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CHAPTER 1
THE FLAVIANS

MIRIAM GRIFFIN

I. VESPASIAN

‘During the whole period of his rule he considered nothing more essential than first to make firm the state, which was tottering and almost in ruins, and then to adorn it.’ This characterization of Vespasian by his biographer Suetonius contrasts sharply with his description, in similar words, of the emperor Claudius attempting to erase from memory the mere two days of instability that had succeeded the assassination of his predecessor.¹ Indeed, nothing comparable to the disruption of A.D. 69, with three emperors meeting violent deaths, had confronted any of the successors of Augustus.

The natural comparison to make is between Vespasian and Augustus himself, for the civil wars which ended the Republic were much in people’s thoughts at the time.² Those had been worse in that they were prolonged and had involved much suffering in the provinces, where huge armies had fought, and in Italy, where large numbers of veterans had to be settled. But the later ones weakened Roman prestige on the Rhine and Danube frontier and left Vespasian with a Gallic secession still in progress. Worse still, there was actual fighting in Rome itself, which moved Tacitus to draw parallels with the earlier civil wars between Sulla and Marius.³ Not surprisingly, grim omens and religious superstitions gained credence, and the civil war itself could be viewed as a giant expiation and purification of the whole world.⁴

Again, Vespasian might appear more fortunate than Augustus in that he did not have to devise a new political system. But the old one had exhibited tensions that had contributed to Nero’s fall, and his short-lived successors had not resolved them or found new ways of maintaining equilibrium. What was the correct image for the *princeps* who was in fact, but not in

¹ See now Levick (1999), from which this chapter, revised in 1994 and again in 1997, unfortunately could not benefit. Suet. *Vesp.* 8.1: ‘per totum imperii tempus nihil habuit antiquius quam prope afflictam nutantemque rem publicam stabilire primo, deinde et ornare’. Cf. *Claud.* 11: ‘imperio stabilito nihil antiquius duxit quam id biduum, quo de mutando rei publicae status haesitatum erat, memoriae eximere’.

² Tac. *Hist.* 1.50, cf. 11.6; 111.66.3. ³ Tac. *Hist.* 1.89; 111.51; 72; 83; 11.38.

⁴ Tac. *Hist.* 1.3; 11.3.3: ‘civilia arma . . . postquam . . . omnis provincias exercitusque *lustraverant, velut expiato terrarum orbe cepisse finem videbantur*’.

theory, a monarch? What of the many rival claimants encouraged by a system with no formal method of designating a successor? How was the Senate to be given importance without power? How was the *princeps* to practise liberality without rapacity? How were the emperor's freedmen, powerful through proximity, to be kept in their traditional social place? How was the candidate of the eastern legions to satisfy the aspirations of eastern provincials without retarding the steady rise of men from the western provinces?

1. Vespasian before his accession

Tacitus with justice describes the rise of Titus Flavius Vespasianus to the position of *princeps* as the work of fortune. His undistinguished family background was his chief liability, but, as his confederate Mucianus is made to say, standards had dropped by the time he made his claim, and Vitellius, though of the imperial nobility and patriciate, was not, like Nero and Galba, of the republican aristocracy.⁵ Tacitus underlines the fact by starting his *Histories*, which told the story of the Flavian dynasty and its rise to power, on the day of Vitellius' acclamation as *princeps*. Vespasian, born on 17 November A.D. 9, was nearly sixty when he made his bid. He was the second son of T. Flavius Sabinus and Vespasia Polla, from whom he derived his cognomen. He never attempted to hide the fact that his background was, at most, equestrian on his father's side, for even as emperor, he continued to visit regularly the house in Cosa where his paternal grandmother Tertulla had raised him after his father's early death. His mother's family, however, was more distinguished: her father was an equestrian army officer, and her brother entered the Senate and reached the rank of praetor.

Some traced his frugality as emperor to the financial expertise he inherited from his father, a tax-collector and a money-lender, and to his own experience of straitened circumstances which led him to seek help from his older brother in the later years of Nero.⁶ He had acquired military experience and success, though the latter can be exaggerated. He served as a military tribune, probably of equestrian rank, in Thrace, and after securing the *latus clavus* from Tiberius and holding the offices of quaestor, aedile and praetor was put in charge of the legion II Augusta stationed at Argentoratum (Strasbourg) in Upper Germany under Claudius. The legion took part in the invasion of Britain in 43, and Vespasian received triumphal honours which were normally reserved for consular commanders. Claudius, however, was notoriously generous with such awards, and Vespasian had courted Claudius' powerful secretary Narcissus.⁷ He may

⁵ Tac. *Hist.* II.1; 76. ⁶ Suet. *Vesp.* 1-2; 12.1; Tac. *Hist.* III.65; Suet. *Vesp.* 4.3.

⁷ Suet. *Vesp.* 4.1-2; Tac. *Hist.* III.44, cf. Suet. *Claud.* 24.3.

also have helped him achieve his suffect consulship in the last two months of 51 and his two priesthoods, the augurate and one of the minor colleges. At the appropriate time, he became proconsul of Africa, the usual honourable end to a senatorial career. He was, however, unpopular there because, without being seriously extortionate, he had neither the means nor the will to be generous: he was unlucky to be in Africa in the 60s, the same period as the rich Vitellii.⁸ The crisis of the Jewish revolt, which broke out in 66, combined with Nero's increasing fear of ambitious and well-born army commanders unexpectedly revived Vespasian's chance for military glory, and he was sent to Judaea at the head of three legions.

Vespasian's career had not so far suggested outstanding qualities of leadership. His reluctance to assume the *latus clavus* in early life foreshadowed the caution he showed in making his bid for the throne: he was lucky to have dynamic and impetuous allies. He was a survivor, flexible to the point of sycophancy in dealing with tyrants like Gaius or Nero, though later he was to lay claim to Nero's displeasure. Even the sons who were his greatest asset as a claimant to imperial power were the fruits of an unambitious marriage. Early in the reign of Gaius, Vespasian had married a freedwoman of Junian Latin status, who had been claimed by her father and vindicated as originally of free birth: otherwise Vespasian, as a senator, would have been debarred by the Augustan marriage legislation from entering such a union. She and her daughter, both called Flavia Domitilla, had died before Vespasian became *princeps*, leaving him two sons considerably distant in age, Titus, now nearly thirty years old, and Domitian, now approaching eighteen. As *princeps*, Vespasian continued to act cautiously and gradually – a matter of temperament and of his awareness that he had time. For, though nearly sixty when he acceded, he was establishing a dynasty.⁹

2. Source problems

The nature of our literary sources makes it impossible to reconstruct the detailed chronology of the reign of Vespasian. His biographer Suetonius used a non-chronological structure and the chronological account of Dio is only preserved in fragments. The sequence of events is most nearly recoverable for the period before the autumn of A.D. 70 when the surviving portion of Tacitus' *Historiae* breaks off and Josephus finishes his account of the Jewish War. On the other hand, the problem of bias in our accounts is here at its most acute, because it reflects the rivalry among

⁸ Suet. *Vesp.* 4.2–3, cf. Tac. *Hist.* 11.97. The riot at Hadrumetum suggests that Vespasian could not help in a crisis.

⁹ Under Nero: Suet. *Vesp.* 4.4, cf. Tac. *Ann.* xvi.5; *Hist.* iv.7. Marriage: Suet. *Vesp.* 3; *Epit. de Caesaribus* 10.1; 11.1; Tac. *Hist.* 11.1.

supporters of Vespasian claiming the principal credit for his victory,¹⁰ as well as the competition among pretenders to the throne. Though the Flavian emperors themselves did not commission or encourage historical accounts of their reigns, to judge by the fact that the elder Pliny left his flattering historical work unpublished when he died in August 79,¹¹ the partiality towards the Flavians that works written under that dynasty displayed is attested by Tacitus at *Histories* II 101 and exemplified in an extreme form by Josephus in his *Jewish War*.

Unlike Suetonius or Dio, Tacitus tried to adopt a critical approach towards this material. Even the quarter of the work that survives gives clear indications that his portrait of Vespasian was a very mixed one. It was best for Rome that Vespasian won the civil war (III.86) and he turned out better than had been expected (I.50; II.97). But there were darker aspects: Vespasian overcame inhibitions about the methods for obtaining money (II.84), and his close associates were no better than the discredited minions of Otho and Vitellius (II.95.3). Two are named there, T. Clodius Eprius Marcellus and C. Licinius Mucianus, and the first makes a plea, clearly meant to be prophetic, for a curb on liberty (IV.8.4).

3. Rome in the absence of Vespasian

Vespasian was acclaimed by the two legions at Alexandria, under the command of Tiberius Iulius Alexander, on 1 July 69 and by the three legions in Judaea on 3 July.¹² By the middle of the month he had been recognized by the three legions in Syria, under the command of Mucianus, and by the surrounding client kings. At the end of July a council of war was held at Berytus. Meanwhile Vitellius had entered Rome. In the middle of August Mucianus set out for Italy. A month or so later Vespasian and Titus started for Egypt, where they heard the news of the Flavian victory at Cremona, won by Antonius Primus and the Danubian legions on 24–5 October. They then moved on to Alexandria where they heard of the death of Vitellius on 20 December. There Vespasian remained until September 70, though Titus left to prosecute the war in Judaea in late March or early April of that year. Vespasian left when Jerusalem was under siege; he did not wait until the news of its fall on 8 September reached Alexandria. He probably arrived in Rome in late September or early October 70.¹³

¹⁰ Hence conflicting representations of Antonius Primus in Tac. *Hist.* III and IV (e.g. III.28; IV.2; 39.3); Wellesley (1972) 3–5. On *Hist.* IV.1–2; II.1.1 *vs* Joseph. *BJ* IV.654; Chilver (1984) I.31–2.

¹¹ Tac. *Hist.* II.101; Pliny, *HN* I, pref. 20, telling Titus of the favourable bias of his unpublished history. ¹² Suet. *Vesp.* 6.3; Tac. *Hist.* II.79; Dio LXVI.8; cf. Joseph. *BJ* IV.601; 617.

¹³ Tac. *Hist.* III.48; IV.51, cf. Suet. *Vesp.* 7. Vespasian was probably in Alexandria for the rising of the Nile in late June/July but not for news of the fall of Jerusalem on 8 Sept. 70 (Joseph. *BJ* VII.21); he was not back in Rome by 21 June (Tac. *Hist.* IV.53); Chilver's (1984) commentary on *Hist.* IV.81.

Why did Vespasian go to Egypt, thus delaying his appearance in the capital for over a year from his proclamation as *princeps*? Tacitus says that it was decided at the council of war that Vespasian would hold on to the points of access to Egypt, and he later hints of a plan to cut corn supplies to Rome and to raise money in the rich province; Josephus speaks of the strategic importance of Egypt as a defensive position and of making the Vitellians in Rome surrender through the threat of starvation.¹⁴ It is hard to see how an embargo on grain could have been very effective quickly enough or, indeed, at all given the popularity of the Vitellian cause in Africa, a more important source of corn in this period for Rome, as Josephus himself tells us. The aim of sending Egyptian corn to Rome, adduced by Dio and realized by Vespasian early in 70 when shortages were falsely attributed to the Vitellians in Africa, fits the situation better than the idea of a Flavian embargo.¹⁵ That story may belong with other attempts to emphasize the Flavian hope of a bloodless victory.

Even if control of Egypt was important strategically and financially, why was it necessary for Vespasian to go there himself rather than send others? That the enthusiasm initially aroused by his visit – the first by a Roman *princeps* since Augustus – would be dampened by his exactions could have been predicted.¹⁶ Suetonius suggests that the new emperor acquired some of the authority and majesty that he lacked through the miracles of healing that he performed in Alexandria, while Tacitus notes that eye-witnesses went on recounting them years later. Though they report differently Vespasian's visit to the Serapeum to seek confirmation of his chances of becoming emperor, both agree that divine sanction was conferred: Tacitus gives the name of the priest as Basilides, Suetonius notes the presentation of items associated with Egyptian kingship. Yet these miracles seem to have been organized by the loyal prefect of Egypt, Tiberius Iulius Alexander, mostly for Egyptian and eastern consumption, perhaps to counter the appearance of a false Nero there in spring 69.¹⁷ Vespasian himself was not apparently eager to stress the eastern basis of his early support: of our literary authorities, only Philostratus mentions Vespasian's visit after the Serapeum to the Hippodrome, where, a papyrus records, the Alexandrians at the prompting of their prefect hailed Vespasian as son of Ammon, hence legal sovereign of Egypt, and 'Divine Caesar', 'Lord Augustus'.¹⁸ Philostratus is only interested in the incident as a good background to Vespasian's fictitious meeting with his hero, the sage Apollonius of Tyana. Josephus ignores all these

¹⁴ Tac. *Hist.* II.82, cf. Suet. *Vesp.* 7 ('claustra Aegypti'); Tac. *Hist.* III.48; cf. III.8; Joseph *Bf* IV.605 ff.

¹⁵ Tac. *Hist.* II.97; IV.49; II.58; cf. Joseph. *Bf* II.383; 386; Africa supplies two thirds, Egypt one third, of Roman corn imports. Sending of corn to Rome: Dio LXV.9.2; Tac. *Hist.* IV.38; 52.2.

¹⁶ Dio LXVI.8. ¹⁷ Suet. *Vesp.* 7; Tac. *Hist.* IV.81–2; Heinrichs (1968). False Nero: *Hist.* II.8.

¹⁸ P. Fouad 8=MW 41; Philostr. *VA* v.27–36; cf. Titus' visit in P. J. Parsons, *Oxyrhynchus Papyri* 34 (1968), no. 2725, 127–9.

events, and though he probably wished to avoid overshadowing his own prophecy of Vespasian's elevation, he may also reflect Flavian reluctance to have Vespasian's entry into Rome overshadowed. Vespasian will have been aware of Roman sentiment, reflected in Tacitus, who specifically notes the lack of success of Romans whose base of support in civil wars was in the East and postpones his account of the miracles until long after the *princeps'* recognition at Rome. Only later did Vespasian put in his Temple of Peace, not completed until 75, a statue of the River God Nile.¹⁹

Then again, even if it made sense for Vespasian to visit Egypt in person, why did he stay there so long? He was not back on 21 June for the religious ceremony of moving the Terminus stone, the first step towards the restoration of the great Capitoline temple which had been burned during the defeat of the Vitellians. Yet he had sent a letter specifying the arrangements for the ceremony, and, on his return to Rome, he was to make a great point of initiating the rebuilding in person (see p. 14). Tacitus says that he was waiting for favourable winds, but he could have gone at the start of the sailing season in the spring. Dio says that he originally wanted to return with Titus after the capture of Jerusalem, but then why did he not wait a little longer?²⁰

The answer may emerge if we consider not why Vespasian *wished* to be in Egypt, but why he might *not wish* to be in Rome. Suetonius provides a hint when he says that Vespasian put no innocent person to death in his reign except when he was absent or unaware, while Dio notes that Mucianus, who could use the imperial seal and had the real authority to act, collected money for the Roman treasury, sparing Vespasian the *invidia*.²¹

Then again, the conduct of the Flavian armies in Rome after the death of Vitellius, and earlier in Italy where they sacked Cremona, had made Antonius Primus a liability to the Flavian cause. It was Mucianus who had to break the power of this hero of the soldiers, already the recipient of consular insignia from the Senate, first by promoting his supporters and hinting at an honourable term as governor of Hispania Tarraconensis, a position left vacant by Cluvius Rufus, then by sending away from Rome his own legion on which he most depended. This was not a matter of personal envy on the part of Mucianus, for when Primus fled to Vespasian he was not reinstated. Primus was suspected by Mucianus of encouraging one of the remaining members of the republican aristocratic clan from which the luckless adoptive son of Galba came. This man, Licinius Crassus Scribonianus, was apparently killed in this period, along with Calpurnius Piso Galerianus, the son of the Neronian conspirator, and his father-in-law,

¹⁹ Joseph *BJ* vii.63–74; Tac. *Hist.* ii.6; iv.81 (the miracles are not even placed at the start of the visit to Alexandria); Pliny, *HN* xxxvi.58.

²⁰ Tac. *Hist.* iv.53; Suet. *Vesp.* 8.5; Dio *LXVI*.10.2; *Hist.* iv.81 with Chilver's (1984) commentary.

²¹ Suet. *Vesp.* 15 (cf. 12 'civilis et clemens'); Dio *LXVI*.2.1–2; 5, cf. Tac. *Hist.* iv.11.1; 39.2.

L. Calpurnius Piso, the proconsul of Africa.²² Even if none of these was ambitious, they could, as the few remaining survivors of the Republican nobility, offer alternatives for those unhappy with a new upstart *princeps*.

Similar considerations will have dictated the elimination of the young son of Vitellius, who was only six or seven years old when presented by his father to the soldiers, entitled and accoutred as the heir apparent. To Vespasian was left the more grateful task of sparing Vitellius' daughter and finding her a suitable husband while, under Mucianus, Vitellius' praetorian prefect Iulius Priscus was driven to death and his trusted freedman Asiaticus crucified as a slave, despite having been given equestrian rank by his former master.²³

The praetorian guard also presented a problem. Vitellius had dismissed the old members who had murdered Galba and supported Otho, and Vespasian had ordered his army commanders to approach them with offers of reinstatement. In the meantime, Vitellius had enrolled sixteen cohorts from the German legions and even from his auxiliary troops, and now there were also Flavian soldiers who demanded service in the guard as a reward for their victory. Financial pressures made it imperative, moreover, that the number of cohorts be reduced from the sixteen to which Vitellius had increased them, even from Nero's twelve. Mucianus first tried demoralizing the Vitellians and then sending Domitian as Vespasian's representative with promises of honourable discharge and land. Eventually, he had to re-enroll them all *en masse* and then discharge or retain them individually. Inscriptions duly show Vitellian legionaries dismissed after three, eight or fifteen years of praetorian service, two of them having served even beyond A.D. 76, the date by which the number of cohorts was reduced to nine. By such gradual dismissals, Mucianus clearly hoped to avoid the trouble produced by the partisan treatment of the praetorians at the hands of Galba and Vitellius.²⁴

The hardest task facing Mucianus, however, was the disappointment of senatorial expectations, or rather the expectations of a small but very vocal minority in the Senate. Vespasian had written, probably before Mucianus even reached Rome, to promise the reinstatement of those, alive and dead, whom Nero had condemned for *maiestas* and the abolition of trials for the 'un-republican' verbal or trivial charges that had come to be covered by that charge.²⁵ In this he was following the example of Galba and Otho who pardoned Nero's victims. But there remained the question of punishing those

²² Antonius Primus: Tac. *Hist.* iv.39, cf. 4; 80. Republican aristocrats: *Hist.* iv.11; 39.3-4; 49-50.

²³ Tac. *Hist.* ii.59; cf. Suet. *Vesp.* 14; *Hist.* iv.11, cf. ii.47; 95.

²⁴ Suet. *Vit.* 10.1; Tac. *Hist.* ii.67.2; 82, 93.9; iv. 46; *ILS* 2036=MW 382; *ILS* 2034=MW 375; *ILS* 2035=MW 381; *ILS* 1993=MW 400.

²⁵ Dio LXVI.9.1, cf. Tac. *Hist.* iv.3.4. On ἀσέβεια, Dio's word for 'unrepublican' treason charges, see Brunt (1984a).

responsible for the convictions. In 68, probably even before Galba had entered the Capitol, the Senate had set in train the trials of Neronian accusers, but Galba, moved by pleas from vulnerable senators, had been unenthusiastic and the issue had lapsed. Now it was renewed, and in a form that the new emperor might find hard to reject: whereas, under Galba, Helvidius Priscus intended to try Eprius Marcellus, the prosecutor of Thræsea Paetus, himself, now the *eques* Musonius Rufus was invited to speak against Publius Egnatius Celer, a philosopher who had testified against his pupil and friend, Q. Marcius Barea Soranus, a respected senator whose daughter had once been married to Titus.²⁶

There can be no real doubt that Vespasian was the architect of the policy that Mucianus, with the help of Domitian, now gradually revealed to the Senate. While Mucianus, surrounded by his bodyguard, was clearly the person in authority, it was the younger son of the *princeps*, then only eighteen, who guaranteed the legitimacy of what he did, a role from which his reputation was never to recover. In the last days of 69, Domitian had been called Caesar by the soldiers and named praetor designate by senatorial decree, and early in 70 he replaced Iulius Frontinus as urban praetor, after which his name appeared on the letters and edicts implementing the *princeps*' wishes. It was he who presided over the Senate on 9 January when Egnatius Celer was condemned and Iunius Mauricus, the brother of one of Thræsea Paetus' close associates, asked that access to the notebooks of previous emperors be granted to the Senate so that accusers could be brought to justice.²⁷ Each of the magistrates and the senators then, individually, took an oath that he had not used his influence to harm any of the victims or profited from a condemnation. This led to allegations of perjury, threats of prosecution, and denunciation of Aquillius Regulus, one of the younger generation of Neronian informers, who was to flourish again in Domitian's reign. Helvidius Priscus renewed his attack on Eprius Marcellus, though such a revival of a charge by the same prosecutor was illegal. Less than a week later, Domitian broke the news: there were to be no prosecutions of Neronian accusers. Although, in deference to senatorial sentiment, an informer was one of two Neronian exiles excluded from the amnesty, the point was brought home by the appointment of Eprius Marcellus to be proconsul of Asia where he was retained for three years, an appointment that could only have been made by interference with the system of allocation by lot by the *princeps* or his representatives.²⁸

There is evidence of consultation with Vespasian over such matters as the restoration of the Capitol and the securing of copies of old laws for

²⁶ Tac. *Hist.* 1.4.3; II.10.1; IV 42.6; IV.6; IV.10.1. See Evans (1979).

²⁷ *Epit. de Caesaribus* 9.2; Aur. *Vict. Caes.* 9.2. Domitian: Tac. *Hist.* III.86; IV.2; 39.2; 40.

²⁸ Tac. *Hist.* IV.41–4, cf. Tac. *Ann.* XVI.14; Eprius Marcellus: *ILS* 992=MW 271; cf. Dio LXVI.2.2.

the archives, but the distance involved must have made detailed referral difficult.²⁹ In the sphere of appointments, signs of a lack of coordination between the distant *princeps* and his representatives at Rome are sometimes divined. A notable example is Ti. Plautius Silvanus Aelianus, a patrician related by marriage to Claudius, whom we find presiding over the ceremony on 21 June, perhaps as senior *pontifex* in the absence of the *princeps* (who was in any case not yet *pontifex maximus*). He was then sent out to the consular Spanish province, which still lacked a governor. Vespasian apparently had other ideas: he wanted to appoint Plautius Silvanus as prefect of the city in succession to his murdered brother. As his funerary inscription shows, Plautius Silvanus was recalled to hold the prefecture. More than that, on his return to Rome, Vespasian proposed that he receive triumphal honours for his outstanding service as governor of Moesia under Nero, whose lack of generosity is implicitly condemned.³⁰ Vespasian clearly wanted to have, on permanent display as his prefect, this show-piece of Flavian magnanimity: Plautius Aelianus went on to a second consulship in 74, which he shared with the emperor's elder son.³¹

Similar lack of harmony has been suggested in the case of the prefecture of the praetorian guard. An Egyptian papyrus describes Tiberius Iulius Alexander as praetorian prefect, though there is no parallel for an office held outside the province by a former prefect of Egypt being recorded there. However, he is unlikely to have held the post in Egypt, simultaneously with being prefect. The reference on the papyrus would be best explained if Alexander became praetorian prefect before he reached Rome and while still in the vicinity of Egypt. The praetorian prefecture is generally taken to be a separate post from the prefecture of the Judaeian army, mentioned by Josephus: that was an exceptional post created by Vespasian because of Titus' inexperience as a commander. Alexander could have held these two posts simultaneously while still with Titus in Judaea, or he could have assumed the praetorian post later when he accompanied Titus on his visit to Egypt in the spring of 71. Members of the ruling house were often escorted by praetorians led by one prefect, and though Titus had his two legions with him in Egypt and presumably had no actual praetorians escorting him to Rome either, it may have been thought appropriate for him, as the emperor's son, to have a praetorian prefect in attendance.³²

On the return of Titus and Ti. Iulius Alexander to Rome in the summer

²⁹ Tac. *Hist.* iv.53.1; iv.40, cf. Suet. *Vesp.* 8. The voyage from Egypt to Rome would take about 80 days in November to March; about 30 days from April to October: Duncan-Jones, *Structure* ch. 1.

³⁰ Tac. *Hist.* iv.53; *ILS* 986=MW 261; on *AE* 1989 no. 425, see Eck (1993b) 249 n. 13.

³¹ On consuls of 74: L. Vidman, *Fasti Ostienses* 43 (Prague, 1982).

³² *PHib* 215=MW 329; cf. Joseph. *Bj* v.46; vi.237; vs the restoration of *OGIS* II 586=MW 330 as ἐπιάρχου [τ]οῦ Ἰουδαίου στρατοῦ: Kokkinos (1990) 131. See Turner (1954); Syme (1977) 1071; 1277 n. 9; Jones, *Titus* 85.

of 71, a complex situation would have arisen. At the end of 69 Arrius Varus had been appointed to the post, perhaps by Domitian, while Antonius Primus was in charge of Rome. In the spring or summer of 70 Mucianus replaced Varus by Arrecinus Clemens, the uncle to Titus' daughter Iulia, though Clemens was of senatorial standing. Some time after Titus returned home, he himself became praetorian prefect, and Alexander may have served as prefect in Rome at some point. What happened to Clemens? His tenure must have been short, to judge from the embarrassment contemporaries still felt about a non-equestrian holding the post when Titus took it over. Dio reports that Vespasian's ironic message to Domitian, thanking him for allowing him to hold office, was provoked by the appointments, including prefectures, given by Mucianus and his son. Yet Clemens became suffect consul in 73 and went on to a distinguished career, probably before as well as during the reign of Domitian. There is no need to posit disharmony. Vespasian could have sanctioned two prefects early in his reign, one (Alexander) for Vespasian and Titus in the East and one (Clemens) in Rome. Then Ti. Iulius Alexander may have served briefly with Clemens in Rome and perhaps even went on to serve jointly with Titus.³³

A more serious area of possible tension between Vespasian and his representatives in Rome concerns the repute of Galba. While in the East, Vespasian and Mucianus had recognized Galba, Otho and Vitellius in turn. By the time Vespasian was acclaimed by the eastern legions, the first two were dead but Vespasian had bid for and received substantial help from previous adherents of Otho, who naturally hated Vitellius. Otho had to be treated with some respect, but what was to be done about the memory of Otho's enemy Galba, from whom the Senate had removed the stain of usurpation by declaring his predecessor a public enemy?

The letter that Vespasian sent to Rome in December 69 clearly said nothing on this point or nothing favourable to Galba, on the assumption that the inscribed *Lex de Imperio Vespasiani* was passed in reaction to that letter (see pp. 11–12 below). For Galba is omitted, along with Nero, Otho and Vitellius, from the respectable precedents cited in that law. However, on the Acts of the Arval Brothers for 69, which had been inscribed before Vitellius' death, only the name of that emperor has been erased, and when Domitian took the chair of the Senate on 9 January 70, he proposed the restoration of Galba's honours, a restoration which, unlike the simultaneous decision to revive Piso's memory, actually took effect.³⁴ Yet Suetonius says that, when the Senate voted, apparently on this occasion, to put up a naval monument in Galba's honour on the spot where he was slain,

³³ Arrius Varus: Tac. *Hist.* iv.2; cf. iv.68; Arrecinus Clemens: Tac. *Hist.* iv.68, cf. iv.11.1; Dio lxxvi.2; MW 302. Embarrassment: Suet. *Tit.* 6; Pliny, *HN* 1, pref. 3.

³⁴ Tac. *Hist.* iv.3.3, cf. *ILS* 244=MW 1; *Acta Fratrum Arvalium* (MW 2–3); *Hist.* iv.40.

Vespasian annulled the decree because he thought Galba had sent assassins from Spain to Judaea to kill him. If this suggests long-standing resentment, then not only Domitian, but Primus, Cerialis and Mucianus all adopted an attitude to Galba contrary to that of the *princeps*.³⁵ But the real reason for Vespasian's attitude to the monument may be that in Rome it was better to be seen as the avenger of Otho than of Galba whose memory, though revered by a vocal group in the Senate, was hated by the praetorian guard and had been vindicated by Vitellius, the real enemy of the Flavians.

In fact, Vespasian was to adopt a pragmatic attitude to his predecessors in the matter of precedents and privileges, cancelling divisive concessions by Galba but restoring to a town in Corsica privileges 'retained into the time of Galba' but removed by Otho. Grants of citizenship made by Otho and Vitellius, unlike Galba's, were apparently not recognized by Vespasian or, though not formally rescinded, were not officially recorded. Similarly, Galba, but not Otho or Vitellius, is included in the lists of sources of law in the Spanish charters issued under Domitian, which at least shows that Vespasian's younger son, when carrying out the programme started by his father and brother, did not hesitate to include him.³⁶

4. *Flavian ideology*

The main lines of Flavian ideology were, however, clear from the start. Vitellius was the real target of abuse, as Josephus and, to a lesser extent, Tacitus clearly show. It was his name that was erased from the proceedings of the Arval Brothers, and his consular appointments, fixed for many years ahead, that were cancelled.³⁷ Continuity with the Julio-Claudian Principate in its respectable form, i.e. with Augustus, Tiberius and Claudius, was advertised. The *Lex de Imperio Vespasiani* already mentioned (p. 10), which is preserved on a bronze plaque discovered c. 1345 and displayed in the Basilica of St John Lateran in Rome by Cola di Rienzo, cites all of these emperors as precedents in four of its eight clauses and Claudius alone in one.

The only clauses conferring specific powers on the *princeps* that do not list precedents (clauses III and IV) seem to reflect past imperial practice and could easily have been formally conferred on one of the emperors after Claudius who were not regarded as respectable.³⁸ There is therefore no serious obstacle to regarding this *lex* as the ratification of the senatorial

³⁵ Tac. *Hist.* III.7; II.76.4, cf. I.4; v.16. Suet. *Galba* 23; *RIC* II nos. 507–9; for another explanation: Sutherland (1987) 116–18.

³⁶ Tac. *Hist.* I.8; 65; *FIRA* I 72=MW 460; Tabula Banasitana: *AE* 1971 no. 534 with Sherwin-White (1973) 86; 90–1; *Lex Irnitana*: González (1986). ³⁷ *Hist.* II.91; III.55; IV.47.

³⁸ Tacitus mentions senatorial grants of traditional powers to Otho (*Hist.* I.47) and to Vitellius (*Hist.* II.55).

decree conferring ‘all the customary powers voted to *principes*’ in the last days of December 69: the linguistic form is that of the *rogatio* put to the assembly for ratification. The decree and law granted Vespasian (in the first part, now lost) *imperium* and tribunician power, the main constitutional powers of the *principes*, and (in the preserved part) a number of accumulated imperial prerogatives. Cola di Rienzo regarded the law as a testimony to the power of the Roman Senate and people, but, far from limiting imperial prerogatives, the law appears to confer on the *principes* the authority to do ‘whatever he deems to be in the interests of the commonwealth or in accordance with the dignity of Roman affairs, both secular and religious, public and private’ (clause VI). Moreover, this authority is backdated (clause VIII) to cover what Vespasian had done as emperor before the law was passed and whatever had been done under his orders. The law also indemnifies anyone who, in obedience to this law, violates any other legal requirement.

It has been suggested that none of these provisions was an innovation and that even the apparent illogicality of granting specific prerogatives and specific dispensations from the laws (clause VII) alongside the apparent blanket grant of authority (clause VI) goes back to A.D. 37 when Gaius became the first emperor to acquire imperial powers *en bloc* rather than piecemeal over time, as Augustus and Tiberius had done. In that case clause VI should perhaps be interpreted in a more limited sense: at the very least, the naming of all the respectable *principes* as precedents must be intended to suggest that the discretion granted the *princeps* should be exercised according to traditional precedents.³⁹ However, even if the clause was hastily added for Vespasian without the logic being examined, the intention was clearly to grant him the authority that his respectable predecessors were believed to have had in practice, if not in theory.

Even the adoption of 1 July 69, the day of Vespasian’s acclamation by the Egyptian legions, as his day of accession (*dies imperii*) need not be construed as a deliberate break with tradition designed to emphasize the power of the soldiers over the authority of the Senate and people. It is true that, for his Julio-Claudian predecessors from Gaius on, the *dies imperii* had been the day when the Senate conferred the imperial powers on them, but it was only with the *coups* of Galba and Vitellius, staged outside Rome, that the problem arose of a period of time between taking executive action as *prin-*

³⁹ *ILS* 244=MW 1=Crawford (1996) 1 no. 39 (described as a *lex* in vv. 30, 34); Tac. *Hist.* 1v.3: ‘senatus cuncta principibus solita Vespasiano decernit’. Brunt (1977) 8; *vs* H. Last, *CAH* xii 404 ff. The discretion given to magistrates by the republican Senate to do ‘quod e re republica esse censeret’ when dealing with specific problems or chores is not parallel, despite Pabst (1991) ‘“... ageret faceret quaecumque a re publica censeret esse”’. J. A. Crook favours a minimalist interpretation of clause VI as ‘a grant of residual emergency powers’ (*CAH*² x 118–20). Levick (1999) 86 regards the *lex* as supplementing Vespasian’s formal powers and strengthening his hand against the Senate. On its use by Cola di Rienzo, see Collins (1998).

ceps and being recognized as such. Galba had ostentatiously avoided claiming the title of *princeps* until Nero's death and his own recognition by the Senate; when the Senate voted prerogatives to Vitellius on 19 April they may have added, for the first time, the backdating clause (VIII), in case the new *princeps* decided to count his reign from 1 January when he was proclaimed by the legions. The Arval Brothers held back celebrating his accession day until 1 May, by which time he had made it clear that 19 April was to be the official *dies imperii*: he had to consider the views of the Upper German legions, schooled by Verginius Rufus to wait for the decision of SPQR. Vespasian, however, had a longer period of time to cover, a period of five months in which he had been making appointments and other dispositions. Nonetheless, though he assumed right away the titles of Caesar and Augustus which Vitellius had refused until after his *dies imperii*, it was only in retrospect that he claimed to possess the tribunician power from 1 July 69.⁴⁰

Vespasian then wished to be seen as continuing in the tradition of the Principate as founded by Augustus. The Lex de Imperio Vespasiani neither enhances nor curtails the powers of the Senate and people or the freedom of action of the *princeps*. That is the political truth behind the fictional story told by Philostratus, in which Vespasian rejects one philosopher's advice to restore the Republic and another's to leave the choice of constitution to the Romans, in favour of the advice of Apollonius of Tyana not to give up the position he has won.⁴¹

A similar message is conveyed by the types of coins issued under Vespasian. Though those issued by Galba during the rebellion of 68 included a large number of republican types, that did not signify hopes of a restoration of the Republic, for there were also many revived Augustan types, while the resonant type depicting daggers, originally accompanied by the legend 'EID. MAR.', appeared instead with the anodyne legend 'LIBERTAS P.R. RESTITUTA'. Vespasian's coinage was even less specific, though the extent to which it repeated earlier republican and imperial types from 70 on is striking. Attempts to show that allusion was largely restricted to Augustus fail, and it is notable that types and even dies, not only of Galba, but even of Vitellius, were in use. Even the portraits continue the trend, set in the later reign of Nero, towards realism and away from the idealized portraiture of Augustus and his successors. The resemblance of early gold and silver coins showing busts of Titus and Domitian facing

⁴⁰ Vespasian's *dies imperii* and his *tribunicia potestas* were numbered from 1 July 69, but the latter is not attested on documents of 69 and first appears on a diploma of 7 Mar. 70 (*ILS* 1989), which may explain why Suet. *Vesp.* 12 says that he did not assume the power 'statim'. Vitellius' *dies imperii* 19 April (*Acta Fratrum Arvalium* in *MW* 2, vv. 85–6), cf. *Hist.* 11.55; 62.2; and 1.55 for the attitude of Verginius Rufus' legions. Vespasian assumed the titles of Caesar and Augustus possibly before 70: Isaac and Roll (1976); Buttrey (1980) 8–10. ⁴¹ Philostr. *VA* v.33–5.

each other to Vitellian coins portraying his children in a similar way, and the striking from Vitellian dies of bronze coins portraying Victory with a shield and a palm-tree, alluding to Vespasian's own victories in Judaea, make it hard to believe that the details of Vespasian's coins were very important either to him or to his mint officials.⁴² Before and after the emperor returned to Rome, their most striking feature is their lack of originality. In so far as they mattered at all, continuity must be what they were intended to advertise. To proclaim Pax, Libertas, Concordia, even Aeternitas P(opuli) R(omani) – an innovation – is to assert that the new regime is continuous with the past and that the Principate and Rome will survive together.

There are some new types, such as the FORTUNA REDUX coins celebrating Vespasian's return to Rome, the types depicting Titus and Domitian in various postures, and the copious advertisement in 71, the year of the triumph, of the repression of the Jewish revolt. But it is typical that, instead of the representations of buildings that had adorned the coins of Nero and were to appear again with Domitian, the building programme, by which Vespasian set great store, was reflected only in the ROMA RESURGENS legends, reflecting at most the symbolic significance of that programme. The depiction of the Temple of Isis on early coins commemorates the night that Vespasian and Titus passed there before their triumph. The appearance of the Temple of Vesta also on early coins, like the figure of Vesta on others, is probably just a way of celebrating Rome itself, while the repeatedly used type of the Capitoline temple commemorates, significantly, not a new building, but a careful restoration: the priests warned that the gods did not want the old form changed. Vespasian himself shifted the debris of the old temple to the marshes as they prescribed, and the *plebs* worked on the new one *en masse*, rebuilding their city, still only partially reconstructed after the catastrophic Neronian fire.⁴³

Two of the three *principes* recognized in 68/9 had anticipated Vespasian in adopting the Julian family name of Caesar. Claudius had been the first to assume rather than inherit it, but he had been a member of the imperial house. When assumed by Galba, Otho and now Vespasian, when conferred on Galba's adopted son Piso and on Titus and Domitian, as it was in 69, the family name Caesar had clearly become the name of an institution. It could have been dropped, as Vitellius originally intended to do for himself and his heir.⁴⁴ Instead it was adopted, and through it the continuance of the Augustan Principate was declared.

⁴² C. M. Kraay, 'The bronze coinage of Vespasian: classification and attribution', *Scripta Nummaria Romana* (1978) 47 ff.; Buttrey (1972) 89 ff.; *BMCRE* II 180 no. 748B=MW 83; cf. *BMCRE* I 372 no. 27=MW 80.

⁴³ *BMCRE* II 87 no. 425=MW 42 (Roma Resurgens); *BMCRE* II 17 no. 90=MW 426 (Vesta); Hill (1979) 208, 210; Hill (1989) 28–9; 23–4; 25; *BMCRE* II 123 no. 572; 133 no. 614=MW 425 (Capitoline Temple), cf. Suet. *Vesp.* 8.5; Tac. *Hist.* IV.53 and Wardle (1996). ⁴⁴ Tac. *Hist.* II.59; 62, cf. III.58.

If Vespasian's rule was to last, he must be seen as fit to continue this tradition. Tacitus has Mucianus emphasize, as assets of Vespasian's house, a triumph and two sons, one of whom is already fit to rule and possessed of a distinguished military record. Under Domitian, the adaptable senator and poet Silius Italicus attributed to Jupiter a retrospective prophecy: a Sabine will win victories in Germany, Britain, Africa and Idumaea, and end up with divine honours.⁴⁵ Vespasian himself made much of his Sabine toughness and frugality and the military prowess that was supposed to accompany it. He was said to want his officers to smell of garlic, not perfume. The military theme was brought into sharp focus with the Jewish triumph of June 71 and the closing of the Temple of Janus symbolizing the attainment of peace through Roman arms. Indeed a Temple of Pax which would hold the spoils taken from the Jewish temple in Jerusalem was duly planned and completed within four years.⁴⁶ The thematic connection was stressed by Josephus who, writing in Rome after 75, living in Vespasian's old house, and endowed with the Roman citizenship, property and a pension, will have studied how to please the emperor. Publication of his *Jewish War*, a work based on the notebooks of Vespasian and Titus, was ordered by Titus who affixed his seal as testimony to its truthfulness. It includes, as a set piece, an extended account of the triumph, preceded by Vespasian's return to Rome and the sentiments it generated in the senators, confident that his maturity and military achievement would restore prosperity, and in the army, glad to have a proven soldier in charge. The theme of the triumph in the Flavian poets clearly reflects the emphasis on this particular event, although some embarrassment about the presentation of a provincial revolt as a new conquest may explain why the cognomen 'Iudaicus' was not assumed by the triumphators.⁴⁷

Josephus' account of the triumph mirrors the particular importance it had for the reputation of Titus. Ten years later an arch was erected at the end of the Circus Maximus with an inscription which echoes the senatorial decree acclaiming his military victory 'achieved under the auspices and instructions of his father', with invidious comparison of those who had failed to conquer Jerusalem earlier in the war. The extant Arch of Titus at the top of the Sacred Way, completed after his death and restored in 1824, carries a frieze depicting the triumphal procession with Titus alone as the conquering hero.⁴⁸

Josephus notes accurately, however, that the triumph was a joint one of

⁴⁵ *Hist.* II.77; *Sil. Pim.* III.596–602.

⁴⁶ *Suet. Vesp.* 12; 8.3. Temple of Pax: *Dio LXVI.15*; *Joseph. BJ VII.158*.

⁴⁷ *Joseph. Vit.* 361–3; *BJ VII.123* ff. (the triumph); 67; *Rajak (1983) ch. 8*. Cognomen 'Iudaicus': *Dio LXVI.7.2*, but cf. *Yavetz (1975) 432 n. 70*.

⁴⁸ *ILS 264=MW 53*; for the interpretation of 'quod praeceptis patris consiliisque et auspiciis gentem Iudaeorum domuit et urbem Hierusolymam omnibus ante se ducibus regibus gentibus aut frustra petitam aut omnino intemptatam delevit' adopted here, *Instinsky (1948) 370–1*.

Vespasian and Titus and that the emperor rode ahead in his chariot followed by Titus in his, while Domitian accompanied them on a richly caparisoned horse. Another principal theme of Flavian ideology was the harmony existing between Vespasian and his two sons.⁴⁹ Galba's desperate adoption of Piso, Otho's plan to adopt his nephew and Vitellius' presentation of his infant son to the army all underline how important it was for the *princeps* to be able to offer the prospect of a peaceful and secure succession. The troubles of Augustus had already shown, and the future was to confirm, that more than one possible successor had to be in the wings. Josephus sees Vespasian as passing his power to his sons and their descendants. Although it is Titus whose military exploits are exaggerated and whose closeness to his father is stressed, Domitian too is presented as responsible for the victory over the Batavians and showing prowess and responsibility befitting his father, whom he represents in Rome.⁵⁰

By 70 coins proclaimed the two young Caesars as *principes iuventutis*, a title invented in the time of Augustus to mark out Gaius and Lucius Caesar as leaders of the younger generation of the governing class. Each of Vespasian's sons feature on the obverses of substantial issues of coins.⁵¹ Moreover, by being *consul ordinarius* every year but two and sharing the post with Titus often, he amassed nine consulships for himself and seven for Titus. Domitian was *consul ordinarius* in 73 and suffect consul four times, though not yet of consular age. The contrast with the Julio-Claudian successors of Augustus, all of whom, except for the murdered Gaius, clearly limited themselves to five, is striking.⁵²

Vespasian was also determined to employ and honour other members of his family. Both his brother Flavius Sabinus and his son-in-law Petillius Cerialis, married to his deceased daughter Flavia Domitilla, had been important in his rise to power. Now the former was given a belated public funeral and a statue in the forum, while the latter was appointed governor of Britain, with instructions to quell the Batavian revolt on the way, and was then made suffect consul for the second time in 74. L. Iunius P. Caesennius Paetus, the husband of Vespasian's niece Flavia Sabina, became his first governor of Syria, replacing the illustrious Mucianus, while the brother of Titus' first wife, Arrecinus Clemens, was first named praetorian prefect and then advanced to a suffect consulship in 73. The chief magistracy also went to his brother's son and to the son of his niece and Caesennius Paetus. The Flavians, however, were to show themselves concerned to avoid an unnecessary proliferation of relatives of the imperial house. So the grandsons of his brother Flavius Sabinus were both married within the family: Sabinus to Titus' daughter Iulia, and Clemens to Flavia Domitilla, another of

⁴⁹ Joseph. *BJ* VII.152, cf. Dio LXVI.1a; family harmony: Joseph. *BJ* IV.597; VII.119 ff.

⁵⁰ Joseph. *BJ* VII.73; IV.654; VII.85. ⁵¹ *BMCRE* II xxxiii, xxxv, xliii, l-li.

⁵² Gallivan (1981); Pliny, *Pan.* 58.

Vespasian's granddaughters. It is possible that a fear of confusing the succession issue by producing another legitimate child is what deterred Vespasian from taking a second wife as *princeps*. Instead he resumed his youthful liaison with the imperial freedwoman Antonia Caenis, retained her as his concubine, and found others to replace her when she died.⁵³

The practical role assumed by the *princeps'* sons was to cause trouble for them in the future. For just as Domitian and Mucianus did the dirty work for Vespasian before his return to Rome, so Titus as praetorian prefect dealt with opposition in a way that protected the person of the *princeps* while preserving his reputation for clemency. At the end of the reign, Josephus was to try and combat the reputation for cruelty that Titus thus acquired by stressing his clemency as commander in the Jewish War.⁵⁴

Tacitus and Suetonius, however, reflect rumours not only about the ambitions of Vespasian's sons but about the tensions between the brothers and, in particular, about the jealousy of Domitian, who was denied the opportunity to acquire independent military glory.⁵⁵ That was inevitable, for Vespasian, who had seen under Tiberius and Claudius the problems that could arise from ambiguity over who was to succeed, made a clear distinction between his sons while advancing both. He doubtless expected Titus, who was only thirty years old and, though divorced, had shown himself capable of producing progeny, to be followed by his own son. Vespasian's wish to establish a clear difference was facilitated by the substantial and visible twelve-year difference in their ages and was reinforced by Roman tradition: Galba, according to Tacitus, cited the fact that he was adopting Piso and not his older brother as evidence that he had no dynastic designs. It was natural for Domitian to be praetor when Titus was given his first consulship in 70, and natural for Titus as a consular to become censor with his father while Domitian was holding his first ordinary consulship in 73. The inequality is clear to see in the attributes the two have on coins and in the fact that Titus is the first to appear in Rome on the obverses of gold and silver coins.⁵⁶

The principal difference, however, was manifested in their titulature, for it is only Titus' which includes the title 'Imperator', and not just as a way of recording the number of imperial salutations. The question of this title has more than anything else given rise to the problem of Titus' position *vis à vis* his father. Like Josephus in retrospect, the elder Pliny, dedicating his *Natural History* to Titus in 77, addresses him as 'imperator' and speaks of 'imperatores Caesares Vespasiani'.⁵⁷ Although he has to omit 'Augustus'

⁵³ For the Flavian family tree: Townend (1961); Castritius (1969); Caenis: Suet. *Vesp.* 3; 21; Dio LXVI.14 (she died before 75). ⁵⁴ Dio LXVI.24.4; cf. Suet. *Tit.* 6–7.1. See Yavetz (1975).

⁵⁵ Tac. *Hist.* IV. 85–6, cf. Suet. *Dom.* 2.2 ⁵⁶ Above, n. 51.

⁵⁷ Jones, *Titus* 81; Joseph. *Vit.* 359; 361; Pliny, *HN* III.66: 'imperatores et censores Caesares Vespasiani'; VII.162 'Imperatores Caesares Vespasiani pater filiusque censores'.

from Vespasian's name in order to achieve this plural, the designation reflects the fact that Titus' position was highly unusual. Coins probably from the Roman mint at Ephesus and inscriptions in the eastern and western provinces, and even in Italy, show Titus at various dates with the praenomen 'Imperator'. Some of these, notably the coins and milestones, have some claim to reflect official sanction; others are attributable to Roman military commanders who ought to have been aware of official protocol.⁵⁸ But in Rome the practice is unattested, though 'Imperator' is given considerable prominence, occurring between 'Titus' and 'Caesar' or between 'Titus Caesar' and 'Vespasianus' or at the head of the titles following the name. The fact that the numbering of Titus' *tribunicia potestas* follows but lags behind Vespasian's by two, and that the numbering of his imperial salutations follows Vespasian's, starting from the conjunction of his first with his father's seventh, suggests a parallel with the position of Tiberius between his adoption in A.D. 4 and the death of Augustus. Even being Vespasian's colleague in the censorship does not argue for full parity except in that office, traditionally collegiate like all Republican magistracies.

In his biography of Titus, Suetonius describes him as 'partner and protector of the imperial power'. The second term he glosses by a reference to his punishment of potential enemies as prefect of the praetorian guard. Vespasian had witnessed the threat to Tiberius from that quarter and had seen Nero undone by an ambitious prefect and Galba by a negligent one. He had also seen the friction between Tiberius' son and heir and his prefect. In addition to avoiding friction and providing security, Vespasian may have wished to reinforce the impression that Titus was the military arm of the regime: the prominence of 'Imperator' in his titulature may have had a similar function. The long-term consequence of the decision to make Titus the prefect of the guard, especially after the appointment of Tiberius Iulius Alexander to that post, was to establish it as the highest to which an *eques* could aspire, that of prefect of Egypt now coming second.⁵⁹

As for Titus' role as *particeps imperii*, Suetonius adduces the sharing of unspecified duties, and, specifically, the writing of letters and edicts in his father's name and the reading out of his speeches to the Senate. He points out that Titus was thought to take bribes to influence Vespasian's judicial decisions. The implication is that it was Vespasian, not Titus, who exercised jurisdiction, just as the letters and edicts were issued in the name of Vespasian. Again, Titus is shown commenting on a tax already established by his father.⁶⁰

⁵⁸ e.g. *ILS* 8904=MW 86; *ILS* 254=MW 87; *IGRR* III 223=MW 88. Coins show it down to 74 (*BMCRE* II n. 47), see Mattingly, *BMCRE* II lxx, who suggests imperfect instructions, not filial rebellion.

⁵⁹ Suet. *Tit.* 6: 'participem atque etiam tutorem imperii'; Aur. Vict. *Caes.* 9.11; Chilver (1962) 243.

⁶⁰ Suet. *Tit.* 6.1; *Vesp.* 23.3, cf. Dio LXVI.14-5.

Although Titus was said to have found time for riotous living, he must certainly have been seen to be working and learning the job which he would eventually assume. The elder Pliny in his dedication claims to have provided the table of contents to his voluminous work 'as it was my duty in the public interest to save time for your occupations'. For the justification of Vespasian's continued tenure of power was to be the laborious attention to the needs of the *res publica* shown by himself and his son. His nephew describes how the elder Pliny, prefect of the fleet at Misenum, would go before daybreak to see the emperor who was already at his desk, and then attend to his own work, clearly in the city. He was one of the *amici* whom Vespasian admitted after reading his letters and the reports of all the administrative departments (*officia*). The portion of the day left over from business, the emperor devoted to exercise and relaxation, a way of life which, with one day of fasting a month and a rubdown after his workout, ensured Vespasian robust health. This was the new image of the *princeps* that was to replace that of his dissolute predecessors, its antithesis being the lazy and gluttonous Vitellius of our literary sources.⁶¹

It is not just Vespasian's gratitude for his own advancement to military honours and the consulship, and Titus' loyalty to Britannicus, that explain why Claudius was the Julio-Claudian *princeps* whom Vespasian particularly chose to honour. Claudius, as his literary portraits make plain, loved his work: he spent time on jurisdiction, on issuing edicts, on supervising useful construction works. He censured Tiberius and Gaius for impeding business, the first by his absence, the second by the terror he inspired in his officials. By honouring Claudius, Vespasian could also suggest a continuity between himself and the founding dynasty, while, at the same time, by discrediting Nero, he could justify the supersession of that line.

Admiration for Claudius was combined with criticism of Nero when Vespasian ordered the completion of the Temple of Divus Claudius. The false allegation that Nero destroyed the temple and cancelled Claudius' deification forms part of the Flavian attack on Nero's Golden House which had swallowed up the started temple, as Martial's poem *De Spectaculis* 2 makes clear.⁶² Writing under Titus, the poet proclaims the message that the city of Rome, which the sprawling palace and gardens would have made a personal luxury for the tyrant, is now restored to the people. On the site of Nero's lake the great amphitheatre, the Colosseum, was built up to the third tier by Vespasian, to be completed by his sons. To the north on the Oppian Hill, on the site of Nero's palace and park, were to rise the Baths of Titus, and the colossal bronze statue of the megalomaniac emperor,

⁶¹ Pliny, *HN* I pref. 33; Pliny, *Ep.* III.5.9 ff., cf. VI.16.4; see Syme (1969) 227=*Roman Papers* II 765–6. Suet. *Vesp.* 20–1; cf. Vitellius in Tac. *Hist.* II.77.3; II.76.5.

⁶² Suet. *Tit.* 2; Sen. *Ad Polybium* 7.2; *ILS* 206=Smallwood, *GCN* no. 368; Suet. *Claud.* 45; *Vesp.* 9. See Charlesworth (1937) 57 ff.; Griffin (1994).

designed to be placed in front of the vestibule on the Velia, was redesigned as a statue of the Sun and erected there. Finally, as the elder Pliny stresses, many of the Greek works of art that had been looted for the Golden House were now displayed in the Temple of Peace, built on land made available by the Great Fire of 64. The great Flavian structures could be claimed as public munificence and opposed, in accordance with republican tradition, to private luxury.⁶³ This would divert attention from the fact that the public had gained at the expense of the private individuals whose houses and shops had been destroyed by the fire and by the Neronian building operations.

Vespasian claimed Augustan precedent for the idea of a huge amphitheatre in the heart of the city, but for his restoration to the public of a vineyard in Rome occupied by private individuals there was a Claudian precedent, and it was Claudius whose reputation as a builder of useful constructions Vespasian celebrated. Walls, ports and aqueducts attracted more approval than places of entertainment, even more than temples. Claudius had advertised, in an inscription on the Aqua Virgo, that he had restored and rebuilt the aqueduct whose arches were disturbed by Gaius.⁶⁴ Now, in 71, a new inscription on the Aqua Claudia and Anio Novus informed the citizens of Rome that the aqueduct, built by Claudius, had, after nine years of neglect, been restored by Vespasian at his own expense, and the point was underscored by a dedication to Vespasian celebrating his repair of the streets of the city ruined 'by the neglect of earlier times'. In addition to disparaging Nero, these inscriptions make the more general point that a *princeps* has duties, among them looking after and spending his own fortune on works of public utility, not on selfish projects for his own comfort. The elder Pliny, writing in 77, makes a similar criticism of Nero for letting the canal drained by the Fucine lake fill up again: the idea was to increase the area of cultivated land and make the river more navigable.⁶⁵

Again, the four surviving boundary stones that proclaim Vespasian's extension of the city's sacred boundary, an imperial prerogative for which the *Lex de Imperio Vespasiani* could give only Claudius as precedent, carefully repeat the inscription on the *cippi* of 49, thereby endorsing the view of Claudius, controversial in his time, that such extensions were justified by foreign conquest: Vespasian was doubtless thinking of the reduction of Judaea and two eastern client kingdoms to the status of Roman provinces (p. 39) and of the gains in Britain (pp. 37–8).⁶⁶ The extension belongs to

⁶³ Pliny, *HN* xxxiv.84; xxxvi.27. Republican tradition. Cic. *Flac.* 28; *Mur.* 76.

⁶⁴ Suet. *Vesp.* 9; *ILS* 249=MW 430; *ILS* 205=Smallwood, *GCN* no. 308b. Cf. Cic. *Off.* ii.60.

⁶⁵ *ILS* 218=MW 408a; *ILS* 245=MW 412. Pliny, *HN* xxxvi.124–5; Dio LX.II.5, cf. Suet. *Iul.* 44; *Claud.* 20.

⁶⁶ *NSC* (1993) 241=MW 51; *ILS* 213=Smallwood, *GCN* no. 44; Tac. *Ann.* xii.23–4; Sen. *Brev. Vit.* 13.8; see Boatwright (1986).