



# The context of REDD+ in Cameroon

Drivers, agents and institutions

Guy Patrice Dkamela



# **The context of REDD+ in Cameroon**

Drivers, agents and institutions

Guy Patrice Dkamela

Occasional Paper 57

© 2011 Center for International Forestry Research  
All rights reserved

ISBN 978-602-8693-32-5

Dkamela, G.P. 2010 The context of REDD+ in Cameroon: Drivers, agents and institutions. Occasional paper 57.  
CIFOR, Bogor, Indonesia.

Cover photo by Terry Sunderland

CIFOR  
Jl. CIFOR, Situ Gede  
Bogor Barat 16115  
Indonesia

T +62 (251) 8622-622  
F +62 (251) 8622-100  
E [cifor@cgiar.org](mailto:cifor@cgiar.org)

**[www.cifor.cgiar.org](http://www.cifor.cgiar.org)**

# Contents

<b>Acknowledgements</b>	<b>ix</b>
<b>Executive summary</b>	<b>x</b>
<b>1 Introduction</b>	<b>1</b>
1.1 CIFOR's Global Comparative Study on REDD+ (GCS-REDD)	1
1.2 Methodology	2
1.3 Cameroon and the still-uncertain REDD+ mechanism	3
<b>2 Drivers of deforestation and forest degradation</b>	<b>5</b>
2.1 Forest cover and related changes	5
2.2. Drivers of forest cover change	8
2.3. The climate change mitigation potential of Cameroon's forests	12
<b>3 Institutional environment and benefit-sharing mechanisms</b>	<b>15</b>
3.1 Forest governance in Cameroon	15
3.2 Decentralisation and co-benefits	20
3.3 Rights of indigenous peoples, rights to land and trees, and carbon tenure	25
<b>4 The political economy of deforestation and forest degradation</b>	<b>30</b>
4.1 Effects of past policies on forest cover	30
4.2 Forest policy in the 1990s: Conservation or destruction?	31
4.3 Future deforestation in Cameroon	32
4.4 Deforestation at the crossroads of development needs, wastage and dependence on 'the great system'	35
<b>5 The political environment: Actors, events and processes</b>	<b>37</b>
5.1 Climate change policies	37
5.2 REDD+ actors, events and political processes	38
5.3 The FCPF R-PP consultation process	39
5.4 Processes and future political options for REDD+	40
<b>6 Evaluating Cameroon's REDD+ profile against the 3E+ criteria</b>	<b>46</b>
6.1 Institutional context and governance	46
6.2 Resource tenure and property rights	47
6.3 Capacity for monitoring, reporting and verification (MRV)	48
6.4 REDD+ funding and cost-benefit options	48
6.5 Participation and vertical coordination	48
6.6 Horizontal coordination	49
6.7 Concluding remarks: The global REDD+ process from Cameroon's perspective	49
<b>Notes</b>	<b>50</b>
<b>References</b>	<b>53</b>
1. Publications and reports	53
2. Media	61
3. Legal and political documents	61

# List of tables and figures

## Tables

1.1	Elements of a phased approach to REDD+	3
1.2	Potential implications of Phases 1 and 2 of REDD+ for the Cameroonian context	4
2.1	Legal framework for the status of land in Cameroon	7
2.2	Gazetted permanent forests (DFP) in 2009	8
2.3	Institutions and their responsibilities in monitoring deforestation factors	11
2.4	Deforestation extent and rates by land use in the Alternative to Slash and Burn study site	13
3.1	Outline of administrative decentralisation in Cameroon	21
3.2	Distribution of revenue from forests and wildlife in Cameroon	23
3.3	Overlapping forest and mining rights	29
4.1	Production forecasts for crops in forest zones under the Rural Sector Development Strategy (RSDS)	33
5.1	Potential REDD+ field activities in Cameroon	41

## Figures

2.1	Timber production and export trends in Cameroon	10
2.2	Deforestation 'hotspots' in Cameroon	11
4.1	The development of mining operations and their potential impact on southern Cameroon forests	34

# List of abbreviations

3E+	Effectiveness, efficiency, equity and co-benefits
ACFCAM	Association of Forest Councils of Cameroon
ACHPR/CADHP	African Commission for Human and Peoples' Rights
ADEBAGO	Association pour le développement des Bagyéli de l'Océan
AFF	Annual forest fee
ANAFOR	National Forestry Development Agency
ASB	Alternative to Slash and Burn
ASBAK	Association des Baka
ATO	African Timber Organisation
CADDAP	Action Center for Sustainable Development of Indigenous Pygmies
CAPAM	Projet appui à l'organisation de l'artisanat minier
CBD	Convention on Biological Diversity
CBFF	Congo Basin Forest Fund
CCPM	Consultation Circle of Partners of MINFOF/MINEP
CCSPM	Cercle de concertation de la société civile partenaire du MINFOF/MINEP
CDM	Clean Development Mechanism
CED	Centre for Environment and Development
CENADEFOR	National Centre for Forest Development
CFC	Chlorofluorocarbons
CIFOR	Center for International Forestry Research
CITES	Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species
CMSE	Ecological monitoring unit/Cellule de Monitoring et du Suivi Ecologique
CN-MDP	National CDM Committee
CO <sub>2</sub>	Carbon dioxide
COMIFAC	Central Africa Forests Commission
COP	Conference of the Parties
CTFC	Technical Centre for Council Forestry
DFID	Department for International Development (UK)
DFNP	Non-permanent forest estate
DFP	Permanent forest domain/estate
DNA	Designated national authority
DRC	Democratic Republic of Congo
ECOSOC	Economic and Social Council

EU	European Union
FAO	United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization
FCFA	Franc of the African Financial Community
FCPF	Forest Carbon Partnership Facility
FESP	Forest and Environment Sector Programme
FFEM	French Global Environment Facility
FGF	Forest Governance Facility
FLEG	Forest Law Enforcement and Governance
FLEGT	Forest Law Enforcement on Governance and Trade
FMU	Forest management unit
FSC	Forest Stewardship Council
FSDF	Forest Development Fund
FSF	Wildlife Aid Fund
GCS-REDD+	Global Comparative Study on REDD+
GEF	Global Environment Facility
GESP	Growth and Employment Strategy Paper
GHG	Greenhouse gas
GIS	Geographical information system
GTZ	German agency for technical cooperation/Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit
HEVECAM	Hévéa du Cameroun
HIPC	Heavily indebted poor countries
ICRAF	World Agroforestry Centre
IFA	Illegal forest activities
IITA	International Institute of Tropical Agriculture
ILO	International Labour Organization
INS	National Institute of Statistics
IO	Independent observer
IUCN	International Union for the Conservation of Nature
IUCN-ROCA	IUCN Regional Office for Central Africa
KfW	Kreditanstalt für Wiederaufbau
LAGA	Last Great Ape Organization
MED	Minimum exploitable diameter
MINADER	Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development
MINAS	Ministry of Social Affairs
MINAT	Ministry for Territorial Administration
MINATD	Ministry of Territorial Administration and Decentralisation
MINDUH	Ministry of Urban Development and Housing
MINEE	Ministry of Energy and Water Resources
MINEF	Ministry of Environment and Forests
MINEFI	Ministry of Economy and Finance
MINEP	Ministry of Environment and Nature Protection
MINEPAT	Ministry of Planning and Regional Development



MINEPIA	Ministry of Livestock, Fisheries and Animal Industries
MINFI	Ministry of Finance
MINFOF	Ministry of Forests and Wildlife
MINTP	Ministry of Public Works
MRV	Monitoring, reporting and verification
NAMA	Nationally appropriate mitigation action
NAP/CD	National Action Plan to Combat Desertification
NAPA	National Adaptation Programme of Action
NBSAP	National Biodiversity Strategy and Action Plan
NEAP	National Energy Action Plan for Poverty Reduction
NEMP	National Environmental Management Plan
NESDA-CA	Network for Environment and Sustainable Development in Central Africa
NESDF	National Environment and Sustainable Development Fund
NFAP	National Forestry Action Plan
NGO	Nongovernmental organisation
NPDP	National Participatory Development Programme
NTFP	Non-timber forest products
ONACC	National Observatory on Climate Change (Observatoire national sur les changements climatiques)
ONADEF	National Forestry Development Agency
ONAREF	Office National de Régénération des Forêts
ONF Int'l	Office Nationale des Forêts—France
PANERP	National Energy Action Plan for Poverty Reduction
PDD	Project Design Document
PES	Payments for Environmental Services
PIN	Project Idea Note
PPDP	Pygmy Peoples Development Plan
PRECESSE	Environmental and Social Capacity Building for the Energy Sector Project
PSRF	Programme de Sécurisation des Recettes Forestières
PVIP	Plan for Vulnerable Indigenous Peoples
RACOPY	Concerted Action on Pygmies' Network
REALU	Reducing emissions from all land uses
RED	Reducing emissions from deforestation
REDD	Reducing emissions from deforestation and forest degradation
REDD+	Reducing emissions from deforestation and degradation, including forest conservation, sustainable forest management and enhancement of forest carbon stocks
REPAR-Cameroun	Réseau des parlementaires pour la gestion durable des écosystèmes forestiers d'Afrique centrale—section du Cameroun (Network of parliamentarians for sustainable management of forest ecosystems in Central Africa—Cameroon section)
RIL	Reduced impact logging
R-PIN	Readiness Plan Idea Note
R-PP	Readiness Preparation Proposal

RSDS	Rural Sector Development Strategy
RWE	Roundwood equivalent
SAFACAM	Société africaine forestière et agricole du Cameroun
SBSTA (of UNFCCC)	Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Technological Advice
SCAC	Service de Coopération et d'Action Culturelle
SFM	Sustainable forest management
SIGIF	Système informatique de gestion de l'information forestière
SNPADB	Stratégie Nationale et Plan d'Action sur la Diversité Biologique - National Strategy and Action Plan on Bio-diversity
SNV	Netherlands Development Organisation
SOCAPALM	Société Camerounaise de Palmeraies
TNS	Tri-National de la Sangha
TREES	Tropical ecosystem environment observations by satellite
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNDRIP	UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples
UNEP	United Nations Environment Programme
UNFCCC	United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change
UNFF	United Nations Forum on Forests
UN-REDD	United Nations Collaborative Programme on Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation
US\$	United States dollar
USA	United States of America
VPA/APV	Voluntary Partnership Agreement/Accord de Partenariat Volontaire
WCS	Wildlife Conservation Society
WRI	World Resources Institute
WWF	World Wide Fund for Nature
WWF-CARPO	WWF Central Africa Regional Programme Office
ZAPI	Zone d'actions prioritaires intégrées
ZIC	Hunting area - Zone d'intérêt cynégétique
ZICGC	Community managed hunting area - Zone d'intérêt cynégétique à gestion communautaire

# Acknowledgements

The starting point for this report was a detailed, 40-page methodology manual showing the type of information that should be sought in the national context and the interlinkage of information needed to give it meaning. The guidelines were part of the GCS Component 1 methodological framework prepared by Maria Brockhaus, Monica Di Gregorio, and Sheila Wertz-Kanounnikoff (unpublished project document), who set the tone for this work. However, feeling that that was not enough, they also organised a methodology seminar (Barcelona, Spain, 7–8 January 2010) to allow the members of the Component 1 research team of CIFOR's Global Comparative Study on REDD+ (GCS-REDD) to discuss and assimilate the manual. They also prepared and facilitated the discussion of the preliminary results of the study (26 April – 2 May 2010, Bogor, Indonesia).

In Cameroon, Jolien Schure (CIFOR) played a key role in facilitating access to scientific information and in handling relations with her CIFOR colleagues. Her availability and generosity contributed enormously to this work. Jolien did a masterful job in organising the internal review team for this report and even found time to participate in this important evaluation. Denis Sonwa, Olufunso Somorin, Samuel Assembe Mvondo and Robert

Nasi, all from CIFOR, participated in the internal assessment.

Several external colleagues also read the report and offered wise criticism and valuable comments. Special mention should go to Alain Karsenty (CIRAD), whose remarks and suggestions led to essential reorientation of certain aspects of the study. Patrice Bigombe Logo (Independent Observer Project), Valentina Robiglio (IITA) and Ann Degrande (ICRAF), each applying a critical eye in his or her own field, added to the quality of this report.

It is one thing to write a long report, quite another to reread it and weed out the typos. Special mention must go to Ghislaine Aboubakar Yang for taking on this painful task.

We gratefully acknowledge the support received from the Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation, the Australian Agency for International Development, the UK Department for International Development, the European Commission, the Department for International Development Cooperation of Finland, the David and Lucile Packard Foundation, the Program on Forests, the US Agency for International Development and the US Department of Agriculture's Forest Service.

# Executive summary

Since the UN climate change conference at Poznań in 2008, international discussions on forest emissions reductions in developing countries have led to a consensus on what is now called REDD+, a mechanism that encompasses both the reduction of emissions caused by deforestation and forest degradation and the role of forest conservation, sustainable forest management and enhanced forest carbon stocks. The consensus on REDD+ does not yet clearly reflect the types of activity needed at the national level. Pending clarification through negotiations, the national contextual conditions need to be examined to reveal the constraints and opportunities connected to the future implementation of REDD+.

In response to this need, this profile of Cameroon describes and analyses the national context being primed to receive the REDD+ mechanism. The aim is to highlight relevant processes, in particular: discussions (or lack of discussions) on reference scenarios, mechanisms for funding, costs and benefits, carbon levels, MRV (monitoring, reporting, and verification), policy and action coordination and political reforms. An exercise of this type is necessarily limited in scope because the activities referred to in REDD+ are not yet clear. Another limiting factor can be traced to the Cameroonian context: preparations for the country's participation in REDD+ have not really started. The analysis developed in this report adopts 2 main approaches to compensate for these shortcomings. The first approach considers the starting point to be the basic hypothesis that a REDD+ mechanism has 3 phases. Phases 1 and 2 are of interest here: the first phase is devoted to capacity building and the formulation of emissions reduction and absorption policies and measures, and the second phase focuses on the

implementation of these policies and measures. The second approach adopted in this report comprises an evaluation of the contextual conditions and the presentation of options based on the 3E+ criteria, i.e. effectiveness, efficiency and equity, and co-benefits. These analyses bring out 5 important points.

**MRV.** In the Cameroonian context, MRV systems could be established by drawing on the experience of the Ministry of Forests and Wildlife (MINFOF) and through projects such as the ASB initiative on reducing emissions from all land uses (REALU) and the REDD Cameroon Pilot Project. However, these are insufficient as a foundation, considering the enormous requirements of a well-functioning MRV system. The country's technical capacity needs to be developed, and the forestry sector lacks human resources, in terms of both quantity and quality. Further, there have not been enough field demonstrations of the MRV system in REDD+ pilot projects to generate instructive experience. At the national level, there is no organisation able to monitor carbon emissions and absorption, although, theoretically, ONACC (National Observatory on Climate Change, created in December 2009) should be given this task when it becomes operational. Considering the major investments required to build an MRV system, the question arises of whether the benefits generated through REDD+ will be enough to sustain the mechanism. Sizeable requirements such as these justify adopting the phased approach, which gradually positions the pieces of the MRV puzzle up to the last phase when the strengths of the system are consolidated. But how can the steps leading to the final phase be evaluated? Carbon emission and absorption indicators are not enough—monitoring changes in key governance factors is just as important.

**Institutional context and governance.** Forestry sector reforms, started in the 1990s, have enabled Cameroon to create institutions and a legal framework whose performance in sustainable forest management has often been assessed. These institutions, which are generally accountable to MINFOF and the Ministry of Environment and Nature Protection (MINEP), can be mobilised and adapted to the REDD+ context. However, the processes of adapting and creating institutions are fraught with challenges: weak enforcement of forest and environmental law, weak capacity, strong dependence on external partners to implement programmes—in other words, insufficient uptake capacity within the country, endemic corruption, conflict between MINFOF and MINEP, conflicting perceptions of land and forest ownership between the state and communities, and so on. Forestry sector reforms are to be added to more global national reforms, especially through the administrative decentralisation process, which introduces the possibility of transfers of powers and responsibilities to the local level, i.e. councils and regions. If Cameroon decides on this approach, the fact that the decentralisation process has not been completed may jeopardise the implementation of REDD+ at the subnational level. Either way, the Cameroonian institutional context clearly shows that REDD+ can only be successfully implemented if it can transform the existing institutions and convince them to change their ways in order to achieve greater emissions reductions and enhanced carbon stocks. This will require substantial investments and a cost-benefit analysis.

**Coordination.** Must be viewed at 3 levels: inter- and intrasectoral coordination; coordination amongst MINFOF and MINEP partners; and coordination of civil society actions. The ways in which institutions function and policies are implemented give an indication of what can rightly be dubbed ‘the coordination tragedy’ of institutions in Cameroon, as illustrated by the following 3 examples: 1) the ministries’ reflex to keep a tight hold over their respective fields, i.e. each seeks full control over its own niche and they seldom work together; 2) the large number of (mostly non-functioning) inter- and intrasectoral coordination committees and services; and 3) the institutional instability characterised by changes in—sometimes

even the breakdown of—government structure through ministerial reorganisations that very often undermine coordination processes. Furthermore, there is insufficient coordination between sectoral policies on forests, land tenure, environment, infrastructure, mining and agriculture. Poor policy coordination and alignment could lead to the disproportionate development of mining, one of the main and potentially growing causes of deforestation. The alignment of all these sectoral interventions in the forest area is essential to the effectiveness of REDD+ policies and measures.

Coordination with the partners of MINFOF and MINEP, as channelled through the CCPM (Consultation Circle of Partners of MINFOF/MINEP), seems to be more effective in coordinating development aid and interventions in the Cameroon Forest and Environment Sector Programme (FESP). Experience during the past few years has shown that actions related to climate change and REDD+, carried out through development partners’ initiatives, have not been well coordinated. This is undoubtedly due to the context: the national REDD+ strategy is not yet available and MINEP is having difficulty in fulfilling its leadership role. Weak coordination amongst partners’ activities is a handicap because the partners’ projects are often the frameworks where concrete intra- and intersectoral coordination’s activities are carried out. The same lack of synergy can be observed amongst Cameroon’s civil society organisations, which have had little involvement in REDD+ preparations.

**Mobilisation and participation.** National REDD+ actors include organisations generally of international stature (large NGO conservation organisations, bilateral and multilateral organisations, research institutes and think tanks), a few Cameroonian civil society organisations and the government represented by the MINEP CMSE (Ecological Monitoring Unit). Thus, the REDD+ process in Cameroon remains externalised and elitist; most of the huge number of relevant actors in the forestry sector have not yet become involved, e.g. the traditional swiddeners, hunter-gatherers, community forest managers, council forest managers, municipal councils, the forestry industry with its national and foreign

components, agroindustries, the mining industry, civil society organisations and many other actors. The conclusions of Cameroon's R-PIN external review, under the auspices of the Forest Carbon Partnership Facility (FCPF), clearly reveal insufficient mobilisation and participation in the REDD+ process. The reason can be traced to the lack of institutions (national REDD+ coordination, technical REDD+ committee) responsible for carrying out the process. Is this delay in mobilising actors part of the government strategy of waiting for more details on the international architecture of REDD+ before launching a comprehensive national process? Or is it merely institutional lethargy?

**Co-benefits.** Leads to questions surrounding eligible activities and the potential legal successors to the benefits accruing from carbon emissions reductions and absorption. Activities that are eligible for REDD+ must be clearly defined through international negotiations and, of course, must contribute to identifying which actors, by carrying out these activities, are entitled to benefits. Complicating efforts to identify the potential legal successors are the 'legal pluralism' and the 'conflict of language' between the state and local and indigenous communities concerning ownership of land and forest resources. The lack of clearly expressed rights connected to a new

commodity—carbon—has to be added to the list of complicating factors. Clearly, these questions need to be resolved before Cameroon commits fully to REDD+. Land tenure reform might be considered in the long term. As an urgent matter for the short term, the state, local and indigenous communities and other concerned actors need to develop a sort of 'pragmatic consensus' on the ownership of lands and forest resources. This would guarantee the effectiveness and equity of the REDD+ mechanism.

As for sharing the benefits, no empirical field project on REDD+ in Cameroon has generated the information needed to make an outline of a benefit-sharing plan. However, the forest and wildlife taxes distribution mechanism offers many valuable lessons, especially with regard to the need for transparency and accountability. These lessons should be kept in mind in the preparation of any future mechanism for sharing benefits generated by REDD+.

The detailed information in this country profile reflects the fact that Cameroon is a fragile state. Therefore, when considering the implementation of a REDD+ mechanism, it is essential to consider basic questions related to the adoption and appropriation of reforms.

# 1

## Introduction

### 1.1 CIFOR's Global Comparative Study on REDD+ (GCS-REDD)

This study forms part of Component 1 of the Global Comparative Study on REDD+ (GCS-REDD) conducted by the Center for International Forestry Research (CIFOR). The aim of the GCS-REDD is to inform decision-makers, practitioners and donors on what is likely to work, and what is not, in the REDD+ mechanism currently being discussed under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). Since the 14th Conference of the Parties (COP 14) in Poznań, Poland, in 2008, a consensus has been reached on the scope of the mechanism, i.e. that it should play a role both in the reduction of emissions from deforestation and forest degradation in developing countries and in forest conservation, sustainable forest management and enhancement of forest carbon stocks. The implications of this political choice, which seeks to satisfy the majority of participating countries, for REDD+ activities are not yet clear. It is therefore important to look ahead to understand how REDD+ will be implemented in these countries.

Component 1 of the GCS-REDD focuses on REDD+ processes and policies at the national level and proposes 4 hypotheses, as follows.

The first hypothesis is that the efficiency, effectiveness and equity of national REDD+ strategies and their implementation depend on governance structures, stakeholders, mechanisms, processes, the institutional context and

macroeconomic conditions in the national political arena.

According to the second hypothesis, the level of political commitment, the existence of mechanisms for political learning and government dynamics are also determinants of the success of REDD+.

The third hypothesis is that the lack of institutions and appropriate institutional mechanisms restricts the effective orientation of financial incentives to reduce deforestation and obtain related benefits.

Finally, the study postulates that the efficiency, effectiveness and equity of a national REDD+ strategy, and the capacity to obtain related benefits, can be improved by: 1) understanding the relations between the actors, the structure, the processes, the national context and the contents of the REDD+ policy, and 2) formulating appropriate actions for the REDD+ mechanism that are enriched by such understanding.

Five countries—Bolivia, Brazil, Cameroon, Indonesia and Vietnam—were selected for the first phase of the Component 1 of GCS-REDD. The research begins with case studies at the national level, followed by a comparative analysis of the findings to summarise national results at a more global level. These case studies are carried out using the following methods: country profiles, media discourse analysis, policy network analysis, strategy assessment and specific policy studies.

The country profile is an attempt to place REDD+ in context. For comparative purposes, the report

follows an outline developed with the research teams for other sites, with the analysis divided into the following 5 sections:

- drivers of deforestation and forest degradation;
- institutional environment and revenue-distribution mechanisms;
- political economy of deforestation and forest degradation;
- political environment of REDD+: actors, events and processes; and
- an attempt to evaluate the profile of REDD+ in Cameroon on the basis of the 3E+ criteria.

The aim of this report is to present the contextual conditions into which the REDD+ mechanism is to be received (assuming that REDD+ is ultimately adopted at the international level) by examining the current, relevant processes, such as discussion or lack of discussion, on the reference scenarios, funding mechanisms, cost/benefit sharing, carbon stocks, MRV (monitoring, reporting and verification) systems, coordination of policies and actions, and political reforms. This report also seeks to evaluate the contextual conditions in relation to the potential REDD+ mechanism using the 3E+ criteria (see description of criteria below).

## 1.2 Methodology

This report draws on 2 types of data. The main data source is documentation on relevant aspects in Cameroon, with a literature review that encompasses a range of publications, grey literature and official documents. Other data were drawn from interviews with resource persons. As very few of the people we contacted were able to make time to participate in the study, most of this report is based on the abundant literature on sustainable management of forestlands in Cameroon.

The analysis uses the 3E+ criteria—effectiveness, efficiency, equity and co-benefits—from the discussion on climate change to assess proposed options and expected results (Stern 2006). The criteria have been adapted to the REDD+ context to evaluate not only the options, but also past results (Angelsen and Wertz-Kanounnikoff 2009, Jagger *et al.* 2009). Following are descriptions of the 4 criteria

as developed by Angelsen and Wertz-Kanounnikoff (2008) and improved upon in Angelsen (2009).

**Effectiveness:** The criteria encompassed in *effectiveness* seek to determine whether the mechanisms that are established will in fact achieve the goals set for greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions reductions and enhanced absorption. Effectiveness is evaluated by assessing the emissions reduction level, additionality, magnitude or extent of the field of application, flexibility and robustness, and controls and measures to avoid leakage, as well as examining how well the actions target the key drivers of deforestation and forest degradation. The evaluation also focuses on governance and corruption.

**Efficiency:** The question underlying *efficiency* is whether REDD+ objectives can be achieved at a low cost. The evaluation looks at the initial investment costs (including capacity building), costs connected to controls (e.g. forest protection), opportunity costs (compensation for revenue foregone) and transaction costs (additional costs such as the cost of certification).

**Equity:** The notion of *equity* concerns the effects of revenue distribution in relation to the efforts made by the actors. The term also refers to the distribution of costs between all levels (central and local government administration) and all stakeholders involved in land use. The effect on local and indigenous communities is another important aspect.

**Co-benefits:** REDD+ is not limited to reducing emissions but has other objectives, such as sustainable development. REDD+ is expected to result in at least 4 additional benefits: forest conservation, socio-economic benefits, improved governance and respect for the rights of vulnerable groups, and the capacity of forests and societies to adapt to climate change.

## 1.3 Cameroon and the still-uncertain REDD+ mechanism

COP 15 of the UNFCCC in Copenhagen in 2009 was expected to result in a final version of the



REDD+ mechanism at the global level. However, little progress was made, especially with regard to the activities to be carried out as part of the mechanism. Nevertheless, states hastily agreed to prepare for the implementation of REDD+ after it had been adopted. Unlike many REDD+ countries, Cameroon has not yet fully entered the preparatory phase as its national REDD+ strategy, which is the most important indicator, is not yet ready.

Because clarification on the international mechanism is still pending and because little has been done at the national level, the analysis of how REDD+ will be received in Cameroon is limited. The preliminary analysis can be based on

concrete elements only if we introduce hypotheses. In this report, therefore, we broach the question of national and subnational implementation of REDD+ by drawing on a gradual 3-phase approach developed by the Meridian Institute (Angelsen *et al.* 2009). Each phase is supported by one or more appropriate financial options (see Table 1.1). We are mainly interested in Phase 1 (preparation for REDD+) and Phase 2 (the development and enforcement of policies and measures to reduce GHG emissions and enhance absorption). To put these phases in more concrete terms with regard to Cameroon, Table 1.2 sets out the relevant actions and actors.

**Table 1.1 Elements of a phased approach to REDD+**

Phase	Scope	International financial instrument
Phase 1	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Formulation of the national REDD+ strategy</li> <li>- Capacity building</li> <li>- Institution building</li> <li>- Demonstration activities</li> </ul>	Voluntary contributions (Example: FCPF, UN-REDD) <b>Basic features:</b> available immediately <b>Eligibility:</b> national commitment established with regard to the formulation of a national REDD+ strategy
Phase 2	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Implementation of policies and measures for the national REDD strategy</li> </ul>	Global fund (single fund or exchange centre recording bilateral and multilateral contributions that are eligible, according to obligatory commitments) <b>Basic features:</b> funding available over a defined period of time <b>Eligibility:</b> national commitment established with regard to implementation of national REDD+ strategy, with continuous access based on performance, including substitute indicators on emissions reduction and/or enhanced absorptions
Phase 3	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Quantified changes in GHG emissions or absorption</li> </ul>	Passage from global mechanism to integration in compliance markets

Source: Angelsen *et al.* (2009)

**Table 1.2 Potential implications of Phases 1 and 2 of REDD+ for the Cameroonian context**

REDD phase	Potential REDD+ actions for Cameroon	Actors, responsibilities and expected benefits
Phase 1: Formulation of a national strategy, capacity building, institution building, demonstration activities	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Organisation of consultations and stakeholder participation</li> <li>- Establishment of reference level</li> <li>- Definition of MRV mechanism</li> <li>- Capacity building for actors</li> <li>- Capacity building for institutions</li> <li>- Demonstration activities</li> <li>- Planning policies and measures</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Preparation phase involving all stakeholders: administration, indigenous and local communities, civil society, decentralised territorial communities, forestry enterprises, etc.</li> <li>- Phase conducted under leadership of administration and characterised by the inclusion of all the actors and the formulation of a strategy in which everyone understands the efforts needed and the expected benefits</li> </ul>
Phase 2: Implementation of policies and measures for the national REDD+ strategy	<p>Relevant examples of policies and measures:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Launch of agro-land reforms targeted to strengthening community rights</li> <li>- Improvement of governance and rehabilitation of legal system</li> <li>- Improvement of forest management planning</li> <li>- Optimisation of management of protected areas</li> <li>- Reduction of illegal timber production</li> <li>- Institutionalisation of low-impact forest exploitation</li> <li>- Modernisation of agriculture</li> <li>- Alignment of forest management, mining, agricultural development and infrastructure</li> <li>- Modernisation of firewood supply chain</li> <li>- Promotion of improved stoves and alternative energy</li> <li>- Payment for environmental services for local and indigenous communities, and other local actors</li> </ul>	<p>Illustrations of potential beneficiaries and their responsibilities:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- <b>Central state level:</b> organise implementation of policies and measures at national level</li> <li>- <b>Decentralised regional and local authorities:</b> organise investments at community level, encompassing full range of policies and measures</li> <li>- <b>Local and indigenous communities:</b> adopt new agricultural techniques and protect trees and forests</li> <li>- <b>Forest enterprises:</b> implement sustainable management practices for forestlands</li> <li>- <b>REDD+ project proponents:</b> implement GHG emissions reduction or GHG absorption project at specific local level</li> </ul>

Source: inspired by Angelsen *et al.* (2009)

# 2

## Drivers of deforestation and forest degradation

### 2.1 Forest cover and related changes

Data on forest cover in Cameroon are considered to be the best in Central Africa (Wilkie and Laporte 2001). However, related statistics are sometimes inconsistent and contradictory. Between 1980 and 2000, various estimates by research scientists and institutions put forest cover at somewhere between 33% (15 533 000 ha) and 54% (24 980 000 ha) of the national territory (see statistics compiled by Ickowitz 2006). One of the main reasons behind this inconsistency is the use of different methodologies, especially the use of different definitions of 'forest'. Furthermore, depending on the source, the size of Cameroon varies slightly: 46 540 000 ha (FAO 2006); 46 632 000 ha (de Wasseige *et al.* 2009); and 47 500 000 ha (Topa *et al.* 2009). For practical reasons, this report uses forest cover figures published in 'Forests of the Congo Basin: State of the forest 2008' (de Wasseige *et al.* 2009), which are considered authentic in Central Africa. According to that assessment, forest cover in Cameroon is 22 523 732 ha, or 48% of the national territory (de Wasseige *et al.* 2009). The typology of the forestland, based on classes of land occupancy, features 2 major categories: dense forests and other forests. The coverage of dense forests is estimated at 16 876 143 ha; this is divided into lowland dense forests (16 467 570 ha), submontane forests (900–1500 m, 270 540 ha), montane forests (>1500 m, 17 685 ha), mangroves (120 348 ha) and swamp forests. Other plant formations in the forests are forest-cropland mosaics (4 501 395 ha), forest-savannah mosaics (5 867 865 ha), dense deciduous

forests (105 984), cultivated land (4 873 077 ha), other land uses (towns, villages, industrial sites, etc.; 341 766 ha) and other plant formations (14 066 352 ha) (de Wasseige *et al.* 2009).

According to FAO, the annual average deforestation rate in Cameroon for the 1980–1995 period was 0.6%, or a loss of close to 2 million ha (WRI, UNEP, UNDP and World Bank 1998). The rate reportedly rose to 0.9% for the 1990–2000 period and reached 1% between 2000 and 2005 (FAO 2006). Recent work by Duveiller *et al.* (2008), used in de Wasseige *et al.* (2009), found the FAO figures to be too high. They estimate the average net annual deforestation rate at 0.14% for the 1990–2000 period, with a gross average deforestation rate of about 0.2%. These figures suggest that Cameroon has the second highest deforestation rate of Congo Basin countries, after the Democratic Republic of Congo (0.2% net deforestation).

Forest degradation is also widespread in Cameroonian forests, although statistics are relatively scarce. A 2003–2004 evaluation of national forest resources indicates that a mere 25% of Cameroon's forests has not been disturbed (MINEF and FAO 2007); therefore, 75% of the forest cover is subject to pressure, especially from selective logging, which is known to be the main cause of forest degradation. Abt *et al.* (2002) report that 59% of forest management units (FMUs) in Cameroon have been exploited at least once. Again, the most accurate measurement of forest degradation comes from Duveiller *et al.* (2008), who report a net degradation rate of 0.01% for

the 1990–2000 period. However, Devers and Vande Weghe (2007) had previously put the figure at 0.02% for the same period. This difference is indicative of the methodological challenges that arise.

Four of the 16 deforestation and forest degradation ‘hotspots’ identified in Central Africa in 1997 by the TREES project are in the following regions of Cameroon: 1) forests located in the Cross River and Korup area along the border with Nigeria; 2) the vast region demarcated by the 4 cities of Yaoundé (the capital), Mbalmayo, Ebolowa and Kribi, which is being cleared for agriculture; 3) the Bertoua and Abong-Mbang region, especially the areas around the new roads; and 4) the roads built around Djoum (TREES 1998). According to TREES, these 4 ‘hotspots’ span a major part of Cameroon’s residual forestlands. It would be interesting to replot the contours of these ‘hotspots’ to include new threats, such as mine development, new infrastructure and biofuel development.

As afforestation and reforestation, the data are insufficient to get a clear grasp of their extent. According to the latest Cameroonian forests inventory—but with a large margin of error—6631 ha has been allocated to forest plantations (MINFOF and FAO 2007), meaning that plantations account for less than 1% of forestlands. Over the years, several institutions have been created to take responsibility for reforestation.<sup>1</sup> The penultimate one, ONADEF, spent nearly half the funds allocated to the forestry sector, but much of the money went to ‘power wielders’ (Topa *et al.* 2009). ANAFOR was created in 2002, after ONADEF was dissolved, with the aim of promoting financially and ecologically viable plantations.<sup>2</sup> Unlike ONADEF, ANAFOR is trying to work with various types of funding, as can be seen through its efforts to secure funding through the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) projects. One way to assess reforestation is through the management plans for FMUs. Vandenhoute and Doucet (2006) noted that very few management plans adopted strong measures for problematic forest species, e.g. targeted forest development measures such as assisted regeneration. Enrichment planting is not financially viable (Topa *et al.* 2009) and forest services do not have sufficient resources

to implement their policies. Hence, natural regeneration is the main practice and can only be measured through multi-period monitoring with sophisticated tools.

One of the most important aspects of Cameroon’s 1994 law on the forest regime is the division of its forestlands into 2 domains: the permanent forest estate (DFP) and the non-permanent forest estate (DFNP) (Articles 20–39). The law stipulates that DFP lands should occupy at least 30% of the national territory, be representative of the national biodiversity, permanently serve as forest and/or habitat for wildlife and be sustainably managed according to approved management plans. The DFNP comprises lands that can be used for purposes other than forestry. The architecture of these zones and the legal status of their components are presented in Table 2.1. The overarching principle is that all forestlands in Cameroon are under some form of state control. The DFP includes production and protection forests, which can be in the public or private domain, as well as council forests, which may also be designated for production or protection and which are in the private domain of a council. Forests in the DFNP are in the national domain; they are recognised as part of a collective patrimony managed by the state, but under certain circumstances may be privately owned. This category is zoned as agroforestry and includes community crops, community forests and, in some cases, private forests—implying the possibility of private forest ownership. However, Kamto (cited by Karsenty, in Devers and Vande Weghe 2007) suggests that the land tenure regime does not allow private individuals or private companies to own forests; i.e. they can only hold concessionary rights. The state thus keeps a strong hold on the DFP forestlands, which hold most of the resources, and exercises control over the DFNP, which has fewer resources.

Logging permits can be divided into 5 categories. Permits available in the DFP are 1) an FMU agreement covering a maximum of 200 000 ha for a renewable 15-year period and 2) an agreement for council forests, which is valid for the same duration but does not specify a maximum area. For the DFNP, a distinction is made between 3) *ventes de coupe*, which permit the holder to log a maximum

**Table 2.1 Legal framework for the status of land in Cameroon**

Purpose based on land management goals (zoning)	Permanent forest area (DFP)		Non-permanent forest area (DFNP)	
	Gazetted forests and forests to be gazetted		Agroforestry zone	
Administrative name	Domain forests	Local council forests	Community forests	Other forests
Legal status	Private state domain	Private council domain	Fraction of the national domain	National domain, private forests
Allotment	Protected areas for wildlife 1) national parks, 2) wildlife reservations, 3) community-managed hunting zones, 4) state-owned game ranches, 5) state-owned zoos, 6) wildlife sanctuaries, 7) buffer zones  Forest reserves 1) ecological reservations, 2) production forests, 3) protected forests, 4) recreational forests, 5) forests for learning and research, 6) plant sanctuaries, 7) botanical gardens, 8) reforestation area		Set out in a 25-year management agreement between the village community and the government forest services	Area allotted (private forest) and pending allotment (registered in the name of communities or private persons)

Source: Adapted from Karsenty, in Devers and Vande Weghe (2007)

area of 2500 ha or a precise volume of timber for a non-renewable 3-year period, 4) community forest management agreements and 5) *petits titres* ('little permits'). A community forest management agreement between a village community and the forestry service can cover up to 5000 ha for a renewable 25-year period, and the agreement is revised at least once every 5 years (MINFOF 2009a). The *petits titres* refer to: 1) a logging permit authorising a maximum offtake of 500 m<sup>3</sup>; 2) an authorisation to recover and extract timber, but with no stipulated land area or volume; and 3) a personal logging permit authorising an individual to cut up to 30 m<sup>3</sup> in a 3-month period to meet personal, non-commercial needs.

The DFP accounts for the lion's share of the country's forestlands, covering 18 048 295 ha, or 80% of all the forestlands, compared with an estimated 4 475 437 ha (20%) for the DFNP (de Wasseige *et al.* 2009). However, zoning of southern Cameroonian forests, as stipulated in the decree of 18 December 1995, is indicative only. It has evolved over the years through a gazetting process, that is, through the allocation and confirmation of ownership regimes for each of the forest categories. According to data on the DFP compiled by the

World Resources Institute (WRI), 7 966 763 ha of FMUs, council forests and protected areas had been gazetted by the end of 2009; another 4 511 774 ha in the same category had not yet been gazetted (Gideon Shu personal communication). The status of 9 ungazetted FMUs with a total area of 867 009 ha (Mertens *et al.* 2007) is the subject of debate between logging proponents and conservationists, who claim the zone has exceptional potential for conservation purposes (Topa *et al.* 2009). The gazetting trends for the 3 types of DFP lands are shown in Table 2.2. In addition to the forests in the table are 177 community forests spanning more than 632 000 ha; 143 of these forests (564 000 ha) already have a simple management plan approved by the government (2007 data; de Wasseige *et al.* 2009).

Protected areas have been established in Cameroon both in forestlands and in other ecoregions. These areas harbour 90% of the country's animal species, 95% of plants species, close to 65% of habitats and 80% of the country's ecosystems (MINFOF 2008). Cameroon's rich biodiversity has made it one of the chief biodiversity centres of the world; it ranks fifth in Africa for biodiversity (MINEF and UNDP 1999). The country is home to nearly 8000 species of higher plants, of which 156 are endemic;

**Table 2.2** Gazetted permanent forests (DFP) in 2009

Forest categories (total number)	Number of gazetted units	Status of the forests		
		Gazetted area (ha)	Number of ungazetted units	Ungazetted area (ha)
Forest management units (FMUs) (114)	62	4 197 592	52	3 268 134
Council forests (31)	7	162 707	24	572 477
Protected areas (34)	26	3 606 464	8	671 163
Total		7 966 763		4 511 774

Source: Gideon Neba Shu, WRI

250 mammals; 542 fish of which 96 are endemic; 848 birds; 330 reptiles; and 200 amphibians of which 63 are endemic (Fomete Nembot and Tchanou 1998). Most of the biodiversity is located in forestland, specifically in the lower Guinean forest, one of Africa's biodiversity 'hotspots' (Devers and Vande Weghe 2007), which is renowned for its high number of endemic plant and animal species. The network of protected areas has been designed to accommodate all this diversity. Protected areas now account for 44% of the DFP, or 10 437 336 ha (MINFOF 2008). They are divided into several categories to protect the forests and wildlife (see Table 2.1) including national parks (2 682 407 ha of specially selected lands).

## 2.2. Drivers of forest cover change

Cameroon's R-PIN (Readiness Plan Idea Note) lists the following direct and indirect causes of deforestation and forest degradation, in order of importance: agriculture, illegal timber offtake, firewood, industrial logging, mining, population growth, construction of roads, bushfires, an inheritance system that can lead to land fragmentation, and forest cover degradation (MINEP 1998). Most of these factors are discussed in the budding literature on the drivers of forest cover change in Cameroon, which we examine below.

### 2.2.1. Direct causes

The development of agriculture, in particular shifting slash-and-burn agriculture, is most often cited as

the main direct cause of deforestation; it has been deemed responsible for 80–95% of deforestation in Cameroon (Essama-Nssah and Gockowski 2000). This form of agriculture is described as especially destructive because it shortens the fallow period (Kotto-Same *et al.* 1997, Gockowski *et al.* 1998, Devers and Vande Weghe 2007); this process places great pressure on the land and does not leave time for the fallows to develop into secondary forests, as occurs in the traditional farming system. Survey responses from experts working in natural resources management in Cameroon also unanimously point to shifting agriculture as the main cause of deforestation (REDD Pilot Project Cameroon 2009). However, another study finds no compelling scientific evidence on the adverse effects of a shorter fallow period (Ickowitz 2006); the study challenges the position that holds the small farmer most accountable and queries whether deforestation can in fact be attributed so much to slash-and-burn agriculture. The causes are, indeed, more complex, as we can see from the following factors and the links between them.

Cash crops are also often cited as a direct cause of deforestation and forest degradation. A distinction needs to be made here between small-scale cocoa and coffee farming in smallholder agroforests in the southern Cameroon forests and industrial monocropping in rubber, oil palm, sugar cane and banana plantations. The cocoa and coffee agroforests that could be ranked amongst the direct causes of degradation currently occupy some 914 609 ha (MINEP and FAO 2007). By 1984, large industrial rubber, tea, oil palm, sugar cane and banana plantations occupied 129 900 ha

in the forestlands of the country's Southwest and Littoral regions and northeast of Yaoundé (Ndoye and Kaimowitz 2000). As these plantations arose out of radical conversion of forestland, they are listed amongst the direct causes of deforestation. The Cameroon and its former and present partners, including many multinational corporations, have promoted these agroindustries. They extend across nearly half the inland areas of the coastal ecosystem in the Southwest and Littoral regions and are deemed responsible for 30% of the loss of the original plant cover and the disappearance of highly prized wood species such as ebony (*Diospyros* sp) and tigerwood (Zingana) (MINEF and UNDP 1999).


Logging is also cited as a direct cause, especially of forest degradation. Again, a distinction needs to be made between illegal or informal logging and industrial logging. The former, usually called 'artisanal sawing', is carried out by small-scale loggers to meet local needs or the needs of neighbouring countries (Chad and Nigeria) and North Africa. Little was known about this sector until several recent studies were conducted (Lumet *et al.* 1993, Enviro-Protect 1997, Plouvier *et al.* 2002, Cerutti and Tacconi 2006, Cerutti *et al.* 2010). The most recent of these, which was conducted between July 2008 and June 2009, shows that the domestic informal timber sector is booming, with total log production figures estimated at 2.1 million m<sup>3</sup> RWE (Cerutti *et al.* 2010); this informal production is equivalent to the official production for the same period (2.2 million m<sup>3</sup> RWE) (Cerutti *et al.* 2010). During this period 990 000 m<sup>3</sup> was sawn and sold (Cerutti *et al.* 2010). Most of the timber sold on the market (662 000 m<sup>3</sup>) came from the DFNP; only 27% came from industrial sawmills. More than twice as much sawn timber is being taken from the DFNP now than in 2002, when the amount was set at 300 000 m<sup>3</sup> (Plouvier *et al.* 2002). The study by Cerutti *et al.* (2010) reports that the volume of domestic timber sales (662 000 m<sup>3</sup>) is higher than the volume of sawn timber production and exports, which fell from 580 000 m<sup>3</sup> in 2008 to 360 000 m<sup>3</sup> in 2009.

Industrial logging is carried out by certified national foresters and, to a greater extent, by a

large number of foreign companies, including multinational corporations (see, in particular, Eba'a Atyi 1998). Timber from the formal sector is mostly for export. Statistics show that, until the current downturn, this sector had grown exponentially since the colonial days and reached its peak in the 1990s (see Figure 2.1). Although sustainable forest management is recognised as the guiding principle for forest use in Cameroon, many obstacles hinder its implementation in daily practice. The waste of wood and the destructive logging practices in certain areas have been strongly criticised (Verbelen 1999). A recent review of 20 management plans found them to be generally of poor quality (Vandenhaute and Doucet 2006). Sustainability has not been achieved in the Cameroon forestry sector.

Wood as a source of energy is listed amongst the direct causes of deforestation, but relevant data are scarce. Fuelwood and charcoal comprise the largest market for forest products, especially in terms of volume of felled trees (Essama-Nssah and Gockowski 2000). Estimates of annual volumes of fuelwood differ somewhat, depending on the source: 9.5 million m<sup>3</sup> (FAO) and 12 million m<sup>3</sup> (MINFOF) (Topa *et al.* 2009). It is important to note the magnitude of forest degradation near peri-urban areas as a result of wood offtake for energy (Ndoye and Kaimowitz 2000). Each urban household spends an average US\$55–59 per year on fuelwood, which means that cumulatively, the 1.3 million urban households in Cameroon spend US\$65–70 million on wood each year (Topa *et al.* 2009). This kind of wood consumption is indicative of the link between population growth (especially in urban areas) and deforestation; a recent global study found that forest losses are greatest in areas with accelerated urbanisation, where the per capita trade in agricultural products is the highest (DeFries *et al.* 2010).

The development of infrastructure in general, and roads and railways in particular, is included as both a direct and an indirect cause of deforestation and forest degradation (REDD Cameroon Pilot Project 2009). The importance of this factor is discussed below, and in more detail in Chapter 4.



**Figure 2.1 Timber production and export trends in Cameroon**

Source: Cerutti *et al.* (2010)

## 2.2.2 Underlying causes, agents and their interactions


The 2 main direct causes of deforestation and forest degradation—expansion of agriculture and wood offtake—are affected by several other underlying processes and parameters that determine the extent and the location of the impact on the forest cover. Many studies have examined these underlying causes in Cameroon (Benhin and Barbier 1999, Ndoye and Kaimowitz 2000, Mertens and Lambin 2000, Mertens *et al.* 2000, Sunderlin *et al.* 2000, Brown and Ekoko 2001). These studies show how interactions between macroeconomic, agricultural and monetary policies and the price of raw materials on the international market cause different degrees of pressure on the forests at different periods of time (see Chapter 3 on the political economy).

Another useful perspective is that of Brown and Ekoko (2001), who examined how synergies between agents (the various actors) and deforestation drivers affect forest cover, either positively or negatively. Their study illustrates 3 types of synergistic impacts stemming from the combination of actions of local agents:

1) accelerated expansion of food cropping in forestlands; 2) greater market access; and 3) greater migration into rural areas. Several factors support these synergistic impacts: roads built for logging operations increase access to isolated forests; competition for land use encourages forest clearing; and employees of forestry companies represent an agricultural market and also serve as middlemen and traders. In other words, Brown and Ekoko's (2001) study discredits the minimalist theory that traces deforestation and forest degradation to the villager/forester duo, instead seeking to re-establish the complexity of the processes leading to loss of forest cover in Cameroon.

The results of these various sources of pressure (direct and indirect) can be seen in Figure 2.2. Over the years, pressure shifted gradually from the Southwest and Centre of Cameroon to the East and Southeast. The main reason the Southwest became a major deforestation 'hotspot' is its relative proximity to export ports (Hédon 1930). The extension of the Trans-Cameroon railway to Belabo in eastern Cameroon in the early 1970s contributed to shifting logging operations to that region, turning the East region into the nation's biggest timber producer. Between 1982/83 and 1985/86,





**Figure 2.2 Deforestation ‘hotspots’ in Cameroon**

Source: Woods Hole Research Center: <http://www.whrc.org/mapping/informs/cameroon>

the proportion of the nation’s timber supplied by the East region grew from 42% to 55%, whilst that of the Southwest and the Littoral regions dropped from 22% to 14%. By 1991/92, the East region was supplying 59% of all the wood produced in Cameroon, whereas the share from the Southwest and Littoral regions had dropped to a mere 8% (Van Dorp 1995).

### 2.2.3 Monitoring of drivers of deforestation and forest degradation by national institutions

The activities driving deforestation and forest degradation fall under the remit of various ministries:<sup>3</sup> forests and wildlife (MINFOF), environment and nature protection (MINEP), agriculture and rural development (MINADER), planning and regional development (MINEPAT), urban development and housing (MINDUH) and public works (MINTP). The task of monitoring the impact of these factors devolves to MINEP (see Table 2.3), which, considering its trans-sectoral mandate, is appropriate—in theory. In reality, however, MINEP lacks the capacity, leadership and

**Table 2.3 Institutions and their responsibilities in monitoring deforestation factors**

	Shifting agriculture	Export agriculture	Logging	Development of infrastructure
MINEP	Formulation, monitoring, evaluation of the implementation of the sectoral master plans for environmental protection Monitoring the evaluation of the implementation of Agenda 21 and subsequent action plan Designing, disseminating and monitoring indicators of sustainable development			
MINEPAT	- Monitoring and coordinating sectoral strategies and policies on development issues			
MINFOF	Regeneration Reforestation, forest inventory and management Application of logging standards			
MINADER	Agricultural production			
MINDUH	Planning and controlling urban development			
MINTP	Construction of infrastructure			

institutional authority to perform this function. MINEPAT could monitor forestry sector indicators as part of its trans-sectoral monitoring and control activities, especially for the implementation of land development and planning programmes, but it cannot be expected to produce precise data on deforestation and forest degradation. MINFOF is responsible for keeping track of logging operations' compliance with standards and the state of resources. The ministry does this by partnering with WRI, which uses remote sensing and geographical information systems (GIS) to develop a cartographic database and statistics (Mertens *et al.* 2007).

In sum, setting aside logging data produced by MINFOF and WRI, there is no coordinated monitoring system that could be used to create a complete database of the key factors of deforestation and assess the importance of each. The recently created National Observatory on Climate Change (ONACC)<sup>4</sup> is tasked with monitoring and evaluating the socio-economic and environmental impacts of climate change. However, as ONACC is not yet operational, it is too soon to envisage how this new institution will monitor deforestation and forest degradation. Related data from the National Institute of Statistics (INS)<sup>5</sup> are based more on other indicators and variables of Cameroonian development and economics, and thus cannot provide specific monitoring information on deforestation and forest degradation. Similarly, as part of its agricultural development function, MINADER sometimes produces statistics on various production lines and on the expansion of cropping areas; cropping area statistics give an idea of deforestation but are of limited use, as MINADER is not responsible for monitoring changes in forest cover.

### 2.3. The climate change mitigation potential of Cameroon's forests

In 1994, GHG emissions from changes in land use accounted for half (50.44%) of all emissions in Cameroon (MINEF 2005). Since the 1990s, many studies have assessed the potential of Cameroon's forests in terms of GHG emissions reduction and

carbon storage (Kotto-Same *et al.* 1997, Nolte *et al.* 2001, Sonwa 2004). The best-known work was carried out as part of an ASB partnership assessment of carbon stocks and GHG emissions for various categories of forestlands, including mature forests, secondary forests, old and young *Chromolaena* fallows, cocoa plantations and food crop fields (Swallow *et al.* 2007). Gaston *et al.* (1998) estimated a 1.7% annual decline in total carbon pools due to deforestation and forest degradation. Global estimates of carbon stocks are also available but differ depending on the source: 3454–6138 million tonnes (Gibbs *et al.* 2007), 3131 million tonnes (Gaston *et al.* 1998), 3505 million tonnes (MINFOF and FAO 2007) and 5043 million tonnes (de Wasseige *et al.* 2009). As emphasised by de Wasseige *et al.* (2009), these differences show the need for substantially more work to evaluate the annual amounts of stored, sequestered and emitted carbon. Historical data on carbon in Cameroon have not been compiled.

Two recent initiatives attempt to address this need. The first is the REDD Cameroon Pilot Project, which was started in 2007 by GAF AG, GTZ-COMIFAC and MINEP (Siwe 2009, Siwe *et al.* 2010). One of the aims of the pilot project is to assess the carbon stock, and the impact of logging on this stock, in a certified forest concession, and compare it with that of a non-certified concession in eastern Cameroon. The results of this study indicate that: 1) logging has a greater impact on carbon in the non-certified concession than in the certified concession; 2) the average amount of carbon in the biomass in the intact forest is 326 tC/ha; 3) improving harvesting practices by encouraging certification can reduce the impact of logging by about 0.65 tC/m<sup>3</sup>; and 4) further improvement in harvesting practices, focusing on 25% of the wood production in eastern Cameroon, could lead to an annual emissions reduction of some 834 165 tCO<sub>2</sub>e (Tejada *et al.* 2010).

The second initiative, conducted by the ASB Partnership, is a study of the options for reducing emissions from all land uses (REALU) (Robiglio *et al.* 2010). The study explores all the elements that can contribute to a carbon accounting scheme for a complete landscape, including its various types of forest and agricultural land. The study area is a

2.2 million ha region between the centre and the south of Cameroon that includes both DFP and DFNP lands with various uses. Measurements indicate that the rate of deforestation differs (between 0.05% and 1.32%) depending on the land category (see Table 2.4), thus leading to the following conclusions.

The fact that loss of forest cover is higher in the DFNP than in the DFP indicates that the zoning is generally complied with, and that an emissions reduction strategy should give special attention to the threat of massive conversion in the DFNP.

Realistic, detailed maps of the agricultural mosaic are needed if the REDD-Cameroon team is to establish baselines for carbon accounting, analyse opportunity costs involved in emissions reduction and design an effective strategy for increasing carbon stocks in the landscape.

The deforestation rate and the changes in forest cover have to be seen in the context of the prevailing conditions, with a distinction made between the various types of land management unit. This will mean going beyond national reference emission levels and focusing on forest cover and changes in land use at the subnational and regional/local levels.

Simulations of the study indicate that the different emissions reduction regimes (RED, REDD, REDD+, REALU) would have different impacts

on the land categories under consideration. The existence of this range of options should make it possible to select the mechanism that is most efficient and best suited to the conditions.

Research has revealed a range of difficulties in establishing a carbon accounting and monitoring scheme. Many of the difficulties have been identified in the Cameroon R-PIN, including: limits to current cartographic monitoring, which focuses more on the DFP and cannot be used to monitor all forest cover; the obsolescence of cartographic data, which do not reflect the current situation of Cameroon's forests; the lack of precision in maps at the scale of 1:200 000, which have not been updated for a long time; the prohibitive cost of obtaining recent satellite images with good resolution; the complete or partial lack of technical capacity to monitor GHG emissions from forests; and the lack of coordination between these activities (MINEP 2008).

Data on Cameroon's potential for climate change mitigation are inadequate. There is a clear need to establish a REDD+ MRV system using relevant, available expertise; this will require considerable investment. The system must be established using a phased approach, as acknowledged in the UNFCCC and developed by observers (Angelsen *et al.* 2009). Given the current insufficient capacity for MRV, then, what indicators can be used to evaluate performance or progress? A REDD+ MRV system for carbon accounting probably cannot be

**Table 2.4 Deforestation extent and rates by land use in the Alternative to Slash and Burn study site**

	Non-permanent forests			Permanent forests	
	Community forests	Vente de coupe (sale of standing vol.) logging rights	Undetermined*	FMU	Protected area
Total area	34 332 ha	23 959 ha	834 748 ha	106 998 ha	65 103 ha
Area that underwent change	1469 ha (4.28%)	1199 ha (5%)	65 936 ha (7.9%)	2064 ha (1.93%)	182 ha (0.28%)
Annual rate of change (2001–2007)	0.71%	0.83%	1.32%	0.32%	0.05%

\* DFNP space that does not belong to any category

Source: Robiglio *et al.* (2010)

established until the REDD+ mechanism is in its final stages of development. Hence, the interim indicators will merely form a link to the initial phases of development of a national strategy and the implementation of policies and measures. A good understanding of changes in key governance factors and in socio-economic and environmental aspects is a prerequisite for carbon assessment. Therefore, discussions should also focus on the

MRV of other important aspects of the REDD+ mechanism that go beyond carbon, as already outlined by the FCPF (2009), UN-REDD (2009) and Global Witness (2009). It would be interesting to research these interim indicators in the Cameroonian context. The forest governance tool box developed by WRI, Imazon and ICV (2010) would be a useful document in this regard.

# 3

## Institutional environment and benefit-sharing mechanisms

### 3.1 Forest governance in Cameroon

In this section, forest governance is first considered from the perspective of Cameroon's international commitments with regard to forests, biodiversity and climate change. The country's efforts to implement the international and regional instruments of the conventions and agreements it has signed are then assessed, highlighting problems of forest governance linked to corruption and capacity, amongst other things. Finally, lessons are drawn for deploying the REDD+ mechanism in Cameroon.

#### 3.1.1 International commitments on forests, biodiversity and climate change

Cameroon has signed, ratified or adopted the leading regional and global instruments on forests, biodiversity and climate change. The country's involvement with international processes has been acknowledged, in particular at the United Nations Forum on Forests (UNFF). Insufficient documentation makes it difficult to evaluate Cameroon's input at the UNFF, but over the years, its representation to the UNFF has grown, judging by the size of its delegation (1 representative at the 5th session in 2005, 11 representatives at the 8th session in 2009).<sup>6</sup> Cameroon has, therefore, participated in making major decisions at the UNFF, including Resolution ECOSOC 2006/49, which adopted the 4 common global objectives for

forests, and Resolution 62/98 by the UN General Assembly to adopt legally non-binding instruments on all types of forest.

The most illustrative example of Cameroon's regional commitments is its signing of the Treaty on the Conservation and Sustainable Management of Forest Ecosystems in Central Africa and to establish the Central Africa Forests Commission (COMIFAC), in Brazzaville in February 2005. Under this treaty, Cameroon and 9 other countries in Central Africa (Burundi, Central African Republic, Chad, Congo, Democratic Republic of Congo, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, Sao Tomé & Príncipe and Rwanda) committed to sustainable, concerted management of the Congo Basin forests, to having non-state actors participate in the process and to developing forest economies in the subregion by optimising their potential (Assemblée Mvondo 2006c). Implementing the treaty involves a Convergence Plan composed of 10 strategic axes, one of which deals with the alignment of forest and fiscal policies (COMIFAC 2004). The COMIFAC Treaty is an attempt to integrate various important forest-related issues, which are considered piecemeal in several other international instruments.

Cameroon's signing of a broad array of international and regional agreements contrasts sharply with its low implementation level, as can be seen from the overall context of environmental and sustainable development issues (Dasse 2001, Kamto 2001). Cameroon's efforts to implement these agreements became evident mainly after

the Rio Earth Summit in 1992 when the country adopted a new forest policy (1993, revised and completed in 1995), promulgated a new forestry law (1994) and a framework law on environmental management (1996) and established new institutions. However, implementing the Forestry Law has been a slow process. For various reasons—lack of regulations, lack of political will, insufficient institutional capacity—the law did not come into effect until 1998 (Topa *et al.* 2009). The Forest and Environment Sector Programme (FESP) is the most tangible indication of Cameroon's efforts to meet its commitments. The FESP, established in 2004, is divided into 5 components (MINEF 2003a).<sup>7</sup> Although various reports have noted its progress, the overall average for activity implementation was 45% by 31 December 2008 (MINFOF 2009b).

Questions of forest governance, treated in the FESP as a cross-cutting issue, seem to be managed through partnerships between MINFOF and various organisations. Following are 3 examples: 1) the MINFOF/WRI partnership, which for some about 10 years has contributed to the development and availability of information needed to monitor compliance with logging standards and the state of forest resources (Mertens *et al.* 2007); 2) the MINFOF/SNV/DFID partnership, created in 2006 to establish the Forest Governance Facility (FGF), whose aim is to 'build up a public domain' together with the FESP and to facilitate the commitment and participation of non-state actors in the development and implementation of government policies in the forestry sector (Ingram and de Baan 2005); in 2009 this programme was transferred from SNV to Planet Survey, a Cameroonian NGO, thereby complying with a basic principle that after 2 years of development and operations, the initiative would be transferred to a Cameroonian civil society organisation; and 3) the MINFOF/LAGA partnership on compliance with wildlife legislation. LAGA set up a system to track and halt practices that jeopardise biodiversity, in particular commercial poaching and the sale of protected species. It is involved with legal proceedings, from field investigations to bringing cases before the law courts.<sup>8</sup>

There are 2 other markers of changes in forest governance. The first is the adoption of the independent observer (IO) principle connected

to the issuance of forest permits and the control of forestry activities. IOs prepare and publish reports on the quality of forestry operations, thus contributing enormously to the sector's transparency. The IOs have helped establish and maintain a national register of forest and wildlife violations. Second, since 2007, Cameroon has been engaged with the EU FLEGT processes to fight illegal logging, in particular through a national system to confirm the legal origin of timber. The Voluntary Partnership Agreement (VPA) between the European Commission and Cameroon to establish the process was signed in May 2010 and will probably enter into force in 2 years. This will be an important point in the evolution of forest governance, which is marked by the following: before 1994, lack of rationality and coherence in contracts, leading to situations that authorised different people to exploit the same areas and even protected areas; 1999, introduction of a planning and publishing policy for valid and future permits, thus ending the racket; 2006, a situation where 85% of timber came from managed areas (FMUs), compared with only 30% in 1998 (Topa *et al.* 2009).

### 3.1.2 Forest governance in the field

Illegal logging is one of the main subjects in discussions on the forestry sector in Cameroon (Verbelen 1999, Agir ici et Survie 2000, Forest Monitor 2001, Nguiffo 2004, Greenpeace 2005). Illegal practices occur both upstream, such as in the allocation of logging permits, and downstream, in timber transport and export. Hence, the term 'illegal forest activities' (IFA), introduced by Cerutti and Tacconi (2006), is useful for describing the phenomenon as a whole. The concept of IFA goes beyond illegal logging to encompass environmental implications and the livelihoods of local communities. IFA is thus multifaceted.

Chronologically, observers have identified 2 periods characterised by different levels of IFA (Cerutti and Tacconi 2006, Topa *et al.* 2009). During the first period (1998–2002), IFA were developed on a large scale and apparently accounted for more than one-third of the annual timber production. Data on declared industrial harvests and registered exports at the Port of Douala show excesses over official production of 48.5% (1998/99), 36%

(1999/00) and 19% (2000/01) (Cerutti and Tacconi 2006). The sharp rise in illegal activities can be traced to the devaluation of the FCFA, the expiry of export licences, the suspension of the *petits titres* (see Section 2.1) and the failure to designate new FMUs (Topa *et al.* 2009). The second period, since 2002, has been marked by great improvements, as evidenced particularly by the closer match between production and export figures; in 2004, the discrepancy was a mere 9.3%. Changes in forest management and controls by IOs contributed to this improvement.

Statistics cannot fully illustrate or explain illegal practices in the forestry sector. One of the most highly criticised practices is the allocation of logging permits by government forest services on mutually agreed—and hence mutually agreeable—terms. This has many implications, such as the creation of false documents that do not appear in the official figures. Timber recovery and extraction permits and personal logging permits are at the heart of a system marked by corruption and collusion between civil servants and permit holders. Aware of abuses in the *petits titres* system, the authorities suspended them between 1999 and 2006.<sup>9</sup> However, this move clearly did not stop the informal sector from continuing its fast growth to meet the large domestic demand for timber, as the forestry department had little capacity to control it (Plouvier *et al.* 2002). MINEF, which also seemed to be at a loss as to how to control the problem, however, some claim its move to suspend the *petits titres* was illegal, as it failed to adhere strictly to legal procedures (Cuny *et al.* 2004).

Other illegal practices have been identified in the system for allocating forest concessions and *ventes de coupe* logging titles. This system involves an interministerial commission and selection procedures and criteria. The allocation process involves a public call for tenders from forestry enterprises. These offers are examined according to technical and financial criteria and, in principle, a scoring system is used to select the best bid. This mechanism is supposed to guarantee equity and transparency. However, in many cases, competition was visibly slanted as a result of the commission's 'internal strategies to avoid the official strict conditions of the public award' (Nguiffo 2004, Cerutti and Tacconi 2006). Clearly, certain

members of the commission had interests in the competing forestry companies. This malfunctioning was documented by the IO.

Although illegal practices are less prevalent in the DFNP, FMUs are not completely free of them. Punishments have often been meted out for exceeding FMU limits, or for failure to comply with the *assiette annuelle de coupe* (the surface area authorised for cutting logging in a particular year) or the minimum exploitable diameter (MED) for certain species.<sup>10</sup> A comparative assessment of 20 FMU development plans indicates the alarming fact that half these plans received a score of only 60% for compliance with required legal criteria (Vandehaute and Doucet 2006). This finding raises questions about the approval procedure for these plans.

As the preceding discussion suggests, corruption seems to be the real driver of illegal logging. Indeed, Cameroon's forestry sector has been described as a 'hub of corruption' (Transparency International 2007). The phenomenon is so insidious that one study reached the conclusion that '[in] Cameroon, the state of corruption is the norm and honesty, the offence' (Titi Nwel 1999). Corruption recruits at all levels, even in local and indigenous communities. For example, when a government agent went to eastern Cameroon to verify compliance with a community forest management plan, the representatives of the community forest offered to pay him to keep quiet about their failure to comply with the *assiette de coupe* (Dkamela 2003).

However, such small-scale, local-level corruption is secondary compared with the activities of the local and national elite, whose stakes are much higher. The large number of elite in the forestry industry is not coincidental. Rather, it reflects a long-documented reality, namely that the economic importance of the forestry sector makes it a 'precious source of influence, political credit and reward in a vast system of Cameroonian clientelism' (Topa *et al.* 2009). Nguiffo (2001), writing with informed accuracy on the matter, considers forest management in Cameroon as part of the state's neo-patrimonial abuses. The 'forest pie' is shared according to a power scale (Nguiffo 2001). He notes there are 2 channels by which to receive benefits from forests: 1) directly, by using one's position

of power to create a logging permit (legal or *de facto*) and 2) indirectly, by pressuring a political or administrative decision-maker to obtain a favourable decision that would not have been given otherwise. During a seminar on the evaluation of 10 years of forest management in Cameroon, MINFOF staff recognised the real effects of the problem in their jobs and suggested: 1) regularly publishing the results of investigations and sanctions against dishonest staff; 2) strengthening the verification, prevention and monitoring functions of the anti-corruption committee; and 3) drawing up an ethics code for all staff members (MINFOF 2005).

From what precedes, the fight against illegal practices appears logical. The work of IOs has been very important in identifying and publishing illegal practices and the names of the perpetrators, thus enabling the government forest services to punish and fine guilty parties. The publication of illegal logging cases, fines and cases pending has almost been institutionalised because the data are published every quarter (Topa *et al.* 2009). However, despite this progress, only a small proportion of fines are actually paid. Between 2001 and 2007, only 14.17% of the fines were paid, i.e. US\$4.4 million (2 209 364 548 FCFA) out of a total US\$30 million (15 010 000 000 FCFA) (Topa *et al.* 2009). This is partly due to the transaction system, which allows the forest service to negotiate a lower rate with the business operators out of court, thus settling a dispute that a judge would have treated more strictly. In 2005–2006, the IO noted that MINFOF was handling a growing number of cases and negotiating fines down by 70%–98% of their initial amount. This situation weakens the impact of this deterrent on illegal operators.

A forest policy reform in Cameroon introduced consultations with stakeholders on decisions relating to land use. In the absence of any specific studies, it is difficult to determine how much influence Cameroonian civil society has had on decisions on zoning, forest gazetting and the allocation of logging permits. Although the influence of international organisations and advocacy groups is well known (Ekoko 1997, Topa *et al.* 2009), that of the national civil society is yet to be assessed. The most telling indication is the operating method of the interministerial

commission to allocate forest concessions. This commission is composed mainly of ministry representatives (forestry and finance), along with representatives of the forest operators' unions, experts and IOs. First, IOs' reports on irregularities do not seem to have much effect, and second, civil society is clearly absent. Consultations with local communities have led to boundaries being changed during the gazetting process for protected areas and forest concessions (Topa *et al.* 2009). However, given the recurrent complaints in the field, questions remain regarding the extent to which communities' claims are taken into account (IUCN-ROCA 2007).

It would be interesting to see how NGO-type civil society organisations, partnering with local communities, participate in these processes. Such organisations often assist local and indigenous communities through activities such as land mapping, claiming use rights for Bagyeli Pygmies in the Campo-Ma'an National Park (Nelson and Tchoumba 2004, Nguiffo and Djeukam 2008) and providing technical and financial support for communities in community forest management and allocation procedures (Cuny *et al.* 2004).

However, such activities tend to be isolated, unconnected to civil society networks and apex organisations. The sharp increase in the number of civil society organisations following the political and rural reforms of the early 1990s has not been accompanied by efficiency. In fact, the lack of cohesion, cooperation, basic association, aptitude for learning and shortage of information are well-known weaknesses in these organisations (Bonis Charancle 1997, Oyono and Temple 2003, Abega 2004). These weaknesses explain the organisations' difficulties in pursuing common goals and exercising collective influence over decisions relating to the use of forestlands. There is more than one civil society in Cameroon (Otayek *et al.* 2004), as can be ascertained by looking at natural resources management. In the past, societal initiatives have not been successful. The most recent attempt is the Cercle de Concertation de la Société Civile Partenaire du MINFOF/MINEP (CCSPM; Consultation Circle of Civil Society Partners of MINFOF/MINEP), created in 2009, which played a leading role in the revision and adoption of the



new procedures manual on community forest allocation and management standards. It is not clear if this was a one-off episode or if the CCSPM will continue in the long term.

Insufficient capacity, a major cause of weak governance in forest management in Cameroon, has been identified in several institutional evaluations (I&D 2000, MINFOF 2005, 2007) that point to lack of human and financial resources. For example, MINFOF, which has the main responsibility for implementing the FESP, had a staff of 870 in 2007, although, according to institutional reforms, 1550 additional employees were to be recruited in 2006 for the FESP (de Wasseige *et al.* 2009). The East region provides another telling illustration of the shortage of field staff: 82 people, 4 vehicles and 15 motorcycles to cover an area of 109 000 km<sup>2</sup> (MINFOF 2007). This shortage can lead to irregular situations, such as the case where the transportation costs of a verifying agent were covered by the same forestry operator whose activities he was supposed to control. The problem of human resources is not limited to numbers but is also a matter of suboptimal assignment and use of staff, inappropriate job profiles, lack of motivation, aging and corruption of agents (I&D 2000, MINFOF 2007). An estimated two-thirds of MINEP and MINFOF employees were scheduled to retire between 2005 and 2011 (Topa *et al.* 2009). Similarly, the shortage of financial and material resources is compounded by inefficient allocation choices, difficulties in obtaining and disbursing forest funds and ignorance of disbursement procedures, especially for the FESP funds (I&D 2000, MINFOF 2007). Possible solutions suggested during the 2005 seminar to evaluate 10 years of forest management included the preparation of a manual with job descriptions to ensure a good match between job profile and job applicant, the preparation of an ethics code, and staff training and refresher courses (MINFOF 2005).

### 3.1.3 Lessons for formulating and implementing the national REDD+ strategy

To better understand the implications of forest governance for the REDD+ mechanism, it is helpful to think in terms of the principles of effectiveness,

efficiency, equity and co-benefits. Applying the 3E+ criteria leads to the following conclusions, which can be employed in the formulation and implementation of a national REDD+ action plan and strategy.

Cameroon's legal and regulatory framework on forests, which is spoken of highly in Central Africa, should be seen as an asset. As indicated in the R-PIN, this framework will be useful in drafting the REDD+ strategy for Cameroon and can contribute to consolidating an effective strategy based on time-tested legal and regulatory measures.

Serious challenges exist in relation to implementation and enforcement, mainly because of a capacity deficit. This implies that a REDD+ strategy can be effective only if it contributes to creating an enabling environment for enforcing laws and regulations. Capacity building is very important and will require considerable investment. For reasons of efficiency, the appropriateness of this needs careful evaluation.

The government's heavy dependence on external partners to carry out its programmes raises the problem of capacity and hence, effectiveness and sustainability. Can the capacity to implement REDD+ be acquired, thus turning the mechanism into a coherent, sustainable process?

Efficiency and equity will depend on efforts to fight corruption and IFA. This raises questions regarding the capacity of REDD+ to provide the forestry sector—and even beyond—with a new governance dynamic that has a positive impact on individuals and institutions. Global Witness (2009) has suggested that an independent review be made to guarantee respect of principles such as transparency and equity.

Controlling corruption and IFA depends on improved control of transactions between government forest services and logging companies. Clearly, given the extent of corruption within the government, the approach in REDD+ of fighting economic crime runs counter to state interests. One option that should be carefully considered is to reinstate the role of judges in forestry disputes to enhance the effectiveness of forestry laws, as the purely administrative approach to settling disputes

apparently cannot continue. It is worth recalling here that the MINEF–MINJUSTICE–MINFIB interministerial committee (called CACOFLEX), created in 2004 to improve the application of the forestry laws, never became operational (Topa *et al.* 2009).

Lack of involvement by civil society and the very small number of people who make the decisions on land use have led to many illegitimate decisions and lack of efficiency in the field. This shows the importance of the consultation process and the need to strengthen the less powerful stakeholders when formulating and implementing national strategy.

Given the weak governance system, violations of standards seriously jeopardise the realisation of co-benefits. This aspect is connected, on the one hand, to the adoption and application of both environmental and social standards in support of communities' livelihoods, and, on the other, to factors that cannot necessarily be expressed in quantities of absorbed or emitted carbon but point to the need for subsidies (Phelps *et al.* 2010). The carbon market does not offer an adequate solution; a global fund such as that proposed in Phase 2 of the Meridian Institute's approach (see Table 1.1) would seem more effective.

## 3.2 Decentralisation and co-benefits

### 3.2.1 Decentralisation of sectors closely related to deforestation

The main guidelines of administrative decentralisation in Cameroon are set out in the 1996 Constitution,<sup>11</sup> especially in Part X on regional and local authorities. The structure of this decentralisation is outlined in Table 3.1. The first column of the table lists the decentralised entities, which were created by the 1996 Constitution. Establishing these local entities appears to have been very laborious: it took 8 years to promulgate the first orientation law (2004)<sup>12</sup> and 14 years before the first decrees transferring certain state rights to the councils were published (2010).<sup>13</sup> The word 'province' has been replaced by the word 'region',

but there are still no elected regional councils. The authorities justify this delay by referring to the need for wisdom, prudence and safety and to ensure the process is irreversible.<sup>14</sup> However, analysts have already observed problems that prevent effective decentralisation, including the burdensome and rigid guardianship measures imposed on the decentralised territorial entities (Tang Essomba *et al.* 2004). Eboussi Boulaga (2009) suggests the process is unlikely ever to apply, believing that 'decentralisation with the transfer of power to local authorities is impossible in a time of "hyperpresidentialism", in other words, an autocratic regime that can tolerate no more than delegation of authority'. Obviously, the future of decentralisation is uncertain; this will have implications for initiatives such as REDD+, which will take place at the subnational level.

The forestry sector is a leader in the overall administrative decentralisation process in Cameroon. Before 1994, forest management policy was characterised by central state hegemony (Bigombe Logo and Nkoum-Me-Ntseny 1998), that is, the state was the 'guardian' of the national domain, the only legal owner of forestlands and the sole administrator of forest revenues. The 1994 Forestry Law confirms and institutionalises the concept of forest management decentralisation, especially for council forests (Articles 30 and 33) and the allocation of the Annual Forest Fee (AFF) from forest concessions to riparian populations (Articles 67 and 68). The innovation for council forests consists of gazetting and the transfer of part of the DFP to a council, which, through its municipal board, is responsible for forest management and exploitation on the basis of a management plan approved by the forestry administration. The AFF gives councils and local communities access to funds that previously were completely state controlled (see below). Community forests (Articles 37 and 38) are part of the same process, but only receive delegated managerial powers, and they do not meet the criteria for the transfer of power that characterises council forests or for the AFF. The community forest process gives management of a small part of the DFNP—no more than 5000 ha—to a legal entity that is accountable on behalf of the community that applied for the process. The community signs a

**Table 3.1 Outline of administrative decentralisation in Cameroon**

Cameroon, a unified state		
Decentralised entities (with certain autonomy)	Administrative entities (entities with delegated powers through 'déconcentration')	Technical entities (Ministries with shift of powers to given units through 'déconcentration')
10 regions (regional councils composed of delegates from divisions and elected representatives of the traditional leadership) 339 municipalities (municipal councils, with 9963 elected members)	58 divisions (appointed divisional officers) 275 subdivisions (appointed subdivisional officers) 53 districts (appointed heads of district)	Regional delegation (appointed delegate) Divisional delegation (appointed delegate) Subdivisional delegation (appointed delegate)

management agreement with the state. All activities are carried out according to a simple management plan approved by the state.

These are the main features of institutional decentralisation of forest management in Cameroon. There are 3 other elements along the same lines: 1) the introduction of a parafiscal tax of 1000 FCFA per cubic metre of wood leaving the logging site of a *vente de coupe*, which is paid to riparian communities for social welfare purposes;<sup>15</sup> 2) the recognition of rights to customary forestry uses and within certain protected areas (Article 8(1)); and 3) the development of community-managed hunting zones (ZICGC), based on consensual agreement amongst local stakeholders rather than on laws, in particular through the Membélé Convention of 8 June 1999 (Assembe Mvondo 2006a). The ZICGC are run by local committees that rent the areas to professional hunting guides. These committees receive rental fees and 10% of the leasing and hunting taxes from ZICGC operations. This money is invested in community development projects.

Evaluations and analyses of the decentralisation of the Cameroonian forestry sector abound (Milol and Pierre 2000, Bigombe Logo 2003, Nzoyem *et al.* 2003, Cuny *et al.* 2004, Ndjanyou and Majerowicz 2004, Oyono 2004, Lescuyer *et al.* 2008, Morrison *et al.* 2009, Oyono *et al.* 2009). All reports agree that the decentralisation process failed to achieve the local development goals it targeted. Numerous reasons are given for this failure, the main ones being: 1) the existence of authoritarian

decentralisation, crafted at the top level, which perpetuates centralisation; 2) the difficulty for this style of approach to fulfil aspirations and needs at the grassroots level and engender real democratic decentralisation; 3) capture of the process by intermediary forces and elites who form alliances and turn decentralisation into a source of predation and accumulation; 4) the country's very limited capacity to manage the various local structures created through decentralisation; 5) the lack of managerial transparency and accountability; and 6) in the case of AFF and community forests, numerous conflicts caused by the legal vacuum and vagueness of the concepts of 'community' and 'village community'. Clearly, the process that was launched in the forestry sector could prove very instructive for the entire decentralisation process in Cameroon.

It is interesting to observe how MINADER and MINFOF, the ministries responsible for the 2 main drivers of deforestation and forest degradation (agriculture and logging) carry out their mission, moving from the central level to the level of their local agents. MINADER has a central structure composed of 10 technical departments and operates throughout the country via its local agents and extension services.<sup>16</sup> Delegation occurs in all the regions (regional delegations), divisions (divisional delegations), subdivisions (subdivision delegations) and districts (district delegations). Extension services include training facilities and technical units. MINFOF operates similarly, but has only 4 technical departments. Lack of documents makes it difficult to assess the coordination between the

2 ministries in the field; however, the Rural Sector Development Strategy (RSDS) designed in 2006 (MINADER 2006) suggests that coordination and alignment are insufficient. For instance, MINADER has set an agricultural production target for 2015 which requires a yield increase of close to 50% and an increase in cropping areas of about 25%. This means converting forestland into farmlands to grow crops such as cocoa, robusta coffee, rubber, oil palm, cassava and plantain. MINADER apparently believes that increasing croplands is compatible with the present state of land reserves, if rational, concerted land management methods are applied. However, there is no indication that the other ministries concerned, e.g. MINFOF and MINEP, were consulted. The RSDS makes no mention of the FESP or the National Environmental Management Plan (NEMP), which were adopted earlier.

Through decentralisation, several functions formerly carried out by ministries have been officially transferred to councils. Some of these can be included in the list of drivers of deforestation (creation of livestock production infrastructure, creation and maintenance of certain roads, development of rural mini-infrastructure, agricultural development, etc.); others reflect the need for resources management (cattle movement controls, concerted management and demarcation of agropastoral areas, protection of water resources, etc.). These transfers are recent and have not yet had any effect; furthermore, they essentially involve responsibilities for wealth production and creation at the local level. At this stage, areas involving higher stakes, such as mining and implementation of environmental standards and forestry and wildlife controls, are being kept within the purview of the central state, with no mention of transfers of authority. Details are not yet available on powers being shifted to the regions and regional councils. The question, therefore, is how far the central government is willing to go in transferring lands and prerogatives. This question is also important for REDD+ at the subnational level.

The most time-tested mechanism for sharing benefits in Cameroon is the one used for the forests. It is a system to distribute certain taxes between the state (50%), riparian forest councils (40%) and villages bordering forests (10%). As part of forest exploitation, especially in the FMUs, the Annual Forest Fee (AFF,

a tax based on the size of the FMU) is collected and redistributed according to the scale below.<sup>17</sup> Hunting in community-managed zones is also subject to taxation, e.g. slaughter and leasing taxes, which are collected and redistributed according to the same principle (50% for the state, 40% for councils and 10% for communities).<sup>18</sup> There is a notable difference between the retrocession of the 10% of the AFF to the communities, which is channelled through the councils, and the 10% wildlife fee, which is paid directly to the communities and has a more visible impact on local development (CERAD and IGC 2008). The problems with managing these funds are discussed above. Of the 50% of the AFF that is paid to the state, 45% is supposed to be put into the Forest Development Fund (FSDF) and 55% to the single Treasury account (Nzoyem *et al.* 2003). In reality, however, the principle of the single fund has more weight than the FSDF and impinges on the performance of the forest administration (Karsenty *et al.* 2006). The 50% of the wildlife fee that is paid to the state and other related taxes also support the Special Wildlife Fund (FSF). Little mention is made of this tax, probably because the amount is small, compared with the AFF.

A new joint order made on 3 June 2010<sup>19</sup> regulates the administration of all forest and wildlife revenue intended for councils and riparian village communities. This order covers various categories of revenue (see Table 3.2) and attempts to deal with the limits imposed in the old system. Innovations include:

- combining all the revenue from forests and wildlife intended for these entities and formerly administered under a variety of rules (see Table 3.2);
- overcoming MINFOF's frustrations over its lack of involvement in AFF distribution (previously only Ministry of Territorial Administration and Decentralisation (MINATD) and MINFI had a visible role) by restoring its position in AFF management;
- aligning the benefit-sharing mechanism with the new decentralisation process;
- adopting new equitable distribution measures for revenue from council forests, to bring non-forest councils into line;

**Table 3.2 Distribution of revenue from forests and wildlife in Cameroon**

Source of revenue	Share		
	Central state	Councils	Riparian village communities
Annual Forest Fee (AFF) (tax base is size of FMU)	50%	20% (for the forest councils) 20% (for the other councils)	10%
Council forests	–	70% (for development actions on council territory)	30% (to build infrastructure for the communities)
Community forests	–	–	100%
Community-managed hunting zones (ZIC) (leasing tax)	50%	40%	10%
Tax on recovery of products from non-council and non-community forests (2000 FCFA/m <sup>3</sup> )	–	70% (for development actions on council territory)	30% (to build infrastructure for the communities)
Social and economic realisations in forest concessions	–	–	Defined in technical specifications and management plan

- adopting a new balance for revenue from council forests between allocations to riparian village community development (30%) and development activities for the whole council territory (70%);
- introducing a cap on operating costs so as to free more funds for investments and create more impact;
- strengthening measures that contribute to transparency and public access to information; and
- strengthening measures to ensure accountability.

### 3.2.2 Lessons for drafting and implementing the national REDD+ strategy

Using the 3E+ framework, we can draw the following lessons from Cameroon's experience with decentralisation.

Cameroon, like other COMIFAC countries, favours a hybrid approach to REDD+, that is, an approach that links the national and subnational levels. The idea is to maintain enough flexibility to carry out studies at the subnational level that can progress to the national level. The Cameroonian

decentralisation programme could therefore be drawn upon in discussions on the possibility of establishing activities at the subnational level.

Considering the context of decentralisation in Cameroon, which option for distribution of authority is most favourable to REDD+ implementation at the subnational level? The Irawan and Tacconi (2009) study suggests 3 possible scenarios: 1) the central government has full authority, makes decisions based on a national reference level and then delegates implementation to decentralised entities; 2) the central government decides on a national reference level and calls for the opinions of local entities before delegating implementation responsibilities; 3) the central government holds discussions with local entities, together they decide on the national reference level and then the local entities implement the resulting measures based on their own proposals. As the preceding discussion illustrates, this process is fragile and the local entities are not completely operational; hence, the first option may be the most appropriate in the present situation, despite the risk that the decentralised entities may not adopt the reforms. The question is whether the central government should wait until decentralisation has been completed before adopting option 3, which

has the greatest chance of achieving successful REDD+ implementation.

The option of devolving responsibility for certain REDD+ activities upon decentralised entities leads to the question of how to measure their performance. In addition to the national reference level for emissions, should there be a decentralised MRV system tied to the national level? It is understandable, in light of the subsidiarity principle, that certain responsibilities for the coordination of policies and measures that especially affect the economic agents should be carried out by these decentralised territorial entities; thus, it is legitimate for them to expect to be paid. Obviously, benefit sharing has to be considered vertically (central government and decentralised entities) and horizontally (amongst economic agents who are responsible for emissions reduction and absorption), as suggested in the IUCN (2009) study.

In the current context, at least 6 economic agents can claim payment (see Table 1.2): 1) communities in charge of community forest management, for reforestation activities and for complying with forest management rules; 2) councils that have council forests, for their commitment to afforestation, forest enhancement, biodiversity conservation and other management practices; 3) traditional swiddeners, for adopting new agricultural protocols and for protecting the trees; 4) hunter-gatherers, for maintaining their lifestyle and the attendant benefits that support conservation; 5) forest concession managers, for their commitment and their performance in sustainable forest development; 6) REDD+ project proponents who, for instance, propose a fuelwood substitution project. Differences in the potential beneficiaries' rights over the land and the resources will affect who accepts responsibility for implementing REDD+ actions. This leads to 2 further issues: guaranteeing rights, and the strict balance that must be maintained between the process whose legitimacy is based on land guarantees and effective incentive measures to reduce emissions (IUCN 2009).

The forest revenue redistribution system also can inform REDD+. The limited impact of forest revenue on local development can be traced to a

variety of causes, including the 'money path', which involves intermediaries, capture and corruption, management by bodies that are not sufficiently representative, limited management capacity and the absence or weakness of monitoring, which means a lack of accountability. The system that had been in place from the end of the 1990s created a serious problem of inequity. The joint order of June 2010 is an attempt to deal with this and many other problems, although it is still to be tested in practice. In calling for an independent verification organisation, local communities (Dkamela *et al.* 2009) are actually calling for social justice. They expect to find the answer in the national strategy for a REDD+ benefit-sharing mechanism.

Decentralisation of forest management in Cameroon has led to several challenges for governance, such as the effectiveness of results for local development, law enforcement and corruption control, as discussed above. Again, the national strategy for REDD+ should provide appropriate responses that guarantee the effectiveness and the equity of the mechanism.

Accountability is essential in combating embezzlement. This goes beyond REDD+, but largely conditions its success. This fight is related to at least 2 elements of the institutional reform now underway in Cameroon. The first is the effective functioning of the Court of Accounts (*Chambre des comptes*) of the Supreme Court, which was recently created as an independent public service charged with controlling funds administered by public institutions. The second is connected to the fact that local communities cannot go to court as plaintiffs and institute legal proceedings for misappropriation because of the legal definition of 'public money'; Article 25 of the new joint order of June 2010 clearly confirms this rule.

Experience shows that the effectiveness of the funds created for biodiversity conservation and sustainable management (FSDF and FSF) is compromised by the single state fund principle. It may be difficult to develop co-benefits if conservation activities depend on a single fund. For REDD+, this may indicate a need to design mechanisms that automatically transfer money to these specific funds.

### 3.3 Rights of indigenous peoples, rights to land and trees, and carbon tenure

#### 3.3.1 Laws relating to indigenous peoples

Cameroon has signed the 2007 United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples;<sup>20</sup> this willingness is probably due to the declaration's non-binding character, given that Cameroon is still balking at the idea of adhering to the legally binding 1989 ILO Convention (No. 169), which is an international framework for indigenous peoples.<sup>21</sup> This reasoning applies to most African states that avoid ILO Convention No. 169, despite urging by the African Commission for Human and Peoples' Rights (ACHPR) for them to accept it (ACHPR and IWGIA 2005). The notion of 'self-determination' for indigenous peoples is clearly the most worrisome aspect for Cameroon, which is still a fragile state.

The terms 'indigenous populations' and 'minorities' appear in the preamble to the 1996 version of the Cameroonian Constitution, but it is clear the drafters intended these to refer to situations other than those covered by the related international instruments. No text has been produced to clarify these terms or to formulate an affirmative action policy in favour of these groups. The ACHPR has noted the tendency of African governments such as Cameroon to deny the existence of 'indigenous people' by arguing that 'all Africans are indigenous'. Unlike in the American context, which concerns the relationship between people of European origin (the settlers) and indigenous communities, Cameroonian hunter-gatherers and traditional farmers have the same history. Moreover, important anthropological studies have shown that this category of indigenous people is not really relevant in Central Africa (Bahuchet and de Maret 2000).

The Ministry of Social Affairs (MINAS), thus, speaks of 'marginal populations' and 'vulnerable populations';<sup>22</sup> these terms encompass Pygmy hunter-gatherers, Mbororo nomadic herders, mountain dwellers, island and creek populations and cross-border populations.<sup>23</sup> Actions to support these groups fall under the authority of

the Department of National Solidarity, which is composed of 2 subunits, one to fight social exclusion and the other to promote national solidarity.

However, Cameroon has not yet prepared a coherent policy document setting out government plans to address the specific problems of these population groups. In response to pressure from the international community, certain *ad hoc* programmes have been introduced, such as the Plan for Vulnerable Indigenous Peoples (PVIP), which is part of the compensation plan for damages caused by the construction of the Chad-Cameroon pipeline. It was published in 1999 and first implemented in 2002. The PVIP is open to Bagyeli Pygmies who were expropriated because of the pipeline. It covers costs related to health care, education, farming, housing and citizenship (COTCO 1999, Dkamela 2004). A Pygmy Peoples Development Plan (PPDP) was established as part of the Cameroon Forest and Environment Sector Programme (FESP) to facilitate the Pygmies' access to community forests and to ensure fair distribution of the Annual Forest Fee (AFF) and the wildlife tax (MINEF 2003b). Another programme was drawn up under the National Participatory Development Programme (NPDP), funded by the World Bank (MINEPAT 2003). Both programmes were developed to meet World Bank requirements on indigenous peoples.<sup>24</sup>

Having addressed the problem through sectoral interventions and projects, the current tendency appears to be to think in terms of a national policy on marginalised populations. This, at least, is the opinion conveyed in MINEP's recent call for expressions of interest for the recruitment of a consultant to conduct a study outlining a general policy framework on marginalised populations in Cameroon (Cameroon Tribune, 25 Feb. 2010). This initiative forms part of a new project called 'Environmental and Social Capacity Building in the Cameroonian Energy Sector' (PRECESS), the aim of which is to provide multisectoral support to the environmental and social components of major infrastructure projects (GIC 2008).

That Pygmies are treated the same as other Cameroonians can be seen by the rights granted to

them. Baka, Bagyeli and Bedzang Pygmies living in the forests have the same rights as all other Cameroonians living in the region, i.e. land use rights in national forest domains.<sup>25</sup> They have the right to consume forest products (such as fruit, leaves, bark and roots) without having to prove land ownership (Nguiffo *et al.* 2009). The 1994 Forestry Law confirms these use rights in both DFNP and DFP, although with restrictions on the latter, namely that such rights apply only for personal use; authorisation is required for the products to be sold. The other category of rights granted by the state is a type of land enjoyment right under conditions defined in the 1994 Forestry Law, a by-product of the establishment of community forests and decentralised taxation (Nguiffo *et al.* 2009).

With the help of NGOs, the hunter-gatherers in the southern Cameroonian forests were able to express their connection with the international notion of 'indigenous people' and demand solutions to their specific problems, namely, forest degradation, poor living conditions, non-recognition of ancestral land rights, poor access to revenue from forest taxes (wildlife and community forests), little access to citizenship and weak representation in political bodies; they also presented the problem of the autonomy of the Pygmy chieftainships vis-à-vis their Bantu neighbours (Assembe Mvondo 2006b, Bigombe Logo *et al.* 2006, ILO, MINAS and MINEPAT 2008). Partly for the historical reasons mentioned above, these demands are not supported by a well-structured, truly indigenous movement, as in Latin America (Jackson and Warren 2005) although there are several associations: Baka associations such as ASBAK (Dkamela 2003), Bagyeli associations such as ADEBAGO (Abe Eyebe 2009) and local NGOs such as CADDAP, which is run by a Baka woman. These initiatives are usually backed by international NGOs that establish national partnerships to support the indigenous organisations. These intermediary partners and associations of indigenous people have formed a network called RACOPY to coordinate their activities.

Many indigenous leaders participate in national, regional and international forums, but not as representatives of a dynamic that could be called a national indigenous movement. There are many

obstacles to the creation of such a movement, such as a model for associations that does not fit with their own organisational methods, leadership conflicts, manipulation by NGOs and a disconnect between the leaders and the grassroots level (Dkamela 2003). WRI and NESDA-CA are carrying out a project called 'Participation and Representation of Indigenous Forest Peoples', whose goal is to select representatives of the various indigenous communities using a participatory approach (Abe Eyebe 2009). It remains to be seen whether this project will lay the foundations for a well-structured, national indigenous movement.

### 3.3.2 Property rights to land and resources

The recentness of the emergence of carbon as an important resource in Cameroon, as in many other countries, explains the absence of clear legislation. Cameroon's R-PIN does not explain how this lack of legislation should be handled from the perspective of REDD+. As yet, nobody but a few parliamentarians in the REPAR-Cameroon network has drawn up a position paper on the subject; the view of this group is that the revision of the forestry law would provide an opportunity to discuss and clarify forest carbon rights (REPAR-Cameroon 2009).

Legal experts describe 2 options. First, a 'carbon credit' could be categorised as an 'intangible asset' (Perez Correa 2009). In countries with a civil law system, such as Cameroon, a carbon credit would appear to be more a 'tangible asset' because it can be moved; however, it is also 'intangible' when it takes the form of absorbed or avoided carbon. In this context, a carbon credit could be seen as a security, or a monetary asset representing the result of an action (avoidance or absorption). The ownership of carbon credits, thus, would be granted to those who can prove they are at the origin of this kind of result. The question remains of what criteria or indications lawmakers could apply to identify these owners: would it be land tenure (including ancestral rights), operating rights, use rights or capital investment? Once these criteria have been codified in legislation, the owners could easily be identified, and could easily sell or transfer



their rights. This option allows for and encourages private ownership.

The second option is different. Two Cameroonian lawyers (Nchunu Sama and Bih Tawah 2009) assert that absorbed or avoided carbon is a natural resource. They based this assertion on the current status of other natural resources belonging to the state, namely all genetic resources (1994 Forestry Law, Section 12), all water resources in the national territory (1998 Water Resources Act)<sup>26</sup> and all mining resources except those covered by personal exploitation permits (Mining Code, Section 2).<sup>27</sup> At first glance, the 'carbon credit' could also be nationalised and thus become state property. However, these lawyers take their line of reasoning further by focusing on forestlands and examining the present status of lands and the absence of any clear distinction between rights over the trees that store carbon and rights over carbon *per se*. Zoning of forestlands, as described in Chapter 1, distinguishes between state forests, council forests that are part of the councils' heritage and individually owned forests, which are more theoretical than real. Their conclusion is that carbon credits should belong to whoever owns the land. However, they recognise the difficulties in giving a definitive answer to this question because the land tenure regime is not clear, especially given that the question of ancestral land rights has not been settled. Under this option, the state could be recognised as the owner of nearly all the REDD+ credits, thus making the state the only entity legally authorised to transfer ownership rights to a third party.

The legal basis for ownership of natural resources in Cameroon is set out in Ordinance No. 74/1 of 6 July 1974 to establish rules governing land tenure. This text abolishes ancestral rights that were recognised in the pre-independence period, makes registration the only way to gain ownership and places all unregistered lands under state control (Nguiffo *et al.* 2009). The state, thus, is at the centre of all natural resources ownership and grants natural resource exploitation permits and titles through its government services. In the forestry sector, for instance, logging permits and titles are issued under the supervision of MINFOF and in application of the 1994 Forestry Law. As mentioned in Chapter 1,

the forest zoning plan establishes a permanent domain (DFP) that, for the most part, is controlled by the state (with a small percentage under council control). The non-permanent domain (DFNP) is always under state control; the state is the 'guardian' but has granted use rights and enjoyment rights to communities. These rights, as described previously, stipulate that, legally, forest products may only be removed for domestic consumption, thus prohibiting commercial activity without the proper permits. These use rights also apply to agriculture. Finally, individuals have the option (albeit theoretical) of growing private forests on DFNP, and communities have—greatly restricted—use rights to forest products in the DFP.

There are at least 3 ways to convert forestlands into farmlands. The first, and the most common, concerns smallholders and stems from the abovementioned use rights. The second is via medium-sized plantations, usually controlled by the elite, who have the means to register the land and establish farms that are bigger than smallholders' plots. This type of farm can stem from ancestral use rights and/or land registration. The third way is via the large industrial holdings that are usually concessions granted to corporations (sometimes multinationals) by the state in the form of emphyteutic leases. For example, the state awarded 2 concessions through an emphyteutic 99-year lease to Hévéa du Cameroun in 1975 (HEVECAM S. A., 41 339 ha) and to Société des Palmeraies du Cameroun in 1980 (SOCAPALM, 16 332 ha) (Ngoufo *et al.* 2007).

In addition to the standards adopted by the state to govern forestlands and resources, communities have their own land and resource management systems. There is considerable literature on land and resource ownership regimes concerning both hunter-gatherers (the minority) and farmers (the majority) (Joiris and Tchikangwa 1995, Diaw 1997, Diaw and Njomkap 1999, Tiayon 1999, van den Berg 1999, Oyono *et al.* 2000, van den Berg and Biesbrouck 2000, Dkamela 2001). One of the basic principles of these regimes is the *axe or first occupant's right (droit de hache)*, which gives control of a forest area to the first person who clears it. Several categories of rights both to land and to natural resources fit together: *ancestral rights*, by

which the first occupants transmit ownership to their descendants; *production rights* (usufruct, axe and planters' rights), which allow members of the community to make a living from their activities; and *inheritance rights*, based on the principle of patrilineal transmission, which allows people to enjoy the property they inherit from their ancestors. These rights are superimposed on lands and resources and are exercised by various social units: family, lineage and village. They are guaranteed by the moral authority of the 'elders' and other traditional authorities, i.e. head of the family, head of the lineage or the village head with his council of notables, who settle conflicts and thus act as a customary tribunal. One regime focuses more on land ownership, which is justified for mainly agricultural production systems such as those in the Bantu communities. Amongst the hunter-gatherers, for whom sedentarisation is recent, the most prevalent system is a bundle of rights over resources entrenched in a network of links with family and friends. The coexistence of positive law and these various property systems and resource management institutions inspired the concept of 'legal pluralism' (von Benda-Beckmann 1991). However, this pluralism was actually born of a situation that Oyono (2005) describes as a 'conflict of language' concerning lands and forests in Cameroon; that is, the state and the communities have different understandings and express different views of land and forest ownership. With its primary authority over resources, the state imposes the organisation of space. In certain forest areas such as Campo-Ma'an, where the HEVECAM and SOCAPALM concessions are located (see above), the zoning plan has created so much 'tenure stress' that conflicts over lands are ever present (Akwah Neba *et al.* 2007, Dkamela 2007, Gerber 2008). The forest management reform reflects the state's efforts to settle a long-standing dispute. The story of community forests can be read as an attempt to establish a formal link between local communities and forestlands, which is not the same as recognising customary law. The approach to rights recognition is still highly inadequate. In 'legal pluralism', the actors generally identify and apply standards that can help justify their actions. This appears clearly in the case of artisanal logging; owners with customary rights refer to customary

law to dispose of ligneous resources but not to manage them (Robiglio 2009).

Central state and local institutions reached a compromise in their conflicts over rights to land and resources. However, this compromise gave rise to a 2-tier justice system (Diaw and Njomkap 1999). Local affairs are submitted to institutions at the family level (with the elders having the authority to settle problems) and/or the village level (village chief and his council of notables). Disputes between 2 villages can be mediated by the group chieftainship. Local problems are usually settled at the local level, with decisions based on the customary principles outlined above. Disputes can also be taken to government authorities, e.g. the subdivisional officer or the district chief. For the judiciary, the positive law supersedes earlier decisions, especially in application of the principle of tenure intangibility. However, as Diaw and Njomkap (1999) pointed out, the property model is still marginal to local land tenure regimes (2.4% of property titles). In other words, most property disputes in Cameroon's forestlands are settled in customary institutions.

No in-depth study has been conducted on the agreement between forestry laws and laws on sectors such as land tenure, mining, water resources and energy, agriculture and infrastructure. However, the 2 most recent forums on mining held in Cameroon<sup>28</sup> revealed conflicts of interest and overlapping rights and obligations, which reflect the urgent need for such research and appropriate decision-making. An example of the lack of compatibility between the forestry and mining laws is that mining permits have been issued for sections of national protected areas (Lobéké and Boumba-Bek National Parks, part of the Sangha Tri-National Park area, which is becoming a world heritage site, and the Douala Edea Wildlife Reserve) and for forest concessions such as the registered concession in the east (Ngniado 2009, Nicoll and Tchikangwa 2009). These overlaps seriously challenge the zoning plan for southern Cameroon forests adopted in 1995 (see Table 2.1). Nguiffo and Nguiepjouo (2009) have listed areas with overlaps between the rights of mining and forestry permit holders and community rights (see Table 3.3).

**Table 3.3 Overlapping forest and mining rights**

Rights of mining permit holders	Rights of forest permit holders
Long-term guaranteed access to the resource	Right to remove timber from allotted areas
Offtake rights using most appropriate means (often implies cutting down vegetation)	Obligation not to oppose other uses in the concession area (including mining)
Obligation to provide compensation	Obligation to guarantee long-term forest development
Rights of communities	
Protection of space and resources use right	
Protection of health	
Share of economic repercussions	

Source: Nguiffo and Ngujepjouo (2009)

### 3.3.3 Lessons for the formulation and implementation of the national REDD+ strategy

The legal context described above reveals the following challenges for REDD+ in relation to equity, effectiveness and co-benefits.

As indicated above, many economic actors in the forestry sector could ask for payment in return for carrying out REDD+ activities. Although these groups, e.g. local and indigenous communities who demand recognition of their customary rights, do have rights to the land and forest resources, their claims to such rights may not meet the criteria for ownership of carbon credits. This situation could give rise to problems of legitimacy and equity, and compromise the effectiveness of REDD+. Hence, a question that should be considered when discussing national strategy is how REDD+ can be used as a forum for open discussion on the ownership of land and forest resources. Discussions should lead to a sort of pragmatic consensus, with the state increasing the rights of grassroots communities. Such consensus would help defuse the current conflict on forestlands; if the conflict continues, REDD+ is certain to fail.

The other highly sensitive question concerns the Baka, Bagyeli and Bedzang hunter–gatherers whose production system does very little harm to the forests—i.e. it is a *de facto* forest conservation system. This special situation leads to the question of what minority groups should receive from affirmative action; that is, how to recognise the specific rights for which they will be paid in order to encourage them to maintain their lifestyle and help them overcome the precariousness of their current living conditions. This case will require consensus and the establishment of a permanent, well-adapted consultation process that engages resident populations, who clearly have their own definitions of the notions of ‘commitment’ and ‘responsibility’.

Another aspect that threatens the effectiveness of REDD+ is the very weak coordination between sectoral interventions in forest areas and the disconnectedness between certain laws and policies. This leads to the question of the capacity of REDD+ to impel new dynamics—in this case, to align policies and coordinate sectoral activities.

# 4

## The political economy of deforestation and forest degradation

### 4.1 Effects of past policies on forest cover

By adopting a diachronic approach, several studies, including Ndoye and Kaimowitz (2000), have identified 4 periods during which national macroeconomic, agricultural and monetary policies and international market prices for raw materials placed various kinds of pressure on forest cover in Cameroon. During the first period (1967–1976), most agriculture was for domestic consumption, rural out-migration was minor and the only real factor that caused new lands to be cropped was growth in the forest population. Government policy on coffee and cocoa prices did not encourage large numbers of farmers to enter the sector.

The second period (1977–1985) was marked by the oil boom and general enthusiasm. Cameroon's economy grew at an average annual rate of 14.2% between 1977 and 1981, and 6% between 1981 and 1986. During this period, as prices for oil and agricultural commodities rose on the international market, changes to the government's pricing policy for cocoa and coffee encouraged planters to expand into forestlands. The average size of new cocoa plantations in the forest zone grew from 7600 ha in 1971–1980 to 12 000 ha in 1980–1984 (Ndoye and Kaimowitz 2000). In the Haut-Nyong Department, located in the large forest region in eastern Cameroon, 11 400 ha of robusta coffee was planted between 1972 and 1984 (Ndoye and Kaimowitz 2000), due partly to the upturn generated by the new oil resources and partly to the ZAPI-East project, an integrated rural development project

funded by the World Bank to the tune of US\$8.5 million. The government's policy was to encourage direct conversion of forestlands into agroindustrial plantations—a policy strongly supported by the World Bank. About 100 000 ha of land in the Atlantic coastal forests around Mount Cameroon and south of Douala was turned over to agriculture in the 1967–1985 period in application of this voluntaristic policy (Essama-Nssah and Gockowski 2000). The fact that by 1984, 38 500 ha of rubber, oil palm, sugar cane and banana plantations had not yet reached maturity suggests that 6400 ha of land was converted each year during the oil boom (Ndoye and Kaimowitz 2000). Job opportunities in the cities triggered a rural exodus and probably created new markets for agricultural products; this would have further increased pressure on peri-urban forest zones, although the effects were moderated by the urban population's tendency to prefer imported food.

The third period, the post-oil boom years (1986–1993), was marked by a deep economic crisis and structural adjustment. The crisis was triggered by plummeting oil, cocoa and coffee export prices and depletion of Cameroon's oil reserves. Between 1985/86 and 1987/88, the terms of trade fell by 65%, thus severely reducing state income. In 1989, Cameroon adopted a structural adjustment programme with the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund to cut public expenses drastically, liberalise markets and introduce institutional reforms. Farm gate prices gradually dropped by 40% for cocoa and 60% for robusta coffee. Subsidies for fertilisers and pesticides were

reduced and then eliminated, leaving smallholders helpless. To adjust to this situation, the farmers boosted their production of market-oriented food crops (Tiayon 1999), to the detriment of cash crops. Urban unemployment prompted return migration and contributed to the development of a stronger market-oriented agricultural system, which consumed more of the forestland (see also Mertens and Lambin 2000, Mertens *et al.* 2000, Sunderlin *et al.* 2000, Brown and Ekoko 2001).

According to Gockowski *et al.* (1998), these policies had a considerable adverse impact on the environment. Their analysis of transformations to cocoa agroforests caused by food crops shows that even in the zones along the edges of the forest, and hence less rich in carbon, food crops can reduce carbon stocks by 0.21%–2.14%. Based on their projections, their study estimated that the amount of carbon would have been 4–17 million tonnes in the 4 administrative divisions in the forest zone if the policy shock to the farmlands had lasted. Further, an evaluation of World Bank policies, which were blamed for the farmers' difficult situation, notes that the World Bank should have helped the farmers adjust rather than apply its standard liberalisation policy (Essama-Nssah and Gockowski 2000).

The most recent period (since 1994) has been marked by the 50% devaluation of the CFA franc; this was designed to boost cocoa and coffee exports, but it appears to have benefited the forestry sector the most, as explained below. This devaluation also seems to have boosted the fuelwood sector; the consequent rise in household fuel prices (kerosene and gas) provided additional encouragement for deforestation (Essama-Nssah and Gockowski 2000).

The infrastructure development policy formed an integral part of the environmental economics discussed above. As mentioned previously, the construction of the railway as far as Belabo pushed the eastern logging front deeper into the forests. Furthermore, the construction of roads in the Bertoua and Abong-Mbang region and around Djoum turned these regions into 'hotspots' of deforestation and degradation (TREES 1998). Other major infrastructure projects included the Yaoundé–Edea road, built with World Bank funding, and the Yaoundé–Ayos road, built with a

loan from the European Union (Essama-Nssah and Gockowski 2000). These roads provided access to the frontier forests of the East, Centre and South regions of Cameroon.

The literature on the drivers of deforestation in Cameroon curiously omits all mention of the Chad–Cameroon Petroleum Development and Pipeline Project, even though it stands out amongst the country's greatest infrastructure projects. The magnitude of the project, which was started by an oil consortium and the governments of Chad and Cameroon, with financing and political guarantees from the World Bank, makes it unique in Africa. The pipeline cuts diagonally through the forest massif from the northeast of the country to the southwest. This omission is especially curious given that this 1050-km-long underground pipeline was built from Doba in southern Chad to the Atlantic Ocean in Cameroon, and that a good part of the oil pipeline, buried in the forest zone of Cameroon, required a 30-m swath of forestland to be cleared.

## 4.2 Forest policy in the 1990s: Conservation or destruction?

Forest reforms in Cameroon have also been carried out through a structural adjustment programme. The third structural adjustment credit (SAC III) included sustainable forest management as one of its conditionalities (World Bank 1999). According to Topa *et al.* (2009), such conditionalities are at the root of what are sometimes called 'forest reforms on paper', which allowed state export earnings to soar; e.g. between 1986 and 2004, income from the forestry sector registered a 5-fold increase (Essama-Nssah and Gockowski 2000). Revenue from the Annual Forest Fee (AFF), included in these reforms, rose from US\$1.1 million (260 million FCFA) in 1991/92 to US\$30.6 million (15.3 billion FCFA) in 2004 (Topa *et al.* 2009). Timber production peaked in 1993/94, rising from 2 million m<sup>3</sup> in 1992/93 to 2.7 million m<sup>3</sup> in 1993/94. This boom can be traced partly to the increase in the number of export species, which rose from 40–50 between 1987 and 1993 to 60–75 between 1994 and 1996 (Eba'a-Atyi 1998). It would be interesting to know whether this increased the pressure on the land. Boosted by the devaluation of the CFA franc, this diversification

was clearly a reaction to market demand, as world market prices for Cameroonian wood doubled.

As shown in Chapter 2, the context of this booming forestry sector was marked by extremely weak enforcement of the principles of sustainable forest management and good governance. This occurred for reasons of costs (forest management was expensive) and knowledge (foresters did not understand—and clearly did not want to understand). The foresters viewed management plans as a ‘new 1000 FCFA per hectare tax’ (World Bank 1999). This explains why low-impact logging practices are not popular with the industry (Ezzine de Blas and Ruiz Perez 2008) and the overall poor quality of the 20 approved management plans assessed by Vandenhoute and Doucet (2006).

Although the forestry reforms of the 1990s did make improvements, as described in the first 2 chapters, they were essentially designed to fill the state coffers and pay the debt service costs. A World Bank evaluation recognised the lack of effective implementation enforcement measures accompanying the adoption of the structural adjustment conditionalities (Essama-Nssah and Gockowski 2000). It is comforting to note that, 10 years later, Cameroon’s forest resources remain relatively well preserved and deforestation is still limited (Topa *et al.* 2009). Nevertheless, it is important to emphasise that weak enforcement of the reforms contributed to deforestation and forest degradation.

### 4.3 Future deforestation in Cameroon

Cameroon is facing a wide range of challenges: 40.2% monetary poverty; 80–90% of jobs are in the informal sector, where the agriculture sector accounts for 75% of the work force; investments are at a low 17.4% of GDP (MINEPAT 2009). Current economic performance leaves little hope of Cameroon achieving the Millennium Development Goals. These conditions are used to justify current political choices in the agriculture, mining, energy and infrastructure sectors—choices that unquestionably will have medium- and long-

term impacts on forest cover. Three essential documents introduce and explain the government’s choices: Cameroon Vision 2035 (MINEPAT 2009); the Growth and Employment Strategy Paper (GESP) (MINEPAT 2008); and the Rural Sector Development Strategy (RSDS), which summarises the agriculture and rural development component (MINADER 2006).

The slogan of Vision 2035 is: ‘Cameroon: an emerging, democratic country united in diversity’. This overall objective for the next 25–30 years is translated into medium-term objectives, notably: 1) poverty alleviation; 2) becoming a middle-income country; 3) becoming a newly industrialised country; and 4) consolidating democracy and national unity whilst respecting the country’s diversity. We discuss the implications of these policy decisions in terms of pressure on resources and forestlands.

#### 4.3.1 Future agriculture and planned deforestation

The RSDS considers increasing the yields of certain crops and expanding their growing area as priority actions for achieving the its objectives. Projections for crops in forestlands, under the RSDS (Table 4.1), indicate that forestlands will be increasingly converted. Agricultural production is to be increased by 50% from 2005 to 2015 by increasing cropping areas by 25%. Oil palm production is a good example of how agriculture consumes the forests: the slated increase is from 40 000 ha to 110 000 ha over 10 years. MINADER’s aim is not only to respond to national consumption requirements but also to consider potential biofuel needs for the international market.

Projections regarding biofuels can only be made in relation to oil palm. There is not yet a clear strategy on the development of the biofuel industry in Cameroon (Tsalefac 2009). In his analysis of the potential effects of biofuel development on Cameroon’s lands, biodiversity, water and soil resources, Tsalefac (2009) suggests 3 possible scenarios. Scenario 1, called ‘continuity’, is for zones growing crops that could contribute to the biofuel

**Table 4.1 Production forecasts for crops in forest zones under the Rural Sector Development Strategy (RSDS)**

Crop	Cultivated areas (ha)			Production (tonnes)		
	2005	2010	2015	2005	2010	2015
Cocoa	350 000	375 000	400 000	140 000	263 000	320 000
Robusta coffee	143 000	150 000	157 000	50 000	75 000	110 000
Rubber	4 000	6 000	8 000	5 200	7 800	12 000
Oil palm	40 000	60 000	110 000	44 000	75 000	166 000
Cassava	151 000	151 000	172 000	2 114 000	2 698 000	3 444 000
Plantain banana	206 000	211 000	225 000	1 350 000	1 903 000	2 700 000

Source: MINADER (2006)

sector. This scenario requires incentive policies for crop development and intensification. The author explains that agroindustries such as SOCAPALM, SAFACAM and Ferme Suisse have already launched oil palm development plans with this in mind. Scenario 2, called ‘discontinuity’, characterises zones where the targeted crops are intercropped and hence compete with other crops. Scenario 3, called ‘the break’, would be a major cause of deforestation because the plan involves penetration of new lands, conversion of forestlands and destruction of the habitat of numerous species, with other connected risks such as soil depletion and water pollution due to the intensive production of biofuels.

#### 4.3.2 The mining boom

The GESP includes projections for the mining sector, with a distinction between the artisanal (small-scale) and the industrial sectors. An estimated 15 000 people work in the former, mainly in the forest regions of southern and eastern Cameroon. Their activities do not always comply with the zoning plan, as shown by the fact that artisanal mining sites have been found south of Lobéké National Park (Ngniado 2009, IUCN-PACO and CIFOR 2009). CAPAM, an artisanal mining support project launched in 2005, attempts to organise this informal sector (Ntep Gweth 2009).

The industrial mining sector is still in its infancy but is expected to grow into a dominant economic

hub in the next 10 years. During the past few years, the ministry in charge of mining has issued 82 research permits and 4 mining permits to the private sector. Many of the mines are located in forest areas (Matip 2009). The extent of current explorations suggests that the forest massifs from the Atlantic coast to the Guineo–Congolese forests in the east may well be dotted with mining operations in the near future.<sup>29</sup> The following deposits have already been evaluated: cobalt, nickel and manganese near Lomié in the east, estimated at 54 million tonnes of ore at 5%; iron at Mbalam, estimated at close to 2.5 billion tonnes at 40%; and at Kribi, estimated at more than 350 million tonnes at 35% (Matip 2009). Pre-mining formalities seem well underway for the Lomié and Mbalam projects. The major players, as in the forestry sector, are multinational corporations and foreign companies, e.g. GEOVIC (USA), Sundance Resources Ltd. (Australia), Sinosteel (China) and C&K Mining (Korea).

The risk that mining operations will drive further deforestation in Cameroon is especially high because of the overlap of natural forest and mining resources, which has not been dealt with through the coordination of mining, property and forestry laws or of government services in charge of mines, property, forests and the environment (Nguiffo and Nguiepjouo 2009). Mining permits apparently are being issued for lands located in protected areas, forest concessions and even a site being recognised as a world heritage site (Ngniado 2009).

### 4.3.3 Large-scale energy and infrastructure projects

The development of infrastructure is another priority in achieving the GESP goals. Cameroon plans to increase its railway lines from 0.06 km to 0.12 km per 1000 km by 2020, and increase

asphalt roads from 0.28 to 0.43 km per 1000 km (MINEPAT 2008) to encourage, amongst other things, investments in the agriculture and mining sectors as discussed above. The railway infrastructure projects include the following: 1) Kribi–Ebolowa–Mbalam (485 km) to serve the iron order project; 2) Limbe–Douala–Edéa–Kribi;




Figure 4.1 The development of mining operations and their potential impact on southern Cameroon forests

Source: World Bank. Document exchange through CCPM.



3) Edéa–Yaoundé–Ngoundal; and 4) Belabo to Bangui in the Central African Republic (Solo 2009). As well as communications infrastructure, energy development projects have been carried out, such as the hydro-electric dam in Memvèle in the South region and the highly controversial Lom–Pangar dam in the East region.<sup>30</sup> Future development activities in the southern Cameroon forests are depicted in Figure 4.1, which models the extent of future deforestation.

#### 4.4 Deforestation at the crossroads of development needs, wastage and dependence on ‘the great system’

Conclusions from this chapter are based on 3 elements: 1) the need to develop the country; 2) the wastage leading to deforestation and forest degradation; and 3) Cameroon’s dependence on externalities linked to the global economy.

Agricultural development plans respond to real needs for development and poverty alleviation. The official rhetoric on expanding agricultural lands is supported by the idea of the existence of vast ‘land reserves’. This undoubtedly refers to the DFNP, where lands can legally be turned over to agriculture. Emissions reduction plans must therefore factor in the conversion of forestlands in the national domain to other uses. Controlling this cause of deforestation will require various parameters such as widely disseminated and accepted technological innovations and major financial resources. It is important to identify the acceptable threshold of forestland conversion to agriculture and assess the capacity of REDD+ to offer effective incentives to minimise this threshold.

Although the need for agriculture—a major driver of deforestation—is apparent, the same cannot be said for the other factors that can be grouped as ‘institutional weaknesses’ causing ‘forest resources wastage’. Reference here is to the laws and measures that essentially exist on paper only and largely explain forest degradation in the DFP, e.g. the weakness of forest management and the scope of illegal forest activities. Beyond the

crippling conflicts between MINEP and MINFOF is the lethargy of the ‘coordination units.’<sup>31</sup> The result is an uncoordinated attempt by the forestry and wildlife, environment, agriculture, water resources and energy sectors to take over the forestlands. Perfect examples are the construction of the abovementioned hydro-electric dam at Lom-Pangar and the issuance of mining permits authorising research in protected areas. There is reason for concern that the development of government institutions will not keep up with the development of the mining sector, thus creating a situation where the government is extremely weak in its relations with multinational companies and the mining industry. Ultimately, deforestation and forest degradation due to institutional weaknesses can rightly be considered as wastage, as they are not necessary and could be avoided. This then leads to the question of the ability of REDD+ to inspire far-reaching, appropriate, feasible and productive reforms.

The other important factor underlying what we call ‘wastage’ is corruption, which is so deeply embedded in Cameroon’s business environment that it is sometimes called ‘endemic’ (Bendoma 2009). Active corruption explains the collusion and the patronage/clientelism logic often found in the forestry sector. The impact is twofold: private use of public resources and barriers to the enforcement of environmental standards. In this context, it is important to consider how REDD+ can support and drive the fight against corruption.

The final element refers to factors that affect deforestation but that are under no (or very little) government control. Reference here is made to what Balandier (2001) called ‘the great system’. Cameroon’s economy depends largely on the price of raw materials on the international market, where any fluctuations can have positive or negative effects on forests. Three factors have had a certain impact, in one direction or the other: the drop in cocoa, coffee and oil prices, which affected land use (examined above); the devaluation of the CFA franc, which boosted timber exports, with a production peak of 3.5 million m<sup>3</sup> in 1997/98; and growth in demand from Asia, especially China (Topa *et al.* 2009). By exporting nearly all its production during this period marked by

devaluation and depressed local purchasing power, the forestry industry neglected the domestic demand for timber, thus opening the way for the informal sector, which operates on the edges of the law (Topa *et al.* 2009). However, balancing acts often tumble over, as can be seen from the international financial crisis that started with the real estate crisis

in the United States in November 2008. Stories on the repercussions for the forestry industry in Cameroon headlined media reports (Nguiffo 2009). Some observers felt that the downturn of certain activities had a 'positive' effect on the forests. Similarly, the results of REDD+ will depend on parameters that are beyond the control of the Cameroonian authorities.

# 5

## The political environment: Actors, events and processes

### 5.1 Climate change policies

Cameroon ratified the UNFCCC on 19 October 1994 and the Kyoto Protocol on 23 July 2002, but has yet to create a policy document on climate change or an operational plan to implement these 2 instruments. The first national document on climate change, made public in 2005 (MINEF 2005), sets out a long list of climate-support activities that are related mostly to instruments and operational plans connected to the Rio Declaration of 1992. Other notable documents are the 1995 National Forest Action Programme (NFAP) adopted in 1996, the National Environmental Management Plan (NEMP) adopted in 1996, the National Biodiversity Strategy and Action Plan (NBSAP) of 1999, the National Action Plan to Combat Desertification (NAP/CD) of 2006 and the National Energy Action Plan for Poverty Reduction (PANERP). In the first national document (MINEF 2005), adaptation and emissions reduction measures were presented as worth consideration; certain were taken up in projects or actions such as the Cameroon Ozone Programme to control and eliminate chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs) by 2010. Activities related to reforestation attracted a lot of media coverage and began in 2006 through a national campaign to plant 15 000 trees on about 10 ha by 2015 (Avana Tientcheu 2009).

However, existing projects are disconnected because of the lack of coordination between the various plans listed above (Avana Tientcheu 2009) and because of the political/strategic vacuum with regard to climate change. The National Adaptation

Programme of Action (NAPA) on climate change has not yet been finalised, and neither the Nationally Appropriate Mitigation Action (NAMA) plan nor the national REDD+ strategy has been drafted. Two tools published in 2009 will certainly guide policy formulation: the Cameroon position paper for international discussions on climate change (MINEF 2009) and Decree No. 2009/410 of 10 December 2009 on the creation, organisation and functioning of the National Observatory on Climate Change (ONACC), signed by the President of the Republic. Positions set out in the former document concern 1) the need for developed countries to finance adaptation actions in developing countries and, at the same time, greatly reduce their emissions; 2) support for REDD+ with a phased approach interlinking financial support from funding and from the carbon market, a historical reference level with an adjustment factor and subnational and national implementation measures; 3) support for the development of clean technologies and technology transfer; and 4) the creation of an adaptation fund financed through taxes on the use of fossil fuels, amongst others.

Cameroon does not yet have a fiduciary fund for climate change. The 1996 framework law on environmental management provides for the creation of a National Environment and Sustainable Development Fund (NESDF) (Article 11), but the fund is not yet operational (Avana Tientcheu 2009). The NESDF is not mentioned as a source of funding for ONACC (created December 2009) although ONACC's mandate makes it eligible for the NESDF. This could mean that the NESDF will

never actually eventuate. One of the best-known environmental coordination mechanisms in Cameroon is the Consultation Circle of Partners of MINFOF/MINEP (CCPM), which has been active for more than a decade. It plays an important role in coordinating and aligning government aid to the forestry and environment sectors, mainly through the FESP (Forest and Environment Sector Programme). The CCPM is a platform that brings funding agencies together with international technical partners and bilateral development cooperation partners. In 2006, the CCPM partners signed a Code of Conduct for the FESP, which includes plans for a joint funding–evaluation mechanism. There are at least 2 mechanisms for funding the FESP: 1) budgetary support, which means allocating money directly to the MINFOF and MINEP budgets, with the funds being managed according to Cameroon government rules; and 2) a basket fund for partners to pool their contributions; special procedures govern the management of basket funds and the fund consumption rate has been low.

For the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM), on 16 January 2006 Cameroon established a Designated National Authority (DNA) called the National CDM Committee (CN-MDP).<sup>32</sup> Its mission revolves around 4 main functions: defining and updating sustainable development criteria for project evaluation; creating and maintaining a CDM register; promoting the CDM in Cameroon; and drafting annual reports for the executive committee in Bonn. The committee is composed of 12 members from various government sectors, as well as a representative from civil society and 2 representatives from the private sector. One of the CN-MDP's main achievements has been to define the term 'forest' for future afforestation and reforestation projects. In the past few years, it has examined close to 30 projects submitted for assessment and has issued about 12 'no objection' letters. Several council forest plantation, community reforestation and agroforestry projects have been examined but did not pass the PIN (Project Idea Note) stage. The only project to have received the committee's 'no objection' letter for the outline of the PDD (Project Design Document) is a project on solid household waste that seeks to capture and destroy methane from the Nkolfoulou

landfill in Yaoundé (Beligné 2009, Pouth 2009). The project has already crossed a crucial barrier by finding a financial partner and launching its activities in the field.

Thus, efforts to establish REDD+ are taking place in a context in which other UNFCCC programmes have not yet materialised, either because they have not yet been designed (NAPA, NAMA) or because they did not meet expectations (the CDM). The fact that none of the CDM projects that produce carbon credits has been able to get off the ground, despite the launch process in Cameroon in 2006, can be explained, in part, by the complexity of the related procedures. The same argument is used to justify the absence of afforestation and reforestation projects. The lack of both a NAPA and a NAMA, however, raises the question of whether there is sufficient political will and technical/financial capacity. The questions for REDD+, therefore, are: 1) How can REDD+ contribute to overcoming these problems? 2) How can REDD+ become a tool in Cameroon's institutional landscape to promote a low-carbon-emitting forest economy geared towards sustainable development?

## 5.2 REDD+ actors, events and political processes

In international REDD+ negotiations, during which the Congo Basin states developed common positions and negotiated as a block, Cameroon participated as a member of COMIFAC (Kasulu Seya Makonga *et al.* 2009). Between COP 11 in 2005, when the basic concept of REDD was first presented, and COP 15 in Copenhagen in 2009, the countries actively worked out their positions and prepared their submissions to the UNFCCC SBSTA (Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Technological Advice). At the national level, 3 key events indicated active interest in the REDD+ initiative, at least within the government: 1) the creation of the Steering Committee for the REDD Pilot Project in January 2008, around which MINEP planned to structure national REDD management; 2) submission of Cameroon's R-PIN as part of the FCPF process (July 2008), which was supposed to lead to the formulation of a national strategy; and 3) the publication, in December 2009,

of a Presidential Decree to create the National Observatory on Climate Change (ONACC), which, if it becomes operational, could play a role in the sensitive issue of REDD+ MRV.

However, Cameroon's enthusiasm at the regional level alongside other COMIFAC countries has not been reflected at the national level, as indicated by the following: 1) the participatory process leading to the formulation of a national strategy has not yet been started, i.e. the REDD+ strategy does not yet exist; and 2) facilities responsible for managing the national process, similar to the coordinating institutions, have not yet been created. The Steering Committee of the REDD Cameroon Pilot Project has put forth proposals to create a broad national REDD+ coordinating committee responsible for political and strategic orientation and planning, as well as a national technical unit at the MINEP (REDD Cameroon Pilot Project 2010). Cameroon, thus, is lagging behind other REDD+ countries in the subregion, which have already developed a major part of the organisational infrastructure for REDD+ process management.

There is evidence of a certain lethargy at the government level, although in the field a number of development cooperation and civil society organisations have already begun working. REDD+ actors in the national arena include international organisations, i.e. major conservation NGOs, bilateral and multilateral organisations, research institutes, think tanks and banks. More than 15 international organisations are also involved. A few Cameroonian NGOs are carrying out real REDD+ activities. As for government services, although MINFOF and MINEP would appear to be the natural leaders for REDD+, given their mandates, and thus should have the greatest involvement, the only source of action is MINEP's CMSE. In other words, the REDD+ process in Cameroon is officially entrusted to a MINEP subunit. This, combined with the lack of REDD+ institutions, explains the problem of horizontal and vertical coordination and the fact that international partners are carrying out REDD+ activities without real coordination and without the Cameroonian government taking ownership.

### 5.3 The FCPF R-PP consultation process

The REDD+ consultation process in Cameroon can be better understood by examining the observations and conclusions of the R-PIN external review team, drafted on 28 August 2008 and revised on 7 October 2008:

Thirty-four people were consulted, but the majority of these work for international agencies, even if some of them are of Cameroonian nationality. Only two people from MINFOF, the national forestry agency, were consulted. It is not clear if logging companies and/or timber exporters were consulted. Not enough local NGOs and civil society groups appear to have been involved.

Communities have not been involved in the gathering of the data although some of the forest communities (Baka and Bagyeli) have access to cyber tracker technologies that they are using to monitor deforestation, forest degradation and biodiversity in their respective territories. This might indicate that there is a communication disconnect between the national level and the local level which might eventually bring problems given that the projects will be done at the local level. ...

The IP reviewer stressed the urgency of including and building the capacity of pygmy populations. The government seems to have left this to the NGOs (local and international) .... The reviewer warned that a failure to include the pygmy communities early in REDD consultations and planning might result in extensive human rights violations during REDD implementation in their territories. (FCPF R-PIN, External Review Team)

This summary provides a realistic description of consultations with and participation of not only the target groups mentioned above but also the other parties involved in the process. It is not clear whether the government's attitude is based on a deliberate decision to wait for more details on the international architecture of REDD+ before committing to a comprehensive national process or whether it is simply a matter of institutional lethargy, as discussed previously. Clearly, neglecting to discuss REDD+ with the very people who will be essential to its future operation is tantamount

to postponing the matter altogether. Discussions can and should take place immediately, both to keep participating parties informed of the process underway and to obtain their opinions, which will be useful in preparing the national strategy. However, discussions with local and indigenous communities must be approached with care and clarity to avoid raising unrealistic expectations.

Some civil society organisations have consulted with grassroots communities, including the following 3 initiatives. The first of these was part of a 15-month project called 'Making REDD Work for the Congo Basin', designed by WRI and implemented in Cameroon by NESDA-CA. This project sought to build the capacity of a group of parliamentarians, NGO leaders, grassroots organisations and local and indigenous community leaders to understand the stakes of the mechanism being discussed and hear their opinions (Dkamela *et al.* 2009).

The second initiative was carried out by the CED. It focused more on creating awareness amongst the Baka and Bagyeli Pygmies and seeking their opinions. It also tried to establish dialogue between MINEP, MINFOF and these communities (CED and FPP 2010). The third initiative was part of the IUCN REDD project on poverty alleviation (Pro-poor REDD) (Akem Ango personal communication). Its goal was to prepare proposals on a consultation/participation mechanism for vulnerable population groups, especially women and pygmies, through the national REDD+ process.

However, these 3 NGO initiatives only comprise projects targeting certain groups in certain places. They are not nationwide and so will be useful only if a national institutional structure is established and capitalises on their results in a far-reaching consultation and participatory process.

## 5.4 Processes and future political options for REDD+

As this exploration of the context reveals, the position of REDD+ remains uncertain, making it difficult to decipher Cameroon's political options for the future. This study has looked at embryonic initiatives in the field to identify elements for assessing potential funding mechanisms, MRV approaches, benefit-sharing schemes, participatory approaches and the

policies and institutions that need to be established. This analysis draws both on incomplete, fragmentary data from these embryonic experiences (see Table 5.1) and on the official positions of Cameroon and the COMIFAC countries, which include Cameroon.

### 5.4.1 Activities proposed for REDD+

Many initiatives are in the planning and start-up phases, including biodiversity conservation, activities to support the livelihoods of community populations, integrated management of mining, forestry and hunting activities, artificial regeneration (afforestation and reforestation), development of participatory plans for land allocation, low-impact logging activities, protection against fire and straying cattle, and agroforestry. The scale of projects being proposed also varies, ranging from a small community forest of no more than 5000 ha to a transnational forest landscape of some 4 520 000 ha, via a medium-sized landscape of 870 000 ha. This array of activities fits in with the broad vision of REDD+ that is being supported by Cameroon and the other COMIFAC countries and includes deforestation and forest degradation, conservation, sustainable forest management and carbon stocks enhancement (Kasulu Seya Makonga *et al.* 2009). As some of these activities are not directly connected to carbon, should the project proponents be entitled to payment? Their proposals can be understood in the current context in which much remains to be learned and the activities that will be included in the final version of the mechanism have yet to be clearly defined.

### 5.4.2 Co-benefits

The diversity of activities described above shows that, theoretically at least, the projects have enormous potential for generating co-benefits. Biodiversity has been given a central role, especially in the very large-scale projects. Further, the implementation of such projects will protect habitat diversity and other ecosystem services. Considering the abundance of challenges and stakes related to biodiversity conservation and many other environmental services, the Ngoyla-Mintom landscape (870 000 ha) emerges as representative of the kinds of co-benefits that can be produced in Cameroon. The government's final decision on the use of this land will clearly reflect its intentions and indicate the role of co-benefits in the official vision of REDD+ in Cameroon.

Table 5.1 Potential REDD+ field activities in Cameroon

Type of activity envisaged and potential site	Potential lead organisations	MRV proposal	Funding mechanisms, proposed or discussed	Benefit sharing	Remarks
<p><b>Conservation concession</b> at Ngoyla-Mintom (Southeast Cameroon; 830 000 ha of primary forest), Proposal 1: Central protected area</p> <p>Sustainable use of buffer zone by the communities</p> <p>Institutional support and planning of long-term conservation</p> <p>Support for local institutions and establishing sustainable business</p>	Wildlife Works Carbon, San Francisco, CA, USA	?	Trust fund for protected area part Subsidies from donors Carbon market	?	Originally, Cameroon had decided that the 830 000 ha area would be divided into 9 logging concessions. The importance of the site for other services (esp. biodiversity conservation) triggered a debate on the options for using this frontier forest. It is difficult to impose and to find funding for the first approach that targets total conservation (Proposal 1). The second approach (Proposal 2) combines conservation and exploitation. It seems to be more popular and has been submitted to the EU GEF for funding.
<p><b>Conservation concession</b> at Ngoyla-Mintom (Southeast Cameroon), Proposal 2:</p> <p>Protected area with managed resources (IUCN, Category IV): 988 000 ha</p> <p>Core zone established and managed as an IUCN Category 1 protected area: 160 000 ha</p> <p>REDD+ component (capacity building for government services and support to communities for PES initiatives)</p> <p>Integrated management of forestry, mining and sport hunting</p> <p>Support to community initiatives (income-generating activities, etc.)</p>	GTZ WWF MINFOF and MINEP	?	Duplicable sustainable funding mechanism for the protected central area Subsidy (GEF, EU) Cameroon government contribution Carbon market	?	
<p><b>Tri-National de la Sangha:</b> Stabilisation of carbon emissions in forest landscape with multiple usage zones (Cameroon, Central African Republic and Congo; 4 520 000 ha)</p> <p>Activities supporting community livelihoods</p> <p>Integrated management of forestry, mining, professional hunting and conservation</p>	Fondation Tri-National de la Sangha	?	Sustainable funding mechanism Subsidies from donors (CBFF)	?	This project, with 2-year CBFF funding, apparently is not specifically a REDD+ project designed for carbon sales.

Type of activity envisaged and potential site	Potential lead organisations	MRV proposal	Funding mechanisms, proposed or discussed	Benefit sharing	Remarks
<p><b>Community forests:</b> payment for community ecosystem services (Nkolenyeng and Nomedjo, villages in South and East regions)</p> <p>Generate revenue to invest</p> <p>Diversify sources of livelihood</p> <p>Make communities and ecosystems more resistant</p> <p>Diversify sources of livelihood</p> <p>Capacity building</p> <p>Provide guidance and assistance to improve use of income</p>	Centre for the Environment and Development (CED)	Quantification of carbon and participatory determination of basic scenario Use of adapted Plan Vivo system	Subsidies from donors Voluntary market	Rules to be determined by the community after a feasibility study on the use of carbon revenue	Although this pioneer experience does not fit in with REDD+, it could inspire REDD+ projects in community forests. It would be interesting to learn more about the benefit-sharing mechanism being studied.
<p><b>Council forests:</b> REDD+ initiative in council forests. Conservation series</p> <p>Artificial (assisted) regeneration</p> <p>Low-impact logging techniques</p> <p>Protection against fire</p> <p>Protection against straying cattle</p> <p>Agroforestry</p>	Forest Stewardship Council (FSC) Association of Forest Councils of Cameroon (ACFCAM) Fédération Nationale des -Communes Forestières de France (FNCoFor) GTZ	?	Subsidy from French global environment facility (FFEM) Carbon market	?	The project is still in the pre-feasibility study stage. The question of sharing benefits is especially important and sensitive because of the conflict over the distribution of forest fees between the communities and the councils.
<p><b>Mount Cameroon:</b> Initiative to establish a REDD+ pilot project in a biodiversity-rich region subjected to numerous threats.</p> <p>Protection of Korup National Park (160 000 ha)</p> <p>Management of national park</p> <p>Monitoring REDD+ project</p> <p>Management of activities that cause leakage</p>	KfW Bankengruppe GFA ENVEST	?	Subsidies Carbon market	?	The project is still in the feasibility study stage.



Type of activity envisaged and potential site	Potential lead organisations	MRV proposal	Funding mechanisms, proposed or discussed	Benefit sharing	Remarks
<p><b>Takamanda Mone:</b> Initiative to establish a REDD+ pilot project in a landscape near Mount Cameroon. Evaluation, planning and implementation of REDD+ activities at landscape level</p> <p>Encourage local communities to maintain connections and protect the forests</p> <p>Community management of natural resources</p> <p>Strengthening protection of threatened habitats</p> <p>Capacity building for local actors</p>	WCS ?	?	Subsidies Carbon market	?	
<p><b>Mbam and Djerem:</b> Initiative to establish a REDD+ pilot project in a national park.</p> <p>Development of knowledge and tools needed to reduce deforestation and prevent leakage</p> <p>Strengthening biodiversity conservation in and around the national park</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Development of a participatory plan for land allocation</li> <li>- Capacity building and strengthening collaboration amongst government services participating in REDD implementation</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- WCS</li> <li>- MINEP</li> <li>- MINFOF</li> <li>- MINADER</li> <li>- MINEPIA</li> </ul>	?	Subsidies Carbon market	?	

Sources: <http://ngoylamintom.blogspot.com>; <http://news.mongabay.com>; <http://www.wildlifeworks.com>; <http://www.gfa-group.de>; [www.cbf-fund.org](http://www.cbf-fund.org); Beligné (2010), MINFOF and MINEP (2009), Nnah Ndobe (2009), Fotso *et al.* (2010), B. Tchikangwa personal communication, S. Nnah Ndobe personal communication.

The relatively high number of community-oriented activities reflects the determination on the part of project proponents to include and even prioritise development and poverty alleviation. This is reflected also in the position of the Congo Basin states that seek to use REDD+ and its implications as an essential, structuring, cross-cutting approach in their development strategies (COMIFAC 2009).

### 5.4.3 Possible sources of funding

At present, the preferred funding mechanism seems to be subsidies, which are supposed to be allocated as start-up funds in the overall context of REDD+ preparations. For conservation activities, especially in protected areas, sustainable financing through trust funds is systematically being sought. The Fondation Tri-National de la Sangha is a success story that is inspiring other initiatives. Clearly, these initiatives are targeting the carbon market as their final goal, but there is still a long way to go. No payments have yet been made for carbon, although the CED project on payments for community ecosystem services is in the process of becoming part of a voluntary market.

### 5.4.4 Possible MRV systems

For the time being, little or no information is being circulated on monitoring, reporting and verification (MRV) systems. This can be explained, no doubt, by the rudimentary level of related proposals, as well as by the general situation: public authorities do not seem to be giving any indications of what they want from MRV. The initiative on community payments for ecosystem services, which adapted a system designed by Plan Vivo based on community participation, is the only project carrying out MRV activities to qualify for a Plan Vivo certificate. On the whole, the enormous capacity deficit in MRV needs to be corrected by the development of a dedicated capacity-building plan.

### 5.4.5 Possible plans for sharing benefits

The early stages of field activities do not seem to include any concrete experience involving a benefit-sharing mechanism related to REDD+.

Certainly, it would be difficult to rely on such a sensitive issue given the lack of clarity in the contextual conditions. This said, however, Cameroon's experience during the past decade with the redistribution of forest and wildlife fees could be instructive for REDD+. The rules for a benefit-sharing mechanism have yet to be devised, and will depend both on international mechanisms still being negotiated and on rights, including forest carbon rights. The IUCN study (2009) suggests a sharing mechanism featuring a vertical dimension and a horizontal dimension. The vertical dimension encompasses sharing benefits amongst national levels and non-governmental stakeholders via regional governments and intermediaries down to the local level. Horizontal benefit-sharing distributes benefits amongst and within communities, households and other local-level stakeholders.

### 5.4.6 Potential mechanisms for actor participation

The only information on actor participation comes from Cameroon's R-PIN, which stresses the need for far-reaching consultations with all interested parties and with selected networks and groups. The R-PP translating these intentions into a detailed mechanism is not yet available. With proposals for field activities still in the embryonic stage, it is difficult to design detailed mechanisms for stakeholder participation. Nonetheless, lessons learned from activities carried out by a handful of NGOs to prepare communities and by the few groups of REDD+ participants, mentioned earlier, will be worth capitalising on, when the time comes.

### 5.4.7 New potential policies and institutions

REDD+ preparatory activities and REDD+ field projects (whether already designed or under discussion), indicate a need for the following new orientation policies and institutions.

A national REDD+ coordinating unit with strong leadership to coordinate the participation of the various actors and set out the main points of the REDD+ strategy. This is especially important

because of the difficulty project proponents experience in finding the appropriate ministry (MINEP or MINFOF) to endorse their projects and because of the troubling lack of interest on the part of certain ministries that will be playing an important role in the REDD+ process.

Forest- and climate-related policies that set out clear positions on undecided issues such as carbon rights and sectoral participation in the REDD+ mechanism.

Orientation policies on financial mechanisms to be approached and institutions that could channel funds to the various beneficiaries.

Continuation of decentralisation and clear definition of the various levels of project implementation.

#### **5.4.8 What can politicians learn from pilot projects?**

Cameroon is still waiting for the installation of its first REDD+ field project. Empirically, REDD+ raises more questions than answers. However, experiences with the new forest policy since 1993 have produced many lessons that could prove useful for REDD+, including the following: 1) to reduce deforestation and degradation, carefully target the drivers of these phenomena; 2) these drivers are usually trans-sectoral and require a policy that is not limited to the forestry sector alone, which means intersectoral coordination is a crucial principle; 3) the involvement of riparian forest populations guarantees success for this type of activity, which means that it is important to discuss the question of communities' rights to land and natural resources; and 4) it is necessary to ensure enforcement of any laws that are made.

These lessons and the many others emerging from the evaluation of the forest policy implementation during the past 15 years must be taken into account when preparing the R-PP.

# 6

## Evaluating Cameroon's REDD+ profile against the 3E+ criteria

### 6.1 Institutional context and governance

Considering the institutional and current governance context, what success factors or barriers condition the effectiveness of REDD+? One advantage that Cameroon has, which could facilitate the establishment of REDD+, is the existence of institutions that already have experience in forest management and could be enrolled and adapted. Theoretically, the separation between the ministry in charge of conservation and forest production (MINFOF) and the ministry in charge of controlling environmental standards (MINEP) makes sense: having an institution that specialises in the application of environmental standards increases the chances of this happening. In the context of REDD+, emissions reduction activities in both the DFP and the DFNP would automatically fall under the responsibility of MINFOF, whereas MINEP would most likely have a key role in MRV of emissions and absorption. In this adapted scenario, the MINFOF–MINEP relationship would be central to the development of both horizontal and vertical coordination.

However, as the contextual conditions details in this report reveal, in reality, forest-related institutions and governance are characterised by factors hampering the effective implementation of a REDD+ mechanism. Following is a brief summary of these.

There is insufficient national engagement with the REDD+ agenda because REDD+ remains an elitist mechanism discussed mainly by a group

of organisations with international stature, a few national NGOs and a handful of MINEP staff. Cameroonian society in general, local and indigenous communities in forest regions and councils have not really been exposed to REDD+. Moreover, the role of the private sector—especially the forestry industry, which is the main underlying cause of forest degradation—in this mechanism has not been discussed. Also worth mentioning, again with reference to the effectiveness of institutions and governance, is Cameroon's capacity to manage large volumes of funding. The under-consumption of various budgets and the difficulties in channelling funds to their correct destination in the forestry sector, and more generally the HIPC (highly indebted poor countries) fund, raises doubts about this capacity.

The effectiveness of REDD+ will depend heavily on policies related to the drivers of deforestation and forest degradation. Existing forest and environmental policies are listed in this report, along with a discussion of their weak implementation; the results of efforts to combat the drivers through these policies are uneven. In other words, the national REDD+ strategy will only have a chance of succeeding if it contributes to solving the problems of forest and environmental policy implementation. Other sectoral policies, e.g. on mining, agriculture and infrastructure, anticipate the conversion of large forest areas and lack adequate coordination and alignment, thus threatening forest cover and biodiversity. The effectiveness of REDD+ in Cameroon will depend on effective coordination and alignment of sectoral interventions in forestlands. Discussions

on alignment should be structured to focus on sustainable forest and environmental management.

Implementing REDD+ will require the adaptation of existing institutions and the creation of new ones. REDD+ will succeed only if existing institutions can be transformed and convinced to adopt a perspective based on emissions reduction and increased carbon stocks. In the Cameroonian context, 3 key needs indicate that enormous investment will be required to achieve this ideal: 1) needs connected to the transformation of existing institutions and the creation of new ones; 2) the need for a broad reinforcement programme to improve current levels of services and structures; and 3) the need to upskill the parties most concerned with REDD+ (followed by discussion of their positions). In the current situation, if a cost-benefit analysis fails to show that these investments could generate benefits for the parties involved, the viability of the REDD+ mechanism would be seriously compromised.

The question of equity in the context of existing Cameroonian institutions and governance has received little treatment, although the following issues emerge.

Although the Annual Forest Fee (AFF) distribution mechanism could provide a useful example for REDD+, the REDD+ benefit-sharing mechanism appears to be more complex and to require a special institutional design that would also be anchored in the overall financial plan—which has not yet been prepared.

The far-reaching administrative decentralisation process currently underway in Cameroon has not generated definitive answers to questions surrounding decentralised entities' authority and autonomy to participate in REDD+, especially at the subnational level. The process is progressing too slowly to suggest that the issue will be resolved soon. The question of successor rights to carbon credits also needs to be resolved.

Transparent mechanisms, such as awarding forest permits through calls for tender, independent observation of the permit issue process and forest controls, publication of forest titles and sanctions for violations, are good sources of inspiration for REDD+. On

the whole, however, Cameroon's notorious lack of accountability constitutes a major risk.

The current forest regime includes efforts to recognise community rights but voices from the forest claim show that these do not go far enough. The specific case of the hunter-gatherers requires appropriate, lasting, affirmative action.

The management of the AFF at the council and community levels has been very controversial because of large-scale misappropriation. It is important to consider the capacity of existing (and future) institutions to avoid embezzlement in the REDD+ context, where large financial flows can be expected.

Law enforcement, shown in this report to be weak, is essential to equity. The future REDD+ strategy will need to consider what resources are needed for law enforcement.

## 6.2 Resource tenure and property rights

Property tenure and rights to forestlands and resources relate mainly to questions of equity and effectiveness. As seen earlier, the question of equity comes up when looking at the state monopoly of lands and resources, and the reduction in the ancestral rights of local and indigenous communities. This underpins the permanent 'conflict of language' concerning forest resources and lands, fuelled by local stakeholders' need for access and enjoyment rights to these resources. This inequitable situation will prevent REDD+ from functioning smoothly. A long list of actors are behind deforestation and forest degradation and are therefore positioned as those whose efforts could reduce carbon emissions and enhance absorptions, and thus have the right to claim payment. The question of payment has not been considered in Cameroon because it is connected both to the implementation conditions of activities that merit compensation and to the criteria for identifying the heirs of carbon credits. According to an IUCN study (2009), a well-functioning benefit-sharing mechanism for REDD+ has the following 5 features: 1) it engages the right stakeholders; 2) it determines the right forms and levels of incentive measures;

3) it creates legitimate benefits management mechanisms; 4) it enforces effective transparency; and 5) it develops effective dispute settlement mechanisms.

### 6.3 Capacity for monitoring, reporting and verification

The effectiveness of an MRV mechanism depends on an underlying permanent emissions reduction capacity, clarification of reference levels, apprenticeship systems, feedback and leakage control mechanisms. At present, Cameroon has no clear response to these requirements. Therefore, an MRV system will have to be designed as part of the REDD+ national strategy before implementation.

What is Cameroon's capacity to reduce the costs of a potential MRV system? This report points to a certain amount of data that could be useful in developing a monitoring mechanism. Strong points have been identified at MINFOF (SIGIF (Système Informatique de Gestion de l'Information Forestière): forest concessions, production data, management plans, inventory of managed and unmanaged species, the interactive forest atlas, with various types of information, etc.), MINFI (PSRF (Programme de Sécurisation des Recettes Forestières): land tax, redistribution, etc.), MINEPAT (INS: micro- and macroeconomic data, development indicators, etc.) and MINADER (possibly data on crop-growing areas). Data generated by the REDD Cameroon Pilot Project and the ASB initiative on options for reducing emissions from all land uses (REALU) will also be helpful in constructing MRV systems. However, these positive factors should not mask the reality—national technical skills are weak and need to be upgraded, and the quality and quantity of human resources in the forestry sector are low. Cameroon does not have a national organisation capable of monitoring emissions and carbon absorption, although theoretically, when ONACC becomes operational, it should take on this responsibility. All this requires major investment. The question then arises as to whether the subsequent benefits will be large enough to convince stakeholders to continue their efforts.

### 6.4 REDD+ funding and cost-benefit options

The position of Cameroon and other COMIFAC countries on REDD+ financing holds that 3 mechanisms need to be created: 1) an enabling fund for capacity building and for establishing policies that reduce deforestation; 2) a stabilisation fund to protect and preserve carbon stocks in countries with low forest clearing rates; and, ultimately, 3) market mechanisms that index payments received for a country's performance. In proposals and in embryonic projects, most requests are for subsidies; this reveals a need for the 'fund approach' during the preparatory stage. The carbon market is the ultimate goal in the pilot project proposals. At present, there are too few tangible examples to be able to evaluate the funding mechanism against the 3E+ criteria. Two major questions are: 1) whether subsidies will be big enough to cover all the needs included in pilot project proposals; and 2) whether the development of a market mechanism (carbon market) will be delayed or jeopardised in the event of insufficient funding for the preparatory phase.

### 6.5 Participation and vertical coordination

At the present stage of REDD+ preparation, the question of participation is completely open because MINEP, which is responsible for the process, is having difficulty in fulfilling its leadership role. As explained in this report, the cast in the REDD+ arena is composed of: 1) about 15 organisations of international stature and bilateral organisations that share information about their plans and activities more or less amongst themselves; 2) a few Cameroonian civil society organisations that are subcontracted by the first group; and 3) a MINEP unit responsible for carrying out the REDD+ process. It is obvious—and is confirmed by the R-PIN—that most of the huge numbers of people working in the forestry sector have not yet become involved in the process: traditional swiddeners, hunter-gatherers, community forest managers, municipal councils, regional councils, the forestry industry with its national and foreign components, agroindustries, civil society organisations and many other stakeholders who have not yet entered the arena.

Experiences with vertical coordination in Cameroon, especially with regard to natural resources management, have not registered many success stories. In the context of REDD+, this has implications for the mechanism's effectiveness and equity. Ensuring participation and vertical coordination will be challenging and demanding, especially since some groups of participants, e.g. civil society organisations, find it difficult to reach agreement and present consensual positions. These requirements and difficulties again emphasise the importance of making the investments needed to obtain decisive results.

## 6.6 Horizontal coordination

The many examples presented and analysed in this report show what can rightly be dubbed 'the coordination tragedy' of institutions in Cameroon. This can be illustrated by the following 3 examples: 1) the ministries' reflex to keep a tight hold over their respective fields, i.e. each seeks full control over its own niche and they seldom work together; 2) the large number of mostly non-functioning inter- and intrasectoral coordination committees and structures; and 3) institutional instability characterised by changes in—or even the breakdown of—government structure through ministerial reorganisations that very often undermine coordination processes. REDD+ will require the alignment of sectoral policies; it will also require that decisions to take actions (at the central level) and to implement them (at the local delegates' level) are effectively coordinated not only in the forestry sector but also in other sectors such as environment, mining, agriculture and infrastructure. Coordination should also mean that the sectors are treated equitably regarding levels of intervention and the sharing of transaction costs. Finally, to be efficient, the national REDD+ strategy (design and implementation) must be aligned with other strategies connected to the UNFCCC, such as NAMAs and NAPAs. In other words, to ensure coherency and save resources, discussions on the formulation of the national REDD+ strategy should not be dissociated from the formulation of the NAMAs and the NAPAs.

## 6.7 Concluding remarks: The global REDD+ process from Cameroon's perspective

The REDD+ context described in this report and the analysis based on the 3E+ criteria point to a wide gap between the official discourse on climate change in general (and REDD+ in particular) and the inertia that characterises policy and strategy formulation and implementation. This fundamental disconnect raises the question of how high REDD+ really is on Cameroon's political agenda. One of the keys to understanding this disconnect resides in the notion of 'fragile states'. In other words, Cameroon is in the category of countries 'whose State bodies do not have the capacity and/or the political will to assume their core functions' (OECD/DAC 2006) in many sectors where public action is required. The numerous institutional problems and the endemic corruption that we describe in this report, which are characteristics of this category of countries, mean there is a need to address the question raised by Buba *et al.* (2010) about how to use REDD+ funds in a way that can have the greatest impact on public deforestation control policies in fragile states.

Any serious discussion on the implementation of REDD+ in states such as Cameroon, and in many other forest states considered to be 'fragile', must focus on the conditions required for these states to assimilate and appropriate the necessary reforms (Buba *et al.* 2010). This national context is a stubborn reality that affects the way the process is to be conducted at the global level. The question is whether, during the mad race seen at the UNFCCC level and in related mechanisms to push the REDD+ process onto the international scene, enough attention will be given to the inertia characterising a good number of countries. This inertia could compromise the emissions reduction objectives of the whole forestry sector. The stakes are high. One of the conditions of success for REDD+, so well expressed by Seymour and Angelsen (2009), is that the 'willingness to pay' at the international level must be matched by a 'willingness to play' at the national level. As the contextual conditions of Cameroon suggest, however, the national level does not really seem able to speak up and respond fast enough to international demands.

# Notes

1 The Office National de Régénération des Forêts (National Office for Forest Regeneration; ONAREF) and the Centre National de Développement des Forêts (National Centre for Forest Development; CENADEFOR) were merged in 1990 to form a single institution, the Office National de Développement des Forêts (National Office for Forest Development; ONADEF). ONADEF was replaced in 2002 by the Agence Nationale d'Appui au Développement Forestier (National Forestry Development Agency; ANAFOR).

2 See Decree No. 2002/155 of 18 June 2002 changing ONADEF's name to ANAFOR and Decree No. 2002/156 of 18 June 2002, which approves the ANAFOR statutes.

3 See in particular the following official decrees: Decree No. 2005/117 of 14 April 2005 to organise the Ministry of Environment and Nature Protection (MINEP); Decree No. 2005/099 of 6 April 2005 to organise the Ministry of Forests and Wildlife (MINFOF); Decree No. 2005/118 of 15 April 2005 to organise the Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development (MINADER); Decree No. 2008/220 of 4 July 2008 to organise the Ministry of Economic Planning and Regional Development (MINEPAT); Decree No. 2005/330 of 6 September 2005 to organise the Ministry of Public Works (MINTP); Decree No. 2005/190 of 3 June 2005 to organise the Ministry of Urban Development and Housing (MINDUH).

4 Decree No. 2009/410 of 10 December 2009 on the creation, organisation and functioning of the National Observatory on Climate Change.

5 See Decree No. 2001/100 of 20 April 2001 on the creation, organisation and functioning of the National Institute of Statistics. See the website: <http://www.statistics-cameroon.org/>.

6 See <http://www.un.org/esa/forests/documents-unff.html#org>.

7 Component 1: Regulation and environment information management; Component 2: Production forest management; Component 3: Protected area and wildlife management; Component 4: Community forest resources management; Component 5: Institutional strengthening, training and research.

8 <http://www.laga-enforcement.org/>.

9 See Decision No. 0944/D/MINEF/DF of 30 July 1999 to terminate timber recovery and extraction permits and personal logging permits and authorisations, and Decision No. 0124/D/MINFOF/SG/SDAFF/SAG of 16 March 2006 to reinstate authorisation for the allocation of these permits.

10 See <http://www.globalwitness.org/pages/fr/cameroon.html> and <http://www.observation-cameroon.info/documents>.

11 Law No. 96/06 of 18 January 1996 to amend the Constitution of 2 June 1972.



12 See the following laws: Law No. 2004/017 of 22 July 2004 on the orientation of decentralisation; Law No. 2004/018 of 22 July 2004 laying down rules applicable to councils; Law No. 2004/019 of 22 July 2004 laying down rules applicable to regions.

13 See the following 9 decrees: Decree No. 2010/0239/PM of 26 February 2010 instituting conditions for exercising certain activities transferred from the State to the councils concerning the supply of potable water in zones not covered by the public water distribution network conceded by the State; Decree No. 2010/0240/PM of 26 February 2010 instituting conditions for exercising certain activities transferred from the State to the council concerning the creation and maintenance of ungazetted rural roads and the construction and management of ferryboats; Decree No. 2010/0241/PM of 26 February 2010 instituting conditions for exercising certain activities transferred from the State to the councils concerning the maintenance and management of women's and family development centres; Decree No. 2010/0242/PM of 26 February 2010 instituting conditions for exercising certain activities transferred from the State to the councils relating to the promotion of agricultural production and rural development; Decree No. 2010/0243/PM of 26 February 2010 instituting conditions for exercising certain activities transferred from the State to the councils relating to aid and assistance for indigents and people in need; Decree No. 2010/0244/PM of 26 February 2010 instituting conditions for exercising certain activities transferred from the State to the councils relating to the promotion of pastoral and piscicultural production; Decree No. 2010/0245/PM of 26 February 2010 instituting conditions for exercising certain cultural activities transferred from the State to the Councils; Decree No. 2010/0246/PM of 26 February 2010 instituting conditions for exercising certain activities transferred from the State to the Councils relating to public health; Decree No. 2010/0247/PM of 26 February 2010 instituting conditions for exercising certain activities transferred from the State to the councils relating to basic education.

14 See website of the Presidency of the Republic of Cameroon. [http://www.prc.cm/index\\_fr.php?link=dossiers/decentralisation\\_au\\_cameroun](http://www.prc.cm/index_fr.php?link=dossiers/decentralisation_au_cameroun)

15 Circular No. 370/LC/MINEF/CAB of 22 February 1996 instituting a parafiscal tax of 1000

FCFA per cubic metre of wood leaving the logging site to be paid to riparian communities.

16 See Decree No. 2005/118 of 15 April 2005 to organise the Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development.

17 See Joint Order No. 00122/MINEFI/MINAT of 29 April 1998 instituting conditions for the disbursement of revenue from forest operations intended for riparian village communities.

18 Service Note No. 0144/NS/MINFOF/SG/DFAP/SDVEF of 6 March 2007 giving instructions on the collection of wildlife taxes and the compilation of statistics on wildlife offtake.

19 Joint Order No. 0520/MINATD/MINFI/MINFOF of 3 June 2010 setting out conditions of employment, monitoring and management of revenue from the exploitation of forests and wildlife intended for riparian village councils and communities.

20 United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples adopted by UN General Assembly Resolution A/RES/61/295 of 13 September 2007.

21 ILO Convention on Indigenous and Tribal Peoples, 1989, No. 169.

22 Decree No. 2005/160 of 25 May 2005 to organise the Ministry of Social Affairs.

23 See the speech by the Minister of Social Affairs of Cameroon at the opening of the regional workshop on the rights of indigenous peoples in Central Africa, 15 April 2009.

24 See Operational Policy 4.10 on Indigenous People.

25 See in particular Article 17 of Ordinance No. 74/1 of 6 July 1974 laying down the land tenure system.

26 Law No. 98/005 of 14 April 1998 promulgating the water regime.

27 Law No. 001 of 26 April 2001 to lay down the Mining Code.

28 See First National Mining Forum (Yaoundé, Cameroon, 27–28 May 2009) and the National Forum on the Integrated Management of Forest and Mining Resources (Yaoundé, Cameroon, 16–17 July 2009).

29 Explorations in the southern Cameroonian forest area identified the following resources in the

following regions: nickel, cobalt and manganese in Lomié, iron in Mbalam, diamond in Mobilong, uranium in Lolodorf, iron in Kribi, gold in Batouri, iron and gold in Djoum, limestone in Mintom and dolorite in Ebolowa (Matip 2009).

30 During the construction of the Chad–Cameroon oil pipeline, the Deng Deng forest reserve was identified as a site that might need protection. The oil consortium was obliged to change the routing of the pipeline to avoid damaging the reserve and to comply with the environmental standards of the World Bank, the project partner. The current problem is the construction of the dam: it will

destroy the Deng Deng forest reserve and dam waters will submerge part of the oil pipeline (Nguiffo 2009). This situation creates some doubt about the level of the Cameroon government's commitments, especially to environmental protection.

31 Good examples are the National Advisory Commission on Environment and Sustainable Development and the Interministerial Committee on the Environment.

32 Decision No. 003/MINEP/CB of 16 January 2006 to create the National CDM Committee.

# References

## 1. Publications and reports

- Abe Eyebe, S. 2009 Développement d'une méthodologie pour la sélection des représentants des peuples autochtones. Network for Environment and Sustainable Development in Central Africa, Yaoundé, Cameroon.
- Abega, S.C. 2004 La société civile camerounaise et la malédiction de la belle au bois dormant. *Terroirs* 1(2): 9–25.
- Abt, V. Carret, R. Eba'a Atyi R. and Mengin-Lecreulx, P. 2002 Étude en vue de la définition d'une politique sectorielle de transformation et de valorisation du bois. CERNA-ONF International and ERE Développement. Centre d'Économie Industrielle de l'École des Mine de Paris.
- African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights (ACHPR) and International Work Group for Indigenous Affairs (IWGIA). 2005 Report of the working group on indigenous populations and communities of the African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights, Banjul, Gambia.
- Agir ici et Survie. 2000 Le silence de la forêt: réseaux, mafias et filière bois au Cameroun. Dossiers noirs 14. L'Harmattan, Paris.
- Akwah Neba, G., Nlom, J.H., Assako, J.-P., Tekem Tessa S. and Engolo, G. A. 2007 Analyse de l'économie politique des dynamiques pauvreté-environnement dans la zone Campo-Ma'an: rapport de l'étude socioéconomique. Research report. WWF Kudu Zombo, Yaoundé, Cameroon.
- Angelsen, A. and Wertz-Kanounnikoff, S. 2009 What are the key issues for REDD and criteria for assessing options. *In*: Angelsen A. (ed.), *Moving ahead with REDD : issues, options and implications*, 11–21. Center for International Forestry Research, Bogor, Indonesia.
- Angelsen, A., Brown, S., Loisel, C., Peskett, L., Streck, C. and Zarin, D. 2009 Réduire les émissions liées à la déforestation et à la dégradation de la forêt: un rapport d'évaluation de choix. Meridian Institute and Norwegian Government, Washington, DC.
- Assembe Mvondo, S. 2006a Conformité et application des lois environnementales: étude des zones d'intérêt cynégétique à gestion communautaire, Cameroun. *Africa* 61(2): 238–250.
- Assembe Mvondo, S. 2006b Decentralized forest resources and access of minorities to environmental justice: an analysis of the case of the Baka in southern Cameroon. *International Journal of Environmental Studies* 63(5): 681–689.
- Assembe Mvondo, S. 2006c Dynamiques de gestion transfrontalière des forêts du bassin du Congo: une analyse du traité relatif à la conservation et la gestion des écosystèmes forestiers d'Afrique centrale. *Journal du Droit de l'Environnement et du Développement* 2(1): 108–117.
- Avana Tientcheu, M.L. 2009 Synthèse nationale sur la problématique, les réponses et les enjeux de la désertification couplée aux changements climatiques au Cameroun. Consultation report., Network for Environment and Sustainable Development in Central Africa, Yaoundé, Cameroon.
- Bahuchet, S. and de Maret, P. (eds) 2000 Les peuples des forêts tropicales aujourd'hui. Volume III: Région Afrique Centrale. APFT-ULB, Brussels, Belgium.

- Balandier, G. 2001 *Le grand système*. Fayard, Paris.
- Beligné, V. 2009 Situation de la mise en œuvre au Cameroun du mécanisme de développement propre du Protocole de Kyoto. Summary documents distributed at the CCPM. Yaoundé, Cameroon, 22 May 2009.
- Beligné, V. 2010 Forêt communale et REDD+. Presentation at the community REDD+ workshop. Yaoundé, Cameroon, 7 April 2010.
- Bendoma, M. 2009 Note sur la perception des entreprises du climat des affaires et des investissements au Cameroun entre 2006 et 2008. *In*: Eboussi Boulaga, F. (ed.) *L'état du Cameroun 2008*, 231–239. Editions Terroirs, Yaoundé, Cameroon.
- Benhin, J.K.A and Barbier, E.B. 1999 A case study analysis of the effect of structural adjustment on agriculture and forest cover in Cameroon. Center for International Forestry Research/ Central African Regional Program for the Environment, Environment Department, University of York, UK.
- Bigombe Logo, P. 2003 The decentralized forestry taxation system in Cameroon: local management and state logic. Environmental Governance in Africa Working Paper No. 10. World Resources Institute, Washington, DC.
- Bigombe Logo, P. and Nkoum-Me-Ntseny, L.M.M. 1998 Vers la décentralisation de la gestion forestière au Cameroun? Dynamiques de contestation de l'état forestier et de la construction de la gestion participative des ressources forestières. *Bulletin Arbres, Forêts et Communautés Rurales* 15/16: 6–19.
- Bigombe Logo, P., Nkoumbele F.N. and Ngima Mawoung, G. 2006 La création des chefferies de troisième degré Pygmée au Cameroun: faisabilité politique et juridique et contraintes sociologiques. *In*: Abega, S.C. and Bigombe Logo, P. (eds.) *La marginalisation des Pygmées d'Afrique Centrale*, 225–233. Afrédit, Yaoundé, Cameroon.
- Bonis Charanle, J.M. 1997 Diagnostic des ONG de l'Afrique Centrale: cas du Cameroun, du Congo, du Gabon, et de la République Centrafricaine. Biodiversity Support Program/ United States Agency for International Development, Washington, DC.
- Brown K. and Ekoko, F. 2001 Forest encounters: synergy among agents of forest change in Southern Cameroon. *Society and Natural Resources* 14(4): 269–290.
- Buba, J., Karsenty, A., Ongolo S. and Bassaler, N. 2010 La lutte contre la déforestation dans les états fragiles: une vision renouvelée de l'aide au développement. La note de veille, No. 180. Centre for Environment and Development (CED) and Forest Peoples Project (FPP). 2010 Atelier de la société civile et la contribution des peuples autochtones de la forêt dans les politiques et processus du REDD, Yaoundé, Cameroon, 30 June –1 July 2010.
- Centre de Recherche et d'Action pour le Développement Durable and Initiative de Gouvernance Citoyenne 2008 Projet d'appui à la révision de la réglementation relative à la gestion des revenus financiers provenant de l'exploitation forestière et faunique et destinés aux communautés villageoises riveraines. Final report. Central African Regional Program for the Environment/International Union for the Conservation of Nature, Yaoundé, Cameroon.
- Cerutti, P.O. and Lescuyer G., with Robiglio V., Essiane Mendoula E., Ondoua J.P., Nguiebouri J., Assembe Mvondo S., Nasi, R. and Tacconi L. 2010 Le marché domestique du sciage artisanal au Cameroun: état des lieux, opportunités et défis. Draft research report. Center for International Forestry Research (CIFOR), Yaoundé, Cameroon.
- Cerutti, P.O. and Tacconi, L. 2006 Forests, illegality and livelihoods in Cameroon. Working paper 35. Center for International Forestry Research, Bogor, Indonesia.
- Cerutti, P.O., Nasi, R. and Tacconi, L. 2008 Sustainable forest management in Cameroon needs more than approved forest management plans. *Ecology and Society* 13(2): 36.
- Cameroon Oil Transportation Company 1999. Plan de gestion de l'environnement, vol. 4: Plan pour les Peuples Autochtones Vulnérables (PPAV). May 1999.
- Cuny, P., Abéèle, P., Eboule Singa, N., Eyene Essomba A. and Djeukam, R. 2004 État des lieux de la foresterie communautaire au Cameroun. Department for International Development, Yaoundé, Cameroon.
- Dasse, P. 2001 La mise en œuvre du droit international de l'environnement dans le secteur 'marin et littoral' du Cameroun. *In*: Prieur M. (ed.) *La mise en œuvre nationale du droit international de l'environnement dans les pays francophones*. Actes des troisièmes journées scientifiques du réseau 'Droit de

- l'environnement' de l'AUF, 131–153. Presses de l'Université de Limoges, Limoges, France.
- De Wasseige C., Devers D., de Mercken P., Eba'a Atyi R., Nasi R and Mayaux P. (eds.) 2009 Les forêts du Bassin du Congo: état des forêts 2008. EU Publications Office, Brussels, Belgium.
- DeFries, R.S., Rudel, T., Uriarte, M. and Hansen M. 2010 Deforestation driven by urban population growth and agricultural trade in the twenty-first century. *Nature Geoscience* 3: 178–181.
- Devers, D. and Vande Weghe, J.P. (eds.) 2007 Les forêts du Bassin du Congo: état des forêts 2006. Partenariat sur les Forêts du Bassin du Congo.
- Diaw, M.C. 1997 Si, Nda Bot and Ayong: shifting cultivation, land use and property rights in Southern Cameroon. Rural Development Forestry Network Paper 21e. Overseas Development Institute, London.
- Diaw M.C. and Njomkap, J.C.S. 1999 La terre et le droit. Une anthropologie institutionnelle de la tenure coutumière, de la jurisprudence et du droit foncier chez les peuples bantou et pygmées du Cameroun forestier méridional forestier. Work document. Inades-Formation, Yaoundé, Cameroon.
- Dkamela, G.P. 2001 Les institutions communautaires de gestion des produits forestiers non-ligneux dans les villages périphériques de la Réserve de Biosphère du Dja, Tropenbos-Cameroon Document 7. The Tropenbos-Cameroon Programme, Kribi, Cameroon.
- Dkamela G.P. 2003 Associations, argent et exercice du pouvoir chez les Pygmées Baka de la région de Lomié (Est-Cameroun). Étude en vue d'une recherche des formes appropriées d'action collective. Research report. Inades-Formation, Yaoundé, Cameroon.
- Dkamela, G.P. 2004 Les Pygmées Bagyéli face au pétrole. *Ikewan*, 52: 13-15.
- Dkamela, G.P. 2007 Le complexe pauvreté/ressources naturelles dans l'UTO Campo-Ma'an: revue analytique de la littérature anthropologique, sociopolitique et économique en vue de l'orientation des options d'intervention du programme WWF Kudu-Zombo. Research report. WWF Kudu Zombo, Yaoundé, Cameroon.
- Dkamela, G.P., Kabamba Mbambu, F., Austin, K., Minnemeyer, S. and Stolle, F. 2009 Voices from the Congo Basin: incorporating perspectives of local stakeholders for improved REDD design. WRI Working Paper. World Resources Institute, Washington, DC.
- Duveiller G., Defourny, P., Desclee B. and Mayaux, P. 2008 Deforestation in Central Africa: estimate at regional, national and landscapes levels by advanced processing of systematically distributed Landsat extracts. *Remote Sensing of Environment* 112(5): 1969–1981.
- Eba'a Atyi, R. 1998 Cameroon's logging industry: structure, economic importance and effects of devaluation. Occasional Paper No. 14. Center for International Forestry Research, Bogor, Indonesia.
- Eboussi Boulaga, F. 2009 Constitution et décentralisation. *In: Eboussi Boulaga, F. (ed.) L'état du Cameroun 2008*, 37–53. Editions Terroirs, Yaoundé, Cameroon.
- Ekoko, F. 1997 The political economy of the 1994 Cameroon forestry law. CIFOR Working Paper No. 4. Center for International Forestry Research, Bogor, Indonesia.
- Enviro-Protect 1997 Illegal logging and timber trade in Cameroon: background and consequences. Enviro-Protect, Yaoundé, Cameroon.
- Essama-Nssah, B. and Gockowski, J.J. 2000 Forest sector development in a difficult political economy: an evaluation of Cameroon's forest development and World Bank assistance. World Bank, Washington, DC.
- Ezzine de Blas, D. and Ruiz Perez, M. 2008 Prospects for reduced impact logging in Central African logging concessions. *Forest Ecology and Management* 256: 1509–1516.
- Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) 2006 Global forest resources assessment 2005: progress towards sustainable forest management. Food and Agriculture Organization, Rome.
- Forest Carbon Partnership Facility (FCPF) 2008 Cameroon R-PIN: Consolidated Technical Advisory Panel review. World Bank, Washington, DC.
- Forest Carbon Partnership Facility (FCPF) 2009 Forest Carbon Partnership Facility (FCPF) Readiness Preparation Proposal (R-PP) template.
- Fomete Nembot, T. and Tchanou, Z. 1998 La gestion des écosystèmes forestiers du Cameroun à l'aube de l'an 2000, Volume 1. International Union for the Conservation of Nature/Conference on Moist Forest Ecosystems of Central Africa, Yaoundé, Cameroon.

- Forest Monitor 2001 La forêt prise en otage. La nécessité de contrôler les sociétés forestières transnationale: une étude européenne. Forest Monitor, Cambridge, UK.
- Fotso, R., Nicholas, A. Fosso, B. Burren C. and Stevens, T. 2010 Les processus REDD+. Presentation at discussions with government of Cameroon. Wildlife Conservation Society Cameroon, Yaoundé, Cameroon.
- Gaston, G., Brown, S., Lorenzini M. and Singh, K.D. 1998 State and change in carbon pools in the forests of tropical Africa. *Global Change Biology* 4: 97–114.
- Gerber, J.-F. 2008 Résistances contre deux géants industriels en forêt tropicale: Populations locales versus plantations commerciales d'hévéas et de palmiers à huile dans le Sud-Cameroun. Mouvement Mondial pour les Forêts Tropicales, Montevideo, Uruguay.
- Gibbs, H.K., Brown, S., Niles, J.O. and Foley, J.A. 2007 Monitoring and estimating tropical forest carbon stocks: making REDD a reality. *Environmental Research Letters* 2: 045023. <http://iopscience.iop.org/1748-9326/2/4/045023/> (22 November 2010).
- Global Witness 2009 Building confidence in REDD: monitoring beyond carbon. Global Witness, London and Washington, DC.
- Gockowski, J., Tonye, J., Baker, D., Weise, S., Ndoumbe, M., Tiki-Manga, T. and Fouaguegue, A. 1998 Characterization and diagnosis of farming systems in the ASB forest margins benchmark of Southern Cameroon. International Institute of Tropical Agriculture, Yaoundé, Cameroon.
- Greenpeace 2005 Illegal logging in Cameroon: how French government action is fuelling rainforest destruction. Forest crime file. Greenpeace International, Amsterdam, The Netherlands.
- Groupe International Consultatif (GIC) 2008 Rapport de mission au Cameroun, du 20 au 26 juin 2008. Projet d'Exploitation Pétrolière et d'Oléoduc Tchad-Cameroun.
- Hédon, L. 1930 Étude sur la forêt et les bois du Cameroun sous mandat français. Librairie Larose, Paris.
- Ickowitz, A. 2006 Shifting cultivation and deforestation in tropical Africa: critical reflections. *Development and Change* 37(3): 599–626.
- Institutions et Developpement (I&D) 2000 Bilan diagnostic secteur forestier camerounais, Mission revue institutionnelle du secteur forestier. Work document. Ministry of Environment and Forests, Yaoundé, Cameroon.
- International Labour Organization (ILO), Ministry of Social Affairs (MINAS) and Ministry of Planning and Regional Development (MINEPAT) 2008 Document de synthèse des préoccupations des peuples autochtones (populations vulnérables 'pygmées' et Mbororo) formulées par leurs représentants en vue de leur intégration dans le DSRP II. Ebolowa, Cameroon, 10–12 April 2008.
- Ingram, I. and de Baan, P. 2005 Forest Governance Facility: introducing a multi-stakeholder approach in Cameroon's forest and environment sector. Netherlands Development Organisation/Department for International Development, Yaoundé, Cameroon.
- International Union for the Conservation of Nature (IUCN) 2009 REDD-plus et partage des avantages: expériences en conservation forestière et en d'autres secteurs de gestion des ressources. International Union for the Conservation of Nature US Multilateral Office, Washington, DC.
- International Union for the Conservation of Nature Programme de l'IUCN Afrique Centrale et Occidentale (IUCN-PACO) and Center for International Forestry Research 2009 Study on impacts of artisanal gold and diamond mining on livelihoods and the environment in the Sangha Tri-National Park (TNS) landscape. Presentation of the national forum on integrated management of forest and mining resources. Yaoundé, Cameroon, 16–17 July 2009.
- International Union for the Conservation of Nature Regional Office for Central Africa (IUCN-ROCA) 2007 Rapport de l'application de la boîte à outil pauvreté/forêts du PROFOR dans deux villages du Sud-est Cameroun. Yaoundé, Cameroon.
- Irawan, S. and Tacconi, L. 2009 Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation (REDD) and decentralized forest management. *International Forestry Review* 11(4): 427–438.
- Jackson, J.E. and Warren, K.B. 2005 Indigenous movements in Latin America, 1992–2004: controversies, ironies, new directions. *Annual Review of Anthropology* 34: 549–573.
- Jagger, P., Atmadja, S., Pattanayak, S.K, Sills, E. and Sunderlin, W.D. 2009 Learning while doing: evaluating impacts of REDD+ projects. *In*: Angelsen, A. (ed.) *Realising REDD+: national*

- strategy and policy options, 283–292. Center for International Forestry Research, Bogor, Indonesia.
- Joiris, D.V. and Tchikangwa, B. 1995 Systèmes foncier et socio-politique des populations de la Réserve du Dja. Approche anthropologique pour une gestion en collaboration avec les villages. Research report. Conservation et utilisation rationnelle des Ecosystèmes Forestiers d'Afrique Centrale/AGRECO/CTFT, Yaoundé, Cameroon.
- Kamto, M. 2001 Rapport introductif général. *In*: Prieur M. (ed.) La mise en œuvre nationale du droit international de l'environnement dans les pays francophones. Actes des troisièmes journées scientifiques du Réseau 'Droit de l'environnement' de l'AUF, 9–41. Presses de l'Université de Limoges, Limoges, France.
- Karsenty, A., Roda, J.-M. Milol, A. and Fochivé, E. 2006 Audit économique et financier du secteur forestier au Cameroun. Ministry of Economy and Finance/Centre de coopération internationale en recherche agronomique pour le développement, Yaoundé, Cameroon.
- Kasulu Seya Makonga, V., Amougou J.A. and Hamel, O. 2009 Les pays du Bassin du Congo dans le processus de réduction des émissions liées à la déforestation et à la dégradation des forêts (REDD). *In*: de Wasseige C., Devers D., de Merken P., Eba'a Atyi R., Nasi R and Mayaux P. (eds.) 2009 Les forêts du Bassin du Congo: état des forêts 2008, 179–198. EU Publications Office, Brussels, Belgium.
- Kotto-Same, J.P., Woomer, M. Appolinaire M. and Zafack, L. 1997 Carbon dynamics in slash and burn agriculture and land use alternatives of the humid forest zone in Cameroon. *Agriculture, Ecosystems and Environment* 65: 245–256.
- Lescuyer, G., Ngoumou Mbarga H. and Bigombe Logo, P. 2008 Use and misuse of forest income by rural communities in Cameroon. *Forests, Trees and Livelihoods* 18: 291–304.
- Lumet, F., Forni, E, Laurent D. and Maitre, H. F. 1993 Étude des modalités d'exploitation du bois en liaison avec une gestion durable des forêts tropicales humides. Quatrième étude de cas: Cameroun. Centre de coopération internationale en recherche agronomique pour le développement, Nogent-sur-Marne, France.
- Matip, O. 2009 Secteur minier camerounais: potentiel et perspectives. Presentation First Mining Forum. Yaoundé, Cameroon, 27–28 May 2009.
- Mertens, B and Lambin, E.F. 2000 Land-cover change trajectories in Southern Cameroon. *Annals of the Association of the American Geographers* 93(3): 467–494.
- Mertens, B., Matthew S., Nsoyuni L.A., Neba Shu G. and Minnemeyer S. 2007 Atlas forestier interactif du Cameroun (version 2.0): document de synthèse. World Resources Institute, Washington, DC.
- Mertens, B., Sunderlin, W., Ndoye O. and Lambin, E.F. 2000 Impact of macroeconomic change on deforestation in South Cameroon: integration of a household survey and remotely-sensed data. *World Development* 28(6): 983–999.
- Milol, A. and Pierre, J.M. 2000 Impact de la fiscalité décentralisée sur le développement local et les pratiques d'utilisation des ressources forestières au Cameroun. Volet additionnel de l'audit économique et financier du secteur forestier. Centre de coopération internationale en recherche agronomique pour le développement, Ministry of Economy and Finance, Yaoundé, Cameroon.
- Ministry of Environment and Forests (MINEF) and Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) 2007 Evaluation des ressources forestières nationales du Cameroun 2003–2004. Yaoundé, Cameroon.
- Ministry of Environment and Forests (MINEF) 2005 Communication initiale du Cameroun sur le climat. Ministry of Environment and Forests, Yaoundé, Cameroon.
- Ministry of Environment and Nature Protection (MINEP) 1998 Cameroon's Readiness Plan Idea Note (R-PIN). Forest Carbon Partnership Facility.
- Ministry of Forests and Wildlife (MINFOF) and Ministry of Environment and Nature Protection (MINEP) 2009 CBSP: conservation and sustainable use of the Ngoyla-Mintom Forest. GEF Project Identification Form.
- Ministry of Forests and Wildlife (MINFOF) 2005 Communiqué final. Séminaire sur les dix années de gestion forestière et faunique au Cameroun (1995–2005). Yaoundé, Cameroon, 25–28 April 2005.
- Ministry of Forests and Wildlife (MINFOF) 2007 Aide mémoire de la mission conjointe de suivi du Programme sectoriel Forêts et environnement (PSFE). Yaoundé, Cameroon, 18–22 June 2007.

- Ministry of Forests and Wildlife (MINFOF) 2008 Indicateurs FORAF pour le suivi de l'état des forêts d'Afrique centrale. Ministry of Forests and Wildlife, Yaoundé, Cameroon.
- Ministry of Forests and Wildlife (MINFOF) 2009b Rapport de rendement du PSFE: une vue d'ensemble sur le niveau d'atteinte des résultats du programme au 31 décembre 2008. Ministry of Forests and Wildlife, Yaoundé, Cameroon.
- Morrison, K., Cerutti P. O. and Oyono, P.R. 2009 Broken promises: forest revenue sharing in Cameroon. WRI Forest Note. World Resources Institute, Washington, DC.
- Nchunu Sama, J. and Bih Tawah, E. 2009 Case study: Cameroon. *In*: Costenbader, J. (ed.) Legal frameworks for REDD. Design and implementation at the national level, 139–150. International Union for the Conservation of Nature, Gland, Switzerland.
- Ndjanyou, L. and Majerowicz, C.H. 2004 Actualisation de l'audit de la fiscalité décentralisée du secteur forestier Camerounais. Institutions et Développement and World Bank, Yaoundé, Cameroon.
- Ndoye, O. and Kaimowitz, D. 2000 Macro-economics, markets and the humid forests of Cameroon, 1967–1997. *The Journal of Modern African Studies* 38(2): 225–253.
- Nelson, J. and Tchoumba, B. 2004 Environmental offsets, indigenous rights, and Chad-Cameroon Pipeline: Bagyeli document their land use around Campo Ma'an National Park. *Terroirs* 1(2): 159–169.
- Ngniado A. 2009 Gestion des ressources forestières et minières au Sud-Est du Cameroun: impacts et conflits potentiels. Presentation at the National Forum on the Integrated Management of Forest and Mining Resources. Yaoundé, Cameroon, 16–17 July 2009.
- Ngoufo, R., Tessa B. and Tchala, S. 2007 Étude environnementale stratégique des activités agro-industrielles de GMG HEVECAM s.a. en périphérie du Parc National de Campo-Ma'an, Rapport d'étude. World Wide Fund for Nature/ Cameroon Environmental Watch, Yaoundé, Cameroon.
- Nguiffo, S. 2001 Propos sur la gestion neopatrimoniale du secteur forestier au Cameroun. *In*: Forest Monitor, La forêt prise en otage. La nécessité de contrôler les sociétés forestières transnationale: une étude européenne, 14. Forest Monitor, Cambridge, UK.
- Nguiffo, S. 2004 La réforme de la législation forestière a-t-elle amélioré la transparence? *Terroirs* (1)2: 191–202
- Nguiffo, S. 2009 La gestion des ressources naturelles. *In*: Eboussi Boulaga, F. (ed.) L'état du Cameroun 2008, 243–255. Editions Terroirs, Yaoundé, Cameroon.
- Nguiffo, S. and Djeukam, R. 2008 Using law as a tool to secure the land rights of indigenous communities in Southern Cameroon. *In*: Cotula, L. and Mathieu, P. (eds.) Legal empowerment in practice: using legal tools to secure land rights in Africa. International Institute for Environment and Development, London.
- Nguiffo S. and Nguelpjoug, D. 2009 Mines et forêts et droits: bref aperçu des chevauchements. Presentation at the National Forum on the Integrated Management of Forest and Mining Resources. Yaoundé, Cameroon, 16–17 July 2009.
- Nguiffo, S., Kenfack P.E. and Mballa, N. 2009 Les droits fonciers et les peuples des forêts d'Afrique: perspectives historiques, juridiques et anthropologiques, Vol 2: Cameroun. Forest Peoples Programme, Moreton-in-Marsh, UK.
- Nicoll, M. and Tchikangwa, B. 2009 Mining, oil and the environment in Madagascar with perspectives for Cameroon. Communication au premier forum minier national. Yaoundé, Cameroon, 27–28 May 2009.
- Nnah Ndobe, S. 2009 Community payments for ecosystem services (PES). Communication at the Second Forest Day Central Africa. Yaoundé, Cameroon, 10 November 2009.
- Nolte, C., Kotto-Same, J., Moukam, A., Thenkabail, P.S., Weise, S.F. and Zapfack, L. 2001 Land use characterization and estimation of carbon stock in the alternative to slash and burn benchmark area in Cameroon. Resource and crops management research monograph no. 28. International Institute of Tropical Agriculture, Ibadan, Nigeria.
- Ntep Gweth, P. 2009 Le CAPAM, un programme intégré bâti autour de la valorisation des ressources minérales avec le soutien du fonds PPTTE. Presentation at the First National Mining Forum. Yaoundé, Cameroon, 27–28 May 2009.
- Nzoyem, N., Sambo M. and Majerowicz, C.H. 2003 Audit de la fiscalité décentralisée du secteur forestier camerounaise. Institutions et Développement, Yaoundé, Cameroon.



- Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development – Development Assistance Committee (OECD/DAC) 2006 Whole-of-government approach in fragile states. Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, Paris.
- Otayek, R., Ayee, J., Boukougou, J.-D., Catusse, M., Eboko, F., Idrissi Janati M. and Toulabor, C. 2004 Les sociétés civiles du Sud. Un état des lieux dans trois pays de la ZSP: Cameroun, Ghana, Maroc. Ministère des Affaires Etrangères, Paris.
- Oyono, P.R. 2004 Institutional deficit, representation and decentralized forest management in Cameroon: elements of natural resource sociology for social theory and public policy, environmental governance in Africa. Working Paper No. 15. World Resources Institute, Washington, DC.
- Oyono, P.R. 2005 The foundation of the conflict de langage over land and forests in Southern Cameroon. *African Study Monographs* 26(3): 115–144.
- Oyono, P.R. and Temple, L. 2003 Métamorphose des organisations rurales au Cameroun: implications pour la recherche-développement et la gestion des ressources naturelles. *Revue Internationale de l'Économie Sociale* 288: 68–79.
- Oyono, P.R., Cerutti P.O. and Morrison, K. 2009 Forest taxation in post-1994 Cameroon: distributional mechanisms and emerging links with poverty alleviation and equity. WRI Working Paper. World Resources Institute, Washington, DC.
- Oyono, P.R., Diaw M.C. and Efova, S. 2000 Structure et contenu anthropologique du Bilik au Cameroun. *Environnement Africain* 11(1–2): 9–21.
- Perez Correa, S. 2009 Spécificités juridiques sur le carbone. Presentation at a seminar on the CDM projects in Cameroon. Yaoundé, Cameroon, 28–30 October 2009.
- Phelps, J., Guerrero, M.C., Dalabajan, D.A., Young, B. and Webb, E.L. 2010 What makes a 'REDD' country? *Global Environmental Change* 20(2): 322–332.
- Plouvier, D., Eba'a Atyi, R., Fouda, T., Oyono R. and Djeukam R. 2002 Étude du sous-secteur sciage artisanal au Cameroun. AGRECO/Ministry of Environment and Forests, Yaoundé, Cameroon.
- Pouth, J. 2009 État des lieux du mécanisme pour un développement propre au Cameroun. Presentation at the seminar on CDM projects in Cameroon. Yaoundé, Cameroon, 28–30 October 2009.
- REDD Pilot Project Cameroon 2010 Report of second meeting of the Steering Committee of the REDD Pilot Project. Mbalmayo, Cameroon, 20–21 July.
- REDD Pilot Project Cameroon 2009 Land use change policy scenarios. GAFAG/GTZ.
- Réseau des parlementaires pour la gestion durable des écosystèmes forestiers d'Afrique centrale – section du Cameroun (REPAR-Cameroun) 2009 Déclaration des positions du REPAR-Cameroun sur le REDD. Yaoundé, Cameroon.
- Robiglio, V. 2009 The invisible forest: high-value trees in shifting cultivation farmland of Cameroon, Research report. International Institute for Tropical Agriculture/Center for International Forestry Research, Yaoundé, Cameroon.
- Robiglio, V., Ngendakumana S., Yemefack M., Tchienkoua M., Gockowski J., Tchawa P. and Tchoundjeu Z. 2010 Options for reducing emissions from all land uses. Report for the REALU-Cameroon project. ICRAF Working Paper. World Agroforestry Centre, Nairobi, Kenya.
- Seymour, F. and Angelsen, A. 2009 REDD wine in old wineskins. *In: Angelsen, A. (ed.) Realising REDD+: national strategy and policy options.* Center for International Forestry Research, Bogor, Indonesia.
- Siwe, R. 2009 REDD Pilot Project Cameroon. Presentation at the Steering Committee of the REDD Pilot Project. Mbalmayo, Cameroon, 17–18 November 2009.
- Siwe, R., Ramminger, G., Storch C. and Armijo, E. 2010 Deforestation mapping and modeling. Presentation at the second meeting of the Steering Committee of the REDD Pilot Project. Mbalmayo, Cameroon, 20–21 July 2010.
- Solo, J.D. 2009 Mbalam: a sustainable mining and infrastructure project. Presentation at the National Forum on the Integrated Management of Forest and Mining Resources. Yaoundé, Cameroon, 16–17 July 2009.
- Sonwa, D.J. 2004 Biomass management and diversification within cocoa agroforest in the humid forest zone of southern Cameroon. PhD Thesis, University of Bonn and Cuvillier Verlag, Bonn and Goettingen, Germany.
- Stern, N. 2006 *The Stern review: the economics of climate change.* Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK.

- Sunderlin W., Ndoye, O., Bikie, H., Laporte, N., Mertens, B. and Pokam, J. 2000 Economic crisis, small-scale agriculture, and forest cover change in Southern Cameroon. *Environmental Conservation* 27(3): 284–290.
- Swallow, B, van Noordwijk, M., Dewi, S., Murdiyarso, D., White, D., Gockowski, J., Hyman, G., Budidarsono, S., Robiglio, V., Meadu, V. *et al.* 2007 Opportunities for avoided deforestation with sustainable benefits. Interim Report by the ASB Partnership for the Tropical Forest Margins. ASB Partnership for the Tropical Forest Margins, Nairobi, Kenya.
- Tang Essomba, A.C., Forbah Tanjong, M. and Ndong, A.M. 2004 La décentralisation au Cameroun: un grand chantier démocratique. *Télescope* 11(3): 18–21.
- Tejada, G., Quispe J., Añez S., Viscara E., Seifert-Granzin J. 2010 Measuring logging impacts in certified and non-certified timber concessions in Cameroon. Presentation at the second meeting of the Steering Committee of the REDD Pilot Project. Mbalmayo, Cameroon, 20–21 July 2010.
- Tiayon, F. 1999 Marchandisation et systèmes de production paysan dans la région de Bipindi (Sud-Cameroun): perspectives pour les perceptions et utilisations de la forêt. First draft of PhD Thesis, Programme Tropenbos-Cameroun/Université de Yaounde I, Kribi, Cameroon.
- Titi Nwel, P. 1999 De la corruption au Cameroun. Research Group on the Democratic, Economic and Social Development of Africa (GERDDES) Cameroon/Friedrich-Ebert Stiftung, Yaoundé, Cameroon.
- Topa G., Karsenty A., Megevand C. and Debroux L. 2009 The rainforests of Cameroon: experience and evidence from a decade of reform. World Bank, Washington, DC.
- Transparency International 2007 Cameroon 2007. National integrity systems country study report. Transparency International, Berlin, Germany.
- TREES 1998 Identification of deforestation hotspot areas in the humid tropics. European Commission, Luxembourg.
- Tsalefac, M. 2009 Problématique de développement des biocarburants au Cameroun. University of Yaounde I, Yaoundé, Cameroon.
- United Nations Collaborative Programme on Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation in Developing Countries (UN-REDD) 2009 UN Collaborative Programme on Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation in Developing Countries (UN-REDD) framework document. <http://www.un-redd.org/AboutUNREDDProgramme/tabid/583/Default.aspx> (22 November 2010).
- Van den Berg, J. 1999 Sustainable exploitation and management of forest resources: diverging perceptions on the forest. *In: Forest management related studies of the Tropenbos-Cameroon Programme. Proceedings of the joint WAU-Tropenbos workshop held in Wageningen on 1 October 1998.* Tropenbos Cameroon Reports 99-1. Tropenbos-Cameroon Programme and Wageningen Agricultural University.
- Van den Berg, J. and Biesbrouck, K. 2000 The social dimension of rainforest management in Cameroon: issues for co-management. Tropenbos-Cameroon Series 4. The Tropenbos-Cameroon Programme, Kribi, Cameroon.
- Van Dorp M. 1995 Shaking the tree: an economic geographical analysis of the foreign import on forestry in Cameroon. Master's thesis, University of Amsterdam and Wageningen Agricultural University, The Netherlands.
- Vandenhoute, M. and Doucet, J-L. 2006 Étude comparative de 20 plans d'aménagement approuvés au Cameroun. Deutsche Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit, Yaoundé, Cameroon.
- Verbelen, F. 1999 L'exploitation abusive des forêts équatoriales du Cameroun. Greenpeace Belgium, Brussels, Belgium.
- Von Benda-Beckmann, F and von Benda-Beckmann, K. 1991 Law in society: from blindman's-bluff to multilocal law. *Recht des Werkelijkheid*, Special issue, 118–139.
- Wilkie, D. and Laporte, N. 2001 Forest area and deforestation in Central Africa: current knowledge and future decisions. *In: Weber, W. White, L., Vedder, A. and Naughton-Treves, L. (eds.) African rain forest ecology and conservation: an interdisciplinary perspective*, 119–138. Yale University Press, New Haven, USA.
- World Resources Institute (WRI), Instituto do Homem E Meio Ambiente da Amazônia (Imazon) and Instituto Centro de Vida (ICV) 2010 The governance of forests toolkit. A framework of indicators for assessing

governance of the forest sector (version 1). The Governance of Forests Initiative, Washington, DC. World Resources Institute (WRI), United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP), United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and World Bank 1998 World resources 1998–1999. Oxford University Press, New York.

## 2. Media

Cameroon Tribune, 25/02/2010

<http://www.whrc.org/mapping/informs/cameroon>

<http://www.statistics-cameroon.org/>

<http://www.un.org/esa/forests/documents-unff.html#org>

<http://www.laga-enforcement.org/>

[http://www.prc.cm/index\\_fr.php?link=dossiers/decentralisation\\_au\\_cameroun](http://www.prc.cm/index_fr.php?link=dossiers/decentralisation_au_cameroun)

FAOSTAT: <http://apps.fao.org>

<http://ngoylamintom.blogspot.com/>

<http://news.mongabay.com>

<http://www.wildlifeworks.com>

<http://www.gfa-group.de>

[www.cbf-fund.org](http://www.cbf-fund.org)

<http://www.globalwitness.org/pages/fr/cameroon.html>

<http://www.observation-cameroon.info/documents>

## 3. Legal and political documents

### International documents

Central Africa Forest Commission (COMIFAC) 2004 *Plan de convergence* for the conservation and sustainable management of the Central Africa forest ecosystem. Central Africa Forest Commission, Yaoundé, Cameroon.

Central Africa Forest Commission (COMIFAC) 2009. Submission of views of Congo Basin countries to SBSTA 30. Central Africa Forest Commission, Kinshasa, Democratic Republic of the Congo.

Economic and Social Council Resolution 2006/49 of 28 July 2006.

ILO Indigenous and Tribal Peoples Convention, 1989, No. 169.

Operational Policy 4.10 on Indigenous People, World Bank.

Treaty on the Conservation and Sustainable Management of the Central African Forest Ecosystem and to Establish the Central Africa Forest Commission (COMIFAC). February 2005

United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, adopted by UN General Assembly Resolution A/RES/61/295 of 13 September 2007.

United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) 2009 Revised negotiating text, ad hoc working group on long-term cooperative action under the convention, sixth session held in Bonn from 1 to 12 June 2009. FCCC/AWGLCA/2009/INF.1.

United Nations General Assembly Resolution 62/98 to adopt a non-legally binding instrument on all types of forests, 17 December 2007.

### National documents, policies

National Forestry Action Plan (NFAP) 1995.

National Environmental Management Plan (NEMP) 1996.

National Action Plan to Combat Desertification (NAP/CD) 2006.

National Energy Action Plan for Poverty Reduction (PANERP).

Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development (MINADER) 2006 *Stratégie de développement du secteur rural (SDSR): synthèse du volet agriculture et développement rural (Rural Sector Development Strategy; RSDS)*. Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development, Yaoundé, Cameroon.

Ministry of Environment and Forests (MINEF) 2003a *Programme sectoriel forêts et environnement (PSFE): document de programme*. Ministry of Environment and Forests, Yaoundé, Cameroon.

Ministry of Environment and Forests (MINEF) 2003b *Indigenous people (Pygmy) development plan for the Forest and Environment Sector Programme*. Ministry of Environment and Forests, Yaoundé, Cameroon.

Ministry of Environment and Forests (MINEF) and United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) 1999 *Etat des lieux, stratégie et plan d'action national de la diversité biologique (SNPADB)*. Ministry of Environment and Forests/United Nations Development Programme, Yaoundé, Cameroon.

Ministry of Environment and Nature Protection (MINEP) 2009 Position du Cameroun sur les discussions internationales concernant les changements climatiques. Ministry of Environment and Nature Protection, Yaoundé, Cameroon.

Ministry of Planning and Regional Development (MINEPAT) 2003 Indigenous people (Pygmy) development plan for the Participatory Community Development Programme. Ministry of Planning and Regional Development, Yaoundé, Cameroon.

Ministry of Planning and Regional Development (MINEPAT) 2008 Growth and employment strategy paper. Ministry of Planning and Regional Development, Yaoundé, Cameroon.

Ministry of Planning and Regional Development (MINEPAT) 2009 Cameroun vision 2005 (Cameroon vision 2005). Ministry of Planning and Regional Development, Yaoundé, Cameroon.

Ministry of Forests and Wildlife (MINFOF) 2009a Manual of procedures for the attribution, and norms for the management of community forests. Ministry of Forests and Wildlife, Yaoundé, Cameroon.

### **National documents, legislation**

Ordinance No.74-1 of 6 July 1974 to establish rules governing land tenure

Law No. 94/01 of 20 January 1994 to lay down forestry, wildlife and fisheries regulations

Law No. 2004/17 of July 22 2004 on the orientation of decentralisation

Law No. 98/005 of 14 April 1998 on water planning

Law No. 001 of 16 April 2001 to lay down the mining code

Law No. 2004/018 of 22 July 2004 laying down the rules applicable to councils

Law No. 2004/019 of 22 July 2004 laying down the rules applicable to the regions

Law No. 96-06 of January 18, 1996 revising the Constitution of June 2, 1972

Law No. 96/12 of 5 August 1996 relating to environmental protection management

Decree No. 95/678/PM of 18 December 1995 to institute an indicative land use framework for the southern forested area of Cameroon

Decree No. 2005/117 of 14 April 2005 to organise the Ministry of Environment and Nature Protection

Decree No. 2005/099 of 6 April 2005 to organise the Ministry of Forests and Wildlife

Decree No. 2005/118 of 15 April 2005 to organise the Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development

Decree No. 2008/220 of 4 July 2008 to organise the Ministry of Economic Planning and Regional Development

Decree No. 2005/330 of 06 September 2005 to organise the Ministry of Public Works

Decree No. 2005/190 of 03 June 2005 to organise the Ministry of Urban Development and Housing.

Decree No. 2009/410 of 10 December 2009 on the creation, organisation and functioning of the National Observatory on Climate Change

Decree No. 2005/117 of 14 April 2005 to organise the Ministry of Environment and Nature Protection

Decree No. 2005/099 of 6 April 2005 to organise the Ministry of Forests and Wildlife

Decree No. 2005/118 of 15 April 2005 to organise the Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development

Decree No. 2008/220 of 4 July 2008 to organise the Ministry of Economic Planning and Regional Development

Decree No. 2005/330 of 06 September 2005 to organise the Ministry of Public Works

Decree No. 2005/160 of 25 May 2005 to organise the Ministry of Social Affairs

Decree No. 2005/190 of 03 June 2005 to organise the Ministry of Urban Development and Housing.

Decree No. 2001/100 of 20 April 2001 on the creation, organisation and functioning of the National Institute of Statistics

Decree No. 2010/0239/PM of 26 February 2010 setting out the terms and conditions for the exercise of certain activities transferred from the State to the Councils concerning drinking water supply in zones not covered by the public water distribution network conceded by the State

Decree No. 2010/0240/PM of 26 February 2010 setting out the terms and conditions for the exercise of certain activities transferred from the State to the Councils concerning the creation and maintenance of ungazetted rural roads as well as the construction and management of crossing ferryboats

Decree No. 2010/0241/PM of 26 February 2010 setting out the terms and conditions for

- the exercise of certain activities transferred from the State to the Councils concerning the maintenance and management of centres for the advancement of the woman and the family
- Decree No. 2010/0242/PM of 26 February 2010 setting out the terms and conditions for the exercise of certain activities transferred from the State to the Councils concerning the promotion of agricultural production and rural development activities
- Decree No. 2010/0243/PM of 26 February 2010 setting out the terms and conditions for the exercise of certain activities transferred from the State to the Councils concerning the allocation of aide and assistance to indigents and needy persons
- Decree No. 2010/0244/PM of 26 February 2010 setting out the terms and conditions for the exercise of certain activities transferred from the State to the Councils concerning the promotion of pastoral and piscicultural production activities
- Decree No. 2010/0245/PM of 26 February 2010 fixant les modalités d'exercice de certaines compétences transférées par l'Etat aux Communes en matière de culture
- Decree No. 2010/0246/PM of 26 February 2010 setting out the terms and conditions for the exercise of certain activities transferred from the State to the Councils in the field of public health
- Decree No. 2010/0247/PM of 26 February 2010 setting out the terms and conditions for the exercise of certain activities transferred from the State to the Councils concerning basic education
- Decree No. 2002/155 of 18 June 2002 to change the name of ONADEF into ANAFOR
- Decree No. 2002/156 of 18 June 2002 to approve the statutes of ANAFOR
- Joint Order No. 00122/MINEFI/MINAT of 29 April 1998 instituting conditions for the disbursement of revenue from forest operations intended for riparian village communities
- Joint Order No. 0520/MINADT/MINFI/MINFOF of 3 June 2010 setting out conditions of employment, monitoring and management of revenue from forest and wildlife operations intended for councils and riparian village communities
- Decision No. 09/MINEP of 15 January 2009 on the creation of a Steering Committee for the REDD Cameroon Pilot Project
- Decision No. 003/MINEP/CB of 16 January 2006 on the creation of the national MDP Committee
- Circular No. 370/LC/MINEF/CAB of 22 February 1996 instituting a parafiscal tax of 1000 FCFA per cubic metre of wood leaving the logging site to (be paid to) the riparian communities
- Service Note No. 0144/NS/MINFOF/SG/DFAP/SDVEF of 6 March 2007 giving instructions on the collection of wildlife taxes and the compilation of statistics on wildlife offtake
- Decision No. 003/MINEP/CB of 16 January 2006 to create the national CDM committee
- Decision No. 0944/D/MINEF/DF of 30 July 1999 on the termination of timber recovery and removal authorisations and termination of personal logging authorisations and permits





Since 2009, CIFOR has initiated the Global Comparative Study of REDD+ in six countries: Bolivia, Brazil, Cameroon, Indonesia, Tanzania and Vietnam. In analysing national REDD+ policy arenas and emerging strategies, CIFOR researchers have developed five areas of work for each country. These include a country profile, media analysis, policy network analysis, strategy assessment and a fifth area of specific policy studies, to be determined by emerging research results. In 2010 we are publishing the first country profiles and media analyses.

*CIFOR Occasional Papers* contain research results that are significant to tropical forestry. The content is peer reviewed internally and externally.

[www.cifor.cgiar.org](http://www.cifor.cgiar.org)

[www.ForestsClimateChange.org](http://www.ForestsClimateChange.org)



**Center for International Forestry Research**

CIFOR advances human wellbeing, environmental conservation and equity by conducting research to inform policies and practices that affect forests in developing countries. CIFOR is one of 15 centres within the Consultative Group on International Agricultural Research (CGIAR). CIFOR's headquarters are in Bogor, Indonesia. It also has offices in Asia, Africa and South America.

