insult of the jurors who were performing their civic duties. On the contrary, the topos is found in passages where the intended effect is *captatio benevolentiae*.³⁵ It is of no consequence whether or not the speaker is telling the truth. The citizen who professes his passivity to the active citizens is a topos which shows that to be an *apragmon* was certainly a respectable attitude even among active Athenian citizens.³⁶ It is only natural that we have no similar evidence for the citizens who never or hardly ever visited the *ecclesia*. A passive citizen could be forced to go to court either as a defendant or as a plaintiff, and then the topos is appropriate. But no citizen could be forced to go to the *ecclesia*, and logographers hardly ever wrote symbolleutic speeches. Therefore we do not have and probably shall never find an orator stating, "Regularly I never attend the *ecclesia*, but in this case . . ." So we must look for other types of evidence. Plato's description of the passive citizen (quoted *supra*) includes the *ecclesia* (*psephismata*), but Plato is not a good source for the ideology of the Athenian democratic citizens. A much better source is Euripides, who in *Orestes* 917ff describes the honest farmer whose trustworthiness is only increased by the fact that he hardly ever comes to the city and attends the assembly. The setting is Argos, but the audience was Athenian and the play probably reflects a view accepted by many Athenian democrats. The ideology must of course be connected with the fact that the assembly-place on the Pnyx could accommodate only a fraction of the adult male population.

(b) Citizens who attended the *ecclesia*, who served as *bouleutai*, and who manned the panel of 6000 jurors, but who restricted themselves to listening and voting without ever addressing the assemblies. There is ample evidence that this was a very common type of citizen. Commenting on the 'Solonian' *dokimasia* of male prostitutes, Demosthenes imputes to Solon the following reason for restricting the

³⁵ In all four cases the speaker's purpose is of course to persuade the jurors that he is not a sycophant. For this purpose, however, it would have been sufficient to deny any prior appearance in court as a prosecutor or defendant. All four speakers take the further step of denying any involvement in the administration of justice. The clients of Lysias and Isaeus are probably too young to have served as jurors; so they emphasize that they have never *listened* to a trial in a *dicasterion*. The two old men, Socrates and Isocrates, emphasize that they have never even been jurors. So in all four cases the alleged total ignorance of the lawcourts is intended as an argument in favour of the speaker.

³⁶ Cf. A. W. Gomme, *A Historical Commentary on Thucydides* II (Oxford 1956) 121–22.

law to those who make proposals or address the *ecclesia* (22.30): *πολλαχόθεν μὲν οὖν ἄν τις ἴδοι τοῦτο, οὐχ ἥκιστα δ' ἐκ τούτου τοῦ νόμου, μήτε λέγειν μήτε γράφειν ἐξεῖναι τοῖς ἡταιρηκόσιν. ἑώρα γὰρ ἐκεῖνο, ὅτι τοῖς πολλοῖς ὑμῶν ἐξὸν λέγειν οὐ λέγετε.* A few sections later (36) he makes a similar statement about the councillors: *τῷ γάρ [sc. τῶν βουλευτῶν] ἔστιν ὄνειδος, εἰ σιωπῶντος αὐτοῦ καὶ μηδὲν γράφοντος, ἴσως δ' οὐδὲ τὰ πόλλ' εἰς τὸ βουλευτήριον εἰσιόντος, μὴ λάβοι ἢ βουλή τὸν στέφανον;* And Aischines has the following statement to make about the ordinary juror (3.233): *ἔπειτ' ἔξεισιν ἐκ τοῦ δικαστηρίου ὁ τοιοῦτος κριτῆς ἑαυτὸν μὲν ἀσθενῆ πεποιηκώς, ἰσχυρὸν δὲ τὸν ῥήτορα. ἀνὴρ γὰρ ἰδιώτης ἐν πόλει δημοκρατουμένη νόμῳ καὶ ψήφῳ βασιλεύει· ὅταν δ' ἑτέρῳ ταῦτα παραδῶ, καταλέλυκε τὴν αὐτὸς αὐτοῦ δυναστείαν.* Aischines' portrait of the ordinary juror is confirmed by the preserved dicastic *pinakia*. In *Athenian Bronze Allotment Plates* (1972) John Kroll collected 82 dicastic *pinakia* of the fourth century with 161 attested uses. The names of 65 citizens are either preserved or can be restored. But not a single one of these 65 citizens is known as a *rhetor*, a *strategos*, or an ambassador.

(c) Citizens who conform to the democratic ideal. They took it upon themselves occasionally to act as *ho boulomenos*, but they avoided any regular or 'professional' involvement in politics. They were emphatic in stating that they were *idiotai*, and they did not like to be grouped with those *rhetoires* who took the platform incessantly. This type of citizen is regularly praised by the orators, as can be seen from the following four quotations, one referring to each of the four major assemblies—the *ecclesia*, the *boule*, the *nomothetai*, and the *dicasteria*:

Aeschin. 3.220: *ἐν μὲν γὰρ ταῖς ὀλιγαρχίαις οὐχ ὁ βουλόμενος, ἀλλ' ὁ δυναστεύων δημηγορεῖ, ἐν δὲ ταῖς δημοκρατίαις ὁ βουλόμενος καὶ ὅταν αὐτῷ δοκῆ. καὶ τὸ μὲν διὰ χρόνου λέγειν σημεῖόν ἐστιν ἐπὶ τῶν καιρῶν καὶ τοῦ συμφέροντος ἀνδρὸς πολιτευομένου, τὸ δὲ μηδεμίαν παραλείπειν ἡμέραν ἐργαζομένου καὶ μισθαρνοῦντος.*

Dem. 22.37: *εἰ μὲν ἀπογνώσεσθε, ἐπὶ τοῖς λέγουσι τὸ βουλευτήριον ἔσται, ἐὰν δὲ καταγνώτε, ἐπὶ τοῖς ἰδιώταις· ἐορακότες γὰρ οἱ πολλοὶ διὰ τὴν τῶν λεγόντων πονηρίαν τήνδ' ἀφηρημένην τὴν βουλήν τὸν στέφανον, οὐχὶ προήσονται τούτοις τὰς πράξεις, ἀλλὰ τὰ βέλτιστ' ἐροῦσιν αὐτοί. εἰ δὲ γενήσεται τοῦτο καὶ τῶν ἡθάρων καὶ συνεστηκῶτων ῥητόρων ἀπαλλαγῆσεσθε, ὄψεσθ', ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, πάνθ' ἃ προσήκει γιγνόμενα.*

Dem. 24.66: *οὔτε γὰρ ὡς οὐκ ἐναντίος ἔσθ' ὁ νόμος τοῖς ἄλλοις δεικνύειν ἔξει, οὔθ' ὡς δι' ἀπειρίαν ἰδιώτην αὐτὸν ὄντα τοῦτ' ἔλαθεν δύναται' ἄν πείσαι· πάλαι γὰρ μισθοῦ καὶ γράφων καὶ νόμους εἰσφέρων ὤπται.*

Dem. 23.4: *ἐπειδὴ γάρ, οὐχὶ τῶν ἐνοχλούντων ὑμᾶς οὐδὲ τῶν πολιτευομένων καὶ πιστευομένων παρ' ὑμῖν ὄν, πράγμα τηλικούτον φημι δείξειν πεπραγμένον, ἐάν, ὅσον ἐστὶν ἐν ὑμῖν, συναγωνίσησθέ μοι καὶ προθύμως*

ἀκούσητε, τοῦτό τε σώσετε καὶ ποιήσετε μὴ κατοκνεῖν, ἔάν τις τι καὶ ἡμῶν οἴεται δύνασθαι ποιῆσαι τὴν πόλιν ἀγαθόν. οἰήσεται δέ, ἂν μὴ χαλεπὸν εἶναι νομίζῃ τὸ παρ' ὑμῖν λόγου τυχεῖν. νῦν δὲ πολλοῖς τοῦτο φοβουμένοις, λέγειν μὲν ἴσως οὐ δεινοῖς, βελτίοσι δ' ἀνθρωποῖς τῶν δεινῶν, οὐδὲ σκοπεῖν ἐπέρχεται τῶν κοινῶν οὐδέν.

It is worth noting that *idiotes*, in these and similar passages, does not denote the passive citizen, but the active ordinary citizen in a true democracy. This almost technical use of the word is to be found not only in the speeches but also in inscriptions.³⁷

(d) Finally, the orators refer with the greatest frequency to a small group of citizens who regularly addressed the *ecclesia*, proposed laws and decrees, and frequented the courts as prosecutors or *synegoroi*. *Rhetor* is by far the most common designation attested for this group of citizens, but we also find them called *πολιτευόμενοι*,³⁸ sometimes *σύμβουλοι*,³⁹ occasionally *δημαγωγοί* (in a neutral sense),⁴⁰ and only

³⁷ Apart from the passages just quoted, *idiotes* is applied to a proposer of a decree (Aeschin. 3.214) and of a *nomos* (Dem. 23.62, Andoc. 1.83), to a speaker in the *ecclesia* (Dem. *Prooem.* 13, Hyp. 3.13), and to a prosecutor in a public action (Dem. 53.2, Lys. 5.3). Furthermore, *idiotai* are sometimes appointed *presbeis* (IG II² 16.19, 204.82) or *archai* (Dem. 24.112, Hyp. 1.25). So, in a political context, *idiotes* has a whole range of denotations: (a) a citizen who avoids all involvement in the affairs of the city (Aeschin. 3.252), (b) a citizen who, as a listener, attends a public meeting (Ant. 6.24, Dem. 19.17, Aeschin. 3.125), (c) a citizen who is a voting member of one of the political assemblies (Aeschin. 3.233), (d) a citizen who occasionally acts as *ho boulomenos*, cf. the references *supra* 45f.

³⁸ *Politeuomenos* is a common term but vaguer than *rhetor*. In its broader sense it means 'one who acts as a citizen' and may refer to any politically active citizen or to the entire body of citizens (*supra* n.7). Most occurrences, however, indicate the meaning 'political leader', regularly without reference to any specific form of political initiative (Lys. 25.27; Dem. 3.29–31; 8.68; 10.46, 70; 13.35; 15.33; 17.23; 19.12, 285; 22.52; 23.209; 24.155, 164, 192–93; 26.1–6, 18; 39.3; 52.28; 58.23; *Prooem.* 12.2; *Ep.* 2.9; 3.15, 27, 33, 45; Aeschin. 3.8, 235–36; Din. 1.96; 2.15; Isoc. 7.55; 15.132). If *politeuomenos* is connected with a body of government, it denotes in most cases a proposer or speaker in the *ecclesia* (Dem. 8.32–33; 18.173, 301; 20.132; Aeschin. 1.195; 2.64; Isoc. 15.231) and only rarely a citizen addressing the *boule* (Dem. 22.36), the *nomothetai* (Dem. 20.91), or the *dicasteria* (Dem. 23.4, 24.157). *Politeuomenos* is sometimes juxtaposed with *rhetor* (Dem. 13.20; 18.94, 278; Isoc. 15.231) and once with *strategos* (Dem. 24.135). These references are fairly exhaustive but not complete. I have concentrated on the participle, although other forms of the verb have the same uses.

³⁹ As one would expect from the rhetorical term *συμβουλευτικός λόγος*, *symbolos* is used exclusively about proposers and speakers in the *ecclesia*: Dem. 18.66 *τί τὸν σύμβουλον ἔδει λέγειν ἢ γράφειν τὸν Ἀθήνησιν . . . ὃς συνήδειν μὲν ἐκ παντὸς τοῦ χρόνου μέχρι τῆς ἡμέρας ἀφ' ἧς αὐτὸς ἐπὶ τὸ βῆμ' ἀνέβην*; Aeschin. 1.120 *ὁ τοῦ δήμου σύμβουλος* (cf. Dem. 1.16; 7.1; 18.66, 94, 189; 22.77; 58.62; Aeschin. 1.26; Hyp. 1.28; Din. 1.38–40; etc.). *Symbolos* and *rhetor* are juxtaposed in Dem. 18.94, 212; 58.62; Din. 1.38–40. *Symboloi* and *stratego*i are juxtaposed in Din. 1.76. The verb *συμβουλεύειν* has the same meaning (e.g. Dem. 9.3–4) but may occasionally be applied to somebody who advises a *dicasterion* (Dem. 20.167).

⁴⁰ *Demagogos* means 'leader of the people' sometimes in a positive sense (Lys. 27.10; Aeschin. 3.78, 226; Hyp. 1.16; Din. 1.31, 53), sometimes in a neutral sense (Dem.

one time *πολιτικοί*.⁴¹ By contrast with *rhetor*, neither *politeuomenos* nor *symbolos* nor *demagogos* is used in documents as a technical term. Furthermore, an examination of all occurrences of the word *rhetor* in the orators shows that, in most cases, it denotes specifically the citizen who *habitually* took political initiatives.⁴² And when *ῥήτορες καὶ στρατηγοί* are juxtaposed, the reference is invariably to this smaller group of ‘political leaders’, to the exclusion of active citizens who only at intervals acted as *hoi boulomenoi*. Apart from all the general references, the term *rhetor* is applied to the following fourth-century ‘political leaders’:⁴³

- Aischines (Dem. 18.130, 308, 318; 19.23)
- Androtion (Dem. 22.37, 70)
- Aristogeiton (Dem. 25.62)
- Aristophon (Dem. 18.219, Hyp. 3.28)
- Autokles (Hyp. fr.97 Jensen)
- Demades (Din. 1.100-01)
- Demosthenes (Dem. 18.94, 212, 246, 319; 21.189; 25.38; 32.31; *Ep.* 2.10; Aeschin. 3.55, 73, 148; Din. 1.86, 100-02; Hyp. 1.12, 21)
- Diopetithes of Sphettos (Hyp. 3.29)

26.4, Aeschin. 3.134, Hyp. 1.22, Din. 1.99), and only twice in a pejorative sense (Lys. 25.9, Din. 1.10, *cf.* *δημαγωγέιν* in Dem. 8.34). In most cases there is no reference to a specific body of government; if any, then to the *ecclesia* (Din. 1.31). *Demagogoi* and *strategoí* are juxtaposed in Hyp. 1.22. *Demagogos* occurs in Andoc. 4.27, which is however a late composition. *Cf.* furthermore Pytheas fr.4 (Baier/Sauppe 311).

⁴¹ The only occurrence of *politikos* is Aeschin. 2.184 (*cf. supra* 36), and the orators never use the word *demegoros*, which may occur in other texts (*e.g.* Xen. *Mem.* 2.6.15; *Hell.* 6.2.39, 6.3.3).

⁴² *Cf. supra* 39f with nn.16–22. In the orators the word *rhetor* is used in its legal sense in references to *nomoi* (Aeschin. 1.28, 34, 186; 3.2; Din. 1.71; Lycurg. fr.18 Conomis; Hyp. 3.1, 4, 8). In some cases it applies to a proposer of a specific decree (Lys. 13.72; Dem. 22.70; 59.105; Aeschin. 3.31, 203), and once it is used about a citizen who at intervals addresses the *ecclesia* (Dem. 18.308). In all other cases the reference is to the *rhetores* in the political sense.

⁴³ Some historians suggest a different grouping of the politically active citizens, distinguishing between (a) citizens who attend the meetings, (b) minor politicians, and (c) the true political leaders, *cf.* Jones (*supra* n.1) 128–33 and Perlman (*supra* n.1) 328–30. Jones gives the following description of (b): “There was throughout Athenian history a class of semi-professional politicians, at first consisting of the gentry, later partly of the gentry and partly of poor men of rhetorical talent. These were the people who held the elective offices, were chosen as envoys to foreign states, proposed motions in the council and in the assembly, and prosecuted (and defended) in political trials” (130). There was indeed some kind of ‘hierarchy’ within the group of *rhetores* (*cf. e.g.* Dem. 2.29, Hyp. 1.12), but Jones’ description of the minor politician fits Demosthenes, Demades, and Lykourgos better than Aristogeiton or Theokrines, and the distinction between major and minor politicians tends to obliterate the distinction between groups (c) and (d) above, which is, however, well attested in the sources. Consequently I will in this paper treat the group of *rhetores* as a whole and reserve a discussion of the hierarchy within the group for a future study.

Kallistratos (Dem. 18.219, Hyp. 3.1)
 Kephalos (Dem. 18.219, Din. 1.38)
 Ktesiphon (Aeschin. 3.31, 203–04)
 Lykourgos (Lyc. 1.31)
 Philokrates (Hyp. 3.29)
 Philostratos (Dem. 42.21)
 Polyeuktos of Sphettos (Din. 1.100)
 Stephanos (Dem. 59.43)
 Theokrines (Dem. 58.62ff)
 Thrasymboulos (of Kollytos?) (Dem. 18.219)
 Timarchos (Aeschin. 1.112, 188)
 Timokrates (Dem. 24.124)

Summing up: in the Athenian democracy of the fourth century, we are faced with two different uses of the important political term *rhetor*. As a legal term it occurs in *nomoi* and signifies any citizen who addresses his fellow citizens in the assemblies—groups (c) and (d) above. But in the speeches *rhetor* is almost invariably used as a political term in the much narrower sense of a citizen who addresses his fellow-citizens habitually, sometimes even professionally—group (d) above to the exclusion of (c)—and the citizen who only once or at intervals performs the part of *ho boulomenos* is described as an *idiotes*, to be distinguished from the *rhetores* proper.

The clash between these two uses of the term *rhetor* is best illustrated by Hypereides in the speech *For Euxenippos*, who had been elected by the people to sleep in the Amphiaraion and then to tell in the following *ecclesia* what the god had revealed to him. He performed his task; but when he had reported his dream to the people in the *ecclesia*, Polyeuktos (of Kydantidai?) suspected foul play and indicted Euxenippos by an *εἰσαγγελία εἰς τὸν δῆμον*, based on the third section of the *eisangelic* law: *εἰάν τις ῥήτωρ ὢν μὴ λέγῃ τὰ ἄριστα τῷ δήμῳ τῷ Ἀθηναίων χρήματα λαμβάνων*.⁴⁴ Euxenippos was defended by Hypereides, and one of the basic arguments put forward by the defence is that Euxenippos is not a *rhetor* but a private citizen (*idiotes*), and so he is not liable to be prosecuted by an *eisangelia* which is reserved for *rhetores*, *i.e.* citizens who regularly take a political initiative (Hyp. 3.3, 9, 11, 27–30). In his *graphe paranomon* against Ktesiphon, Aischines anticipates that his opponent will rely on precisely the same line of defence: Ktesiphon has admittedly proposed and carried the *psephisma*, but he is an *idiotes* and not a *rhetor* (Aeschin. 3.214). Now apart from the *eisangelia*, Euxenippos cannot be connected with

⁴⁴ Cf. Hansen (*supra* n.1: 1975) Catalogue no. 124.

any other political activity, but since he has addressed the *ecclesia*, he must have been a *rhetor* in the legal sense. The two different uses of *rhetor* in Athens illustrate a common phenomenon in societies of all periods: a gap between the constitution and how it works.

IV

I have argued that *rhetoires* and *strategoï* are regularly grouped together when the reference is to 'political leaders' in general. Having discussed the *rhetoires*, I turn to the distinction between *rhetoires* and *strategoï*. It is well known that in the fifth century the two different tasks of being a *rhetor* and a *strategos* were regularly performed by the same men, whereas in the fourth the two functions tended to become more and more separated.⁴⁵ In the *Ath. Pol.* 28.2–3 Aristotle enumerates thirteen Athenian *προστάται* after Kleisthenes down to the end of the Peloponnesian War. Eleven were *strategoï*, the twelfth may have been a *strategos*; only the thirteenth, Kallikrates of Paiania, was certainly a *prostates* without being a *strategos*.⁴⁶ After the restoration of the democracy, however, a sharp division developed, so that policy-making was left to a group of *rhetoires* who were no longer elected *strategoï*, whereas the wars were conducted by a group of professional *strategoï* who tended to keep away from the *bema* on the Pnyx. Of the 77 known *strategoï* of the period 403–322, only 11 or 12 are recorded as proposers of decrees or speakers in the *ecclesia*. In the first half of the fourth century at least some political leaders were still elected *strategoï*, but after the Social War, Phokion was the only man of any importance to combine the *strategia* with addressing the *ecclesia*.⁴⁷

⁴⁵ Cf. Jones (*supra* n.1) 128, Perlman (*supra* n.1) 347; C. Mossé, *La fin de la démocratie athénienne* (Paris 1962) 269–73; J. K. Davies, *Wealth and the Power of Wealth in Classical Athens* (New York 1981) 124–31.

⁴⁶ Xanthippos (480/479), Miltiades (490/489), Themistokles (481/0), Aristides (479/8), Ephialtes (?), Kimon (478/7), Perikles (454/3), Thoukydides (444/3), Nikias (427/6), Kleon (424/3), Theramenes (411/0), Kleophon (?), Kallikrates. The year is that of the first attested *strategia*; cf. C. W. Fornara, *The Athenian Board of Generals from 501 to 404* (*Historia Einzelschr.* 16 [1971]). Concerning Ephialtes see Fornara 46 n.24, concerning Kleophon 70 with n.126. Connor (*supra* p.33) has argued convincingly that a new type of 'politician' appeared after the death of Perikles. The 'new politicians', however, were regularly *strategoï*, and in this respect there is no difference between the new and the old politicians. The first source mentioning a separation of civilian and military political leaders is Lys. 13.7: τοὺς τοῦ δήμου προεστηκότας καὶ τοὺς στρατηγούοντας καὶ ταξιαρχούοντας. But the splitting up of *rhetoires* and *strategoï* is basically a fourth-century phenomenon, and most marked after 355.

⁴⁷ For the period 403–355: Rhinon of Paiania, Thrasyboulos of Steiria, Archinos of Koile, Anytos, Aristophon of Azenia, Kallistratos of Aphidna, Timotheos of Ana-

And the prosopographical statistics support the general comments on the change in leadership which can be found in the orators and in later sources:

Isoc. 8.54–55: τοσοῦτον δὲ διαφέρομεν τῶν προγόνων, ὅσον ἐκεῖνοι μὲν τοὺς αὐτοὺς προστάτας τε τῆς πόλεως ἐποιούντο καὶ στρατηγούς ἤρουντο νομίζοντες τὸν ἐπὶ τοῦ βήματος τὰ βέλτιστα συμβουλευσαὶ δυνάμενοι, τὸν αὐτὸν τοῦτον ἄριστ' ἂν βουλευσασθαι καὶ καθ' αὐτὸν γενόμενον, ἡμεῖς δὲ τούναντίον τούτων ποιούμεν· οἷς μὲν γὰρ περὶ τῶν μεγίστων συμβούλους χρώμεθα, τούτους μὲν οὐκ ἀξιούμεν στρατηγούς χειροτονεῖν ὡς νῦν οὐκ ἔχοντας, οἷς δ' οὐδεὶς ἂν οὔτε περὶ τῶν ἰδίων οὔτε περὶ τῶν κοινῶν συμβουλευσαίτο, τούτους δ' αὐτοκράτορας ἐκπέμπομεν ὡς ἐκεῖ σοφωτέρους ἔσομένους καὶ ῥᾶον βουλευσομένους περὶ τῶν Ἑλληνικῶν πραγμάτων ἢ περὶ τῶν ἐνθάδε προτιθεμένων.

Aeschin. 3.146: εἰ δὲ τις αὐτῷ (Demosthenes) τῶν στρατηγῶν ἀντίποι, καταδουλούμενος τοὺς ἄρχοντας καὶ συνεθίζων μηδὲν αὐτῷ ἀντιλέγειν διαδικασίαν ἔφη γράψειν τῷ βήματι πρὸς τὸ στρατήγιον· πλείω γὰρ ὑμᾶς ἀγαθὰ ὑφ' ἑαυτοῦ ἔφη ἀπὸ τοῦ βήματος πεπονθέναι, ἢ ὑπὸ τῶν στρατηγῶν ἐκ τοῦ στρατηγίου.

Plut. Phoc. 7.5: ὁρῶν δὲ (Phokion) τοὺς τὰ κοινὰ πράσσοντας τότε διηρημένους ὡς περ ἀπὸ κλήρου τὸ στρατήγιον καὶ τὸ βῆμα, καὶ τοὺς μὲν λέγοντας ἐν τῷ δήμῳ καὶ γράφοντας μόνον, ὧν Εὐβουλος ἦν καὶ Ἀριστοφῶν καὶ Δημοσθένης καὶ Λυκούργος καὶ Ὑπερείδης, Διοπίθη δὲ καὶ Μενεσθέα καὶ Λεωσθένη καὶ Χάρητα τῷ στρατηγεῖν καὶ πολεμεῖν αὔξοντας ἑαυτοὺς, ἐβούλετο τὴν Περικλέους καὶ Ἀριστείδου καὶ Σόλωνος πολιτείαν ὡς περ ὀλόκληρον καὶ διηρησομένην ἐν ἀμφοῖν ἀναλαβεῖν καὶ ἀποδοῦναι.⁴⁸

The reason for the separation of the *strategoι* from the *rhetores* is lucidly stated by Aristotle at *Politics* 1305a7–15: ἐπὶ δὲ τῶν ἀρχαίων, ὅτε γένοιτο ὁ αὐτὸς δημαγωγὸς καὶ στρατηγός, εἰς τυραννίδα μετέβαλλον· σχεδὸν γὰρ οἱ πλείστοι τῶν ἀρχαίων τυράννων ἐκ δημαγωγῶν γεγόνασιν. αἴτιον δὲ τοῦ τότε μὲν γίνεσθαι νῦν δὲ μὴ, ὅτι τότε μὲν οἱ δημαγωγοὶ ἦσαν ἐκ τῶν στρατηγούντων (οὐ γὰρ πω δεινοὶ ἦσαν λέγειν), νῦν δὲ τῆς ῥητορικῆς ἠϋξημένης οἱ δυνάμενοι λέγειν δημαγωγούσι μὲν, δι' ἀπειρίαν δὲ τῶν πολεμικῶν οὐκ ἐπιτίθενται,

phlystos, Exekestides of Thorikos. For the period 355–322: Phokion of Potamos, Melanopos of Aixone, Nausikles of Oe, Philokles of Eroiadai. For Anytos as a fourth-century *strategos* cf. Pl. *Meno* 90b, αἰρούνται γοῦν αὐτὸν ἐπὶ τὰς μεγίστας ἀρχάς. The dramatic date of the dialogue is after the restoration of the democracy in 403, perhaps 402: J. E. Thomas, *Musings on the Meno* (The Hague 1980) 22. A twelfth *strategos* who was probably also a *rhetor* is Polyektos (Hyp. fr.xlv [182–84 Sauppe]), identified by Kirchner *PA* 11947 with Polyektos of Kydantidai.

⁴⁸ The rhetorical juxtaposition of βῆμα and στρατήγιον both in Aischines and in Plutarch indicates that Plutarch had the Aischines passage in mind here. The separation of *rhetores* and *strategoι* is also emphasized in Isoc. 15.136; Dem. 12.19; 18.212, 246; Din. 1.76; Plut. *Mor.* 486D, 812F.

πλήν εἴ που βραχὺ τι γέγονε τοιοῦτον. So a growing professionalism (both in rhetoric and in warfare) produced its regular effect: a division of labour. To the account given by Aristotle we must add that in the fourth century citizen armies tended to be replaced by mercenary forces commanded by condottieri, some of whom were not even native Athenians but only naturalized in order to be elected *strategoï*. The outstanding example is Charidemos of Oreos.⁴⁹ A naturalized condottiere or an Athenian mercenary leader, who for years might be in the service of a tyrant or a barbarian prince, is not the obvious type of person to persuade the Athenians in the *ecclesia*, and the result was that the leading *rhetores* had to fight the battles in the ranks,⁵⁰ whereas the *strategoï* attended the *ecclesiai* and voted without ever addressing the people.

On the basis of the undeniable and important distinction between *rhetores* and *strategoï*, modern historians sometimes identify the *rhetores* with the politicians, as opposed to the *strategoï* who are no longer to be regarded as proper 'political leaders'.⁵¹ There may be some truth in this, but I emphasize a caution stated by Raphael Sealey: "it is well known that in fourth-century Athens the profession of general and politician tended to diverge. The tendency should not be overestimated."⁵² As argued above, when the sources refer to 'political leaders' in general they regularly mention both *rhetores* and *strategoï*. One can think of several good reasons for this common practice.

Like other Greek *poleis*, Athens was regularly at war. After a period of peace (403–395) the Athenians joined the Corinthian War (395–386), and then the war against Sparta in alliance with Thebes (379–371). In the 360's the Athenians fought regularly in the Aegean, *i.a.* to recover Amphipolis, and sometimes in Hellas as well, now in alliance with Sparta against Thebes. The Social War was fought and lost in 357–355, and the first war against Philip dragged on for eleven years (357–346). The more formidable second war against Philip was over in two years (340–338), and after the defeat at Chaironeia Athens experienced her only long period of peace and prosperity until Antipater put an end to the democracy after the Lamian War (323–

⁴⁹ For a short biography see J. K. Davies, *Athenian Propertied Families* (Oxford 1971) 570–71. Other examples are Philiskos (*PA* 14430), Polystratos (12070), and Strabax (12911).

⁵⁰ Both Demades (Diod. 16.87.1) and Demosthenes (Plut. *Dem.* 20.2, *Mor.* 845F) fought in the battle of Chaironeia as ordinary hoplites.

⁵¹ Jones (*supra* n.1) 128, Perlman (*supra* n.1) 347; Davies (*supra* n.45) 124ff.

⁵² Sealey (*supra* n.1) 178–79.

322). Admittedly, warfare was not continuous and battles were fought only occasionally, but Athens nearly always had a squadron operating somewhere in the Aegean or Ionian Sea and sometimes an army operating somewhere in Hellas. When peace is the exception and war the rule, political leaders tend to include generals, and the Athenians can certainly testify to the principle stated by Clausewitz: war is politics carried on by other means.

Second, the splitting up of the 'political leaders' into a group of *rhetores* and a group of *strategoï* resulted in close collaboration between members of the two groups. This is perhaps best illustrated by Demosthenes in his description of Athenian political behaviour in the *Second Olynthiac* (2.29, quoted *supra* 37), but many other sources can be adduced: Aischines describes Chares' collaboration with citizens who dominated the *ecclesia* (2.71), and collaboration between *rhetores* and *strategoï* is also discussed in Isocrates' defence of Timotheos (15.136ff), in Philip's letter to the Athenians (Dem. 12.19), and in Plato's *Euthydemus* (290C–D).

Third, tradition is always an important factor, especially for the Athenians who cherished the idea of an ancestral constitution and tended to believe that reaction was the only true form of progress. For almost a century the Athenians had been used to political leaders who both commanded the armed forces and addressed the *ecclesia* and the *dicasteria*. In the fourth century, when the *strategoï* tended to become professional generals and left the political initiatives to citizens acting as *hoi boulomenoi*, the Athenians' first reaction, in my opinion, would be to believe that the group of leaders now comprised *both* generals *and* orators. And so they coined the phrase *ρήτορες καὶ στρατηγοί*. The juxtaposition of *rhetores* and *strategoï* does not occur in the sources before the 350's. It may of course be accidental, but it may also reflect the Athenians' adaptation to a change in political leadership during the first half of the fourth century.

Fourth, one of the important political activities in Athens was to serve on an embassy. The *presbeis* were elected by the *ecclesia*, and of the 94 envoys known in our period 32 are attested also as *rhetores* in the *ecclesia* and 11 also as *strategoï*.⁵³ The *rhetores* outweigh the *strategoï*, but, on the other hand, to be an envoy was an activity that tended to bind together the *rhetores* and the *strategoï*, especially since the *strategoï* who served as envoys would have to make a report on

⁵³ Konon of Anaphlystos (*PA* 8707), Eunomos (*PA* 5861), Thrasyboulos of Kollytos, Kallistratos of Aphidna, Kallias of Alopeke, Autokles of Euonymon, Aristophon of Azenia, Melanopos of Aixone, Nausikles of Oe, Phokion (of Potamos?), Ephialtes (*PA* 6156).

their mission to the *boule* and the *ecclesia* and would become *rhetores*, at least in the technical legal sense of the word.

Finally, the distinction between *rhetores* and *strategoï* is most marked if we focus on the *rhetores* in the *ecclesia*. But some *strategoï* are also known as *rhetores* addressing the *boule* or the *nomothetai*, and more appeared before the *dicasteria* as prosecutors or *synegoroi*. Many political battles were fought not in the *ecclesia* but in the people's court. Political trials were still brought by *strategoï*, and it was quite common, for both prosecutor and defendant, to call on a *strategos* to be his *synegoros*.⁵⁴ If we take into account that *rhetor* denotes not only policy-makers in the *ecclesia* but also the citizens appearing before the *boule*, the *nomothetai*,⁵⁵ and the *dicasteria*, the number of *strategoï* who were also *rhetores* rises from 11 or 12 to 17 or 18 with several more activities attested. Including ambassadors, the figure rises to 22–23. In conclusion, *rhetores* and *strategoï* were diverging groups throughout the fourth century, which is probably the reason why the Athenians had to use two words instead of one when referring to their 'political leaders'; but there was still a considerable overlap which must not be underrated.⁵⁶

V

In conclusion, the comprehensive term for political leaders in fourth-century Athens was *ρήτορες καὶ στρατηγοί*, not *rhetores* to the exclusion of *strategoï*, and the juxtaposition of *rhetores* and *strategoï* was not only a political fact but also acknowledged in the law code. There was indeed an increasing separation of *rhetores* and *strategoï* due to a growing professionalism both in rhetoric and in warfare.

⁵⁴ Aeschin. 3.7 *μήτε τὰς τῶν στρατηγῶν συνηγορίας, οἱ ἐπὶ πολλὸν ἤδη χρόνον συνεργούντες τισι τῶν ῥητόρων λυμαίνονται τὴν πολιτείαν*. 196 οἱ γὰρ ἀγαθοὶ στρατηγοὶ ὑμῖν καὶ τῶν τὰς σιτήσεις τινὲς εὐρημένων ἐξαιτοῦνται τὰς γραφὰς τῶν παρανόμων . . . The following *strategoï* are known also as *synegoroi*: Iphikrates of Rhamnous, Aristophon of Azenia, Phokion (of Potamos?), Nausikles of Oe, Philochares of Kothokidai. The following *strategoï* are known as public prosecutors: Archinos of Koile, Konon of Anaphlystos (*PA* 8707), Kallistratos of Aphidna, Iphikrates of Rhamnous, Melanopos of Aixone, Aristophon of Azenia, Chares of Angele.

⁵⁵ Three, perhaps four, *strategoï* are also known as proposers of *nomoi*: Agyrrhios of Kollytos, Archinos of Koile, Aristophon of Azenia, and perhaps Kephisophon of Aphidna, whose name however is only restored in *IG* II² 244.2.

⁵⁶ Several *strategoï*, for whom no activity as *rhetor* is attested, are nevertheless described in our sources as outstanding *rhetores*: Autokles of Euonymon (*Xen. Hell.* 6.3.7), Eunomos (*PA* 5861: *Isoc.* 15.93), Leosthenes of Kephale (*PA* 9141: Aeschin. 2.124), and Thrasyboulos of Kollytos (?) (*Dem.* 18.219).

Political leadership tended to be split up between the *rhetores* who dominated the *ecclesia* and the *stratego*i who commanded the armies in the constant wars. But there were some *stratego*i who were still active in the *ecclesia*; both *rhetores* and *stratego*i influenced foreign policy by being elected ambassadors, and in the *dicasteria* it was still common to see a *strategos* as a prosecutor or as a *synegoros* in a political action. *Rhetor* was a technical legal term denoting the citizen who performed the task of *ho boulomenos* in the decision-making assemblies. A *rhetor* was the proposer of decrees of the *demos* or the *boule*, of laws passed by the *nomothetai*, or he was a prosecutor in a political public action. Furthermore, a *rhetor* addressed the *ecclesia*, the *boule*, or the *nomothetai* supporting or opposing a proposal made by another *rhetor* or he was a *synegoros* for the prosecutor or the defendant in a political action. By contrast with the modern 'politician' a *rhetor* was not elected—he volunteered; he was never entrusted with making decisions but only expected to take initiatives; he might collaborate with other *rhetores* or with a *strategos*, but he was not affiliated with any party or any broader group among the voters in the decision-making bodies. To be a *rhetor* was essentially a one-day business, and ideally the political initiatives should have been distributed among all citizens so that a citizen only occasionally would assume the responsibility of being a *rhetor*. In fact a small group of active citizens dominated the decision-making assemblies by taking initiatives habitually, sometimes almost professionally. And as a result the word *rhetor* developed a new meaning different from the legal use of the term. As a legal term *rhetor* denoted any citizen who addressed the decision-making bodies, no matter whether he did it occasionally or frequently. As a political term *rhetor* tended to denote only those who habitually addressed the assemblies to the exclusion of the occasional *rhetor*, who was called *idiotēs* and often contrasted with the *rhetores* in the political sense. Consequently, the Athenian citizens can be divided into four groups according to their political participation: (a) passive citizens, (b) active citizens who attended the assemblies and voted but never addressed the people or the jurors, (c) the *idiotai* who occasionally acted as *hoi boulomenoi*, being *rhetores* in the legal sense, and (d) the *rhetores* in the political sense who regularly addressed the assemblies and assumed the responsibility for most of the initiatives. Modern scholarship tends to overlook the difference between (c) and (d), emphasizing instead a subdivision of (d) into major and minor *rhetores*. A kind of hierarchy within (d) can indeed be traced in the sources, but must not obliterate the existence of (c). There was of course no sharp distinction between (c) and (d),

and the group of *rhetoires* in the political meaning seems also to have been much larger than often assumed. But this problem will be reserved for a future study. Finally, the accountability of the *rhetoires* and the *strategoï* was more far-reaching than the accountability of all the *archai* selected by lot. Especially the *graphe paranomon* (against *rhetoires*) and the *eisangelia* (frequently used against *strategoï*) were dangerous weapons against the 'political leaders', whereas the obligatory *euthynai* against *archai*, as far as the sources go, only infrequently resulted in a public action.⁵⁷

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