

DOCUMENT RESUME

ED 284 766

SO 017 838

**AUTHOR** Marshall, Catherine; And Others  
**TITLE** The Context of State Level Policy Formation.  
**PUB DATE** Apr 86  
**GRANT** NIE-G-83-0020  
**NOTE** 75p.; Paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the American Educational Research Association (San Francisco, CA, April 16-20, 1986).  
**PUB TYPE** Speeches/Conference Papers (150) -- Reports - Research/Technical (143)

**EDRS PRICE** MF01/PC03 Plus Postage.  
**DESCRIPTORS** Administrators; Boards of Education; Decision Making; \*Educational Policy; Elementary Secondary Education; \*Legislators; \*Policy Formation; \*Politics of Education; \*State Government; State Legislation; State Officials; Superintendents; Teacher Associations

**IDENTIFIERS** Arizona; California; Illinois; Pennsylvania; West Virginia; Wisconsin

**ABSTRACT**

Individual members of state legislatures wield the greatest influence in state level policy formation. This was one of the findings of a study that identified the power and influence context of state-level policymaking. Data were gathered from six states (Arizona, California, Pennsylvania, West Virginia, Wisconsin, Illinois) using an instrument devised to ask respondents their perceptions of policymakers' influence levels. While the six states provided an overall picture of power and influence, each state had its own individual picture. There were five levels of influence identified: (1) the Insiders made up of individual legislators and legislative bodies; (2) the Near Circle made up of professionals such as the Chief State School Officer and teachers' associations; (3) the Far Circle made up of interest groups and legislative staffs; (4) the Sometime Players made up of state school boards associations and administrative associations and; (5) the Often-Forgotten Players made up of courts, federal statutes, and non-education groups. Policy groups with high influence rankings were most likely to see their values incorporated into policy. A contributing factor to the wide variations among states is the differing perceptual screens of policymakers. Policymakers are socialized in distinctive cultures and share understandings about what is right in their state policy environment. This perceptual screen is termed the "assumptive worlds of policymakers." Any valid picture of educational policy should incorporate assumptive worlds. Tables analyzing the data state by state are included in the appendices. (SM)

\*\*\*\*\*  
 \* Reproductions supplied by EDRS are the best that can be made \*  
 \* from the original document. \*  
 \*\*\*\*\*

ED284766

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION  
Office of Educational Research and Improvement  
EDUCATIONAL RESOURCES INFORMATION  
CENTER (ERIC)

- This document has been reproduced as received from the person or organization originating it.
- Minor changes have been made to improve reproduction quality.
- Points of view or opinions stated in this document do not necessarily represent official OERI position or policy.

"PERMISSION TO REPRODUCE THIS MATERIAL HAS BEEN GRANTED BY

Catherine  
Marshall

TO THE EDUCATIONAL RESOURCES INFORMATION CENTER (ERIC)."

The Context of State Level Policy Formation\*

Catherine Marshall  
Peabody College of Vanderbilt University  
Nashville, TN 37203

Douglas Mitchell  
University of California-Riverside

Frederick Wirt  
University of Illinois-Urbana

\*Senior author for the paper is Catherine Marshall

This paper was prepared for delivery at the American Educational Research Association meeting in San Francisco, California, April 16-20, 1986. The research on which the paper is based was supported in part by a grant from the Department of Education, Office of Educational Research and Improvement (formerly National Institute of Education) under Grant No. NIE-G-83-0020. The interpretation of the data and the conclusions presented herein are solely the responsibility of the authors, however, and do not necessarily represent the views of the Department of Education.

83817838

## The Context of State Level Policy Making

The Alternative State Policy Making in Education study (Mitchell, Marshall, & Wirt, 1986) sought to identify and describe state policy mechanisms (SPMs) and priorities in the choices made for education.

It was assumed in this study that state constitutions and formal charts of powers, responsibilities, and processes in policymaking do not portray the entire picture of influence in state education policy. We wanted to identify the power and influence context of policy making suggested in Easton's, Thompson's, Campbell and Mazzone's and Milstein's models, to fill in the blanks and identify the hierarchies of influence from these models.

(Insert Figures 1 - 5 about here)

We generated a list of policy actors most likely to be involved in education policy making based on previous literature (Fuhrman & Rosenthal, 1982; Milstein & Jennings; Iannaccone, 1967; Wirt & Kirst, 1982; Marshall, 1985; Mitchell, 1982) and based on findings from the first round of interviewing. An instrument was devised which asked respondents for their perceptions of the levels of influence on policy making between 1982 and 1985.

In this paper we report the rankings of groups in the entire sample and then rankings within each state. Second, we describe special features of the policy groups in each state, based on field studies. We can begin to see how the context and the policy choices are connected when we combine the policy choices, reported by Mitchell (1986), the political culture, reported by Wirt (1985), and these influence rankings and policy context.

### Findings: The National Perspective

Figure 7 reports the ranks across the six states. Respondents recognized clear delineations of levels of power and influence. Some policy groups can be viewed as similar in rankings of influence, since their means have no significant difference. Those policy groups with similar means are discussed as clusters. Where there is a significant difference between the mean ranking of policy groups, this can be viewed as a real difference in influence. The rankings can be portrayed in a model, as shown in Figure 6, and data on rankings shown in Figure 7 can be inserted.

(Insert Figures 6 and 7 about here)  
(Table 7 in the Appendix displays the statistical data.)

### The Insiders

The most influential group in education policy making are called the Insiders. The highest mean ranking of power and influence was individual members of the legislature. In four states, Pennsylvania, West Virginia, Arizona, and Wisconsin, they were ranked higher than the legislature as a whole. This is consistent with a decades-old finding about specialists--legislators who specialize in a policy area and guide the votes of other legislators, who have the power to affect budget items, and who spend their legislative careers in education committees (Wahlke, Buchanon, & Ferguson, 1962). For example, key actors in Pennsylvania identified the Chairperson of the House Education Committee as the person who was knowledgeable, interested, expert, and had the power to make or break education policy, having chaired the committee for twenty years.

Most legislators devote only sporadic attention to education. The legislature as a whole, therefore, ranked just below "individual members of the legislature" in power and influence in this national sample.

### The Near Circle

Among policy actors there are those whose full-time occupation is education policy--the professionals. Those with the most power, the Chief State School Officer (CSSO) and the State Department of Education (SDE) senior staff, the teachers' associations, and "all education interest groups combined" are called the Near Circle. They are distinguished from other policy group professionals by their high influence.

The CSSO was ranked third in power and influence, by the mean ranking from the six states. However, the mean is derived from a wide range of state rankings. In Wisconsin with no State Board of Education (SBE) the CSSO has the highest mean. In Pennsylvania, where the CSSO was viewed as the governor's education adviser, the CSSO ranks third, right after the governor. And California's CSSO is an elected official, commanding a constituency of his own.

There were examples of a conscious, patient sort of control, a slow building up on the part of a CSSO and his/her staff to put initiatives into policy. It is important to remember that those who are in for the long term, the bureaucrats, may have a long-term power and influence which is less flashy and obvious than the legislators or governors who must show results and get attention to keep their positions.

The wide range in the CSSO rankings across the states suggests that there were state-specific definitions of the CSSO role.

Presumably the CSSO and staff's relationship with the governor, the legislative staff, and the legislators were variables that affected influence. Note that the CSSO and SDE senior staff is the policy group that had the full-time, legitimate expertise and authoritative responsibility for managing state educational policymaking, nevertheless, had lower power than legislators.

The teachers' associations' influence ranking was high, only slightly lower than the CSSO and senior staff of the SDE. All of our states had a state affiliate of the American Federation of Teachers and the National Education Association, usually representing urban and suburban/rural teachers respectively. These two groups' positions and interests were not always congruent. However, their political action committees, numerous lobbyists, and campaign funds allow them to wield high political influence. Teachers' associations in Arizona were significantly lower than the six-state rank, but in Illinois they were significantly higher than the national rank.

"All Education Interest Groups Combined," signifying the combined forces of teachers, administrators, and school boards, associations and other educator groups that work in coalition, was viewed as a powerful policy group of professional lobbyists. It is interesting that their influence was not significantly different from the CSSO and SDE senior staff or the governors and their staff. In several states, the teachers' organizations ranked higher than "all education interest groups combined." In Arizona non-educator groups and the state school board's association ranked higher than "Education Interest Groups Combined," and in Illinois the teachers' organizations ranked higher than any policy group.

The influence rankings of the governor, executive staff and the legislative staff were lower than the interest groups combined and teachers' associations. Their involvement and influence was still substantial enough, however, to group them with the Near Circle.

Governor and executive staff interest and expertise in education has been focused, in the past, on education finance (Campbell & Mazonni, 1976). Governors' budgets, their rising political responsibility for education, and the press from interest groups like the teachers' association obligated governors to pay attention to education issues. But governors' proactive agenda-setting in education is a new phenomenon.

Governors are newly involved in education policymaking, capitalizing on the national interest, attempting to take initiative now in an area where they previously were involved only where education and finance intersect. It remains to be seen whether governors will continue to take control and credit for education policy. The policy groups which have been continuously concerned with education may be temporizing and manipulating the "new kids on the block"-- governors. On the other hand, perhaps this high ranking of governors is connected with the data showing that Finance was the State Policy Mechanism which gets more attention in most of the states, and the governors' budgets control education finance.

The mean ranking of legislative staff placed them at seventh ranking, just below governors and significantly higher than SBE's. They belong in the Near Circle because legislators and interest groups depended upon their expertise and information. We often observed close working relationships between education interest groups and two key legislative staff members.

### Far Circle

The policy groups in the Far Circle were influential but not crucial education policy makers. The state boards of education had the lowest ranking of any formal state policy group. Interest groups and legislative staff, professionals hired to inform and influence policy making, had significantly higher power than the SBE.

In all of our states (as in a majority of the states) the governor appoints the SBE. In Pennsylvania the SBE is appointed by the governor, but it existed because of statute, not because of constitutional language. Among the six states Arizona and West Virginia had the highest ranking for the SBE; California had the lowest, and Wisconsin was the only state in the Union with no SBE.

### Sometime Players

At a level of influence significantly lower than the Far Circle lie the Sometime Players, the state school boards associations and administrations associations, policy actors and agencies who were involved but less influential in our six states' policy making.

### Often-Forgotten Players

The courts, federal statutes, and non-education groups are labelled the Often Forgotten Players by our rankings. The states' mean ranking of the state and federal courts placed them twelfth in power and influence over education policymaking. Court influence was construed as immediate and direct involvement. For example, Pennsylvania subjects frequently commented that the courts had been a major influence in the past, but were no longer. One explained, "We haven't had a court decision affecting us in a while" (PA,2,7).<sup>1</sup> But policy makers' choices,



particularly in school finance policy, were made with clear knowledge of previous court decisions. Court decisions influenced and constrained policy choices but policy actors did not recognize the influence when it was subtle.

The mean ranking of federal policy across the six states was lower than twelve other policy groups. Thus, from the perception of the key participants in education policymaking, the state policy groups were in control and they liked it that way. Speaking of federal influence, a Pennsylvania staffer said, "Federal is ranked pretty low now. I give it a high ranking when talking about special education, but generally it is a lower rating" (PA,2,7).

Non-educator interest groups such as business leaders and taxpayer groups were ranked 14th, just below the federal government's ranking. Of the remaining policy groups, Lay Groups, such as PTA's and advisory councils, were ranked 15th in the mean rankings in the states. The mean ranking of "educational researchers" across the six states was near the bottom ranking among all policy groups.

The ranking of producers of education related products (such as textbook manufacturers and test producers) had the lowest mean ranking among the six states. This may be related to the fact that some of the sample states eschew involvement in curriculum materials selection. Pennsylvania respondents consistently said that the state policy arena does not and should not decide on the textbooks that local districts should use. There, the low power of producers was tied to an area of local control. California, the one sample state with major state approval and selection policy, had producers as its lowest ranking policy group.

### Surprises and Exploded Myths

As we look at these rankings the surprises and myths are exploded. The myth of the powers of producers of education materials is demolished--at least policy actors do not see it. Policy actors in state capitals did see federal mandates and court influence as waning in the 1980's. Policy actors saw little or no actual power and influence by lay citizen groups or by direct referenda.

Also surprising--even in the era of school reform governors--we see governors ranked below teacher organizations and barely above legislative staff! And, the poor SBEs! No doubt it is a honor to be appointed for the SBE, but it certainly does not signify high influence in policy making!

It is surprising, too, how clearly we see the individual legislators influencing policy. They had higher power than the CSSO, SDE and the SBE (two sets of actors officially designated for education in their appointments). The legislature, therefore, designates them as education specialists, through its own processes.

### Intriguing Differences and Puzzles Among the States

Most intriguing is the wide range of rankings of policy actors as we look across the six individual states. Figure 7 displays these differences.

Why was the School Boards Association ranked so low in West Virginia compared with Arizona's high ranking? Why did the teachers' associations in Arizona and Pennsylvania have the lowest relative ranking in any of the state teachers' associations? Why did the CSSO/State Board of Education policy groups rank higher in West Virginia than in any other

state? Insights and answers can be derived from examining each state's rankings and searching the case studies to understand the informal structures policy making processes.

#### Relative Ranking of Policy Groups' Influence by State

The distinctive characters of each state's power structure for education policymaking are shown in the findings displayed in Tables 1-6.

(Insert Tables 1-6 about here)

These tables show remarkably different pictures of informal structures of power and influence in the different states. Tables 7-13 present in the Appendix the statistical data for the rankings and the clusters of policy groups.

Some of the differences among states are significantly different. West Virginia and Arizona rankings were particularly different from the mean of the total sample. For example, Arizona had significantly higher rankings for non-educator groups and the school boards association, but significantly lower rankings for the governor and for teachers' associations. Note significant differences like Pennsylvania's high ranking of the governor; Illinois' top ranking of teachers' associations, Wisconsin's top ranking of the CSSO and the absence of an SBE, and California's very low ranking of the SBE. In order to understand these differences, we now present descriptions of some of the policy-making dynamics among the key actors in each state, from the case studies of each state.

#### Special Features in the Arizona Education Policy Context

Arizona's Insiders were legislators, the State Board, and the CSSO. A few players loomed "larger than life" and had to be thought of in terms

of their individual personalities, backgrounds, and specific interests. Our respondents provided us with a clearly differentiated set of rankings for the major actor groups as shown in Table 2.

Arizona's policy elite believed that the state legislature, especially the leading members of key legislative committees, was the prime mover in education policy for the state. On a seven point scale the legislative members' score was nearly a full point above the State Board of Education which was ranked as the most influential non-legislative actor.

In ranking the other key actor groups, Arizona respondents deviated quite significantly from the other states in the high ranking of the State Board, however. The board had a broad mandate from the legislature to develop programs and regulations and they have actively pursued curriculum policy improvements. It was expected that these competencies would also be used by teacher training institutions in the preparation of new teachers.

The State Board also adopted expansive school personnel policies. Primarily in its pilot program for extended supervision and assessment of teachers, are its Centers for Excellence across the state for both pre-service and in-service training of teachers and administrators, and the Arizona Principals' Academy whose declared objective, according to the Board, is to "provide administrators with the tools to make school improvement a reality." The special place of the State Board of Education in Arizona can be traced to the work of a relatively small group of key board members. The board has succeeded in bringing into coalition, business and industrial interests with key school

administrators in the state. Nearly identical in rank with the board is the vigorous and generally quite effective Superintendent of Public Instruction.

Arizona's rankings differed from the other states in its ranking the Non-educator Interest Groups (business leaders, taxpayer groups, etc.). In Arizona they are ranked high enough to be called the Near Circle. Our interview data identified (as at least two of these unusually effective non-educator groups) the prestigious "Phoenix 40" group (a group of business leaders that met about once a month on an informal basis), and the technically competent but less obviously powerful Arizona Tax Research Association.

Among the state's education interest groups, Arizona respondents reported that the association of local school boards was stronger than its counterpart in other states, with its well-organized staff of professionals, their senior executive and who was widely known by name as a person who paid close attention to state policy formation and implementation. While Arizona respondents ranked federal policy mandates as a substantially stronger influence in state policy than did respondents in other states, our impression was that this is due more to the general ideological conservatism of the state than to any specially strong federal intrusions into the affairs of Arizona education. Also a very large part of Arizona's land area is in federal lands and Indian reservations bringing in the influence of the Bureau of Indian Affairs and of the vicissitudes of Federal Impact Aid (PL 81-874). Also there were widely publicized problems bringing Arizona financing for special education into line with the standards set forth in the Education for All

Handicapped Act (PL 94-142) which has, no doubt, heightened sensitivity to the impact of federal action on state policy.

Arizona respondents identified four groups as having less influence than their counterparts in other states. We were not at all surprised to find teachers' organizations ranked low. The Arizona Education Association was extraordinarily active in the state policy arena, but its efforts have been generally unsuccessful. It has used a variety of tactics--direct lobbying, campaign contributions, highly publicized surveys of their members and of the general public, identification of key legislators and staffers to support or oppose, etc. In doing so, the organization has acquired a reputation for being tough and aggressive, but also for being "politicized" and "self-serving." The latter elements in their reputation has seriously damaged their ability to influence policy.

There were three factors that contribute substantially to a reduction in the governor's influence, however. First, Governor Babbitt was seen as much more interested in non-education issues. Second, the governor was a Democrat while the Republicans have controlled both houses of the legislature. The school administrators organization did not express the activist, reform-oriented concern that we found in other states and which was visible when we talked with teacher and school boards association representatives.

The general weakness of all education interest groups was quite evident. Arizona policymakers seemed generally agreed that education policy was directly related to the state's overall economic development process. Hence, policy was more a matter for political officials and

community-based business and industry leaders than for professional educators.

### Special Features in the in West Virginia

#### Education Policy Context

As Table 2 shows, in West Virginia the courts were the key Insiders in education policy making. The courts became involved in policy making when the 1979 case of Pauley vs. Kelley was remanded to Circuit Court Judge Arthur Recht, who issued a decision unprecedented in its detailing of an equitable reform of the state school system. The decision actually defined minimum standards and asserted that the state government was remiss in not providing an efficient system for generating and allocating the funding to provide for a quality educational system to each student, no matter which county the student resided in.

The state superintendent, ranking second only to the courts in West Virginia, was significantly higher in ranking than all the other sample states except Wisconsin. The West Virginia Constitution gives education special status. In fact in 1982, when the governor cut the education budget (but not transportation budget), the CSSO brought suit against the governor and won. The constitutionally-protected independence of the CSSO is demonstrated here.

In third ranking, "individual members of the legislature" have played a less consistently active role in policy making compared to the CSSO and the SBE.

The legislature's greatest involvement in education was through the budget, in which state aid to locals, including the state base rate of teacher pay is decided. The legislature was dependent to a significant

degree on the expertise of the SDE to draft proposals for changes in policy; many of their bills originated in SBE recommendations. Legislators, with few staffers, only a sixty-day legislative session, and pay of only \$1,500 per annum, did not devote much time to education policy.

The state board was seen among policy actors as the prime educational policy-making body; board policies are the equivalent of legislation in other states. However, most SBE policies were based on plans and analyses initiated by SDE officials.

These top five dominant policy groups all had formal power for education policy making. Below them in ranking was another grouping--the Near Circle of policy actors.

The teachers' associations ranked sixth influence, above "education interest groups combined." Since salary bargaining was conducted with the legislature, teachers associations visibly monitored legislators' votes and gave or withheld electoral support on that information. Threats of teacher marches on the capitol (not strikes, but similar) swayed legislators and governors.

Teachers' associations worked closely with other education lobbyists when their interests are common. But they differ strongly in that they supported collective bargaining policy, but the other education interest groups opposed it. "Other" included the powerful School Personnel Association.

"All education interest groups combined" ranks eighth in power and influence. Although these groups were vital and active in influencing policy, the outlets for their concerns was limited to the formal and



occasional hearings of legislative committees and the SBE. There had been little continuing, informal contact between representative of these groups and state officials.

Neither Governor Jay Rockefeller nor Governor Arch Moore had employed full-time advisors to consult on education issues. Governors have, in recent years, generally looked to the SBE and CSSO for policy initiatives in education.

The state association of school boards notably low in West Virginia. The local boards were county elected officials, responsible to local citizens' needs and had some difficulty accepting state control, at a time when increased state control was a fact of life. More importantly, the state association often worked independently from the coalitions of other education interest groups.

#### Special Features in the Policy Context in California

In California, there was a decided tendency for individual personalities to rise to prominence, overshadowing formal processes or identifiable political resources in the formation of education policy. The legislature was the prime mover in education policy matters, and major education programs were frequently known by the name of the legislator who introduced them--the Ryan Act for teacher certification, the Rodda Act for labor relations, the comprehensive Hughes-Hart Reform Act of 1983, etc. The legislature was surrounded by some of the most sophisticated, energetic, and well-financed lobbyists to be found in any state.

The governor, Deukmejian, was not noted for strong initiatives in any policy area. He did, however, have very sub-stantial powers over the

development of an executive budget and line item veto over legislative appropriations and he gave good budgetary support of schools. The relationship between the governor and the legislature was especially complex during Deukmehian's term because of partisan struggles for the control of legislative houses.

The state superintendent, Koenig, whose ultimate influence was still being proven, was elected in a highly visible campaign emphasizing an accountability-focused "basic education" approach to educational quality. This contrasted with the theme of innovation and equity that dominated the policies and rhetoric of Wilson Riles, his predecessor.

In California the tendency of all key policy groups to be strong and active led to policy proposals being more plentiful, heavily contested, and comprehensive than those found in most other states. Only in this state did we find 500 to 700 bills on education policy topics being introduced in every legislative session. And California's omnibus reform bills were typically longer and more complex than those in other states. At 290 pages, SB 813 (1983) clearly set the record for length in education policy legislation.

A close look at the mean influence ratings shown in Table 3 reported for California suggests four special aspects of the policy influence system in this state. First, note that the State Board of Education, dropped to 16th rank in the California list. The board, appointed by the governor and forced to live with a popularly elected superintendent of public instruction, was not as effective in the intensely political environment of this state as in others. Interview data suggest that Governor Deukmehian's predecessor, Jerry Brown, opened up the board to

minority groups and women who brought less prestige and informal power with them. With few formal powers at its disposal, the influence of the SBE depended heavily on the level of prestige and respect accorded to its individual members.

The second point of interest in the California influence rankings was the fact that "the state legislature as a whole" received the top ranking, rather than the "leading members of legislative committees" which was given number one ranking by the entire sample. This overall influence of the legislature taken as a whole is directly attributable to the recognition of California's strong legislative staff. Staff consultants were ranked 5th in California.

A third difference between California respondents and those in the other states was the strong showing of the education interest groups. In this state, the school administrators and lay groups were given particularly strong ratings, raising the ranking of "all education interest groups combined" to 3rd place in the overall ranking. The strongest special interest groups in the state were the teacher organizations. They rank right behind the legislature and were viewed as more influential than all other groups, including the governor's office and the superintendent of public instruction.

The fourth area in which California's influence ratings were special was in the importance of the courts and of direct referenda, both of which were viewed as substantial sources of influence in this state--the courts through the finance reform process (the Serrano case) and special education and labor relations policy decisions. The referendum process has been especially important in California, having produced a dramatic

shift in funding from local property taxes to the state's general fund and initiated a state lottery expected to put significant new money into the schools.

### Special Features in Influence in School

#### Policy Making: Wisconsin

Clearly, the Insiders in Wisconsin consisted of executive leadership and key interest groups (see Table 4). Policy influence was thus seen as in the hands of a few, of whom the professionals--the CSSO, the governor and pressure groups--were clearly most important.

Wisconsin differed somewhat because its CSSO was first in influence, compared to a third ranking among the six states, and the legislature was perceived as significantly less influential. Wisconsin also differs from the 6-state rankings of the governor who was stronger--number three--than they were nationally. The teacher organizations were also significantly higher in influence than in the national sample. Wisconsin differed from the other states in having no State Board of Education.

These high influence actors, both appointed and elected, politician and professional, operated in a moralistic culture which gave different signals than in other states in the use of power. If that culture saw the political system as a place where persons enter into cooperative arrangements for the mutual benefit of the community, then leadership was expected. Politics was seen as an exercise for the commonweal, so influence must go to executive leadership, in this case, the CSSO and governor. That was where educational policy power was being exercised, and that was where this more structured ranking of potentially powerful agents and agencies found again that power resided.

In Wisconsin, 1984, with Democrats in the governor's mansion, the CSSO office, and the majorities of both legislative houses, they needed not deal with Republican ideas, but had to reach agreement among themselves on education policy. The open style of this state's policy making, was shown by the fact that even party caucuses, where agreements are reached, were open to the public and press.

### Special Features in the Education Policy Making

#### Context in Pennsylvania

The main significant differences between Pennsylvania's rankings and those of other sample states were the high power of the legislative staff, the administrators' association, and the governor. Table 5 shows the cluster of policy groups.

The Insiders in Pennsylvania were clearly the individual members of the legislature, the governor, the CSSO, and the legislature as whole. There was considerable evidence of active competition between the House Education Committee and other actors (the SBE, SDE, the governor) for the reputation of being the ones who have the best ideas and the final say on key education policy.

Lobbyists congregated in the House Education Committee office. Several key senators also had keen interest in education policy, were trusted by other members to guide their assessment of proposals and carried on the active competition for control of education policy with the SBE, the SDE, and the governor.

The high power of the governor in education policy was a recent development, stemming from his Turning the Tide initiative and his power over the budget. The power over the budget allows governors to decide,

while other groups must negotiate. In the 1985 legislative session, the governor was able to project an image of the beneficent giver of funds (at the very end of the legislative session) for remedial programs for students who failed state testing, while other policy actors had been jockeying that, along with other issues like statewide minimum salary and merit pay for teachers and basic school subsidy for six months.

The state superintendent of schools, an appointee of the governor, was seen as the governor's chief education advisor. During SDE policies were completely in line with the governor's Turning the Tide policy agenda. Thus, the power of the governor, the CSSO and the SDE were one and the same during the span of this study.

In the Near Circle, ranked just below the legislature as a whole, Pennsylvania staffers are plentiful, expert, full-time professionals. They met with lobbyists and acted as middlemen, conveying the sense of how legislators will respond to proposals and, at the same time, gleaning information about the concerns and potential actions of interest groups.

In the Far Circle, the administrators' association was significantly higher than in other states. It represented the concerns of suburban and rural administrators and worked closely with the lobbyists for Pittsburgh and Philadelphia. Pennsylvania has a state affiliate of American Association of School Administrators, more oriented to superintendents, and a Principals' Association. The latter succeeded in promoting policy for a form of collective bargaining for principals.

The Pennsylvania State Board's low ranking was demonstrated in their recent attempts to initiate in testing, program definition, and personnel policy have resulted in other policy groups forming parallel actions.

Their low power was demonstrated by legislators' stories of recent struggles in which legislators reminded SBE members that their body was created, and could be abolished, by legislative act. Soon after that, legislation altering school governance policy to include key legislators on the SBE.

The federal policy, the courts, and the school boards association were Sometimes Players in Pennsylvania. Pennsylvania has avoided court intervention by successfully continuing an equitable school finance policy formula.

Thus, the picture of power, influence, and interaction among Pennsylvania's education policy groups was one of high activity, competition for control, with the governor and the CSSO as a major cohesive force, active and well-staffed key legislators, and with education interest groups well practiced in the strategies of coalition and compromise and consequently, recognized as very powerful actors.

#### Special Features in Illinois Education Policy

The Illinois Constitution was totally rewritten in 1970, including an appointed, rather than an elected, state superintendent, plus a School Problems Commission for long-range planning in education. So the state was in a learning period of planning for state-wide education.

Table 6 displays the clusters of policy groups. Particularly striking in Illinois was the low ranking of the CSSO and his SDE staff, finding which presaged his resignation and another appointment in the period of this study. The Insiders were teachers' groups, education interest groups in combination leading legislators, and the legislature as a whole. With a highly bipartisan legislature and a long tradition of

lobbyists getting special favors, we should not be surprised that the teachers' associations wielded high influence. The governor's reversal on school consolidation stemmed in part from active teacher association lobbying.

The teachers lobby, because of this knowledge and numbers throughout the state had significantly higher influence than any other policy group. They had great concern for salaries, of course. In 1984, they successfully promoted a state collective bargaining law which then stimulated the largest wave of teacher strikes in Illinois history.

The legislature was a reactive and rancorous body. Its committees often reacted to, rather than generated education bills.

The education lobbies were widely reported as very active, numerous, and effective at all stages of the legislative process. Special interest education lobbies were equally intense and important (e.g., special education, vocational education, handicapped).

All respondents reported in great detail interest group testifying, saying, "the education committees are sometimes more like a traffic cop."

In the Near Circle, the governor in 1984, was less energetic than his counterparts in other states in grabbing the school reform issues flowing from the Nation at Risk publicity. By early 1986, he was struggling to form a funding coalition among state policy actors to increase even slightly the state's share of local costs.

The Illinois policy groups rated Others, (which to them meant The School Problems Commission) as seventh in influence ranking, within the "Near Circle." Higher influence actors deferred to it, but did not wait for its counsel.



The CSSO's significantly lower ranking in Illinois can be put in context. The state superintendent's role in education policy has been transformed, but still seemed to have only a limited initiative in the policy system. Under the new constitution, his role changed from its traditional, elective nature (which meant exercising limited policy leadership) to one appointed by the state board. Efforts by three of these officers since this change demonstrated it is not useful for leadership in the education policy system; a fourth, appointed in 1985, was too recent for evaluation. The first did little, but the second tried to do much (desegregation, consolidation). He got the Legislature and local school boards so unhappy with these efforts that legislators actually threatened to change the Constitution and make the office elective once again (he left shortly thereafter with little substantive progress to report). The incumbent until 1984, Donald Gill, had a low-key role, possibly in response to the furor of his predecessor. He identified his role as "executive officer" to a school board, while directing and leading his staff. However, when Governor Thompson in early 1984 announced he would not continue a tax increase that would help education, Gill spoke out against education receiving only 1% increase in its budget, sounding more like his predecessor. While on this issue, he had support of all education interest groups and most LEAs, he opposed the governor; the result was only a modest funding increase. Dissatisfaction with the CSSO's role, and the governor's unhappiness with his opposition, underlay Gill's resignation during our study. In short, the role permitted any incumbent to enunciate consensus policy items in that policy world, but to take initiative without such support had not characterized this position.

Of the Sometime Players, the administrators' association carried little weight in Illinois. Nor did the SBE. While the GOP senators and the state superintendent saw the State Board as positive, and Democratic members did not, all agreed that it was distant from legislative activities. Note that a GOP governor appointed the state board (ostensibly GOP) who appointed the state superintendent--so this division of views made political sense. Democratic legislators said that didn't know what the board was doing in that great grey building except writing voluminous reports that no one would read because they were much too long.

Members of the state board rarely if ever gave testimony to the legislature, although the same state board staff appeared to do so regularly. The state superintendent reported that his office called on them individually or collectively to provide counseling on funding and other policy matters. The central influence of the state board was its staff, often working in liaison with legislators; it seemed to be the silent partner in the education policy system.

#### Implications of Power and Influence Rankings

We can expect that the policy groups with high influence rankings were most likely to see their values and preferred mechanisms and approaches receiving the most attention. In fact, this was reflected in our data.<sup>2</sup>

For example, the West Virginia courts' valuing equity, choosing equalizing access to good education programs through the State Policy Mechanisms (SPMs) of Finance and Buildings and Facilities, was shown in West Virginia's significantly higher concern with those SPMs. The

courts' top influence showed in this SPM. It showed in the Finance SPM too. Wisconsin and West Virginia, both with high court influence, had high attention given to the SPM Finance approach of equalization.

In Illinois, with teachers organizations in highest ranking, we saw high interest in the Governance SPM, much of it centering on collective bargaining.

The Personnel SPM choices are related to particular configurations of policy group power. Arizona, had significantly higher power of legislators, CSSO, SBE, Non-educator groups and Association of Local School Boards, and significantly lower power of teacher and administrator associations. It is interesting to see, with this configuration of power, high activity in all approaches to personnel policy. Pennsylvania had high influence legislators and legislative staff and administrators association working in coalition with teachers organizations and Pennsylvania showed low interest in any Personnel approaches except pre-service. In fact, our data showed that the three states with relatively high teacher organization power and low SBE power (PA, CA, and IL) gave more emphasis to pre-service and training approaches to personnel policy. West Virginia, with a high power SBE and CSSO working closely together, showed high interest in professional development. Keep in mind, this is a state where the teachers bargained directly with the legislature for pay scales, and the SBE set much of the other education policy.

The power of the teachers' organizations and the association of local school boards is related to Student Testing policy. In Wisconsin and Illinois where these groups had high power, there was high interest in mandating local test development. In West Virginia, California and

Pennsylvania, states where the association of local school boards had low power, there was high interest in statewide testing.

In the Governance SPM, we can see the interaction of high teacher power and the approach of "strengthening teacher influence" in Illinois. California and Arizona showed no interest in increasing teacher influence. This may be related to the fact that California teachers already had high influence and the Arizona teachers organizations have significantly low power. Arizona, with its significantly high Non-educator interest groups and lay groups, shows high activity in defining student rights and responsibilities and increasing citizen influence.

Still in the Governance SPM, West Virginia, with its significantly high court, CSSO, SBE, and federal policy mandate influences, showed high interest and activity in increasing state authority. Its significantly low power association of local school boards could not stop this trend, particularly with SBE and SDE control over local district accreditation.

Our data are amenable to further analysis to identify correlations among policy group's values, their knowledgability about SPMs, their estimation of the activity and interest in each SPM and approach, and the level of power and influence of the policy groups.

### Summary

The state's policy systems present a quite complex and varied picture. It is one in which history and the present institutions and private groups, politicians and professionals--all interact in regular but slightly differing ways. The regularity speaks to the impact of institutionalizing democratic practices across the nation. The difference speaks to the distinctive impact on policy services and

decisional systems made by state political culture and the culture of each state capital.

Legislatures were where the policy fight was carried out. Its leaders led the fights, and their staff carried surprising weight. Then, the most vocal participants outside it were the most active in benefiting from its actions--all education pressure groups, especially teachers--and the single statewide education administrator, the CSSO. Closely allied were the governors and their staffs, because of this office's increasing concern about two matters. First was keeping state budgets under control, of which education accounts for the single largest cost. Second, was leading in educational innovation ideas which came on the scene in the 1980s. In short, the political authorities most responsible under the constitutions of the states were seen as the ones with most influence. All the others who had a continuing, or even occasional, interest in school policy generally could not approach this influence, possibly because they lacked the legitimacy bestowed by the political system on the Insiders.

While the six-states sample provided an overall picture of power and influence, each state had its own individual picture. History, current crisis, recent power shifts, and pervasive informal rules for action maintain policy groups' power in each state.

Each state had its special context of power and influence wherein policy was made. Rosenthal (1981) noted that "the legislative process cannot be considered isolation from the prevailing ethos, the political ethics, and the capital community in which it operates," (p 111). What we have seen so far is that the different capital communities have

different processes and power rankings. We now turn to briefly identify the cultural norms that rule education policy makers' actions.

#### The Assumptive Worlds as Part of the Policy Context

Policy makers are socialized in distinctive cultures and share understandings about what is right and proper in their state policy environments that affect the perceptions of the key actors in each state. These perceptions relate to the expected behaviors, rituals, and judgments about feasible policy options. This perceptual screen we term the "assumptive worlds of policy makers."

Young (1977) identified these "assumptive worlds of policy makers" as the "policy makers' subjective understandings of the environment in which they operate" (p. 2), incorporating "several intermingled elements of belief, perception, evaluation, and intention as responses to the reality 'out there'" (p. 3). This is a crucial, unexplored variable in policy making. It means that among policy actors there is a shared sense of what is appropriate in action, interaction, and choice. This section introduces and demonstrates the utility of a assumptive worlds for explaining how values are translated through policy making. The interview data were replete with stories featuring common language and understandings about what does and does not work in the distinctive state policy cultures.

It seemed worth searching for some connection between the rankings on influence, the policy actors' sense of what works, and their words about systematic interaction within their policy culture.

The subsequent analysis revealed definite rules for the exercise of influence. These rules served to establish and control definitions

of rights and responsibilities among policy groups. The stories of policy making told by various key actors illuminate how specific activities allowed policy groups to gain (or lose) power. Stories also reveal shared, state-specific understandings about the cultural constraints on policy behavior and choice.

Consequently, we found that there were distinctive assumptive worlds in the states, and that their actors shared common language about the processes, constraints, and rituals that must be observed in policy making. The common language reflected the taken-for-granted framework within which policy making occurs. Analysis of the language showed how the assumptive worlds interact with particular policy initiatives and function in the policy culture.

Fuller explanation of the literature and the methodology appears elsewhere (Marshall, 1985). This paper presents the action guides and demonstrates the connection between these principles of the policy culture, the informal systems of power and processes in policy making, and actual policy choices.

This analysis explicitly focused on the words of policy makers--their modes of expression, of obfuscation, of bias (Schattsneider, 1960). Using their utterances as a key to understanding their assumptive worlds provided insights into the way values are introduced, translated, interpreted, and mobilized within a policy system.

This analysis is a form of political anthropology, a way "to perceive regularities and similarities and differences in behavior, institutions and systems of behavior, and to develop therefrom correlations and principles of behavior" (Merritt, 1970, p. 200). How

elites actually behave is dependent upon the aspects of their underlying perspectives that are politically relevant (Merritt, 1970). Our interviewing of formal and informal elites contain inside stories about how the powerful act, both in front of and behind the scenes. How these elites act, with what understandings, values, and senses of what is possible and proper are revealed. Our data are from elites who were choosing their own words to describe policy culture activity, openly and extensively, in interviews of approximately 30 to 120 minutes each. The data set is replete with stories, values, assessments of personalities, groups, history, and common understandings.

This analysis follows methodological developments emerging from (a) the tradition of using a field study approach to identify the normative and cognitive bases for action, and from (b) Glaser and Strauss's (1967) constant comparative method of analysis to discover grounded theory, which builds upon but explores beyond previous theory.

Policy culture research on assumptive worlds, focusing on policy makers' words about boundaries, areas of conflict, and informal rules governing the exercise of power will add to our understanding of policy choices.

The analytic questions identified from the literature are:

1. What are the guides to action, norms, and informal boundaries of behavior and choice in the policy world?
2. How are they played out? For example, how do action guides evolve and how do these rules affect policy choices?
3. What functions do they serve in the policy culture?
4. Do their expressions tell consistent stories about the policy culture?



Focusing on such questions, using comparable qualitative data from policy cultures, builds grounded theory on policy culture. The Alternative State Policy Mechanism (ASPM) data provided rich opportunities for exploring meaning in policy cultures and for cross-case analysis and theory building. With these understandings we now turn to the findings about states' assumptive worlds.

### The Findings on Assumptive Worlds

West Virginia and Pennsylvania data provide answers to two questions: (a) what are the domains of a policy makers' assumptive world? and (b) what are the functions and consequences of that assumptive world in education policy formation?

Four domains were identified:

1. Who has the right and responsibility to initiate policy?
2. What policy ideas are deemed unacceptable?
3. What policy mobilizing activities are deemed appropriate?
4. What are the special conditions of the state?

These domains are action guides in the policy culture. Within each domain are operational principles that are shared understandings about how to act and think. The domains and operational principles are described below, with illustrations from the Pennsylvania and West Virginia assumptive worlds. Figure 8 displays the levels of analysis of the following presentation.

(Insert Figure 8 about here)

Ironically, the richest data are from stories of mistakes, violations of the rules, and failures to act and think within the assumed parameters in a particular policy culture. The interview data show the

cognitive mapping--the understood part of the assumptive worlds--emerging from the words and stories of policy actors.

Within the domains are operational principles followed by policy groups in all of our state policy cultures. The state by state specifics, the actual rules, rituals, and boundaries in each state, were derived from interviews and observation data. The outline of these operational principles is displayed in Figure Nine.

(Insert Figure 9 about here)

### The Effects of Assumptive Worlds in the Policy Cultures

These assumptive worlds are part of the context of policy making for education. There is not sufficient space here to trace the evolution and provide examples of assumptive worlds (see Marshall, Mitchell, & Wirt, 1986 for more complete details). Instead, III present a discussion of the effects of assumptive worlds.

### The Effect of Maintaining a Predictable Environment

Order and predictability in the state policy culture are maintained by the rules regarding areas of right and responsibility to initiate and the rules of behavior for using power to mobilize policy. These assumptive worlds are understood by insiders in the policy arena. In an environment where the competition for control is the main game, there has to be a system which defines renegade behavior. Policy actors' stories about their own acculturation in the policy arena are full of examples of learning by faux pas, and they are upset when others violate the rules, overstep the boundaries, or fail to observe the rituals. In the policy world, there is a predictability that comes from the assumptive world understandings. There is stability and control when there are

understandings, for example, about what sorts of people will be allowed to share in agenda-building. There is security in knowing that the ritual of touching all bases, involvement, and sharing information will be observed. This system of rules, roles, proper behavior and boundaries is important for power maintenance. However, groups and individuals can gain power if they challenge the rules and change the culture, but part of their ability to maintain power is their observance of the rules. In turn, they can better work toward shaping the values embodied in policy in a predictable policy culture.

#### The Effect of Building Cohesion

In the policy culture made up of individuals with an array of different personal values and biographies and groups with an array of positions, demands, and competing values, policy actors actually do come to agreement from time to time, temporarily, on a policy choice. Assumptive worlds function to limit the range of options and focus debate within certain understood priorities.

The common understandings, reflected in their words and stories about what matters, are part of the fundamental nature of their state system that constrain policy choices within the common biases regarding what threatens and what is good in their system. Their stories tell about how they and others use words and symbols to tap into those assumptive worlds to mobilize policy making or to limit policy choices.

This cohesion building function allows a shorthand of communication among insiders in policy making. Dissonant ideas are not articulated; policies that promote unfashionable values are not formulated. It facilitates policy making; it also limits policy making by excluding

people and ideas that do not fit with the local language and stories.

### Implications of Assumptive Worlds

#### Assumptive Worlds as Values-Translators

Fitting into state-specific assumptive worlds means complying with the rules and working within the constraints of proper ideas and behavior, only proposing ideas that are "appropriate", attuned to the unique features of that state. Aberrant behavior, ideas, and proposals are filtered out.

Thus, in order to have one's ideas and values incorporated in the policy making process, state policy actors must alter the values and preferences of the people they represent. They must be re-created to fit within the assumptive worlds. They must, in effect, be translated so that they will be recognized, included, and heard in the policy culture.

For example, the Pennsylvania teachers' associations' preference for a state-wide minimum salary could not pass. It was not translated to fit into the context of an assumptive world where the PSEA had lost power by betting on a gubernatorial loser, and where a predictable brake on policy was the demand that the state pay for every cost of a state mandate to the Locals. In addition, the proposal was not part of the governor's initiative, at a time when the governor, the OSSO, and the key legislators were coalescing around quality as the understood goal and personnel SPMEs (not Finance SPMEs) as the appropriate approach.

On the other hand, the West Virginia School Service Personnel Association's positions, activities in policy mobilizing, and behaviors in coalition-building apparently fit with the understandings of language,

norms, values and understandings of the rules in that state's policy culture. Although it was a labor association, it affiliated with key education lobbies, took an anti-collective bargaining position, and succeeded in maintaining the power to meet membership's needs. This association has already translated its goals to successfully fit with assumptive worlds in West Virginia. Lobbyists are often excluded from education agenda building by the SDE and SBE, but they do have influence with the legislators, for whom the allocation of resources, particularly for school personnel, is the main education issue.

Thus policy actors alter, re-phrase, create, change the image and symbols, and change the content and goals of policy preferences if they are to maintain power and have a chance of seeing their needs met. The alterations are made in response to the assumptive worlds. They translate preferences to fit.

#### Assumptive Worlds as Barometers of Change

Assumptive world action guides are embedded in the understandings of socialized policy actors. When there is a shift in the policy culture, their assumptive words are upset. Such upset is revealed in stories of "outrageous" behavior, wild proposals, policies that jar tradition. For example, Judge Recht's decree that the legislature must equalize West Virginia school children's access to quality education signalled realignment of values. In these cases, state policy actors defied the assumptive worlds. They did so with enough force and power to change the assumptive worlds. Recht's decision forced the West Virginia policy culture to alter its values and re-shape its ideas of "fashionable policies" to include equity goals, tied to the state tax system. Less

powerful actors attempting to defy the assumptive worlds would risk sanctions--loss of power and exclusion from policy deliberations.

The Nation at Risk report was an outside influence that upset the state assumptive worlds. Such national attention on the quality of education obligated formal policy actors to respond. In states where CSSOs and legislators had formulated education policy agendas, governors, like Thornburg, had to respond. The Risk report, with its policy proposals for specific mechanisms for controlling quality implementation of quality improvements (e.g., required homework, competency exams) obligated policy actors to demonstrate an assertive, controlled program of school improvement or else, in effect, admit to constituents that there was no leadership toward excellence in education.

Upsets in the assumptive worlds--boundary crossing, defiance of norms, policy proposals that veer away from tradition--are indicators of significant shifts in values, power alignments and understandings about what is possible and preferable. Assumptive worlds are barometers that predict change in state policy cultures.

#### Implications for Theory

Predominant values and policy choices are filtered through the assumptive worlds of a state. The differences seen among the sample states in their choices of policy mechanisms and approaches emerged from different assumptive worlds.

Any valid picture, map, model, theory, or practice of education policy making needs to incorporate assumptive worlds. In fact, assumptive worlds touches on, and glues together, the other elements of the policy making world that have been previously defined. It derives

from the history, the values, and role obligations of key actors, the political culture, the formal structure of power and responsibility, the partisan politics, and the informal processes of the policy world. Assumptive worlds bind together these other elements, in policy making. They are revealed by policy makers whose words and stories incorporate all elements affecting policy making, from personal propensities of key actors to enduring cultural factors in their states. Figure 10 presents a picture of the fit of assumptive worlds with these other elements.

(Insert Figure 10 about here)

Wirt and Kirst (1982), reflecting on the varied separate research traditions for studying policy making said, "As a consequence of these different approaches, what is known is much like the four blind persons who describe an elephant in terms of the particular parts touched" (p. 216). Assumptive worlds provide the model or skeleton and connective tissue that pulls together the data from various views of policy making. Mapping and creating models of state education policy making may be more than the sum of its parts.

Assumptive worlds, where the parts connect, wherein lie the uncodified understandings through which policy actors behaviors and choices are filtered, can be explored by focusing on policy actors' words. Their social construction of the reality in which they live is displayed in their words and their descriptions of interactions. As Minogue said, "objectives are the products of interaction," so the interaction and beliefs of policy actors are key to understanding their way of coming to the point of policy objective or choice.

## Bibliography

- Bailey, S., Frost, R., Marsh, P., & Wood, R. (1962). Schoolmen and politics. New York: Syracuse University Press.
- Campbell, R. F., & Mazzone, T. L., Jr. (1976). State policy making for the public schools. Berkeley: McCutchen Publishing.
- Campbell, R., Cunningham, L., Nystrand, R., & Usdan, M. (Eds.). (1985). The organization and control of American schools. Columbus, OH: Charles E. Merrill.
- Easton, D. (1965). A systems analysis of the political life. New York: John Wiley & Sons.
- Furhman, S., & Rosenthal, A. (1981). Shaping education policy in the states. Washington, DC: The Institute for Education Leadership.
- Glazer, B., & Strauss, A. (1967). The discovery of grounded theory. Chicago: Aldine.
- Kirst, M. W. (1981, April). The state role in education policy innovation (Policy paper No. 81-C1). Stanford, CA: Institute for Research on Educational Finance and Governance.
- Marshall, C. (1984). Elites, bureaucrats, ostriches and pussycats: Managing research in policy settings. Anthropology and Education Quarterly, 15(3), 194-201.
- Marshall, C. (1985, January). Politics of evaluation: The competition for control of education policy. Urban Education, 19(4), 411-439.
- Marshall, C., Mitchell, D. & Wirt, F. (1986). Power, influence and assumptive worlds in state education policy making. Peabody Journal of Education, forthcoming.
- Mechley, R. (1981, Fall). Court grants education preferred funding status in West Virginia. Journal of Education Finance, 7, 227-229.



- Milstein, M. & Jennings, R. (1973). Educational policy-making and the state legislature: The New York experience. New York: Praeger.
- Merritt, R. L. (1970). Systematic approaches to comparative politics. Chicago: Rand McNally.
- Mitchell, D. A. (1981). Shaping legislative decisions: Education policy and the social sciences. Lexington, MA: D. C. Heath.
- Mitchell, D. (1985). (in press). A taxonomy of state policy mechanisms for education. Peabody Journal of Education.
- Mitchell, D., Marshall, C, & Wirt, F. (1986, April). The structure of state education policy making. Paper presented at the meeting of the American Education Research Association, San Francisco, CA.
- Murphy, J. T. (1980). State leadership in education: On being a chief state school Officer. Institute for Educational Leadership, The George Washington University, Washington, DC.
- Rosenthal, A. & Fuhrman, S. (1981). Legislative education leadership in the states. Washington, DC: The Institute for Educational Leadership.
- Rosenthal, A. & Fuhrman, S. (1982, Fall). State legislatures and education policy: An overview. Educational Horizons, 61(1), 4-49.
- Schatschneider, E. E. (1960). The semi sovereign people. New York: Holt, Rinehart.
- Thompson, J. (1976). Policymaking in American public education: A Framework for analysis. Englewood Clifts, NH: Prentice-Hall.
- Wahlke, E. H., Buchanon, W., & Ferguson, L. C. (1962). The legislative system: Explorations in legislative behavior. New York: John Wiley & Sons.

Wirt, F., & Kirst, M. (1982). Schools in conflict: The politics of education. Berkeley, CA: McCutchan.

Young, K. (1977, March). Values in the policy process. Policy and Politics, (5)3, 1-22.

### Footnotes

<sup>1</sup>In order to protect anonymity, subjects are given labels; first their state is identified, then the type of data collection, then the number assigned to that particular informant. Thus PA,1,11. means this Pennsylvania quote is from round 1 of data collection, code number is 11. W VA,2,22 is a West Virginian quoted from round 2 of data collection, and her code number is 22. Data collected from participant observation were designated as round 3. Thus W VA,3,14 is West Virginia data collected during informal participant observation 3 and the person providing the datum was code number 14.

<sup>2</sup>The study developed a taxonomy of seven State Policy Mechanisms, each with an array of alternative approaches that policy makers use to affect education. They are School Finance, Buildings and Facilities, Personnel Training and Certification, Student Testing and Assessment, Curriculum Materials, Program Definition, and Governance and Organization. This is reported extensively in Mitchell, Marshall and Wirt, 1986 and Mitchell, 1985.

Table 1

Arizona Policy Group Influence Ranking and Clusters

Cluster	Policy Groups	Within State Rank	6-State Rank
Insider	Individual Members	1	1
	Legislators As a Whole	2	2
Near Circle	State Board of Education	3	8
	Chief State School Officer	4	3
	Non Educator Interest Groups	5	14
	School Boards Association	6	10
	Legislative Staff	7	7
Far Circle	Federal Policy Mandates	8	13
	All Education Interest Groups Combined	9	4
	Other	10	9
	Courts	11	12
	Teacher Organizations	12	5
Sometime Players	Governor and Executive Staff	13	6
Often Forgotten Players	Lay Groups	14	15
	State Administrator Association	15	11
	Education Researchers	16	16
	Producers of Education Materials	17	18
	Referenda	18	17

N = 30

NOTE: \_\_\_\_\_: denotes statistically significant (at .10) difference between clusters.

- - - -: denotes no significant difference (at .10) between clusters.

Table 3

California Policy Group Influence Ranking and Clusters

Cluster	Policy Group	Within State Rank	6-State Rank
Insiders	Legislature As a Whole	1	2
	Individual Members of Legislature	2	1
	Education Interest Groups Combined	3	4
Near Circle	Teacher Organizations	4	5
	Legislative Staff	5	7
	Governor and Executive Staff	6	6
Far Circle	Chief State School Officer	7	3
	Other	8	9
	State Administrator Association	9	11
Sometime Players	Courts	10	12
	School Boards Association	11	10
Often Forgotten Players	Non Educator Groups	12	14
	Federal Policy Mandates	13	13
	Referenda	14	17
	Lay Groups	15	15
	State Board of Education	16	8
	Education Researchers	17	16
	Producers of Educational Materials	18	18

N = 15

NOTE: \_\_\_\_\_ denotes statistically significant (at .10) difference between clusters.

- - - - denotes no significant difference (at .10) between clusters.

Table 2

West Virginia Policy Group Influence Rankings and Clusters

Cluster	Policy Groups	Within State Rank	6-State Rank
Insiders	Courts	1	12
	Chief State School Officer	2	3
	Individual Members of Legislature	3	1
	State Board of Education	4	8
	Legislature As a Whole	5	2
Near Circle	Teachers Organizations	6	5
	Other	7	9
	Education Interest Groups Combined	8	4
Far Circle	Governor and Executive Staff	9	6
	Federal Policy Mandates	10	13
Sometime Players	Legislative Staff	11	7
	Administrators Association	12	11
Often Forgotten Players	Non Educator Groups	13	14
	Researchers	14	16
	School Boards Association	15	10
	Lay Groups	16	15
	Producers of Education Materials	17	18
	Referenda	18	17

N = 18

NOTE: \_\_\_\_\_ denotes statistically significant (at .10) difference between clusters.

- - - - denotes no significant difference (at .10) between clusters.

Table 4

Wisconsin Policy Groups Influence Ranking and Cluster\*

Cluster	Policy Group	Within State Rank	6-State Rank
Insiders	Chief State School Officer	1	3
	Teacher Organizations	2	5
	Governor and Executive Staff	3	6
Near Circle	Individual Members of Legislature	4	1
	Education Interest Groups Combined	5	4
	Legislature As a Whole	6	2
	School Boards Association	7	10
Far Circle	Administrators Association	8	11
	Legislative Staff	9	7
Sometime Players	Non Education Groups	10	14
	Federal Policy Mandates	11	13
	Lay Groups	12	15
Often Forgotten Players	Other	13	9
	Courts	14	12
	Education Researchers	15	16
	Producers of Education Materials	16	18
	Referenda	17	17

N = 24

\*Wisconsin has no State Board of Education

NOTE: \_\_\_\_\_ denotes statistically significant (at .10) difference between clusters.

- - - - denotes no significant difference (at .10) between clusters.

Table 5

Pennsylvania Policy Group Influence Ranking and Clusters

Cluster	Policy Groups	Within State Rank	6-State Rank
Insiders	Individual Members of Legislature	1	1
	Governors and Executive Staff	2	6
	Chief School Officers	3	3
	Legislature as a Whole	4	2
Near Circle	Legislative Staff	5	7
	Education Interest Groups Combined	6	4
	Teacher Organizations	7	5
Far Circle	Administrator's Association	8	11
	State Board of Education	9	8
Sometime Players	Federal Policy Mandates	10	13
	School Boards Association	11	10
	Courts	12	12
Often Forgotten Players	Non Educator Groups	13	14
	Lay Groups	14	15
	Education Researchers	15	16
	Producers of Education Materials	16	18
	Referenda	17	17
	Others	18	9

N = 25

NOTE: \_\_\_\_\_ denotes statistically significant (at .10) difference between clusters.  
 - - - - denotes no significant difference (at .10) between clusters.



Table 6

Illinois Policy Group Influence Rankings and Clusters

Cluster	Policy Group	Within State Rank	6-State Rank
Insiders	Teacher Organizations	1	5
	Legislature As a Whole	2	2
	Individual Members of Legislature	3	1
	Education Interest Groups Combined	4	4
Near Circle	Governor and Executive Staff	5	6
	Legislative Staff	6	7
	Others	7	9
	School Boards Association	8	10
Far Circle	Federal Policy Mandates	9	13
	Non Educator Interest Groups	10	14
	Courts	11	12
	Chief State School Officer	12	3
Sometime Players	Administrators Association	13	11
	State Board of Education	14	8
Often Forgotten Players	Lay Groups	15	15
	Referenda	16	17
	Education Researchers	17	16
	Producers of Educational Materials	18	18

N = 22

NOTE: \_\_\_\_\_ denotes statistically significant (at .10) difference between clusters.

- - - - denotes no significant difference (at .10) between clusters.

Table 7

Policy Groups 6-State Means of Rankings and Clusters: Statistical Data

6-State Rank	Policy Group	Group $\bar{x}$	SE	Diff Bet Group $\bar{x}$	Degrees of Freedom	2-Tail Prob	Cluster	Policy Groups	Cluster $\bar{x}$	Cluster SE	Diff Betw Cluster $\bar{x}$ s	2-Tail Prob				
1	Indiv Members of Legis	5.8033	.090													
				.0902	121	.25	Insiders	Individuals Legis As Whole	5.7513	.052						
2.	Legislature As Whole	$\frac{5.7131}{5.6855}$	$\frac{.095}{.096}$													
3	CSSO	$\frac{5.2661}{5.2193}$	$\frac{.137}{.148}$	.4194	123	.01										
				.1053	113	N.S.					.7406	.001				
4	All Educ Interest Groups	5.1140	.101													
				.0088	113	N.S.										
5	Teacher Organizations	$\frac{5.1053}{5.1203}$	$\frac{.140}{.126}$					CSSO								
				.2406	132	.25	Near Circle	Teacher Assoc All Educ Int Grps Gov & Exec Staff Legislative Staff	5.0107	.097						
6	Governor & Exec Staff	$\frac{4.8797}{4.8955}$	$\frac{.146}{.145}$													
				.2761	133	.10										
7	Legislative Staff	$\frac{4.6194}{4.7727}$	$\frac{.121}{.130}$												.5643	.055
				.3091	109	.10										

8	State Brd of Education	$\frac{4.4636}{4.4587}$ $\frac{.153}{.155}$				Far Circle	{ State Brd of Educ Others		
			.1127	20	N.S.			4.4464 .015	
9	Others	$\frac{4.5714}{4.2917}$ $\frac{.313}{.327}$							
			.2367	23	N.S.			4.007	.025
10	School Brd Assoc	$\frac{4.0550}{4.1880}$ $\frac{.133}{.120}$				Sometime Players	{ School Brd Assoc Admin Assoc		
			.2180	132	.10			4.0457 .076	
11	Admin Association	3.9699 .117							
			.0301	132	N.S.				
12	Courts	$\frac{3.9398}{3.9328}$ $\frac{.165}{.164}$						.9776	.01
			.0299	133	N.S.				
13	Fed Policy Mandates	3.9030 .129					{ Courts Fed Policy Mandates Non Educ Int Grps		
			.1045	133	N.S.				
14	Non Educ Groups	$\frac{3.7985}{3.8045}$ $\frac{.113}{.113}$				Often Forgotten Players	{ Lay Groups Educ Research Grps		
			.8045	132	.001			3.0681 .309	
15	Lay Groups	3.000 .106					{ Referenda Prod of Educ Materials		
			.3835	132	.01				
16	Educ Research Organiz	$\frac{2.5165}{2.6136}$ $\frac{.112}{.113}$							
			.4848	131	.005				
17	Referenda	$\frac{2.1288}{2.1298}$ $\frac{.141}{.142}$							
			.0382	.130	N.S.				
18	Prod of Educ Materials	2.5916 .105							

1. Means and standard errors have some slight differences because of sample size differences.
2. Based on AZ, CA, IL, PA, and WV. WI has no State Board of Education
3. Cluster Xs calculated by taking mean scores for each policy group.

Table 8

Arizona Policy Groups Influence Rankings and Clusters: Statistical Data

Within- State Grp Rank	Policy Group	N	Group x	SE	Diff Betw Group Xs	2-Tail Prob	Cluster	Policy Groups	Cluster x	Cluster SE	Diff Betw Cluster Xs	2-Tail Prob				
1	Indiv Mem of Legis	30	6.1667	.128			Insider	Indiv Member of Legis Legislature As Whole	6.135	.045						
					.0633	N.S.										
2	Legislature As Whole	29	6.1034	.188												
					.8701	.005										
3	State Brd of Education	30	5.2333	.213							1.1084	.001				
					.1333	N.S.										
4	CSSO	30	5.1000	.227			Near Circle	State Brd of Educ CSSO Non-Educ Groups School Brd Assoc Legislative Staff	5.0267	.166						
					.0333	N.S.										
5	Non-Educ Interest Grps	30	5.0667	.159												
					.1334	N.S.										
6	Sch Board Association	30	4.9333	.179												
					.1333	N.S.										
7	Legislative Staff	30	4.8000	.232							.7707	.05 01				
					.2000	N.S.										
8	Fed Policy Mandates	30	4.5000	.252			Far Circle	Fed Pol Mandates All Educ Int Grps Others Courts	4.2560	.340						
					.1200	N.S.										
9	All Educ Interest Grps	25	4.4800	.217												
					.0800	N.S.										
10	Others	5	4.4000	.510												
					.4000	N.S.										
11	Courts	30	4.000	.292							.5560	.10				
					.2000	N.S.										
12	Teacher Organiz	30	3.8000	.251												
					.1000	N.S.										
13	Governor & Exec Staff	30	3.7000	.280			Sometime Players	Gov & Exec Staff	3.7000	.000						
					.2333	N.S.										
14	Lay Groups	30	3.4667	.208							.7742	.10				
					.1000	N.S.										
15	State Admins Assoc	30	3.3667	.212			Often Forgotten Players	Lay Groups State Admin Assoc Educ Research Org Prod of Educ Mat Referenda	2.9258	.495						
					.4334	.10										
16	Educ Research Organiz	30	2.9333	.225												
					.4505	.10										
17	Prod of Educ Materials	29	2.4828	.220												
					.1035	N.S.										
	Referenda	29	2.3793	.334												



Table 9

West Virginia Policy Groups Influence Rankings and Clusters: Statistical Data

Within State Grp Rank	Policy Group	N	Group X	SE	Diff Bets Group Xs	2-Tail Prob	Cluster	Policy Groups	Cluster X	Cluster SE	Diff in Cluster Xs	2-Tail Prob				
1	Courts	18	6.5000	.185												
2	CSSO	18	6.1111	.196	.3889	.10										
3	Indiv Members of Legis	17	5.8824	.225	.2287	.25	Insiders	{ Courts CSSO Ind Mem of Leg State Brd of Educ Legis As Whole	5.9334	.386						
4	State Brd of Educ	18	5.6111	.304	.2713	.25										
5	Legis As Whole	16	5.5625	.258	.0486	N.S.										
6	Teacher Organiz	18	5.4444	.185	.1181	N.S.										
7	Others	10	5.3000	.300	.1444	N.S.	Near Circle	{ Teacher Organiz Others All Ed Int Grps	5.2926	.156						
8	All Educ Interest Grp	15	5.1333	.256	.1667	N.S.									.4315	.25
9	Gov & Exec Staff	18	5.111	.387	.0223	N.S.										
10	Fed Policy Mandates	18	4.6111	.293	.5000	.25	Far Circle	{ Gov & Exec Staff Fed Policy Mand	4.8611	.354						
11	Legislative Staff	18	4.2778	.434	.3333										.6388	.25
12	Adminis Staff	18	4.1667	.316	.1111	N.S.	Sometime Players	{ Legislative Staff Adminis Assoc	4.2223	.079						
13	Non-Educ Groups	18	3.8333	.283	.3334	.25										
14	Research Organ	18	3.111	.254	.7222	.05					1.3241	.25				
15	School Brd Assoc	18	2.6111	.270	.0554	N.S.	Often Forgotten Players	{ Non-Educ Groups Research Organiz Sch Brd Assoc Lay Groups Prod of Ed Materials Referenda								
16	Lay Groups	18	2.611	.270	.4445	N.S.										
17	Prod of Educ Materials	18	2.5000	.345	.1111	N.S.										
18	Referenda	18	2.2778	.331	.2222	N.S.										

Table 10

California Policy Group Influence Rankings and Clusters: Statistical Data

Within State Rank	Policy Group	N	Group X	SE	Diff Betw Group X	2-Tail Prob	Cluster	Policy Group	Cluster X	Cluster SE	Diff in Cluster Xs	2-Tail Prob
1	Legislature As Whole	14	6.2143	.239								
2	Individual Memb of Legis	15	6.0000	.239	.2143	N.S.						
3	All Educ Interest Grps	15	5.6667	.252	.3333	N.S.	Insider	Legis As Whole Indiv Mem of Legis All Educ Int Groups	5.9603	.276		
4	Teacher Organizations	15	5.3333	.287	.3334	.25						
5	Legislative Staff	15	5.3333	.361	.0000	N.S.	Near Circle	Teacher Organiz Legis Staff Gov & Exec Staff	5.2666	.115		
6	Govenor & Exec Staff	15	5.13333	.322	.2000	N.S.						
7	CSSO	15	5.0667	.345	.0666	N.S.					.3555	.25
8	Others	2	5.0000	.000	.0667	N.S.	Far Circle	CSSO Others State Adm Organiz	4.9111	.214		
9	State Adminis Organiz	15	4.6667	.374	.3333	.25						
10	Courts	15	4.4000	.456	.2567	N.S.	Sometime Players	Courts Assoc of Loc Sch Brd	4.2334	.236	.6777	.10
11	Assoc of Local Sch Brd	15	4.0667	.284	.3333	N.S.						
12	Non Educ Interest Grps	15	3.6667	.287	.4000	.25						
13	Fed Policy Mandates	15	3.6667	.287	.0000	N.S.					.9477	.05
14	Referenda	15	3.6000	.576	.667	N.S.						
15	Lay Groups	15	3.5333	.236	.0667	N.S.	Often Forgotten Players	Non Ed Int Grps Fed Pol Mandates Referenda Lay Groups State Brd of Educ Educ Research Org Prod of Educ Material	3.2857	.466		
16	State Brd of Educ	15	3.2000	.341	.3333	.25						
17	Educ Research Organiz	15	2.8667	.350	.3333	.25						
18	Prod of Educ Material	15	2.4667	.307	.4000	.25						

Table 11  
Wisconsin Policy Group Influence Ranking and Clusters: Statistical Data

Within State Rank	Policy Group	N	Group X	SE	Diff Betw Group X	2-Tail Prob	Cluster	Policy Group	Cluster X	Cluster SE	Diff in Cluster Xs	2-Tail Prob		
1	CSSO	24	6.3750	.189										
2	Teacher Organiz	24	5.8333	.293	.5417	.10	Insiders	CSSO Teacher Organiz Gov & Exec Staff	5.9583	.370				
3	Governor & Exec Staff	24	5.6667	.267	.1666	N.S.								
4	Indiv Mem of Legis	23	5.2174	.243	.4493	.25							.9417	.05
5	All Educ Int Groups	20	5.2000	.236	.0174	N.S.	Near Circle	Indiv Memb of Legis All Educ Int Grps Legis As Whole Sch Board Assoc	5.0166	.223				
6	Legislature As Whole	21	4.8571	.232	.3429	.25								
7	Sch Board Assoc	24	4.7917	.248	.0654	N.S.							1.0582	.01
8	Admin Assoc	24	4.0000	.276	.7917	.025								
9	Legislative Staff	24	3.9167	.275	.0833	N.S.	Far Circle	Adminis Assoc Legis Staff	3.9584	.059				
10	Non-Educ Groups	24	3.3333	.274	.5834	.10							.9862	.10
11	Fed Policy Mandates	24	2.9167	.329	.4166	.25	Sometime Players	Non Educ Grps Fed Pol Mandates Lay Groups	2.9722	.337				
12	Lay Groups	24	2.6667	.197	.2500	N.S.								
13	Others	3	2.3333	.882	.3334	N.S.							1.121	.10
14	Courts	24	2.2500	.257	.0833	N.S.	Often Forgotten Players	Others Courts Educ Research Organ Prod of Educ Mat Referenda	1.8511	.491				
15	Educ Research Organ	24	1.9167	.216	.3333	.25								
16	Prod of Educ Materials	24	1.6250	.224	.2917	.25								
17	Referenda	23	1.1304	.072	.4946	.025								

Table 12

Pennsylvania Policy Group Influence Rankings and Clusters: Statistical Data

Within State Rank	Policy Group	N	Group X	SE	Diff Betw Group X	2-Tail Prob	Cluster	Policy Group	Cluster X	Cluster SE	Diff in Cluster Xs	2-Tail Prob			
1	Indiv Memb of Legis	25	5.7600	.176											
2	Governor & Exec Staff	25	5.6800	.309	.0800	N.S.									
3	CSSO	25	5.4800	.317	.2000	N.S.	Insiders	Indiv Mem of Legis Gov & Exec Staff CSSO Legis As Whole	5.5946	.148					
4	Legis As whole	24	5.4583	.199	.0217	N.S.								.5073	.05
5	Legis Staff	25	5.2000	.224	.2830	.25									
6	All Educ Int Groups	22	5.1818	.234	.0182	N.S.	Near Circle	Legis Staff All Ed Int Grps Teacher Organiz	5.0873	.179					
7	Teacher Organiz	25	4.8800	.273	.3018	.25								.4673	.05
8	Admin Assoc	25	4.6800	.236	.2000	N.S.									
9	State Brd of Educ	25	4.5600	.327	.1200	N.S.	Far Circle	Admin Assoc State Brd of Educ	4.6200	.085					
10	Fed Policy Mandates	25	3.8400	.304	.7200	.10								.8333	.005
11	Sch Brd Assoc	25	3.8000	.365	.0400	N.S.	Sometime Players	Fed Policy Mandates School Brd Assoc Courts	3.7867	.061					
12	Courts	25	3.7200	.368	.0800	N.S.								1.5367	.05
13	Non-Educ Int Groups	25	3.0000	.224	.7200	.10									
14	Lay Groups	25	2.8400	.335	.1600	N.S.		Often Forgotten Players	Non-Ed Int Grps Lay Groups Research Organ Prod of Educ Mat Referenda Others	2.2500	.669				
15	Research Organiz	25	2.6800	.287	.1600	N.S.									
16	Prod of Educ Materials	25	1.9200	.208	.7600	.025									
17	Referenda	25	1.5600	.245	.3600	.25									
18	Others	25	1.5000	.500	.0600	N.S.									




Table 13

Illinois Policy Group Influence Rankings and clusters: Statistical Data


Within State Rank	Policy Group	N	Group X	SE	Diff Betw Group X	2-Tail Prob	Cluster	Policy Group	Cluster X	Cluster SE	Diff in Cluster Xs	2-Tail Prob
1	Teacher Organiz	21	6.0476	.212								
2	Legis As Whole	20	5.9500	.198	.0976	N.S.	Insiders	Teacher Organ Legis As Whole Ind Mem of Leg All Ed Int Grps	5.8035	.310		
3	Indiv Mem of Legis	22	5.8636	.231	.0865	N.S.						
4	All Educ Int Groups	17	5.3529	.226	.5107	.10						
5	Governor & Exec Staff	22	4.4545	.376	.8984	.025						
6	Legislative Staff	22	4.2727	.220	.1818	N.S.	Near Circle	Gov & Exec Staff Legis Staff Others Sch Brd Assoc	4.1699	.236		
7	Others	2	4.0000	1.000	.2727	N.S.						
8	School Board Assoc	21	3.9524	.244	.0476	N.S.						
9	Fed Policy Mandates	22	3.6818	.266	.2706	.25					.6358	.05
10	Non-Educ Int Grps	22	3.5455	.205	.1363	N.S.	Far Circle	Fed Pol Mandates Non-Ed Int Grps Courts CSSO	3.5341	.114		
11	Courts	22	3.5000	.285	.0455	N.S.						
12	CSSO	22	3.4091	.284	.0909	N.S.						
13	Admin Assoc	21	3.2857	.250	.1234	N.S.					.2776	.40
14	State Board of Educ	22	3.2273	.237	.0584	N.S.	Sometime Players	Adminis Assoc State Brd of Educ	3.2565	.445		
15	Lay Groups	21	2.8571	.221	.3702	.25						
16	Referenda	22	2.3636	.305	.4935	.10	Often Forgotten Players	Lay Groups Referenda Research Organiz Prod of Educ Mat	2.2825	.501		
17	Research Organiz	22	2.2727	.265	.0909	N.S.						
18	Prod of Educ Materials	22	1.6364	.203	.6363	.05						

Source: Page 5 of The Organization and Control of American Schools, Fifth Edition, Roald F. Campbell, LeGuvern L. Cunningham, Raphael O. Nystrand and Michael D. E Usdan.(Eds.). Charles E. Merrill Publishing Company, Columbus, 1985.

**FIGURE 1**  
**A Simplified Model of a Political System**




SOURCE: David Easton. *A Framework for Political Analysis* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1965). Used by permission of the author.



**FIGURE 2**  
 EGP System and Influence Concepts

**Educational Policymaking in State Government**

**Figure 3** Interaction Between Formal Decision Makers in State Educational Policymaking






Figure Six  
 A Model of Power and Influence  
 Education Policy Making

Figure 7

Comparison of Individual States to the Six-State Rankings

Policy Group	6-State Rank	States					
		AZ	WV	CA	WI	PA	IL
Individual Members of Legislature	1+	1	3+	2	4--	1	3
State Legislature As Whole	2+	2	5	1	6	4	2
CSSO	3	4	2++	7	1++	3	12--
All Education Interest Groups Combined	4	9	8	3+	5	6	4
Teacher Organizations	5	12	6	4	2++	7	1++
Governor & Executive Staff	6	13--	9	6	3+	2++	5
Legislative Staff	7	7	11	5+	9-	5++	6
State Board of Education	8	3++	4++	16	*	9	14--
Others	9	10	7	8	13	18	7
School Board Association	10	6	15--	11	7+	11	8
Administrators Association	11	15	12	9+	8	8+	13-
Courts	12	11	1++	10+	14	12	11
Federal Policy Madates	13	8+	10++	13	11	10	9
Non-Education Groups	14	5++	13	12	10	13	10
Lay Groups	15	14	16	15	12	14	15
Educ Research Organiz	16	16	14	17	15	15	17
Referenda	17	18	18	14+	17	17	16
Production of Education Materials	18	17+	17	18	16	16	18

\*WI has no State Board of Education

- \*\*
- + + Ranked much higher in AZ than other states.
  - + Ranked higher in AZ than other states.
  - Ranked lower in AZ than other states.
  - Ranked much lower in AZ than other states.

Figure 8

The Levels of Analysis of Assumptive Worlds




Figure 9

Functions of the Operational Principles of Assumptive Worlds

<u>Action Guide Domains and Operational Principles</u>	<u>Maintain Power and Predictability</u>	<u>Promote Cohesion</u>
<u>Who has the Right and Responsibility to Initiate?</u>		
The prescription for the CSSO role	X	
The prescription for the SDE role	X	
Legislative - SBE boundaries	X	
<u>Variations in initiative in legislature</u>	X	
<u>What Policy Ideas are Deemed Unacceptable?</u>		
Policies that trample on powerful interests		X
Policies that lead to open defiance		X
Policies that defy tradition and dominant interests		X
Policy debates that diverge from the prevailing value		X
<u>Untested "unworkable" policy</u>		X
<u>What Uses of Power in Policymaking Activities are Appropriate?</u>		
Know your place and cooperate with the powerful	X	
Something for everyone	X	
Touch all the bases	X	
Bet on the winner	X	
Limits on social relationships	X	
Constraints on staffers	X	
Work with constraints and tricks		X
Policy actors sponsorship of policy issue network		X
<u>Uses of interstate comparison</u>		X
<u>What are the Special State Condition Affecting Policy?</u>		
Cultural characteristics		X
Geographical demographic characteristics		X



Figure 10

Assumptive Worlds Fit With Other Approached to Understanding Policy Making

---





FIGURE 4


Dynamics of the Thruput Process



From: EDUCATIONAL POLICY-MAKING AND THE STATE LEGISLATURE:  
THE NEW YORK EXPERIENCE by Mike M. Milstein and  
Robert E. Jennings. New York: Praeger Publishers,  
1973.

**Figure 5 State Education Structure and Function Charts**

I. State of ALASKA



II. State of CALIFORNIA

