THE COMPARATIVE STUDY OF POLITICAL ELITES

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The topic of leadership has long been at the center of studies of politics. Classical political theorists were deeply concerned by questions both of who should govern, and of who in fact did rule. Recent scholarship on political elites has also focused on both of these questions, with normative theorists often asking how representative political leaders are of their societies, while their empiricist counterparts have tried to discern those characteristics of politicians that would suggest explanations and predictions of attitudes and behavior. Both of these concerns have led to careful compilations and analyses of the social backgrounds of political leaders.[1] But despite masses of accumulated data, one finds rather few general relationships between social facts and political behavior emerging from these studies. Dissatisfaction with the meager results of these studies -- such as the finding that 46.9% of some legislature consists of lawyers whose average age is 53 -- has led many political scientists

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[1] A recent survey of literature on political elites is Dankwart A. Rustow, "The Study of Elites: Who's Who, When, and How," World Politics, Vol. 18, No. 4, July 1966. See also Frederick W. Frey, The Turkish Political Elite, (Cambridge, Massachusetts: M.I.T. Press, 1965); Lewis J. Edinger and Donald D. Searing, "Social Backgrounnd in Elite Analysis: A Methodological Inquiry," American Political Science Review, Volume 61, No. 2, June 1967; and Donald D. Searing, "The Comparative Study of Elite Socialization," Comparative Political Studies, Vol. 1, No. 4, January 1969.

either to reject social background analysis as a meaningful approach to the study of political leadership and political development,[2] or to call for radical changes in the way in which data are collected and presented.[3]

While it is easy to sympathize with critics of the typical quantitative descriptions of political elites, there are sound reasons to believe that these studies, laboriously carried out by a generation of scholars, can usefully add to the analysis of political change if they can be made comparable. In isolation, the statistical breakdown of occupations in the French cabinet, for example, may not be particularly informative. Used comparatively or in aggregate analysis, the same figure may be considerably more interesting.[4]

[2] Joseph Schlesinger states that "... inference from a politician's origins or his personality to his political behavior does not work. The social or occupational composition of Congress is no guide to its voting behavior." Ambition and Politics: Political Careers in the United States (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1966), p. 13. Donald R. Matthews, The Social Backgrounds of Political Decision-Makers (New York: Random House, 1962), p. 40, disagrees with Schlesinger's judgment and shows that voting in Congress on some issues is predicted quite well by the social backgrounds of Congressmen.

[3] Donald Searing, op. cit., p. 490, says that: "Given the present state of knowledge concerning attitude formation and change, we can conclude in the strongest terms possible for discursive social science analysis of this nature, that the background taxonomy currently employed in elite studies is inadequate for forecasting attitudinal distributions among elite populations."

[4] For example, Dankwart Rustow, op. cit., draws on data on the backgrounds of elites in several countries, and in particular Sweden, to suggest that Weber's "availability hypothesis" explains entry into politics better than arguments based on particular skills of groups such as lawyers.

In aggregate analyses of all political systems, there are relatively few variables which are susceptible to quantification that are of greater concern to the political scientist than those describing the backgrounds of political elites. Such information may well prove to be as informative and to explain as much variance as the social and economic characteristics of nations -- such as literacy and per capita income -- that are commonly used in comparing political systems. In addition, systematic information on earlier generations of political leaders can often be obtained, which greatly extends the possible scope of comparative analysis beyond the times and places in which interviews with leaders can be carried out. Finally, even contemporary political elites, especially at the national level, are quite often inaccessible and attitudinal information is therefore difficult to obtain.

The justifications for gathering social background information for the comparative study of political change seem to withstand most criticisms, and yet results have been disappointing. What can be done to make better use of both the technique of social background analysis and the large body of existing data on the political elites of over half the countries of the world? (See Appendix I for a summary of the available data.)

Methodology and Data

Literally hundreds of studies of political institutions contain some quantitative data on the backgrounds of political elites. In addition, countless non-quantitative studies exist which rely on information about the origins and experiences of political leaders. The attention paid to political elites and to their social backgrounds has frequently been

justified by injunctions such as those of Reinhard Bendix, who has written that:

> ... a study of politics should be concerned with the social composition of the members and leaders of different political organizations; this kind of knowledge will provide a clue to the political goals which their leaders are likely to pursue.[5]

Expanding on the rationale for these studies, Lewis Edinger and Donald Searing have written that:

> The stated or implied underlying assumption [in social background research] is that leadership, social background and recruitment patterns will facilitate understanding of the political system because we can infer from them a good deal about the system's homogeneity and dominant values, about elite-elite relationships and about elite-mass relationships.[6]

The difficulties in social background analysis are certainly not due to infrequent attention being paid to these variables. Even the most non-quantitative, non-behavioral study of politics is likely to stress the importance of some social background facts such as the following: the "old school tie" in the British cabinet; the dominant role played in Israeli politics by Central European and Russian emigrants; the implications for future Chinese politics of the advanced age of the top leadership; the growing influence of technically trained bureaucrats in communist systems; and the Alawite origins of Syrian Baathist leaders. For virtually every country, some similar "insight" based on social background facts can be found.

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[5]Reinhard Bendix, "Social Stratification and Political Power," in Reinhard Bendix and Seymour M. Lipset, eds., Class, Status, and Power (Glencoe: The Free Press, 1953), p. 596.

[6]Lewis J. Edinger and Donald D. Searing, op. cit., p. 430.

In order to add to these limited generalizations and to make use of quantitative data for developing testable hypotheses about political leadership, problems of incomplete data, poor methodology and inadequate theory must be overcome. Fifteen years ago, Donald Matthews imaginatively surveyed the field of social background studies and reached a conclusion that is largely valid even today.

> It seems to have been assumed by the researchers in this field that any and all facts take on great significance when displayed in imposing tables of figures worked out to two decimal places. One always is impressed by the industry, patience, and arithmetical skill which have gone into constructing these tables, but not always by their political significance.[7]

Since Matthews wrote, more tables have been produced on the elites of many more nations, and the computer has made sophisticated quantitative analysis a less tedious business. The prospects of using this large source of data on elites for comparative analysis of political systems would seem to be considerable, but only a few modest attempts have thus far been made.[8]

The most common type of study, and probably the least interesting for both theoretical and comparative purposes, is the analysis of a single political unit at a single point in time. Studies abound which show the occupational and educational breakdowns for the lower house of some state or national legislature in a given year. To increase the value

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[7] Donald Matthews, op. cit., p. 59

[8] For example, the potential of elite studies is demonstrated in Rustow, op. cit., Edinger and Searing, op. cit., and Searing, op. cit.

of such a study, data on other political bodies at different levels of authority, as well as information on the same body from earlier years would be useful. The most complete studies are those which show changes over time at more than one level of authority.[9]

Problems of data collection and presentation have generally not been approached by researchers with comparative analysis in mind. Categories for listing occupations are often taken uncritically from available sources. At times occupations are listed in great detail, which at least allows for recombining categories for secondary analysis. But just as frequently, too few distinctions are made, so that individuals are merely placed in classes such as "bourgeoisie" or "proletariat," or "upper class" and "lower class."

While some data that are of particular interest in a given country -- such as participation in a unique historical event -- cannot be made comparable across countries, most of the standard background variables can be so used if coded by some common criteria. Data on family background, class, father's profession, foreign language knowledge and the religious affiliation of political leaders can all be used comparatively, but for large-scale aggregate analysis there are simply too few studies which include these variables. Until further research is carried out which focuses on these more unusual -- and perhaps more interesting -- variables, comprehensive comparative analysis of the social backgrounds of political leaders will be limited to data on age, occupation and education.

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[9] Two studies which show trends over long time-periods and analyze more than one level of authority are Frederick W. Frey, op. cit., and R. Bayly Winder, "Syrian Deputies and Cabinet Ministers, 1919-1959," Middle East Journal, Vol. 16, No. 4, Autumn 1962 and Vol. 17, No. 1, Winter 1963.

While the variables of age, occupation and education may seem rather pedestrian to some analysts, the latter two do have the merit of referring to complex socialization experiences rather than simply to an individual's origins. Both education and occupation are generally viewed as playing a major part in the political socialization process. Age is of less *a priori* interest, but may be used as an indicator of political generations, and thereby of distinctive experiences in politics. These variables, however, all require attention if they are to be used effectively in comparative studies.

Age, for example, has been reported in several ways, no two of which are strictly interchangeable. The percentage of the members of a political body falling into each five-year age group is often reported and has the advantage of showing the distribution of cases. For comparison, however, a summary statistic is needed, and for this the mean of all cases is most useful. The median, while also reported at times, is less common. In future studies, it would seem that the average age should always be reported, even if other measures are used in addition to the mean. The result will be a figure which can easily be interpreted, carries the same information across all political systems, and is likely to be accurately measured. But while the data on age are by far the most reliable, they are probably of least theoretical interest.

Education is a more difficult variable to use in comparative research. Data are occasionally reported in terms of the average number of years of education of leaders. More frequently, percentages of those attaining various levels of education are given. Problems also arise from the distinctive terminology used in different educational systems.

For comparative analysis, the most useful categories, even if they at times seem to do violence to the data, are those of "university education," "secondary school education" and "primary school education." Distinctions of where leaders were educated -- such as French universities or elite schools -- are also worth making, but are still too infrequently reported to be used in aggregate comparative analysis.

If the variable of level of education causes some methodological problems, these are minor compared to those associated with "occupation." The variety of descriptive terms used to present this information is remarkable, and only with considerable uncertainty can the analyst try to recombine data into comparable categories. Some consolation, however, may be found in the fact that most modern occupations, at least, do have relatively similar prestige ratings across cultures, and thus comparisons seem to make sense. A recent study of occupational prestige in a large number of countries has concluded that:

> The extension of the study of occupational prestige to "underdeveloped countries" has provided evidence that many such nations have occupational-prestige hierarchies which are very similar to those of more advanced nations.[10]

With the data on occupations of political leaders that now exist, the following common-sense categories appear most relevant for comparative purposes: lawyers, agriculturalists, businessmen, journalists, doctors, teachers, bureaucrats,

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[10]Robert W. Hodge, Donald J. Treiman and Peter H. Rossi, "A Comparative Study of Occupational Prestige," in Reinhard Bendix and Seymour M. Lipset, eds., Class, Status, and Power (Second Edition) (New York: The Free Press, 1966), p. 310.

military officers, union leaders and workers.[11] These can then be further summarized as "Liberal Professions" (lawyers, doctors, teachers), "Economic Professions" (businessmen and agriculturalists), and "Official Professions" (bureaucrats and military officers). Other occupations are either found in such small numbers among political elites as to be uninteresting in macro-comparisons or can be subsumed under these categories.

Using these standardized categories, data on the political elites of sixty-one countries and twelve American states have been recoded so that comparisons can be made. The political elites studied here consist of the members of formal political bodies, such as cabinets, parliaments, political bureaus and central committees. The largest number of studies report on lower houses of parliament or unicameral legislatures, with cabinets receiving the next most attention. The sample of political units covered in this analysis is clearly not representative of the total universe of cases. Few studies of Latin American countries have been found, for example, while elites in Anglo-American countries have been extensively surveyed. More studies of state or regional political bodies would also be welcome. But for the moment these gaps in the data do exist, and consequently any tentative findings based on the present body of information will be subject to revision or refinement in the light of more and better data.

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[11] Where possible, it is useful to distinguish between small and large businessmen, small and large agriculturalists, and non-university teachers and university professors.

Comparative Elite Analysis

Studies of political leadership have drawn on social background information both to illustrate theoretical concepts and to establish relationships among social, economic, and political variables. Terms such as a "homogeneous ruling elite," "the elite-mass gap," or "the integration of a political system" may be illustrated and clarified by quantitative studies of the characteristics of leaders of various political groups. Similarly, in the search for theoretically interesting statistical relationships, information concerning political elites may be seen as a dependent variable affected by social and economic changes, or as an independent variable producing results of political and social significance. Examples of the variety of uses of the data on backgrounds of elites should serve to illustrate these two major purposes of comparative social background analysis.

Regional Comparisons -- An Example from North Africa

When data on political elites are used to clarify theoretical concepts, comparisons based on relatively few cases may be preferred to comprehensive aggregate analysis. Cases may be chosen selectively, because of specific data requirements or because of an area studies orientation. Some problems of comparative elite analysis are overcome by focusing attention on countries which have a common culture and history. Categories used in comparisons will then be likely to carry the same or similar meaning in each political system.[12]

[12] American states provide a large number of units for comparative analysis in which educational and occupational categories maintain similar meanings. Other regional groupings that could be studied in which categories would probably be readily comparable are the countries of Latin America, Eastern Europe, Western Europe, South Asia, the Arab Middle East, and Southeast Asia.

The countries of North Africa, for example, have much in common, particularly when contrasted with their African and Middle Eastern neighbors. The level of economic development in Tunisia, Algeria and Morocco is roughly the same, the inhabitants of each country are Sunni Muslims, and all three societies were deeply influenced by a long and close colonial tie to France. Despite these similarities, however, the political systems in these three countries have been quite different since independence. Tunisia has generally been described as a benevolent but authoritarian tutelary democracy led by pragmatic men of similar middle-class origins.[13] The regime in Algeria has been much less stable, more highly ideological, and has been composed of men of widely divergent backgrounds.[14] Finally, the Moroccan monarchy is the most difficult of the three systems to portray, since a semi-competitive system coexists with the strong rule of the king.[15] Morocco is poorly integrated, and the gap between urban and rural areas is great.

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[13] See Clement H. Moore, Tunisia Since Independence, (Berkeley, California: University of California Press, 1965).

[14] William B. Quandt, Revolution and Political Leadership: Algeria 1954-1968, (Cambridge, Mass.: The M.I.T. Press, 1969).

[15] John Waterbury, "Marginal Politics and Elite Manipulation in Morocco," Archives européennes sociologiques, Vol. VIII, 1967.

With these brief characterizations of the three North African countries in mind, one can turn to the data on the backgrounds of political leaders to illustrate and clarify concepts such as "homogeneity" and the "elite-mass gap." Table I shows the available information on the age, education and occupations of North African cabinet ministers in the mid-1960s. The figures demonstrate the relative "homogeneity" of the top elite in both Morocco and Tunisia, with over three-fourths of the ministers in both countries having university educations and coming from liberal professions.[16] In contrast, Algerian ministers are drawn from a greater diversity of backgrounds. With these base line figures, it should be possible to discern gradual changes over time, including the apparent trend toward greater homogeneity of the Algerian leadership. The entry of new social groups into positions of top leadership, such as workers or businessmen, would also reflect major changes in the political strength of various social groups in the three countries.

The concept of an integrated political system implies that political leaders and activists throughout a country and at each level of authority hold relatively similar ideas as to how government should be managed. To some degree, integration suggests that the "gap" between national, regional, and local leaders will not be so great as to obstruct

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[16]The Tunisian elite is particularly well integrated. Seventy-five percent of the Tunisian cabinet in 1965, for example, attended the same prestige secondary school, Sadiki College. L. Carl Brown has stressed the role of Sadiki College in forming the nationalist elite in his contribution to Charles A. Micaud, et al., Tunisia: The Politics of Modernization (New York: Praeger, 1964).

Table I: SOCIAL CHARACTERISTICS OF NORTH AFRICAN CABINET MINISTERS

	Average Age	University Education	French University Education	Lawyers	Doctors	Teachers	Liberal Professions	Bureaucrats; Military; Politicians	Workers
Tunisia (1965) (n = 16)	46	88%	69%	62%	---	25%	87%	13%	0%
Morocco (1964) (n = 24)	44	79%	75%	42%	17%	17%	76%	21%	0%
Algeria (1965) (n = 21)	37	52%	29%	19%	14%	10%	43%	24%	14%

communication between higher and lower levels of authority. Sufficient data have been collected on Tunisian leaders to show the gradual change in background characteristics of leaders at each level of the political system.[17] As Table II shows, leaders and deputies to the National Assembly are highly educated, while regional Governors and Secretary Generals are somewhat less so. Members of regional assemblies are about as well-educated as the top leadership at the local level. Top leaders at the regional and local levels have generally attained the same level of education as secondary leaders one level higher. Party members at the local level have the least education. The gradual, progressive change in background characteristics from higher to lower levels of authority indicates that a serious "elite-mass" gap has not been allowed to appear in Tunisia.

The data for Morocco are less complete, but the existence of a gap between a highly educated elite and a very poorly educated local leadership is apparent. (Table III.) The entire cabinet has received at least a modern French secondary school education, and most attended university in France. Of the more than 10,000 municipal councillors, however, over 66% had no education at all, and only four percent had received a modern secondary school education or more.

Changes in the degree of integration and the size of the "elite-mass gap" may be traced over time with figures on the educational attainments of political leaders in these and other countries.

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[17] Data on regional and local Tunisian elites have been collected and reported by Lars Rudebeck, Party and People: A Study of Political Change in Tunisia (Stockholm: Almavist and Wiksell, 1967).

Table II: EDUCATION AND AGE OF NATIONAL, REGIONAL AND LOCAL LEADERS IN TUNISIA

	Univ.Ed. or Mod. Secondary Degree	No Secondary Education	Age
Cabinet (n = 16)	100%	0%	46
Assembly (n = 90)	70%	1%	--
Governors (n = 14)	50%	0%	42
Secretary Generals (n = 14)	55%	8%	35
Regional Committees of Coordination (n = 189)	27%	28%	38
Local Branch Presidents (n = 40)	30%	25%	38
Local Branch Members (n = 220)	7%	37%	37

Table III: EDUCATION OF NATIONAL AND LOCAL LEADERS IN MOROCCO

	Univ.Ed. or Mod. Secondary Degree	No Secondary Education
Cabinet (n = 24)	100%	0%
Municipal Councillors (n = 10,194)	4%	92% (66% No education 23% Quranic School only)

Analysis of Trends

Changes over time in the composition of political elites have often been seen as the reflection of broad social and political changes in society at large. Comparisons in such cases may take the form of analyzing the same political unit at different points in time. Both magnitudes and rates of change can be revealed by data on the social backgrounds of political leaders. Generalizations about the "decline of the aristocracy," the "rise of the working classes," or the emergence of a "managerial elite" can be illustrated with relatively accurate figures, particularly in the Anglo-Saxon countries. Theoretical ideas put forward by Mosca, Burnham, Mannheim, Lasswell and Pareto can guide the search for significance in the careful compilations of data presented by men such as Sir Lewis Namier and his successors.[18]

Trend studies of the characteristics of political decision-makers exist for over thirty political bodies in about twenty countries, and consequently it is possible to get some rough ideas as to which characteristics of political leaders tend regularly to increase or decrease over time. Table IV indicates that the average age, the percent university-educated and the percent workers found among the leaders of a country increase in about three out of four cases. The percentage of lawyers and agriculturalists in the elite is more likely to increase than to decrease, while the proportion of businessmen and bureaucrats most frequently declines.

Comparisons of the same political unit at different points in time may be of particular interest in the study

[18] Lewis Namier, The Structure of Politics at the Accession of George III (London: Macmillan, 1965); G. P. Judd, Members of Parliament, 1734-1832 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1955); William L. Guttsman, The British Political Elite (New York: Basic Books, 1964).

Table IV: CHANGES IN CHARACTERISTICS OF ELITES: PERCENTAGE OF CASES SHOWING INCREASE OR DECREASE

Variable	% Increase	% Bell Curve	% Increase or Bell Curve	% Decrease	% U-Curve	% Decrease or U-Curve	% No Change
Age (n = 24)	63	25	88	12	0	12	0
University Education (n = 24)	46	25	71	21	8	29	0
Workers (n = 13)	69	8	77	8	0	8	15
Lawyers (n = 37)	24	32	56	16	11	27	17
Agriculturalists (n = 32)	28	22	50	19	19	38	12
Businessmen (n = 24)	13	29	42	29	17	46	12
Bureaucrats (n = 25)	36*	4	40	36	20	56	4

*Eight of the nine cases in this cell represent communist countries.

of periods of rapid change, such as wars or revolutions. Matthews, along with many others, has suggested that revolutions are led by intellectuals, but that usually the bureaucrats win the post-revolutionary struggle for power.[19] This generalization is supported by evidence which shows the decline in the number of cosmopolitan, well-educated political leaders in many countries after the attainment of independence or the consolidation of a revolution.[20] Changes of this sort, of course, do not necessarily follow a linear pattern,[21] and it is common to find that countries in transition, especially during periods of rapid social and economic change, will experience the rise of a bureaucratic elite to power, which gradually will be replaced by professionals or local influentials at a later stage of development. By tracing these changes in the composition of the political elite, one may obtain an indicator and measure of instability or continuity, and may also be able to determine whether political changes deserve the name revolution or coup d'état.

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[19] Donald Matthews, op. cit., p. 58-59; and Harold D. Lasswell and Daniel Lerner, eds., World Revolutionary Elites (Cambridge, Mass.: The M.I.T. Press, 1965).

[20] See William B. Quandt, op. cit., p. 159, for a survey of the cases which illustrate the declining cosmopolitanism of elites over time. The authoritarian countries showing this pattern are the Soviet Union, China, Nazi Germany, Fascist Italy, Ghana, Burma and Indonesia. The democratic countries showing a similar pattern include the United States, India, the Philippines, Turkey and Ceylon. Samuel P. Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968), pp. 446-461, talks of "ruralizing elections" as one reason for the rise of local influentials.

[21] Frederick W. Frey, op. cit., pp. 387-393, shows for the Turkish case that the changes in social backgrounds of deputies to the Grand National Assembly were closely linked to broad political developments and generally followed a bell-shaped or U-shaped curve.

Comparisons at Different Levels of Authority

Comparisons of the characteristics of decision-makers at several levels of authority within the same political system may reveal which social background factors are most highly associated with success in politics. Many of those qualities of political leaders which increase in frequency over time are the same ones which tend to increase from lower to higher levels of authority. Interpreting the evidence linking status and power, Donald Matthews has stated that:

> ... as the importance of the public office declines, we find a gradual decline in the occupational status of its usual incumbent.

Likewise, Gaetano Mosca has written that:

> ... members of a ruling minority regularly have some attribute, real or apparent, which is highly esteemed and very influential in the society in which they live.[22]

Available evidence supports these observations. Those few cases, however, where power and status are not congruent are of particular interest to the analyst.

For nearly twenty countries it has been possible to compare incumbents of higher and lower positions of authority. Cabinet officers can be contrasted with members of parliament, upper house members with lower house ones,[23] and

[22] Matthews, op. cit., p. 28; Gaetano Mosca, The Ruling Class (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1939), p. 53; William B. Quandt, op. cit., pp. 160-161, analyzes the post-independence period in Algeria as one in which the top leadership generally had lower status and less education than the secondary elite. Some of the instability which characterized Algeria's first few years of independence may have been linked to this incongruous relationship between power and status.

[23] It should be noted that upper houses of legislative systems may merely have ceremonial functions, and consequently comparisons of lower and upper houses may not reveal differences in social background characteristics of politicians

Political Bureau members with Central Committeemen of communist parties. Of the variables for which sufficient data exist, "university education" is the characteristic most likely to increase in frequency in the upper ranges of power. In eighteen out of nineteen cases, the political unit with the greater authority contained the larger number of university-educated men. The average amount of increase in the frequency of university-educated politicians from one level in the hierarchy of authority to the next is 16%. Upon more careful inspection, however, it appears that the amount of increase in "developed" countries is 13%, while in the "developing" nations it is 24%. In other words, where higher education is least common, it is most strongly associated with success in politics. This finding suggests why the theme of "elite-mass" gap has been so persistently discussed with reference to developing nations. The education of the leaders of these new states, in which the level of adult literacy may be only ten percent, often far surpasses that of European and American politicians.[24]

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at various levels of authority. For lack of a better solution, however, political bodies called upper houses have been treated as if they had more authority than lower houses.

[24] A. H. Halsey, "The Education of Leaders and Political Development in New Nation," in Richard L. Merritt and Stein Rokkan, eds., Comparing Nations: The Use of Quantitative Data in Cross-National Research (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1966), pp. 210-211, suggests that the average academic achievement of leaders in developing countries is probably higher than that of cabinet members in countries with well-established democratic and educational institutions where political elites are recruited from a broader social base.

Other characteristics of elites found more frequently in higher levels of authority are a background in law or in the liberal professions. Bureaucrats increase in number in the higher levels of communist systems, but in other countries there is little difference between their degree of success in different parts of the political hierarchy. Both businessmen and agriculturalists are more common in lower levels of authority, and become increasingly rare in the higher ranks of politics. Finally, the average age of leaders tends to increase by about three years from one level to the next. (See Table V.)

With the large amount of evidence that exists suggesting that socio-economic status and political power are closely linked, it should be possible to identify particularly unstable political systems, such as those in which the secondary elite is more highly educated and enjoys more prestige than the top elite.[25] In addition, predictions of the type of political leaders likely to emerge after a period of rapid social change which produces growing numbers of educated professionals should be possible. The phenomenon of a bureaucratic elite dominating the political system during periods of rapid social mobilization, only to be displaced a generation later by men of "the new middle-class," seems to be related to the finding that power and status tend to remain congruous.

The Search for Empirical Relationships

In seeking statistical relationships between socio-economic variables and the social backgrounds of political leaders, the researcher is entering a field where little

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[25] William B. Quandt, op. cit., Ch. 9.

Table V: CHANGES IN FREQUENCY OF BACKGROUND CHARACTERISTICS FROM LOWER TO HIGHER LEVELS OF AUTHORITY

Variable	Differences All countries, Upper-Lower	% cases Rising	% cases Falling	Dev.	Less Dev.
University Education (n = 19)	+ 16%	95%	05%	+ 13%	+24%
Lawyers (n = 23)	+ 6%	83%	13%	+5.5%	+6.5%
Liberal Professions (n = 18)	+ 7%	78%	11%	+10.9%	+5.3%
Bureaucrats (n = 18)	+ 3%	61%	39%	(Less Dev.) +1.5%	(Comm.) +7.7%
Businessmen (n = 21)	- 4%	29%	62%	-1.7%	-5.4%
Agriculturalist (n = 20)	- 6%	25%	75%	-7.9%	-5.6%
Age (n = 19)	+ 3.1 years	.74	.11	+3.1	+3.2

work has been done, where data are disappointingly incomplete, and where crude empiricism and abstract theorizing are both occupational hazards. Aggregate data analysis must be used carefully, and findings should be considered as tentative pending further validation through studies on the level of individual behavior. Some hypothesized relationships, however, may be shown not to exist, on the macro level, which may help to direct future research toward areas of particular relevance for the study of political change.

At the present stage in the study of political leadership, quantitative analysis is seriously limited by inadequacies in the available data. For the post-1945 period, data exist in various stages of completeness on the political leaders of about fifty countries of the world.[26] Sometimes the data are for a political body in a single year, while in other cases a figure represents an average of numbers from several years. Because of gaps in these studies, only twenty to thirty cases are generally available for statistical analysis. Lower houses of parliament, or unicameral legislatures, have been most fully studied, and the statistically significant relationships discovered are generally between

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[26]Some data on age, occupation or education on the post-1945 leaders of the following countries have been collected and recoded: Algeria, Argentina, Australia, Bulgaria, Canada, Ceylon , China, Congo (Kinshasha), Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Egypt, Finland, France, East Germany, West Germany, Ghana, Great Britain, Greece, Guatemala, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Iran, Israel, Italy, Ivory Coast, Japan, South Korea, Lebanon, Malaysia, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Pakistan, the Philippines, Poland, Rumania, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Switzerland, Syria, Tanzania, Tunisia, Turkey, the United States, the USSR, Uganda, South Vietnam, Yugoslavia.

social background characteristics of members of parliament and socio-economic variables such as those reported in A Cross-Polity Survey and the World Handbook of Political and Social Indicators.[27] To analyze the existing data, frequency tables, simple and multiple correlation and regression analysis are all useful. Path analysis, which would be of particular value, requires more cases than those available at present.

The social characteristics of leaders vary from one political system to another. Different stages of economic and political development seem to be associated with the dominance of distinctive types of political elites. Each political culture, as well as each region of the world, differs somewhat in the typical backgrounds of its rulers. Amid all of this diversity, however, some regularities do appear.

Three typical patterns of the distribution of occupational and educational characteristics among political elites emerge from analysis of available data. One pattern, most common in relatively underdeveloped countries, consists of political leaders drawn from economic professions, particularly agriculturalists and merchants, as well as teachers. A second pattern, only partially distinct from the "underdeveloped syndrome," is most frequently found in rapidly developing

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[27] Arthur S. Banks and Robert B. Textor, A Cross-Polity Survey (Cambridge, Mass.: The M.I.T. Press, 1963); Bruce M. Russett, et al., World Handbook of Political and Social Indicators (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1964); and Phillips Cutright, "National Political Development: Its Measurement and Social Correlates," in Nelson W. Polsby, et al., Politics and Social Life: An Introduction to Political Behavior (Boston: Houghton-Mifflin Co., 1963), pp. 569-582.

countries. In these "transitional societies," leaders are commonly drawn from official professions. The bureaucrats and the military are in ascendance. A third, quite distinct pattern, is common in the more highly developed countries of Europe and North America. These nations are generally led by older men from liberal professions who have rather advanced educations. In addition, however, leaders from the working class are more common in modern than in "modernizing" political systems.[28]

Against these empirically derived typologies, certain variations must be noted. Anglo-American systems, for example, draw many of their political leaders from the ranks of the legal profession, while remaining peculiarly lacking in leaders with bureaucratic backgrounds.[29]

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[28]While the above patterns hold at the level of legislatures, there are some differences at the cabinet level. In parliaments, men from economic professions and official professions may be found together to the exclusion of the liberal professionals. In cabinets, however, the proportion of men from economic and liberal professions moves in the same direction, and are both inversely related to the percentage of official professionals.

The following variables are positively correlated across three levels of authority: Age; % Liberal Professions; % University Educated; % Lawyers. In other words, if there are large numbers of lawyers in the cabinet there are likely to be large numbers in the lower house of parliament as well.

[29]Heinz Eulau and John D. Sprague, Lawyers in Politics (Indianapolis: The Bobbs-Merrill Co., 1964), p. 123, have stated that: "Preoccupation with real or alleged dysfunctional consequences of the lawyer's ubiquity in politics has had the effect of orienting research toward analysis of differences rather than of similarities in the behavior of the politician who is a lawyer and the politician who is not."

In developing countries and in Europe, however, government civil servants frequently enter parliament or cabinet positions. In communist systems, bureaucrats are even more commonly found in leadership roles. (See Table VI.)

Table VI: CHARACTERISTICS OF POLITICAL ELITES IN DIFFERENT POLITICAL CULTURES

	Type of Political Culture			
Social Background Characteristics:*	Anglo-American	European	Developing	Communist
Lawyers	26% (n=5)	12% (n=5)	19% (n=17)	---
Liberal Professions	38% (n=5)	24% (n=6)	33% (n=23)	---
Bureaucrats	4% (n=4)	23% (n=7)	25% (n=16)	31%** (n=6)

*Lower houses of parliament only.
**Figure for Communist systems is based on Central Committee members.

Among developing countries, further distinctions are needed. The countries of the Middle East and Asia, for example, tend to draw leaders from Liberal Professions with high educations, whereas African elites are generally of more modest backgrounds and have less education.[30] (See Table VII.)

[30]See Seymour Lipset, Political Man, (Garden City) N.Y.: Anchor Books, 1963), pp. 101-102, where he suggests that "... increases in tolerance associated with higher educational level are greater than those related to higher occupational level." If this holds true for political leaders, it would be an important example of how social background characteristics may help to predict the behavior elites.

Table VII: CHARACTERISTICS OF POLITICAL ELITES IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES

Regional Groupings of Developing Countries

Social Background Characteristics:*	Asia	Middle East	Africa
University Education	59% (n=7)	49% (n=6)	19% (n=4)
Lawyers	29% (n=6)	18% (n=6)	9% (n=4)
Bureaucrats	23% (n=5)	22% (n=6)	32% (n=5)

*Lower house of parliament only.

To clarify some of these relationships, simple correlations between socio-economic variables and individual background characteristics are useful. Rather strong relationships exist between various measures of social mobilization and the characteristics of political decision-makers. Both age and the percentage of politicians from Economic Professions at the cabinet level, for example, are positively correlated with measures of urbanization, industrialization, education, literacy, GNP per capita, and communications development. The proportion of lawyers, Liberal Professionals, and university educated politicians on the other hand, is highly associated with measures of achievement motivation, as scored by David McClelland, and with the number of students receiving higher educations per 100,000 population. The percentage of bureaucrats

and politicians from official professions is positively correlated with the percentage of the population in agriculture, the rate of population increase and the rate of growth in GNP. Negative relationships with Official Professions and bureaucrats exist for measures of political and communications development, GNP per capita and achievement motivation. Finally, the percentage of workers and trade union leaders among legislators is, as Marx might have predicted, positively related to the degree of urbanization and measures of communications development in a society.[31] (See Appendix II for a summary of all significant correlations.)

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[31]It is reasonable to believe that whatever impact the type of political leadership may have on such variables as degree of literacy, economic growth rates and communications development would only be apparent after a generation or so had passed. To test this possibility, data for fifteen countries on the backgrounds of political leaders were collected for 1935 and 1955 and were correlated with 1955 measures of social, economic and political development. The differences between the 1935 and 1955 correlations were generally minor. Nonetheless, a few interesting discrepancies do appear. For example, the 1935 measure of the number of official professionals in the lower house of parliament correlated weakly but positively ($r = +.24$) with rate of economic growth, while the 1955 measure was barely negatively related ($r = -.07$). Also, the number of Liberal Professionals in 1955 is strongly and negatively related to economic growth rate in 1955 ($r = -.55$), while the 1935 measure was hardly related at all ($r = .09$). The only other measures where the 1935 figures were more highly related to 1955 indices of political development involved executive stability and voting. The % Official Professionals in 1935 was correlated weakly but positively with 1955 voting rates ($r = +.24$) and executive stability ($r = +.28$), while the 1955 figures were not correlated with voting ($r = -.03$) or executive stability ($r = +.07$).

By using multiple regression analysis, a large part of the variance in social background characteristics of elites can be accounted for. Four variables, representing slightly different measures of modernization, are able to account for 74% of the variance in average age of parliamentarians. Two variables account for 62% of the variance in the proportion of lawyers, 54% of Liberal Professionals, 35% of workers, 54% of Official Professionals, 31% of teachers, 41% of bureaucrats, and 21% of University-educated men found among legislative elites. (See Table VIII.)

If some regularities do indeed exist which help to account for the appearance of distinctive types of political actors at the national level, the question still remains of what difference it makes for a society or a political system if bureaucrats or lawyers, more or less educated men, are in positions of power. Donald Searing has found, for example, that social background variables are frequently highly associated with attitudes of political leaders, and presumably with their behavior as well.[32] But relationships discovered in one political

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[32]Donald Searing, op. cit., p. 474, suggests that attitudes will be more highly related to social background variables than will behavior because of the degree to which behavior is affected by immediate environmental constraints. His findings are somewhat ambiguous in their implications, but do suggest that occupation, education and age generally serve to predict some attitudes quite well, but with different success in each political system. In Venezuela, for example, the best prediction of attitudes from among thirty-eight independent variables was present occupation; the third best was level of education, and age was tenth best. For U.S. Senators, level of education was the eighth best predictor of attitudes out of fifty-six, occupational status was ninth and age was eleventh.

Table VIII: MULTIPLE CORRELATION ANALYSIS OF SOCIAL BACKGROUND VARIABLES

Dependent* Variable:	Independent Variables:	Simple Correlation:	Coefficient of Determination
Average Age (n = 23)	Newspaper circulation	r = .70	r^2 = .74
	% children in school	r = .72	
	% population in agriculture	r = -.62	
	Inhabitants per physician	r = -.67	
% Lawyers (n = 21)	Higher education	r = .56	r^2 = .62
	Economic Growth Rate	r = -.35	
% Teachers (n = 23)	% children in school	r = -.55	r^2 = .31
	% urban population	r = -.53	
% Liberal Professions (n = 19)	Achievement Motivation	r = .54	r^2 = .54
	Economic Growth Rate	r = .-70	
% Workers (n = 16)	% Urban Population	r = .54	r^2 = .36
	Radios per 100 population	r = .54	
% Bureaucrats (n = 15)	Achievement Motivation	r = -.55	r^2 = .35
	Higher Education	r = -.24	
% Official Professions (n = 16)	Achievement Motivation	r = -.55	r^2 = .35
	Higher Education	r = -.24	
% University Educated (n = 19)	Achievement Motivation	r = .39	r^2 = .21
	Higher Education	r = .43	

*Note: All social background variables refer to members of lower houses of legislature.

system are likely to be nonexistent in others, and consequently Searing is skeptical of finding generalized relationships between social background and attitudes. Still, his work has shown the importance of adult socialization experiences in affecting political attitudes. In particular, for several countries the best predictor of elite opinions seems to be present or most recent occupation.

Each social background characteristic when viewed as an independent variable -- except for percentage of economic professionals -- is related rather strongly to some political, social or economic dependent variable.[33] Average age of parliamentarians, for example, is associated positively with a nonidelogical political style, political stability, a shared political culture, a high degree of interest group activity and freedom of the press. The proportion of lawyers and university-educated men in parliaments is likewise associated with some of these characteristics of liberal democracies, as well as with a low rate of economic growth.

Bureaucrats and Official Professionals generally preside over political systems which have a high rate of economic growth, but are also typified by a fragmented political culture,[34] little interest group activity, restrictions on freedom of the press, and relative political instability. (See Appendix III.)

Characteristics of political leaders may also be seen as intervening variables which are affected by socio-economic

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[33]Categories are taken from Banks and Textor, op. cit.

[34]Bureaucrats seem to be relatively more frequent in cabinet and legislative positions in ethnically fragmented countries. For seventeen countries, the correlation between % bureaucrats in the lower house of parliament and the percent of the population speaking the dominant language was -.42.

changes and in turn influence the political and economic development of a nation. In this model, it is necessary to determine whether the variables describing types of political leaders add anything to the relationships which exist between the socio-economic variables such as literacy and Gross National Product per capita and the political system's qualities, such as its ideological organization or tolerance for interest group activity. The evidence for an independent effect of leadership variables on the dependent political variables is mixed. If the socio-economic variables are closely associated with the leadership variables, then virturally no addition to the amount of explained variance is produced by including the intervening variable. For instance, the number of students enrolled in higher education accounts for 41% of the variation in the dichotomous variable of ideological or non-ideological political style. By adding information on the percent of lawyers in parliament, only one percent is added to the explained variance.

If, however, the two independent variables in a multiple regression analysis are not highly related to one another, the inclusion of the social background variable may add considerably to the amount of explained variance in the dependent variable. For example, the proportion of children of school age enrolled in schools accounts for 13% of the variance in economic growth rate for twenty-four countries. By adding data for those same countries on the percentage of official professionals in the legislature, the proportion of explained variance is increased by 26% to 39% of the total.[35]

[35]The three summary occupational variables alone, Liberal Professions, Official Professions and Economic Professions were able to account for 35% of the variance in economic growth rates for twenty-three countries.

More studies and more analysis will be needed to determine which social background characteristics have an independent effect on which dependent variables, and which are simply reflecting broader socio-economic forces at work in the society at large. Much of the attention paid to studies of political leadership would seem to be misplaced if it could be shown that not only economic growth rates, but also characteristics of political systems, could be equally well accounted for by urbanization, industrialization, education, and GNP per capita as by the characteristics of political leaders. The evidence is not yet all in, but it seems as if the backgrounds of leaders do have an independent effect on some measures of political change. For the moment, it is possible to say that relatively consistent and strong relationships do exist between measures of political, social and economic change and various social background traits, whether these latter are seen as dependent, independent or intervening variables. With more complete data, better theoretical suggestions, and more political behavior analysis, the relationships presented here may be refined, clarified and perhaps rejected.

Summary and Conclusions

The study of political leadership will no doubt continue to occupy a central position in the analysis of political change. Among the numerous methods for analyzing political elites, the social background approach has been frequently employed, but thus far with mediocre results. The non-comparative focus of most of these studies is largely responsible for the absence of theoretically interesting and empirically testable hypotheses linking the socialization experiences of elites to their political behavior and to the overall functioning of the political system.

The examples given here of the uses to which social background analysis might be put suggest that both the clarification and measurement of key concepts and the search for causal relationships may be advanced by this form of research. It is still not clear, however, when, how, or which social facts influence political behavior.

Some evidence does suggest that adult socialization experiences are more important than a politician's origins in determining his political behavior.[36] Studies of leadership in developing countries, however, have often stressed the importance of primordial loyalties, of early identifications and of experiences associated with the time of entry into political activities in accounting for the beliefs and actions of the elites of new nations.

To reconcile these conflicting interpretations, it will be necessary to know more about the role of politician in various societies. In more highly developed societies, the role of politician is probably clearer than in the developing nations, the rules of the game of politics are more nearly codified, and expectations of other members of the political system may act to define the appropriate forms of behavior. Whatever predispositions are brought by the individual to the job of politician may count for little in comparison with institutional or legal constraints.

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[36] From a study of American politicians, Kenneth Prewitt, Heinz Eulau, and Betty Zisk have concluded that: "Differences in orientation toward significant actors in the legislative arena and differences in self-evaluation are not rooted in experiences associated with the genisis of the political career." See their article, "Political Socialization and Political Roles," Public Opinion Quarterly, Vol. 30, No. 4, p. 582.

In the developing nations, by way of contrast, the role of politician is much less clear, since neither traditional nor colonial models are fully adequate.[37] Rules of behavior are difficult to formulate in the absence of consensus and accepted legal practices. Consequently, the background and experiences an individual brings with him to his new political role may weigh heavily in his later conduct. Occupational and educational attainments may serve as a rather accurate guide to attitudes and probable behavior.[38] In the developing countries, it seems as if both the rationale and the need for studies of the backgrounds and socialization experiences of political elites is greater than in the more developed nations. If and when these country studies are completed, aggregate analysis can proceed without constantly facing the "empty cell" problem.

This survey of the comparative study of political elites suggests that several concepts can be clarified and perhaps measured by using data on the social backgrounds of political leaders. For example, studies of socialization and recruitment of politicians can usefully draw on social background data both to test theories of childhood or adult socialization and to trace the changing social base of recruitment into political roles. Likewise, studies of succession crises may draw on social background analysis to help predict the occurrence of such events and to trace their development and consequences.

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[37]Lucian Pye, Aspects of Political Development (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1966), p. 108, explores some of the consequences of the unclear definition of the role of politician in the developing countries.

[38]Donald Searing, op. cit., provides some evidence, especially from Venezuela, that social background variables may be more closely related to political attitudes in less developed countries than in more highly developed nations.

The concepts of homogeneity and of the integration of a political system may be viewed in terms of the degree to which members of the political elite share common socialization experiences. Rough measures of homogeneity or integration may be provided by social background data. Similarly, the stability or instability of political systems may be measured in part by the rate of change in background characteristics of leaders.

The search for empirical relationships between social background variables and measures of political, social and economic change has led to some tentative findings which merit further research. For example, competitive and non-competitive political systems seem to produce quite different types of leaders. In competitive systems, leaders are frequently recruited from a broad social base, and Liberal Professionals seem to do quite well in competition for public office with bureaucrats or businessmen. In non-competitive systems, however, the advantage clearly lies with bureaucrats and military officers.

Links between the characteristics of political leaders and the rate of social and economic change also seem to exist. Preliminary analysis suggests that political competition, the dominance of Liberal Professionals and slow rates of change go together. Similarly, non-competitiveness, bureaucratic rule and rapid change frequently characterize the political and social systems of developing countries.[39]

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[39]Frederick W. Frey, "Democracy and Reform in Developing Societies," mimeo , 1967, reaches similar conclusions based on his analysis of other data.

Future research would do well to focus both on cases which conform to these empirically derived patterns as well as to exceptions. Eventually it may be hoped that careful and comparable studies will exist on the social backgrounds of the leaders of most of the countries of the world. Combined with the data being gathered on socio-economic development and on the conflict behavior of nations, quantitative data on political elites may permit the testing of numerous theories which link leadership and political development. When such research is completed, the tentative relationships and hypotheses suggested here can be replaced with more accurate findings. Until then, our understanding of the links between political leadership and the processes of development will be fragmentary at best.

APPENDICES

APPENDIX I: Data on the Social Backgrounds of Political Elites

APPENDIX II: Correlations between Socio-Economic Measures and Social Backgrounds of Elites

APPENDIX III: Social Background and Political System Characteristics

Appendix I: DATA ON THE SOCIAL BACKGROUNDS OF POLITICAL ELITES

Data for the following countries have been reported and were used in the analysis for this study. "A" indicates that the data on average age are available for the political unit in question; "O" stands for data on occupations; "E" stands for educational data. For Communist countries and one-party states, available data on Political Bureaus and Central Committees are shown.

Country	Cabinet	Upper House (or Political Bureau)	Lower or Unicameral House (or Central Committee)	Data for more than one level of authority	Trend data available 20+ year span
Algeria	AOE	AOE	AOE	Yes	No
Argentina	O	AOE	AOE	Yes	Yes
Australia	OE	O	O	Yes	Yes
Bulgaria		O	O	Yes	Yes
Canada		OE	O	Yes	Yes
Ceylon			OE	No	Yes
China		E	AOE	Yes	Yes
Congo (Kinshasha)		AO	AO	Yes	No
Czechoslovakia			O	Yes	Yes
Denmark			AOE	No	Yes
Egypt			O	No	No
Finland			OE	No	No
France	O		O	Yes	Yes
East Germany		A		No	No
West Germany	AOE		AOE	Yes	Yes
Ghana	AOE		AOE	No	No

Country	Cabinet	Upper House (or Political Bureau)	Lower or Unicameral House (or Central Committee)	Data for more than one level of authority	Trend data available 20 year span
Great Britain	AOE	OE	AOE	Yes	Yes
Greece	OE			No	Yes
Guatemala			AO	No	Yes
Hungary		O	O	Yes	Yes
India	AOE	AOE	AOE	Yes	No
Indonesia	AOE		AOE	Yes	No
Iran			AOE	No	Yes
Israel			AOE	No	Yes
Italy		AOE	AOE	Yes	Yes
Ivory Coast		O	AOE	No	No
Japan			AOE	No	Yes
South Korea	O		O	Yes	No
Lebanon			O	No	Yes
Malaysia		AOE	AOE	Yes	No
Morocco	OE			No	No
Netherlands	OE			No	No

Country	Cabinet	Upper House (or Political Bureau)	Lower or Unicameral House (or Central Committee)	Data for more than one level of authority	Trend data available 20 year span
New Zealand	AOE		AOE	Yes	Yes
Norway			AOE	No	No
Pakistan			AOE	No	No
Philippines		AOE	AOE	Yes	Yes
Poland		OE	O	Yes	Yes
Rumania		O	O	Yes	Yes
Senegal		AO	AO	Yes	No
Sierra Leone			O	No	No
South Africa		AO	AO	Yes	Yes
Sweden	O		O	Yes	Yes
Switzerland			O	No	Yes
Syria	AOE		AOE	Yes	Yes
Tanzania			O	No	No
Tunisia	OE		OE	Yes	No
Turkey	AOE		AOE	Yes	Yes
U.S.A.	AOE	AOE	AOE	Yes	Yes

Country	Cabinet	Upper House (or Political Bureau)	Lower or Unicameral House (or Central Committee)	Data for more than one level of authority	Trend data available 20 year span
USSR		OE	AOE	Yes	Yes
Uganda			AOE	No	No
South Vietnam	AO			No	No
Yugoslavia		A		No	No

Appendix II: CORRELATIONS BETWEEN SOCIO-ECONOMIC MEASURES AND SOCIAL BACKGROUNDS OF ELITES

The following tables show statistically significant relationships between country characteristics -- e.g., percent of population employed in agriculture -- and the social background of political leaders in cabinets, upper houses and lower houses of parliament. For all these bodies, the following social background measures are shown:

Age = Average age of Cabinet Ministers or Parliamentarians
Law = Percent Lawyers in the political unit analyzed
Bur = Percent Bureaucrats
Lib = Percent Liberal Professionals (Lawyers, doctors, teachers)
Econ = Percent Economic Professionals (Businessman, Agriculturalists)
Off = Percent Official Professionals (Bureaucrats, Military)
Univ = Percent University Educated

Row four in each table shows correlations involving the following variables for lower houses:

Agr = Percent Agriculturalists in Lower House
Jour = Percent Journalists
Bus = Percent Businessmen
Doc = Percent Doctors
Teach = Percent Teachers
Union = Percent Trade Union Leaders
Work = Percent Workers
SecEd = Percent Secondary Educated

The variable with which these social background characteristics have been correlated is given as the title of each table. Only those correlations involving at least ten cases and showing significance at the .05 level were included. Correlations above .50 are underlined for emphasis. In addition, when a significant correlation exists at one level, say the cabinet, and a correlation of similar magnitude, the same sign, but based on fewer cases exists at the other levels of the political system, a plus (+) or minus (-), indicating the sign of the correlation, is given. These signs merely show that the statistically significant relationship is supported by similar correlations between the same variables at higher or lower levels of the political system. The number of cases (n) on which these correlations are based is given below the correlation (r) in parentheses.

PERCENT OF POPULATION EMPLOYED IN AGRICULTURE

CABINET:	Age	Law	Bur	Lib	Econ	Off	Univ
r=					-.62		
n=	(-)				(15)		

UPPER HOUSE :	Age	Law	Bur	Lib	Econ	Off	Univ
r=			.63			.58	
n=	(-)		(10)			(13)	

LOWER HOUSE :	Age	Law	Bur	Lib	Econ	Off	Univ
r=	-.62						
n=	(23)						

LOWER HOUSE :	Agr	Jour	Bus	Doc	Teach	Union	Work	SecEd
r=	-.36		.35					
n=	(24)		(21)					

PERCENT OF POPULATION EMPLOYED IN INDUSTRY

CABINET:	Age	Law	Bur	Lib	Econ	Off	Univ
r=					.69		
n=	(+)				(12)		

UPPER HOUSE :	Age	Law	Bur	Lib	Econ	Off	Univ
r=							
n=	(+)				(+)		

LOWER HOUSE :	Age	Law	Bur	Lib	Econ	Off	Univ
r=	.60						
n=	(18)						

LOWER HOUSE :	Agr	Jour	Bus	Doc	Teach	Union	Work	SecEd
r=								
n=								

PERCENT POPULATION IN URBAN AREAS (20,000+)

CABINET:	Age	Law	Bur	Lib	Econ	Off	Univ
r=					.60		
n=	(+)				(13)		

UPPER HOUSE :	Age	Law	Bur	Lib	Econ	Off	Univ
r=						-.60	
n=						(11)	

LOWER HOUSE :	Age	Law	Bur	Lib	Econ	Off	Univ
r=	.62						
n=	(21)						

LOWER HOUSE :	Agr	Jour	Bus	Doc	Teach	Union	Work	SecEd
r=	.38				-.50		.60	
n=	(23)				(18)		(14)	

SIZE OF POPULATION (RANK)

CABINET:	Age	Law	Bur	Lib	Econ	Off	Univ
r=							
n=							

UPPER HOUSE :	Age	Law	Bur	Lib	Econ	Off	Univ
r=		-.55					
n=		(10)					

LOWER HOUSE :	Age	Law	Bur	Lib	Econ	Off	Univ
r=		-.44					-.41
n=		(27)					(26)

LOWER HOUSE :	Agr	Jour	Bus	Doc	Teach	Union	Work	SecEd
r=	.50				.52			
n=	(25)				(24)			

RATE OF POPULATION INCREASE

CABINET:	Age	Law	Bur	Lib	Econ	Off	Univ	
r=								
n=			(+)					

UPPER HOUSE :	Age	Law	Bur	Lib	Econ	Off	Univ	
r=			.62					
n=			(11)					

LOWER HOUSE :	Age	Law	Bur	Lib	Econ	Off	Univ	
r=	-.40							
n=	(23)		(+)					

LOWER HOUSE :	Agr	Jour	Bus	Doc	Teach	Union	Work	SecEd
r=			.37					
n=			(22)					

INHABITANTS PER PHYSICIAN

CABINET:	Age	Law	Bur	Lib	Econ	Off	Univ	
r=	(-)	-.52	.77	-.45	-.45			
n=		(15)	(13)	(16)	(16)			

UPPER HOUSE :	Age	Law	Bur	Lib	Econ	Off	Univ	
r=	-.72	-.52					(-)	
n=	(10)	(10)						

LOWER HOUSE :	Age	Law	Bur	Lib	Econ	Off	Univ	
r=	-.60	(-)	.35				-.44	
n=	(26)		(25)				(27)	

LOWER HOUSE :	Agr	Jour	Bus	Doc	Teach	Union	Work	SecEd
r=					.55			.59
n=					(25)			(18)

PERCENT SPEAKING DOMINANT LANGUAGE

CABINET:	Age	Law	Bur	Lib	Econ	Off	Univ
r=							
n=			(-)				

UPPER HOUSE :	Age	Law	Bur	Lib	Econ	Off	Univ
r=							
n=							

LOWER HOUSE :	Age	Law	Bur	Lib	Econ	Off	Univ
r=			-.42				
n=			(17)				

LOWER HOUSE :	Agr	Jour	Bus	Doc	Teach	Union	Work	SecEd
r=								
n=								

STUDENT ENROLLED IN HIGHER EDUCATION
PER 100,000 POPULATION

CABINET:	Age	Law	Bur	Lib	Econ	Off	Univ
r=	.63	.50			.49		
n=	(10)	(15)			(16)		

UPPER HOUSE :	Age	Law	Bur	Lib	Econ	Off	Univ
r=							
n=	(+)	(+)					

LOWER HOUSE :	Age	Law	Bur	Lib	Econ	Off	Univ
r=	.56	.46					.43
n=	(23)	(28)					(25)

LOWER HOUSE :	Agr	Jour	Bus	Doc	Teach	Union	Work	SecEd
r=					-.58			
n=					(23)			

PRIMARY AND SECONDARY SCHOOL PUPILS AS A PERCENTAGE OF POPULATION AGED 5-19

CABINET:	Age	Law	Bur	Lib	Econ	Off	Univ
r=					.61		
n=	(+)				(15)		

UPPER HOUSE :	Age	Law	Bur	Lib	Econ	Off	Univ
r=	.66						
n=	(10)				(+)		

LOWER HOUSE :	Age	Law	Bur	Lib	Econ	Off	Univ
r=	.66						
n=	(26)						

LOWER HOUSE :	Agr	Jour	Bus	Doc	Teach	Union	Work	SecEd
r=		.37			-.54			
n=					(26)			

PERCENT LITERACY (AGE 15 AND OVER)

CABINET:	Age	Law	Bur	Lib	Econ	Off	Univ
r=					.54		
n=	(+)				(16)		

UPPER HOUSE :	Age	Law	Bur	Lib	Econ	Off	Univ
r=							
n=	(+)						

LOWER HOUSE :	Age	Law	Bur	Lib	Econ	Off	Univ
r=	.67						
n=	(24)						

LOWER HOUSE :	Agr	Jour	Bus	Doc	Teach	Union	Work	SecEd
r=		.36			-.43			
n=		(20)			(24)			

INDEX OF ACHIEVEMENT MOTIVATION (McCLELLAND)

CABINET:	Age	Law	Bur	Lib	Econ	Off	Univ
r=				.45			
n=				(12)			

UPPER HOUSE :	Age	Law	Bur	Lib	Econ	Off	Univ
r=							
n=							

LOWER HOUSE :	Age	Law	Bur	Lib	Econ	Off	Univ
r=			-.55	.60		-.63	.39
n=			(15)	(23)		(20)	(20)

LOWER HOUSE :	Agr	Jour	Bus	Doc	Teach	Union	Work	SecEd
r=				.68				
n=				(12)				

INDEX OF COMMUNICATIONS DEVELOPMENT

CABINET:	Age	Law	Bur	Lib	Econ	Off	Univ
r=			-.78		.78	-.72	
n=			(10)		(13)	(11)	

UPPER HOUSE :	Age	Law	Bur	Lib	Econ	Off	Univ
r=							
n=			(-)		(+)	(-)	

LOWER HOUSE :	Age	Law	Bur	Lib	Econ	Off	Univ
r=	.54						
n=	(18)		(-)				

LOWER HOUSE :	Agr	Jour	Bus	Doc	Teach	Union	Work	SecEd
r=						.50		
n=						(13)		

INDEX OF POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT (CUTRIGHT)

CABINET:	Age	Law	Bur	Lib	Econ	Off	Univ
r=	(+)		-.66		.79	-.64	
n=			(10)		(13)	(11)	

UPPER HOUSE :	Age	Law	Bur	Lib	Econ	Off	Univ
r=	(+)		(-)		(+)	-.76	
n=						(11)	

LOWER HOUSE :	Age	Law	Bur	Lib	Econ	Off	Univ
r=	.36						
n=	(18)		(-)			(-)	

LOWER HOUSE :	Agr	Jour	Bus	Doc	Teach	Union	Work	WSecEd
r=								
n=								

NEWSPAPER CIRCULATION PER 1000 POPULATION

CABINET:	Age	Law	Bur	Lib	Econ	Off	Univ
r=	(+)				.77		
n=					(16)		

UPPER HOUSE :	Age	Law	Bur	Lib	Econ	Off	Univ
r=	(+)				(+)		
n=							

LOWER HOUSE :	Age	Law	Bur	Lib	Econ	Off	Univ
r=	.70						
n=	(21)						

LOWER HOUSE :	Agr	Jour	Bus	Doc	Teach	Union	Work	SecEd
r=	.38				-.35			
n=	(23)				(20)			

RADIOS PER 100 POPULATION

CABINET:	Age	Law	Bur	Lib	Econ	Off	Univ	
r=	(+)				.53			
n=					(15)			
UPPER HOUSE :	Age	Law	Bur	Lib	Econ	Off	Univ	
r=	(+)				(+)			
n=								
LOWER HOUSE :	Age	Law	Bur	Lib	Econ	Off	Univ	
r=	.46							
n=	(24)							
LOWER HOUSE :	Agr	Jour	Bus	Doc	Teach	Union	Work	SecEd
r=							.55	
n=							(17)	

GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT PER CAPITA

CABINET:	Age	Law	Bur	Lib	Econ	Off	Univ	
r=			(-)		.69	(-)		
n=					(16)			
UPPER HOUSE :	Age	Law	Bur	Lib	Econ	Off	Univ	
r=			-.62		(+)	-.57		
n=			(10)			(13)		
LOWER HOUSE :	Age	Law	Bur	Lib	Econ	Off	Univ	
r=						-.57		
n=						(13)		
LOWER HOUSE :	Agr	Jour	Bus	Doc	Teach	Union	Work	SecEd
r=			-.36					
n=			(22)					

ANNUAL GROWTH OF GNP PER CAPITA

CABINET:	Age	Law	Bur	Lib	Econ	Off	Univ	
r=	(-)					(-)		
n=								
UPPER HOUSE :	**Age**	**Law**	**Bur**	**Lib**	**Econ**	**Off**	**Univ**	
r=				(-)		.78		
n=						(11)		
LOWER HOUSE :	**Age**	**Law**	**Bur**	**Lib**	**Econ**	**Off**	**Univ**	
r=		-.38		-.46		.54		
n=		(18)		(23)		(19)		
LOWER HOUSE :	**Agr**	**Jour**	**Bus**	**Doc**	**Teach**	**Union**	**Work**	**SecEd**
r=				-.54	-.60			
n=				(12)	(16)			

REVENUE OF CENTRAL GOVERNMENT AS A PERCENT OF GNP

CABINET:	Age	Law	Bur	Lib	Econ	Off	Univ	
r=							(-)	
n=								
UPPER HOUSE :	**Age**	**Law**	**Bur**	**Lib**	**Econ**	**Off**	**Univ**	
r=								
n=								
LOWER HOUSE :	**Age**	**Law**	**Bur**	**Lib**	**Econ**	**Off**	**Univ**	
r=							-.38	
n=							(17)	
LOWER HOUSE :	**Agr**	**Jour**	**Bus**	**Doc**	**Teach**	**Union**	**Work**	**SecEd**
r=								
n=								

Appendix III: SOCIAL BACKGROUND AND POLITICAL SYSTEM CHARACTERISTICS

Ideological Organization

Social Background Characteristics:	Ideological	Non-Ideological
Age	42 (n = 9)	51 n = 11)
Lawyers	9% (n = 10)	23% (n = 14)
University Education	34% (n = 9)	55% (n = 12)
Bureaucrats	26% (n = 11)	19% (n = 9)

Stability of Regimes

Social Background Characteristics:	Stable	Unstable
Age	51 (n = 12)	43 (n = 8)
Lawyers	20% (n = 17)	24% (n = 7)
University Education	51% (n = 16)	55% (n = 6)
Bureaucrats	19% (n = 13)	27% (n = 6)
Official Professions (Cabinet)	25% (n = 6)	35% (n = 6)

Political Enculturation
(Degree of Shared Political Culture)

Social Background Characteristics:	High	Medium	Low
Age	53 (n = 6)	46 (n = 10)	44 (n = 9)
University Education	45% (n = 6)	54% (n = 13)	42% (n = 6)
Bureaucrats	14% (n = 4)	18% (n = 13)	33% (n = 6)
Official Professions	20% (n = 4)	22% (n = 15)	31% (n = 8)

Interest Group Articulation

Social Background Characteristics:	Significant	Negligible
Age	51 (n = 13)	43 (n = 12)
Lawyers	23% (n = 10)	15% (n = 13)
University Education	55% (n = 14)	41% (n = 12)
Bureaucrats	19% (n = 11)	24% (n = 13)
Official Professions (Upper House)	13% (n = 4)	35% (n = 10)

Freedom of Press

Social Background Characteristics:	Complete	Restricted	Absent
Age	51 (n = 12)	45 (n = 6)	43 (n = 5)
Lawyers	21% (n = 14)	22% (n = 6)	13% (n = 5)
University Education	48% (n = 13)	58% (n = 5)	37% (n = 7)
Official Professions (Upper House)	21% (n = 5)	20% (n = 2)	44% (n = 6)