

**The Cultural Divide in Europe:
Migration, Multiculturalism, and Political Trust**

Lauren M. McLaren*
Associate Professor of Politics
Director, Centre for the Study of European Governance
University of Nottingham
School of Politics and International Relations
Nottingham NG7 2RD
United Kingdom
e-mail: lauren.mclaren@nottingham.ac.uk
Phone: +44 (0) 115 846 7511
Fax: +44 (0) 115 951 4859

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Abstract

One of the defining features of modern states is their incorporation of notions of political and social community based on shared language, history, and myths. However, large numbers of citizens in modern states have come to believe their national communities are under threat from several modern forces, including immigration. Using the European Social Survey (2002-2009), this paper explores the extent to which perceived threats posed by large-scale immigration undermine national political communities by reducing trust in national politicians and political institutions. The findings indicate that even after controlling for other predictors of trust in the political system, concerns about the effect of immigration on the national community have an impact on trust in politics. Moreover, having a lengthy post-war history with mass immigration mediates this effect, while the potentially mobilizing effects of far-right parties on the relationship between concern about immigration and political distrust are somewhat limited.

Since the end of World War II, immigration has become one of the most divisive issues on the political agendas of western democracies. Many individuals in European democracies express unease or outright concern with the potential effects of migration to their countries while others in these countries are less uneasy or even welcoming toward newcomers. Ultimately, these divisions are unlikely to be solely about immigration but also about fundamental questions regarding how the nation-state should be constituted—does it need to remain closed to outside cultures and influences or can it absorb or incorporate these? These divisions have implications for voting and party systems, particularly with the rise of the far-right in many European countries;¹ in addition, research indicates that whichever side of this division holds government power can make a difference to immigration and immigrant policymaking.² This article contends that in the modern mass-immigration states of Europe, such divides also affect how individuals perceive the key political institutions of their nation-states, as well as the politicians running those institutions. Specifically, the article argues that public divisions over immigration affect trust in politicians and political institutions, and that this relationship is not simply an artifact of general dissatisfaction nor necessarily solely a result of far-right mobilization activities.

The paper begins by briefly discussing the focus of the analysis—distrust in politics. It then outlines why divisions over immigration and multiculturalism are likely to affect political trust. Although this article does not contend that negative perceptions about the impact of immigration are the only drivers of political distrust—and indeed, later sections of the article discuss some of the other explanations offered in academic literature—it is contended here that this is an overlooked variable that is likely to have significant effects on perceptions of the political system in the modern day. After

explaining why this is expected to be the case, the article then discusses how contextual variables may be expected to affect this relationship, particularly history of immigration and far-right mobilization. The article then discusses the key alternative explanations for political trust found in the academic literature, and after this, the methods and data used in the analysis. The hypotheses proposed in previous sections are then tested using multi-level modeling on the four waves of the European Social Survey. The findings indicate that even after controlling for other predictors of trust in the political system, divisions about the effects of immigration on the national community are related to trust in politics. In addition, it appears that this relationship is partly mediated by the history of migration to the country: on average, in countries where there has been a long history of post-World-War-II immigration, the impact of concern about immigration on trust in politics is stronger than in countries with more recent experiences with being countries of immigration. On the other hand, the potential for mobilization of concerns about immigration and political distrust by strong far-right parties is more limited than might be expected.

Political Trust

Political trust is crucial to effective policymaking, compliance with government regulations, and engagement in civically moral behavior.³ It is also thought to be crucial to the representative relationship that lies at the heart of most democratic regimes.⁴ Thus, understanding the causes of political distrust is important. What do we mean by “political trust” or “distrust,” though?

Expressions of trust in a political institution may be affirmations that on average the agents operating within those institutions will prove trustworthy, or that the democratic

institutions serve to select relatively trustworthy agents.⁵ Alternatively, “an expression of trust in government (or synonymously political confidence and support) is a summary judgment that the system is responsive and will do what is right even in the absence of constant scrutiny.”⁶

Easton’s distinction between diffuse and specific system support is also pertinent to our understanding of political trust. On the one hand, diffuse support can be understood as a deep-seated set of attitudes toward politics and the political system that is relatively impervious to change.⁷ On the other hand, specific support pertains to the actions and performance of government or political elites. In a stable political system, it is assumed that short-term policy failures should not directly erode diffuse regime support or support for the political community as a whole.

Although this distinction between diffuse and specific support may seem fairly apparent, measuring it is less than clear-cut. When citizens express trust or confidence in their national parliaments, presidencies, or governments, does this provide a reasonable measure of general orientations to institutions and elites or is it solely measuring attitudes toward current leaders and policies?⁸ Comparative analyses indicate that although individual-level perceptions of current authorities and attitudes to other aspects of the political system—e.g., its institutions—are related to one another, perceptions of institutions appear to be empirically distinct from perceptions of current government officials.⁹

This article is particularly concerned with general orientations toward political institutions and elites, and based on these comparative analyses, it is assumed that indicators of trust and confidence can validly tell us something meaningful about these general orientations. Given that such items are, in fact, likely to tap into both types of

support, in order to try to eliminate the likelihood that the findings here solely pertain to specific support, this article (a) investigates multiple indicators of political trust to determine how generalized our findings are across targets of trust and (b) controls for known predictors of specific support. In terms of (a), the indicators of political trust analyzed here refer to parliaments, politicians, and legal systems (see below). It would not necessarily be expected that the predictors of trust in each of would be similar—particularly trust in the legal system vis-à-vis parliament and politicians—unless they were all tapping into general system support. In terms of (b), after controlling for the known predictors of specific support, it is expected that any remaining covariance (once these predictors are included in the model) is likely to tell us something about diffuse support, although it must be acknowledged that the findings may ultimately refer to both specific and diffuse support. Before discussing the measures of political trust further, the article first outlines why it is expected that divisions over the impact of immigration on the national community will be related to political trust.

Concern About Immigration and Political Trust

A distinguishing feature of modern states—particularly modern European states—is that they were built upon notions of shared identity and values. While modern advances in transportation and printing as well as increased state-led nation-building activities clearly helped in the process of constructing national identities,¹⁰ some contend that “the presence of a core *ethnie* around which strong states could be built” made the creation of nations possible.¹¹ That is, strong states have been built around shared cultural heritage and norms. Research on modern perceptions of national identity points to the conclusion that these identities, including their civic, ethnic and cultural components are still

extremely relevant to citizens of European countries.¹² In addition, social identity analysis has highlighted the importance of identities—even artificially constructed laboratory-based identities—and contended that they contribute positively to self-esteem and self-image and help to provide clarity in a complex, confusing world.¹³ Established identities like national identities would thus seem to be even more relevant and powerful than those constructed in laboratories by social psychology researchers. For some, immigrants pose strong threats to these identities by bringing with them seemingly different values and ways of life; they may also be seen as threatening to the economic resources of fellow countrymen and women.¹⁴ Newcomers who may be perceived as holding extremely different values from those of natives—Muslim migrants vis-à-vis a predominantly secular Britain or France, for instance—may be particularly difficult to reconcile with existing national identities. In short, notions of nationhood and citizenship attempt to distinguish those who belong and those who do not. This may have the effect of fostering fear of those with whom we do not share common identity.¹⁵ In the modern mass-immigration states of Europe, immigration also divides natives between those who perceive the state as being unable to accommodate newcomers and those who believe that it can accommodate such newcomers.¹⁶

The difficulty of coming to terms with new migrants and differences in perceptions about whether newcomers are problematical for the maintenance of the national society or not, in turn, have potential implications for political systems. Political systems are thought to not work well if individuals in the system are not “sufficiently oriented toward one another” and willing to support the existence of a group of individuals who can negotiate and settle differences.¹⁷ Some research has already come to the conclusion that immigration and multiculturalism *may* create problems for the former

of these conditions (i.e., orientation toward one another), although it must be noted that the evidence is somewhat mixed.¹⁸ Immigration, or more specifically, *perceptions* of the impact of migration, may also create problems for the latter. That is, negative perceptions of the impact of immigration may reduce willingness to support the existence of a group of individuals who can engage in policymaking and willingness to support the institutions through which these groups of elites govern. This is because feelings of disunity are not likely to apply solely to feelings of citizens for one another but are also likely to extend to feelings about the elites in this community and the way the community is governed. Consistent with this idea is the fact that evidence already indicates that individuals tend to be increasingly less favorable toward using the institutions of the state to reduce poverty and provide welfare *as a result of perceptions of cultural differences between groups who access these services*.¹⁹ Moreover, it has been argued that many European democratic political systems have been layered onto pre-existing cultural connections—indeed, many would contend that democratic political systems arose in Europe partly as a result of the development of feelings of national community and the demands of this community for a more representative political system.²⁰ Thus, those who perceive that immigration is a threat to this community are likely to feel a weaker connection to elites and institutions which were originally designed to govern a national community. More specifically, though, they are likely to distrust that elites and institutions are adequately protecting this community from the potentially major changes to cultural composition and economic competition that they perceive are likely to result from large-scale immigration. That is, when it comes to immigration, those most concerned about it may feel that their political system (the elites and institutions) has “sold out” (or let the public down) by failing to

protect the national community from the potentially disruptive and divisive force of immigration.

In sum, large-scale mass immigration clearly creates widespread concern about political and social community and about social identities.²¹ Under pre-mass-immigration conceptualizations of national identity to which many Europeans still subscribe, it is assumed that the institutions through which elites governed the national polity were designed to govern and adjudicate between members of the *national* community. If individuals perceive newcomers as a threat to that community, the institutions that govern these individuals are likely to be called into question: those most worried about the effects of newcomers on the national community may question the extent to which national political institutions exist to represent a national citizenry in the multicultural state. In addition, individuals are likely to blame their political elites and institutions for allowing large-scale migration in the first place and thus feel negatively about these elites and institutions as a result. While some of the existing research mentioned above hints at the connection between immigration and perceptions of political systems, there is still only very limited academic investigation of this relationship.²² The analysis here takes a step towards filling this gap. Thus, the first proposition to be investigated is as follows.

Proposition 1 *Individuals expressing most concern about the impact of immigration on the national community will be most distrustful of politicians and political institutions.*

Contextual Effects: The History of Migration and the Far Right

Based on the discussion above, it might be expected that levels of migration would be significantly related to political trust. However, in the past three decades *all* countries of Western Europe have become countries of immigration. That is, they are all experiencing high levels of influxes of economic migrants, asylum seekers, and other newcomers. Historically, though, this experience has been extremely varied, with Southern Europe and Ireland initially not being prime destinations for migrants; this began to change in the 1980s and 1990s, with Spain, Portugal, Italy, and Greece receiving large numbers of migrants from North Africa and from Central/Eastern Europe in the case of Greece. In recent years, Ireland has also become a key destination for immigrants.²³ Thus, ultimately, all of Western Europe now shares the experience of large-scale mass immigration from outside of Europe, and so all West European nation-states are presented with this same difficulty of how to incorporate newcomers into the polity. This also means that all citizens of West European nation-states are likely to have had to come to terms with their own feelings regarding whether newcomers are detrimental or helpful to the national political and socio-economic systems. The limited effects of actual immigrant numbers on these perceptions is reflected in the fact that actual numbers of migrants to a country appear to have very little impact on perceptions of migrants in the most recent decade, and a very limited relationship to perceptions of actual levels of migration to the country.²⁴ In short, given the now-shared experience across Western Europe with large-scale migration and the vast divergence between actual levels of migration and perceptions of migration, it is unclear as to whether actual levels of migration should have an affect on perceptions of the political system either.

It is possible that the history of migration to the country will affect political trust, though, and, more specifically, will affect the relationship between concern about

immigration and political trust. Why might this be the case? The reasons for the expected connection between concern about immigration and political trust outlined above highlight a process in which citizens are becoming disconnected from their state institutions because of increasing perceptions of non-nationals sharing in the state's spoils and eventually in its political decisions. This is not likely to be a sudden transformation of perceptions, as, for instance, when individuals respond relatively rapidly to economic downturns, but instead is likely to be a gradual process as generations of citizens come to terms with the implications of immigration for their states. In addition, in longer-term immigration countries, several generations of citizens have now had the opportunity to reflect on their perceptions of the impact of newcomers on their societies. This, in turn, is likely to reflect the lengthier public debates on the effects of immigration in these countries, with citizens developing firmer views about whether immigrants are positive or negative for the country and clearer perceptions of the implications of immigration for the political system as a whole.²⁵

Moreover, in terms of specific blame of government for allowing large-scale migration in the first place, there is a significant difference between the longer-term countries of immigration and the more recent countries of immigration regarding how immigration to these countries began in the first place and why it continued in successive periods. Namely, most of the longer-term countries of immigration actively engaged in helping to recruit migrant workers. Thus, the reason for the existence of Germany's large Turkish population can be directly connected to government policies in the first instance; the same is true for Britain's Pakistani, Afro-Caribbean and Indian populations (although colonial ties also played a part in the choice of recruitment centers in the case of Britain). In addition, although there have been periods of economic recession in which these

countries have (mostly unsuccessfully) attempted to halt the high levels of immigration, there have also been periods of growth in more recent decades that have led governments to allow further migration to fill gaps in the labor market. These policies can be contrasted with those of the newer immigration countries, where there has been no such active recruitment on the part of governments, with immigrants arriving for a very different set of reasons, namely the rapid increase in economic development in these countries, the increased difficulty at times of gaining access to the more developed European countries, and in some of the countries, the large informal economy, which is attractive to those travelling to Europe clandestinely.²⁶ That is, there has not been an active attempt by these governments to recruit labor from abroad, so it may be more difficult for citizens to blame government policies for immigration. In this sense, immigration is likely to be viewed as being something that simply happens, with people having less of a clear or focused sense of government being culpable in this process. *Ceteris paribus*, it is thus expected that the group of countries with longer histories of post-war immigration may experience higher levels of political distrust than countries with shorter histories of being countries of immigration and that this variable may mediate the effect of concern about immigration on political trust.²⁷ Therefore, the second and third propositions to be investigated are:

Proposition 2 *Individuals living in long-term “countries of immigration” will be the most distrusting of politicians and political institutions.*

Proposition 3 *Individuals living in long-term “countries of immigration” and who*

*are most concerned about migration will be the most distrustful of politicians and political institutions.*²⁸

As mentioned above, far-right parties have been on the rise in Europe in great part because of anti-immigration sentiment. Ivarsflaten, for instance, finds that the key factor uniting successful right-wing parties in Europe is mobilization of anti-immigration sentiment.²⁹ Many of these same parties also attempt to mobilize hostility to “the political class.” Thus, it is possible that (a) distrust in politics is higher where far-right parties have managed to successfully wage such campaigns and that (b) the relationship between concern about immigration and distrust in politics may be mediated by the mobilizing ability of far-right parties. Therefore, the fourth and fifth propositions to be investigated are:

Proposition 4 *Individuals living in countries with a strong far-right presence will be most distrustful of politicians and political institutions.*

Proposition 5 *The relationship between concern about immigration and political distrust will be stronger in countries where there is a strong far-right presence.*³⁰

Note that the measurement of all these variables is discussed in the Appendix.

Political Distrust: Alternative Explanations

It might be contended that any relationship found between concern about immigration and political distrust is spuriously driven by other factors. The analysis controls for many of these factors here. One that may be of particular importance is the individual's general outlook on life. For instance, it may be the case that some individuals are simply more negatively disposed toward most ideas which they may encounter and so the coincidence of negative perceptions of immigrants and negative perceptions of politics may be a result of this more general negative predisposition or outlook.³¹ In addition, early research on perceptions of politics pointed to factors like anomie, or normlessness related to personal insecurity (which, in turn, is connected to a loss of intrinsic values that give meaning and direction to life), in explaining attitudes toward politics.³² That is, it is perhaps not just general pessimism that may explain negativity toward immigrants and toward politics but also the more modern phenomenon of general alienation. Although the analysis is unable to control entirely for these potential factors, it does control for general unhappiness and dissatisfaction with life. In addition, controls are also included for the frequency of meeting with friends, primarily as an indicator of social capital (see the discussion below), but also because it is likely to capture some degree of alienation and thus anomie.

Existing academic literature points to several other explanations for differing levels of political trust and distrust as well. The multivariate analyses below incorporate controls for many of these variables. For instance, scholars have linked distrust in politics to social capital, including voluntary and other informal participatory networks and interpersonal trust.³³ Controls for social capital are included in the multivariate models below, using interpersonal trust and the frequency of meeting with friends as indicators of social capital.³⁴

In addition, many researchers have pointed to the role of economics in explaining differences in individual-level and aggregate-level perceptions of political institutions. If the economy is performing poorly or if people perceive that the national economy or their own personal economic circumstances are declining (or are likely to decline), support for political institutions and leaders is likely to be reduced, at least in the short-term.³⁵

Controls are therefore included for perceptions of national and personal economic situations and actual economic circumstances at both the country- and individual-level (see the Appendix).

Perceptions of the functioning of political institutions are also important: if governments are perceived to be fair and open, if politicians can be held accountable, and if individuals perceive governments to be performing well along various policy dimensions, individuals are more likely to trust.³⁶ In addition, one of the main findings in recent analyses of attitudes to government institutions has been that the actual functioning of political institutions has strong bearing on how individuals perceive those institutions.³⁷ Corruption, absence of the rule of law, poor public service provision, inefficient bureaucracy, and institutional instability are likely to mean that citizens are less trusting in political institutions and elites. Thus, where possible, controls for perceptions of institutional policy performance and actual performance have been included in the models below (see the Appendix).³⁸

Analyses also point to the effects of being electoral “losers”—i.e., voting for a party that fails to get into government—and indicate that electoral losers may lose some degree of confidence in the political system, at least in the short-term, with winners having a more positive attitude to the political system.³⁹ Controls are therefore incorporated for this variable.

In addition, the models control for having voted for a far-right party in the most recent general election, and left-right self placement. Taken together, these variables are likely to be strong proxies for any potential automatic correlation between concern about immigration and political distrust resulting from ideological confluence of these attitudes. Left-right self-placement is likely to capture the potential ideological confluence between political dissatisfaction and hostility to immigration, with those on the far-right expected to be more negative about political institutions and politicians *and* about immigration, and those who actually voted for the far-right are, of course, very likely to be hostile to immigration and to politics because of ideas stoked by far-right party rhetoric (as discussed above).

In terms of additional controls included in the analysis, it is possible that the long-term-country-of-immigration variable is capturing cross-national differences other than those intended. For instance, governance quality in the shorter term immigration countries may, on average, be lower than in longer-term immigration countries. As noted above, the analysis here controls for governance quality (again, see the Appendix for the measure of this). In addition, the group of countries that have not been long-term countries of immigration are likely to have a different level of welfare protection than longer-term countries of immigration like Sweden, Denmark, the Netherlands and the UK. That is, the long-term country-of-immigration dummy variable may produce a spurious result because it is capturing differences in social welfare protection. A control is introduced for this variable in the analysis below.

Thus, any relationship between concern about immigration and distrust in politics that remains after including all of these controls is the relationship *taking into account these potential causes of spuriousness*—general pessimism, alienation, automatic

ideological confluence of political distrust and concern about immigration, including individual-level support for the far-right, being an electoral winner, perceptions of government performance, perceptions of the economy, and social capital. As discussed above, the analysis further incorporates country-level data on the mobilizing effect of far-right parties, thus controlling for this potential source of spuriousness as well. The analysis further controls for household income, age, education, and gender.⁴⁰ It is expected that with the many predictors of specific support included in the model—particularly winning and losing, perceptions of government performance, and perceptions of the economy—at least some of the remaining covariation between concerns about immigration and political trust will be connected to more general orientations toward the political system and will not be solely limited to attitudes toward the current government.

The Analysis: Univariate and Bivariate

The analysis conducted in this paper is based on the European Social Survey, Rounds 1 through 4 (available at <http://www.europeansocialsurvey.org/>).⁴¹ The dependent variable, political distrust, is measured via an 11-point scale presented to respondents after the following statement: “Using this card, please tell me on a score of 0-10 how much you personally trust each of the institutions I read out. 0 means you do not trust an institution at all, and 10 means you have complete trust. [country]’s parliament? the legal system? politicians?” The coding for these items was reversed so that high values represent higher levels of distrust.⁴² As discussed above, if a relationship is found between concern about immigration and political distrust across these multiple indicators of the latter, this will be taken as a potential indication that the effects are unlikely to be limited to specific support for the particular set of incumbents in power at the time of the survey (and this is

precisely why the three indicators have not been combined into a single index here). Also note that the analysis excludes the newer democracies of Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) because it is likely that the survey questions about immigration capture a very different phenomenon in the CEE countries than in Western Europe, particularly attitudes to co-nationals coming from neighboring countries as a result of historical border changes.⁴³

Table 1 provides the means and standard deviations for each of the indicators of political distrust.⁴⁴ The overall mean scores indicate that distrust of politicians is higher on average than distrust of parliament or the legal system. The means also point to relatively higher levels of distrust of parliament in Portugal, Germany, and the UK, with lower levels of distrust in Denmark, Finland, Sweden, Norway, Switzerland, and the Netherlands, providing some support for the idea that the relationship between political distrust and *actual* levels of immigration is not likely to be very strong, as discussed above.⁴⁵ The cross-national differences in scores for distrust in politicians and the legal system are roughly similar to those for distrust of parliament. In terms of individual-level bivariate correlations between concern about immigration and distrust in politics (analysis not shown), the average Pearson correlation coefficient between these is 0.29 (across all of the indicators of political trust), but this ranges from 0.38 for distrust in parliament in Norway, with similarly high correlations in Britain, Belgium, the Netherlands, and Sweden, to lows of 0.16 to 0.21 in Southern Europe and Ireland. The Pearson correlation coefficients for politicians and the legal system have a similar pattern, providing initial support for Proposition 3 (i.e., a weaker relationship between concern about immigration and political trust in newer immigration countries). At the country-level, the correlation between level of concern about immigration and political distrust

(Pearson's r) ranges from 0.51 in the case of distrust of the legal system to 0.70 for distrust of parliament. That is, the relationship is fairly strong. This is compared to the correlation between distrust of the European Parliament and concern about immigration, for instance, which is only 0.20 and is not statistically significant (whereas the former Pearson correlation coefficients are statistically significant). This implies that the connection between concern about immigration and political distrust appears to be limited to perceptions of *national* institutions. This may be taken as one indication that the relationship between concern about immigration and distrust of national institutions and politicians is not spuriously driven by general unhappiness, dissatisfaction, etc. since the relationship between immigration concern and distrust of the EP should be as strong as (or stronger than) the relationship between the former and distrust of national politicians and institutions if another variable was driving the relationship.⁴⁶

[Table 1 about here]

Multivariate Analyses

The multivariate analyses are conducted using HLM on the four rounds of the ESS. Given that some of the variables discussed above are measured at the country level (specifically, history with migration, far-right mobilization, economic conditions, quality of governance, and level of social welfare protection), and that the four rounds of the ESS have been combined, a technique that takes into account the potential underestimation of standard errors because of lack of uniqueness across observations is required. Multi-level modeling is used here to solve this problem,⁴⁷ using a three-level model with the individual at Level 1, variables that are measured at the country level and which vary

across the four rounds of the ESS (country-round) at Level 2,⁴⁸ and variables measured at the country-level that do not vary across the four rounds at Level 3.⁴⁹ In order to further guarantee robustness, the analysis also controls for the ESS round using dummy variables.

A model with none of the theoretical predictors included was first estimated, in order to examine the variance components of the dependent variable. The model examined is:

$$\text{Distrust}_{ijk} = \pi_{0jk} + e_{ijk} \quad (1)$$

where

$$\pi_{0jk} = \beta_{00k} + r_{0jk}$$

and where

$$\beta_{00k} = \gamma_{000} + u_{00k}$$

The top portion of Table 2 illustrates the variance components across the three indicators of the dependent variable. As seen there, most of the variance in distrust across all indicators of the latter is at the individual-level, with only 1 percent at Level 2 and 8-12 percent at Level 3. The remaining sections of the table illustrate the amount of variance at each level that is explained with each subsequent model presented below.

[Table 2 about here]

The model containing the Level 1 independent variables to be estimated is as follows:

$$\text{Distrust}_{ijk} = \pi_{0jk} + \pi_{1jk} \text{Concern about Immigration}_{ijk} \dots + e_{ijk} \quad (2)$$

Equation 3 illustrates the effect of Level 2 variables on the intercept of Equation 2.

$$\pi_{0jk} = \beta_{00k} + \beta_{01k} \text{Far-right Popularity}_{jk} + \beta_{02k} \text{Social welfare spending}_{jk} + r_{0jk} \quad (3)$$

Equation 4 illustrates the effect of Level 3 variables on the intercept in Equation 3.

$$\begin{aligned} \beta_{00k} = & \gamma_{000} + \gamma_{001} \text{Long-term Country of Migration}_k + \gamma_{002} \text{Governance Quality}_k + \\ & \gamma_{003} \text{GDP/capita}_k + \gamma_{004} \text{Unemployment}_k + u_{00k} \end{aligned} \quad (4)$$

Equation 5 illustrates the effect of popular far-right parties on the slope of concern about immigration in Equation 2:

$$\pi_{1jk} = \beta_{10k} + \beta_{11k} \text{Far-right Popularity}_{jk} + r_{1jk} \quad (5)$$

Equation 6 illustrates the effect of being a long-term country of migration on the slope of concern about immigration in Equations 2 and 5:

$$\beta_{10k} = \gamma_{100} + \gamma_{101} \text{Long-term Country of Migration}_k + u_{10k} \quad (6)$$

Table 3 reports the coefficients for the three-level model excluding any interaction effects. These results indicate that after controlling for fairly powerful predictors of distrust in politics, concern about immigration has a statistically significant effect on

distrust in politics, with maximum effects of 1.7 on the 11-point measure of distrust in parliament, 1.3 on distrust in politicians, and 1.4 on distrust of the legal system. Other relatively strong effects include dissatisfaction with the country's economy, interpersonal (dis)trust, and dissatisfaction with the health and education systems in the country. Indeed the former of these (dissatisfaction with the country's economy) has stronger effects than concern about immigration across all three indicators of political distrust, and the strength of the latter three variables is roughly similar to that of concern about immigration. Amongst the weaker effects in the model are dissatisfaction with one's personal income and one's actual income, the winner effect, voting for a far-right party in the most recent general election, left-right self-placement, frequency of meeting with friends, general unhappiness, dissatisfaction with life, household income, age, education, and gender (see the Appendix for the range and coding of each of these). In short, although not the strongest effect in the model, concern about immigration is far from being the weakest either.

[Table 3 about here]

Perhaps more interesting is that concern about immigration continues to display a significant relationship with political distrust after controlling in particular for unhappiness, life dissatisfaction, voting for a far-right party *and* left-right self-placement. This is important because—as discussed above—the latter two variables capture some of the potential ideological confluence of the two issues of immigration and distrust that have been witnessed in many European countries and the former two capture general pessimism. That is, even after taking into account this potential automatic correspondence

via voting for the far-right and via left-right self-placement, as well as pessimism, attitudes to the economy, and attitudes to government provision of health and educational services, the effect of concern about immigration on political trust remains.

Amongst the Level 2 and Level 3 variables, the only ones that achieve even the most basic generally accepted level of statistical significance ($p \leq 0.05$) are: social protection expenditure, which reduces distrust across all three indicators of the dependent variable; being a long-term country of immigration, which increases distrust in parliament, as predicted; and GDP/capita, which is (unexpectedly) associated with increased distrust in parliament. Political distrust does not, however, appear to be driven by the level of popularity of far right parties, quality of governance, or unemployment level.⁵⁰

The variance components results reported in Table 2 indicate that the model in Table 3 accounts for approximately 19-24 percent of the variance in the dependent variable at the individual level, 20-60 percent of the variance at Level 2 (country-round), and 67-95 percent of the variance at Level 3 (the country level).

The hypothesized interactive effects discussed above will now be estimated. Because of the potentially severe multicollinearity produced by including too many interactive terms in the model (particularly since concern about immigration is included in all of these interactions), each of the interactive effects discussed above—concern about immigration interacted with the long-term country of immigration dummy and with far-right popularity—was estimated separately. Tables 4 and 5 display the coefficients for each of these interactive terms. Both interactions are statistically significant except in the case of far-right popularity and distrust of politicians. The effects of these interactions are displayed in Figures 1 and 2.⁵¹ The interaction between concern about immigration and

being a long-term country of immigration is as predicted (Figure 1). In countries with long post-war immigration experiences, differences over whether immigrants pose a problem for the nation-state also seem to play a role in dividing those who have less or more confidence in political institutions and elites. Note that the level of social welfare protection also plays an independent role in reducing political distrust in these models.

[Tables 4 & 5 and Figures 1 & 2 about here]

For far-right popularity, there is very little difference between countries with strong far-right parties and those without these parties, in terms of the relationship between concern about immigration and distrust of politics. However, the relationship is slightly stronger where there is a popular far-right party, as expected, and the effect is most powerful in the case of distrust of the legal system (see Figure 2).⁵²

The empirical analyses thus generally confirm Propositions 1 and 3, and provide weak support for Proposition 5; Proposition 2 received support in the case of distrust of parliament and Proposition 4 was not supported. Clearly then, divisions regarding the impact of immigration on the national community do appear to divide Europeans regarding their perceptions of the political systems, with those who think immigration is having a detrimental effect on the national community also appearing to feel more strongly that their national political systems are failing them. It is argued here that this is likely to be because these political systems are perceived to be failing to carry out the most basic of functions, protection of the national community. Those who feel more positively about the impact of immigration, however, also remain more positive about the political system as a whole. Moreover, the fact that the relationship holds for perceptions

of politicians, parliament and legal systems indicates that the effect of concern about immigration is likely to pertain to perceptions of the political system as a whole rather than just to the individuals running the system or to elected institutions. In addition, this effect is more pronounced in countries with long histories of post-war immigration, where the impact of immigration presumably has been the subject of debate far longer and where governments initially engaged in active recruitment of migrant labor. The effect is also slightly more powerful in countries with a strong far-right presence, although it is important to note that it also exists where the far-right is weaker as well.

Because of the potential for endogeneity here—particularly that the key independent variable, concern about immigration, may, in fact, be caused by the dependent variable, political distrust—an instrumental variables analysis has been conducted using the first round of the European Social Survey, where adequate instruments could be found for concern about immigration. The results of the multi-level analysis using the instrumental variables confirm those reported above. (These results will be provided upon request.) It should be noted that the author has also investigated the issue of causal order in the British case using the panel component of British Election Studies data for both 2001 and 2005 and these findings further confirm that causality does run in the direction hypothesized here.⁵³ The implications of these findings will now be discussed in the conclusion.

Conclusions

This article has argued that one of the potential consequences of concern about immigration is negative perceptions of political institutions and politicians and that this relationship is not simply spurious and may not simply be a result of far-right rhetoric,

pessimism or unhappiness. Instead, the construction of the modern European state, with its emphasis on common culture and identity, has made it extraordinarily difficult for many citizens in these states to reconcile the functioning of their national political systems with the incorporation of newcomers who are perceived not to share the same culture and values and are perceived to be having a negative impact on the economic prospects of fellow countrymen and –women. That is, concern about immigration is not simply accidentally or coincidentally related to political distrust but is likely to be one of the causes of the latter. That the effects appear for elected officials and an elected institution (parliament) as well as an unelected branch of the political system, the legal system, provides some indication that these effects may not be limited solely to blame of the current government of the day, but instead may pertain to more general system support. The findings also indicate that this divide is stronger in countries with longer post-war experiences with immigration.

Also of interest here are the weaker findings, particularly for the Level 2 variables. Namely, far-right mobilization appears to have more limited effects on the relationship between concern about immigration and political trust than might be expected. The relationship between concern about immigration and political distrust appears to exist *regardless of the presence or absence of powerful far-right parties*, lending further support to the argument of the paper, which is that many Europeans generally have fears about the impact of immigration on their national communities and that in many cases, this weakens their feelings of connectedness to their political systems and elites and leads them to feel negatively about a political system that appears to be failing to protect the national community. This relationship is *not* necessarily solely

stoked by the far-right, but does seem to be stronger in countries with longer experiences with post-World-War-II migration.

The effect of reduced trust, in turn is potentially very serious, in that positive orientations toward political systems make governance possible, as discussed above. That is, the perceived threat posed by immigration presents the prospect of some degree of weakening of governments and governance because of the increasing disconnectedness between political elites and institutions on the one hand and citizens on the other.

Some of the potential confounding explanations for this relationship deserve further exploration in future research. For instance, it is possible that modern life is increasingly associated not just with large-scale immigration but also with phenomena such as alienation and anomie, which as discussed above, may be producing negative reactions to immigration and to political institutions. Although the analysis presented here has attempted to control for this possibility, more work on this could be done using better indicators of these constructs. The same is true for personality factors and general outlook like optimism and pessimism. In addition, it is important to note that the analysis points to the conclusion that a higher level of social welfare protection helps to reduce political distrust; it may thus be the case that government adoption of these types of policies can ameliorate some of the negative effects of concern about immigration. More work on this possibility could also be fruitful. At the very least, however, this article has highlighted the need to consider the potentially negative effects that public concern about immigration may be having on perceptions of political systems in Europe.

Appendix: Measurement of Variables in the Analysis

Level 1 Variables (all in the European Social Survey, Rounds 1-4)

Distrust in politics Using this card, please tell me on a score of 0-10 how much you personally trust each of the institutions I read out. 0 means you do not trust an institution at all, and 10 means you have complete trust. Firstly...READ OUT [country]'s parliament? the legal system? politicians? The coding of these items was reversed such that high scores represent *distrust*.

Concern about immigration Would you say it is generally bad or good for [country]'s economy that people come to live here from other countries? Please use this card. Bad for the economy (0), Good for the economy (10). And, using this card, would you say that [country]'s cultural life is generally undermined or enriched by people coming to live here from other countries? Cultural life undermined (0), Cultural life enriched (10). Is [country] made a worse or a better place to live by people coming to live here from other countries? Please use this card. Worse place (0), Better place (10) The coding of all three of these items was reversed and the items were combined into a single index, with values ranging from 0 to 10, which was the average score given by each respondent for all three items. Inter-item correlation (Pearson's r) ranged from 0.58 to 0.65. Average Cronbach's alpha was 0.83 (minimum alpha was 0.75 for the Netherlands). The items also load onto a single factor in every country. Note that these items were chosen because they are the ones available across all four rounds of the ESS. However, the items appear to capture the main relevant concerns related to immigration—economic and identity concerns,⁵⁴ plus the more general worries about the impact of immigration on the country.

Unhappiness: Taking all things together, how happy would you say you are? Please use this card. Extremely unhappy (0) Extremely happy (10). The coding of this item was reversed such that high values represent *unhappiness*.

Dissatisfied with life: All things considered, how satisfied are you with your life as a whole nowadays? Please answer using this card, where 0 means extremely dissatisfied and 10 means extremely satisfied. Extremely dissatisfied (0) Extremely satisfied (10). The coding of this item was reversed such that high values represent *dissatisfaction*.

Social Capital: Frequency of meeting with friends Using this card, how often do you meet socially with friends, relatives or work colleagues? Never (1) Less than once a month (2) Once a month (3) Several times a month (4) Once a week (5) Several times a week (6) Every day (7). The coding of this item was reversed such that high values represent *rarely meeting with friends*.

Social Capital: Interpersonal (dis)trust A8 CARD 3: Using this card, generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted, or that you can't be too careful in dealing with people? Please tell me on a score of 0 to 10, where 0 means you can't be too careful and 10 means that most people can be trusted. A9 CARD 4: Using this card, do you think that most people would try to take advantage of you if they got the chance, or would they try to be fair? Most people would try to take advantage of me (0) Most people would try to be fair (10). A10 CARD 5: Would you say that most of the time people try to be helpful or that they are mostly looking out for themselves? Please use this card. People mostly look out for themselves (0) People mostly try to be helpful (10).

The coding of all three of these items was reversed and the items were combined into a single index, with values ranging from 0 to 10, which was the average score given by each respondent for all three items. Inter-item correlation (Pearson's r) ranged from 0.48 to 0.58; Cronbach's alpha was 0.76 and factor analysis confirmed that the items all load onto a single factor.

Perceptions of Economic Performance Unfortunately, the ESS does not contain the array of indicators necessary for distinguishing between pocketbook versus sociotropic and retrospective versus prospective economic evaluations, so we rely on the following two indicators of perceptions of economic performance. "On the whole how satisfied are you with the present state of the economy in [country]"? Extremely Dissatisfied (0), Extremely satisfied (10) The coding of this item was reversed such that high values represent *dissatisfaction*; "Which of the descriptions on this card comes closest to how you feel about your household's income nowadays?" Living comfortably on present income(1) Coping on present income(2) Finding it difficult on present income(3) Finding it very difficult on present income(4).

Perceptions of Government Performance: Dissatisfied with health services and education system Still using this card, please say what you think overall about the state of health services in [country] nowadays? Extremely bad (0) Extremely good (10). The coding of this item was reversed such that high values represent *dissatisfaction*. Now, using this card, please say what you think overall about the state of education in [country] nowadays? Extremely bad (0) Extremely good (10). The coding of this item was reversed such that high values represent *dissatisfaction*.

Winning and losing Respondents who claim to have voted for a party that was in government at the time of the survey were given a code of 1; those who voted for parties not in the government were coded 0. Note that in a handful of the counties, elections were held in the midst of the ESS fieldwork. If the government changed after these elections, then winning and losing parties subsequently changed for the purposes of coding this variable, as appropriate.

Voted for far-right (anti-immigration) party in last general election Information regarding which parties held opposition to immigration as one of their key party platforms in each country and for the various years of the ESS was compiled as discussed below, and respondents who claim to have voted for one of these parties in the most recent general election before the conduct of fieldwork were given a code of 1; everyone else was given a code of 0. If, as was the case in a few countries, an election was held in the midst of the ESS fieldwork, the relevant election used for this coding changed, as appropriate.

Other Controls

Left-right self-placement: In politics people sometimes talk of “left” and “right.” Using this card, where would you place yourself on this scale, where 0 means the left and 10 means the right?

Household income: Using this card, please tell me which letter describes your household's total income, after tax and compulsory deductions, from all sources? If you don't know the exact figure, please give an estimate. Use the part of the card that you

know best: weekly, monthly or annual. Note that in the Cumulative Round 1-3 file, this variable is coded on a twelve-point scale, where in Round 4, it is on a 10-point scale. To provide better comparability, the variable has been standardized such that respondents' scores represent the distance of their income categories from the mean value of the survey.

Age: In what year were you born? (Mean age was 48; standard deviation was 18).

Education: What is the highest level of education you have achieved? (0= Not completed primary education; 1= Primary or first stage of basic; 2= Lower secondary or second stage of basic; 3=Upper secondary; 4=Post secondary, non-tertiary; 5=First stage of tertiary; 6=Second stage of tertiary).

Gender: coded by interviewer; 0=Male and 1=Female.

Level 2 Variables

Strong Far-right Presence This was measured by the percent of the popular vote going to a party that has opposition to immigration as one of its main platforms in the national election preceding the fielding of the ESS questionnaire. Information about party platforms was generally obtained from multiple online election resources, as well as annual reviews of elections in the *European Journal of Political Research*. The full list of far-right parties and percentages of votes received in the year before the ESS fieldwork in each country and each round is available from the author, as is the full list of sources used.

Social Welfare Protection This is measured by the total expenditure on social protection per head of population in ecu/euro, in the year before each of the rounds of the ESS

survey. Data are available from

http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/portal/page/portal/social_protection/data/main_tables .

Level 3 Variables

Long-Term History of Immigration As noted in footnote 27, Greece, Spain, Portugal, Italy and Ireland are given a code of 0 for this analysis and all other countries are given a code of 1.

Quality of Governance To measure overall quality of governance, the analysis relies on the World Bank Governance Indicators, which are based on surveys of household and firm respondents, experts working in the private sector, NGOs and public sector agencies.⁵⁵ Kaufmann, Kraay and Mastruzzi define governance

as the traditions and institutions by which authority in a country is exercised.

This includes the process by which governments are selected, monitored and replaced; the capacity of the government to effectively formulate and implement sound policies; and the respect of citizens and the state for the institutions that govern economic and social interactions among them.⁵⁶

There are six indicators of governance which are strongly correlated with one another, with a minimum Pearson's r of 0.60 for the period analyzed in this paper, with an average inter-item correlation of 0.80 and Cronbach's alpha of 0.94 and all items load onto a single factor in a principal components analysis. The six indicators are thus combined by taking the average score across all six for each country and each year. Note that Rohrschneider has conducted extensive validation of several components of this index and found them to be related to Transparency International corruption perception scores,

with the number of European Court of Human Rights judgments against a country, and with public perceptions of the conduct of elections in a country.⁵⁷

Economic conditions GDP/Capita, measured using the average OECD GDP/capita as the base is available from <http://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx?DataSetCode=NAG> , and

Unemployment rate in the year before the survey were both obtained from the OECD, available at

<http://titania.sourceoecd.org/vl=3262696/cl=11/nw=1/rpsv/factbook2009/06/02/01/index.htm> .

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Footnotes

¹ Ivarsflaten 2008.

² Howard 2010

³ Scholz and Lubell 1998; Scholz and Pinney 1995; Levi and Stoker 2000; Braithwaite and Levi 1998; Hetherington 1998; Marien and Hooghe 2011; Letki 2006.

⁴ Bianco 1994; Mishler and Rose 1997, 2001; Braithwaite and Levi 1998.

⁵ Levi 1998; Brennan 1998; Pettit 1998.

⁶ Miller and Listhaug 1990, 358.

⁷ Easton 1957, 1965; this is similar to Almond and Verba's (1963) notion of affective support.

⁸ This very question, of course, sparked a debate in the 1970s over how to interpret increasing levels of expressions of distrust in politics in the U.S. See Arthur Miller 1974a, 1974b and Citrin 1974.

⁹ Dalton 2004, 58-60; Klingemann 1999.

¹⁰ Anderson 1991; Gellner 1983; Hobsbawm 1992.

¹¹ Smith 1991, 61.

¹² Schulman 2002.

It must be recognized that many European countries were already multicultural states before large-scale immigration began after World War II. Countries like Spain and Britain in particular are argued to be multicultural (or multinational). However, this does not necessarily mean that the state-building process and the attempt to build common state identity failed in countries like these. For instance, when asked how close they feel to their country, 91 per cent of survey respondents in Spain claim to feel close (i.e., to

Spain); moreover, a clear majority in every region of Spain claims to feel close to Spain, including the Basque Country and Catalonia (see the 2003 International Social Survey Programme; results were similar for the 1995 ISSP; both available at <http://zocat.gesis.org/webview/index.jsp>, last accessed 9 December 2010). In addition, in the 1995 ISSP, approximately 84 per cent of Spanish survey respondents felt that it is essential for their country to remain as one country rather than allow certain regions to separate. Not surprisingly, however, 50 per cent of the Basque sample believed that regions wanting separation should be allowed to leave the country, and approximately 40 per cent in Catalonia also felt this way. On the whole, though, it appears that the vast majority of the Spanish population is supportive of a unified Spanish state, and ISSP data also indicate a high level of national pride in Spain. With regard to Great Britain, it must be noted that the apparent increase in Welsh and Scottish identity and growing demands from Scotland for separation after World War II called into question the degree to which “Britishness” has “stuck,” but such demands may have been connected to extraordinary dissatisfaction and unease with Thatcherite policies in the 1980s in particular and the prior discovery of North Sea oil, and the clamoring for separation appears to have been reduced in the post-Thatcher era (although the Scottish National Party continues to promise a referendum on membership of the UK). While the results of public opinion polls on separatism in Scotland are very dependent on question wording, it appears that a majority of Scots would prefer to stay in the UK but with greater devolved powers for Scotland (see, for instance, ‘How SNP could win and lose at the same time’, *The Times*, 20 April 2007; ‘Do the Scots support independence?’, Channel 4, 18 January 2007; http://www.channel4.com/news/articles/politics/domestic_politics/factcheck+do+the+sco

ts+support+independence/251043; <http://thescotsman.scotsman.com/politics/Pressure-on-parties--to.5415942.jp>, accessed 7 July 2009; see also <http://www.ipsos-mori.com/researchpublications/researcharchive/poll.aspx?oItemId=2706>, accessed 25 July 2011, for more recent poll results). Supporting evidence from the British Election Study of 2005 indicates that only 32 per cent of respondents living in Scotland claimed to identify as Scottish only, with other respondents acknowledging some degree of British identity; in Wales this figure is only 16 per cent (author's own analyses). Thus the majority of people living in Britain today appear to claim some degree of common British identity.

¹³ Tajfel 1970; Turner 1982, 1985; Turner et al. 1987, 1994.

¹⁴ Sniderman, Hagendoorn and Prior 2004; Quillian 1995; Fetzer 2000.

¹⁵ Huysmans 1995, 60.

¹⁶ Anti-immigration sentiment is, of course, not limited to the European context, and can be seen in countries like the U.S. and Australia as well. However, it is not immediately clear as to whether concern about immigration in these countries would translate into reduced political trust. Given the differences between European countries and the U.S. and Australia, in terms of national identity and construction of the modern nation-state, analyzing the connection between concern about immigration and political trust in the latter contexts is beyond the scope of this paper.

¹⁷ Easton 1957, 391; Rustow 1970; Miller 2006.

¹⁸ Putnam 2007; Anderson and Paskeviciute 2006; Alesina and La Ferrara 2000; Costa and Kahn 2003; Stolle, Soroka and Johnston 2008; Letki 2008; Hooghe et al. 2009; Sturgis et al. 2011.

¹⁹ Gilens 1999; Habyarimana et al. 2007.

²⁰ e.g., Smith 1991.

²¹ Sniderman, Hagendoorn and Prior 2004; Lahav 2004; Ivarsflaten 2005; Gibson 2002; Fetzer 2000; Espenshade and Calhoun 1993.

²² See McLaren forthcoming.

²³ Hollifield 1997; Castles and Miller 2009.

²⁴ Semyonov, Raijman, and Gorodzeisky 2006; Sides and Citrin 2007.

²⁵ It might be expected that the relationship would be the opposite of what is being hypothesized here because long-term immigration countries will contain citizens who have had more opportunity for contact with immigrants. Although the opportunity for contact must, of course, be present for contact to occur, such opportunity does not necessarily guarantee that contact does occur. Moreover, it is possible that in the aggregate, the amount of perceived threat that results from immigration simply outweighs any effects that contact might have (e.g., Quillian 1995). More importantly, it is unclear as to whether the average level of contact with immigrants in a country should affect the individual-level *relationship* between concern about immigration and political trust.

In addition, some might contend that in the countries that have been experiencing immigration for longer, citizens are likely to have recovered from the initial shock of large-scale immigration and so perceptions of immigration should be less likely to affect perceptions of the political system in the modern day in these countries. However, public opinion statistics indicate fairly persistent levels of concern about immigration in these countries (see, for instance, Eurobarometer data available from <http://zacat.gesis.org/webview/index.jsp>). That is, anti-immigration sentiment seems as

firm as it was more than two decades ago, and as argued here, the long-term persistence of concern about this perceived problem is likely to have implications for how individuals perceive their political systems.

²⁶ Castles and Miller 2003; Geddes 2003.

²⁷ Because of the difficulty of adequately capturing the history of experience with post-World-War-II immigration with standard migration statistics (i.e., considering the lack of comparable data for all European countries across the entire post-war period—see Castles 1984), I attempt to capture this history with a dummy variable. The analysis here is limited to Western Europe (see below), and amongst the countries included in the analysis, academic discussions of the history of migration to these countries, as outlined above, clearly point to the conclusion that the southern European countries of Spain, Greece, Portugal and Italy were not “countries of immigration” until the 1980s, whereas the rest of Western Europe, other than Ireland, had become more-or-less areas of large-scale immigration starting in the 1950s (e.g., Hammar 1985; Castles and Miller 2003; Geddes 2003). It is also important to note that the main argument presented in the previous section is not necessarily one about the numbers of migrants but about the impact of being a country of immigration, and the impact of long-term immigration, on perceptions of the construction of the nation-state. Thus, for the analysis below, Greece, Spain, Portugal, Italy, and Ireland are given a code of 0 and all other countries are given a code of 1.

²⁸ It should be noted that I have empirically verified that actual levels of recent migration (i.e., in the years prior to each of the surveys), recent changes in levels of migration, and the percentage of foreigners living in the country all have statistically insignificant effects

on political trust and on the relationship between concern about immigration and political trust. I have, therefore, omitted these from the analysis below. I have also investigated the potential impact of migrant policy on this relationship using the Migrant Integration Policy Index (available at <http://www.integrationindex.eu/> , last accessed 9 August 2010). Although the interaction between migrant policy and concern about immigration is statistically significant, the actual differences in the slopes between those with more migrant-friendly policies and those with less migrant-friendly policies is minimal. That is, the slope for concern about immigration is strong and positive regardless of the migrant integration policies of the country in question.

²⁹ Ivarsflaten 2008.

³⁰ Note that I have also investigated the impact of having centre-right governing coalitions and having a far-right party in the governing coalition on the relationship between concern about immigration and political trust, but the effect did not even achieve basic statistical significance in the case of centre-right coalitions and was very weak (although statistically significant) in the case of coalitions containing a far-right party, and so discussion of this analysis is omitted from this paper. Using the Comparative Manifesto Project data, I have also investigated the possibility that a lack of parties (far-right or mainstream) that address the issue of immigration strengthens the relationship between concerns about immigration and political trust. That is, perhaps individuals are more distrusting when there are no parties that represent their views on the immigration issue. While this interaction was statistically significant, the difference between countries with stronger versus weaker representation on the immigration issue, in terms of the relationship between concern about immigration and political distrust is very small, with

a strong, positive slope between concern about immigration and political trust for countries that do have parties that devote considerable attention to this issue in their platforms and for countries where less attention is paid to this issue. Thus, these results have been omitted.

³¹ On some of the effects of pessimism on attitude formation, see Uslaner 2002.

³² E.g., Eckart and Durand 1975; it should be noted, however, that research on the role of anomie in the rise of the far-right indicates that this is a weak explanation for the latter (see Koopmans 1996).

³³ Brehm and Rahn 1997; Mishler and Rose 2005; Zmerli and Newton 2008.

³⁴ Note that previous drafts of this paper included voluntary participation as an indicator of social capital, but the relationship between this variable and political trust was consistently insignificant, so this draft substitutes another indicator later added to the social capital construct in Putnam's (2001) *Bowling Alone*, socializing with friends.

³⁵ Clarke, Dutt and Kornberg 1993; Newton 2006; Anderson and Guillory 1997.

³⁶ Miller and Listhaug 1990, 1999; Weil 1989; Weatherford 1992; Evans and Whitefield 1995; Mishler and Rose 1997, 2001; Newton 2006.

³⁷ Rohrschneider 2005; Anderson and Tverdova 2003.

³⁸ Fairness and efficiency of the functioning of institutions are measured via the World Bank's Governance indicators. Perceptions of how well government is performing is measured via individual-level survey items about the functioning of two key policy areas, health and education (see the Appendix). Unfortunately, there are no individual-level indicators of perceptions of procedural fairness and openness. These are, however, captured at the country-level with the Governance indicators.

³⁹ Anderson and Guillory 1997; Anderson and LoTempio 2002; Anderson and Tverdova 2001.

⁴⁰ Non-citizens and ethnic minorities have been omitted from the analysis below. These individuals were identified by their responses to the following questions: “Do you belong to a minority ethnic group in [country]?,” with “belong” referring to “attachment or identification” and “Are you a citizen of [country]?” The exclusion of these individuals produced a loss of 5,101 observations, out of a total of 120,080, or four percent of the total number of observations. The results of the statistical analyses reported below are very similar to those that include minorities and non-citizens, however (which is not surprising given the relatively small numbers of these).

⁴¹ Fieldwork for Round 1 was conducted in 2002-2003, for Round 2, in 2004-2005 (except in Italy, where it was conducted in early 2006), for Round 3, in 2006-2007, and for Round 4, in 2008-2009.

⁴² Note that the later rounds of the survey also included political parties in this list, but this item was not included in Round 1 and thus has been omitted here.

⁴³ See, for instance, Wallace 2002, 607-9; note that I have also conducted the analysis with these countries included and the results are very similar to those reported here, although the relationship between concern about immigration and political distrust is somewhat weaker than when the analysis is limited to non-CEE European countries.

⁴⁴ As will be seen below in the variance components analysis, the amount of cross-time variation is fairly limited and so I omit illustrations of this due to space limitations.

⁴⁵ That is, actual levels of migration per capita in Portugal are at the lower end of the migration statistics, whereas Switzerland, for instance, has the highest levels of

migration. As noted in footnote 28, I have investigated this relationship more systematically and using varying indicators of levels of immigration, and these analyses confirm that there is no systematic relationship between levels of immigration and political trust.

⁴⁶ de Vreese and Boomgaarden 2005; McLaren 2002.

⁴⁷ Steenbergen and Jones 2002; Raudenbush and Bryk 2002.

⁴⁸ This includes far-right popularity and level of spending on social protection.

⁴⁹ This includes being a long-term country of migration, governance quality, GDP per capita and unemployment rate; see van der Meer 2010 for a similar approach to analyzing the ESS data.

⁵⁰ Because of potential problems caused by entering too many Level 2 and Level 3 independent variables simultaneously, analyses were also conducted in which each of the Level 2 and 3 variables was entered into the individual-level model separately (i.e., with no other Level 2 or 3 predictors). The results from that exercise indicate that the World Bank Governance indicators (see the Appendix) and GDP per capita were statistically significantly related to distrust in parliament, but the relationships were both positive: better quality of governance was associated with slightly *more* distrust of parliament and higher GDP per capita was also associated with *higher* levels of distrust. In general, though, in this analysis, it appears that political distrust may not be related to governance quality, or not in the expected way, in contrast to Rohrschneider's (2005) findings. In addition, unemployment level appears to be unrelated to political trust. Thus, consistent with the findings of McAllister (1999), actual economic circumstances are only weakly

related to political trust, and here they appear to be related in the opposite way to what would be predicted, as noted above.

⁵¹ The figures were created by setting all non-dichotomous variables to their means and substituting actual values for concern about immigration, long-term country of immigration, and far-right popularity, using the coefficients provided in Tables 4 and 5. All dichotomous variables were set to 0. For Figure 1, far-right popularity was set at its mean and for Figure 2, the long-term country of immigration variable was set at 1.

⁵² Actual voting percentages may not adequately capture the potential mobilizing effects of far-right parties, particularly in places with electoral systems that make it difficult for these parties to have much electoral success. I have, therefore, also investigated the impact of *propensity* to vote for a far-right party using European Election Study data. Those results indicate a statistically insignificant relationship between propensity to vote for a far-right party and political distrust (and the interaction between propensity to vote for a far-right party and concern about immigration is also statistically insignificant).

⁵³ McLaren forthcoming.

⁵⁴ Sniderman, Hagendoorn and Prior 2004.

⁵⁵ Kaufmann, Kraay and Mastruzzi 2009, 4.

⁵⁶ Kaufmann, Kraay and Mastruzzi 2009, 6.

⁵⁷ Rohrschneider 2005, 862.