

# **The Bailo in Constantinople: Crisis and Career in Venice's Early Modern Diplomatic Corps**

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*During the difficult sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, Venice attempted to maintain a precarious balance with its powerful neighbour the Ottoman Empire. The key to this effort was the chief Venetian diplomat in Constantinople, the bailo. The complexities of defending Venice's position in the Mediterranean required the ablest possible officials. Effective service in this most public of positions could provide significant recognition for men at the heights of the Venetian hierarchy and almost always served as a springboard to more important offices within the Venetian state apparatus.*

The years from 1453 to 1520 represent one of the most trying eras in the history of the Republic of Venice. During this time, the city and its state were threatened from numerous quarters. Most serious was the advance of the Ottoman sultans, who, in a series of conflicts in 1463–79 and 1499–1503, made increasing inroads into Venice's eastern Mediterranean empire of islands and port cities, the *stato da mar*, as well as chipping away at Venetian commercial hegemony in the region. A second threat appeared in the difficult decade of the 1490s with the successful voyages to Calicut of da Gama and Cabral, which threatened to squeeze off the city's commercial lifeblood, the spice trade. This decade also saw the French descent into Italy, which threatened Venice's holdings on the mainland (the *terraferma* state), as well as the Italian balance of power established at Lodi. This spectre became a frightening reality during the disaster of the War of the League of Cambrai. While Venice quickly regained its *terraferma* territories, Cambrai had a lasting impact on Venetian confidence, and this, combined with the disastrous war with the Ottomans that ended in 1503, served as a final notice to Venice's rulers that the situation in the Italian peninsula and in the Mediterranean had been permanently altered. Venice had clearly slipped into the second tier of European states. Venetians of the time recognized this and pragmatically accepted a new political and commercial reality. As a result, throughout the sixteenth century and beyond, the Republic pursued a precarious policy of

nonalignment and neutrality. Two factors key to its successful navigation of these perilous waters were an active and able diplomatic corps, and a defensive military presence strong enough to deter potential antagonists. These twin apparatus were especially integral to Venice's relationship with its leviathan neighbour to the east, the Ottoman Empire.

The traumatic outcomes of Venice's wars with the sultans made it clear to its rulers that in the Ottoman case the city would have to rely chiefly on diplomatic and political means rather than offensive military efforts to maintain and defend its position in the eastern Mediterranean. To this end the Venetian governing body, the Signoria, initiated a number of institutional innovations and reforms intended to address this most important relationship.<sup>1</sup> It also expanded its diplomatic presence in the Ottoman capital throughout the sixteenth century, especially after the wars of 1537–40 and 1570–73. This augmentation included ever-increasing financial investments in the Ottoman mission, more diplomatic personnel in Constantinople, and an emphasis on strengthening the position of Venice's chief diplomat in the Porte, the bailo. The men who filled the office of bailo in the sixteenth century played a crucial role in the maintenance and defence of the weakened Venetian state.

Though some scholars have argued that the importance of the baili actually declined during the sixteenth century,<sup>2</sup> this seems questionable given the nature of the Veneto-Ottoman relationship. Among contemporaries there was certainly no question that the office of bailo in Constantinople ranked as the most important and sensitive position in the storied Venetian diplomatic corps.<sup>3</sup> As one seventeenth-century observer wrote, the legation was 'above all others full of inextricable difficulties, ... [requiring] a man of great resolution and prudence', and this viewpoint was widely held among the Venetian patriciate.<sup>4</sup>

There is no question that a wide range of unique challenges was associated with the office of bailo. In a report to the Senate in 1564, a former bailo, Daniele Barbarigo, provided some sense of these: <sup>5</sup>

In my opinion, your Serenity does not give any charge ... of greater importance, and of greater travail ... than this one [bailo in Constantinople]; because if a bailo wants to do his duty he will never loaf about, as he has too much to do in not allowing the merchants to be mistreated, in holding audience with subjects, in meeting with those who can make known to him new information (for which purpose one would need never to leave the house), in addition to going to the Magnificent paşa and negotiating important matters. ... I must believe that in three bailates there will not be as much to do as there was in mine.

Barbarigo's account suggests the range of a bailo's duties; another bailo, Simone Contarini, simplified these into two principal areas: 'The task of bailo in Constantinople for Your Highness seems to me to be contained in two offices: one ambassador, the other consul.' First and foremost, then, the bailo was present in the Ottoman capital to represent and protect Venetian political interests. To prepare them for their important post, the Senate regularly voted to allow the baili-elect to attend its sessions in order that they might be 'informed of current public affairs'.<sup>6</sup> Once in Constantinople they devoted the lion's share of their time to treating the myriad issues and affairs that daily arose in the relations between Venice and the Ottomans. This was accomplished most often through a form of personal diplomacy wherein the baili maintained extensive networks of friendship and patronage through which they were able to establish relationships with influential Ottomans in positions to benefit and protect Venetian interests. On certain important ceremonial occasions, such as the ascension of a new sultan, the circumcision of a sultan's son, to renew the capitulations, or to treat for peace, an extraordinary ambassador was usually sent from Venice. This ambassador had a very specific mission and remained in the Ottoman capital only for as long as was necessary to accomplish it. During his time in Constantinople the extraordinary ambassador was considered the bailo's superior, and indeed the latter vacated his embassy compound in favor of the former.<sup>7</sup>

Related to the political duties of the baili was their responsibility to collect, process, and communicate to Venice information on the Ottoman Empire. Theorists were unanimous in their agreement that this was one of the main tasks of any resident representative. Henry Wooten stated famously that 'an ambassador is an honest man sent to lie abroad for the good of his country'; Spinola concurred that 'spying on the designs and secrets of princes is the very trade of ambassadors, and especially residents'.<sup>8</sup> The bailo obtained information in Constantinople from a wide variety of sources. All his household's personnel were responsible to gather data, as were the agents in the informal Venetian spy network. This included Venetian subjects in the Ottoman Empire, many of whom worked in the imperial arsenal in Galata, banished men and women, the merchants with their many connections, and numerous individuals within the Ottoman bureaucracy itself. Quite often these internal contacts were renegades, such as Ferhat Ağa, kapıcıbaşa of the Porte who was of Venetian origin, the *cesneger* of the sultan, who was from Bologna, and Skender Bey, the chief dragoman of the Porte, who was from Corfu. The baili also utilized moles in the other foreign embassies in Constantinople. Venice's position as the sole regular courier between Europe and the Levant also provided the opportunity to examine the mail of other individuals and missions in

Constantinople.<sup>9</sup> A complementary combination of diplomacy and espionage, then, was among the tools that the skilled Venetian residents used in accomplishing their mandate in matters political.<sup>10</sup>

The baili's second chief task, according to Contarini, was to act as Venice's chief consular representative in the Ottoman Empire. While much has been written about the bailo's ambassadorial responsibilities, little attention has been focused on this commercial role. This latter, however, was repeatedly stressed in commissions given the baili by the Signoria:<sup>11</sup>

We have sent you there [to Constantinople] as our bailo as is the custom, and finally, [you will] recommend the merchants and our subjects to His Majesty as will seem expedient to you during the time that you are in his presence. You will not fail in any of their necessities to give these merchants and our subjects every help and favour possible, as this is one of the principal reasons you are sent there by us.

It was the bailo's duty to promote and protect Venetian trade in the Ottoman Empire, and Ottoman commerce in Venetian lands. Especially in the years following Lepanto, the Senate regularly instructed the baili to defend Venice's commercial position in the sultan's lands against potential interlopers such as the English, the Dutch, and the Florentines.<sup>12</sup> This task was all the more important given that the Ottomans had no permanent diplomatic representatives in any foreign court in the early modern era.

These onerous commercial tasks were little appreciated by the baili and consequently often neglected. As Ottaviano Bon wrote in 1604:

This bailate is today a garden, in which the roses and flowers are the public affairs, and the thorns and twigs are the affairs of private subjects for the occasion of their ships and the contracts they make and the *avanie*<sup>13</sup> that are brought against them, on which it is necessary that I trouble myself every waking hour.

Another bailo justified his scant mention of commercial matters by saying that they were important but complex.<sup>14</sup> Given the changing character and activities of the Venetian patriciate in this period, it is perhaps not surprising that most baili found the noble complexities and challenges of political and diplomatic matters more satisfying and engaging than commercial matters.

Though somewhat averse to the task, the baili nonetheless tried to protect and encourage Venice's Levantine trade. This was done chiefly by ensuring that the capitulations that Venice renewed with every sultan were observed. While the capitulations legally guaranteed the protection of Venetian persons, goods, and property, the baili's constant attention was necessary to ensure that these agreements were respected. Both Venetian

and Ottoman records are rife with complaints by the baili to the Ottoman grand viziers about infractions of the capitulations and threats to the trade of Venetians throughout the Mediterranean.<sup>15</sup>

Another aspect of the bailo's consular responsibilities was the defence and protection of the business interests of the remaining Venetian patricians involved in international commerce. This could take the form of defending the agents of noble merchants in the divan before the sultan or recovering their merchandise when these factors passed away. In some instances patricians would request the bailo to intervene against agents or former agents who were reluctant to settle their debts. Also important was the protection of the merchandise of Venetians and subjects who died in the Ottoman Empire. The capitulations guaranteed the baili's right to receive these goods and see that they were transmitted to the correct heirs and, in the case of the merchants, to their principals.<sup>16</sup> As the chief consular official in Constantinople, the baili also had judicial authority to arbitrate legal and commercial matters within the Venetian nation, and because of their status and the continuity and organization of Venetian institutions in the Porte they were often called on to rule in matters involving members of other European nations and even Ottoman subjects. In many of their consular duties the baili were assisted by the merchant Council of Twelve, though after the War of Cyprus this body's influence progressively decreased as Venice's merchants in Constantinople came to be entirely non-noble and often not even Venetian citizens.<sup>17</sup>

The bailo's consular responsibilities were not limited to Constantinople alone; he was responsible for trade in all the lands of the Ottoman Empire and had the freedom to appoint and replace consuls wherever he deemed it necessary. The *Maggior consiglio* in Venice selected the consuls in the two most important ports of the Levant, Aleppo and Alexandria-Cairo, but all other consuls were chosen by the bailo and then ratified by the Senate. A document of 1586 lists the consulates under the jurisdiction of the bailo (Izmir, Fochie, Mytilene and Anatolia, Chios, Gallipoli, Silivri, Palormo, and Rhodes), and in 1592 a Genoese doctor living in Kaffa was chosen as Venetian consul by Matteo Zane to assist the Candiot and Tiniot merchants trading for caviar and fish there.<sup>18</sup> The correspondence between the baili and the numerous consuls in the eastern Mediterranean was extensive and represented another burden for the baili, who were often called on to obtain imperial commandments from the divan and to resolve disputes in the rough-and-tumble frontier atmosphere of the Venetian trading outposts. The baili also used their influence to have Ottomans who troubled the consuls punished, as in the case of a janissary who in 1603 was vexing the merchants he was supposed to protect in Izmir. The bailo had him imprisoned and then secretly strangled with the complicity of the Ağa of the janissaries.<sup>19</sup>

While the bailo was responsible for the protection and encouragement of commerce in all the Ottoman Empire, he was forbidden by law to engage in any trade of his own, nor could he represent anyone else commercially.<sup>20</sup> The reasons for this were obvious: should a bailo become entangled in the matters of private persons, the integrity and security of the entire mission could be compromised and the bailo could be held accountable for individuals' private actions. Despite this very real threat, there is ample evidence that the baili did engage in commerce while in Constantinople. The Biblioteca Marciana contains an entire register of private letters to Alvise Contarini from patricians in Venice regarding commercial matters. Particularly revealing are the letters exchanged between Contarini and Andrea Cappello, which include both requests by Cappello for goods from Constantinople and references to recommendations by Contarini regarding merchandise he believed would be in demand if shipped to the Levant. There remains little doubt that Contarini was involved in commerce while in office, though to what extent is unclear.<sup>21</sup>

Accusations against baili of involvement in commerce, while always vehemently denied, were not uncommon. In 1525, Piero Bragadin wrote to the Senate and 'passionately' denied any business activities that the senators might have heard of. A century later, Giorgio Giustinian wrote an even more impassioned defence against accusations that he had misused official funds and illegally traded merchandise valued at 100,000 ducats for a profit of 50,000 ducats. In his defence Giustinian argued that in 20 years of service to the Senate he had incurred numerous financial losses – indeed, he had been constrained to cover official expenses with his own funds – and thus had no capital to invest. 'My thoughts have always been, not only in public duties but also in my private life, very far (*lontanissimi*) from such commercial and business intrigues, to the point that if I had wanted to I would not have known how to do it.' To buttress his case, Giustinian pointed to his enforcing Venetian legislation which forbade commerce among members of his household, or *famiglia*, which was received 'with a fair amount of amazement on [the merchants'] part because of the very deep-rooted and common practice of all the other' baili, who, he claimed, turned a blind eye to this practice.<sup>22</sup>

Whether Giustinian actually was engaged in commerce is unclear, but he certainly implied that the practice was not uncommon among his predecessors. His charge was bolstered by the fact that the Senate regularly included specific instructions that the bailo-elect not take merchandise of merchants or others – a tacit recognition that it regularly happened. Indeed, there are repeated references to baili carrying jewels, pearls, and other similarly small but lucrative merchandise destined for merchants in Venice. Commercial connections established in Constantinople could provide long-

term benefits. Paolo Contarini, for example, was reported to have initiated unspecified business dealings while he was bailo in Constantinople which he continued to manage after his return to Venice.<sup>23</sup>

If some baili engaged in commerce, probably the extent to which they did was quite limited, in no small part because the seemingly unending official tasks they faced limited time for trade. Besides the bailo's major administrative duties, there were myriad other administrative tasks for which he was responsible as chief consular official in the Ottoman Empire. His chancellery notarized a wide variety of commercial and legal documents whose validity was accepted not only in Venice but throughout the Mediterranean, including in Ottoman lands. Among these were bills of health which were given to ships and travellers leaving Constantinople, which certified that the city had been plague-free at their departure. These certificates were necessary to avoid protracted quarantine time in Venice's *lazaretto*. Finally, one of the greatest burdens of every bailo was watching over his large household: this included the contingent of interpreters and students learning Turkish (the dragomans and *giovani di lingua*), as well as slaves, letter carriers, chancellery staff, and the many Venetian subjects who resided in Constantinople.<sup>24</sup>

Beyond political and commercial matters, the baili were also intimately involved in the religious life of the Latin-rite communities of the Ottoman empire. For centuries Venice had been the *de facto* protector of Latin-rite Christians in the *stato da mar*, in Ottoman territories, and in the Holy Land. Suraiya Faroqhi has shown that a significant number of the sultanic rescripts solicited by the baili around 1600 deal with religious affairs. These include attempts to secure the churches used by Venetians, as well as numerous cases in which the baili interceded on behalf of small groups of Roman Catholics scattered throughout the Ottoman Empire.<sup>25</sup> The baili were also important figures in the confraternities of Galata and were protectors of the company of the Holy Sacrament; they also often patronized artists and artisans in the creation of religious objects and decorations for the Latin-rite churches of Constantinople and Galata. While holding the protectorate of Catholicism in the region created many trials for the baili, it also returned certain liturgical and honorary benefits of precedence.<sup>26</sup> After 1600, however, Venice's position as the protector of Christianity in the Ottoman Empire was gradually usurped by the French, supported by the Jesuits, who had first come to the Ottoman capital in 1583 but established a permanent presence only after 1609.<sup>27</sup>

One aspect of the spiritual duties of the bailo was the redemption of Christians enslaved in the Ottoman empire. The capitulations declared that any Venetian, citizen or subject, and any person taken in Venetian service was to be turned over to the bailo in a timely manner unless the captive

voluntarily converted to Islam. The reality was that, once captured, slaves were rarely released voluntarily either from private households or from official Ottoman institutions, particularly the arsenal. While the brief periods of open warfare saw upsurges in the numbers of both Ottoman and Christian slaves, the great majority of captives resulted from the corsair activity that plagued the Mediterranean in the late sixteenth century. In 1588 it was estimated that there were at least 2,500 slaves for which the baili were responsible.<sup>28</sup> Piero Bragadin in 1525 reported having already freed 64 slaves, though he hoped to free 300 by the end of his service; 40 years later Daniele Barbarigo freed 90 slaves during his bailate, and Paolo Contarini in 1581 obtained the release of 46 slaves, including a Venetian patrician. Overzealousness in carrying out this duty, however, could create trouble. On at least two occasions the sultans wrote directly to the doge complaining about the actions of the baili in freeing slaves held in Constantinople and requesting the baili's recall.<sup>29</sup>

It was common knowledge that the baili possessed funds earmarked for the freeing of slaves, and this fact attracted many persons, Venetian and not, to the bailate seeking assistance. The liberation of slaves was, in fact, one of the major expenses of the mission.<sup>30</sup> These funds had initially come directly from the bailo's budget or from exceptional funds from the Procuratori di utra, but beginning in 1585 the Senate passed a series of laws that established a perpetual fund – administered by the magistracy charged with administering hospitals and holy places, the *Provveditori sopra ospedali e luoghi pii* – which launched a systematic programme to obtain the release of slaves in Ottoman territories. Preachers throughout Venice's domains were directed to encourage worshippers to make donations in small boxes labelled *Per la Recuperatione di Poveri Schiavi*, placed in all churches in Venetian lands.<sup>31</sup>

Freeing slaves, defending commerce, and treating in the divan, the Venetian baili in Constantinople faced a wide range of tasks which required their full energy. Little wonder, then, that the Venetian governing bodies carefully selected from their most accomplished and capable members those who would be able to withstand the rigours of service in the Ottoman capital.

While the office and duties of the baili have drawn the attention of a number of scholars, surprisingly little has been written about the actual men who filled the position. Certainly this is partly because of the shortage of archival material on any single patrician, but to a degree it is attributable to the intentional anonymity in which patricians were expected to function, rooted in the fear of the rise of cults of personality and factions that might threaten



the tranquillity of the Most Serene Republic. Still, by drawing on a variety of published and unpublished sources we can piece together a revealing composite picture of the men who filled the office of bailo in Constantinople between the wars of Cyprus and Candia.<sup>32</sup>

All of the baili were drawn from the ranks of the Venetian patriciate; this was a fundamental requirement.<sup>33</sup> While the patriciate numbered perhaps 2,500 men, only a small portion – perhaps no more than 100 – circulated among the most important positions, and most baili came from this oligarchy within an oligarchy which dominated Venetian political life.<sup>34</sup> Names such as Contarini, Nani, Bernardo, and Cappello crop up repeatedly in the list of baili in the early modern period.<sup>35</sup> Between 1573 and 1645 no fewer than four members of the powerful extended Contarini family served in Constantinople.

The future bailo's early years were devoted to study and the acquisition of a classical, humanist education that would provide the aspiring patrician with the linguistic and rhetorical tools necessary to fill the highest Venetian offices. Many studied at Padua and were superb students: Paolo Contarini, for example, lived and studied with the humanist and printer Paolo Manuzio for three years and apparently excelled in his scholarly pursuits, for Francesco Sansovino dedicated a portion of his *Delle orationi volgarmente scritte da molti huomini illustri de tempi nostri* to him for the eloquence he displayed at this early age.<sup>36</sup> Perhaps articulateness was a common characteristic among these future diplomats: Nicolò Barbarigo studied philosophy and rhetoric in Padua, and a classmate Agostino Valier recalled of him that 'He seemed born to eloquence'; the same was said of Francesco Contarini upon his death. Simone Contarini, one of the most successful baili of the first half of the seventeenth century, also studied in Padua with some of the great educators and intellectuals of this period. He specialized in moral and natural philosophy as well as mathematics and from an early age wrote poetry, a collection of which is housed in the Biblioteca Marciana.<sup>37</sup>

Although a university education seems to have been the path of many baili, some few patricians still followed the traditional commercial itinerary of their forefathers. Such was the case of Ottaviano Bon, who came from one of the oldest and most noble families of Venice. While very active politically (he eventually achieved one of the highest Venetian offices, *Procuratore di San Marco*), Ottaviano's father remained one of the diminishing number of patricians still involved in maritime commerce, owning numerous ships and making a great fortune. Early on Ottaviano demonstrated a proclivity for letters and studied for a time in Padua, but he abandoned these at his father's request to enter the family business. In the difficult period following the end of the War of Cyprus, as other European

states made inroads into the Levant the Bon family began gradually to redirect its investments from more risky commercial ventures to more stable *terraferma* holdings in Torcello, Padua, and Polesine. On his father's death, Ottaviano left management of family business interests to his brother Francesco, and returned to his studies in Padua. There he excelled in philosophy and Latin, attending the lectures of Gianfrancesco Morosini, Sperone Speroni, and Francesco Piccolomini. Eventually he became involved in the salon of Andrea and Donato Morosini, who opened their house in Venice to him, and there he met Leonardo Donà, Paolo Sarpi, Giordano Bruno, and probably also Galileo.<sup>38</sup> He did not entirely abandon commerce, however: in 1582 he set up a commercial enterprise with Giovanni Santacroce and Alessandro Guagnino to trade in Sweden, but the collapse of several Venetian banks forced him to retreat. He remained involved in the Levantine trade, though, participating in the growing sector of maritime insurance in the late sixteenth century.<sup>39</sup>

Bon is probably exceptional in his commercial involvement. In the case of the Donà family, James C. Davis has shown that the sons who pursued a university education instead of serving an apprenticeship in the family business were the ones who later had major governmental careers. The future doge, Leonardo Donà, for example, did little trading, except for one 'very bad buy' of cotton in 1558, and none after 1570, when he became ambassador to Spain. He attributed his lack of investment in trade or industries to the necessities of his numerous high offices, which required that he invest all his capital 'for living expenses while an ambassador in various capitals'. While this may have been true, the real reason was probably that commerce bored him, as it seems to have done a not insignificant portion of the Venetian patriciate.<sup>40</sup>

After completing his formal education, an aspiring patrician often cut his political teeth and rounded out his education by travelling to the courts of Europe and the Ottoman empire. Lorenzo Bernardo, when he was just 20 years old, accompanied Giovanni Cappello, the newly elected ambassador to France. The future bailo Francesco Contarini travelled as a young man to Spain and Portugal to experience directly the customs and people and their 'standards of political and civil life'. Another future bailo, Almoro Nani, was in Constantinople in 1580, aged just 16, no doubt to become familiar with that most important of all courts. In 1602 Nani's brother Agostino, now himself bailo in Constantinople, recorded the visit of Tommaso Priuli, who came to see the city from Candia, where his father was serving. In an audience with the grand vizier, who inquired about the young man, the bailo responded that Priuli had been to all the important courts of Europe, saving the Porte for last, and was now returning home, where 'as per our custom ... he [will] begin to serve in the most important offices'. Nani accompanied

Priuli with a laudatory letter to the Senate; such a recommendation could be an important step in an aspiring young patrician's career.<sup>41</sup>

Following this practical education, a Venetian nobleman would launch his political career by entering the *Maggior consiglio*, an important rite of passage which usually occurred at the age of 25. By this passage a young noble became eligible to hold public office and to participate in the political life of the Republic. Some few patrician young men, among the very elite, gained early admission to this council at a younger age by means of the *barbarella* lottery, which permitted the winners to join the council at age 20.<sup>42</sup> This was the case with several future baili, including Marcantonio Barbaro, Nicolò Barbarigo, and Girolamo Cappello. Close upon the heels of this advancement, a young patrician would be elected to a variety of positions of increasing importance in the extensive Venetian bureaucracy, something of a Venetian version of the classical Roman *cursus honorum*.<sup>43</sup> Perhaps the career of Girolamo Lippomano is typical. Born 13 April 1538, at age 29 he was elected ambassador to Archduke Charles of Austria, one of a number of second-tier ambassadorships. This was followed by a rapid succession of increasingly challenging offices: he was ambassador to Savoy in 1570–73 and then ambassador to Poland, and in 1575 he was elected *savio di terraferma*, a position he held for just six months. In 1575 he went as extraordinary ambassador to the hero of Lepanto, Don John of Austria; from 1576 to 1579 he was ambassador to France; in 1580 he went as extraordinary ambassador to Spain; in 1581 he was ambassador to the Holy Roman Emperor; in 1585 he was elected *savio del consiglio*<sup>44</sup> and was one of 41 who elected the new doge; in 1586 he was again ambassador to Spain; and finally in November 1589 he was elected bailo at age 51.<sup>45</sup>

Paolo Contarini's career followed a similar trajectory: born 23 January 1529, he began his political life in 1555 as a *savio agli ordini*, then became one of the *sindaci in Levante* (inspectors in the Levant) in 1557. In 1563 he was elected *podestà* in Feltre, in 1567 he was one of ten *savi alla decima* (tax commissioners), and in 1570 he returned to the *stato da mar* as *provveditore* (governor) in Zante. It was here that he made his name as he ably defended the isle and provided important information on Ottoman fleet movements during the War of the Holy League. In 1573 he was elected bailo at Corfu, which he refused so as to accept a position as an *avogador di comun* (state attorney). In 1574 he again refused an office in the *stato da mar*, this time as rector in Candia, so that he could continue as an *avogador*. In 1574 he returned to the Levant as *capitano* in Candia, and after several years in a variety of offices in Venice, in 1580 he was elected bailo at age 51. The advancement evidenced in the cases of Lippomano and Contarini seems not to have been at all exceptional. Alvise Contarini, who has been characterized as a *figura emblematica* of the Venetian diplomat, followed a

similar path. From 1623 to 1635 he filled uninterrupted missions to Holland, England, France, and Rome, followed in 1636–40 by his 57-month term as bailo. He was not retired after this; indeed, from 1643 to 1649 he was Venice's mediator at the Westphalia peace conference.<sup>46</sup>

While the paths of these three men to the bailate are perhaps representative of the experience of most baili, namely, working one's way up the diplomatic ladder in embassies to minor princes and then progressing to the most important courts of France, Spain, Rome, and the Empire, this was not the only avenue to the office. Some baili's careers were spent in important domestic positions and offices in the Venetian *terraferma* state. An example of this road to Constantinople is the career of Giovanni Cappello, born 9 August 1584. In 1612 he was elected *camerlengo di comun*, which he refused, opting instead for a position with the *Quarantia civil nova* (appellate court). In 1615 and again in 1618 he was in the Quarantia ordinaria. In 1618 he served as an elector of the Doge, in 1625 he was a *capo* (head) of the Council of Ten, and in 1625–27 he served as *podestà* in Brescia. Upon his return he was elected to the Senate, and in 1628 he became one of the five *savi alla mercanzia* (board of trade). He was elected bailo in 1630, having never served outside Italy or even as an ambassador.<sup>47</sup>

As this brief study of a sample of the 26 baili who served between the end of the War of Cyprus and the start of the War of Candia has suggested, the paths taken to arrive at this office could be quite varied. All baili were similar, however, in that they had proven their abilities in a wide variety of situations and offices within the Venetian government. They were, thus, among the most important officeholders in the Venetian hierarchy and were specially qualified for the rigours and challenges of the office of the bailo in Constantinople.

Our focus to this point has been on the life of the baili in the public realm, but a brief look at their personal lives outside the civic arena illuminates some often overlooked aspects of the experiences of these important men. From the available data it seems that a number, perhaps even a majority of them, were not married. Of the 26 baili for our period, six were certainly married and five clearly never married. Of the remaining 15, no trace of any marriage is found in the records of the *Avogaria di Comun*, the magistracy charged with keeping track of noble births, marriages, and deaths. In oligarchical Venice, a patrician's political and economic status and that of his posterity hinged on the accurate recording of births and marriages, and therefore, while an occasional error crops up in these records, they are generally viewed as being complete. Given the lack of any indications of marriages for these 15 baili, it seems fair to conclude that a significant number, if not all of them, were probably not married.

This would be in keeping with common patrician practice in this period. Studying the Donà Davis has clearly shown that patricians adopted familial marriage strategies to limit the numbers of marriages among their members in order to concentrate the patrimony of the family in the hands of one son. The picture for the sixteenth century is supported by Chojnacki's finding for the previous century that perhaps half of all male patricians never married.<sup>48</sup> The head of the family usually permitted only one or two sons and an equal number of daughters to marry. The sons who married were then expected to produce large numbers of children in order to ensure the survival of the paternal family.

For example, Leonardo Donà's grandfather, Andrea, had ten children who survived infancy (probably several also died as infants). Of these ten, four were girls: two became nuns and two wed, a clear compromise between the competing strategies applied to patrician daughters, *maritar o monacar* (marriage or the convent). Of Andrea's six sons, one died at a young age, three remained lifelong bachelors, one married a woman past childbearing age, and one, Giambattista, married young and raised a family of 11, including the future doge Leonardo, who himself never married. This duty was reserved for his brother Nicolò, the only one of the male offspring of Giambattista to marry. With a single exception, from 1550 to 1850 only one son in each Donà generation married. In three of the five generations of this period, the son who married was the oldest among those sons who reached maturity.<sup>49</sup>

In the case of the Donà family, the sons who did not marry usually pursued government or business careers in greater numbers than their married brothers.<sup>50</sup> While detailed studies such as that of the Donà are not available for other patrician families, the fact that so many of the baili were unmarried would seem to support this familial strategy of earmarking certain sons to carry on the family name and others to serve in important political and religious positions or to increase the economic patrimony of the family. Given the dangers and difficulties which we shall see were associated with service abroad, especially in Constantinople, it is not surprising that families would not want to run the risk of losing the son responsible for carrying on the male line of the family by sending him abroad for either commercial or political motives.

For a son chosen to advance his family's political fortunes, election as bailo was a significant honour, indeed, scholars have traditionally represented this office as the apex of a political life. There is no question that the bailate was an extremely significant step in a patrician political career and was viewed as the most important diplomatic office to which a Venetian patrician might

aspire.<sup>51</sup> Upon closer examination, however, this image of the bailate as representing the culmination of a career seems unfounded. Several factors support this conclusion.

The first is evident through a simple mathematical examination of the ages of the baili when elected and when replaced. The average age of the 26 baili who served between Cyprus and Candia was 49; Alvise Contarini<sup>52</sup> began his bailate at age 39, though this was exceptional.<sup>53</sup> Just as exceptional was Girolamo Trevisan, the oldest bailo, who began his service at age 67; he proved not up to the task, left early, and died while returning from Constantinople. The average age at death of a bailo was 63, though this number is somewhat skewed by the four baili who died during their bailates, Nicolò Barbarigo, Girolamo Lippomano, Vincenzo Gradenigo, and the aforementioned Trevisan. Even with these four included in our calculation, if a bailo was elected at age 49 and served three years on average, he still had at least ten years of life beyond the end of his term. And in these final years all former baili served the Republic in a variety of important capacities.<sup>54</sup>

Indeed, the bailate seems to have been for many a way station and in some cases a springboard for their careers rather than the end of the line. The most conspicuous example of this is Francesco Contarini. He was born 7 October 1554 to a wealthy branch of this great Venetian family. Following a typical progression of offices of increasing importance both within and outside Venice, he was nominated bailo on 12 March 1602 and arrived in the capital in November of the same year. While his bailate was characterized by relative tranquillity on both the economic and the diplomatic front, Contarini was plagued by illness throughout his sojourn and so was permitted to leave after just two years. Following his bailate he seems to have gained newfound vigour, as he served in a succession of embassies to Rome, which had particular importance during the period of Venice's great interdict crisis. In 1610 he was in London to apologize to James I for the ban of his *Apologia* in Venetian lands, in 1613 he was ambassador to the new emperor, Matthias, and in 1619 he returned to Constantinople as extraordinary ambassador to the new sultan, Osman II. Prior to this, in 1615 he was elected Procuratore di San Marco, and in the intervening years he received votes in the ducal elections of 1615 and 1618. The real culmination of Contarini's career came not in 1602 on his election as bailo but rather on 8 September 1623, when he was elected doge at age 69. His dogeship was relatively short-lived, however, as he died in December of the following year.<sup>55</sup>

Contarini was exceptional, of course, in his ascension to the highest office in Venice, both among his fellow patricians and among his fellow baili. Still, save for the dogeship, his experience was not entirely unusual.

Besides Contarini, four other former baili were elected Procuratori di San Marco – Agostino Nani, Simone Contarini, Sebastiano Venier, and Giovanni Cappello. Others were among the electors in ducal elections, and some also received votes for this highest office.<sup>56</sup> Paul Grendler, in his study of the leaders of the Venetian state from 1540 to 1609, includes six baili on his list of the ‘Great Office Holders’ of this period – Marino Cavalli, Marcantonio Barbaro, Giacomo Soranzo, Matteo Zane, Girolamo Cappello, and Agostino Nani.<sup>57</sup> Career advancements after Constantinople were not limited to secular posts. Gianfrancesco Morosini, for example, was made bishop of Brescia while still in the Ottoman capital and received the cardinal’s hat in 1588; Matteo Zane became the patriarch of Venice in 1599.<sup>58</sup> All the other baili finished out their political lives in a succession of important diplomatic positions and, as they aged, increasingly in offices within the city of Venice itself. Certainly, then, we can say with confidence that for most baili their time in Constantinople represented not the apex but rather a significant stage in their ongoing political careers.<sup>59</sup>

Because of the extreme importance that relations with the Ottoman empire had for Venice, the office of bailo in Constantinople garnered much attention and renown for its holder. In 1524, for example, Piero Bragadin’s son wrote to him describing how all Venice eagerly awaited news of his arrival and successful audience in Constantinople, and when word reached the lagoon everyone was encouraged and impressed by his good offices.<sup>60</sup> The high-profile nature of the office and its sensitivity meant that service in the Ottoman capital could bear lasting fruits for a Venetian patrician’s political career. Conversely, failure could snuff out a promising career and end it in disgrace, even death. The most notable example of this is Girolamo Lippomano, who was believed to be passing sensitive information to the Spanish during his term in Constantinople. He was recalled in 1591 and killed himself (or was killed, some alleged) as his ship sailed into sight of Venice.<sup>61</sup>

Despite the potential importance of the bailate to a patrician’s career, we must not overlook the exceptions. Certain patricians tried, often successfully, to avoid the expenses and responsibilities of such an office. A letter from the papal nuncio Gratiani in Venice in 1598 reveals some of the reasons election as bailo might be seen as less than desirable:<sup>62</sup>

A day or two ago Signor Alvise Priuli, the cardinal’s brother, a gentleman of good name and reputation, was appointed to be the new bailo in Constantinople. In earlier times this post was a desirable one, because [the bailo] handled large sums of money belonging to the Republic and gave no account of them, or at least did so in such a way that one had to trust him and take his word for what he had spent,

because he had to keep all the ministers sweet with presents and to penetrate into the councils of the Turks by means of secret bribery and corruption. Now that this has ceased and the fear of the Turks has passed away, these expenses have for the most part ended, although the perils of a long voyage and other possible mishaps are still attached to the post; and, since opportunities for gain are lacking, men not only do not want the job but actively avoid it. Cardinal Priuli is deeply displeased at his brother's election and told me yesterday that his people are thinking of trying to excuse him on the grounds that as a brother of the cardinal he would command no confidence at Constantinople.

Priuli successfully avoided his office, and he was not alone in attempting to duck the burden of serving as bailo in Constantinople.<sup>63</sup> But what is most interesting about this passage is the various reasons given for a bailo's refusal of his post – the long voyage, the expenses, the lack of possibility for economic gain, and 'other possible mishaps'.

One 'possible mishap' that discouraged some patricians was the health risk associated both with the long voyage to Constantinople and with long sojourns in the city itself. These fears were not unfounded: a number of baili during our period died in Constantinople, and several more died on the trip to or from the city.<sup>64</sup> Almost to a man, all lamented the impact of the 'noxious airs' of Constantinople on their 'complexions'.<sup>65</sup> Agostino Nani complained that he had been bled for a fever, his third serious sickness in the 15 months he had been in the city, which he attributed to Constantinople's air. While complaints of ill health were so common as to appear simple tropes intended to elicit sympathy on the home front and to emphasize the noble sacrifice by the bailo for his *patria*, health concerns were very significant issues. So common were outbreaks of the plague in Constantinople that the French ambassador Salignac described the disease as *le mal de Constantinople*.<sup>66</sup> The seventeenth-century Ottoman poet Nabi similarly wrote of the capital city: 'Were it not for all kinds of diseases / Were it not for the accursed plague / Who would ever leave this place like paradise?' With obvious exaggeration Pietro della Valle reported in 1615 that in the span of three months 120,000 Turks, 2,000 Jews and 18,000 Christians died of the plague, and only his rooms were spared. Only slightly less extreme was the tally reported by Ottaviano Bon in 1607 of 100,000 in four months. Bon wrote:<sup>67</sup>

This evil of the plague serves as a blood-letting and as a purge to this body [the city] of the bad humours of unmeasured greatness, and as an instrument to flush out the faeces and the filthiness of the lowlife, because in the final count very few of the Grandi and those of mediocre condition die in comparison to the plebes.



If life in Constantinople was risky, travel to and from the city was even more so. Cristoforo Valier died on his way home from Constantinople, as did Girolamo Trevisan, grandson of Domenico Trevisan who had been bailo to Süleyman.<sup>68</sup> The most striking case of the dangers associated with travel was that of bailo-elect Vincenzo Gradenigo in 1599. His dispatches chronicle the devastation of his party travelling from Venice to Constantinople. Problems began near Lepanto, when a large number of his entourage became ill due to the bad air, hot sun and cold water. By the time the party reached Thessaloníki, members began to die in rapid succession: seven died in eight days, and Gradenigo himself became very ill. Eventually, the company was able to reach Constantinople on a ship sent by the sultan to rescue them, but Gradenigo was unable to overcome his illness and died in March 1600. So badly deteriorated was his body that, despite his final request to be returned for burial in Venice, he was buried near the baptistry in the church of San Francesco in Galata.<sup>69</sup> This protracted drama did result in some good, as the Senate finally allowed the baili to be accompanied by a physician on their trips to Constantinople, something Gradenigo in his last letters had excoriated the senators for not allowing. Given these sorts of experiences, it is not surprising that Giovanni Dolfín, elected bailo in 1593, should have been excused from the office on the basis of testimonials from several doctors to his ill health and the fact that he had been released early from his service as ambassador to the Holy Roman Emperor for health reasons. Several physicians attested to the particulars of his case: they found him 'so languid and afflicted, with such a great obstruction and hardness in the liver, so emaciated and with such great weakness of stomach and intestines, that reasonably he will not be able to recover his entire health, except with great diligence over a long period of time, with careful care'.<sup>70</sup>

Also of concern for potential baili, both for medical but even more for professional reasons, was length of residency in Constantinople. The two-year term to which baili technically were elected usually extended to at least three years, and when travel and time to train a replacement were factored in it often stretched even longer. Increasingly towards the end of this period the terms of the baili became more and more lengthy, with the most protracted being those of Giorgio Giustinian and Almoró Nani, who both served seven years. The causes of these prolongations were varied. Marcantonio Barbaro was just preparing to return to Venice when the hostilities of the War of the Holy League prevented his departure. He was able to return only in 1574, after six years in Constantinople. Difficulty in finding a replacement could draw out a bailo's time because of scarcity of qualified patricians, their refusal to accept the position, or the death of a bailo-elect before he could arrive. Another potential delay is evidenced in the case of Almoró Nani, who in response to his request to return to Venice

was told that while the Senate commiserated with him, it could not satisfy his request because the replacement it had elected was still in Frankfurt, where he would remain until the election of the new emperor.<sup>71</sup> While service in Constantinople could prove beneficial for one's career, becoming trapped at the Porte, isolated for too long from the centre of political life, had the potential of stifling rather than promoting one's advancement.

Yet another deterrent was the potential for danger that the bailate presented. If hostilities broke out, the bailo was likely to be detained, as happened to Marcantonio Barbaro in 1570 and Alvise Contarini in 1638. Usually imprisonment meant little more than house arrest: the baili were not mistreated and were even permitted to leave for religious services. Some few baili were harmed, however, and this possibility loomed large in the collective memory of officials in the Ottoman capital. In 1453, the bailo Girolamo Minotto had been executed for his role in the defence of Constantinople. The outbreak of the War of Candia in 1645, which ended the peaceful interlude which had endured since the end of the War of Cyprus, had serious ramifications for Venice's representatives to the Porte: in 1649 the bailo Giovanni Soranzo and his dragomans were chained together at the neck and paraded through the streets of Constantinople to the notorious Seven Towers prison. The extraordinary ambassador sent after Soranzo to treat for peace, Giovanni Cappello, was imprisoned in Adrianople in 1653 while trying to return to Venice and held until his death at age 78 in 1662. He became so despondent that he tried to commit suicide. Eventually, following his death, his body was embalmed, cut in half, and returned to Venice hidden in two barrels of caviar.<sup>72</sup>

Despite these incidents, the view commonly advanced that the 'Turks' ignored concepts of diplomatic immunity seems exaggerated. Except in times of open hostility, when Venetian correspondence was viewed as a threat to their war effort, the Ottomans generally respected and defended the diplomatic immunity of all representatives to the Porte. As Mattingly has shown, an ambassador theoretically enjoyed immunity only as long as he did not indulge in conduct unbecoming to his office such as espionage, conspiracy, or criminal activities. Indeed, throughout Europe in this period, the concept of diplomatic immunity was only gradually being worked out, and it was not uncommon for diplomats to be imprisoned and even killed.<sup>73</sup> The Venetians themselves regularly imprisoned Ottoman merchants and officials in their lands at the outset of hostilities and used them as bargaining chips to protect their own people in Ottoman lands. The reality is that European practices differed little from those of the Ottomans.

Another factor that influenced some patricians' decisions had less to do with the dangers of the bailate specifically than with the vicissitudes of holding office abroad in general. Chief among these were the financial

burdens associated with high office. Indeed, a recurrent theme in the requests of baili to be repatriated was the damage that their extended time away in governmental service had wreaked on their households and extended families.<sup>74</sup> Marco Venier gave some indication of the financial burden his absence created in a letter to the Senate. He had left Venice within two months of his election, at age 58, in conditions 'that the young can barely withstand':

I undid my house in my urgent need, and sold at a most vile price to the Jews all the few pieces of furniture that I had been able to put together through my parsimony, after having first sold similarly at a most vile price all that remained of my inheritance to make the payment due on the dowry of my sister-in-law, the former wife of my brother. I sold from my poor substance a great deal of capital that earned me more than 200 ducats income and left behind several debts to get myself in order, having first sold all my possessions to liberate myself from the interest that I suffered from under the provisions made for the payment of this dowry.

Venier did all this 'because whose are my possessions and my life if not my *patria's*?'<sup>75</sup>

While these sorts of complaints must be viewed with some suspicion, certainly the expenses of the bailate were formidable. Leonardo Donà reported in 1595 that the bailate spent 10,000 ducats annually, plus 2,000 ducats in salaries, and this did not include the bailo's salary which was paid out of funds drawn in Venice. Often the baili were forced to use their own funds to cover expenses. One bailo reported that he had money for four servants but had to maintain eight and that the expenses were 'almost intolerable'. Shortage of cash seems to have been a perpetual problem, appearing regularly in letters from 1520 to 1650. As the income from duties collected on goods shipped to and from Constantinople diminished with the declining trade, the baili almost always did not collect enough to cover the expenses of the bailate. One solution to this shortage was to borrow money in the form of letters of credit from the trading nation's merchants to be paid to their principals in Venice. Increasingly this route was closed as merchants were directed by their principals not to lend money to the baili because it took so long, sometimes up to a year, for the Venetian government to pay them back. This forced the baili to turn to Jewish lenders, who were universally held to charge usuriously high interest rates, or to Ottoman Muslims. This shortage of funds, Piero Barbarigo charged, caused the Senate not to receive the quality of representation it desired, as he had been forced to bypass social opportunities that would permit him to develop friendships and curry favour with high Porte officials, such as his refusal of

an invitation from the ağa of the janissaries to accompany him for several days on a retreat to *una bella caza*.<sup>76</sup>

Additionally, because of the great sums involved in maintaining the diplomatic mission, the potential for charges of misuse of official funds always existed. As the nuncio Gratiani indicated, baili in the late sixteenth century did not enjoy the fiscal freedom of those of earlier times. This situation was in part a result of the profligate bailate of Antonio Erizzo, 1555–57. In his two years he spent almost 50,000 ducats, three times as much as his predecessor.<sup>77</sup> This led the Senate to order the merchant Council of Twelve to watch over and approve the baili's expenses and to require that an accounting be sent to Venice every three months. Accusations of mismanagement of funds were also levelled at Giorgio Giustinian, who countered that rather than having misappropriated official funds he had had to use his own personal funds to cover the inflated food and provision costs of his bailate caused by the famine that plagued the capital at that time.<sup>78</sup> Other cost-cutting measures were also variously attempted to shave off some of the baili's many expenses. Dragomans were reduced to two, as were the janissaries protecting the household, and the pay of both of these was reduced. While many of these reforms were quickly overturned, the responsibility to send trimestral accountings endured, and the baili were very careful to observe this requirement.<sup>79</sup>

These, then, are a number of the challenges that might inspire a patrician actively to avoid the post. While some patricians tried to do so, for many more the bailate was highly desirable and sought after. This was the case with Alvise Contarini, who, after 16 continuous years of service abroad, was 'elected, as he desired, bailo' in September 1636. This is also borne out by an exchange between Maria Querini Correr and her husband, Pietro, ambassador in Vienna in July 1756. He had expressed disappointment at his election as ambassador to Rome and not bailo in Constantinople as he had preferred. After two downhearted letters, Correr's wife responded a bit impatiently that he should accept the Roman ambassadorship for now, holding out hope that he would be elected bailo sometime in the future. Her advice was well-founded, as Correr was elected bailo in 1761, following his mission to Rome.<sup>80</sup> Even after the political and economic focus of Europe had shifted away from the Mediterranean, the office of bailo in Constantinople remained one of the city's plum diplomatic postings.

During the sensitive years of the sixteenth century, as Venice worked to maintain its independence and position in a radically changed Italian and Mediterranean world, diplomacy played a critical role. This was particularly true in maintaining the equilibrium of the Veneto-Ottoman

relationship. No Venetian diplomatic posting, then, was more important than that of bailo in Constantinople. The complexities of representing and defending the Republic's political and commercial position in the sixteenth-century Mediterranean required the ablest, most dedicated of Venetian patrician officials. The perils of the road, the expenses of the mission, and the very public and exposed nature of the position deterred some patricians. For men of ambition and ability, however, the office of bailo in Constantinople represented a significant opportunity which outweighed the dangers and inconveniences that it often presented. Effective service in this most public of positions could provide significant recognition for men at the heights of the Venetian hierarchy and almost always served as a springboard to more important offices within the Venetian state apparatus. While some avoided the challenges of defending and representing Venice's commercial and diplomatic positions in Constantinople, it would appear in the end that many more eagerly sought the posting as an important step in their careers and a way in which to bring honour and recognition to their families.

## ABBREVIATIONS

All archival sources are located in the Archivio di Stato di Venezia unless otherwise indicated. Abbreviations are as follows:

<i>Albèri</i>	Eugene Albèri, <i>Relazioni degli ambasciatori veneti al Senato</i> , series 3, Vols. 1–3 (Florence, 1840–55)
<i>APC</i>	Archivi Propri, Costantinopoli
<i>BAC</i>	Bailo a Costantinopoli
<i>Barbaro</i>	M. Barbaro, <i>Arbori de' patritii veneti</i>
<i>Berchet</i>	N. Barozzi and G. Berchet (eds.), <i>Le Relazioni degli stati europei ... nel secolo decimosettimo, Turchia</i> , Vols. 1 and 2 (Venice, 1871–72)
<i>CancG</i>	Cancelliere Grande
<i>CapiXLett</i>	Capi del Consiglio di Dieci, Letter di ambasciatori
<i>CollRel</i>	Collegio, Relazioni
<i>DBI</i>	<i>Dizionario biografico italiano</i> (Rome, 1960–present)
<i>DocTR</i>	<i>Documenti Turchi</i>
<i>DonàR</i>	Donà delle Rose (Museo Correr)
<i>Gregolin</i>	Miscellanea Gregolin
<i>InqStat</i>	Inquisitori di Stato
<i>IT VII</i>	MS. Italiano, classe VII (Biblioteca Marciana)
<i>LSTR</i>	<i>Lettere e scritture turchesche</i>
<i>SDC</i>	Senato Dispacci, Costantinopoli
<i>SDCop</i>	Senato Dispacci, Copie Moderne
<i>SDeIC</i>	Senato Deliberazioni, Costantinopoli
<i>SMar</i>	Senato, Mar
<i>SV</i>	<i>Studi Veneziani</i>
<i>XSeg</i>	Consiglio dei dieci, Deliberazioni segrete

## NOTES

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1. Evidence of Venetian concern with the Ottoman question is ample. In 1506, for example, the Senate created the V Savi alla Mercanzia, a board of trade composed of five patricians charged with nurturing Venice's commercial relations with the Ottomans in response to the Portuguese threat to the spice trade. Another, more subtle organizational change occurred in the middle of the century. Since 1440, all of the Senate's letters and papers had been divided into two major archival groupings, the *Senato terra* and the *Senato mar*, which treated respectively documentation dealing with Venice's landed and maritime empires. In 1556, all Senate materials concerning Venetian relations with the Ottoman Empire were collected in a separate archival collocation, the *Senato Costantinopoli*. Only the affairs of the Papacy were deemed important enough similarly to warrant a separate archival series, the *Roma ordinaria*, established in 1560. While seemingly minor organizational moves, these innovations indicate the importance attached to Ottoman affairs and also the extent to which Venetians were willing to innovate to face the changing tides of their fortunes. M. Borgherini-Scarabellin, *Il Magistrato dei Cinque Savi alla Mercanzia dalla istituzione alla caduta della repubblica* (Venice, 1925); A. da Mosto, *L'Archivio di stato di Venezia*, Vol. 1 (Rome, 1937), p.38.
2. C. Coco and F. Manzonetto, *Baili veneziani alla sublime porta: Storia e caratteristiche dell'ambasciata veneta a Costantinopoli* (Venice, 1985), p.9.
3. The bailo's origins date to the eleventh century, but it was during Michael Paleologus's reconquest of Constantinople in 1265–68 that the post acquired its characteristic features and duties. The title *bailos* itself dates from this time: it derived from the bailo's function as Venetian representative before the Basileus, the Byzantine emperor. Initially the bailo's responsibilities focused primarily on the commercial matters of the large Venetian merchant nation. More than a simple consul, however, he was the official protector of Venetian interests in all the Byzantine Empire, as evidenced in his official title, *Baiulus Venetorum in Constantinopoli et in toto imperio Romaniae*. Over time the baili began increasingly to be charged with political and diplomatic duties as well. D.M. Nicol, *Byzantium and Venice: A Study in Diplomatic and Cultural Relations* (Cambridge, 1988), pp.181–201, 289–91; C.A. Maltezos, *Ho thesmos tou en Konstantinoupolei Venetou vailou* (Athens, 1970), pp.34–7; *ibid.*, 'Il quartiere veneziano di Costantinopoli', *Thesaurimata*, 15 (1978), pp.30–61; H.F. Brown, 'Venetians and the Venetian Quarter in Constantinople to the Close of the Twelfth Century', *Journal of Hellenic Studies*, 40 (1920), pp.68–88; Diehl, 'La Colonie Vénétienne', pp.90–131; B. Simon, 'I rappresentanti diplomatici veneziani a Costantinopoli', in *Venezia e i turchi* (Milan, 1985), p.56; B. Spuler, 'Bāylōs', in *Encyclopedia of Islam*, new edition (Leiden, 1960–), Vol. 1, p.1008; C. Diehl, 'La colonie vénétienne à Constantinople à la fin du XIV<sup>e</sup> siècle', *Mélanges de l'École Française de Rome*, 3 (1883), pp.114, 122–7.
4. L. Lollino, *Vita del cavaliere Ottaviano Bon* (Venice, 1854), pp.8–9.
5. 'Relazione di Daniele Barbarigo', in *Albèri*, Vol. 6, pp.37–8.
6. 'Relazione di Simone Contarini', in *Berchet*, Vol. 1, p.234; *SMar*, reg. 80, c. 124v, 1 Oct. 1622.
7. *DonàR*, b. 23, cc. 65r–v. On the distinctions between the baili and ambassadors in a slightly earlier time, see D. Queller, *The Office of Ambassador in the Middle Ages* (Princeton, 1967), pp.80–82.

8. G. Mattingly, *Renaissance Diplomacy* (Baltimore, 1964), p.99; P. Preto, *I servizi segreti di Venezia* (Milan, 1994), p.197.
9. Simon, 'I rappresentanti diplomatici veneziani', p.65; Idem., 'Les dépêches de Marin Cavalli bayle à Constantinople (1558–1560)', Ph.D. diss., École des Hautes Études en Sciences Sociales, n.d. Vol. 1, pp.303–5. Spying for Venice could be lucrative: in 1583 the Senate promised a pension of 500 ducats annually to the Jewish physician Mose Benveniste for information on Ottoman court affairs. Preto, *I servizi segreti*, p.484.
10. The reliability of the Venetian ambassadors, including the bailo, has been challenged in more recent years. A revisionist article by C.H. Carter maintains that because of Venice's marginalization as a European power and the regular rotation of representatives in its diplomatic corps, Venetian ambassadors were unable to gain much information first-hand and thus relied on official sources and tips from other diplomats. These sources were often unreliable; as a result, misinformation was routinely and intentionally disseminated to the Venetians. C.H. Carter, 'The Ambassadors of Early Modern Europe', in C.H. Carter (ed.), *From the Renaissance to the Counter-Reformation: Essays in Honor of Garrett Mattingly* (New York, 1965), pp.279–80. A more recent critic of the baili, Gino Benzoni, has attacked them as blind repeaters of hearsay rather than careful observers of realities, at least in their *relazioni*. G. Benzoni, 'A proposito dei baili veneziani a Costantinopoli: qualche spunto, qualche osservazione', *SV*, 30 (1995), pp.74–5. For a similar assessment of the baili, see A. Tenenti, 'Profilo di un conflitto secolare', in *Venezia e i turchi: Scontri e confronti di due civiltà* (Milan, 1985), pp.12–15. For a contrasting position, see A. Ventura, 'Introduction', in *Relazioni degli ambasciatori veneti al senato*, Vol. 1 (Rome and Bari, 1976), p.cv; also D. Queller, 'How to Succeed as an Ambassador: A Sixteenth-Century Venetian Document', *Studia Gratiana*, 15 (1972), pp.665–6; idem, 'The Development of the Ambassadorial *Relazioni*', in J.R. Hale (ed.), *Renaissance Venice* (London, 1973), pp.191–2 n.47; Benzoni, 'A proposito della fonte prediletta di Ranke', pp.253–4, 256.
11. *Senato Secreto Deliberazioni*, reg. 71, cc. 37r–49r, cited in Simon, 'Les dépêches de Marin Cavalli', Vol. 2, pp.159–63.
12. See, for example *XSeg*, f. 20, 26 Sept. 1577, in which the bailo is informed of an Ottoman treaty with Florence that would allow its merchants official representation in Constantinople and which he is instructed to try quietly to impede it.
13. Italianized version of *avariz* (Arabic 'aw-rid), extraordinary levies imposed by the state in emergency situations.
14. *SDC*, b. 60, c. 316v, 14 Feb. 1604 (MV), Ottaviano Bon to Senate; 'Relazione di Pietro Foscarini', in *Berchet*, Vol. 2, p.101.
15. The Archivio di Stato contains a great number of these requests and the firmans that the sultan issued in response to them. Many original Ottoman documents are collected there, as well as translations made by contemporary interpreters. For a sample see *BAC*, b. 250–52, 374–5, and the collections *Lettere e scritture turchesche* and *Documenti Turchi*. The latter collection has been minutely indexed recently in M. Pedani Fabris, *Documenti turchi dell'archivio di stato di Venezia* (Rome, 1994).
16. *Gregolin*, b. 2, 17 Nov. 1593, Alvise and Leonardo Sanudo in Venice to Marco Venier; *Gregolin*, b. 2, 27 March 1594, Alvise and Leonardo Sanudo in Venice to Marco Venier; Simon, 'I rappresentanti diplomatici veneziani', pp.59, 62.
17. U. Tucci, 'Tra Venezia e mondo turco: i mercanti', in *Venezia e i turchi* (Milan, 1985), p.45; E. Ashtor, *Levant Trade in the Later Middle Ages* (Princeton, 1983), p.411.
18. Simon, 'I rappresentanti diplomatici veneziani', p.57; N. Steensgaard, 'Consuls and Nations in the Levant from 1570–1650', *Scandinavian Economic History Review*, 15 (1967), pp.25–6; *SDelC*, b. 5, 4 Oct. 1583, Senate to Bailo; *SMar*, reg. 55, c. 87v, 9 Nov. 1594; *SDC*, b. 23, cc. 229r–39v, 16 April 1586, Lorenzo Bernardo to Senate; *BAC*, b. 268, reg. 381, c. 41r, 2 Aug. 1592. Daniel Goffman maintains that there were no European consuls in Izmir

(Smirne) before 1600. There is ample evidence, however, that Venice had a resident consul in Izmir as early as 1587 and perhaps earlier. Goffman's explanation for the eclipse of Venice's commercial fortunes by the English after 1600, while provocative, suffers from a failure to consider Venetian archival materials, which results in numerous incorrect assertions, especially on the nature of Venice's consular officials. While this does not negate the value of a work that in many ways suggests viable explanations for a complex process, it does cause one to question the accuracy of the overall thesis. D. Goffman, *Izmir and the Levantine World, 1550–1650* (Seattle, 1990), p.139; *SDC*, b. 26, cc. 89r–90v, 12 Sept. 1587, Luca di Allegri, Consul in Smirne, to Lorenzo Bernardo.

19. See, for example, the many volumes of correspondence directed to Alvise Contarini preserved in the Biblioteca Marciana. *IT VII* 1193 (8883), cc. 1r–1v, 4 July 1639, Antonio Giustinian in Cairo to Alvise Contarini; *SDC*, b. 57, c. 145v, 18 April 1603, Francesco Contarini to Senate.
20. Simon, 'I rappresentanti diplomatici veneziani', p.56. This prohibition was not unique to Venice; in 1528 Florence made it the law for its bailo in Constantinople. G. Müller (ed.), *Documenti sulle relazioni delle città toscane coll'oriente cristiano e coi turchi fino all'anno MDXXXI* (Florence, 1879; reprint Rome, 1966), p.351.
21. *IT VII* 1179 (8878), c. 86r, 22 May 1639, Andrea Cappello in Venice to Alvise Contarini; *ibid.*, cc. 80r–80v, 26 March 1639.
22. *APC*, b. 2, 5v–7r, 29 Jan. 1524 (MV), Piero Bragadin to Senate; *APC*, b. 18, cc. 5: 23v–24r, 18 July 1621, Giorgio Giustinian to Senate.
23. Simon, 'Les dépêches de Marin Cavalli', Vol. 2, pp.159–63; U. Tucci, 'The Psychology of the Venetian Merchant in the Sixteenth Century', in Hale (ed.), *Renaissance Venice*, p.362; see also *InqStat*, b. 433, 21 March 1592, Alvise Cucina to Antonio Paruta, which mentions Lorenzo Bernardo's carrying a small box full of pearls as well as 300 ducats belonging to Cucina. See also *CollRel*, b. 5, c. 35r, 'Relazione di Jacopo Soranzo'; G. Cozzi, 'Paolo Contarini', *DBI*, Vol. 28, pp.258–60. Olivieri mentions a number of cases involving Girolamo Ferro, whose bailate was an economic disaster, trading directly and under the cover of family members' names in Constantinople. A. Olivieri, 'Mercanti e "mondi": a Venezia, nel "500"', *SV*, 7 (1983), pp.144–5, 158.
24. *BAC*, b. 295, c. 4v, 22 Feb. 1596 (MV); 'Relazione di Alvise Contarini', in *Berchet*, Vol. 1, p.331.
25. Simon, 'I rappresentanti diplomatici veneziani', p.62; S. Faroghi, 'The Venetian Presence in the Ottoman Empire (1600–1630)', *Journal of European Economic History*, 15 (1986), p.363.
26. E. Dalleggio d'Alessio, *Relatione della stato della cristianità di Pera e Constantinopoli* (Constantinople, 1925), 73; G. Matteucci, *Un glorioso convento francescano sulle rive del Bosforo: il San Francesco di Galata in Costantinopoli, c. 1230–1697* (Florence, 1967), pp.358–62; E. Dalleggio d'Alessio, *Le couvent et l'église des Saints-Pierre-et-Paul à Galata* (Istanbul, 1935), pp.14–16.
27. G. de Mun, 'L'établissement des Jésuites a Constantinople sous le regne d'Achmet 1er (1603–1617)', *Revue des Questions Historiques*, 74 (1903), pp.163–72.
28. Simon, 'I rappresentanti diplomatici veneziani', p.62; *BAC*, b. 365-I, 3 June 1588. See also A. Tenenti, 'Gli schiavi di Venezia alla fine del Cinquecento', *Rivista Storica Italiana*, 67 (1955), pp.52–69; W.H. Rudt de Collenberg, *Esclavage et rançons des chrétiens en la Méditerranée (1570–1600)* (Paris, 1987).
29. *SDC*, b. 15, c. 32r, 2 April 1581, Paolo Contarini to Senate; 'Relazione di Daniele Barbarigo', in *Albéri*, Vol. 6, p.43; *APC*, b. 2, c. 13v, 29 March 1525, Piero Bragadin to Senate; *DocTR*, b. 4, #484, c. 2 Oct 1542, Sultan to Doge; *LSTR*, b. 3, cc. 31r–v, 2 Nov 1574, Mehmed Paşa to Doge.
30. *SDC*, b. 16, cc. 269v–272r, 5 Dec. 1582, Gianfrancesco Morosini to Senate; *APC*, b. 2, c.



13v, 29 March 1525, Piero Bragadin to Senate.

31. BAC, b. 365-I, 3 June 1588; pamphlet dated sometime after 1695: *Parti & Ordini Concernanti alla Liberatione de poveri Schiavi* (Venice), in ProvOsp (Provveditori sopra ospedali e luoghi pii), b. 98, #13; *SDeIC*, b. 6, 12 Feb. 1585 (MV). Other similar organizations were established around this same time: the *Opera pia della redenzione de' schiavi* was created in 1581 by Gregory XIII; in 1586 in Sicily the *Arciconfraternità della redenzione dei cattivi* was instituted; and in 1597 Genoa set up the *Magistrato del riscatto degli schiavi*. F. Braudel, *The Mediterranean and the Mediterranean World in the Age of Philip II*, Vol. 2 (New York, 1972), pp.887–8.
32. Few biographical works exist on men who served as baili: the very dated C. Yriarte, *La vie d'un patricien de Venise au 16e siècle* (Paris, 1874), for example, covers the life of Marcantonio Barbaro, bailo during the hostilities of 1570–73. Besides this, there are a number of useful entries in the *Dizionario biografico degli italiani* (*DBI*). Unfortunately this work, while expansive in scope, has proceeded at a snail's pace, and so at present some 40 volumes have only arrived at the letter F and a number of important baili fall towards the end of the alphabet. Still, of a total of 26 baili who served between the War of the Holy League and the outbreak of the War of Candia, 11 have been treated in the *DBI*.
33. Tormene suggests that there were exceptions to this but provides no examples. Perhaps he was thinking of Gabriel Cavazza, the *cittadino* secretary who served as vice bailo after the death of Nicolò Barbarigo in 1579, awaiting the arrival of a replacement. A. Tormene, 'Il bailaggio a Costantinopoli di Girolamo Lippomano e la sua tragica fine', *Nuovo Archivio Veneto*, ns, 6 (1903), p.391.
34. R. Finlay, *Politics in Renaissance Venice* (New Brunswick, NJ, 1980), pp.59–81; G. Cozzi, 'Authority and the Law in Renaissance Venice', in Hale, *Renaissance Venice*, pp.293–345; J.C. Davis, 'Shipping and Spying in the Early Career of a Venetian Doge, 1496–1502', *SV*, 16 (1974), pp.97–8. See also D. Queller, *The Venetian Patriciate* (Urbana, IL, 1986), p.251, who attributes this monopoly of offices to the 'majority of the patricians ... seriously afflicted by poverty'. Both Sanudo and Priuli reported that a majority of the patriciate, perhaps even three-quarters, were poor. *Ibid.*, p.30. See also P.F. Grendler, 'The Leaders of the Venetian State, 1540–1609: A Prosopographical Analysis', *SV*, 19 (1990), pp.35–7.
35. See the tables of baili and ambassadors in Appendices A and B.
36. (Venice, 1575). Angelo Ventura has written, 'There were not many patricians, in truth, that frequented the Paduan *Studio* or the Venetian humanistic circles, but from these very men the Senate often preferred to choose its ambassadors.' Ventura, *Relazioni degli ambasciatori veneti al senato*, Vol. 1, p.xxi.
37. G. Cozzi, 'Paolo Contarini', *DBI*, Vol. 28, pp.258–60; *De cautione adhibenda in edendis libris* (Padua, 1719); G. Benzoni, 'Simone Contarini', *DBI*, Vol. 28, pp.282–90; A. da Mosto, *I dogi di Venezia nella vita pubblica e privata* (Florence, 1977), pp.xxix, 75–6, 354–7.
38. Lollino, *Vita del cavaliere Ottaviano Bon*, pp.2–5; M. Pasdera, 'Ottaviano Bon', *DBI*, Vol. 11, pp.421–4.
39. A document of 14 July 1590 shows Bon loading merchandise for shipment to Tripoli. *Gregolin*, b. 1, 43v–44v; also *Atti Zuan Andrea Catti*, reg. 3356, cc. 232v–233v, 1585, G. Stefani (ed.), *L'Assicurazione a Venezia: Dalle origini alla fine della Serenissima* (Trieste, 1956), Vol. 1, pp.267–8.
40. J.C. Davis, *A Venetian Family and Its Fortune, 1500–1900: The Donà and the Conservation of Their Wealth* (Philadelphia, 1975), pp.37, 54.
41. G. Benzoni, 'Francesco Contarini', *DBI*, Vol. 28, pp.165–72; BAC, b. 263, reg. 372, c. 4r, 30 June 1580; P. Contarini, *Diario del viaggio da Venezia a Costantinopoli di M. Paolo Contarini che andava bailo per la repubblica veneta alla porta ottomana nel 1580* (Venice, 1856), p.11; *SDC*, b. 55, cc. 183r–v, 21 June 1602, Agostino Nani to Senate.
42. G. Maranini, *La costituzione di Venezia*, 2 vols. (Florence, 1927; reprint Florence, 1974),

- Vol. 2, pp.42–3. Stanley Chojnacki has written extensively on the *barbarella* and the passage of young patricians into political adulthood. See, for example, his 'Political Adulthood in Fifteenth-Century Venice', *American Historical Review*, 91 (1986), pp.791–810; also his 'Kinship Ties and Young Patricians in Fifteenth-Century Venice', *Renaissance Quarterly*, 38 (1985), pp.240–70.
43. J.C. Davis, *The Decline of the Venetian Nobility as a Ruling Class* (Baltimore, 1962), pp.29–30.
  44. There were three important councils of savi, or commissioners – including the *Savi agli ordini*, the *Savi di terraferma*, and the highest council, the *Savi del consiglio*. These were among the more important internal offices in the Venetian bureaucracy. Queller, *The Venetian Patriciate*, pp.34–7.
  45. Tormene, 'Il bailaggio a Costantinopoli di Girolamo Lippomano', pp.381–9.
  46. Cozzi, 'Paolo Contarini', *DBI*, Vol. 28, pp.258–60; *Aspetti e momenti della diplomazia veneziana: Mostra documentaria 26 giugno – 26 settembre 1982* (Venice, 1982), p.17; 'Relazione di Alvise Contarini', in *Berchet*, Vol. 1, p.330. For a suggestive table displaying the career trajectory of a Venetian patrician, see Yriarte, *La vie d'un patricien*, pp.433–5.
  47. G. Benzoni, 'Giovanni Cappello', *DBI*, Vol. 18, pp.786–9.
  48. Davis, *A Venetian Family and Its Fortune*, pp.93–5; Idem., *The Decline of the Venetian Nobility*, pp.54–74. S. Chojnacki, 'Subaltern Patriarchs: Patrician Bachelors', in *Women and Men in Renaissance Venice: Twelve Essays on Patrician Society* (Baltimore, 2000), p.249.
  49. In a typical Donà generation, two or three daughters married and the others became nuns. Davis, *A Venetian Family and Its Fortune*, pp.69–73, 98, 102, 104, 106–9. On family strategies for daughters, see J. Gisela Sperling's excellent dissertation, 'Convents and the Body Politic in Late Renaissance Venice (1550–1650)', Ph.D. diss., Stanford University, 1995, pp.12–19, 38–51, now published as Jutta Gisela Sperling, *Convents and the Body Politic in Late Renaissance Venice* (Chicago, 1999).
  50. Davis, *A Venetian Family and Its Fortune*, pp.98, 102, 104. Chojnacki has found that married patricians in the fifteenth century held more offices than their bachelor brothers (4.8 to 2.7 offices on average) and that these offices were of the 'second echelon'. While I am unable to make a statistical comparison of numbers and types of offices held by bachelor and married brothers, for the later sixteenth century, at least among the baili, it is clear that these bachelor diplomats held positions at the very highest level of the Venetian state. Chojnacki, 'Subaltern Patriarchs', pp.252–3.
  51. S. Carbone, 'Note introduttive ai dispacci al senato dei rappresentanti diplomatici veneti', *Quaderni della Rassegna degli Archivi di Stato*, 43 (1974), p.25. A 1572 law clearly states this: 'The negotiations that from time to time it is necessary to treat in Constantinople are of still greater importance than those that are treated in the other above abovementioned courts': the Papacy, the Empire, France, Spain. *CancG*, b. 14, 6 April 1575 in Council of X.
  52. The index of ambassadorial dispatches, *Dispacci degli ambasciatori al senato* (Rome, 1959), incorrectly identifies an Alvise Foscarini as bailo in 1640. This error results from confounding the name of the departing bailo, Alvise Contarini, with that of the ambassador, Pietro Foscarini, who was present at the Porte at this time. The dispatches sent from Constantinople were signed by all three officials, Trevisan, Contarini, and Foscarini.
  53. Political writers of the day generally agreed that the appropriate age for an ambassador was between 30 and 50. Mattingly, *Renaissance Diplomacy*, p.185.
  54. On age and office in Venetian political life, see Finlay, *Politics in Renaissance Venice*, pp.124–41; idem., 'The Venetian Republic as a Gerontocracy: Age and Politics in the Renaissance', *Journal of Medieval and Renaissance Studies*, 8 (1978), pp.157–8. See also Grendler, 'The Leaders of the Venetian State', pp.55–7. Grendler shows that in the second half of the sixteenth century the median age of election to important offices such as ducal councilor, *savio grande*, and membership in the Council of ten was 55, right around the age

in which a bailo would be returning from his prestigious posting. Grendler's findings in this piece differ slightly from the statistics he presents in an earlier article, 'The Tre Savii Sopra Eresia 1547–1605: A Prosopographical Study', *SV*, Vol. 3 (1979), p.289.

55. Benzoni, 'Francesco Contarini', *DBI*, Vol. 28, pp.165–72.
56. Agostino Nani competed for doge in 1615, 1618, 1623, and 1624, Giovanni Moro in 1615, and Simone Contarini in 1623, 1624, and 1630. Despite repeated nominations, Nani never was elected doge; a poem which was anonymously posted in 1618 after he lost out to the infirm Nicolò Donà (who died a month later), suggests that there was a popular opposition to his candidacy: 'Ma finalmente col mal di mal anni / El xe meglio el Donà che no xe el Nani / Se ben l'èfato Dose non importa / Perché tutte le cose va alla storta.' Da Mosto, *I dogi di Venezia*, pp. 338, 343–4, 349, 356, 360, 366. Finlay suggests that it was Nani's youth and good health, not qualities generally desired in Venetian doges, which went against him in the acrimonious election of 1618; Finlay, *Politics in Renaissance Venice*, p.133.
57. Grendler, 'The Leaders of the Venetian State', pp.62–85.
58. *Barbaro*, Vol. 5, p.346; *ibid.*, Vol.7, p.324. Zane's appointment was not well received in Rome and was the subject of some diplomatic wrangling. On this see G. Benzoni, 'Una controversia tra Roma e Venezia all'inizio del '600: la conferma del patriarca', *Bollettino dell'Istituto di Storia della Società e dello Stato Veneziano*, 3 (1961), pp.121–38.
59. The discussion of the careers of the baili and the data on birth and death dates were derived from *Barbaro*; *Avogaria di Comun, Nascite, libro d'oro*; Lollino, *Vita del cavaliere Ottaviano Bon*; Tormene, 'Il bailaggio a Costantinopoli di Girolamo Lippomano'; Grendler, 'The Leaders of the Venetian State'; and especially *DBI*: Vol. 5, pp.98–9, Badoer, Andrea Biagio; Vol. 6, pp.76–8, Barbarigo, Niccolò; Vol. 6, pp.110–13, Barbaro, Marcantonio; Vol. 9, pp.308–10, Bernardo, Lorenzo; Vol. 11, pp.421–4, Bon, Ottaviano; Vol. 18, pp.786–9, Cappello, Giovanni; Vol. 28, pp.258–60, Contarini, Paolo; Vol. 28, pp.165–72, Contarini, Francesco; Vol. 28, pp.282–90, Contarini, Simone; Vol. 28, pp.82–91, Contarini, Alvise; Vol. 29, pp.493–7, Correr, Giovanni.
60. *Gregolin*, b. 6, 21 June 1524, Gianfrancesco Bragadin to Bailo. Some sense of the importance attached to the office of bailo is apparent in the highly symbolic order of the grand ducal processions that filled the Venetian calendar. The order and position of each part of the whole was carefully laid out and highly significant. The last segment of the long procession included the most important figures in the Venetian government. First came the doge, his six counsellors, the Procuratori di San Marco, the Savi grandi, and the Council of Ten, and then the five most important resident ambassadors in Venice's service, 'Rome, Vienna, Madrid, Paris, and Constantinople'. E. Muir, *Civic Ritual in Renaissance Venice* (Princeton, 1981), p.199.
61. On this mysterious incident see Tormene, 'Il bailaggio a Costantinopoli di Girolamo Lippomano', pp.375–431; 7 (1904), pp.66–125; 8 (1904), pp.127–61; G. Pillinini, 'Lorenzo Bernardo', *DBI*, Vol. 9, pp.308–10; Preto, *I servizi segreti*, pp.76–8. Other baili were also accused of improprieties: Marino Cavalli, for example, was accused of accepting bribes from Jewish merchants in Constantinople but was eventually found innocent by the Senate. Grendler, 'The Leaders of the Venetian State', p.69.
62. *Archivio Segreto del Vaticano*, DN, f. 33, cc. 117v–118r, Letter of Papal Nuncio Gratiani, August 1598, cited in D. Chambers and B. Pullan (eds.), *Venice: A Documentary History* (Oxford, 1992), pp.256–7.
63. Other examples include Augustin Barbarigo, who showed 'many, just causes, very pertinent to the public weal of our state, and to that of his own person, which make him unable to be able to go to the above-mentioned office' and was therefore excused. *SMar*, reg. 31, cc. 13v–14r, 21 March 1565; also *SMar*, reg. 42, cc. 99r–v, 3 Jan 1574 (MV); *Barbaro*, Vol. 2, p.152. While Gratiani implies that avoidance of the office of bailo was a new phenomenon, Venetian patricians had a long, rich history of clever means of avoiding the expenses and

- dangers of political offices. On this, see Queller, *The Venetian Patriciate*, pp.113–71.
64. T. Bertelò, *Il Palazzo degli Ambasciatori di Venezia a Costantinopoli* (Bologna, 1932), pp.119–20. Bertelò puts the number of baili who died in Constantinople in the sixteenth century at three – Girolamo Ferro, Niccolò Barbarigo, and Vincenzo Gradenigo – but he overlooks Andrea Priuli, who died of plague in the 1520s. R. Fulin, 'Itinerario di ser Piero Zen stato orator al serenissimo signor Turcho fatto per jo Marin Sanudo in summario', *Archivio Veneto*, 22 (1881), p.118.
  65. *SDelC*, b. 6, 13 Feb 1586 (MV). See also the *fede* of the bailate's physician, David Valentino to Senate, which describes a 'trauma to the head, and a sibilus of the ear', as well as a three-month fever which Bernardo caught due to 'discomforts experienced during the voyage'. *SDelC*, b. 6, 29 July 1586.
  66. *SDC*, b. 53, c. 427r, 26 Aug. 1601, Agostino Nani to Senate; 17 Aug. 1607, Salignac to King, in T. de Gontaut Biron, *Ambassade en Turquie de Jean de Gontaut Biron Baron de Salignac, 1605 à 1610*, Vol. 2 (Paris, 1888–89), p.162.
  67. B. Lewis, *Istanbul and the Civilization of the Ottoman Empire* (Norman, OK, 1963), pp.96–100; P. della Valle, *De' viaggi di Pietro Della Valle Il Pellegrino: Descritti da lui medesimo in Lettere familiari, Parte Prima cioè La Turchia* (Rome, 1650), p.296. *APC*, b. 10, c. 167v, 19 Nov. 1607, Ottaviano Bon to Senate.
  68. *Barbaro*, Vol. 7, p.179; *ibid.*, p.115.
  69. *SDC*, b. 49, cc. 410r–414r, 27 Aug 1599, Vincenzo Gradenigo in Thessaloniki to Senate; *SDC*, b. 50, cc. 32r–33v, 5 Sept. 1599, Vincenzo Gradenigo in Thessaloniki to Senate; *SDC*, b. 51, c. 10v, 7 March 1600, Girolamo Cappello to Senate; Matteucci, *Un glorioso convento francescano*, p.344. On Gradenigo's ill-fated journey, see H. Brown, 'Il viaggio di Vincenzo Gradenigo, Bailo, da Venezia a Costantinopoli 1599', in C. Cipolla *et al.* (eds.), *Scritti storici in memoria di Giovanni Monticolo* (Venice, 1922), pp.43–70.
  70. *SDC*, b. 49, cc. 410r–414r, 27 Aug 1599, Vincenzo Gradenigo in Thessaloniki to Senate; *SMar*, reg. 54, cc. 63v–64r, 4 Sept. 1593; *SMar Minute*, b. 121, 30 Aug. 1593.
  71. Both Marcantonio Badoer and Michiel Foscarini died after being elected bailo. *SDelC*, b. 9, 21 Nov. 1598, Senate to Girolamo Cappello; *SMar*, reg. 83, cc. 74r–v, 17 June 1625; *SDelC*, b. 14, 2 July 1619, Senate to Almoro Nani.
  72. F. Babinger, *Mehmed the Conqueror and His Time* (Princeton, 1978), p.97; G. Romanelli, 'Il bailo Soranzo', *FMR*, 18 (1983), p.41; P. Preto, 'Le relazioni dei bails veneziani a Costantinopoli', *Il Veltro*, 2–4 (1979), p.128; Benzoni, 'Giovanni Cappello', *DBI*, Vol. 18, pp.786–9; Queller, *The Venetian Patriciate*, pp.127–8.
  73. Preto, 'Le relazioni dei bails', p.128; Mattingly, *Renaissance Diplomacy*, pp.233–6.
  74. *IT VII* 1086 (8523), cc. 335r–v, 27 Nov. 1638, Alvise Contarini to Senate; *SDCop*, reg. 19, cc. 80–81, 26 July 1625, Giorgio Giustinian to Senate; Queller, *The Office of Ambassador in the Middle Ages*, p.173.
  75. *SDC*, b. 41, cc. 177v–178v, 22 April 1595, Marco Venier to Senate. Contrast this with the English ambassadorship in Constantinople: 'Men of rank and title competed for it because of the opportunity it offered of recuperating diminished fortunes.' English ambassadors were forbidden by the Levant Company to trade in anything but in jewels and cash, but they often speculated on rates of exchange in various currencies in Levant. They also sold part of the large wine ration allowed them by the Ottomans and made income from the sale of *barats*. A.C. Wood, 'The English Embassy at Constantinople', *English Historical Review*, 40 (1925), p.536.
  76. *DonàR*, b. 23, c. 141r; *CapiXLet*, b. 1, #114, 17 March 1534, N Justinian to the Council of X; *SDC*, b. 98, cc. 290r–293r, 23 Nov. 1624, Giorgio Giustinian to Senate; *APC*, b. 2, cc. 5v–7r, 29 Jan. 1524 (MV), Piero Bragadin to Senate.
  77. In part Erizzo's financial woes were caused by his brother-in-law, Andrea Dandolo, whose family owed the bailo a portion of his wife's (Andrea's sister) dowry. As Erizzo was often

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ill, Dandolo was elected vice bailo and served in the bailo's place regularly. Dandolo was accused of mismanaging official funds by the mission's secretary, and it seems likely that he did use his position and the extensive funds of the bailate to 'revive his personal economic situation'. *DBI*, Vol. 32, pp.441–3. For the exchange of charges between Dandolo and the secretary, Marcantonio Donini, made in the form of *relazioni*, see *Albèri*, Vol. 9.

78. *APC*, b. 18, cc. 5: 23v–24r, 18 July 1621, Giorgio Giustinian to Senate.
79. Simon, 'Les dépêches de Marin Cavalli', Vol. 1, p.288; see also Carbone, 'Note introduttive ai dispacci al senato', p.26. The original law is in *Compilazione delle leggi*, b. 157, #341–42, 24 Sept. 1555. Already by 1556 the law was being reexamined; see *ibid.*, #347–49, 27 June 1556, acknowledging that an additional janissary was needed because they were often absent for negotiations and commerce and one always had to be at the bailate. Another dragoman was authorized as well, so that one could always be present in the divan, one at the customs house, and one other for miscellaneous activities.
80. G. Benzoni, 'Alvise Contarini', *DBI*, Vol. 28, pp.82–91; *Archivio Correr*, #78, c. 45, cited in *Aspetti e momenti della diplomazia veneziana*, p.37.

APPENDIX A  
BAILI IN CONSTANTINOPLE AFTER LEPANTO

Name	In Constantinople	Birth Date	Death Date
Marc Antonio Barbaro	1568–74	1518	1595
Antonio Tiepolo	1573–75	1528	1583
Giovanni Correr	1575–77	1533	1583
Nicolò Barbarigo	1577–79	1534	1579
Paolo Contarini	1580–82	1529	1585
Gian Francesco Morosini	1582–85	1537	1596
Lorenzo Bernardo	1585–87, 1591–92	1534	1592
Giovanni Moro	1587–90	1544	?
Girolamo Lippomano	1590–91	1538	1591
Matteo Zane	1592–94	1545	1605
Marco Venier	1593–96	1533	1602
Girolamo Cappello	1596–1600	1544	1611
Vicenzo Gradenigo	1599–1600	1540	1600
Agostino Nani	1600–2	1555	1622
Francesco Contarini	1602–4	1554	1624
Ottaviano Bon	1604–9	1552	1623
Simeone Contarini	1608–12	1563	1634
Cristoforo Valier	1612–15	1565	1618
Almoro Nani	1614–21	1559	1633
Giorgio Giustinian	1620–27	1572	1628
Sebastiano Venier	1626–30	1572	1640
Giovanni Cappello	1630–33	1584	1658
Pietro Foscarini	1632–37	1577	1648
Alvise Contarini	1636–41	1597	1651
Girolamo Trevisan	1640–42	1573	1642
Giovanni Soranzo	1642–50	1600	1665

APPENDIX B  
EXTRAORDINARY AMBASSADORS TO CONSTANTINOPLE  
AFTER LEPANTO

Name	In Constantinople	Birth Date	Death Date
Andrea Badoer	1573–74	1515	1575
Giacomo Soranzo	1575–76	1518	1599
Giacomo Soranzo	1582–83	1518	1599
Leonardo Donà	1595	1536	1612
Giovanni Mocenigo	1604–5	1552	?
Francesco Contarini	1618–19	1554	1624
Simeone Contarini	1624–25	1563	1634
Pietro Foscarini	1640–41	1577	1648