

On 25 July 1785, a Boston schooner named the *Maria*, bound for the Mediterranean on a trading voyage, was commandeered by a fourteen-gun Algerian xebec plying the waters off the coast of Portugal. The “Mahometans” who boarded the six-man vessel demanded to see its flag and papers. “[O]f the first they had no knowledge,” writes James Cathcart in his account of eleven years in Barbary captivity, “and the papers they could not read and Mediterranean pass we had none.”¹ With this terse assessment of national nonrecognition and the international legal jeopardy it occasioned, the American nation’s political relationship with the Islamic world opened its first violent chapter. The ongoing history of this relationship is proving to be a complex narrative. Of late, scholars and historians have compared the United States’ engagement in the Barbary Wars (1801–05; 1815) with the nation’s current “war on terrorism,” which once again pits the United States against stateless Muslim actors and the Islamic states that give them harbor.² Indeed, the two eras have striking parallels.

The just-marked two-hundredth anniversary of the United States’ first foreign military engagement, the Tripolitan War (1801–1805), presents an appropriate time to survey the arc of American political, military, and rhetorical relations with the Islamic world. Americans first came to know this world through American narratives of Barbary captivity and the wider public discussions to which this white slavery gave impetus. According to Paul Baepler, although “the Barbary captivity narrative in English existed for more than three centuries, it caught the attention of American readers primarily during the first half of the nineteenth century. Between John Foss’ 1798 narrative and

2 American Literature

the numerous printings of James Riley's 1817 account. . . . American publishers issued over a hundred American Barbary captivity editions."³

Baepler demonstrates that tales of Anglo captivity in Barbary were interpreted by both sides of the American slavery debate to support their respective positions on the morality of slavery in the United States.⁴ The figure of the captive has emerged again at the crux of present contestations over the meaning of American democracy, playing a role in claims used alternately to justify and castigate the U.S. military mission against an Islamic enemy. Debates about the moral justifications for captivity have become global, with Arabic television networks and some European networks juxtaposing U.S. complaints about war crimes committed against American soldiers with images and discussions of the indefinite incarceration of Muslim prisoners at the U.S. naval base at Guantánamo Bay, Cuba. A return to discussions surrounding Barbary slavery thus becomes pertinent to our understanding of the relationship between 1805 and the present moment in American history. The discourse surrounding American captives in Barbary illuminates the questions that the twin phenomena of American captivity of foreigners and foreign captivity of Americans demand an ostensibly democratic society to confront.

The United States' first contact with the Islamic empire and the narratives of American captivity spun out of it together provide insight into a critical juncture in the formation of American national identity. The language of democracy that emerges from this zone of contact is not the recognizable racial nationalism of white-citizenship claims or the monocultural ethos of "ruthless democracy"; instead, it resonates with the nascent vocabulary of multicultural democracy.⁵ Why did Barbary elicit from Anglo captives a language of democratic identification with the disenfranchised back in the United States? Put more narrowly, did these mercantile-minded sailors establish early arguments for the universal application of democratic rights that simultaneously codify race and gender hierarchies within the nation form? Did their position as foreign captives provide the possibility for identifying with otherness in a way that did not co-opt that otherness (and subjugate it) in the service of Anglo nationalism? Finally, what is the legacy of this Federal-era language of democratic inclusion today?

The American captives in Barbary in the Federal period were mostly Northern, entrepreneurial men whose race or class position

made the sea attractive. They were representative of a “Yankee” ethos that would later come to define the entire country by the end of the antebellum era, but as their narrative accounts suggest, they were also attempting to individually reconcile their new status as slaves with the greater claims (and failures) of the eighteenth-century American revolutionary covenant promising democratic freedom and opportunity for all.⁶ In spite of their relative marginality, these sailors’ individual travails were a source of collective interest within the United States. The men captured off the coast of North Africa searching for new markets became a new market themselves as narratives of their captivity began to attract American readers. In fact, stories of Barbary captivity in places such as Algiers, Tripoli, and Tunis were so popular that invented narratives, which were sold lucratively as authentic, also entered the market. Federal-era American sociopolitical fears about pluralism, despotism, race revolution, and the incoherence of a heterogeneous society are all illuminated by the discourse surrounding American captivity in Barbary. Barbary acted as a screen onto which these sailors projected fundamental questions about American citizenship, projections that were then returned to the American reader in images of Anglo disenfranchisement and debasement at the hands of native populations.

My essay aims to show that through representations of the polyglot, polyethnic, and polytheist Barbary culture, a socially marginal yet economically emergent class of antebellum American sailors contemplated the inequities in early national identity and opened up a space in the American cultural imaginary, however slender and provisional, that incorporated marginalized groups into the phantasm of national citizenship.⁷ Indeed, the triangulated reconciliations among self, other, and nation in these personal accounts of Anglo slavery in North Africa established the imagery that writers of fictional captivity tales soon deployed to exploit fears in the American populace about pluralist inclusion.⁸ These narratives of captivity, real and fictional, forced their audiences to confront both the dangers and the inevitability of a multicultural nation.

Scholars in American studies have recently begun to examine U.S. orientalism, tracing out the contours of a peculiarly American engagement with both the material and the imaginary East.⁹ What has yet to be sufficiently considered, however, is the formation of an American antebellum discourse on Arabs, one that distinguished the

image of the Arab from the image of the Turk or Persian and from the conglomerate image of the Islamic oriental—and then elaborated the stakes inherent in these distinctions. In identifying this discourse of American Arabism, my intention is to link its exotic imaginary of the East, including the symbolic importance it gives to Arabs, to the insular politics of U.S. national identity.¹⁰ My essay, then, reconstructs a seminal moment in the discourse of American Arabism and demonstrates how the image of the Arab became the exotic vehicle through which Anglo-Americans navigated anxieties about the native inherent in the formation of early American citizenship. Because there was no population of Arabs in the antebellum United States, the image of the Arab, with its mytho-historical connection to American identity, could successfully articulate the democratic bond between white and black, Anglo and indigene, and male and female at the safe historico-spatial distance of an imaginary past. The construction of the Arab in American discourse thus speaks not so much to Arab identity as to Anglo-American identity—and to how the meaning of *Arabness* influenced its formation.

The period in U.S. history in which Barbary captivity narratives reached their greatest popularity was preceded by a surge of interest in Arabs and Arab history. In the 1790s, the American market was inundated with books about Arabs and Muslims, including two biographies of Muhammad and the first American edition of the *Arabian Nights*.¹¹ Although the United States inherited a fascination with biblical narratives and Crusader mythology from its European ancestors, Americans quickly developed their own repository of Arab imagery, which spoke to the specificity of a nuclear American identity psychically aligned with wandering biblical patriarchs and Middle Eastern space. Indeed, travelers, captives, and diplomats habitually described Arab populations as unchanged for the last three thousand years; thus, the figure of the Arab provided Americans with a living portrait of their mythological ancestors.

This figure was introduced to American fiction readers by American writers in the form of the oriental tale, a genre that enjoyed its greatest vogue from 1780 to 1820. The American reading audience was already familiar with writers such as Thomas Moore, Lord Byron, and Voltaire who had used oriental devices and characters as elements in a visionary mode. The American version of the oriental tale, however, was more didactic and less skeptical than its European predecessor.

American writers often employed Arabs and Arab culture as heuristic devices. Rationalists and deists, for example, tapped into the potential for fantasy in the oriental milieu to explore alternatives to Calvinist gloom and to materialize the God and heaven that Puritan doctrine had insistently abstracted.¹² In works such as Benjamin Franklin's *An Arabian Tale* (1779), the characters and contexts were predominantly beneficent, philosophical, and devoid of ethnic or racial specificity.

The ethnographic precision of Barbary captivity tales, then, marked a stage in the development of the image of the Arab in the American consciousness when distinctions began to be drawn among different oriental groups. The Ottoman colonial hierarchy that Barbary captives reproduced for American readers provided the kind of social and ethnic stratification absent in early oriental tales, allowing Americans to navigate the question of indigenoussness and citizenship in the New World.

To Federal-era Americans familiar with the literature of European orientalism, such as the *Arabian Nights*, and who had a historical sense of the Crusades and the Ottoman Empire, Arab and Muslim figures already represented the middle ground between savagery and civilization. They occupied the literal and figurative space between "dark" Africa and overrefined Europe, between ignorant pagan and corrupted Christian. But this was precisely the middle ground that the new American nation claimed to occupy. Richard Slotkin argues that the American conception of national identity at the beginning of the antebellum period was a struggle to find a medium between European overcivilization and Native American savagery.¹³ Slotkin's analysis suggests that the American self-invention of national identity was more a process of triangulation than binary differentiation. In Barbary, American white slaves saw in the various cultural groups they encountered not absolute difference from themselves but moments of uncomfortable cultural recognition. Whether it was an association with the power to enslave and subdue native populations represented by the Turks or identification with indigenous tribes as an oppressed population under the rule of a foreign power, Federal-era American captives could identify with both Turkish and "native" populations in Barbary.

The potential proximity of American and Barbary identity is apparent in the white American captives' anxious effort to discursively marginalize Barbary culture to one extreme or the other and to claim

the vacated territory. Accordingly, representations of ethnic figures in Barbary tend to emphasize either Arab degeneracy as a lack of civilization (the dark and naked Bedouins) or Oriental decadence as overcivilization (the sumptuous and cruel Turkish ruler). Two American captives in Tripoli provide examples in their narratives of these opposing discursive strategies for containing Barbary identity and licensing American identity. Dr. Jonathan Cowdery, captured aboard the foundered brig *Philadelphia* on 31 October 1803, describes Tripoli's "tribes of the back country" as follows:

Many of them have muskets without locks, but had a sort of match to put fire to them. They were almost naked, half starved, and without discipline. When they are going to battle, or appear before the Bashaw, they run to and fro, shaking their rusty muskets above their heads, all crying Halaout Buoy (I am my father's son).¹⁴

Cowdery pushes these Arabized Berbers, or berberized Arabs, into the literal and figurative "back country." They are backward in relation to civilization, described, as were Natives of the American frontier, as existing on the fringe of the modern world. Their weapons are anachronistic, and their allegiance to their paternal past signals a regressive rather than progressive worldview. These "tribes" are clearly presented as relics of an antiquated era, which was still visible on American shores in the form of Native Americans, although American tribes were in the process of being pushed into the nation's own "back country" past; in effect, they were being cleared away both literally and discursively. Cowdery's description implies that a modern Anglo army would easily demolish this Arab militia, a comforting suggestion for Americans who might read their own imminent conflict with Native nations of the American back country into the doctor's description of Barbary.

At the other end of the social scale, the sailor William Ray, who was on the brig *Philadelphia* with the well-to-do doctor when it was captured, describes the Bashaw of Tripoli as having

. . . a very splendid and tawdry appearance. His vesture was a long robe of cerulean silk, embroidered with gold and glittering with tinsel. His broad belt was ornamented with diamonds, and held two gold-mounted pistols, and a sabre with a golden hilt, chain and scabbard. . . . [H]e is about five feet ten inches in height, rather corpulent, and of manly, majestic deportment.¹⁵

Ray registers the decadence of the Bashaw by marking the “splendid and tawdry” combination of material wealth and moral turpitude.¹⁶ The Bashaw’s “glittering” display of tinsel, gold, and diamonds contrasts with Ray’s own rags and supper of “black bread.” To Ray, a common “tar,” the aristocracy’s overabundance of wealth places the “corpulent” Turkish usurper Bashaw in a class with King George. Thus, the other limit to Barbary identity is established, for the Bashaw’s inhumanity, which will manifest itself later in Ray’s narrative, stems not from his simple savagery but from his overcultivation. Again and again, however, regardless of class dynamics, American captives in Barbary turn to descriptions of the native’s natural savagery and the ruler’s cultivated cruelty (which often took the form of unique kinds of torture) as markers of the extreme nature of Barbary culture. Ultimately, both Ray’s and Cowdery’s descriptions marginalize the Barbary inhabitant, representing the population of Tripoli as either Indian or English (or European) in their degeneracy and decadence, thus clearing the space between savagery and overcivilization for American identity to flourish.¹⁷

Ray’s critique of Barbary, however, can also be read as a critique of the United States. In his journal, Ray’s contact with Barbary culture makes manifest the inherently undemocratic nature of many facets of an ostensibly democratic American society. Ray found it disturbing, for example, that common sailors and officers were treated differently not only by the country that captured them but also by the United States. The U.S. government paid a monthly allowance to the North African regencies for the American captives’ benefit; however, captains received eight dollars a month and sailors only three dollars and fifty cents. The Barbary context acts as a litmus test for American values, revealing the inconsistencies between the American rhetoric of democratic equality and the government’s practice of supporting class privilege. In his critique of this hierarchy, Ray notes that “[p]etty despotism is not confined alone to Barbary’s execrated and piratical shores; but the base and oppressive treatment can be experienced from officers of the American, as well as the British and other navies.”¹⁸ Ray collapses the differences between Barbary and American culture—and between American and British culture—to make a point about the gap between American ideals and practice. By using images of Barbary to critique the United States, however, he demonstrates the interpenetration of the two cultures.

Ray's conflation of Barbary and American identity is a rhetorical strategy of social critique, but many captives collapsed the socioethnic hierarchy in order to create a coherent image of Barbary culture, for which most Americans had no actual referent. Michel Foucault contends that the study of humans and the tabulation of their relationships to the world was a phenomenon that appeared around the beginning of the nineteenth century, a period coinciding with American captivity in Barbary and the formative moment of American national identity politics.¹⁹ This process of identifying the human and tabulating all its variations and connections is apparent in American captives' protoethnographic accounts of Barbary culture. John Foss, captured by the Regency of Algiers some years earlier than Cowdery and Ray, demonstrates a process of conflation, distinction, and connection in creating a taxonomy of the inhabitants of Algiers:

The Turks are a well-built robust people, their complexion not unlike Americans, tho' somewhat larger, but their dress, and long beards, make them more like monsters than human beings.

The Cologlies are somewhat less in stature than the Turks, and are of a more tawny complexion.

The Moors are generally a tall thin, spare set of people, not much inclining to fat, and of a very dark complexion, much like the Indians of North America.

The Arabs, or Arabians, are of a much darker complexion than the Moors, being darker than Mulattoes. They are much less in stature than the Moors, being the smallest people I ever saw. . . . As they are not allowed to trade in any mercantile line, nor even learn any mechanic art, they are obliged to be drudges to their superiors.²⁰

Foss strings together four distinct inhabitants of the Algerian region as contiguous links in a cultural chain of being, with each one's identity determined in relation to the previous one. "[I]n the act of speaking," writes Foucault, "or rather in the act of *naming*, human nature—like the folding of representation back upon itself—transforms the linear nature of thoughts into a constant table of partially different beings."²¹ Foss's act of "naming" these "partially different beings" offers not simply a continuum of color, describing progressively darker peoples as he descends the social scale, but also a hierarchy of civilization based on physical appearance. Foss's table is not only linear; it also takes on depth and, as a "constant table," eventually extends to

include the kinds of people found in the United States as well as Barbary. Foss begins with the Turks, the group he finds most like Americans, in skin color and in their “robust” stature. He moves through the dark Moors who most closely resemble American “Indians” and comes finally to the darkest of the group and also the shortest in stature—the Arabs. Foss effectively imposes the American racial hierarchy onto the inhabitants of Algiers, placing white Americans on top, Native Americans in the middle, and substituting the “darker” Arabs for the black African population forced to the bottom. Turk and Arab are represented as two ends of one spectrum, distinct yet intrinsically connected. The American captive aligns the population of Algiers in a racially charged ladder of power and, in his act of naming, congeals his interpretation of their identity into a locus of self-apparent knowledge. Thus, Foss naturalizes a familiar American racial table by demonstrating its universal applicability. But because Foss’s Barbary hierarchy is modeled on the social hierarchy in the United States, the explicit connection between Turk and Arab implicitly suggests that Anglo-Americans, Native Americans, and African slaves in the United States are also connected in a chain of being.²²

But even the narrative possibility of this connection between Anglos and their others elicits from Foss an anxious demarcation of the Anglo-ness of American identity. The Turks, he states, are “not unlike Americans”; then ten words later, he insists that they are “more like monsters than human beings” because of their dress and beards. The “monstrous” difference between Turk and American has to be quickly established because of their similarity. The implications of retaining an undisturbed similarity are multiple, but it was most important to avoid signaling the Anglo-American’s racial or ethnic connection to Natives and black slaves. This possibility threatened to open up contingent discourses on topics as varied as institutionalized plantation rape, polygenesis vs. monogenesis, and the incompleteness of the American Revolution. It would also have meant recognizing Anglo-American despotism and hegemony mirrored in Barbary despotism. Just as Cowdery and Ray marginalize the tribal Arabs and the Bashaw, respectively, as perverse extremes of civilization in an effort to distance themselves from their other and to clear a middle space for their own identities, Foss perverts his Turk into a “monster” in an anxious reaction to self-recognition. Perhaps even more illustrative of American racial anxiety than the “monstrous” Turk is the “Cologlie.” The

child of a Turkish soldier and an Algerian woman, this hybrid figure has no American double because it represents the possibility of racial hybridity, which had no place in Foss's American racial imaginary.

Foss's description of the Barbary social ladder demonstrates that the American construction of North African identity is dramatically shaped by national rhetorical needs. Foss thus justifies the social stratification of Barbary through descriptions of physical stature, writing the body into a transparent testament of racial hierarchy in a discursive move that reveals more about antebellum American anxiety than it does about Barbary society. Foss rewrites the black slave body as dark Arab body and, in turn, marks that body as belonging to "the smallest people I ever saw." Americans in the 1790s needed to look no farther than just off their own coast to the island of Saint Domingue to see the possibility of slave revolution, a fear that white refugees from the island brought to American cities through the port of New Orleans. Thomas Jefferson puts these fears into perspective in a statement on slavery and justice contemporary with Foss's captivity: "Indeed I tremble for my country when I reflect that God is just: that this justice can not sleep for ever: that considering numbers, nature and natural means only, a revolution of the wheel of fortune, an exchange of situation, is among possible events."²³

The threat of revolution wasn't solely racial. In the 1790s, Spain encouraged American settlers in Kentucky, Tennessee, and the southwest territory to believe that the Spanish crown offered more protection than a distant U.S. government located on the eastern seaboard. Given these Federal-era pressures on the stability of the American government, it is informative to compare Foss's description of the Arab population of Algiers with the description of Barbary Arabs in Samuel Goodrich's series, the *Peter Parley Universal Histories*: "They are tall, handsome, and grave in their deportment, with piercing black eyes, teeth white and glittering, a dark complexion, and black hair."²⁴ The gap between Foss's diminutive Arabs and Goodrich's tall and handsome Arabs reveals the quotient of imagination fed into both of their descriptions. Was Foss describing a segment of the population that wasn't Arab but that he labels as Arab because of its social status? Or was Goodrich, some thirty years later, collapsing romantic portrayals of Arabians in ancient Arabia into his description of the contemporary Arabs in Barbary?

The point is not to distill some accurate portrayal of ethnic Arabs in

Barbary but to illuminate the discursive strategy of creating an Arab identity that supports a particularly American discourse on identity. Barbara Harlow's theorization of the sociopolitical desire embedded in French colonial postcards from Algeria explains how snapshot accounts of the manner and customs of North African life speak to the domestic identity politics of Western audiences. Harlow asserts that these postcards "wrest certain features of Algerian life from their indigenous context only to reinscribe them within a framework that answers to the political and psychological needs of the imperialist's appropriation of the Orient."²⁵ Although Harlow is talking about the era 1900 to 1930, and about French colonialism specifically, the lesson applies to Foss's account of Algerian life. Indeed, the difference between the historical circumstances of the early-twentieth-century French occupation of Algeria and late-eighteenth-century American captivity in Algeria is as informative as the similarities between these temporally disconnected Western encounters with North African space. Instead of a colonial gaze directed outward from the colonizing country toward the colony, as with the French postcards, Foss's gaze is directed inward. His descriptions of Algerian manners and customs bear the anxiety of an ethnic group, Anglos, whose claim of possessing American space is tenuous, not the least because these claims are underpinned by a false democratic rhetoric. Thus, the question of colonial or imperial appropriation in the context of Federal-era national identity politics boomerangs back from Africa to the American homeland, demonstrating that fantasies about the meaning of the term *Arab* and about the meaning of American democracy are connected. Thus, Foss's description of the Arab population in Barbary betrays a moment rife with a desire to suppress even the narrative possibility of slave revolution in the United States. Because Arabs occupy the same social position in Barbary as black slaves in his own country, Foss attempts to rhetorically diminish Arab potency by marking Arabs as small and subservient.

The irony is that whereas Foss uses the scopic marker of black skin to familiarize American readers with the social position of Arabs in Barbary, the linguistic term *Arab*, when transported to the United States, supports race hierarchy by symbolically erasing the blackness of certain slaves' skin. Allan Austin has chronicled the lives of seventy-five African slaves on American plantations who identified themselves as Muslims. Many were literate because of Koranic training. This lit-

eracy, as Austin relates, “gave them some standing in the New World, particularly among those who decided that the literate slaves must be Moors or Arabs because they would not credit such a possibility as literacy in an African.”²⁶ In this plantation context, the construction of the term *Arab* ostensibly supports racism by allowing white Southerners to maintain categorical prejudice against black Africans through practices such as marking “outstanding” Africans as Arabs, instead of recognizing their visible African heritage. Although these West African slaves were indeed Muslim, they were not Arab or Moor. In the stratification of plantation society, the range of power positions from field slave to house slave to supervisor of other slaves mirrored arguments for the natural hierarchy of man, with the “whitest” slaves holding the highest position, even if they were whitened through an imaginative process. These literate slaves, however, both justified race hierarchy and undermined it through their proximity to white identity.²⁷ The articulation of the term *Arab* in American discourse thus creates the possibility of connection between the Anglo and the other of Anglo-American sociopolitical discourse, even if it operates in the immediate service of maintaining racial stratification.

The willful misinterpretation of Arab identity as a prominent feature of antebellum American images of the Arab returns us to a consideration of the peculiar reliance in American national discourses on defining the meaning of *Arabness*. When the term *Arab* was applied to African slaves living in the antebellum United States, it operated as a discursive bulwark separating African and white culture, but it also opened up a catachrestic space. As Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak has put it, “[W]ords or concepts [in this space] are wrested from their proper meaning.” The interpretive slip that marks black Muslims on the plantation as Arabs creates “a concept metaphor without an adequate referent.” Thus, the term *Arab* accrues an excessive value that cannot be fully absorbed by its referent.²⁸ This excessive value disturbs the binary of Christian humanism and Muslim despotism that dominates current academic discussions of the antebellum experience of the Muslim world and illuminates a residual pre-Islamic element that still palpitates in the American image of the Arab. This pre-Islamic element reveals a seminal American identification with Arab identity that infuses antebellum American representations of the Arab with a calculated ambivalence, not because Americans ignore the Islamic creed of nineteenth-century Arabs but because the image of the Arab

also accesses discourses on biblical patriarchs, fierce individualism, and civilization in the wilderness. Hence, in the 1850s, the figure of the street Arab appears in urban fiction and children's fiction as a way to describe white children who have been symbolically racialized by their indigence. For instance, in Horatio Alger's *Tattered Tom* series, Tom is the central figure in a capitalist allegory that follows the street Arab's path from nomadic shoe-shine into the capitalist economic relations that by the tale's conclusion rewhiten, domesticate, and stabilize the gender of the hero (by revealing that he is really a girl). In this formulation, the street Arab acts as a protean version of the American entrepreneur and the ethnic Arab as the symbolic ancestor to the American citizen.²⁹

Characterizing the image of the Arab as a catachresis not only confirms the fact that American representations of Arabs are what John Michael has called "figments of the Western imagination" but also clarifies that these figments create the imaginary scene necessary for Anglo-Americans to confront their anxieties about the exclusivity of particularistic formations of American citizenship.³⁰ In this Arab image-space, where identity is negotiable and the signifier is free-floating, self and other meet in an uncanny embrace. It is a place where, as Slavoj Žižek says, "we identify ourselves with the other precisely at a point at which he is inimitable, at the point which eludes resemblance."³¹ As a concept metaphor without a stable referent, the image of the Arab operates as a conduit for the Anglo-American to identify with the disenfranchised Native and the enslaved African precisely at the point of nonresemblance. Therefore, in the fictional narratives of Barbary captivity that emerged on the American market, the Anglo self does not resemble or imitate the "dark-skinned" other but, rather, occupies the subjective position of the other while retaining an essential Anglo identity. In this formulation, a new position of subjective enunciation opens up and the other of American national discourse is granted a voice of response and authority, albeit still filtered through Anglo consciousness. The collective cultural desire to hear this other voice can be located in the place where my essay began—the market.

Nowhere is the influence of the reading market on early American representations of Barbary more apparent than in the fictional captivity narratives that were sold as authentic. The imagined Arabs in these invented tales operate as proxies, and the fictive encounter

between the American and the Arab allows Americans to negotiate democratic rhetorical hypocrisies by reimagining themselves in perverse juxtapositions. Thus, Eliza Bradley describes her imagined capture by North African “natives” as an inverted homecoming in which the United States is replaced with Barbary:

About two hours after the party had departed in search of water, they returned nearly out of breath, and apparently much affrighted, and informed us that they had been pursued by a party of *natives* (some of whom were mounted on camels) and that they were but a short distance from us! . . . Their appearance, indeed, was frightful, being nearly naked, and armed with muskets, spears and scimeters [my emphasis].

Our company having no weapons with which to defend themselves, they approached and prostrated themselves at the feet of the *Arabs* (for such they proved to be) as a token of submission. This they did not, however, seem to understand, but seizing us with all the ferocity of *cannibals*, they in an instant stripped us almost naked [my emphasis].³²

While Bradley invokes the white-settler identity of the American past in her fictive encounter with the natives on shore, she also registers the ambivalent nature of the boundary between settler and native. The imaginative inversion and perversion of these two roles in Barbary dramatizes for Americans not only anxieties about revolution (racial or otherwise) and the morbid desire to fantasize about the outcome but also a collective cultural need for negotiating the inequities in American democracy. Whereas Anglo-Americans saw themselves uncomfortably mirrored in the figure of the Turk, in the figure of the Arab they saw the other part of the American population staring back at them. The Turk, as both illegitimate usurper and legitimized hegemon, offered Americans a split image of themselves—an image that highlighted the conflict between Anglo-Americans’ imaginative cultural opposition to the English and their cultural affiliation with English ancestry. Americans could see themselves in the Turk and they could see the English in the Turk; hence, the figure of the Turk facilitated discourses on the evils of patriarchy, tyranny, and usurpation that threatened to become unconscious critiques of the United States’ own involvement in these practices.

But the image of the Arab, linked in a cultural continuum to the

image of the Turk, also offered Anglo-Americans a moment of anxious recognition. The Arabs in Bradley's fictitious description are first called "natives" and then referred to as "Arabs" before finally being labeled "cannibals." Besides demonstrating Bradley's investment in marking Arabs as natives, although they are not natives of North Africa, this cycle of names allows Arabs to both fit within and to vacillate between the ethnic tropes of Native American and African American. Although neither of these latter groups was recognized politically as American by Anglo-Americans, both nevertheless occupied the literal and imaginative geography of American space. They were a presence that Anglo-Americans had to acknowledge subconsciously and whose claims for inclusion in the national identity were litigated through imaginative projection. When Anglo-American readers came across this passage, they could imagine themselves staring at the native presence in their own country as well as the native presence in Africa that had gained a claim to American identity. A few lines later, Bradley describes the "warm contest" that erupts between the Arabs who are claiming the white Americans as "property" in what had to be recognized as a conscious inversion of African slavery in the United States.³³ The self becomes other, and recognizes itself in the other, for by the end of the passage, the difference between white captives and Arabs has been elided when the "nearly naked" natives strip the captives until they are "almost naked." All that is left of Anglo difference is the fig leaf of civilization—a metonym that links Anglo and native. Thus, master becomes slave as racial hierarchies are collapsed, inverted, and perverted. In the Barbary milieu, the Anglo occupies the place of the subaltern in a moment of identification with American otherness and a gesture toward both inclusion and the anxiety that the possibility of inclusive national identity breeds.

James Cathcart's adoption of a hybridized, Barbary-American identity provides yet another perspective on the issues of cultural identity that Barbary captives and Americans in general struggled with in the Federal era.³⁴ Cathcart, who rose from teenaged captive in Barbary to influential diplomatic player in the Tripolitan War, learned Arabic, studied Arab as well as Barbary history, and requested a diplomatic appointment in North Africa after his redemption from captivity. While a captive, Cathcart not only managed to save enough money (from the proceeds of three slave-prison taverns he owned) to buy the ship that sailed him home but he also raised himself from a common slave to

the highest position a Christian could hold in Algiers: secretary to the dey. Baepler explains the irascible sailor's unique social mobility in Barbary: "[W]hether by luck, industry, bribery, or willingness to inform on his fellow sufferers, Cathcart knew how to take advantage of his situation."³⁵

Cathcart's observations and reflections, unlike other captives' published diaries, were not market driven. His closet journal was not intended for an audience at home and was only published long after his death as *The Captives, Eleven Years a Prisoner in Algiers* (1899). Through this private writing, Cathcart crafted the lines of identity that would allow him to project a distinct identity in a foreign space; thus, he individually performed the collective identity politics of the nation. However, Cathcart's passage from debased self to exalted nation occasions moments of anxious intersubjectivity, especially when he was forced to reconcile his country's idealized language of democracy with its real citizenship laws.

Eight years to the day after his capture, Cathcart chides the United States for neglecting its obligation to one of its citizens:

Is it possible . . . an exile forever from my dear, but cruel Patria . . . ? . . . O! America, could you see the miserable situation of your citizens in captivity, who have shed their blood to secure you the liberty you now possess and enjoy; . . . you are the first that set the example to the world, to shake off the yoke of tyranny, to expel despotism and injustice from the face of the earth. The negroes have even had a share in your deliberations, and have reaped the benefits arising from your wise and wholesome laws and regulations. . . . Have we sold our birthright? Are we excluded without cause from the privileges enjoyed indiscriminately by our lowest class of citizens? (C, 141)

The captive's voice, split between devotion and reprimand, calls to the homeland from across the Atlantic. The Middle Passage is here reversed and inverted into the penumbra of a white slave's journal of African captivity. It is in the very will to reterritorialize, or repatriate, that the captive exile moves across the boundaries of individual identity to identify with the nation itself. But what nation does the exile imagine awaits him, and how does that imaginary nation speak to the anxieties latent in the collective consciousness of the real nation Cathcart has not seen in eight years? In this respect, Cathcart's refrain "O!

America,” which he repeats throughout this journal entry, constitutes a territorial assemblage, an attempt to locate home amid his chaotic surroundings. For Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, “the role of the refrain [in discourse] . . . is territorial, a territorial assemblage. . . . The refrain may assume other functions, amorous, professional or social, liturgical or cosmic: it always carries earth with it: it has a land (sometimes a spiritual land) as its concomitant; it has an essential relation to a Natal, a Native.”³⁶

In calling out “O! America” in his journal, Cathcart summons the “spiritual land” that is “concomitant” to his refrain. The exile expresses his desire to return to the nurturing mother of his natal condition, but this mother has been transmuted from a physical home to a phantasm. This imaginary status of the homeland obviates the realities of Anglo colonialism in the New World and allows Cathcart to assume the position of “a Native.” The word itself—“America”—constructs this native home through repetition by defining an “earthy” locus in the chaos of infinite space that Cathcart can then begin to order with meaning. In his journal, “America” becomes a “territorial assemblage.” Indeed, national identity is this very act of assembling the “spiritual land,” a node that locates one’s distinctiveness and marks space’s infinity with imaginary boundaries—a child drawing a circle, a man marking a map. This invocation of national identity is occasioned by Cathcart’s deterritorialization, by his removal and inability to return to his home.

The refrain is also a type of communication as passage, a movement from one territorial assemblage to another—from the physical slave prison to the spiritual homeland, from Barbary to the United States, from foreigner to native, from individual to nation. “[T]here is rhythm,” Deleuze and Guattari explain, “whenever there is a transcoded passage from one milieu to another, a communication of milieus, a coordination between heterogeneous time-spaces” (*TP*, 313). The refrain builds rhythm, and rhythm creates a passage through chaos from one milieu to another, coordinating in the process the heterogeneous spaces of Barbary and the United States. Deleuze and Guattari, however, also insist that “whenever there is transcoding, we can be sure that there is not simple addition, but the constitution of a new plane, as of surplus value” (*TP*, 314). The emancipated slaves are Cathcart’s surplus value; the nation, whole and without the contradiction of chattel slavery, is the new plane. As exile, Cathcart bases his melodramatic claims for repatriation on the right of individual citi-

zens to ask of their country what the Revolutionary War earned and ensured for all U. S. citizens: freedom, justice, equality. Yet in order for Cathcart's claim to be valid, he must rhetorically position the nation's slaves as free American citizens. The Barbary milieu not only allows Cathcart to imagine himself as "a Native" of a constructed American landscape; it also forces him to reimagine a United States in which the social-justice claims of African slaves are recognized, even if slaves are marked as the "lowest class of citizens." African slaves, though hierarchically inscribed, are granted citizenship in Cathcart's phantasm and thus an imaginative foothold in the political future of the American nation.

The parallel between the African captivity of white Americans and the American captivity of black Africans that Cathcart's invocation implies was made explicit forty years later in William Lloyd Garrison's preface to *Narrative of the Life of Frederick Douglass*:

An American sailor, who was cast away on the shore of Africa, where he was kept in slavery for three years, was at the expiration of that period found to be imbruted and stultified—he had lost all reasoning power; and having forgotten his native language, could only utter some savage gibberish between Arabic and English.³⁷

Comparing the black slave's position not with the Indian captivity of Puritan settlers but with the African captivity of white American citizens, Garrison places Douglass's narrative within the historical continuum of American captivity. He not only humanizes the African American subject, albeit in a troubling manner by comparing him to the temporarily inarticulate Anglo subject, but he also makes an implicit claim for recognizing African Americans as American citizens. Garrison's comparison of the two conditions of slavery prompts a closer look at both types of captivity. This scrutiny reveals that the difference between the white captive in Barbary and the African slave in the United States ultimately cannot be elided, because resonating within the "savage gibberish between Arabic and English," which Garrison marks as the language of white exile from civilization, is a barbarous voice of democratic justice.

Upon receiving the knowledge that he will be heading to Baltimore, an eight-year-old Douglass is instructed to bathe himself in the river in order to remove the plantation scurf from his body. When he recounts this moment of ritual bathing as transition, he offers a medi-

tation on more than the ineradicable difference that excluded African Americans from civil membership in portions of the United States. He also ponders what separated the plight of white Americans in Barbary from that of black Africans in the American South:

The thought of owning a new pair of trousers was great indeed! It was almost sufficient motive, not only to make me take off what would be called by pig-drovers the mange, but the skin itself. I went at it in good earnest, working for the first time with the hope of reward.³⁸

When Douglass's mistress tells him that if he washes himself clean he will be given a pair of trousers, he responds with a poignant image that blends the naïveté of his narrative position with the disillusionment of the narrator. The young Douglass imagines that the literal geographic transition from plantation to city will occasion a transition in social standing; he will move from the figurative position of an animal, defined by his pig-skin of mange, to a humanized subject who wears trousers. Thus he works, as all members of a capitalist society do, with the "hope of reward." Yet Douglass cannot erase his racial identity as easily as he can shed the mangy markings of his former social standing. Rather he could only "hope" to "take off . . . the skin itself" in antebellum Maryland and universalize the benefits of labor in a capitalist economy.

American slaves in Barbary, on the other hand, could enter normalized social relations and shed their marginal status as slaves if they agreed to convert to Islam. Royall Tyler, author of the fictional captivity narrative *The Algerine Captive* (1797), crafts a bathing scene that works dialectically with Douglass's scene. Tyler's hero, Updike Underhill, has been invited to leave the fields of slave labor and join the Muslim mullah at the Muslim College for a series of discussions comparing Islam and Christianity:

Immediately upon my entering these sacred walls, I was carried to a warm bath, into which I was immediately plunged; while my attendants, as if emulous to cleanse me from all the filth of error rubbed me so hard with their hands and flesh brushes, that I verily thought they would have flayed me. . . . I was then anointed on all my parts, which had been exposed to the sun with a preparation of a gum, called the balm of Mecca. This application excited a very uneasy sensation, similar to the stroke of the water pepper to which

“the liberal shepherds give a grosser name.” In twenty-four hours, the sun-browned cuticle peeled off, and left my face, hands, legs and neck as fair as a child’s of six months old.³⁹

In this bathing scene, the threat of conversion is allegorized into a sexual threat that will challenge Updike’s gender orientation even as it excites a “very uneasy sensation.” Thus, as Updike prepares for entrance into the college and his pending religious seduction by the mullah, his body is feminized and infantilized by the act of bathing. But unlike Douglass’s body, Updike’s body is successfully stripped of its skin. The application of the “balm of Mecca” to his body simultaneously puts his gender identity in question and allows him to regain his essential whiteness by peeling off the darker cuticle of slave skin. The soft, feminine, white skin that Updike rediscovers speaks to America’s late-eighteenth-century contradictory discourses on race and labor ethics: the white body is superior in racial discourse, but the browned and hardened laboring body is superior in the context of Protestant values. Despite these contradictions, the balm from Mecca literally Arabizes Updike’s body. Updike uses his Arab skin of passage as a way to move not only from slavery to freedom but also from blackness to whiteness. Ultimately, like Bradley’s mariners and Cathcart’s repatriated exile, Updike does not resemble or imitate the “dark skinned” other of American slavery but occupies the subjective position of the slave while retaining an essential Anglo identity.

The figurative Arabization of Updike’s body has a parallel in the antebellum U.S. slave owner’s practice of figuratively Arabizing the African bodies of exceptional slaves on the plantation, but it also resonates with Cathcart’s actual experience of Arabizing himself as a strategy of both physical and cultural survival. Near the end of *The Captives*, Cathcart narrates what he calls the most dangerous moment of his captivity: a confrontation in his own slave tavern with a Muslim sheriff who demands his seat because he is an infidel. Cathcart responds to this charge with his Arabized tongue:

As far as being without faith I believe in the faith of my forefathers (la illah, ila Allah), there is no God but the true God. But as I was not born in the same country that you was, I have not been taught the symbol of your faith, but I know it. You say “la illah, ila Allah wa Mahomed Arasule Allah, there is no God but the true God and Mohammed is his prophet.” I do not know Mohammed as a prophet,

but I believe him to have been a very great law giver, who converted millions of idolators and induced them to worship the only true God, as I do. (C, 143)

In an adroit rhetorical move, Cathcart recites the shehadda, the profession of the Islamic creed, to establish his faith in Islam if not his Islamic faith. Cathcart believes in the “only true God,” as Muslims do, but he reserves the right to give that God a name that hinges on the contingency of cultural context. By narrating his faith in both the Arabic Allah and the English God of Christianity, Cathcart hybridizes two languages of identity in his own catachrestic gesture of survival. Yet it is not the threat of death from the Muslim sheriff that Cathcart marks as most dangerous; rather, it is the possibility of conversion that his act of hybridization occasions. Cathcart, through an act of hybrid identification, might lose his subject status as American citizen and become permanently Algerian. When Cathcart’s conversion incident is related to the dey and the question of his faith is settled, the erstwhile sailor from Boston is allowed to keep his Christian creed and thus ultimately his American citizenship upon his redemption three years later. Cathcart’s knowledge of Arabic allows him to simultaneously establish his rightful place within Barbary society and prevent the loss of his American cultural identity, but it also establishes his “savage gibberish between Arabic and English” as the exile’s claim to justice. Cathcart, alternating between cultural identities and languages, carves out a multicultural space of enunciation, one that is directly linked to the United States’ democratic covenant and nuclear identification with exile.

I read the “savage gibberish between Arabic and English,” which Garrison marks as the brutish language of the white captive in Africa, as the hybrid language of a self reconciling itself to its other. This psychic confrontation is brought about by the experience of exile and captivity. Upon his arrival in Algiers, Cathcart and his fellow Americans are brought to the homes of several prominent Algerians who are “curious to see Americans, having supposed [them] to be the aborigines of the country” (C, 110). Again, Cathcart figuratively places himself in the position of the disenfranchised, this time the aboriginal. The Algerian viewers’ mistaken assumption that Americans are aboriginal inhabitants of the United States points not only to the momentary collapse of the difference in social status between Anglo and Native Indian that transference to Barbary space entails, but it also

highlights the role of Anglo as usurper. The Anglo has taken the place of the aboriginal inhabitant of America and literally stands in for his country's native population. What is at stake here, then, is not only the split in subjectivity when Cathcart embodies both himself and the nation but a splintering of subjectivity when the exile sees himself as embodying the plight of many different exiles.

In Cathcart's image of himself being surveyed by curious Algerians, the captive conjures his nation's fraught (post)colonial identity by imagining himself simultaneously as disenfranchiser and disenfranchised: as Anglo colonizer and aboriginal colonized. Exile in Barbary forces Cathcart, and other captives like him, to see themselves in the other. This experience appears in most contact literature; however, the peculiarity of Barbary captivity spoke directly to the United States' nascent struggle for national identity, particularly around the questions of indigenoussness, citizenship, and disenfranchisement. Again, Deleuze and Guattari's notion of the territorial assemblage speaks to the way in which national identity, as conceived from the position of exile, involves continual and violent reimaginings and reterritorializations: "Finally one opens the circle a crack, opens it all the way, lets someone in, calls someone" (*TP*, 311). The circle, the imaginative boundary of self and nation, opens up and beckons to those it has disenfranchised with its arbitrary demarcations: "One opens the circle not on the side where the old forces of chaos press against it but in another region, one created by the circle itself" (*TP*, 311). In Cathcart's claim for repatriation, the circle, the lines of territorial acquisition that the United States had drawn and was continuing to redraw on its borders, opens up in the direction of the disenfranchised Native and the displaced African slave. Although Cathcart's journal was not published in the Federal era, the experiences he relates are emblematic of that time. The images of racial, religious, and social inversion engendered by American captivity in Barbary pried open a discursive space for fictional writers of captivity, and later, for American romantics who used oriental imagery to explore American subjectivity from the margins. The pluralistic potential of American identity that emerges, albeit anxiously, at salient moments in these Barbary captivity narratives expresses the claims for inclusion of the disenfranchised groups who were physically present in, but psychically excluded from, the new American nation.

What the discourse of Barbary captivity demonstrates to twenty-

first-century scholars, then, is not the consistency of American imperial ideology over the last two hundred years but, rather, the United States' ability to reformulate its language of identification, in each global moment, to address the democratic anxieties that proliferated in the lacuna between rhetoric and reality in the Federal era. The Arab, as a phantasmatic construction that acts as an object lesson on American identity, thus plays a crucial role today in establishing the rhetorical necessity for current American democratic interventions abroad. As for the present gap between rhetoric and action in American foreign policy, this is precisely the reservoir where future imperial justifications are collecting.

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Notes

- 1 James Cathcart, *The Captives, Eleven Years a Prisoner in Algiers* (1899), in *White Slaves, African Masters: An Anthology of American Barbary Captivity Narratives*, ed. Paul Michel Baepler (Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press, 1999), 107. Further references to Cathcart's narrative are to this edition and will be cited parenthetically as *C*.
- 2 Although Barbary pirates were nominally citizens of the North African regency out of which they operated, many were soldiers of fortune. Some of them, including the captain of Tripoli's maritime force, Murad Rais (Peter Lisle), were termed *renegadoes*, former Europeans who had converted to Islam in order to operate their raiding missions freely from North African ports. Two recent histories establish a continuum between the current U.S. war on terror and the Barbary Wars by emphasizing the Manichean binaries I wish to avoid; see Joseph Wheelan, *Jefferson's War: America's First War on Terror, 1801–1805* (New York: Carroll and Graff, 2003); and Joshua E. London, *Victory in Tripoli: How America's War with Barbary Established the U.S. Navy and Shaped a Nation* (Hoboken, N.J.: Wiley, 2005).
- 3 Paul Michel Baepler, introduction to *White Slaves, African Masters: An Anthology of American Barbary Captivity Narratives*, ed. Paul Michel Baepler (Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press, 1999), 24.
- 4 See Baepler, introduction to *White Slaves, African Masters*, 29–31.
- 5 For recent explorations of the homogenizing language of antebellum American democracy in relation to the multicultural reality of the antebellum nation, see Timothy Powell, *Ruthless Democracy: A Multicultural Interpretation of the American Renaissance* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton Univ. Press, 2000); and David Kazanjian, *The Colonizing Trick: National*

Culture and Imperial Citizenship in Early America (Minnesota: Univ. of Minnesota Press, 2003).

- 6 According to William Robert Taylor, the word *Yankee* “quickly came to stand for the traits of character which were thought to be most characteristically American. In America the term was associated most frequently with New Englanders, but in England and on the Continent it was generally loosely applied to Americans. It carried with it the implication of crass commercial dealings, shrewd bargaining and even a hint of sharp practices” (*Cavalier and Yankee: The Old South and American National Character* [New York: George Braziller, 1957], 48). On the lives of eighteenth-century American sailors and their influence on the rise of capitalism, see Marcus Rediker, *Between the Devil and the Deep Blue Sea: Merchant Sailors, Pirates, and the Anglo-American Maritime World, 1700–1750* (Cambridge, Eng.: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1989). On the direct relationship between sailors and the claims of the American Revolution, see Peter Lindbaugh and Marcus Rediker, *The Many-Headed Hydra: The Hidden History of the Revolutionary Atlantic* (Boston: Beacon Press, 2001). On Americans in North Africa, see Louis B. Wright and Julia Macleod, *The First Americans in North Africa* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton Univ. Press, 1945).
- 7 J. Laplanche and J.-B. Pontalis define “phantasy” as an “imaginary scene in which the subject is protagonist, representing the fulfillment of a wish (in the last analysis, an unconscious wish) in a manner that is distorted to a greater or lesser extent by defensive processes” (*The Language of Psycho-analysis*, trans. Donald Nicholson-Smith [London: Hogarth, 1973], 314). The phantasm of the nation, then, is this imaginary scene in which the individual citizen imagines him- or herself as the protagonist in the narrative of an idealized national identity, embodying simultaneously the individual self and the national self. This wish fulfillment, though, is mediated by the defensive processes that recognize that identification with a national self may mean identification with individual otherness in terms of race, class, and gender, even as the process of national identification seeks to eliminate these marks of otherness or ignore their presence.
- 8 For a concise account of the political fault lines in the language of pluralist inclusion that later fractured mid-nineteenth-century U.S. politics, see Powell, *Ruthless Democracy*.
- 9 For recent work on orientalism in relation to nineteenth-century American literature, see Hilton Obenzinger, *American Palestine: Melville, Twain, and Holy Land Mania* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton Univ. Press, 1999); and Malini Johar Schueller, *U.S. Orientalisms: Race, Nation, and Gender in Literature, 1790–1890* (Ann Arbor: Univ. of Michigan Press, 1998). For earlier work on the subject, see Luther Luedtke, *Nathaniel Hawthorne and the Romance of the Orient* (Bloomington: Univ. of Indiana Press, 1989); and Dorothee Metlitsky Finkelstein, *Melville’s Orienda*

- (New Haven: Yale Univ. Press, 1961). For a discussion of U.S. political discourse and U.S. orientalism, see Fuad Sha'ban, *Islam and Arabs in Early American Thought: Roots of Orientalism in America* (Durham, N.C.: Acorn Press, 1991).
- 10 American cultural studies increasingly places emphasis on imperial citizenship and racial nationalism as integral components of antebellum national identity politics; see, for example, Shelley Streeby, *American Sensations: Class, Empire, and the Production of Popular Culture* (Berkeley and Los Angeles: Univ. of California Press, 2002); Bruce A. Harvey, *American Geographics: U.S. Narratives and the Representation of the Non-European World, 1830–1865* (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford Univ. Press, 2001); and Kazanjian, *Colonizing Trick*.
 - 11 See Robert J. Allison, introduction to *The Crescent Obscured: The United States and the Muslim World, 1776–1815* (Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press, 1995), xvii.
 - 12 See David S. Reynolds, *Faith in Fiction: The Emergence of Religious Literature in America* (Cambridge: Harvard Univ. Press, 1991), 9.
 - 13 See Richard Slotkin, *Regeneration through Violence: The Mythology of the American Frontier, 1600–1860* (Middletown, Conn.: Wesleyan Univ. Press, 1973).
 - 14 Jonathan Cowdery, *American Captives in Tripoli; or, Dr. Cowdery's Journal in Miniature* (1806), in *White Slaves, African Masters: An Anthology of American Barbary Captivity Narratives*, ed. Paul Michel Baepler (Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press, 1999), 173.
 - 15 William Ray, *Horrors of Slavery, or, the American Tars in Tripoli Containing an Account of the Loss and Capture of the United States Frigate Philadelphia. . . .* (1808), in *White Slaves, African Masters: An Anthology of American Barbary Captivity Narratives*, ed. Paul Michel Baepler (Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press, 1999), 173.
 - 16 Ali Bey, who was Ray's contemporary, provides a comparative description of the Bashaw of Tripoli, Yusef Caramanelli, offered from an (ostensibly) Muslim perspective: "He convened a long while with me, after which we were served with tea, scents and perfumes and I received from him all possible proofs of affection. After these ceremonies we separated very much satisfied with each other; he prevented me from kissing his hand as a Sovereign, but shook mine like a man" (*The Travels of Ali Bey: In Morocco, Tripoli, Cyprus, Egypt, Arabia, Syria, and Turkey, between the Years 1803–1807* [Philadelphia: M. Carey, 1816], 260). Domingo Badia y Leblich was Ali Bey el-Abbasi's real name. He was in fact a Spaniard and may have been a French spy, but these affiliations do not alter the representation of the Bashaw of Tripoli that he circulated through his book, even if they complicate his motivations.
 - 17 The representation of Barbary inhabitants as either savage or overcivilized persisted in American public discourse throughout the antebellum

- period. In an article in the *Southern Literary Messenger*, Robert Greenhow describes “[t]he Bey Hamouda” as “a man vastly superior to the generality of Barbary sovereigns, though free from none of the vices which appear to have fixed their seat in that portion of the earth, he was yet by no means their slave, being neither a brutal ruffian nor a luxurious sybarite”; see *The History and Present Condition of Tripoli: With Some Accounts of Other Barbary States/Originally Published in the Southern Literary Messenger* (Richmond, Va.: T. W. White, 1835), 15.
- 18 Ray, *Horrors of Slavery*, 19.
 - 19 Michel Foucault, *The Order of Things: An Archaeology of the Human Sciences* (New York: Pantheon, 1971), 308.
 - 20 John D. Foss, *A Journal, of the Captivity and Sufferings of John Foss; Several Years a Prisoner in Algiers. . . .* (1798), in *White Slaves, African Masters: An Anthology of American Barbary Captivity Narratives*, ed. Paul Michel Baepler (Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press, 1999), 92.
 - 21 Foucault, *The Order of Things*, 309.
 - 22 For a comparative analysis of eighteenth-century British conceptions of race, see Roxann Wheeler, *The Complexion of Race: Categories of Difference in Eighteenth-Century British Culture* (Philadelphia: Univ. of Pennsylvania Press, 2000).
 - 23 Thomas Jefferson, *Notes on the State of Virginia* (1785; reprint, New York: Penguin, 1999), 169.
 - 24 See, for example, Samuel G. Goodrich, *The Second Book of History, Including the Modern History of Europe, Africa, and Asia. . . .* (Boston: Charles J. Hendee, 1837), 150. For more on the significance for American cultural studies of the Peter Parley tales, see Harvey, *American Geographics*.
 - 25 Barbara Harlow, introduction to Malek Alloula, *The Colonial Harem*, trans. Myrna Godzich and Wlad Godzich (Minneapolis: Univ. of Minnesota Press, 1986), 20.
 - 26 Allan D. Austin, “‘There Are Good Men in America, But All Are Very Ignorant of Africa’—and Its Muslims,” in *African Muslims in Antebellum America: Transatlantic Stories and Spiritual Struggles*. ed. Allan D. Austin (New York: Routledge, 1997), 11.
 - 27 See Sylviane A. Diouf, *Servants of Allah: African Muslims Enslaved in the Americas* (New York: New York Univ. Press, 1998).
 - 28 Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak, “Postcoloniality and Value,” in *Literary Theory Today*, ed. Peter Collier and Helga Geyer-Ryan (New York: Routledge, 1997), 225, 227. For a discussion of the catachrestic space and Spivak’s formulation of it, see Homi K. Bhabha, *The Location of Culture* (London: Routledge, 1990), 171–97.
 - 29 See Horatio Alger Jr., *Tattered Tom; Or, The Story of a Street Arab* (Boston: Loring, 1871).
 - 30 “As figments of the Western imagination,” writes John Michael, “the Arab’s romantic identity has been and continues to be terribly useful for

- the maintenance of power” (“Beyond Us and Them: Identity and Terror from an Arab American’s Perspective,” *South Atlantic Quarterly* 102 [fall 2003]: 704).
- 31 Slavoj Žižek, *The Sublime Object of Ideology* (Lincoln: Univ. of Nebraska Press, 1986), 109; quoted in Bhabha, *Location of Culture*, 184–85.
 - 32 Eliza Bradley, *An Authentic Narrative of the Shipwreck and Sufferings of Mrs. Eliza Bradley, the Wife of Capt. James Bradley of Liverpool. . . .* (1820), in *White Slaves, African Masters: An Anthology of American Barbary Captivity Narratives*, ed. Paul Michel Baepler (Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press, 1999), 255.
 - 33 Ibid.
 - 34 Allison details Cathcart’s many diplomatic mistakes and personal shortcomings, including being swindled by the French merchant Joseph Famin in a 1796 American treaty with Tunis that he helped renegotiate; see *Crescent Obscured*, 164–65.
 - 35 Baepler, headnote to *The Captives*, in *White Slaves*, 103.
 - 36 Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, *A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia*, trans. Brian Massumi (Minneapolis: Univ. of Minnesota Press, 1987). Further references are to this edition and will be cited parenthetically as *TP*.
 - 37 William Lloyd Garrison, preface to *Narrative of the Life of Frederick Douglass* (1845; reprint, New York: Penguin, 1997), 7.
 - 38 *Narrative of the Life of Frederick Douglass* (1845; reprint, New York: Penguin, 1997), 42.
 - 39 Royall Tyler, *The Algerine Captive; or The Life and Adventures of Doctor Urdike Underhill* (1797; reprint, New York: Modern Library, 2002), 128–29.