

The London School of Economics and Political Science

The Discursive Construction of Discrimination

The Representation of Ethnic Diversity
in the Korean Public Service Broadcasting News

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A thesis submitted to the Department of Media and Communications in
partial fulfilment of the requirement for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy

April 2012

Declaration

I certify that the thesis I have presented for examination for the PhD degree of the London School of Economics and Political Science is solely my own work other than where I have clearly indicated that it is the work of others (in which case the extent of any work carried out jointly by me and any other person is clearly identified in it).

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*To my parents,
Myung-Hwan Joo & Gap-Yeon Lee*

Abstract

Globalisation has intensified the international movement of labour and South Korea is no exception. Korea, which in the past was itself a labour-exporting country, has seen a reversal in human mobility since the late 1990's with a rapid growth in immigration and a transformation of a previously almost ethnically homogenous society. However, studies on migrant and ethnic minority groups in Korea have primarily focussed on such areas as industrial law and social policy. In this context, the important questions about the cultural and political implications associated with the construction of minority representations in the media have remained highly unexplored. The starting point of this study is an examination of the vital role of public service broadcasting (PSB) in Korean society, where ethnic minorities have increasingly become visible. Korean PSB's mandate, following the BBC model, emphasises the broadcaster's responsibility to represent and reflect the range of public opinion and experiences beyond class, age, ethnicity and ideological orientation. Despite this commitment what this study shows is that PSB in South Korea has failed to fairly represent the culturally diverse groups within Korean society.

The main purpose of this study is to empirically examine the means through which PSB generates discourses of *We-ness* and *Otherness* at times of change in the Korean society. Empirically, the study focuses on primetime PSB news' visual and textual representations of migrants and ethnic minorities. With the use of critical discourse analysis (CDA) it demonstrates that PSB gives a concrete form to the ideological constructions of *Otherness*, sometimes transforming subtle cultural or social differences into fundamental and oppositional ones. Korean PSB appears to be ideologically biased toward nationalism, while in its visual and textual representations it constructs ideological systems of social and racial stratification, with Southeast Asian migrants constantly represented as the ultimate *Others*. The study shows the significant role of PSB in representing cultural diversity in public debates and the ways in which such representations and their dissemination reflect media power.

Acknowledgements

Now I am at last nearing the end of my long and arduous journey. All people are bound to have a strong interest in their own completed research like the proverb 'all is well that ends well', it is very meaningful and important to complete something. A beautiful end is possible by recalling all the memories from the starting point.

First and foremost, I would like to pay my sincere gratitude to my supervisor, Dr Myria Georgiou. I still remember vividly her welcoming bright smile when I first visited her office. Not only her excellent academic guidance but also her respectful warm heartedness helped me advance and successfully complete my thesis. Without her considerate support, my PhD research would have been much tougher. Also I am grateful to my former second supervisor Professor Katharine Sarikakis, who currently works at the University of Vienna. She gave me great advices and thoughtful suggestions on the direction of the initial stages of my research project.

Additionally I would like to gratefully thank Professor Doo-pil Kang, Professor Yeon-Jong Kim and Professor Dae-Young Ryu who decisively guided me to tread the path of knowledge. Without their sincere advice and support, I would not been here. Also, special thank goes to Professor Tae-Jin Yoon and Professor Sang-Gil Lee who also gave me tremendous support during my Master's course at Yonsei University. I was so honoured to have met all these great academic mentors and a great deal of the media theories learned from them became cornerstones for my doctoral research.

I also appreciate the members of Korean community in the UK as their great help and care were a great support for me in a distant foreign country. Without their support and humane care, my loneliness as an alien living in the UK would have been harder to bear.

I owe a profound debt of gratitude to my loving family for their love and support throughout my life. I deeply thank my parents for my grateful upbringing, great support for my study and providing an excellent studying environment from my early years. Additional thanks goes to my brother, who always listens to me and supports me. I again thank my parents-in-law for their support of praying for me from the bottom of their hearts and have sent me many indispensable packages from Korea over the last five years.

Last but not least, I would like to express my deepest gratitude to my wife for her wholehearted support and encouragement over the last five years in the UK. Without her dedication and love, my life of studying abroad would have been much more painful. Also, I want to show my deep love to my lovely three-year-old daughter, Ye-Eun, who grow up in the UK and shared all her joyful life during my studies.

Table of Contents

Abstract	3
Acknowledgements	4
Table of Contents	5
List of Abbreviations	10
List of Figures	11
List of Tables	12

1. Introduction

1.1. Context of Research	13
1.2. Objectives of Study	16
1.3. Significance and Contribution	18
1.4. The Research Questions	19
1.5. Outline of the Thesis	21

2. Media, Societal Change and Otherness

2.1. Introduction	22
2.2. Television as a Core Element of Contemporary Culture and Politics	23
2.2.1. <i>Seeing is Believing: The Power of Visual Communications</i>	23
2.2.2. <i>Television as an Everyday Medium: Representation of the World</i>	25
2.3. Television News and Social Realities	29
2.3.1. <i>Conceptualising Television News: Liveness and Pervasiveness</i>	29
2.3.2. <i>News Discourse and Social Construction of Reality</i>	32
2.4. Globalisation, Migration and Societal Change	34
2.4.1. <i>Migration and Cultural Conflict in the Process of Globalisation</i>	34
2.4.2. <i>Globalisation for the Market, Not for the People: Marginalised Migrants</i>	37
2.5. <i>Otherness in the Media: Differentiating Others from Us</i>	39
2.5.1. <i>Mediated Globalisation and Migration: Learning Racial Hierarchy</i>	39
2.5.2. <i>Reinforcing Nationalism and Otherness</i>	42
2.6. Public Service Broadcasting: Conceptual Challenges between Nationalism and Multiculturalism	47
2.6.1. <i>Conceptualising Public Service Broadcasting</i>	47
2.6.2. <i>Public Service Broadcasting, Public Sphere and National Identity</i>	49

2.6.3. <i>Public Service Broadcasting in the Multi-ethnic Society: Responsibility for Others</i>	52
2.7. Conclusion	54

3. Conceptualising Nationalism and *Otherness* in the Korean Context

3.1. Introduction	56
3.2. Historical and Cultural Background of Ethnic Nationalism in Korea	57
3.2.1. <i>Pre-Modernisation (mid 1800s–1945)</i>	59
3.2.1.1. Origin of Modern Korean Nationalism	59
3.2.1.2. From the Myth to History	61
3.2.1.3. Nationalism under Japanese Imperialism	64
3.2.2. <i>Era of Upheaval: Independence, Korean War and Dictatorship (1945–1980s)</i>	65
3.2.2.1. Nationalism after Independence – One Nation, Two Countries	65
3.2.2.2. Learning Racial Hierarchy from ‘Mighty’ <i>White</i> Americans	67
3.2.2.3. Strengthening the Nationalism under Dictatorship	69
3.2.3. <i>Era of Globalisation (1990s–present)</i>	72
3.2.3.1. Korean Transformation: From Emigration to Immigration	72
3.2.3.2. Between Nationalism and Globalisation	74
3.2.3.3. Ethnic Diversification as a Social Phenomenon in South Korea	76
3.2.3.4. Two Main Streams of Immigration: Migrant Workers and Married Migrant Women	77
3.2.4. <i>National Identity and the Media in the Korean Context</i>	81
3.2.4.1. Globalisation in the Korean Media	81
3.2.4.2. Korean Public Service Broadcasting as a Factory of Fictive Nationalism	82
3.3. Conclusion	86

4. Methodology

4.1. Introduction	87
4.2. Textual Analysis	89
4.2.1. <i>Content Analysis</i>	89
4.2.2. <i>Critical Discourse Analysis</i>	91
4.2.3. <i>Visual Analysis as a Part of CDA</i>	97
4.3. Analysis of the News-making System: Semi-Structured Interviews	104
4.4. Triangulation of Methods	106

4.5. Conclusion	108
-----------------------	-----

5. Representation of *Others*: Quantitative Approach

5.1. Introduction	109
5.2. Newsworthiness of Non-nationals	110
5.3. Iconography of <i>Others</i>	116
5.3.1. <i>Non-nationals as Migrant Workers</i>	121
5.3.2. <i>Non-nationals as Criminals</i>	124
5.3.3. <i>Non-nationals as Members of Multicultural Families</i>	128
5.3.4. <i>Non-nationals as Visitors</i>	131
5.3.5. <i>Non-nationals as Celebrities</i>	133
5.3.6. <i>Koreans as Compassionate People</i>	135
5.4. Conclusion	136

6. Mediated Discourses of Discrimination: A Critical Discourse Approach

6.1. Introduction	139
6.2. A Three-dimensional Framework for Analysis	140
6.2.1. <i>Dehumanisation</i>	140
6.2.2. <i>Pathologisation</i>	142
6.2.3. <i>Victimisation</i>	142
6.3. Dehumanisation of <i>Others</i>	143
6.3.1. <i>Migrant Workers as Ornaments for Korean National Holidays</i>	143
6.3.2. <i>Voiceless and Faceless Illegals</i>	147
6.3.3. <i>The Non-national Criminals Held up to Mockery</i>	152
6.3.4. <i>Feminisation of Others in the Context of Family-centrism</i>	155
6.3.4.1. Daughters-in-law as Maidservants	158
6.3.4.2. Localisation: The Wives in the Countryside	161
6.3.4.3. Clumsy Inferiors	164
6.3.5. <i>Non-national Sports Celebrities: Monsters or Superhuman?</i>	167
6.4. Pathologisation of <i>Others</i>	170
6.4.1. <i>Nosophobia: The Deadly Pathogenic Others</i>	170
6.4.2. <i>The Numbers Game</i>	173
6.4.3. <i>The Lunatic Mob</i>	174
6.4.4. <i>The Natural-Born Cruelty</i>	176
6.5. Victimisation of <i>Others</i>	178

6.5.1. <i>Miserable Others Who Should Be Sent Back to Their Families</i>	178
6.5.2. <i>Victims as Obstacles of Economic Profit</i>	183
6.5.3. <i>Mum Unqualified for Domestic Education</i>	184
6.6. Koreans as Binary Opposites: The Almighty Superiors and Lawful Judges	187
6.7. Conclusion	190

7. Discourse Making: Institutional Voices

7.1. Introduction	194
7.2. The Individual Level of News Makers	198
7.2.1. <i>Internalised Racial Hierarchy</i>	198
7.2.2. <i>Can You Speak English? Otherwise Just Speak Korean</i>	200
7.2.3. <i>The Compassionate Professional</i>	202
7.3. The Routines of Communication Work	203
7.3.1. <i>Formula for Making Ethnic Minority News</i>	204
7.3.2. <i>Limited Application of the Term Multiculturalism</i>	207
7.3.3. <i>Standardisation of News Representation of Ethnic Minorities</i>	210
7.4. The Organisational Level of News Production	214
7.4.1. <i>The High Value of the White Interviewee</i>	214
7.4.2. <i>The Guidelines for News on Ethnic Minorities</i>	216
7.4.3. <i>Limitations to Reporting Issues about Ethnic Minorities</i>	218
7.5. The Social Institution Level	219
7.5.1. <i>Governmental Politics in the Representation of Ethnic Minorities</i>	220
7.5.2. <i>Focusing on the Audience</i>	223
7.6. The Social System Level	225
7.6.1. <i>The Dualism between Nationalism and White-centrism</i>	226
7.7. Conclusion	228

8. Conclusions

8.1. Introduction	231
8.2. Key Findings	232
8.2.1. <i>Multi-ethnic, Mono-cultural Society</i>	232
8.2.2. <i>Selective Globalisation: Visible Globalisation, Invisible Others</i>	235
8.3. Korean PSB: Towards a Multicultural Public Sphere	236
8.4. The British Case: Right on the Mark	238
8.5. Suggestions for Further Research	240

Bibliography	242
Appendix	266

List of Abbreviations

AD: Anno Domini
AFN: American Forces Network
AFKN: American Forces Korea Network
BBC: British Broadcasting Corporation
BC: Before Christ
CCTV: Closed Circuit Television
CDA: Critical Discourse Analysis
CEO: Chief Executive Officer
DPRK: Democratic People's Republic of Korea (North Korea)
EPS: Employment Permit System
EU: European Union
GCIM: Global Commission on International Migration
GGK: Government General of Korea
HIV/AIDS: Human Immunodeficiency Virus / Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome
IDC: Immigration Detention Centre
ISA: Ideological State Apparatus
KBA: Korean Broadcasting Association
KBS: Korean Broadcasting System
KIFPO: Korean Immigration and Foreigner Policy Office
KNSO: Korean National Statistical Office
KOSIS: Korean Statistical Information Service
NGO: Non-governmental Organisation
NIC: Newly Industrialised Country
OECD: Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
OFCOM: Office for Communication
PSB: Public Service Broadcasting
ROK: Republic of Korea (South Korea)
SOFA: Status of Forces Agreement
UK: United Kingdom
UN: United Nations
UNC: United Nations Command
US: United States
USA: United States of America
USIA: United States Information Agency
VOD: Video on Demand
WB: World Bank
WWI: The First World War
WWII: The Second World War
WWW: World Wide Web

List of Figures

Chapter Four

Figure 4.1. The Triangulation Process of Analysis	107
---	-----

Chapter Six

Figure 6.1. Portrayals of Migrant Workers as Interviewees	146
Figure 6.2. Portrayals of Dehumanisation of Migrant Workers as Illegal Residents ...	151
Figure 6.3. Portrayals of Non-nationals as Criminals	153
Figure 6.4. Portrayals of the Power Relations between <i>Us</i> and <i>Them</i>	155
Figure 6.5. Portrayals of Locally Married Migrant Women	164
Figure 6.6. Portrayals of Married Migrant Women Making Korean Food during Holiday	166
Figure 6.7. Portrayals of Non-national Sports Celebrities	169
Figure 6.8. Portrayals of ‘Their Tradition’ as ‘Disorder’ and ‘Our Tradition’ as ‘Order’	176
Figure 6.9. Portrayals of Non-national Criminals’ Cruelty	178
Figure 6.10. Portrayals of Migrant Workers Suffering from Injury or Illness	180
Figure 6.11. Portrayals of Migrant Workers Who Miss Their Families and Homelands	181
Figure 6.12. Portrayals of Koreans in Ethnic Minority Related News Reports	188

List of Tables

Chapter Three

Table 3.1. Official Numbers of Non-nationals Living in South Korea (1997–2010)	77
Table 3.2. The Rate of Inter-cultural Marriage	79

Chapter Four

Table 4.1. The Framework of Analysis for the Visual Texts on Television	103
---	-----

Chapter Five

Table 5.1. News Items about Non-nationals in Korea Year by Year and Newsworthiness Points	116
Table 5.2. Top Three Roles Played by Non-nationals on the <i>KBS News 9</i>	119
Table 5.3. Non-nationals Portrayed as Groups or Individuals	120
Table 5.4. The Total Number of Non-nationals Who Appeared on <i>KBS News 9</i> (2004–2008)	266
Table 5.5. Interviewees Sorted by Nationalities (Non-nationals as Migrant Workers)	267
Table 5.6. Non-nationals as Migrant Workers	267
Table 5.7. Koreans in the Frame of Non-nationals as Migrant Workers	268
Table 5.8. Interviewees Sorted by Nationalities (Non-nationals as Criminals)	268
Table 5.9. Non-national as Criminals	269
Table 5.10. Koreans in the Frame of Non-nationals as Criminals	269
Table 5.11. Types of Crimes and the Dispersion by Ethnicities and Nationalities	270
Table 5.12. Interviewees Sorted by Nationalities (Non-nationals as Multicultural Family Members)	270
Table 5.13. Non-nationals in the Frame of Non-nationals as Multicultural Family Members	271
Table 5.14. Koreans in the Frame of Non-nationals as Multicultural Family Members	272
Table 5.15. Interviewees Sorted by Nationalities (Non-nationals as Visitors)	273
Table 5.16. Non-nationals in the Frame of Non-nationals as Visitors	274
Table 5.17. Koreans in the Frame of Non-nationals as Visitors	275
Table 5.18. Interviewees Sorted by Nationalities (Non-nationals as Celebrities)	275
Table 5.19. Non-nationals in the Frame of Non-nationals as Celebrities	276
Table 5.20. Koreans in the Frame of Non-nationals as Celebrities	276
Table 5.21. Interviewees Sorted by Nationalities (Koreans as Compassionate People)	277
Table 5.22. Non-nationals in the Frame of Koreans as Compassionate People	277
Table 5.23. Koreans in the Frame of Koreans as Compassionate People	278

Chapter Six

Table 6.1. Binary Oppositions: <i>Us</i> and <i>Them</i> in the PSB News Reports on Ethnic Minorities	193
---	-----

Chapter Seven

Table 7.1. Interview Participants	197
---	-----

Chapter One

Introduction

Media can be one important way in which groups who have never been in face-to-face contact can begin to think of themselves as Indonesian or Indian or Malaysian.

(Appadurai, 1998: 8)

1.1. Context of Research

The rapidly increasing mobility of populations is a central aspect of the widespread social transformations occurring in the world (Castles, 1998). Although some nations still insist it is a temporary phenomenon, international migration is now an established structural feature of the East Asian region, as much as it is for other parts of the world. The forces responsible for this increase in movement are complicatedly associated with globalisation, increased levels of education, proliferation of international media, improved transport systems and the internationalisation of business and labour markets (Alford, 1999; Beck, 2000; Vertovec and Cohen, 1999). As home to approximately sixty per cent of the current world population, Asia, in particular, must loom large in any discussion of global migration (United Nations, 2010). The last decade has not only seen an increase in the numbers of Asians moving between nations, but the types of mobility have become more complex and the movement has become less selective. International migration is a topic of unprecedented interest in most Asian nations among both governments and the population; the media report on it frequently and the issue is constantly being placed in the public consciousness (GCIM, 2005).

Among Asian countries, immigration in South Korea has been one of the most disputed social issues of the last decade. This is because traditionally Korea has been perceived as being made up of 'pure-blooded' people; this is the dominant myth of ethnic/national

homogeneity. In the last decades, however, the myth has been threatened because of the large scale of labour immigration and intercultural marriages. The Korean Immigration and Foreigner Policy Office (KIFPO) of the Ministry of Justice announced on 24th August 2007 that foreign residents in Korea officially numbered at one million and two hundred fifty four for the first time, two per cent of the total registered population (49 million)¹. This figure was up by 158 per cent from 386,972 in 1997. This number is expected to rise to over five per cent of the origin population by 2020. It means that South Korea now faces the challenges of a multi-ethnic society.

The influx of foreigners in Korean society and the social changes resulting from this can be understood through the framework of globalisation. Giddens (1990) and Castells (1996) have argued that globalisation is a central driving force behind the rapid social, political and economic changes that are reshaping modern societies and world order. Globalisation accelerates the movement of populations as well as capital and commodities (Cohen, 1997). The influx of new members in society through population movements came to be a serious threat to social and cultural identity of the existing majority in the modern nationalistic system (Robertson, 1992). During this process, the existing majority of society that maintains power categorises, discriminates and marginalises the new members of a society (Brodwin, 2001; Cottle, 1999; Held et al., 1999; van Dijk, 1983). To state it differently, migrants, the new members of the society, are pushed to the periphery and end up as the strangers in the midst of globalisation (C Moon, 2000). Moreover, the most important role of this process of exclusion is played primarily by the media (Curran, 2002; van Dijk, 1988). If the media play a crucial role in the process of exclusion within globalisation, it is important to look at the role of the media in the process of marginalising sub-groups and their culture (Rantanen, 2005).

The significance of media power in modern information societies is undeniable. A society's perception of minorities in most cases conforms to the stereotypes created by the media of that society (Cottle, 1997; Dates and Barlow, 1990; Downing and Husband, 2005; Hall, 1997a). More specifically, the modern media have given massive and disproportionate attention to a series of minorities who have tended to be presented as

¹*The Korea Times*, 24th August 2007, 'Foreigners exceed one million', http://www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/news/nation/2007/08/117_8926.html accessed on 21st September 2009

powerful and irrational threats to society. This is because in modern societies the media play an important role as opinion leaders, and have the power to project a certain image on to a social group or a social object (Curran, 2002). If we analyse the stereotypes of minorities generated by the media, we will be able to understand the various situations that have occurred in a given society. In other words, if we seek to understand a specific social phenomenon, it is a requisite to make an analysis of the media's representation of the phenomenon.

These concerns with socio-cultural processes associated with globalisation, migration and the media provide the contextual framework for this study. More specifically, this research project focuses on the role of the prime time news of public service broadcasting (PSB) in Korean society, where the presence of ethnic minorities is increasing rapidly. Although the World Wide Web has become one of the most attractive media over the last decade, Korean PSB, Korean Broadcasting System (KBS), still remains the most popular and influential medium. According to a survey result of 2003 reported by *Sisa Press*, the leading weekly magazine in Korea, KBS has been ranked as the most influential medium in the last decade. This shows that in Korea, people still depend largely on PSB. There are, however, a few studies on social responsibilities that should accompany PSB, given its power and influence. Social responsibility is one of the key obligations of PSB, according to its charter, but very little discussion and research in the area has been done in Korea. This may be because Korean PSB is a product of national authority. Today's broadcasting system was formed in 1968 during the military rule and has not been able to free itself from the mindset of a 'government-run media'. In Korea, political democracy deteriorated during the military dictatorship from 1960 to the late 1980s. PSB became a tool of propaganda under the autocratic leadership. In some cases, commercial broadcasting was abolished or absorbed into PSB, which has dominated the broadcasting scene for a long time. After the second half of the 1990s, however, political and social democracy grew rapidly, and with the introduction of commercial broadcasts and cable television stations, broadcasting also came to experience democracy and diversity in programming. Nevertheless, today PSB is still more popular than commercial broadcasting – a fact that demonstrates its national media hegemony.

In particular, *KBS News 9*, the prime time news programme on KBS, has overwhelmingly kept the largest audience share among whole television broadcasting market place (KBA, 2008). Therefore, the process of analysing ethnic minorities in Korean society represented in Korean PSB in terms of the public media as a social construction is meaningful in that it provides an important key in understanding the cultural and political background and characteristics of society.

1.2. Objectives of Study

This study focuses on the ways in which Korean society, which believes it is a homogeneous nation, produces media discourses that reaffirm an ideology of national superiority and an ideological system of stratified racial order. This is particularly important as ethnic minorities are recognised as representing an element of a globalised economic system but they are refused cultural and citizenship recognition and rights. The thesis aims to understand how control of culturalist and racialised ideologies of social order are expressed in the construction of media discourses. To put it concretely, this research on the trend in the portrayal of ethnic minorities on prime time public television serves two major purposes. Firstly, it aims to identify the extent to which public service television represent Korean ethnic minorities and especially to determine what tendencies have been shown in the news reports of the last five years. Secondly, the nature of the portrayal of ethnic minorities has been conceptualised as a potential contributor to perpetuating racial stereotypes; examining the dominant attributes of news representations informs that issue.

The reason that I chose PSB as my study subject arises from the basic question of ‘how “public” and “public service” can be defined in a multi-ethnic or multicultural society’. Commercial broadcasting has the fundamental objective of ‘profit pursuit’, whereas PSB is funded by viewers’ licence fees. This means PSB has a social responsibility and a mandate to create an impartial and diverse broadcasting environment, which reflects various opinions from all levels of society, regardless of age, region or ideology (Christensen, 2001). As Avery (1993) states, PSB is based on the principles of universality of service, diversity of programming, provision for minority audiences

including the disadvantaged, sustaining an informed electorate, and cultural and educational enrichment. Campion (2005) also argues that PSB has a vital role to play in mediating the public sphere and in helping diverse communities to learn about each other. To do this effectively 'it must reach as much of the population as possible and be trusted to portray all groups accurately and fairly, particularly those who are currently marginalised in society' (Campion, 2005: 1). Westerstahl (1983) introduced 'objectivity' as a fairness examination standard. In his study, objectivity is defined as satisfying the criteria of factuality and impartiality. Factuality consists of turning out truthful reports and contents relevant to the actual incident. Impartiality consists of giving equal weight to opposite opinions and maintaining balanced and neutral criticism not biased toward any one side.

So, how can the impartiality and diversity of PSB be interpreted in this era of globalisation? Traditionally, PSB has been expected to represent the national as opposed to the foreign (Raboy, 2003). However, in December 1994, a new definition of PSB was agreed upon by the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe, which was that it should 'support the values underlying the respect for human rights, culture and pluralism' (Porter, 1995: 30). Cultural diversity and impartiality in the public media is as much about the human right to live one's own cultural identity, as it is about the human right to have access to the wealth of cultural diversity represented by the social majority. Firstly this study will examine how the main values of PSB, impartiality and cultural diversity, are represented in the primetime news about Korean society, which is experiencing dramatic social changes due to the rapid influx of migrants. With regard to this, if specific tendencies of representation are found in this process, their meaning will be explored. Lastly, it will look into how news-making systems influence media representations and it also seeks to discuss the origin of the ideology rooted behind the media discourse.

1.3. Significance and Contribution

This study aims to contribute to both international and the Korean academia. First of all, this study can be seen as a unique attempt in such a site of research since little research

has been done to analyse nationalism and racial discrimination in Asian society, as the focus of studies on representation of minorities have been predominantly focused on Western societies. In fact, there have been a number of media and communication studies focusing on this issue, especially in the field of critical communication and cultural studies (Boskin, 1980; Campbell, 1995; Cottle, 1999; Downing and Husband, 2005; Entman, 1994; Hall, 1997b; Hartmann and Husband, 1974; van Dijk, 2000). Yet, all these studies focus on Western societies (e.g. Turkish guest-workers in Germany, the Maghreb Africans in France, the Pakistanis or the Greeks in Britain, the Vietnamese or the Chinese in Australia, among many more). Therefore, it is noteworthy that this study is done by a non-Western author about a non-Western phenomenon from a non-Western standpoint. That is, this study raises the issue of inter-Asian racial stratifications as it explores the representational power exercised by Asians on other Asians in a non-Western society. The study goes on to grasp how nationalism as a ruling and excluding ideology is reproduced through the media and how ethnic minorities are discriminated and excluded from this process. Lastly, it applies theories on public service broadcasting and fair representation of minorities, which surpass cultural specificity and address broader issues associated with democratic participation and the public sphere, to the particular Korean context.

Another significance of the study is the critical symbolic meaning of media discourse studies as qualitative research in Korean media academia. A number of social problems occurring in modern society, such as those related to social class, gender, race and other social divides, can be understood by analysing social discourse. The research mainly based on critical discourse analysis (CDA), and primarily represented by van Dijk, Fairclough, Wodak and Chouliaraki, has been mostly conducted in Western Europe. Furthermore, since most media and communication studies scholars in Korea hold PhDs from American universities, Korean media research leans towards quantitative method-based research with critical discourse research remaining marginal in Korean academia. Therefore, this study has significance not only in its unique research subject, but also in its methodological orientation in the context of Korean academia.

This thesis will be a study of the public media's responsibility towards minorities, and it builds upon the researcher's Masters dissertation – 'A Study on "Others in Ourselves"

and “Ourselves in Others” Represented in the Media’. This study, conducted in Yonsei University in Korea, focused on the television documentaries treating problems concerned with foreign migrant workers and Korean migrant workers. It is thought that this doctoral research would not only contribute as a stimulant for Korean media and communications studies, which showed little interest in research on the relationship between media and minorities or public media representing social minorities, but would also serve as a blueprint for how Korean public service broadcasting should respond and reflect on its responsibilities as a public service in a multicultural society. Although it is noticeable that interest in multiculturalism has gradually increased in the media field as well as other academic fields in the four years since this research project has been conducted, concrete and sustained research remains rather limited. Therefore, this current study has the ambition to lay foundations for further research on public service broadcasting, especially on professional ethics, professional training for reporting on minorities and audience research.

1.4. The Research Questions

This research project mainly seeks to understand how the public media present the phenomena of Korean society against the backdrop of a dramatically transforming multi-ethnic society. More specifically, the aim of the thesis is to analyse how the prime time news programme on PSB, *KBS News 9*, which is most influential in Korean society and has a critical position in everyday life, presents ethnic diversity in society. Therefore, the central research question that this research project seeks to answer is as follows:

- How are ethnic minorities represented on the PSB news programmes?

In order to answer this question, this study will focus on textual and visual discourses produced on the news. Discourses take up the most significant part in researching media representation as they provide critical keys in the study. In particular, the process of finding and analysing social and cultural ideologies of discourse produced in the

news, such as, for instance, seeking to discuss the origin of the ideology rooted behind media discourse, will provide the second part of the analysis in this study. Therefore the second research question can be established as follows:

- What kinds of meaning do television text and ideology of media discourses express?

Through the research question above, this work will discuss how discourse around ethnic minorities is formulated and the implications of this for related ideologies. Lastly, this research project will look into the ideologies present in the viewpoint of news-makers towards ethnic minorities and multiculturalism and how this is reflected in and influences broadcasts. This research into news-makers has its significance in a complementary way as news discourse represented through television is not an unconditional reflection of reality, but a social construction of reality produced through a gate-keeping process of news-makers with a personal dimension. In addition, the main body of news production reflects a systematic dimension, while the social dimension shares the hegemonic ideology. Therefore, the last research question is as follows:

- How do news makers and producers construct representations of minorities and how do they evaluate them?

These questions will be framed by an overview of the existing literature on the topics of globalisation, migration and multiculturalism, followed by a discussion on ethnic minorities and the media. Next, the text methodology used in the study will analyse the representation of the prime time news programme on KBS, *KBS News 9*, using content analysis and CDA. Subsequently, the results of the interviews with ten news reporters and editors from KBS will be presented in order to access information about the decision making and the values and regulations that drive the editorial and production process which lead to the production of specific representations in the television news programmes.

1.5. Outline of the Thesis

The project is presented in eight chapters. After Chapter One, which acts as an introduction and a contextualising chapter, Chapter Two discusses theories on key issues and concepts that relate to the research. These include complex concepts of globalisation, migration, ethnic minorities, nationalism and the media, especially public service broadcasting. Chapter Three focuses on conceptualising nationalism and ethnic minorities in the context of South Korea. It describes the historical and cultural background of nationalism and ethnic minorities in Korea. Chapter Four introduces and discusses the methodologies for the study, the reason behind this selection and the strengths and the weaknesses of the methods. This thesis employs three different methods in combination to analyse news texts, including content analysis, CDA and visual analysis. Semi-structured interviews complement and support textual analysis as they provide an insight into the news production system and journalistic evaluation of the production of media discourse. Chapter Five marks the beginning of analysis. The aim of this chapter is to examine how ethnic minorities are represented in KBS news through quantitative news content analysis. Chapter Six examines Korean public news media discourse on ethnic minorities and discusses the tendencies of representation. For this purpose, this chapter presents qualitative methods of researching news discourse, including narratives, specific descriptions and visual images. Chapter Seven focuses on trying to understand the newsmaking process when producing news related to ethnic minorities and foreign countries. This was done by interviewing ten reporters who are currently employed at KBS; the results were then used to reveal their ideas about multicultural society and ethnic diversity. Chapter Eight is the concluding part of the thesis. It argues for the responsibility of public service broadcasting as everyday media for representing cultural diversity. It also demonstrates the limitation of the Korean public service broadcasting system that produces specific stereotypes towards ethnic minorities and strengthens ethnic chauvinism. The conclusion also examines the limitations of the investigation, while noting its implications for policy and future research.

Chapter Two

Media, Societal Change and Otherness

It is in and through these representations, for example, that members of the media audience are variously incited to construct a sense of who 'we' are in relation to who 'we' are not, whether as 'us' and 'them', 'insider' and 'outsider', 'coloniser' and 'colonised', 'citizen' and 'foreigner', 'normal' and 'deviant', 'friend' and 'foe', 'the West' and 'the rest'.

(Cottle, 2000: 2)

2.1. Introduction

This chapter includes the first element of the theoretical review, which constitutes a crucial element of this study. The discussion in this section focuses on the role of television as a medium central to the development of agendas and ideological frames for deliberations in the public sphere. These ideological frames become central to the construction of social roles and identities of *Us* and *Others*. The chapter locates this discussion in the context of globalisation, intense migration and the increasingly mediated world we all occupy. The core starting point is that 'television not only represents social issues; it also constructs and maintains the norms and values through which society is ordered' (D'Acci, 2004: 381). Especially in the era of globalisation, ethnic identities of the majority population are increasingly diverse due to human mobility between different regions of the globe, resulting from a multitude of factors. Broadcasting media, in this respect, become important not only as systems of representation, but also as socially relevant cultural references – in their political economy, their content and their symbolic relevance for particular social groups (Georgiou, 2006). Thus, studying television representation means examining not only images of people of other ethnic groups but also constructions of racial or social *Otherness* as manifested through the discourse of television. In trying to understand the

importance of television's capacity to represent society, it is necessary not only to look beyond particular representations to consider the pervasiveness of television as an everyday medium, but also to underline the fundamental asymmetry of power relations involved in these representations (Allen and Hill, 2004).

In this chapter, I will first discuss the power of television as an everyday medium, which (re-)produces symbolic power in order to examine the uniqueness of the genre of news programming as a discourse constructor among many other television genres. Following this, I will go on to discuss the power relations in society, as these are shaped as a result of population movement associated with globalisation, and their correlation with the role the media play. In the last section I discuss the role and responsibility of public service broadcasting in multi-ethnic societies.

2.2. Television as a Core Element of Contemporary Culture and Politics

2.2.1. Seeing is Believing: The Power of Visual Communications

Modern society is filled with visual images. Urban streets abound with colourful billboards and advertisements. We can easily find this when we are on the bus and there is a large advertisement, which may contain the smile of the main character in a recently released movie, or when reading the newspapers in which more than half of the pages are filled with pictures and visual images. Moreover, it is possible for a whole page to be filled with one image, and from this image the readers can infer the meaning of the whole story being reported. In addition to movies and television, internet media are also becoming image-centric. For example, a picture of a crying child left in a war-ravaged environment can sometimes have a greater effect than an article describing the cruelty and inhumanity of war and indiscriminate violence. Seen like this, it is arguable that visual communication has increased in importance in today's society due to the fact that values, opinions and beliefs are persuasively delivered by visual culture in everyday life (Sturken and Cartwright, 2000).

In this respect, seeing is really a great deal more than believing in the modern society (Mirzoeff, 1998). Berger argues that 'seeing comes before words' (Berger, 1972: 7).

This is the starting point in the study of visual communication. Jenks (1995) argues that 'looking, seeing and knowing have become perilously intertwined' so that 'the modern world is very much a "seen" phenomenon' (Jenks, 1995: 1–2). Debord's (1983) thesis on the 'society of spectacle' does not sound extreme anymore, while Virilio's (1994) claim about new visualising technologies creating 'the vision machine' finds its empirical relevance in the current predomination of image in our highly mediated environments. Stafford (1991) emphasises that the construction of scientific knowledge about the world has become more and more based on images rather than on written texts. Haraway (1991) is concerned with specifying the social power relations that are articulated through the particular form of visibility. She argues that what this visibility does is to produce specific visions of social difference or hierarchies of class, race, gender, sexuality, and so on. That is, the particular forms of representation produced by specific scopic regimes are important to understand because they are intimately bound into social power relations (Rose, 2001). According to Hall (1997), culture is the shared practices of a group, community or society, through which meaning is made out of the visual world of representations. Therefore, the act of 'seeing' can be further interpreted as one of the practices of culture, which constructs and reproduces culture through the process of understanding the world, exceeding the level of just perceiving an object and understanding it.

Visual images have increasingly come to dominate our culture in recent times (Sturken and Cartwright, 2000). Human beings have continually sought more realistic ways of visual expression and their desires are found in the history of the image, as developed from drawing and painting, to photography and film. The development of media is paralleled with innumerable efforts to access 'truth' and 'reality'. This is especially so for photography, which has greatly contributed to the mass production of images in the modern society and also has a close relationship with the development of positivist science. In this context, the photographic camera was taken to be a scientific tool for registering reality and was regarded by its early advocates as a means of representing the world more accurately than hand-rendered images (Sturken and Cartwright, 2000). With the course of time, however, the reality of photography began to lose its freshness and became an object of suspicion. This led to people desiring a more powerful tool to represent reality. Unlike photography or cinema, there is also the possibility of 'instant'

transmission in television, providing the medium with that ‘liveness’ which has been seen to be its defining characteristic, even if with the advent of production recording it was no longer the routine necessity it had been in the early years (Corner, 1999). The ‘liveness’ in this sense is linked to ‘immediateness’ in terms of time, and at the same time is related to ‘on-the-spot’ in terms of space. Therefore, the liveness of television imagery provides viewers with viewpoints which totally differ from images produced by early media. Heath and Skirrow (1977) identify distinctive properties of the image and the viewing relations which follow:

In one sense, the television image is effectively ‘live’, very different from that of film. The image in the film is distant, inaccessible and fascinatingly fixed; the television image is close, available and interpellative (Heath and Skirrow, 1977: 53).

In this sense, televisual communication produces a ‘mythic belief’ which is regarded as a real situation happening around us right now, rather than merely representing information. The social significance of television as an imaginary tool has been broadly focused on the media and communications studies. The television images turn distant suffering into everyday material (Chouliaraki, 2006), deadly war into match of the day (Taylor, 1992), and national events into more significant events than those in private lives (Wodak et al., 1999). Consequently, television has become one of the most influential media as it frames much of the information available in the public domain, with consequences for the construction of identities (Hall, 1996; Silverstone, 1994).

2.2.2. Television as an Everyday Medium: Representation of the World

Although the Internet has fast become a popular and fascinating medium, television remains one of the most significant media in everyday life. In a recent survey conducted by Ofcom, the time people spend watching television remains stable alongside internet growth with the average person watching three hours and forty-five minutes of television per day. Watching television remains the activity that most adults would miss the most (Ofcom, 2010). According to a survey of the average time spent

using media in 2010, the average person in South Korea – who ranks highly for internet usage internationally – spends one hour and fifty-eight minutes watching terrestrial television and twenty-nine minutes watching cable or satellite television. This compares with an average of thirty-seven minutes per day spent on the Internet (Broadcasting Culture, 2011).

Since the beginning of the 1950s when television sets became commonplace in the developed world, researchers have tried to assess the influence and impact of television on the viewing public (Ross, 1992). In particular, there has been a significant body of research on television as a medium and on its everyday consequences (Silverstone, 1994; Gauntlett and Hill, 1999; Morley, 1986, 1992; Rogge and Jensen, 1988). Television, as Silverstone (1994) argues, still represents a central dimension of our everyday life and yet its meaning and its potency vary according to our individual circumstances. Its power will always be mediated by the social and cultural worlds we inhabit. Heath (1990: 268) asks: ‘Can anyone in our societies be outside television, beyond its compulsions?’

Television lies at the heart of political, social, and cultural life in modern society. As people become more and more dependent on television as an everyday medium and become fully trusting of whatever it says, it will then have absolute power to influence the views of millions (Couldry, 2003). This form of power is referred to as ‘symbolic power’ (Couldry, 2003; Silverstone, 1999, 2006; Thompson, 1995), which describes the ability to manipulate symbols to influence individual life. Although different forms of power in society commonly overlap in complex and shifting ways, the power of media representation is directly linked to symbolic power (Thompson, 1995). As Thompson writes, symbolic power ‘may give rise to reactions, may lead others to act or respond in certain ways, to pursue one course of action rather than another, to believe or disbelieve, to affirm their support for a state of affairs or to rise up in collective revolt’ (Thompson, 1995: 16–17). The central location of television in everyday life is thus associated with power relations within society. In the context of this study, this is particularly important when it comes to media representation of *Others* and the position these *Others* – especially as they occupy minority positions within society – might become marginalised and socially excluded. This is because, as Thompson (1995) argues,

‘individuals are constantly engaged in interpreting the expressions of *Others*; they are constantly involved in communicating with one another and exchanging information and symbolic content’ (Thompson, 1995: 16). Studying the role of media in reproducing or challenging power represents one of the fundamental objectives of media and communications studies. That is, as Silverstone argues, ‘we study the media because of the need to understand how powerful the media are in our everyday lives; in the structuring of experience; on the surface and in the depths’ (1999: 143).

One of the significant reasons for television maintaining its powerful role in everyday life is that people use it to promptly access and understand current issues. Understanding the world through television-produced visual images with simple commentary especially has become both simple and powerful. As Williams (1990) insists, in certain kinds of report, there seems to be an absolute difference between the written or spoken account and the visual record with commentary. Fiske (1983), who has written about the ideological function of television, has regarded the combination of pleasure and illusion in television’s images to be the key to its efficiency in the programming process. Apart from visual power, television takes advantage of the ‘always thereness’ and its increasing presence in the daily and weekly cycles of everyday life (Allen and Hill, 2004). Much of the experience of broadcast television, unlike the movie-going experience, is of programming forms comprised of multiple, regularly occurring episodes (Allen and Hill, 2004). Therefore, daily or weekly organised programmes are closely linked to the life of viewers, being based on a weekly or daily life-cycle. Even the daily cycle of television can seem to replicate the life-cycle of viewers, as, for example, when people adjust their dinner time according to the prime time news, or retire to bed after the prime time, late evening drama series. This concerns ‘the central role of routine in everyday life; habit, seriality, framing, and of course the role of television in defining and sustaining these routines’ (Silverstone, 1994: 8).

Television playing a critical role in society in this way, as a dominant, everyday medium, contains the important processes of signification – ‘representation’. As D’Acci (2004) reminds us, any discussion of the ways in which television represents society might start by asking what is meant by the term ‘representation’. As Sturken and

Cartwright (2000) argue, representation refers to the use of language and images to create meaning about the world around us. Discussion of representation begins with the relationship between the ‘reality’ as it exists in the real world and the ‘reality’ as represented by the media. To understand the concept of representation, it is important to find out how the media process the real world and to examine whether the media reflect the world as it is or grant new meanings to the existing reality from the view of the social constructionist (Hall, 1997). The outside world comes to have meaning and be seen visually through a representation system. Media representation, however, does not always constitute the mere reflection of the outside world. Rather it can create a ‘whole new reality’ during the process, into which the social powers and ideologies could intervene.

All types of representation, especially through television, intervene in the new way concepts are organised, gathered, arranged and categorised, and in the way complex relationships are established between different concepts (Hall, 1997). Therefore, the role of representation is more constitutive than reflective; it can also affect the lives, rights and statuses of people in a given society. Due to this inherent nature of representation, minorities in a society sometimes suffer, or find it difficult to be fairly represented, as a result of misinformed, negative or motivated stereotypes widely circulated in the society (Pietikainen and Hujanen, 2003). That is, if media representations are biased toward a particular common set of social, gender, class or racial² stereotypes, it is logical to suggest that these biases play some role in the reinforcement of common perceptions about race, class and gender roles in our society (Eschholz et al., 2002). Every regime of representation is a regime of power formed, as Foucault (1980) reminds us, by the fatal couplet ‘power/knowledge’. But this kind of knowledge is internal, not external. It is one thing to position a subject or set of people as *Other* in a stratified system of social order. It is quite another thing to subject them to that ‘knowledge’, not only as a matter of imposed will and domination but also by the power of inner compulsion and subjective conformation to the norm. One group

² Sociologically, the term ‘race’ does not refer to biological signifiers. Rather it refers to social relationships in which structural positions and social actions are ordered, justified and explained by reference to systems of symbols and beliefs which emphasise the social and cultural relevance of biologically rooted characteristics (Mason, 2000). An alternative way of thinking about human diversity is one that invokes the concept of ‘ethnicity’. In this study, however, the term ‘race’ often appears as this is associated with the socially constructed category discussed in the relevant literature.

exercising this kind of power or dominance over others reaffirms its hegemony (Gramsci, 1971). Gramsci theorised the ways in which society's super-structure, its ideology-producing institutions, are central to struggles over meaning and power (Gramsci, 1971). According to Hall (1985), hegemony is more than social power itself; it is a method for gaining and maintaining power. In this sense, media are tools that ruling elites use to 'perpetuate their power, wealth, and status by popularising their own philosophy, culture and morality' (Boggs, 1976: 39). More specifically, media institutions can (re)produce the content, inflection, and tone of ideas favourable to them far more easily than other social groups because they manage key socialising institutions, thereby guaranteeing that their points of view are constantly and attractively cast into the public arena (Lull, 1995).

In this context, we should understand television as not only a media form, but also as a system of production of ideological hegemony. Both of these aspects must be understood to appreciate the influence of television as an everyday medium. That is to say, when we analyse the text of television, firstly we must understand the characteristics and constraints of the medium, and then we must understand the social conditions from which a specific television programme is produced (K Kim and G Chun, 2003). This entails a multi-dimensional and complex exploration of intricate social relations – such as class, ethnicity, gender, age and religion, among others – rather than an over-simplistic study of the power conflict between the public and the state. Therefore, studying social representation on television means examining not only images, depictions or the presence of something that the research focuses on, but also rhetoric, social structures and power relations within a specific historical context.

2.3. Television News and Social Realities

2.3.1. Conceptualising Television News: Liveness and Pervasiveness

Among many kinds of television genres, news represents the core informational system within the daily flow of television (Hartley, 1982). Television news can be a means of bridging the gap between the public and the private spheres (Gauntlett and Hill, 1999). This is because television news is one of the main media genres that bring something

new about the public to private lives. Most television channels provide their own news programmes for prime time viewing. Television news is one of the most popular sources of information for the public in modern society and therefore has an important part to play in helping people make sense of the world (Gunter and Winstone, 1993). The key concern here is, accordingly, to examine the extent to which television news can and should be expected to contribute to people's knowledge (Harrison, 2000). At this point, however, it is important to investigate whether the information and knowledge made from television news corresponds to 'reality', as assumed and claimed in the news. In essence the Glasgow Media Group see television news as 'a manufactured product based on a coherent set of professional and ideological beliefs and expressed in a rigid formula of presentation' (Harrison, 1985: 15). As Hall contends, the journalistic tenet of objectivity is itself a myth, 'the absolute distinction between fact and value, the distinction which appears as a common sense "rule" in the news making system' (1973: 86). Myth is magnified by the 'structure' of news production:

The news is not only a cultural product: it is the product of a set of institutional definitions and meanings, which, in professional shorthand, is commonly referred to as news values (Hall, 1973: 87).

Bird and Dardenne (1988: 70) even define television news as 'myths' in terms of continuing stories with themes which are rearticulated and reinterpreted over time. These themes are derived from culture and feed back into it. They also explain that the news media is a way in which people create order out of disorder, transforming knowing into telling. Levi-Strauss (1967) and Barthes (1972) have analysed myths in semiotic terms, interpreting cultural myths as meaning-making systems that help explain societal attitudes, behaviours and ideologies. Similarly, Fiske and Hartley (1978) describe news myths as symbolic, 'cultural meanings' that go beyond the literal, connotative meanings of news stories. In their analysis of a news story televised in England about reinforcements of British troops in Northern Ireland, they explain how a soldier included in the story carries with him a great deal of cultural symbolism:

The image in our film of a soldier clipping a magazine on to his rifle as he peers from his sandbagged bunker fortress in Belfast can activate the myth by which we currently ‘understand’ the army. This myth ... is that the army consists of ordinary men, doing a professional and highly technical job (Fiske and Hartley, 1978: 64).

Television news offers more than fact – it offers reassurance and familiarity in shared community experiences; it provides credible answers to baffling questions, and ready explanations of complex phenomena such as unemployment and inflation. In this sense, television news is regarded as trustworthy and as being based on active engagement in the world, in events and in the relationships of everyday life (Giddens, 1990). The active engagement in this sense is physical; it requires bodily presence, face-to-face interactions, communication and language (Silverstone, 1994). Giddens (1990) defines that the trust of television is a kind of ‘faith’. His argument is that we have learnt (as it were) to trust from a distance as a result of our earliest experiences of childhood (Giddens, 1989, cited in Silverstone, 1994). Therefore, we tend to trust information that we have not directly experienced, treating news produced by television as a ‘fact’ without hesitation, such as coverage of the Gulf War, the Bosnian civil war and the Japanese tsunami. Giddens (1990) proposes a number of factors which influence this trusted attribute of television, and this study will focus on the dialectic of time and space, and universality among them.

In comparison with print journalism, the most important characteristics of television news are ‘liveness’ and ‘pervasiveness’. As mentioned above, ‘liveness’, as one of the characteristics of television, includes ‘immediateness’ and being ‘on-the-spot’ in terms of temporal and spatial meaning. Television news depends on its character employing virtual direct address to the viewer in a ‘here’ and ‘now’ that is composed of what are actually highly processed and symbolic images (Morse, 2004). To take the example of 9/11 in 2001, when the terror attack happened, television news delivered it instantaneously in real time through reporters sent to the Ground Zero in New York. In comparison, the published media, such as the newspapers, were not able to deliver the news instantaneously. Especially in this era of globalisation and considering the fact that people are able to access stories happening on the opposite side of the globe in real

time through news, television has never had as great a ripple effect than it has in today's society (Cottle and Rai, 2006). Pervasiveness is related to the universality of television news and its role in the public sphere. Print journalism has many constraints in terms of information delivery only in regional areas and in nations with high rates of literacy, due to its reliance on text and the time required for editing and printing. In terms of dissemination, the press relies on labour force for transportation and has only a limited range of delivery. On the contrary, television news requires much fewer literacy and linguistic skills, as it heavily relies on visual imagery. Also, the transmission and reception system using electro-magnetic signals and satellites enables people to watch news in real time from a distance.

2.3.2. News Discourse and Social Construction of Reality

This study focuses on television news reports as a type of discourse expressed, used or made public in broadcast news (van Dijk, 1988). The study of television news reports is one of the major tasks of discourse-analytical media research (van Dijk, 1992). According to Foucault (1980), discourse is the substance of knowledge, which defines and limits possible discussion about a topic. Fiske (1987) describes discourse as a 'system of representation that has developed socially in order to make and circulate a coherent set of meanings about an important topic area' (1987: 14). Fairclough (2003) defines discourse as a way of representing aspects of the world – the processes, relations and structures of the material world, the mental world of thoughts, feelings, beliefs and so on, and the social world. Discourse takes on different forms according to social and historical context and 'authority' is the important factor in the floating concept of discourse. The authority in this concept is not a substantive presence but the relationship effect of interactive communication. Discourse is one of the methods through which authorities interact and come into being through competition and struggle within systems of communication. The media could be interpreted as a space in which discourse is constantly created and contested. The news media constantly create discourse by representing social phenomena and values.

Empirically studying a specific discourse provides accessible material, which should be analysed within its social function (Hartley, 1995). Fairclough (2003) emphasises that discourses not only represent the world as it is, they are also projective imaginaries, representing possible worlds, which are different from the actual world, and tied in with projects to change the world in particular directions. Media discourse, particularly journalistic discourse, is an important site in the (re)production of prejudiced and rejectionist argumentative strategies (van Dijk, 1999). News develops in an active and even creative way – it does not simply reflect its linguistic, social or historical determinants, it works on them. It transforms its raw materials into a recognisable product, which we accept as familiar (Hartley, 1995). News discourses not only (re)construct power relations such as racial hierarchies, gender roles, the class system and so forth (Berger and Luckmann, 1999), but also become socially produced and often institutionalised ways of making sense of a certain topic that ‘pre-exist their use in any one discursive practice, and that construct a sense, or social identity, of us as we speak them’ (Fiske, 1987: 14–15). When we look at cultural and political power of news discourse in this context, we mean the power to typify, transmit and define social groups (Harrison, 1985). Hall (1982) illustrates the process of the construction of social reality with the observation that the reality as presented in the media is no longer a combination of given facts, but rather a result of the construction of them in a specific way. That is, the media do not simply represent reality, but play an active part in defining reality and conferring meaning upon it. As such, reality is something that is understood, rather than exists objectively, and it is the media that are indispensable in filtering this reality to us. In other words, media discourses are understood as reflecting not the events in the world ‘out there’, but as the manifestation of the collective cultural codes of those employed to do this selective and judgemental work for society (Harrison, 1985). In this context, the role of media is in conveying and sustaining ‘cultural hegemony’ or ‘the dominant ideology’ by using discursive power (Harrison, 1985).

In the last couple of decades, scholars from differing perspectives have suggested that news and representations in the media may play a crucial role in shaping and reinforcing racial hierarchies, particularly in Western societies where the so-called

constructed category *White* remains the social majority (Entman, 1992, 1994; Jamieson, 1992; Hall, 1997; van Dijk, 1988, 1991, 1992). Van Dijk provides one of the most elaborated theoretical frameworks for the analysis of racism and ethnic issues in the news media (1987, 1988, 1991, 1992, 1993). He defines ‘racism as a property of ethnic group dominance, which is identified as the historically rooted dominance of *Whites* (Europeans) over *Others*’ (van Dijk, 1993: 47). The key agents of *White* domination are ‘identified as the elites who indirectly control the minds of *Others*’ (1993: 21), for example, through biased news discourse. Further, this racial dominance needs to be reproduced daily in the many contexts of a multi-ethnic society (van Dijk, 1993). Elite control of media, such as television as an everyday medium, is seen as enabling control over public discourses which then enact, support and legitimate majority dominance (van Dijk, 1993). Media representation of race and ethnicity, in this enlarged sense of the term, does more than present *Others* with images or stereotypes for us to accept or reject, to learn or forget, or maintain at the back of our minds (Downing and Husband, 2005).

2.4. Globalisation, Migration and Societal Change

2.4.1. Migration and Cultural Conflict in the Process of Globalisation

In this study, globalisation becomes the significant starting point of discussion and context for the study of migration and ethnic minorities. This is because contemporary migration is accelerated by globalisation (Cohen, 1997). Giddens defines globalisation as ‘the intensification of worldwide social relationships, which link distant places in such a way that local happenings are shaped by events occurring many miles away and vice-versa’ (1990: 63). For Giddens ‘local transformation is as much a part of globalisation as the lateral extension of social connections across time and space’ (Giddens, 1990: 64). Tomlinson similarly claims that ‘globalisation is a complex process because it involves rapid social change that is occurring simultaneously across a number of dimensions – in the world economy, in politics, in communications, in the physical environment and in culture – and each of these transformations interact with the others’ (2006: 10).

International migration constitutes a significant element of globalisation. Most migrants are forced to move towards more advanced economies and seek a place, sometimes a very modest place, in the global labour market; their mobility reflects the increased interdependence of the world's economies (Cohen, 1987). Migrants are also active agents of globalisation, establishing dense networks of connections between their places of origin and their places of settlement. One of the earliest theoretical explanations of migration is Lewis' model of 'economic development with unlimited supply of labour', an influential model of development in dual economies in which migration plays a pivotal role (Lewis, 1954, cited in Arango, 2004). In Lewis' model, migration is a crucial mechanism of development for the global economy as a whole, exploiting the potential of growth inherent in economic disparities. Both sectors, traditional and modern, sending and receiving, greatly benefit from it. Migration results from the uneven geographical distribution of labour and capital. This model is often represented in the 'push-pull' theories, because they perceive the causes of migration to lie in a combination of 'push factors', impelling people to leave their origin, and 'pull factors', attracting them to certain receiving countries (Castles and Miller, 2003).

This 'push-pull' theory of migration, however, cannot fully explain the complicated social and cultural change associated with migration. The main reality that challenges this analysis is that so few people move, even though there is huge difference in income and welfare between countries. Secondly, a connected problem with this analysis is its inability to explain differential migration. In itself, it fails to explain why some countries have relatively high emigration rates and others, structurally similar, do not. Borjas (1989) claims that the mere existence of economic disparities among various areas should be sufficient to generate migrant flows. In the long run, such flows should help to equalise wages and conditions in underdeveloped and developed regions, leading towards economic equilibrium. This may lead to negative effects for immigration countries, notably the decline of average skill levels (Castles and Miller, 2003). On this score, cultural and political factors are nowadays much more influential than differential wages in determining mobility or immobility, and the selectivity of migration can be explained more in terms of legal entitlements, or of personal characteristics in the case of undocumented moves, than in terms of wage differentials

(Arango, 2004).

Asia has experienced substantial demographic change as both a cause and consequence of the social and economic transformation of the region. At the end of 2009, the total population of Asia was 3,879 million, which marked approximately sixty per cent of the world population (United Nations, 2010). Since the 1990s, the major growth has been in migration within Asia, particularly from less-developed countries with massive labour surpluses to fast-growing newly industrialised countries (NICs), such as South Korea, Singapore and Taiwan (Castles and Miller, 2003). Moreover, the last decade has seen an increase not only in the numbers of Asians moving between nation states but the types of mobility have become more complex and the movement less selective. The forces responsible for this increase in movement are associated with globalisation, especially the increased levels of education which have enriched knowledge of the rest of the world and the associated individual life, the proliferation of international media, improved transport systems and the internationalisation of business and labour markets.

According to Hugo (2005), there are broadly two systems of labour migration in Asia. The first and by far the largest involves mainly unskilled and semi-skilled workers who are employed in low paid, low status, so-called 3D (dirty, dangerous and demeaning)³ jobs that are eschewed by local workers in the fast-growing labour-short nations of East Asia and the Middle East. These are drawn predominantly from the South Asian nations of Indonesia, Thailand, Philippines, China, Burma and Vietnam. The second group is much smaller but is still significant and involves highly skilled professionals drawn mainly from India, Bangladesh, Pakistan, Sri Lanka and the Philippines who are attracted not only to fast-developing labour-short NICs and near NICs but also to labour surplus countries like Indonesia, where there is a mismatch between the products of the education and training systems and the skilled labour demands of a rapidly restructuring and growing economy (Castles and Miller, 2003). In the contemporary condition it is possible to classify Asian nations according to whether they have significant gains or losses of migrant workers. According to this classification,

³ The term 3D is an American neologism derived from an Asian concept, and refers to certain kinds of labour often performed by unionised blue-collar workers. The term originated from the Japanese expression 3K: kitanai, kiken and kitsui, and has subsequently gained widespread use, particularly regarding labour done by migrant workers (Cornell, 1993; cited in [http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dirty, Dangerous and Demeaning](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dirty,_Dangerous_and_Demeaning)).

Philippines, Bangladesh, Cambodia, Laos, China, Sri Lanka, Indonesia, Vietnam, India, Pakistan, Burma and Nepal are primarily defined as emigration countries, and South Korea, Taiwan, Singapore, Japan, Hong Kong and Brunei remain immigration destinations (OECD, 2007).

Changes associated with globalisation are not contained in economic life alone, but are also associated with cultural and social change. This derives partly from economic interconnectedness – most visible in migration flows and diasporisations – but not solely. Flows of representations and commodities also have consequences for identity and self making within and across nation states. Held *et al.* (1999) identify three broad responses to cultural globalisation, namely: those who forecast cultural homogenisation as an outcome of the impact of Western media and consumerism (hyper-globalisers); those who regard the impact of global culture as being relatively superficial (sceptics); and those who predict the emergence of new, exciting global cultural networks and hybrids (transformers). They also argue that contemporary cultural globalisation is generally seen as different from anything that superseded it in that, for the first time ever, it is impossible to be unaffected by it wherever one lives (Beynon and Dunkerley, 2000). Clifford (1988, cited in Barker, 2000) argues that culture and cultural identities can no longer be adequately understood in terms of place, but are better conceptualised in terms of travel. However, the accelerated globalisation of late modernity has increased the relevance of the metaphor of travel because all locales are now subject to the influences of distant places. Such influences are accelerated through electronic communication. Via television representations, we can all be travellers from the comfort of our front rooms. Particularly in the dominant form of national identity, it is the product of deliberate cultural construction and maintenance via both the regulatory and the socialising institutions of the state; in particular, the law, the education system and the public media (Tomlinson, 2003).

2.4.2. Globalisation for the Market, Not for the People: Marginalised Migrants

Employing Appadurai's definition (2006), globalisation is the name of a new industrial revolution. The Industrial Revolution, which was initiated in Europe in the late

eighteenth century, enabled mass production due to innovative change in production methods, completely transforming the structure of the nation state (Giddens, 1990). From this perspective, globalisation represents a new phase of an industrial revolution that enables the global circulation not only of goods, services and capital, but also of ideas and people, owing to groundbreaking advances in information and communication technologies and this eventually has transformed the global organisational structure (Appadurai, 2006; World Bank, 2000). Like the Industrial Revolution in the past, the market mechanisms of globalisation create an abundance of capital. Just as there has been increased polarisation between the rich and poor, as seen in social fragmentation into socio-economic classes, such as the bourgeoisie and the proletariat, globalisation has also polarised and even accelerated these socio-economic inequalities, both within individual societies and between Western and non-Western societies, which can be stated crudely as between the locations where we can find high concentration of capitalists with vast amounts of capital and those locations with the highest concentration of extreme poverty (Appadurai, 2006; Castells, 2009). Notably, labour mobility in the process of globalisation is of prime importance due to the fact that it is a principal agent of change in politics, economics, culture and society and also represents the movement of the object, 'people'.

The double-sided characteristic of the globalised market causes a negative attitude toward the globalised labour force and the social cacophony resulting from this. This antinomic phenomenon is particularly apparent in Western societies since the 9/11 attacks in New York and the 7/7 bombings in London. For instance, while currently capital, commodities and raw material imported from Muslim countries are welcome, reservation and resistance is expressed in the case of migration of people from these regions. To take an example from Western Europe, on the one hand, there are many benefits from deregulation and there is a political lobby which seeks to attract oil money from the Middle East. On the other hand, there are even stricter limitations in issuing visas to people from these same regions who want to enter Western Europe. As such, it is undeniable that the vast majority of today's developed countries welcome the globalisation of markets, which they see as beneficial, but deal selectively with the intensifications of human mobility associated with globalisation.

Although the discourse of globalisation has been predominantly celebratory about mass production and free trade between regions, the globalisation of ethnoscaples and the free movement of populations has been thoroughly excluded from this discourse and negatively represented. In this process, migrants are marginalised in most societies. Brodwin (2001) insists they have a general portrait of collective marginality which includes exclusion and conflicts with normative claims of equality and sentiments of belonging (Germini, 1980), occupying the lower rungs in a stratified society, and exclusion from political processes, economic resources and cultural esteem. Marginalisation is linked to social status. Marginalised groups are often portrayed as outsiders living on the margins of mainstream society. Often those groups lack a voice in the society and are underrepresented.

In the 1960s and 1970s, research observed the ways in which migrants were primarily associated with public health scares, problems of new migrant ‘numbers’ and tensions in ‘race relations’ (Cottle, 1999). Since then, a number of scholars in this context of research have examined media as sites of the reproduction of hegemony (Muijsers, 1998; Dixon and Linz, 2000; d’Haenens and de Lange, 2001; van Dijk, 1983). Research suggests that the deviancy of migrants, asylum seekers and ethnic minorities is continually reproduced through media discourses surrounding the integrity of the nation state, the biologically generated notion of racial otherness, and the equation of the unknown with disease (Pickering, 2001). News coverage, on the other hand, is a reflection of the viewpoints of the majority group and its institutions such as the government, police and justice department (d’Haenens and de Lange, 2001). Therefore, the tendency to produce particular negative and stereotypical portraits of migrants is a crucial factor in the marginalisation of migrants when they come to settle in a new land.

2.5. Otherness in the Media: Differentiating *Others* from *Us*

2.5.1. Mediated Globalisation and Migration: Learning Racial Hierarchy

Although many scholars in media and communications studies have focused on the role of the media in the process of globalisation (Golding and Harris, 1997; Mohammadi,

1997; Thussu, 2000; Curran, 2002; Rantanen, 2005; Appadurai, 2006), the big question of how media and globalisation are connected is open to argument. Media may intervene in the globalisation process. Wood and King (2002) argue that media are involved in the globalisation process in various forms, and most significantly in the production of images and discourses of specific regions and cultures which function as crucial sources of information and an accelerator for potential migrants and global customers. That is, they are interconnected in that they make possible the work of the imagination. Images of wealth and of a free and relaxed lifestyle in Western and developed countries are commonplace in the developing and transforming countries of the world, and the constancy of these images in global media – film, television and advertisements – tends to reinforce their ‘truth’ in the eyes of the beholders (Wood and King, 2002). Although Giddens (1999) argues that ‘Globalisation today is only partly Westernisation and it is becoming increasingly decentred – not under the control of any group of nations, still less of the large corporations’ (cited in Curran, 2002: 171), there are supporting arguments that ‘the expansion of Western media and business corporations promoted capitalist and consumerist values, and eroded local cultures’ (Curran, 2002: 169). The dominant strain of global media, according to Hall, still ‘remains centred in the West and it always speaks English’ (Hall, 1997: 33). This mediated globalisation imposes on the developing world a threat to nationalism which can be understood as cultural imperialism. Curran insists that ‘the threat posed by Western cultural imperialism to “Asian values”, Chinese essentialism and Islamic tradition were pretexts used respectively by conservative, communist and theocratic regimes to justify repressive media censorship’ (2002: 169). This tendency sustained nationalism as economies of these states have become globalised.

The globalisation process inevitably creates imbalance in terms of economic, political and cultural power (Held et al., 1999). In this sense, media – in which the nation, racialised social order and regional particularities are of significant value – play a leading role in producing a negative discourse towards specific nations, ethnic groups and regions that are disempowered (van Dijk, 1988). As argued by a number of scholars (Chouliaraki, 2006; Fairclough, 1992; van Dijk, 1991, 1992, 1994; Wodak et al., 1999), media discourses have been immensely influential in constructing migrants and ethnic minorities as *Others*, and even as criminals or undesirables. Van Dijk’s (1994) work is

central in this analysis as he argues that the elite dominating group supports an information system which legitimises their power and their dominant position, and which creates prejudices against members of ethnic minorities. In other words, the elite media reproduces power in general and can produce racism in particular, by proceeding actively to the construction of a negative representation of ethnic minorities and by spreading such a representation in the public arena (Campani, 2001). According to Morley (2000), media represent migrants as symbols of impurity and through these representations they reinforce the mainstream as consisting of cosmopolitan vis-à-vis segregated and inward-looking minorities, constructing themselves as superior. These media discourses tend to reproduce nationalism in order to exclude *Others* (Wodak et al., 1999). In this context, media become central mechanisms in sustaining and even increasing the relevance of nationalist ideologies within globalisation. According to Appadurai (2006), national identity is reinforced by globalisation, and so the marginalisation of migrants becomes common place. As the movement of populations has grown rapidly as one consequence of globalisation, the number of migrants seeking to enter developed countries has also dramatically increased. When analysing this process, it is arguable that the media act as elite discourse producers for the dominant class, negatively portraying the increasing numbers of migrants, particularly ethnic minorities, which serves to strengthen national identities (Appadurai, 2006). Globalisation, on the other side, tends to reinforce nationalism in developed Asian societies, such as South Korea and Japan. These countries and their dominant classes have used discourses of nationalism in order to protect their own national identities from Westernisation. At the same time, this discourse has been reinforced in the process of setting clear boundaries between the national subject and migrants, who have become *Others*, discriminated and excluded from the nation and the possibility of becoming national subjects by being portrayed as symbols of impurity.

Another role of media representing globalisation and migration is disseminating the discourse of racial hierarchy and universalising and reinforcing it. This is a complex process associated with historical and socio-cultural particularities. In the case of many Asian countries, this discourse production is closely associated with the (post-) colonial experience against Western powers and the process of modernisation associated with obtaining Western technology and social-evolutionary culture. In this process, Asians

become exposed and ‘learn’ *White* Westerners’ viewpoint of racial hierarchy without much difficulty. This is most perceptible in the dissemination of Western cultural artefacts, such as the diffusion of Hollywood films post-WWII (N Park, 2002). In the case of South Korea, it has been greatly influenced by American media even in comparison to other countries due to the tens of thousands of US military personnel stationed in the territory as a result of intervention in the Korean War (S Yoo, 2001). S Yoo (2001) argues that Western missionaries and Korean intellectuals who studied abroad in the United States handed down these racial hierarchies as part of the modernisation process. It can be crudely represented as the ‘*White – Yellow – Black*’ equation, images of which have been embedded in many Hollywood films since the 1930s, and which encouraged the growth of racialised discourses in Korea (this issue will be discussed further in Chapter Three). These racial hierarchies still exist as a dominant ideology in contemporary Korea. According to T Jang’s survey of the racial and ethnic preferences of Korean university students (2001), *Whites* predominate as a preferred group among participants, with Western Europeans being 6th and Americans 9th. However, Southeast Asians, Central and South Americans are seen rather negatively with being ranked from 19th to 25th, and ranked last were people of a *Black* background, with those ranked from 26th to 30th being from African or other *Black* backgrounds. As shown in the previous research by scholars, media discourse is closely related to the maintenance and reinforcement of racial ideologies and, as demonstrated in this example, they can also reinforce racial and social stratification.

2.5.2. Reinforcing Nationalism and Otherness

During a time of intense globalisation in every part of the world, there has been a resurgence of nationalism (Boswell, 1999). Robins (1999) argues that it is because national fragmentation influenced by globalisation may inspire a nostalgic, introverted and parochial sense of national attachment and identity. To support reconstruction of national identity, as Hall (1996) insists, the fictitious ideas of a ‘pure’, ‘original people’ and ‘folk’ are employed as a source of ethnocentrism. Along with the great upsurge of international migration in the era of globalisation, ethnic nationalism has been a major marker of social inclusion or exclusion (Munck, 2005). In terms of Western-centric

racial discourse, in particular, one of the characteristics that can be found in the globalisation process is racial discourses being combined with new or updated forms of nationalism. Wodak et al. (1999), for instance, investigate the tension in Austria's attempts both to maintain and to transform its nationalism in the process of the European Union. In their research, they prove that nationalism, as a special form of social identity, is produced and reproduced discursively. They argue, in this process, that emotional disposition, which relates to the attitudes towards other members of 'in' or 'out' groups, 'would be towards solidarity with one's own group as well as towards excluding the *Others* from this constructed collective' (Wodak et al., 1999: 4). Despite the obvious fact that nationalism is as much about exclusion as it is about inclusion (Schlesinger, 1987), 'it has been the most successful ideology around the world for the last two centuries' (Rantanen, 2005: 82). The collective memory and imagination of nationalism, as Anderson shows (1983), need the media to construct and maintain the sense of continuity and common destiny among fellow citizens. The role of the media in this sense becomes 'increasingly important when nationalism goes through a period of transformation, as happens for example when the physical boundaries of the nation-state change or there is a need to include or exclude new people' (Rantanen, 2005: 84).

Ethnic minorities are mostly recognised by the dominant population through the representations of such groups in the media, such as the press, television and the Internet (Hall, 1997a; van Dijk, 1993; Georgiou, 2006; Woodward, 1997; Entman and Rojecki, 2000). Despite conflicting evidence in media and communications research about the effects of the media, we have theoretical reasons and empirical evidence to support the claim that media discourse plays a central role in the discursive, symbolic reproduction of racism (van Dijk, 1993). Media are undoubtedly a powerful force in the creation and/or dissemination – the distinction is as important as it is problematic – of public images of the 'imagined community' that is the nation (Anderson, 1983). Television in particular, as a medium of multi-layered meaning structure (Fiske, 1987), connects viewers to 'ethnic minorities' through the format of news. The extent to which migrants and their descendants are portrayed by broadcast and print media as part of – or apart from – the national community may significantly affect attitudes among the majority population towards minority groups (Hargreaves, 2001).

Lacan and Saussure (cited in Georgiou, 2006) discuss group identities as always relying on representations. As a cultural and political process, Hall (1997a) argues that representation exercised on the basis of power relations tends to stereotype its objects, and this practice divides people into bi-polar categories such as *Us* and *Them*. Representation means to give meaning to the surrounding world using languages or images (Hall, 1997a). Understanding the general ideas of the concept of representation is important for media analysis. First of all, media representation is not neutral: it is produced with a particular viewpoint. This is because representation has the power to define, describe, exclude and include, and to produce differences and similarities; the question can be raised as to who gets included or excluded in this process (Woodward, 1997). Hall (1997a) argues that representation is an essential part of the process by which meaning is produced and exchanged between members of a culture. It does involve the use of language, signs and images which stand for or represent things. The tradition in art of painting 'exotic peoples' and the photographic representation of various 'races' serve to represent codes of domination and submission, of difference and 'alienness' (Sturken and Cartwright, 2000). The construction of cultural differences by legitimised communication system is especially open to the danger of signification through such stereotyping.

Once prejudice and discrimination are established as norms, people become socialised through this predominant discourse and such negativity becomes reproduced through the generations (van Dijk, 1993). Socialisation is the process of reproducing the existing culture by new members within society through social practices. In the strict sense, an individual will learn prejudicial ideologies from the external social discourse rather than from personal experience; therefore the medium providing information to each individual in the process of socialisation has a vital role in constructing the social prejudice (K Park, 2008). In this process, educational authorities, especially parents and schools, have the crucial role of providing information, but it is undeniable that media such as television have gained a pivotal role as mechanisms of constructing prejudice towards racial and ethnic minority groups (Chomsky, 2002; Hall, 1997a; K Park, 2008). This is no surprise, as most people spend more time watching television over their lifetime than they spend in a classroom.

Media texts as elements of social events can bring about changes. Most immediately, texts can bring about changes in our knowledge, beliefs, attitudes, values and so forth (Fairclough, 2003). Medium is an active discourse producer. It has been shown in a great deal of research that a variety of media since the start of printed media have expansively reproduced racial discrimination in discourse (van Dijk, 1991, 1992, 1993, 2000; Fairclough, 1992; Hall, 1997a; Chouliaraki, 1999; Hartmann and Husband, 1974). Most viewers do not stay untouched by the images and storylines they consume from the media. Although little evidence exists demonstrating a direct connection between the media and behaviour, such as violence, contemporary studies are finding that media messages influence viewers' perceptions of reality in a systematic manner (Signorieli, 1989; Muts and Soss, 1997; Berger, 1998; Surrette, 1999; Chiricos, Padgett and Gertz, 2001, cited in Eschholz, Bufkin and Long, 2002). The conclusions of such research suggest that media representations are incorporated into the knowledge base of audience members. If these media representations are biased toward a particular common set of social, gender or racial stereotypes, it is logical to suggest that these biases play a crucial role in the reinforcement of common stereotypes about gender roles, race and class in the society (Eschholz, Bufkin and Long, 2002). In particular, racism is to be found in the scientific theories, papers and lectures of biologists, historians and anthropologists, in religious doctrines and sermons, in children's comics and books, in advertising, in entertainment through jokes and caricature, and in political debates over the morality of colonialism and empire – all of which found expression in various media forms (Law, 2001).

Academic definitions of the racial stereotyping process have also recognised the complex role stereotypes make in making sense of the world. According to Downing and Husband (2005), stereotypes are 'generally reckoned to be particular aspects of a more general process by which humans categorise the world and thereby make sense of it for practical daily living' (2005: 33). As was already shown by Hartmann and Husband (1974), the British media, especially the popular press, represented *Black* as an invasion and *Blacks'* presence as a problem for the local population. Minority groups are often associated with crime, whereas crimes against them, such as racism or violent attacks, are underrepresented (van Dijk, 1987).

The Glasgow Media Group (1997) has sought to unravel *White*-centric hegemony through studies of the proportional representation of minority ethnic individuals on British television and in television advertising. The research showed that a large section of entertainment and factual programming was exclusively *White*, for example weather forecasts, documentaries, current affairs and quiz shows. The researchers emphasised that *Black* and Asian people tended to be in supporting roles and as temporary guests rather than hosts, and also that other minorities such as the Chinese are virtually absent across television. Entman and Rojecki (2000) provide a comparison of *Black* and *White* roles in film, appearance in television advertisements and entertainment shows, and representation in news stories in demonstrating the discursive construction of American *Whiteness*. As they write, ‘When they (media) endorse racial difference and hierarchy, however subtly and unconsciously, the media may reinforce tendencies toward prejudiced thinking apparently built into human cognition’ (2000: 57). However, the researchers believe media discourse including race should be carefully scrutinised:

Racial identity remains an important component of social appraisal, and this continues to disadvantage *Blacks* while benefiting *Whites* ...Although race clearly remains a strong predictor of life choices, the public face of race is now cloaked in a chameleon-like form, an ever-changing camouflage that obscures its force (2000: 1).

If a nation is defined as an imagined community and at the same time a mental construct (Anderson, 1983), an imaginary complex of ideas containing at least the defining elements of collective unity and equality, of boundaries and autonomy, then this image is real to the extent that one is convinced of it, believes in it and identifies with it emotionally (Wodak et al., 1999). In this sense, national identity, which the imagined community holds and shares commonly, is the product of discourse (Wodak et al., 1999). In an argument similar to this, Hall (1996) describes nations as systems of cultural representations and national identity partly reaffirmed in their meanings through everyday media consumption. As Bourdieu (1994) highlights, school and the educational system form ‘national common sense’ and, similarly, television as an

‘integrated into everyday life’ representational system contributes to the construction of what is commonly designated as national identity through classificational systems. This includes the process of inclusion and exclusion towards *Us* and *Others*. In televisual representations ‘the creation of images of the *Other* was enabled by the use of the camera’ (Sturken and Cartwright, 2000: 284) and television, in this process, functions as a tool which helps to easily and precisely distinguish *Us* from *Others*. These questions have become particularly pertinent in the case of PSB where values associated with the fair representation of all sections of the society represent core principles, at least institutionally.

2.6. Public Service Broadcasting: Conceptual Challenges between Nationalism and Multiculturalism

2.6.1. Conceptualising Public Service Broadcasting

There is no easy answer to the question of ‘what public service broadcasting (PSB) is’. Williams (1961) has identified the idea of ‘public service’ as one of the great achievements of the Victorian middle class, and one that deeply influenced later generations. It was certainly a crucial component of the ideal of public service as grafted onto broadcasting in its formative period from the 1920s to the 1950s. The Victorian reforming ideal of service was animated by a sense of moral purpose and of social duty on behalf of the community, aimed particularly at those most in need of reform – the lower classes (Scannell, 1989). Küng-Shankeleman (2000: 57) argues that PSB has responsibility for ‘the cultural transmission of a nation-state’s traditions and for helping to form the dominant consensus in society’. Although Syvertsen (1999) analyses more than thirty different definition of PSB, she concludes that not only does each usage of PSB differ but also that some directly contradict others. The most commonly cited definitions such as ‘monopoly’, ‘neutralisation’, ‘balanced representation’, ‘national scope’ and ‘non-commercialism’ are features of the old order which reflected the paternalistic and interventionist politics of 1920s and continued until the early 1980s in Western Europe (McQuail, 1995, cited in H Kang, 2003). The more recent definition of PSB equates ‘public service’ with ‘the satisfaction of audience’, implying a conception of the public as individual consumers of the media

(Syvertsen, 1999). In this view, PSB is regarded as a service to satisfy the interests and preferences of individual audiences rather than the needs of the collective (H Kang, 2003).

While some scholars (e.g. Burgelman, 1997) denounce the concept of PSB as hiding the reality that public service broadcasters simply do not operate differently from their commercial counterparts, others, such as Garnham (1986) and Murdock (1992), offer strong support for PSB and question the commercial media system's democratic potential. For them, public broadcasters are key institutions for extending citizenship rights. Curran (1991) argues that public broadcasters produce representative social, political and cultural diversity, including critical and controversial views, whereas the predominant trend within a pure market model is in favour of the production of bland programmes with a universal appeal to an undifferentiated, mass audience.

Looking back at history, PSB's introduction and development has been central to modern nation-building and to the discourse of nationalism and ethnocentrism. Although there are a few exceptional cases, McQuail insists that 'the usual pattern of state-sponsored broadcasting in Western Europe has been nowhere near as subservient to government' (1995: 147). According to Raboy (2003), PSB has been traditionally expected to represent the national as opposed to the foreign. The original public service model of broadcasting was one in which 'all the citizens of a nation can talk to each other like a family sitting around and chatting around a domestic hearth' (Keane, 1991: 164). PSB is an outcome of an agreement generated through the interactions among social forces under a specific historical setting, claims Syvertsen (1992). McQuail (1995) supports this model, saying some of the outcomes have been 'determined by governments and politicians, some by professionals, some by various interest groups, and some even by the audience, which could exert indirect political pressure' (1995: 151). Consequently, PSB grew out of the organic relations between interest groups representing some sections of the public, the state and liberal democratic politics. This tradition is still part of the core identity of the PSB, as seen in terms of 'national unity', 'cultural heritage' and 'one country'.

From the 1920s to the present, for instance, the BBC has continued the work of promoting national unity through its programmes. Royal occasions, religious services, sports coverage and police series ‘all reinforced the sense of belonging to “our” country, being involved in its celebrations, and accepting what it stands for’ (Annan, 1977: 263). Annan’s report describes the BBC as ‘arguably the most important single cultural institution in the nation’, and recommends preserving it as ‘the natural interpreter of great national occasions to the nation as a whole’ (Annan, 1977: 79, 114). Such occasions – exemplified by cases such as the wedding of Prince William and Catherine Middleton in May 2011 – may indeed be moments of national unity. Such national events have been telecasted by the BBC throughout its history over a nationwide network in the UK and the spectacle that is (re-) produced could arguably inspire nationalism in the British viewers. From this perspective, the predominant role of national media as systems of reinforcing nationalist ideologies is reproduced in PSB’s representations.

2.6.2. Public Service Broadcasting, Public Sphere and National Identity

From a historical perspective, Anderson (1983) argues that ‘print capitalism’ was instrumental in forging the ‘imagined community’ of the nation. In his analysis the changed relations of time and space brought about by the Industrial Revolution, especially by print media and most particularly by the newspaper, led to a heightened awareness of the ‘steady, anonymous, simultaneous experience’ of communities of readers (1983: 31). The earliest newspapers connected people to an idea of the nation, and the mass ritual and ceremony of reading the newspaper continues to contribute to the construction of an idea of the national community (Bausinger, 1984). The fact of engaging, through private consumption, in a joint public ritual with significant though absent others may be as important culturally as any information conveyed. If this is true of the newspaper, then it is yet truer of the contemporary regulation of simultaneous experience through broadcast media schedules (Cardiff and Scannell, 1987; Scannell, 1989), perhaps especially as regards the evening broadcast news on television (Morley and Robins, 1989).

In fact, visual media, as much as print capitalism, have become tools for the reproduction of nationalism. The close relationship between visual media and modern nationalism has become apparent from the very beginning of the modern nation states, thus this relationship can be said to be fundamental. The most typical case can be seen in the Soviet films of the 1920s. All of the movies since the Russian Revolution in 1917 were sponsored by the government; therefore, their contents were defined by topics which satisfied the revolutionary imagination. Movies as a tool of demagogy included persuasive styles and formalities and an element of realism. Vertov (1923), who was one of the typical Soviet movie directors, stresses the importance of movies in understanding the communist world. This function was seen in movies such as *Kino-Pravda (Cinema-Realism)* as a tool for reporting the truth of the revolution. Grierson, one of the earliest British film directors and the inventor of documentary as a genre, influenced by the achievements of Vertov, persuaded the government of the UK in the 1930s to initiate national ideology education, inspired by the nationalism of the Soviet movies (Borden et al., 2008). This passion towards nationalistic education through the media by movie directors reached its peak in some of the productions of American directors in the 1940s and 1950s. These films all stressed that the modern nation state contributes towards the public interest and common good, and this role is central in supporting citizens' dedication to the government and state. In this tradition of early film, negative representations of other ethnic groups, races and cultures can be found. One of the most vivid examples is in one of the earliest films, *The Birth of a Nation* (1915, directed by Griffith) represents the crude stereotype of sexually predatory African-American men as a reality using a major breakthrough for subsequent film-making technique (Gray, 1993). In this film, *Black* male characters are repeatedly shown lusting after *White* women. In conclusion, the beginning of visual media was aimed at strengthening and reproducing the discourses of nationalism, and discriminating against ethnic minorities.

As a national service, early PSB on occasions brought together all classes and regions (Reith, 1925, cited in Scannell, 1989). PSB has proved to be a powerful means of promoting social unity, particularly through the live relay national ceremonies and functions. By providing common access for all to a wide range of public events and

ceremonies – royal Weddings, presidential inaugurations, the Olympics and the World Cup, for example – broadcasting has acted as a kind of social cement binding people together in the shared idioms of a public, corporate and national life (Scannell, 1989). Most of all, the very significant genre that shows the conspicuous influence of PSB is that of the news. Although cable and satellite television in South Korea includes hundreds of channels, they account for only a small percentage of viewing – about 10 per cent or so. The importance of public television news, at prime time particularly, is still enormous. This is to say that PSB functions as a crucial base and maintains its position in the heart of the public sphere.

Although Habermas's account of the development of the bourgeois public sphere does not discuss television, his critique of public communication provides a crucial starting point to discuss what role PSB plays in democratic deliberation and citizenship. For Habermas (1989), the public sphere is a space that mediates between civil society and the state, and in which individuals and groups deliberate about public matters. In other words, the notion of the public sphere points to the requirement for democratic societies to sustain a space for the circulation of information, the exchange of opinion and the conducting of debate (Corner, 1999). The rational and critical public sphere created in the bourgeois coffee houses and salons has been transformed into a mass audience arena such as mass communication in the modern society (Harrison, 2000). Habermas (1987) introduces the concept of 'system' and 'life world' in order to explain mass communication as a public sphere. According to him, a system is represented by an economy and a bureaucracy, which correspond to money and power. The true life world for Habermas, however, represents the part of our everyday lives that excludes the influences of money and power (Harrison, 2000). To sum up, in the modern world of money and power, imperatives of the so-called system have infected communication in the life world (Harrison, 2000). For Habermas (1989), in this sense, commercial media production created a 'pseudo-public sphere' within which a culture-consuming public exists, set in its private consumption pattern. Similarly, Garnham (1986) argues that the individual is prioritised as a private consumer, rather than as a public citizen via commercial mass media.

Some scholars within media and communications studies have debated whether PSB is formative of the public sphere and crucial to its existence (Curran, 1991; Garnham 1986; Scannell, 1989). They discuss the ways in which PSB fits within the central Habermasian public sphere narrative (Ramsey, 2010). Curran insists that Habermas' account of the public sphere was historically flawed (1991: 42), but argues that the British PSB corresponds to Habermas' normative conception of the public sphere. He suggests that the normative element of Habermas' work mirrors that of the operation of British PSB (Curran, 1991). From a similar perspective, Garnham insists that addressing the model of PSB as an analogy to the public sphere is important, given that the two models share the same 'strengths and weaknesses' (1986: 45). For Garnham the strength of PSB, based upon the imperatives of public sphere theory, is that 'it presupposes and then tries to develop in its practice a set of social relations which are distinctly political rather than economic, and at the same time attempts to insulate itself from control by the state as opposed to, and this is often forgotten, political control' (ibid: 45). Scannell (1989) asserts that 'PSB is crucial to the very idea of publicness' (cited in Ramsey, 2010: 3). He argues for the foundational role of public sphere theory in the study of modern societies and the contributory role of modern media (Scannell, 1989). Whilst Habermas argues that 'access to the public sphere is open in principle to all citizens' (1997: 105), for Scannell this was actually not the case in the period which Habermas describes. Rather, it is PSB that enables this inclusive condition (Ramsey, 2010). Thus, the idea of the public sphere has been particularly related to the principles and practices of PSB.

2.6.3. Public Service Broadcasting in the Multi-ethnic Society: Responsibility for Others

In the era of globalisation marked by technological developments and faster movement of people across borders, the composition of audiences within national territories served by PSB is changing. Societies all over the world have become increasingly diverse. For migrant and mobile populations the public spheres of the host nation in which they geographically reside are far from being the only source of interpretations and identifications (Morley, 2000). Given that the media in most places are still, despite

globalising tendencies, in many respects based on nationally generated content (Morley, 2000), the challenge remains for the public media to reflect diversity in their programming.

The broad tradition of enquiry into the role of the public media and their potential for public interest leads to one of the key concerns of this research: that public television news should make a contribution to the welfare of a democratic society and that it should be accountable as a source of public information (Harrison, 2000). That is, it should be socially responsible. Although ethnic minority issues have been in the public spotlight only recently, cultural diversity in the media undoubtedly has a long history. PSB is, in particular, one of the most popular media which has a responsibility to contain cultural diversity and impartiality. This is a very important argument because this research adopts this normative perspective as I see PSB as central to representing cultural diversity, impartiality and democracy. Murdock (1994) explains that, as modern society evolved, PSB has undertaken a significant assignment as one of the mass media to provide the informational and cultural resources that would underwrite the rights and responsibilities of citizenship. In other words, the media have become both potent expressions and nurturing agents of democratic practice within a public sphere:

The concept of the public sphere here refers to the arena of civic discourse, in which the mass media are said to play a central role in providing social mechanisms for public dialogue on the common concerns of societies (Venturelli, 1993: 491)

The classic Western European model of PSB is seen as a deliberate expression for, and an understanding of, this role: ‘the tradition of Western European democratic theory and practice situates modes of public communication at the heart of the democratic process, within the very core of the notion of civil society’ (Venturelli, 1993: 495).

Pluralism and diversity refer to the extent that media supply reflects the variety in ideologies, communities and preference within the society. In economic terms, this objective can be translated as the match between the heterogeneity in supply and in demand. This objective is relevant for all types of content (van Dijk, Nahuys and

Waagmeester, 2005: 19). Cultural diversity in the public media is as much about the human right to live one's own cultural identity as it is about the human right to have access to the wealth of cultural diversity represented by the social majority (Raboy, 2006). Although PSB has a duty to represent ethnic minorities impartially, public service broadcasters have been criticised for the 'ghetto effect' they create by using government support to bracket out minorities avoided by the majority (Klimkiewicz, 2003). According to the Broadcasting Research Unit in London (1983, cited in Tracey, 1998), there are eight principles for PSB and among them, 'provision for minorities especially those disadvantaged by physical or social circumstance', as the third principle, supports that PSB is charged with a particular responsibility to serve minority groups including those of a different culture or ethnic origin. Hoggart (1983) explains that there are some minorities who do not necessarily have either great purchasing power or much political clout. They are minorities not of taste but of the accidents of nature: the disabled, the blind, the deaf, the migrants, the very old and the very young, and the indigent. To broadcasters whose eyes are on maximising profits such people and groups will not seem worth the wooing. Yet manifestly their needs are at least as great, and the comfort they may draw from broadcasting even greater, than those of the hale and prosperous. PSB, therefore, should recognise them as special cases with particular needs (Hoggart, 1983).

Pluralism was the word used by the Annan Committee in the mid-1970s to capture and respond to the changing nature of the times, but it is more accurately caught by the word 'multiculturalism' (Scannell, 2006). Multiculturalism of PSB, however, highlights some difficult problems in the politics of cultural representation (Dines and Humez, 1995). Scannell (2006) mentions that there are three major problems with British PSB in representing and serving ethnic minorities: i) badly distorted representation; ii) not getting represented at all; and iii) being lumped together with non-*White* people of entirely different cultures. British Asians and Caribbeans have often been arbitrarily yoked together in 'ethnic minority' programmes in attempts to satisfy both. In fact, broadcasters often feel content to address very different cultural interests or tastes of different cultural groups, as these have all been dealt with based on their 'minority status' alone (Georgiou and Joo, 2009).

2.7. Conclusion

In this chapter, I examined television as a tool of representing social class, and its critical meaning in everyday life within the wider context of globalisation. The chapter focused on the fact that transnational human mobility has accelerated as a result of globalisation. For many nations, as a form of resistance to the diversification of society, marginalisation and discrimination of migrants became a sustained system of ensuring a sense of national, racially stratified order. Within this process, the chapter examined the role of television as a constructor of discourses which reinforces national ideologies and plays a *de facto* role as an ideological state apparatus (Althusser, 1971), which produces discourses classifying *Us* and *Them* through theoretical review. This theoretical background has great significance in theoretically supporting the primary premise of this study, which is to examine how representations of television media produce stereotypes of ethnic minority groups, which is critical for the process of reproducing social discrimination.

The theoretical review that has unravelled throughout this chapter concerns universalistic theories (arguably Western-centric), which cannot be directly applied to the Korean socio-cultural reality. Thus, in this analysis universalistic perspectives need to be understood in dialogue with Korean particularism. Unlike Western societies, Korea itself has unique social traits associated with its history, culture and geography. These include a long history based on Confucian organisation of the society and political life, Japanese colonisation, contact with the Western military personnel through the Korean War and an only recent significant influx of ethnic minorities in the process of modernisation and industrialisation. Korean particularism and the socio-cultural, historical and political context in which this study takes place are the focus of the following chapter.

Chapter Three

Conceptualising Nationalism and *Otherness* in the Korean Context

We are born with the historic mission to restore our nation.

(The first sentence of *The Korean Charter of Education*)

3.1. Introduction

This chapter attempts a critical historical approach to the key issues surrounding meanings of Korean nationalism and the position of ethnic minorities within the nation state of South Korea. It has been shown that the Korean tradition of ethnic homogeneity has been transmitted into multicultural society through press reports and governmental announcements.⁴ Currently, Korean society is becoming more and more multi-ethnic with more than ninety different nationalities having participated in intercultural marriages and foreign wives from twenty-one countries currently residing within the country. Examining the present situation, the number of foreign residents in Korea at 31st December 2010 was around 1,260,000.⁵ Non-national labourers account for 700,000 of these and about 200,000 of them are said to be unregistered in the country. On top of this there is a big population of foreign residents from international marriages and statistics point to 11.4 per cent of all marriages in Korea in 2008 being intercultural marriages; even in rural areas this was as high as forty per cent (KNSO, 2010). Even if these figures end up being slightly high predictions, the fact is that the size of the non-national population shows that the diversification of Korean society is here to stay.

⁴ Munhwa Daily, 3rd October 2007, 'Foreigners in the state exceeding 1 million, Korea becoming multi-ethnic society'
Ministry of Justice, 24th August 2007, 'Non-national residents exceeding 1 million'

⁵ Korea Immigration Service, http://www.immigration.go.kr/HP/TIMM/imm_06/imm_2010_12.jsp, Accessed 1st May 2011

Notwithstanding the rapid popularity of multicultural discourse in Korean society, putting this issue as a question of academic debate is merely the beginning of the process. It is open to doubt that the growth of multicultural discourse in Korea means there is an increasing number of foreigners who look different from Koreans. Strictly speaking it would be more accurate to say that Korea is being transformed into a multi-national and multi-ethnic society, but not necessarily into a multicultural society. It is not easy to define in a succinct way what is meant by multiculturalism, but it is generally defined in Korean academia as a society free from the discrimination of race and ethnicity and where all groups of non-nationals enjoy the same level of social, economic, political and cultural rights as Korean citizens (K Park, 2008; G Han, 2003; H Lee, 2005; K Lee, 2007). This chapter will examine the historical background and the meaning of ethnic minorities and nationalism as formed in Korean society. It reveals the power struggles that, though under the surface of what appears a harmonious co-existence of the different ethnic groups, produce and reaffirm the nation's racial hierarchies.

3.2. Historical and Cultural Background of Ethnic Nationalism in Korea

A survey conducted in South Korea in December 1999 by the KBS and Hallym University found that 68.2 per cent of the respondents in South Korea consider 'blood' the most important criterion of defining the Korean nation; 74.9 per cent agree that 'Koreans are all brothers and sisters regardless of residence or ideology' (KBS, 1999). A survey by G Shin revealed similar views on nation and national identity; Ninety three per cent of the respondents reported, 'Our nation has a single bloodline', and eighty three per cent felt that Koreans living abroad, whether they had emigrated and attained citizenship elsewhere or were born outside Korea and were considered legal citizens of a foreign country, still belong to the Korean ethnicity because of shared ancestry (G Shin, 2006: 2). When Koreans say, 'We, Koreans are one', they mean that Koreans are one race, one ethnicity, and one nation, regardless of their current legal citizenship, place of residence or political beliefs.

Korean nationalism is maintained and strengthened by education acquired from individual socialisation and national institutions. Schools and media play a fundamental role in the process of consolidation. Schools are a vital mechanism in reproducing discourses of social control and act as a key element of the ideological state apparatus (ISA), which internalises acceptance of society and power amongst young generations (Althusser, 1971). To take a direct example, up until 2006 it was clearly stated in Korean high school history textbooks that ‘Korea maintains its traditions of an extraordinary homogenous nation’ and furthermore, the National Ethics textbook said that ‘Korea is a homogenous nation ... the community spirit as a sense of solidarity with other Koreans who share the same blood leads to patriotism’.⁶ The vast majority of people who have received this kind of education accept nationalism as a fact, not an ideology.

As the nationalism discourse within formal education is bound to be forgotten over time, other institutions, such as the media, play a significant role in reproducing and maintaining it in everyday life (Hall, 1997a). The discourses produced in this way function as a form of ethnocentrism. Ethnocentrism suspects *Others* and makes a judgment of other groups and discourses, regarding them as alien, uncivilised, immoral or mentally inferior (Giddens, 2001). The nationalism of discriminative views towards ethnic minorities, which initially came from Western societies, was established in most contexts that experienced modernisation.

However, in order to explain nationalism and discriminative reality in Korean society, we need to examine not only universalistic sociological theories, but also particular historical and cultural factors within a Korean context. Therefore, in this chapter I contextualise and discuss the history of Korean nationalism which is divided into three periods: pre-modernisation, era of upheaval and globalisation.

⁶ *Joong-Ang Daily*, 4th April 2006, ‘Korea is single-blooded nation, schoolbooks make stereotypes.’

3.2.1. Pre-Modernisation (mid 1800s–1945)

3.2.1.1. Origin of Modern Korean Nationalism

Schieder (1978) suggests three types of ethnic group which are largely differentiated by the process of construction of modern nation states. The first is based on the nature of the development of production methods, such as in the UK and France. In this case, the bourgeoisie gained the political power by accumulating capital and gaining control of the state and the citizenry. The second case is seen in Germany, where the bourgeoisie was weak and not able to establish a unified nation state under community cohesion, such as in the UK or France. Therefore, in order to overcome this division, the ruling class constructed an idealistic and mysterious spirit of nationalism and unity to bind the nation. The final example is that of the Southeastern European Slavs whose nationalism was tinged with resistance against a ruling power from outside. The discrimination and persecution suffered under the ruling power inspired nationalist movements among the subjugated, led by the working class and intellectuals (Schieder, 1978).

The Korean experience is most similar to Schieder's Slavic model. According to Y Shin (1989), modern nationalism in Korea is constituted of such thought as withstanding the aggression of foreign powers, upholding national sovereignty and integrity and following an independent and autonomous road of national development. Robinson (1988) also confirms that Korean nationalism was a response to an international threat to the traditional political and social order of the Chosun Dynasty. Looking into Korean history, it is not straightforward to find records of nationalistic events prior to the mid-1800s, when imperialism led to the opening up of Korean society. Korea has sustained ceaseless threats and invasions from foreign powers throughout its history because the Korean peninsula is geographically surrounded by three of the most powerful states in the world – Russia, China and Japan. Its crisis became acute in the mid-nineteenth century when it had to wage a relentless struggle against powerful and aggressive Western powers and Japan in order to maintain its independent life and retain its national identity.

Although some scholars go back to the middle phase of the Chosun Dynasty era (1392–1910) to seek the roots of modern Korean nationalism, it is commonly accepted that the modern nationalism of Korea began with the formation of the early ‘Enlightenment Movement (*Gae-hwa Undong, 1853*)’ and ‘Eastern Learning Movement (*Dong-hak Undong, 1860*)’ (Macdonald, 1990). Korea’s early nationalism started to resist the influence of ‘*hwa-yi* thought’⁷; however, it expanded to strive for independence and advancement of the nation under Western and Japanese threat (Y Shin, 1989). Enlightenment thought recognised the superiority of the science and technology of the contemporary West and advocated the application of this science and technology to the country’s needs (particularly those of the factory system which used iron, coal and machines) so as to promote industry and trade to make the nation strong and prosperous. The core of Enlightenment thought was to completely reorient the country and change it into an independent, strong and prosperous nation and a capitalist and civil society (Y Shin, 1985). On the other hand, ‘the thought of Eastern Learning (*Donghak Sasang*)’ argued that the strength of the big powers of the West emanated from the Western learning or Catholicism and was intended as a resistance against them. It began in the 1860s as a reaction to the influence of Christianity and Western ideas in Korea (Robinson, 1988); it realised that its popularity as a national religion would stem the tide of Western challenges. Besides, Eastern Learning predominantly comprised the consciousness of anti-Western learning (Y Shin, 1989). It might be characterised not just as conservative anti-foreignism, but also as the fusion of patriotic motives with ethnic uniqueness (Robinson, 1988). These two forms of nationalism are the two major currents of thought that meet and sometimes come into conflict when applied to modern nationalism in Korea.

According to Em (1999), the Korean nation was born out of Korea’s integration into the modern world system of nations and the subsequent rise of ethno-nationalist historiography (*minjok sahak*) in the early twentieth century. He also points to the rise of ethno-nationalist historiography that replaced dynastic historiography as crucial to the birth of the Korean people as a modern nation. This for the first time narrated the history of Korea as the history of the Korean people, a category inclusive of every

⁷ ‘*Hwa-yi* thought’ regarded China as the centre of civilisation and the rest of the world as peripheral barbarians.

Korean without regard to age, gender or status distinctions (Em, 1999). In this view, the Korean nation was no exception to the general pattern of nation state building seen elsewhere: it was a fundamentally modern construction that developed in conjunction with the emergence of the modern world system.

Although the universalistic model of modern national society that originated in European societies became popular throughout the world, particularistic elements also appeared in the construction of Korea's modern nationalism. In the late nineteenth century, some Korean leaders became familiar with modern Western ideas such as social Darwinism, civilisation, liberalism, individualism, nationalism, democracy and racism. Elements of the universalistic modernism from Western cultures were transplanted into the Korean context and two of the most conspicuous characteristics were 'ethnic nationalism' and 'the exclusion of individualism and liberalism' (Jager, 2003). Above all, the concept of Korean ethnic nationalism reflects that of modern Germany and Japan (G Shin, 2006; Em, 1999; Schmid, 2002). In Germany and Japan, the nation was based on the idea of race or *volk*, a group with common cultural and racial features, and ethnic or racial consciousness was promoted as a marker of the modern nation. Likewise, in Korea, nation or *minjok* came to be strongly conflated with ethnicity and race. In the name of an abstract, immortal collectivity (that is, ethnic nation), people were asked to sacrifice their individual, civic, and political rights (G Shin, 2006; Em, 1999). During colonial rule ethnic nationalists such as Yi Kwangsu charged that Western individualism and liberalism were destroying Korea's 'valuable' tradition of 'we-ism' and 'groupism', and they called for their revival (K Yi, 1922). As N Park (2003) points out, in the early years of the nation-building process liberalism was mistakenly positioned as the opposite of nationalism.

3.2.1.2. *From the Myth to History*

In establishing a new nation-based identity and solidarity, Korean nationalists promoted the value of their own history and language. In this sense, the work of Shin Chaeho, an editorial writer working for the *Dae-Han Maeil Sinbo* (*The Great Korea Daily Newspaper*, one of the earliest Korean newspapers), is very significant. In keeping with

the trend away from state-centred definitions of the nation, Shin adopted an ethnic definition of the nation, known as the *minjok* (Korean ethnicity). His 1908 essay *Toksa Sillon* ('A New Way of Reading History') set forth the first and most influential historical narrative equating Korean history (*Guksa*) with the history of the Korean nation (*minjoksa*). As a history of the ethnic nation, rather than a dynastic history, Shin traced the origin of the Korean nation to the mythical figure *Dan-gun* (Em, 1999). In his view, history was an 'indispensable instrument ... in instilling nationalism and implanting national awareness in young people so that they can compete on equal terms with other nations in the struggle for survival, where only the winners are allowed to exist and the losers perish' (cited in G Shin, 2006: 36). This new historiography established a racial and ethnic genealogy of the Korean nation that emerged from *Dan-gun*, the mythic founder of ancient Korea.

Although it was not mentioned in Korea's oldest extant historical texts, *Samgook Sagi* (*Historical Record of the Three Kingdoms*), compiled in AD 1145, *Samgook Yusa* (*History of Three Kingdoms*), a thirteenth century document, described that the kingdom of *Dan-gun*, the ancient Korea, was established in 2333 BC. *Samgook Yusa* was written after the Mongol invasion and dominance from 1259 to 1356, and the inclusion of the *Dan-gun* legend may have been a 'narrative of resistance' (G Shin, 2006). Not coincidentally, for a long time, the story of the birth of the nation was assumed to be a 'mythology'⁸ and was not confirmed as a supposed historical fact until 1909, under Japanese colonisation. At that time, the independence activists who fought against the Japanese began to appeal to a nationalist spirit in order to raise consciousness among the general populace (Y Shin, 1989). Therefore, historically, the myth of *Dan-gun* can be seen to have functioned as reinforcing Korean nationalism at a time of national crisis, creating internal cohesiveness and strength amongst its members.

⁸ According to the myth, *Hwan-in*, the heavenly king, had a son, *Hwan-woong*, who wished to live on earth. He descended to earth with three thousand followers to *Baek-du Mountain* under a sandalwood tree in today's North Korea and set up a kingdom there. There was a bear and a tiger in this land that wished to be human, and prayed to *Hwan-woong* for this wish. *Hwan-woong* gave them twenty cloves of garlic and a bunch of mugwort and told them to only eat this and stay out of the sun for a hundred days. The tiger and bear retired to a cave, but the tiger was impatient and left early (the animals probably represented ancient tribal totem symbols). The bear stayed and turned into a woman. This woman prayed to *Hwan-woong* for a son, who granted her wish and she gave birth to *Dan-gun*, who became the first human king on the Korean peninsula and established his capital at *Wang-geom* (*Pyongyang*, the capital city of North Korea now) in 2333 BC and called his kingdom *Chosun*, meaning 'Morning Calm' (cited in <http://koreanhistory.info/tangun.htm>, accessed on 30th March 2011).

The reinforcement strategy of nationalism using the myth of *Dan-gun* has continued up to the present day. Particularly after the Korean War, the divided North and South authorities strenuously propagated the authenticity of their own nation with an emphasis on the succession to the spirit of *Dan-gun*. The North Korean regime actually informed the South that they had discovered the tomb of *Dan-gun* in 1993 in an attempt to emphasise their legitimacy as inheritors of *Dan-gun* (Cumings, 1997). As H Song (2003) points out, it was an effort to strengthen national identity among North Koreans at a time when the country was facing a difficult situation (both internally and externally) and to present a North Korea-centred history of the unitary Korean nation. It also affirmed the homogeneity and longevity of the Korean nation. Actually, North Korea experienced a series of crises in the 1990s: extreme isolation from the outside world, the death of its leader Kim Il-sung, drought and famine, and economic hardship. Therefore, the myth of *Dan-gun* plays a central role in modern Korean nationalism and has significance in terms of historical support for the legitimacy of a homogeneous Korean national identity.

According to Hall (1996), the foundational myth or myth of origin is accorded great significance in the invention of a national culture. He added that such myths do not just play a role in the officially sanctioned narrations of a nation, but also in the antithetical narratives which are used as instruments to found new nations. More specifically, as Em points out, it was a case of ‘reinvention – and not simply a revival – of this old and recurrent narrative in pre-modern Korean historiography’ for present use (1999: 341). Shin Chaeho (1908), for instance, argued that the Korean people are descendants of *Dan-gun*, thus the Korean nation should be considered to be distinct from, and not a part of, the Chinese, Japanese or any other Asian nation in terms of a ‘single bloodline’ (cited in Jager, 2003). As Schmid points out, it was ‘the bloodline, the genealogy of the racial nation that provided unity to Shin Chaeho’s new narrative’ (1997: 33).

3.2.1.3. Nationalism under Japanese Imperialism

The Japanese colonisation which was prior to the modernisation process, played a critical role in the formation of Korean nationalism. The colonial experience with the absence of the autonomous modern state contributed to the rapid spread of the nationalism discourse. Nationalism contributed greatly to anti-imperialism (Cumings, 1984). The nationalistic independence movement and the concept of nation have been reproduced as holy and noble values of absolute virtue through these processes (J Yim, 1999). It is noteworthy that this discourse of nationalism displays some particularities. In Western society, there is no division between ‘people’ and ‘nation’. However, due to the experience under the Japanese colonisation, race was separated from the nation in Korea. As such there was not a state of Korea, but only the ethnic Korean people (K Park, 2008).

In *The Origins of Totalitarianism*, Arendt (1951) identifies race and bureaucracy as two major devices of colonial rule. Her observation of European colonial rule in Africa and India also captures the nature of Japanese colonial rule in Korea. Many have argued that colonialism was a primary factor in the rise of nationalism throughout the world, and particularly outside the West (G Shin, 2006; N Kim, 2008; Em, 1999; Cumings, 1984, 1997). Em (1999) points out that the Japanese colonial state actually endeavoured to treat Koreans as subjects – subjects in the sense of having a separate (and inferior) subjectivity. In his view, the logic of racist colonial policy compelled the governor-general to reconstitute Korean identities into a homogeneous *Chosenjin*, which means ‘the humble Korean people’. Koreans resisted the imposition of this colonialist categorisation and the insistence on the unique racial origins of the Korean people and the promotion of the Korea-centred view of East Asia became particularly important in the nationalist response to Japan’s colonial racism and assimilation policy (G Shin, 2006).

After the massive nationalist movement in March 1919, Japan instituted a new colonial policy known as *bunka seiji* (cultural rule), which allowed some limited space for ‘cultural activities’ such as the publication of newspapers and magazines on the part of colonial subjects (Em, 1999). Consequently, colonial Korea witnessed the rapid growth

of ‘print capitalism’ in the 1920s (G Shin, 2006). As in the birth of Western nationalisms (Anderson, 1983), the development of Korean nationalism during the Japanese regime was also indebted to the growth of ‘print capitalism’.⁹ The rapid increase in Korea’s own print journalism decisively contributed to the spread of Korean nationalistic discourse. This is because, as Wodak et al. state, ‘nationalism is constructed and conveyed in discourse, predominantly in narratives of national culture. National identity is thus the product of discourse’ (1999: 22).

In the 1930s, some of the key materials that explained mainstream Korean nationalism were published. The best-known example was Yi Kwangsu’s *Chosun minjoknon* (*A Theory of the Korean Nation*). Here, he not only stressed pride in Korean heritage but also presented a highly racialised view of the nation. He defined the nation as ‘eternal beings’ and Koreans have been without a doubt a unitary ethnic nation in blood and culture for thousands of years (K Yi, 1962). The insistence on the unique racial origins of the Korean people and the promotion of the Korea-centred view of East Asia became particularly significant in the nationalist response to Japan’s colonial racism (G Shin, 2006). Consequently, the initiation of Korean nationalism was promoted as a reaction to Japanese colonisation. In the period after the colonisation, the discourse of nationalism that had fostered the independence movement settled into an internal social discourse that was reproduced through the mass production of media. This nationalism became the founding principle of Korea (North and South) ever since independence from Japan, and it has continued up to this day.

3.2.2. Era of Upheaval: Independence, Korean War and Dictatorship (1945–1980s)

3.2.2.1. Nationalism after Independence – One Nation, Two Countries

With the Japanese surrender to the allied power, Korea was liberated from colonial rule on 15th August 1945. However, the United States and Soviet Union came to occupy Korea and separate the peninsula: the Republic of Korea (ROK) in the South, and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) in the North. Although they looked

⁹ In 1920 alone, the Japanese government issued 409 permits for magazines, newspapers and books, while in the 1910–1919 period, fewer than 40 magazine permits had been issued (Eckert et al, 1990).

opposite in political ideology and system, careful examination reveals a great deal of similarity in terms of their view of the Korean nation and their use of nationalism in politics (G Shin, 2006; Cumings, 1997). Ethnic nationalism became a highly effective organising and mobilising force in both parts of Korea. Postcolonial nationalism continued to function as an ideology of anti-imperialism (anti-Americanism and anti-Japanism) for the North and anti-communism for the South (Cumings, 1997).

Jowitt (1987) characterised the political ideology of North Korea as ‘Socialism in one family’, referring to its socialist system ruled by a single powerful leader and family. North Korea resembles the family-state of pre-war Japan in that it regards Korean people as one family, or as a ‘socio-political organism’, sharing the same bloodline with the powerful leader, with Kim Il-sung as a father figure. Indeed, Kim was not simply considered a political leader but was revered as *oboi suryung* (the fatherly or parental leader) among North Koreans (Cumings, 1997). He even called himself the present-day *Dan-gun*, the mythic founder of the Korean nation (G Shin, 2006). Although they respected Marxism-Leninism and established an important relationship with China and the Soviet Union, North Korea’s primary ideology is nationalism, not socialism or communism. They called their own model of socialism *Juche Sasang* which means ‘Socialism of our style’ based on strong nationalism (Jowitt, 1987; Cumings, 1997).

While North Korea constructed nationalism based on a communist state, the first South Korean president, Rhee Syngman, proposed *Ilmin Chuui*, which means an ‘Ideology of one people’. *Ilmin Chuui* was clearly an expression of ethnic nationalism similar to what had appeared during colonial rule. From this viewpoint, the nation was understood in organic and collectivistic terms, being considered a natural being or fate characterised by shared bloodline and ancestry (G Shin, 2006). The first president of South Korea stressed his view of nationalism in his article – ‘What is *Ilmin Chuui*?’ (1949); he proclaimed, ‘As a single ethnicity of Koreans that has a long history, we are always one and not two. As one nation, we have to be one always’ (S Rhee, 1949: 2). *Ilmin Chuui* was further articulated by Ahn Hosang, the first Korean minister of education. In the article, ‘Fundamentals of *Ilmin Chuui*’, published in 1950, Ahn proclaimed; ‘We are one people. One people has the same bloodline, the same fate, and the same ideology’ (Ahn, 1950: 7).

In sum, in the five years between Korean independence from Japan and Korean War, the Korean society was in complete chaos and eventually experienced tragic division. Due to this process, Koreans managed to realise their own modern nation state and therefore the leaders of both the North and the South sought to construct their own ethnic nationalism and national identity in order to secure authenticity with the people. As such, it can be seen that ethnic nationalism arises as a crucial spirit from the national foundation and is an official ideology of the state continuing to the present day.

3.2.2.2. Learning Racial Hierarchy from 'Mighty' White Americans

Korea became independent from Japanese colonial rule when Japan surrendered unconditionally after the United States dropped nuclear bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki in Japan to end World War II in 1945. Despite the Korean struggle for independence, this was actually a result of external military intervention rather than internal insurrection. As such, in the view of the majority of Koreans, the American soldiers and other allied forces were regarded as heroes and mighty beings that had brought the Japanese imperial forces to capitulate and withdraw. Even the sturdy build and fair skin of the American soldiers made them seem like perfect human beings in the view of the Koreans in those days (G Cho, 2008).

Although the elite Koreans likely learned of social Darwinism – *White* top, Asian middle and African bottom – from Japanese colonial scholars (Russell, 1991), this perception of being in between has been most forceful and popular since the domination of the US military after the Japanese regime (K Park, 2008). The respect towards *White* Americans and the United States was at its height in the years following the Korean War of 1950–1953. Abelman and Lie (1995: 57) write that ‘the US military carried the United States to South Korea. Carrying the United States also meant bringing in its baggage of *White* superior – *Black* inferior racial ideologies’. With little exception, Koreans conform to *White* America’s hegemonic construction of itself as the racialised reference point (Lipsitz, 1998). This reflection of *Whiteness* accords with Koreans’ association of a nation with its ‘owners’ or ‘majority group’. As well as

this, much of Koreans' interactions with Americans since the 1880s have been with *White* Americans (i.e. diplomats, missionaries). The most potent indicator of the persistence of this racialisation today is Koreans' use of *miguk saram* ('American people') to denote 'White people' (N Kim, 2008). Koreans also frequently use *oeguk saram* ('foreigner') to denote a *White* person unless they specify otherwise, demonstrating that 'White Westerners' are the reference point for anyone not Korean (e.g. 'Asian' versus 'not American', 'foreigner' versus 'Thai foreigner') (N Kim, 2008).

In Korean culture, the importance of the colour white cannot be overstated. The country has valorised white as representative of its people's purity and desire for peace since the Three Kingdoms Period of 57 BC to AD 668 (K Moon, 1997). According to the public educational textbook on Korean history, Korea has earned the moniker the 'white-clad nation' because Koreans continued to wear solely white clothing through pre-modern history. Although there are competing theories as to why Koreans adopted white as their clothing colour of choice, the three prominent accounts are Korea's lack of dyes, the worship of the sun, which they considered 'white', and the desire to reflect their spiritual purity (N Kim, 2008). In addition to the specific colour preference, skin colour reflected social hierarchy. Through the Chosun Dynasty era (1392–1910), which was defined the Confucian agrarian society, *Yang-ban* (the nobility/elites) were light and white skinned and the peasants who worked outside were tanned and dark skinned. Simply put, in this hierarchy system, light and white skin denoted high social status, authority and respect, while dark skin indicated the opposite (N Kim, 2008). K Moon writes that 'it is commonly known among Koreans that they prefer lighter skin to darker one even in the present age' (1997: 72). Although racial ideology and skin colour preference are not necessarily synonymous, it can be argued that the prevalence of particular hegemonic ideologies around skin colour reproduced throughout modern, Korean history relates to the ways in which Koreans think about race.

More than anything else, however, the fantasy of the 'Honourable *Whiteness* of Americans' in South Korea has been affected by the mass media. Along with US military prowess in South Korea, American mass media and commodities have been powerful markers of modernity, inspiring 'American Fever' and subsequent emigration to the United States (Abelmann and Lie, 1995; K Park, 1997). Beyond exports of

imperialist commodity racism to Asia, the influence of both the U.S. military and mass media culture on Korean society converges in the form of the American Forces Korea Network (AFKN). Now dubbed AFN Korea (since 1997), South Korean residents have been exposed to the same US military propaganda and pro-American representations that have saturated the bases since 1957 (H Kang, 2003).

As South Koreans have been inculcated with ideologies of the United States as a saviour and have witnessed what they consider US heroism and material abundance, ‘America’ has become synonymous with ‘utopia’ (Yuh, 2002). The United States literally translates to *miguk* (미국, 美國) in Korean (in Chinese characters), which means ‘the beautiful country’. By implication, this word contains the great feelings towards America that the majority of Koreans have had for a long time. In conclusion, Korea’s subordination to the *White* West has incited the uglier sides of nationalism, not only prejudices but a submission to the powerful and mistreatment of the weak – a type of authoritarian personality (N Kim 2008).

3.2.2.3. *Strengthening the Nationalism under Dictatorship*

In the aftermath of the Korean War, nationalism was combined with racism under the influence of the US and, at the same time, it became a complicated ideology combined with anti-communism (K Park, 2008). In the forty years after independence, between 1945 and 1987, a strong form of nationalism was propagated in South Korea by the authoritarian regime in order for it to maintain power; however, in 1987 the opposition movement also began to use nationalism as a means to achieve democratisation. The nationalism propagated by the government was combined with a number of other ideologies, such as pro-Americanism, anti-communism (anti-North Korea) and modernisation. On the other hand, the opposition groups combined ideologies like anti-Americanism, the agrarian movement and unionism with North Korea in terms of ethnic nationalism. However, hegemonic oppression from the government succeeded in suppressing these ideologies of opposition. As a result, the general populace has accepted the nationalistic discourse through textbooks and media, and it has now been embedded in the political, economic, and social ideologies of Korean society.

General Park Jung-hee, who took political power through a military coup in May 1961, recognised the power of nationalism in governing the country. He relied heavily on nationalist rhetoric to justify his illegal power-taking and established the national slogan ‘modernisation of the fatherland’ to justify his rule (G Shin, 2006). Park regarded modernisation as more than improving the living standards of individual people or making profit for corporations. He claimed his modernisation project to be a clear historic mission – ‘to accelerate our economic growth, to modernise our fatherland, and to achieve peaceful unification of our country on the basis of self-reliance, independence, and prosperity’ (J Park, 1976: 31). Like reformers of ‘Meiji Japan’ who sought to establish a ‘rich nation, strong military’, Korean modernisation was taken as a matter of national survival in the sense that it was the only way to prevent South Korea from falling into another colonial or communist rule (G Shin, 2006). In this sense, his nationalism included accepting superior aspects of foreign civilisation such as America, Europe and even Japan to achieve the developmental goals (J Park, 1979).

Although he appropriated foreign civilisation and economic growth for the nationalist agenda, Park also sought to preserve and revitalise national culture and identity. This is because, as Gramsci (1971) observes, modern forms of domination are not only economic or political but also cultural and ideological. Park launched the *Saemaul Undong* (New Community Movement) in 1971 to achieve national spiritual development. Although this movement has been regarded as the result of Park narrowly defeating the opposition candidate, Kim Daejung (late-president of South Korea, 1998–2002), in the 1971 election (53.2 to 45.3 per cent), and he felt an urgent need to secure popular rural support, this movement achieved huge success. In this social movement, Koreans were asked to preserve and develop virtues of their history, culture and tradition (G Shin, 2006). Park placed emphasis on an organic sense of nation based on the single bloodline stemming from the myth of *Dan-gun*, just as former ethnic nationalists had. After this movement combined with anti-communism and later with totalitarianism, it suddenly became firm as a symbolic representation of universal patriotism (Jager, 2003).

Family-centrism was an important component of the nationalism of Park's regime, along with anti-communism and economic growth (Cumings, 1997). This is linked to the restoration of traditional values movement. Therefore, nationalism was combined with patriarchal ideologies of Confucianism, which was deeply embedded in society due to the 500-year Chosun Dynasty. Family-centrism attaches greater worth to the family than to the individual and these values are reproduced in relationships throughout society (M Jung, 2007). Under this ideology, females are subordinate to males and the parent-child relationship is more important than marital relations. Furthermore, the family is prioritised over the individual and this was reflected in the monarchical structure itself, which viewed the nation as an extended family of the patriarchal king. With the king as father, it is anathema to select the monarch since it is impossible for the children to select their own father. Under this ideology, even the law was unable to violate the sovereignty of the monarch and patriarchal relations (Haboush, 2001). D Lee (2001) explains the combination of family-centrism and nationalism with the terminology *Ga-guk-che-je* (家國體制, 'familial nation system'). According to his argument, the familial nation system is a political system modelled on the family. Modelling the nation means that the nation and family are not separated as a public sector and private sector, and the family as a private sector takes responsibility for the role of the public sector as the nation. Since this familial nation system emphasises legitimacy in regards to the blood of members of the nation, it is almost unavoidably intolerant to outsiders and those deemed to be *Other* and different from *Us*, which would include ethnic minorities and those from mixed backgrounds.

To sum up, there have been massive key moments of change throughout Korean history in the forty years since independence from Japan, including the momentous achievement of the institutionalisation of democracy in the 1990s. Politically there were also turbulent periods, such as that under American military rule, the Rhee Syngman dictatorship and the subsequent thirty-year military dictatorship. During this period of confusion, the only ideology that has been consistently strong politically and socially throughout has been that of ethno-nationalism. Korean political ideologies, starting with *Ilmin Chuui* ('ideology of one people'), interlinked with the economic concept of 'the modernisation of our fatherland' in the 1960s and 1970s and became distorted as tools to maintain the strength of the dictatorship. Furthermore, even the number of

democratisation groups that resisted dictatorship also appealed to a racial discourse, rallying around such political slogans as ‘One people, One nation state’ and ‘By Only Our People’, aiming at progressive nationalism. As a consequence, ethno-nationalism in Korea during the modernisation period became a powerful unifying ideology regardless of whether one was allied with the North or South, conservative or progressive, or the rulers or the ruled. From this perspective we can see that forms of anti-nationalism were naturally excluded from the discourse and discriminated against in all aspects of society, such as in political, economic and cultural ideologies, regardless of political bias.

3.2.3. Era of Globalisation (1990s–present)

3.2.3.1. Korean Transformation: From Emigration to Immigration

Due to the rapid increase in foreign influence and media in the 1980s, the social discourse on how to adapt the exposure to foreign cultures began to diffuse throughout the Korean society. The rapid economic growth experienced since the 1960s eventually led to the export of technical professionals to Southeast Asia and the Middle East in the 1980s. At that time, some Koreans returning from abroad actively produced stereotypical discourses around partial foreign cultures as they have seen and experienced. In the ‘Korean Success Story,’ these workers starred as the heroes and heroines and the stereotyped discourses of inferior coloured races began to gain ground.

In addition, two large international events were held in South Korea in the 1980s, these being the Seoul Asian Games (1986) and the Seoul Olympics (1988), which led to a surge in foreign labour in South Korea. Until the 1980s, Asian foreign labour was concentrated in Japan, Hong Kong, Taiwan and the Middle East, and Korea was not an immigration country for foreign labour. However, at this time a large number of undocumented workers from Southeast Asia began to enter Korea under waivers introduced to attract tourists. This system initiated a loosening of immigration controls (G Han, 2003). This foreign worker influx helped small businesses, which had suffered from a shortage of manual labour due to high rates of university entrance and wage increases due to stronger labour unions (K Park, 2008). Therefore, the government

turned a blind eye to the undocumented migrant labourers due to the fact that they would contribute to national economic growth (G Han, 2003).

As non-*White* non-nationals had only been seen in the media or through others' stories of travels abroad before, their sudden appearance in everyday life led to the propagation of stereotypes of these new migrants. In this process, Korean nationalism reinforced ethnocentrism and increased discrimination and social exclusion of non-*White* foreigners. This initiated the exclusion of ethnic minorities in South Korean society.

The origin of xenophobia in Korean society dates back to the mid-1800s, around the time when nationalistic ideologies were being formed (e.g. expulsion or execution of early missionaries from Western countries). The level of the mass, anti-foreign, patriotic sentiment continued to increase at the end of the Chosun Dynasty (Robinson, 1988). The *Donghak* (Eastern Learning)¹⁰ religious movement had begun in the 1860s as a reaction to the influence of Christianity and Western ideas in Korea. The *Donghak* revolution figures prominently in most treatments of Korean nationalism. *Donghak* nationalism broadly includes conservative anti-foreignism because it celebrated the movement's Korean roots in opposition to *Seohak* (Western Learning). It represented a mass reaction to broad changes in rural life brought about by the intrusion of capitalism in the form of Japanese rice brokers, Chinese merchants and Western traders (Robinson, 1988). In later years, the patriotic anti-foreign sentiment of the *Donghak* was revived by the Righteous Army movement (*Uibyeong Undong*, 1905–1911) against Japanese colonialism. Due to economic needs, Korea, which had not yet even opened its doors to foreigners during modernisation, was eventually consumed by the inevitability of globalisation, and as a reaction the discourse of ethnic nationalism was strengthened. In this process, the reproduced and reaffirmed ethnic nationalism functioned as a discriminatory mechanism within institutions and caused the categorisation of foreigners according to their skin colour and the degree of wealth of the country from which they came.

¹⁰ The legacy of the rebellion continued with the revival of the *Donghak* religious organisation in the *Chundo-gyo* (Korean Church of the Heavenly Way) after 1900. During the Japanese colonial period, the *Chundo-gyo* played a significant role in the nationalist movement through publishing and education (Robinson, 1988).

3.2.3.2. *Between Nationalism and Globalisation*

Although there exist different views as to when globalisation reached South Korea, it became recognised and named as a major state policy and ideology during the Kim Young-sam government from 1993 to 1998. If modernisation was the catchphrase for the Park Jung-hee regime in the 1960s and 1970s, globalisation served the same purpose for the Kim government, which was the first civilian government in three decades (G Shin, 2006). Under the term *seggyehwa* ('globalisation'), the Kim government attempted to reform the Korean political economy to meet the rapidly changing conditions of the world economy. According to Ohmae (1990), globalisation accelerates the formation of a borderless world with the weakening of nation state political regimes. However, in Korea's case, the state played a key role, referred to as 'managed globalisation' by leading scholars (Alford, 1999; C Moon, 1995).

The state's drive for integration in the global markets brought huge changes to the Korean economy and society. The launch of Korean companies into the world market can be seen as one of the most significant changes in economic structure in South Korea. Gigantic companies such as Samsung, LG, and Hyundai began to stand out in the global market with the full support of the Korean government, through tax deductions, political aid, etc. Korea thus became the tenth strongest economy on the basis of GDP owing to the huge increase in exports. The twin affects of mass travel by Koreans and an influx of foreign companies into Korea again led to increased exposure to foreign cultures. English increasingly became the dominant mode of communication with foreigners and English proficiency exams became critical for employment in the majority of companies. There was an additional increase in migrant workers for cheaper labour as companies sought to make their products more and more competitive on the global market.

Although these changes indicate that Korea was being globalised, that is, becoming more interconnected with the rest of the world, the Korean response to globalisation has been shaped by the ideology of ethno-nationalism as well as its own specific history of national development (G Shin, 2006). As Alford (1999) argues, Koreans view

globalisation as dangerous because it threatens to eliminate the foundation of Korean social relations and, thereby, the fundamental bases of Korean ethnic identity. He states, 'Most of the ways in which Koreans appear to embrace globalisation are in fact strategies to keep globalisation at bay' (Alford, 1999: 12). In his view, Koreans assert the ideology of 'Korean body, Western utensils', which is just another version of the nineteenth century nationalists' adage 'Eastern spirit, Western technology'.¹¹ S Kim (2000) points out that 'despite the rising globalisation and globalism chorus, deep down Korea remains mired in the cocoon of exclusive cultural nationalism' (2000: 263). He concludes, in terms of globalisation, 'no fundamental learning – no paradigm shift – has occurred in the course of Korea's globalisation, only situation-specific tactical adaptation' (2000: 275).

The uniqueness of the state-driven participations in the process of globalisation in Korea can be simply found in the address of President Kim Young-sam in 1996. He proclaimed; 'Koreans cannot become global citizens without a good understanding of our own culture and tradition ... Koreans should march out into the world on the strength of our unique culture and traditional values. Only when the national identity is maintained and intrinsic national spirit upheld will Koreans be able to successfully globalise' (1996: 15). In other words, 'Koreanisation' was regarded as a precondition of globalisation and led to the revitalisation of Korean culture in the 1990s. As a result, the globalisation policies of Kim Young-Sam attempted to introduce Korean culture and values to the world. Furthermore, from an economic perspective the government fully supported native companies to make roads into the global market, which to a certain extent was parallel to the revitalisation of Korean values at home. According to this policy, a huge number of folk festivals were held and there was a rise in the sponsorship of Korean studies led by the government. *Sinto Buri* ('body and the soil are the same') was created as a social movement in this period, which encouraged people to use more domestic products and the rise in sales of Samsung and LG products in the global market was on the news everyday in order to instil pride in the nation; this became the discourse of globalisation in Korean society (S Kim, 2000).

¹¹ By no coincidence, it is arguable that similar forms of nationalistic modernisation are present in other nations in East Asia. In China, the idea of 'Chinese principles, Western applications' became the number one rule of reform after the Opium War (Wang, 2011). In Japan, the motto of 'Eastern ethics, Western technology' played an indispensable role in their course of modernisation (Koizumi, 2002).

To sum up, the hegemonic public discourse in Korea in the 1990s was a part of government policy which focused on the reinforcement of national identity and value, rather than the global community, and also stressed the international competitiveness of Korean culture and products in a global market. Thus, it is thought that the Korean state has demonstrated a nationalist approach to globalisation as it did with the modernisation drives of earlier decades (G Shin, 2006).

3.2.3.3. *Ethnic Diversification as a Social Phenomenon in South Korea*

In the last decades, the myth based on Koreans' pure blood has been directly challenged by the large scale of labour migration. The accelerating pace of globalisation is giving rise to various forms of migration and diasporisation even in South Korea. During the rapid industrialisation period of the 1960s–1970s, South Korea was a typical example of a labour force exporter country, sending workers to Germany, Japan, and the Middle East, but it passed through the migration transition: by March 2008, the GDP per capita was US\$24,500 and labour departures had fallen sharply. It was inevitable that allowing the migration of foreign labour would be needed to sustain economic growth. According to the Korean National Statistical Office (2010), in December 2010 the official number of non-nationals was 1,260,000, which is a 142 per cent increase from 2000 and equates to 2.6 per cent of the 48,607,000 registered citizens in South Korea; the number of foreigners in Korea will top 3.6 million by 2030, Korea Immigration Service Commissioner Han Sang-Dae told *The Korea Times*.¹² Among these non-nationals, the largest group consists of documented migrant workers of 534,041 (46.1 per cent), undocumented migrant workers of 187,163 (16.2 per cent) and internationally married women of 107,799 (9.3 per cent).¹³ Although the Chinese group among the immigrants in South Korea is the biggest, over a half of them (over 25 per cent of total immigrants in South Korea) are *Chosun-Jok* ('Korean-Chinese'), which means 'ethnic Koreans holding Chinese nationalities'.

¹² *Korea Times*, 26th July 2007, 'Foreigners to top 3.6 million by 2030'.

¹³ The Ministry of Justice, Republic of Korea <http://moj.go.kr>, accessed on 21st March 2011

Table 3.1. Official Numbers of Non-nationals Living in South Korea (1997–2010)

Year	1997	2003	2006	2008	2010
Non-national residents in Korea	386,972	678,687	910,149	1,158,866	1,260,000

Source: The Ministry of Justice, Korea (2011)

3.2.3.4. Two Main Streams of Immigration: Migrant Workers and Married Migrant Women

Migrant Workers

For the last twenty years, there have been multiple forms of immigration; however, migrant workers and married migrant women are the two most significant groups among them. A rapid increase of labour migration in particular has led to growing ethnic diversification in South Korea. Although South Korea is still at an early stage in the migration process, it is fast becoming a labour-import society. According to Castles (2007), the country no longer has to decide whether it wants to become a multicultural and multi-ethnic society or not. Today it faces a different challenge: what type of multicultural society does it want to be? Does it want to be an exclusionary society in which immigrants and minorities are treated as second-class citizens, discriminated against and socially excluded? Or does it want to be an inclusive society in which everybody who contributes to the economy and society enjoys equal treatment and equal opportunities?

Although the racial hierarchy of Koreans has been affected by eighteenth century Western Darwinism, Japanese colonial scholars and American culture, South Korea began borrowing Japan's racialisation of the global order in the late 1980s, similarly blackening the migrant workers who immigrated from China, and South and Southeast Asia (e.g. Sri Lanka, Bangladesh, Philippines and Vietnam) (Lie, 1998). Koreans have considered these workers' desperation for Seoul's jobs of drudgery an expression of inferior national blood, sometimes signified by darker skin (K Park, 2008). By contrast,

South Korea is whiter and more middle class in the world system than the developing countries from which the migrant workers hail (N Kim, 2008). The majority of migrant workers are doubly discriminated by racial classification as well as being perceived as manual labourers. The perception of labourers in Korean society is different from that of European countries that experienced the Industrial Revolution. Under the 500-year influence of Confucianism prior to modernisation, the caste system of the Chosun Dynasty period traditionally identified 'Four Classes' in society, which were aristocrats, farmers, artisans and tradesmen; the after-effects of this system are visible throughout society, and manual labour is still the least favoured occupation in Korean society due to this traditional prejudice, and it can be said that manual labourer does not simply represent a career but also a social class (Park, 2007). Therefore, migrant workers in Korean society are subject to dual exclusion, exposing them to discrimination in the racial hierarchy, and also in the social hierarchy as being working class.

South Korea showed a large increase in immigration, as a result of the introduction of a work permit system for less skilled migrants. South Korea implemented significant changes to its migration policy during 2003 and 2004 in the form of the legislation and implementation of the act on employment for migrant workers, known as the Employment Permit System (EPS), which was designed to bring in temporary migrant workers who would only be allowed to stay for three years. An extension of a further three years was possible, but the workers had to leave for a whole year in between. Moreover, workers were not allowed to bring spouses or children into the country. Thus, under this system, most migrant workers are permitted and regarded as temporary residents for work, but not as those permanently settled (Castles, 2007). This is the structure of Korean society that symbolically reproduces *Otherness*.

Married Migrant Women

Another main stream of the new ethnic minorities in South Korea is migrant women marrying Korean men. There has been a dramatic growth in intercultural marriages in recent years. In August 2009, the Korean National Statistical Office (KNSO) announced that the number of international marriages in 2008 was 36,204, which was eleven per cent of all marriages in Korea that year (327,715). Most of those come from China (13,203) followed by Vietnam (8232), Philippines (1857), Japan (1162) and other

countries in Southeast Asia (3659) including Cambodia and Thailand.¹⁴ Much like the influx of migrant workers, the recent trend of ‘international families’ was set off as part of a drive towards international division of labour (G Han, 2003). But the formation of such families in South Korea was driven by the need to maintain the gender division of labour in the countryside by making up for female emigration to the cities (triggered by urbanisation) with immigration of brides mainly from China, Vietnam, Philippines, Russia, Uzbekistan, and so on (G Han, 2003). The number of international marriages has been rising every year, from 12,319 in 2000 to 43,121, or 13.6 per cent of the total, in 2005. In particular, 35.7 per cent of men living in the countryside who got married in 2005 married foreigners and it is expected that this will result in about fifty per cent of the population below the age of nineteen in rural regions to be biracial by 2020 due to the quickly growing number of inter-racial marriages in the farming and fishing community, the Ministry of Food, Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries announced (*The Korea Times*, 9th April 2009).

Table 3.2. The Rate of Inter-cultural Marriage

Year	1990	1995	2000	2003	2005	2008
Rate of inter-cultural marriage	1.2 %	3.4 %	3.7 %	8.4 %	13.6 %	11.0%

Source: KNSO (2010)

The history of married migrant women in Korea stems from the 1980s when Korean-Chinese, the supposed first group of married migrant women, began to enter the country. At that time the problem of unmarried men in rural areas was seen as a social problem and that was the reason for the sudden influx. This movement was promoted actively through intervention by local governments after Korea officially established diplomatic relations with China in 1992. Starting in Okcheon, Chung-buk Province, in 1993 before expanding to Jangsu and Jyeong-eup Districts in Cheon-buk Province in 1995 and 1996, respectively, the local governments were either facilitating international marriages or

¹⁴ *Munwha Daily*, 26th July 2009, ‘1 of 10 international marriages, 46% of them are of Chinese nationality’.

providing financial support for them (H Lee, 2005). By 2000 this had expanded to the national level, but mostly in rural areas throughout the country. Currently, 29.4 per cent of local governments and subsectors (242 out of 822) are facilitating programmes that encourage international marriages, which, although not simply explained, can be understood through the politics of population. The number of registered residents, including non-nationals, at the local government level is pivotal data for estimating the budget and human resources from central government. Therefore, the population level is an essential condition for maintaining a certain level of organisational capacity for local government and the most fundamental way to do this is for the local population to produce more children, which can be realised in the long run by match-making unmarried men in areas with a population shortage. Without regard for the supposed necessity of this project, it became problematic because the administratively centred methods of accepting migrant women, and the fact it gave little thought for local communities and needs, meant the women were treated as a disposable resource for maintaining the rural family structures (G Han, 2003).

The extension of migration and diasporisation to areas of the rural periphery not only brought with it changes in the economic sphere, it also brought changes in the socio-cultural sphere, with various ethnic groups forming local communities in their areas of residence and developing diverse cultures. As a consequence, the formation of new social and cultural groups raises further questions around national identity and the cultural and educational capital of the children of diasporic people and Koreans, about diasporic populations' communication and interaction with the locals, and the future shapes of specific local communities (K Lee, 2007). The phenomenon makes Koreans realise that the rise in international marriages is not just in numbers. It reflects how the nation is fast becoming a multi-ethnic society and, importantly, indicates that ethnic diversity has become inevitable in Korean society.

3.2.4. National Identity and the Media in the Korean Context

3.2.4.1. Globalisation of the Korean Media

Globalisation challenges the traditional ways of thinking about nationalism, which are based on the idea that people who live in a given geographical territory share a national identity and feel they belong to the same nation (Rantanen, 2005). This globalisation is continuously reproduced through various forms of media discourse, rather than being an actual phenomenon, and is expanded and disseminated throughout society. The period of time in which the terminology of globalisation began to be used in earnestness throughout South Korea corresponded with the time at which the Olympics were held in Seoul, in 1988. The slogan of the Olympics at that time was ‘The World to Seoul, Seoul to the World’ and this can be said to be the beginning of the construction of a discourse which emphasises the ‘world’ or ‘global’ as a central concept in mass-produced Korean media. However, the meaning of the word was somewhat restricted to referring to the ‘Western world’, implying the inclusion of the more developed countries in terms of economic power.

In the period of the first civilian government of President Kim Young-sam, initiated in 1993, the terminology ‘globalisation’ began to be frequently used. The increasing use of the term ‘globalisation’ as a motto of national policy was a result of the changing Korean economic structure, which was heavily dependent on exports. Korea achieved remarkable economic growth due to strong economic and modernisation policies beginning in the 1960s; however, the rapid development had come to a standstill by the early 1990s. As the dramatically soaring stock market reached its limit, Korean companies tried to launch their businesses in overseas markets. In this situation the wave of globalisation that had taken off during the Seoul Olympics of 1988 became the perfect ideology to satisfy the needs of political and economic interests, with the former wanting to distract the internal opposition and the latter wanting to access new and broader markets.

Taken together, the discourse of globalisation produced by the media has been used in a very limited sense in Korean society. It was claimed that in this new world the globe was our local neighbourhood; however, this often emphasised Western developed

countries, rather than Africans, Southeast Asians and other ethnic minorities. Moreover, globalisation in this context is limited to economic sectors, in particular, an efficient means of international trade and economic growth. In order to survive in this globalised world, international competitiveness is emphasised and globalised society is no longer perceived as a 'society we live together with' but as a 'society of accelerating competitiveness'. This discourse utilises a selective vision of globalisation which both minimises its impacts and highlights the threat it poses to the homogeneity of Korean culture.

3.2.4.2. Korean Public Service Broadcasting as a Factory of Fictive Nationalism

While there are more differences among Asian television systems than among Western systems, there are also significant similarities in the ideologies and structures of broadcasting in Asia. Four similarities will be noted here. First, the state acting independently of societal interests in many Asian countries has exerted monopolistic power in the initial configuration of broadcasting (Tsai, 1998). With civil society being weak, the state compensates for an underdeveloped market or a deficient bourgeoisie (Gerschenkron, 1992). Second, in many Asian countries, the state-run systems have general arrangements for the broadcasting media. Primary reasons for the establishment of these systems were the extension of education, economic development, nation building, national security and prevention of internal insurgency (Tay, 2001). Third, PSB in many Asian nations is run on the noble idea of 'public service' but their programmes are replete with entertainment. State broadcasting was routinely legitimised in the language of public service, national security and state prerogative, but gradually its 'role as an educational medium' was relegated to the background. It became a medium for entertainment followed by information that was predominately political (Thomas, 1998). Fourth, the state intervention in broadcasting results not only from the lack of strong civil society but also from 'Asian culture'. In fact, the Western concept of public media is rooted in the enlightenment philosophy of individual freedom and rights, which cannot be directly transferred to many Asian countries where a Confucian philosophy of consensus and cooperation are stressed as critical social values (Menon, 2000).

These characteristics of television broadcasting systems of Asian countries are similar to the Korean broadcasting environment, especially those of PSB. In South Korea PSB is the most powerful media. This is because the Korean broadcasting system was set up under the strong influence of the monopolistic power of the state. The Korean state still has relatively strong control of PSB, at least compared to Western European countries. South Korean PSB retains a legacy of being supportive towards the regime. After the democratisation of Korean politics in the late 1980s, direct control of the media disappeared. There is no longer any coercion, reporting guidelines or censorship. However, the complex nomination system behind the scenes for designating the heads of public broadcasters still remains and the state still retains the right to intervene on particular issues (H Kang, 2003).

PSB is the product of interaction and consultation with the purpose of maximising the benefits for social groups, such as nations, capital, or political parties (McQuail, 1995; Syvertsen, 1992). For this reason, PSB is bound to operate within the political ecology. Therefore, the governance structure of PSB is influenced by the relations between the broadcaster and the political system. This is particularly so in the case of the composition and appointment of board members in the PSB. The board members have distinctive political influence over broadcasters.

Hallin and Mancini (2004) categorise the PSB on the basis of political influences: political-over-broadcasting system; autonomous systems; and politics-in-broadcasting system. 'Autonomous systems' correspond to the professional model which notes that the broadcaster should be free from political control and operated by broadcasting professionals. On the other hand, the 'political-over-broadcasting system' represents a model of direct control by government or the political majority. Likewise, the 'politics-in-broadcasting system' corresponds to the parliamentary model or the civic model which are controlled by a proportion of parliament seats or diverse cultural/political groups.

None of these three models are to be fully applicable or reproduced in a clear manner in every society, as in all applications of the PBS there are distinct particularities. Within

this context, the case of Korea is closer to the government-controlled model of PSB that Hallin and Mancini discuss (2004). The Korean nation-state has a relatively short history of institutional democracy compared to most of the Western countries with PBS. In Korea, the authority of its president, a so-called ‘imperial president’, is so powerful that the president has the authority of appointment of the head of KBS. Consequently it is evident that the political independence of KBS is not guaranteed in this structural environment.

The history of PSB in Korea can be traced back to the Japanese colonial period. In 1926, the Government General of Korea (hereafter GGK), the Japanese colonial government in Korea, established the Kyung-Sung Broadcasting Station¹⁵ (the old name of KBS) and the old KBS started its first radio broadcast on 16th February 1927 (KBS, 1997). The GGK enacted a wartime programming policy centred on the enhancement of Japanese spirit and the mobilisation of the whole Korean Peninsula for the war. Even the subjects of radio dramas changed for the mobilisation with themes such as patriotism and sacrifice for the Japanese Empire (H Kang, 2003). Just after the Japanese emperor announced his World War II surrender on 15th August 1945, ironically, the Korean personnel of KBS began to broadcast ‘Arirang’, Koreans’ favourite traditional folk song, on the radio station that had aired Japanese military songs only a day before. This ‘opportunism’ is the most peculiar characteristic of Korean broadcasting journalism (Y Choi, 1998). This seems to be a general relationship between the state and broadcasting in which the power of the broadcasters varies depending on that of the state.

After liberation from the Japanese, the southern half of the Korean Peninsula was under the command of the US Army Military Government, while the northern half came under the Soviet Union. They renamed the Kyung-Sung Broadcasting Station (the old name of KBS) as the Korean Broadcasting System (KBS) (J Song, 1991) and prohibited news coverage opposed to the American strategy of establishing a pro-American government and eliminating the left in order to secure a bridgehead in East Asia as preparation for the Cold War with the Soviet Union (H Kang, 2003). Under this US regime, a reporter was dismissed from KBS after protesting that his report on UN

¹⁵ ‘Kyung-Sung’ was the old name of ‘Seoul’ that the Japanese regime forced the Korean people to use.

trusteeship of Korea had disappeared in the process of censorship in 1946 (B Yoo, 1998) and three reporters were examined by the US police on the charge that they had quoted a report of a newspaper, which had positively covered a speech by a representative of the Soviet Union urging joint America-Soviet discussions in 1947 (KBA, 1997). The most ridiculous happening, moreover, was that twelve employees of KBS were arrested and seven were prosecuted on the charge of making a bad quality transmission during a right wing party's speech in 1947 (KBA, 1997).

The American military government's period had two significant impacts on the Korean PSB system. The first is that it moulded the broadcasting environment of the future, where the form of state-owned broadcasting appeared for the first time. The state exercised its power in forming the broadcasting system and structure following the Japanese occupation period. The active intervention of the state in the area of broadcasting resulted in a broadcasting culture vulnerable to pressure from the state (H Kang, 2003). The second is that Korean people were influenced by American programmes and televisual cultural forms. Under the financial difficulties of the time of the Korean War, KBS broadcast programmes provided by the United States Information Agency (USIA) and United Nations Command (UNC) (S Chung, 1991). This provided an opportunity for the Korean viewers not free from the influence of KBS broadcasting, which produced biased programming from the viewpoint of Americans, to adhere to the majority American Caucasian position in terms of racial issues (J Roh, 1995).

After the US military regime, KBS was still utilised as one of the most important institutes for the state regime (H Kang, 2003). In particular, during the eighteen-year dictatorship of General Park, KBS developed under the extreme power of the state. During the Japanese colonial period, the US military rule period and Rhee's government, broadcasting had been passively controlled by the state, while the Park government actively exploited broadcasting, putting its ideology of economic development to the fore and permitting private broadcasting. The broadcasters in Korea learned the strategy of supporting the regime and obtaining economic benefits in return for this support. Under this situation it was impossible to distinguish public service broadcasting from other private broadcasting (H Kang, 2003).

Moreover, General Chun, the very next dictator was in urgent need of controlling the national media and forcefully integrated a number of private broadcasters into KBS (H Kang, 2003). As a result, KBS possessed an unrivalled level of resources compared to other broadcasters and this meant its output displayed a tendency to follow the government line in its own interests. Another attempt to control broadcasting can be confirmed by the official broadcasting guidelines. Journalists used to call it ‘today’s saying’ until it had the official title, *bodojichim* (‘the press guidelines’). The guidelines consisted of prohibitions on certain news items such as the activities of dissidents or the opposition party, university demonstrations and labour-management disputes. News stories in the everyday media were graded as ‘allowed’, ‘not allowed’ and ‘absolutely not allowed’, and there was a specific format and a way each story should be written (*Hangyore* 12th December 1995). What was worse, marginal groups such as the homeless, orphans, those in poverty and the handicapped could not appear on the television screen (H Kang, 2003).

Since the democratisation of Korean society, after the mid-1990s, there has been a guarantee of the freedom of the press; however, KBS broadcasts are still closely related to the official government position and the service has been greatly influenced by changes of regime in its tones and arguments. In particular, producers and reporters under the military regime (1960s–1980s) now enjoy high positions of authority such as editorships. Therefore, there are still arguments that self-censorship of news makers still has an impact on news outlets such as KBS as an authority-oriented broadcaster. To take a direct example, President Lee Myung-bak, elected recently when the former ruling party was replaced in 2008, legislated for the KBS president to be removed from his position despite having remaining time on his term in office. The South Korean president was fiercely criticised as he put his favoured people, who were close to him and his ruling ideology, in the position instead. Additionally, there have been rumours that KBS has a confidential internal document which obstructs celebrities who have publicly voiced their opposition to the policies of the conservative party from being on KBS and related radio programmes. As a consequence, the political independence of KBS has been repeatedly questioned and remains a big issue.

Nationwide television in South Korea today is dominated by three public service broadcasters: Korean Broadcasting System (KBS), Educational Broadcasting System (EBS, which KBS transmits on behalf of EBS), and Munhwa Broadcasting Corporation (MBC). The revenue structures of the three public broadcasters differ from each other: KBS relies heavily on a subscription fee and advertising revenues, while EBS depends in part on subscription fees, in part on support from the Broadcasting Development Fund, and in part on advertising, and most of MBC's revenue comes from advertising (KBS, 1999). Despite its heavy dependence on advertising revenues, MBC is considered as a public broadcaster because 70 percent of its stock is owned by the Foundation for Broadcast Culture, an organisation operated entirely from funds provided by the national government (H Kang, 2003). Its highest decision-making body, the Board of Governors, is comprised of 11 members who are nominated by the Korea Communications Commission (KCC), and appointed by the president of South Korea. The Board nominates the KBS president and the chief executive officer, who are also appointed by the South Korean president. In this context, KBS cannot become fully free and independent from the government's control.

3.3. Conclusion

In this chapter, as examined earlier, the migrant influx as a form of the globalisation process in Korean society was discussed, and there was an analysis of the ways in which Korean nationalism intervened and was reproduced by this process. To conclude, Korean nationalism as an exclusionary device for ethnic minorities has been formed through a series of historical events over a period of time; therefore it cannot be described through mere rhetoric, but is a highly complex and longstanding phenomenon. Particularly in the last fifty to sixty years of Korean modern history, society has had such diverse experiences as Japanese colonisation, the Korean War, political intervention of the US, modernisation and globalisation. As a result of this series of historical events, Korean nationalism has been strengthened, reconstructed and transformed and it is still a process in progress.

Simultaneously, the Korean public media environment plays a critical role in producing public discourse. Due to the complicated historical background, Korean PSB tends to be authority-oriented rather than people-oriented, and typically represents the ‘national’ interest, rather than impartiality. Therefore, it can be said that Korean PSB has produced nationalism as a national ideology, defining it as an absolute value, and it has tailored and evaluated all the social changes within the frame of nationalism. On the premise of this contextual background, the next chapters will look into what kind of new discourse KBS, as the Korean PSB, produces in the process of experiencing a radical increase in migrant numbers over the last decade and in what light they represent them as new members of society.

Chapter Four

Methodology

Methodology is the fundamental part of our story-telling technique, and as such is more than technical: it is the very language of research, quite simply how we go about doing things.

(Morrison, 1998: 3)

4.1. Introduction

The starting point of this study is an examination of the role of public service broadcasting (PSB) in South Korea, where ethnic minorities have increasingly become visible in its programmes. This study is particularly crucial as it examines the role of the media, and especially PSB, as the main source of social discourse concerning discrimination and cultural exclusionism against ethnic minorities. This is valuable as studies of this kind are rare in South Korea. Moreover, studying media representations of ethnic minorities forms a significant method to understand the relationship between ethnic minorities and media power. This is because most people understand and define their world through the representational systems provided by the media. Ethnic minorities in modern societies are mostly recognised by the way they are represented in the mass media, especially the press and television. The media have the ability to give concrete form to abstract ideologies. Media constructs can then turn into widely consumed ideological discourses that have the ability to transform subtle cultural or social differences into fundamental differences. Therefore, in studying how ethnic minorities are located and recognised in social contexts, media representations represent one of the most significant research areas.

To approach the main research questions this study employs two modes of analysis: textual analysis and interviews. More specifically, textual analysis is composed by content analysis and critical discourse analysis (CDA). The texts of television news

programmes, which this study intends to analyse, are not only composed by discourses such as visual images, news stories, commentary and interviews, but are also produced in the context of the society (Richardson, 2007). Content analysis helps to answer questions about ‘what themes occur?’, ‘how often the themes and messages are represented?’, ‘what semantic relations exist among the occurring themes?’ and ‘what network positions are occupied by such themes or theme relations?’ On the contrary, CDA as a qualitative method is adopted to explore the specific discourses in the representation of television news. This methodology will help to explore and explain the reasons why there are certain representations of ethnic minorities in the Korean context and discuss what forms they take. This is because not only are discourses historical and only understood in relation to their context but CDA can also investigate systematically the relationship between the text and its social conditions, ideologies and power relations (Fairclough, 1989; Wodak, 1996; van Dijk, 1996). By finding and categorising news images, at the final stage of textual analysis, this study will recognise the visual images as discourses which will be examined in categories to denote what they mean in the specific social context.

Interviews with ten news reporters, producers and editors of *KBS News 9*, occupying decision-making positions about the content of news programmes, constitute the third component of the research. The interviews will examine the politics and practices of the producers’ perceptions in the news-making system. The interviews with news makers will not only aim to shed light on the decision-making process and the editorial and production procedures that lead to the production of specific representations in the television news programmes, but also find out about these representations. One of the reasons these interviews play a significant part in this research is the current insufficiency of media policies addressing the representation of ethnic minorities in South Korea. Thus, interviews will be the only way to record and analyse how Korean PSB news makers’ perception of minorities produce and organise news contents.

4.2. Textual Analysis

4.2.1. Content Analysis

The starting point of any study of television must be with what is actually there on the screen and this is what content analysis is concerned with establishing (Fiske and Hartley, 1978). Since content analysis can be applied to any piece of recorded communication or writing, it is widely employed to evaluate different types of information such as documents, newspaper articles, books and so on (Y Kim, 2007). It provides an excellent tool to analyse various aspects of journalism and communication (Krippendorff, 2004). In particular, a sizable amount of research has been devoted to the systematic content analysis of the images of racial and ethnic minorities in the media (Neuendorf, 2002) and the vast majority of them have examined African American portrayals, and they include several important reports and volumes that provide an excellent first look at some of the landmark content analysis in this area (Dates and Barlow, 1990; MacDonald, 1983; Poindexter and Stroman, 1981). However, there are few studies that have examined the status of other ethnic minorities, especially Asians, in media content. Thus, content analysis of an Asian media's representation of another Asian people will be very meaningful research.

Content analysis is primarily concerned with analysing cultural texts in accordance with the ideals of quantification and natural science methodology (Krippendorff, 2004). It is not concerned with questions of quality, of response or of interpretation, but confines itself to the large-scale, objective survey of manifest content (Fiske and Hartley, 1978). Although some critics of content analysis argue that its definition of 'reliable' equates reliability with quantitative methods of analysis (Ball and Smith, 1992; Slater, 1998), Berelson (1952) offers a definition that has subsequently been widely adopted as the definitive description of quantitative content analysis: 'Content analysis is a research technique for the objective, systematic and quantitative description of the manifest content of communication' (1952: 263). Krippendorff (2004) also makes clear that content analysis involves various qualitative procedures. He argues that 'content analysis is a research technique for making replicable and valid inferences from data to their context' (Krippendorff, 2004: 21). Research using content analysis does tend to use lots of numerical analysis. This is because, in its concern for replicability and

validity, content analysis offers a number of techniques for handling large numbers of images with some degree of consistency (Rose, 2001).

The method of content analysis is based on counting the frequency of certain visual elements in a clearly defined sample of images, and then analysing those frequencies. Thus content analysis assumes that if a word is used twenty times in one newspaper and only twice in a different newspaper this is of significance. There are four steps to content analysis which are ‘finding data’, ‘devising categories for coding’, ‘coding the data’ and ‘analysing the results’ ; each aspect of this process has certain requirements in order to achieve replicable and valid results (Rose, 2001). Content analysis is a technique the results of which need interpreting through an understanding of how the codes in an image connect to the wider context within which that image makes sense. To do that requires not just quantitative skills but also qualitative ones and this is the reason why I decided to use CDA as well.

As Winkler and Kozeluh argue (2005), content analysis identifies and counts the occurrence of particular aspects in a text. According to Weber (1988, cited in Kim, 2007), content analysis involves codifying the units into various categories. Seggar and Wheeler (1973), for instance, found that an analysis of occupational roles portrayed on television in terms of gender and race produced some interesting results. In that study, 57 per cent of *Black* males and 65 per cent of *Black* females worked in the five most frequently portrayed occupations whereas the figures for *Whites* were 29 per cent and 50 per cent for males and females respectively (Fiske and Hartley, 1978). They found significant racial differences, but even larger sexual ones in the symbolic world of television.

Content analysis was originally designed to analyse documents such as newspapers and books. Thus the approach to units of television text analysis can be largely divided into visual and explanatory. More specifically, ‘images’ as visual narratives, ‘narrations’ and ‘interviews’ are explanations, and ‘narrative structure’ is the overall flow. First of all, this study will analyse ‘newsworthiness’ with consideration of the unique characteristics of television news content. This is because ‘television news is delivered to the customers in a linear arrangement, not allowing consumers to select or arrange

the order of viewing' (McQuail, 2000: 235). Therefore, prior to an analysis of the detailed content, an analysis of newsworthiness is essential in understanding how the news content is arranged and its importance. Next I will conduct a topical analysis of news content and a detailed categorical analysis of how participants appeared on the news, such as by ethnicity, country of origin, roles, gender, visual frame, and so on. I will go on to discuss the implications of the findings and continue with textual analysis using CDA.

To fulfil the aims of this thesis, the texts of *KBS News 9*, the main news programme of KBS, aired between 1st January 2004 and 31st December 2008 (five years) dealing with issues related to ethnic minorities and foreigners in Korean society will be analysed. This period is chosen because it represents a period of peak migration, as discussed in Chapter Three. The Korean Ministry of Justice officially announced that the number of foreigners who live in South Korea went over one million in 2007. This means that during this period there were numerous stories around migration, diversity and foreign workers that dominated the news agenda. I can access all news contents through the VOD (Video on Demand) service on the KBS website (www.kbs.co.kr) for this period; there are 364 news items concerned with ethnic minorities and multicultural issues which I will analyse.

4.2.2. Critical Discourse Analysis

Since news reports are a type of text, I will not just treat news as transparent messages whose contents may be analysed in a superficial, quantitative way, but will also examine the complex structures and strategies of news reports and their relations to the social context (van Dijk, 2000). The goal of analysing the discourse of broadcast news is to display its structure as situated communicative action under conditions of mediation in the specialised domain of news broadcasting. The pursuit of this goal resembles the long-established sociolinguistic and ethnographic concern with 'who speaks what, to whom, when, and how' (Hymes, 1977, 2001; Saville-Troike, 2003, cited in Montgomery, 2007). In other words, the aim of analysis is to display how this is accomplished by attempting to answer the question of how the communicative parts

hold together in a meaningful and intentional fashion in a unified act of communication (Montgomery, 2007).

Critical discourse analysis (CDA) is employed as a qualitative instrument to examine the results of the content analysis and other parts of television news text. This is because media discourse is currently one of the main sources of people's knowledge, attitudes and ideologies and one of the crucial tasks of CDA is concerned with studying and analysing texts to reveal the discursive sources of power, dominance, inequality and bias (van Dijk, 1998). CDA identifies itself as inter-disciplinary in orientation, which generally means that its practitioners draw on a diverse array of methods, though more recently there has been a concern to theorise inter-disciplinarity more carefully in relation to CDA (Fairclough, 1992, 1995; Chouliaraki and Fairclough, 1999; van Dijk, 1993, 1995; Weiss and Wodak, 2003). However, there is no consensus amongst CDA researchers as to whether CDA is a theory, methodology or neither or both of these (Lee and Otsuji, 2009). Van Dijk (2008), one of the most influential scholars in the field, claims that CDA is neither a method nor a theory but is a movement of critical scholarship and should therefore allow any methodologies and theories to be employed. Correspondingly, Weiss and Wodak (2003) identify CDA through a multivalent and inclusive orientation towards theory and methodology.

Influenced by the social thought of Gramsci (i.e. the concept of *hegemony*), Habermas (i.e. the concepts of *colonisation of discourse*), Foucault (i.e. *orders of discourse*) and others, CDA sees languages, including all forms of semiosis such as body language and visual images, as discourse, that is, as a form of social practice (Stamou, 2001). In other words, CDA is analysis of the dialectical relationships between discourse and other elements of social practices. Its particular concern is with the radical changes that are taking place in contemporary social life: with how discourse figures within processes of change, and with shifts in the relationship between discourse and more broad semiosis, and other social elements within networks of practices (Fairclough, 2003). More specifically, such analysis should describe and explain how power abuse is enacted, reproduced or legitimised by the text and talk of dominant groups or institutions (van Dijk, 1996). Discourse plays a particularly important role in the production and reproduction of prejudice and racism. It is clear from news reports in the media that

people are engaged daily in communication about ethnic minorities and race relations. It is therefore an important task of CDA to study the precise cognitive structures and strategies involved in these processes affecting the social cognition of groups (van Dijk, 1996).

According to Wodak (1996), CDA is concerned with social problems. She insists that CDA starts by identifying a social problem, ‘chooses the perspective of those who suffer most, and critically analyses those in power, those who are responsible and those who have the means and the opportunity to solve such problems’ (Wodak, 2001: 1). In other words, it is not concerned with language, but with the linguistic character of social and cultural processes and structures. Society and culture are shaped by discourse, and at the same time constitute discourse. Discourse analysis is interpretative and explanatory and it implies a systematic methodology and a relationship between the text and its social conditions, ideologies and power relations. In essence, CDA involves an analysis of how discourse relates to and is implicated in the (re)production of social relations – particularly unequal, iniquitous and/or discriminatory power relations (Richardson, 2007). In response to social inequality and the abuse of power, CDA demands politically involved research with an emancipator requirement (Titscher et al., 2000).

It is very significant to define what the terms ‘critical’ and ‘discourse’ mean at this point. The term ‘critical’ means not taking things for granted, opening up complexity, challenging reductionism, dogmatism and dichotomies, and being self-reflective, and, through these processes, making opaque the ways in which structures of power relations and ideologies manifest themselves in specific texts. ‘Critical’, thus, does not imply the common sense meaning of ‘being negative’ but rather being sceptical (Reisigl and Wodak, 2001). This study will also employ Fairclough’s definition of ‘discourse’ as a way of representing aspects of the world – processes, relations and structures of the material world, the ‘mental world’ of thoughts, feelings, beliefs and so forth, and the social world (Fairclough, 2003). Following his argument, discourses not only represent the world as it is (or rather as it is seen to be). They are also projective imaginaries, representing possible worlds which are different from the actual world, and tied in to projects to change the world in particular directions (Fairclough, 2003).

Van Dijk (1995: 17) essentially perceives discourse analysis as ideology analysis because, according to him, ‘ideologies are typically, though not exclusively, expressed and reproduced in discourse and communication, including non-verbal semiotic messages, such as pictures, photographs and movies’. Van Dijk’s approach incorporates the two traditional approaches in media education discussed earlier: interpretive (text based) and social tradition (context based), into one analytical framework for analysing media discourse (Sheyholislami, 2005). Ideologies indirectly control the mental representations that form the interpretation basis and contextual embeddedness of discourse and its structures (Le and Le, 2009). He explains the link between ideology, discourse and social practice as follows:

The crucial concept of ideology I proposed is defined in terms of the fundamental cognitive beliefs that are at the basis of the social representations shared by the members of a group. Thus, people may have ideological racist or sexist beliefs (e.g., about inequality) that are at the basis of racist and sexist prejudices shared by the members in their group, and that condition their discourse and other social practices. We thus at the same time are able to link ideologies with discourse, and hence with the ways they are (discursively) reproduced, as well as the ways members of a group represent and reproduce their social position and conditions in their social cognitions and discourse (van Dijk, 2004: 27).

Although he admits that it is theoretically and empirically impossible to provide a complete and detailed ‘account of the ideologies involved and the structures of news that are controlled by them’, he states that a polarisation between the in-group (*Us*, a positive self-image of a social group) and the out-group (*Them*, assessed and represented in a negative way) is characteristic of many such ideological structures (van Dijk, 2009: 199). Therefore, it can be assumed that media discourse is also permeated by structures, institutions and values from politics, economy and ideology (Richardson, 2007).

In the last couple of decades, a significant number of CDA scholars have focused on media discourse (Fairclough, 1992, 1995, 2003; van Dijk, 1988, 1991, 2000, 2004; Wodak 1996, 1999, 2001; Chouliaraki, 2006). Fairclough (1995) argues that media discourse is very much under professional and institutional control, and in general it is those who already hold economic, political or cultural power that have control over media representation. He adds that media discourses ‘contribute to reproducing social relations of domination and exploitation’ (1995: 44). Chouliaraki and Fairclough (1999), van Dijk (1998) and Chomsky (2002), following Gramsci, use the concept of ‘hegemony’ to explain the media’s dominant power in the real society – named ‘manufacturing consent’. Chouliaraki and Fairclough (1999) refer to it as follows:

Hegemony is relations of domination based upon consent rather than coercion, involving the naturalisation of practices and their social relations as well as relations between practices, as matters of common sense – hence the concept of hegemony emphasise the importance of ideology in achieving and maintaining relations of domination (1999: 24).

Hackett (1991) even defines the mainstream media as ‘agents of hegemony’. Hegemony concerns power that is achieved through constructing alliances and integrating classes and groups through consent, so that the articulation and re-articulation of orders of discourse is correspondingly one stake in hegemonic struggle (Fairclough, 1992). CDA is much more interested in the implicit manifestation of power which is not clearly marked or coded but can strongly control discourse and discourse (re)production, as van Dijk notes:

Power is directly exercised and expressed through differential access to various genres, contents, and styles of discourse. This control may be analysed more systematically in terms of the form of (re)production of discourse, namely, those of material production, articulation, distribution, and influence (van Dijk, 2008: 22).

The study of media discourse as the enactment and reproduction of ethnic and racial inequality has recently attracted interested in CDA research. Traditionally, such work focused on ethnocentric and racist representations in the mass media, literature and film (Dines and Humez, 1995; Wilson and Gutierrez, 1985; Hartmann and Husband, 1974; van Dijk, 1991). Later discourse studies have gone beyond the more traditional, content analytical analysis of the images of *Others* and probed more deeply into the linguistic, semiotic and other discursive properties of text and talk to and about ethnic minorities, migrants and other minorities (van Dijk, 1993).

In this study, media discourse in television news reports about ethnic minorities, non-nationals and multicultural issues are analysed following van Dijk's analytical framework (1995, 1998). This is because analysing and making explicit the contrasting dimension of *Us* versus *Others* has been central to most of van Dijk's research and writings (1988, 1991, 1992, 1993, 1995, 1996, 2000, 2008). What distinguishes van Dijk's framework for the analysis of news discourse is his call for a thorough analysis not only of the microstructures of media discourse including semantic relations between propositions, syntactic, lexical and other rhetorical elements but also of the macrostructures. His framework pertains to the thematic structure of the news stories and their overall schemata, which give a broader picture of the news actors under analysis (van Dijk, 1988, 1991, 1993; Sheyholislami, 2001). He sketches a three-dimensional framework for conceiving of and analysing discourse: 'discourse analysis, cognitive analysis, and social analysis (analysis of social structure)' (van Dijk, 1995: 30). These elements resemble Fairclough's three dimensions of analytical framework: *text* (news report), *discourse practice* (the process of production and consumption), and *socio-cultural practice* (social and cultural structures) (Fairclough, 1995; Chouliaraki and Fairclough, 1999). Van Dijk's approach incorporates the two traditional approaches in media discourse, interpretive (text based) and social tradition (context based), into one analytical framework for analysing media discourse (Sheyholislami, 2001). For van Dijk, it is socio-cognition that mediates between society and discourse. He defines social cognition as 'the system of mental representations and processes of group members' and states that 'ideologies are abstract mental systems that organise socially shared attitudes' (van Dijk, 1995: 18). He concludes that 'ideologies indirectly influence the personal cognition of other group members in their act of comprehension

of discourse among other actions and interactions' (Ibid., 19).

The purpose of his analytical framework, thus, is to understand how people act, speak or write, or how they understand the social practices of *Others* (Sheyholislami, 2001). Van Dijk (1998: 61–63) suggests five stages to analyse media discourse on power related to social groups including ethnic minorities: 1) examining the context of the discourse, the historical, political or social background of a conflict and its main participants; 2) analysing groups, power relations and conflicts involved; 3) identifying positive and negative opinions about *Us* versus *Them*; 4) making explicit the presupposed and the implied; and 5) examining all formal structure, i.e. lexical choice and syntactic structure.

Thus, at first, this study will categorise news texts and the overall analysis of objects will be done by topic, depending on the result of the content analysis, and from this I will analyse each typical news text. Secondly, based on the results drawn from the initial analysis, I will classify the tendency of discursive practice of *KBS News 9* by frames and analyse them in detail. Lastly, I will look into the socio-structural meanings and examine the evidence for socio-ideologies, hegemonic processes and political structures that affect news discourses. For this purpose, the analysis adheres to the analytical paradigm of CDA as a qualitative method for researching news discourse including narratives, specific descriptions and visual images. This critical method incorporates 'linguistic description of the language text, interpretation of the relationship between the discursive processes and the text, and explanation of the relationship between the discursive processes and the social processes' (Fairclough 1995: 97).

4.2.3. Visual Analysis as a Part of CDA

As a method, discourse analysis pays careful attention to images, and to their social production and effect (Rose, 2001). This is because discourse can refer to many different types of text such as linguistic, visual, symbolic, etc. As Chouliaraki (2006: 84) notes in her research on *Others* in television news, more than anything else, the impact

of any news text is almost always a function of its visual referent (Peters, 1997; Boltanski, 1999; Barnett, 2003, cited in Chouliaraki, 2006). As Corner says, ‘the offer of “seeing” is absolutely central to the project of television journalism’ (1995: 59, cited in Chouliaraki, 2006). The image that television news provides is instrumental in helping viewers to believe that something really happened. Moreover, in the era of visual communication, television and film images function as ‘the book of nature’, as ‘windows on the world’, as ‘observation’, and verbal text serves to identify and interpret, to ‘load the image, burdening it with a culture, a moral, an imagination’ (Kress and van Leeuwen, 2006).

CDA is a method of analysis of television text that treats the linguistic and visual choices on the screen as subtle indicators of the power of television to mediate the world to the world. This is the power of television to classify the world into categories of *Us* and *Others* (Chouliaraki, 2006). Studies of racism and the representation of ethnicity over the centuries in the visual arts, literature, theatre, popular music, popular science, educational textbooks and religion all need to be integrated into the study of ‘racial’ visual representation in film, photography, television and the press (Downing and Husband, 2006). In this sense, visual analysis is concerned with the way in which imagery builds social identities, social relations and systems of knowledge and how these images maintain power through their ideological properties (Brookes, 1995). Visual analysis offers researchers an interdisciplinary method for understanding and contextualising images – crucial concerns, given the cultural centrality of vision (Schroeder, 2006).

Like linguistic structures, visual structures point to particular interpretations of experience and forms of social interaction. Kress and van Leeuwen (2006) define that ‘visual grammar’, which can be expressed linguistically to some degree, describes a social resource of a particular group, its explicit and implicit knowledge about this resource, and its uses in the practices of that group. The word ‘grammar’ in this sense refers to a description of structure rather than the rules for correct usage of prescriptive grammar (Richards and Schmidt, 2002). Visual language as discussed in Kress and van Leeuwen (2006) is not conceived of as transparent and universally understood but as constituted within a culture; there may be variations in the structures of visual

expression from culture to culture (Koga-Browes, 2009). However, as Kress and Leeuwen (2006) argues, in most parts of the world, Western visual communication exists side by side with local forms owing to the dominance of Western visual culture (television, films and so on). Thus, in this research, it is confirmed that the method of visual analysis is broadly based on Western tradition. In some particular cases of visual meaning, however, it should be fully explained.

In this thesis, the framework of visual analysis focuses on the original five basic aspects as recomposed and employed from Bignell (2004), Kress and van Leeuwen (2006) and Zettle (2005):

- Attitude (angle)
- Background (scenery)
- Contact (gaze)
- Distance (frame)
- Effect (movement)

These five aspects are named as the ‘visual framework of A to E’. Although a number of critiques of these tools have been undertaken by former scholars, this study is the first application to organise and put them into one analytic framework. I will discuss the application of these aspects below.

Attitude

First of all, the selection of an angle, as a point of view, implies the possibility of expressing subjective attitudes towards represented participants. Kress and van Leeuwen discuss this as follows:

There are, since the Renaissance, two kinds of images in Western cultures: subjective and objective images ... In subjective images the viewer can see what there is to see only from a particular point of view. In objective images, the image reveals everything there is to know (or that the image produced has judged to be so) about the represented participants, even if, to do so, it is necessary to

violate the laws of naturalistic depiction or, indeed, the laws of nature (2006: 130).

The camera angle reflects the viewpoint that the medium directly or indirectly wants to use. The convention of using variations in vertical camera angle to imply relationships of power is well established in visual expression. This research will analyse visual texts, using a framework of three angles. First of all, low angles, whereby the camera is located below a subject and is gazing upwards, giving the impression of superiority, exaltation and triumph. Secondly, through high angles, whereby the camera is located above the subject and looking downwards, giving the impression of loneliness and inferiority. Messaris (1998) suggests this convention may have its ultimate origins in the analogical relationship between child and parent; the child necessarily views adults, those with the authority to determine the course of many fundamental aspects of the child's life, from a low angle and, at least metaphorically, looks up to them. Thirdly, eye-level angles, whereby the camera shoots an actor at an equal face level, are most frequently used in news reporting and present stability and familiarity. Depending on the angle chosen, a subject can thus be seen as superior or inferior, familiar or unfamiliar, ordinary or extraordinary, and significant or insignificant, which in turn reflects the socio-cultural power embodied by the subject (Kress and Leeuwen, 2006).

Background

Background images have an influence on the authority of the subject in news footage, as can the behaviour displayed by the interviewee or interviewer. This can be seen as authority given by space. According to Merrifield (1993), space is a result of social interaction, while at the same time being a process. Giddens (1990) uses the terminology 'locale', which is not merely a physical environment or stage but something actively organised by people who participate in social interaction. Space as a text is a place where the interests of people and society are reflected. This can be explained by the concept of 'space-ness', which refers to social consciousness and agreement about life spaces and the process of living as a group among members of a specific society. For example, if a professor of a reputable university delivers a lecture in a market, street or factory, which is highly accessible, noisy and disorganised, then most people would pay little attention and would not know if that scholar is

academically established (i.e. spaces with authority and credibility). On the other hand, if the same lecture was delivered in a lecture hall, an office or church, where it is quiet and has more limited access, then people will tend to listen more carefully and attempt to understand the subject of the speech more intently. This shows how the authority of space is socially constructed and this authority is then bestowed upon people in the space as well as the discourse produced there (Harvey, 1993; Augé, 1995). Therefore, actors within visual images cannot help but be influenced by the socio-cultural meaning of the background in which they are captured.

Contact

There is a fundamental difference between images from which represented actors look directly at the viewer's eyes, and images in which this is not the case. When represented participants look at the viewer, vectors, formed by the participants' eye lines, connect the participants with the viewer. The actor's gaze (and the gesture, if present), Halliday (1985) argues, demands something from the viewer. It demands that the viewer enters into some kind of imaginary relation with him/her. In each case, whether the participant gazes or not, the image wants something from the viewers – wants them to come closer or stay at a distance or to form a pseudo-social bond of a particular kind with the represented participant (Kress and van Leeuwen, 2006). In particular, someone who looks at the viewer is represented as a human being, while another who does not look at the viewer is portrayed as *Other* or a stranger. The mutual contact between viewer and actor as closely linked is defined by the matter of who takes the lead in the discourse production. Therefore, the power reproduction between the viewer and actor needs to be analysed so that we can understand the mechanisms of discourse production and how it relates to socio-cultural power.

Distance

The choice of the size of frames can suggest different relations between represented participants and viewers. According to Zettle (2005), in terms of distance between viewer and actor, the field of view is basically organised into five steps: *extreme long shot*, *long shot*, *medium shot*, *close-up* and *extreme close-up*. Grosser (cited in Hall, 1964) especially defines that at a distance of more than four metres people are seen as having little connection with ourselves, and hence the painter can look at his model as

if he were a tree in a landscape or an apple in a still life. The distance of 1.25 to 2.5 metres, on the other hand, is the portrait distance:

The painter is near enough so that his eyes have no trouble in understanding the sitter's solid forms, yet he is far enough away so that the foreshortening of the forms presents no real problem. Here at the normal distance of social intimacy and easy conversation, the sitter's soul begins to appear ... Nearer than 90cm, within touching distance, the soul is far too much in evidence for any sort of disinterested observation (Hall 1964: 71).

In sum, the distance used to represent participants on television is significant to define the relationship between actors and viewers.

Effect

Finally, camera movement is also a key tool in instituting the relations between the viewer and actor, particularly in terms of angles and frames. In terms of television's visual communication, camera movement means a change in the point of view for the viewer and the position of the actor. This change alters the meaning of the image, enabling dynamic and intensive meaning, as opposed to static visual text (Zettle, 2005). For instance, when a bright image of a foreigner who looks at the viewers and waves his or her hands, by slowly zooming and showing this close-up he or she is shown to be like us, even though they are still 'aliens'. On the other hand, when a dark image is used where individuals avoid eye contact and are shown from the back, they are portrayed as 'not part of our world', '*Others*' and 'strangers' (Zettle, 2005; Kress and van Leeuwen, 2006). Therefore, the movement of the screen shot can be the object of interpretation as a televisual text, which also produces unique meaning.

Table 4.1 summarises the main kinds of interactive meaning discussed above. According to Kress and van Leeuwen (2006), it should be remembered that these are simultaneous systems: any image must either be a demand or an offer and select a certain size of frame and select a certain attitude, and so on. The systems of attitude, background, contact, distance and effect interact to create more complex and subtle

relations between represented and interactive participants.

Table 4.1. The Framework of Analysis for the Visual Texts on Television

Framework	Signifier (representation)	Definition	Signified (meaning)
Attitude	low angle high angle eye-level angle	subject looking up subject looking down subject looking collinearly	dynamic, superiority, exaltation, triumph inferiority, loneliness stability, regularity, familiarity
Background	private space public space space of government	office, research lab market, festival, street police station, court, governmental department, parliament	professional, trust, important non-professional, distrust, unimportant authority, trust, good, protect
Contact	contact absence of contact	actor gazing at the viewer actor not gazing at the viewer	demand, human being offer, stranger, otherness
Distance	extreme close-up close-up medium shot long shot extreme long shot	specific part of body face only head and waist whole body and background far from background	anxiety, tension, defect friendly, important, emotion stability, authority neutrality, public relationship spectator, other, spectacle
Effect	tracking zoom-in zoom-out panning	shooting in movement focusing on subject focusing away from subject turning camera to left or right	sense of realism, anxiety, shock, accident something ours, inside otherness, outside changing viewpoint

In this study, the visual representation among television news texts, as subjects of analysis, will be examined by the analytic framework presented in Table 4.1. It can be understood as a process, of course a part of CDA, which converts visual text into linguistic text for analysis. After the first analysis of this visual analysis framework, the research will go on to connect this with linguistic text in news script and analyse them in turn.

4.3. Analysis of the News-making System: Semi-Structured Interviews

In addition to the quantitative and qualitative analysis of media representations of ethnic minorities and migrants, interviews with media producers and decision makers represent the third central and critical log of a triangulated methodology. Interviews as a major research method are used for analysing the news production system as discourse practice. This is because not only is news representation produced by editorial guidelines of producers, but also South Korean PSB has not established enough set media regulations and policies which are significant or comparable to the BBC's. The interview is different from ordinary conversation 'because of the existence of controls in the gathering of information' (Keats, 2000: 1). In this sense, it is premised that the interviewee may know enough in some circumstances to volunteer information on an issue. It is usually based on expectations that a prospective source is familiar with a subject, or the need to dig deep because of the views and opinions of interviewees, so data can be fresh, raw and insightful (Creswell, 1997; Denzin, et al., 1998; Guion, 2007). The interviews with news makers, consequently, have allowed me to explore the intentions and the interpretations of the representations by the people who actually produce them. In addition to recording the opinions and the processes of media production, the interviews also serve as a tool to record the regulations and the guidelines that drive decision making. Since that there are very few public policies on minority representation in the media, the interviews with the media producers become an entry point to the newsroom's political values, the guidelines and the regulations (or lack thereof) that drive media representations of migrants and ethnic minorities.

Although there are three main interview methods that are frequently chosen in the social sciences, the structured interview, unstructured interview and semi-structured interview (Britten, 1995), many studies in media and communications studies employ the semi-structured interview method (Burns, 2000). The semi-structured interview is the most common form of academic research interviewing (Barbour et al., 2005; Berger, 2000). In it, the interviewer develops a set of questions beforehand, but intends to be conversational and adapt according to the discussion, without abandoning the set priorities and focus. Thus, the main job is to get the interviewee to talk freely and openly while making sure the researcher gets the in-depth information (Rubin and

Rubin, 1995). For talking to media producers, this form of interviewing is considered the most appropriate for two reasons. Firstly, this form of interview is in general considered as the most appropriate for highly educated, expert participants. Secondly, the nature of the study includes the investigation of various processes, references (e.g. institutional guidelines and editorial meetings) and opinions, which requires a reflexive interview method that can adapt to the content of the discussion as it unfolds during its conduct. In this study, therefore, semi-structured interviews, which combined standardised questions with in-depth discussions (Berger, 2000), were chosen.

In this study, the interviews were conducted during a field trip to South Korea from December 2009 to January 2010, after content analysis was completed and in order to investigate further the elements of representation that emerged through the content analysis. Participants were chosen from KBS reporters who had covered news stories related to ethnic minorities, non-nationals or multicultural issues at least twice between 2004 and 2008. Among them, twenty reporters and producers were initially contacted by email. Although twelve of them agreed to take part in the interview, ten participants were considered as representing the range of the producer body, and its regional, gender, experience and decision-making, directly. The final sample included five women and five men; four worked in KBS Seoul and six worked in other cities; individuals' career length ranged from four to sixteen years; seven of them were reporters and three editorial journalists. The interviews took place between December 2009 and January 2010. Each interview session lasted a minimum of fifty minutes and a maximum of seventy minutes. Most interview sessions were conducted at the interview offices in KBS, but a couple of interviews took place in public places such as cafes and restaurants. For reasons of accuracy and credibility, a digital voice recorder was used with their permission and all interviews were transcribed into a 138-page transcript. All interviewees had a chance to check their own transcript and to make sure that there was no problem with it.


4.4. Triangulation of Methods

The three methods explained so far, content analysis, CDA and semi-structured interview, represent different approaches selected in order to answer the research question of this thesis. Thus, in order to maximise the meaning of this study, the effective connection of the analytic results gained from these three methods is required. Mixing methods can be useful as it sieves personal prejudices possibly inherent in a method (Denzin and Lincoln, 2003). Triangulation represents an important strategy for maximising the use of various methods (Adeniyi, 2008). Triangulation is broadly defined by Denzin as ‘the combination of methodologies in the study of the same phenomenon’ (1978: 291). Triangulation of methods provides researchers with several important opportunities (Jick, 1979). It not only allows researchers to be more confident of their results but also helps to uncover any deviant or off-quadrant dimensions of a phenomenon (Jick, 1979). In addition, use of multiple methods can also lead to a synthesis or integration of theories. In this sense, ‘methodological triangulation closely parallels theoretical triangulation’ (Denzin, 1978: 295), that is, efforts to bring diverse theories to bear on a common problem (Levine and Campbell, 1972; Marris, 1975, cited in Jick, 1979: 609). Finally, triangulation may also serve as the critical test, by virtue of its comprehensiveness, for competing theories. The use of multiple methods in this research results from the multiple causes, rather than fragmentary phenomenon. Hence, this can be a critical factor from the perspective of analysing a power-related social phenomenon that needs multi-dimensional analysis.

In this study, of the two major approaches to triangulation, the ‘between (or across) methods’ type, which refers to the application of distinct methods, is employed; there is also the ‘within method’, as a counterpart, which is about using different techniques within a given method (Jick, 1979). The ‘between methods’ type was chosen as it involves the use of multiple methods to examine the same dimension of a research problem (Jick, 1979). For example, in this thesis, the representation of ethnic minorities on the television news may be studied by evaluating news contents quantitatively, by analysing news discourse critically, and by interviewing the news makers. The focus always remains that of the power-related news representation but the mode of direction varies. Multiple and independent measures, if they reach the related conclusions,

provide a more certain portrayal of the representation process. This study attempts to draw meaningful conclusions with a phased and gradual discussion of each set of results and analysis, rather than by thoroughly mixing and interpreting the results of research gained from the three methods. That is, as shown in Figure 4.1, firstly I will categorise the total subjects of analysis, 364 news articles, by theme and by frames depending on their frequency, through the process of content analysis. Next, according to the results of the content analysis, and critical discourse analysis which will thoroughly critique the news articles according to dominant themes, all meaningful discourses of news texts including verbal and visual parts will be analysed using an in-depth critical approach. From these two processes, it will be possible to grasp the tendency of news representation of major discourses and answer the question ‘why is the tendency of representation occurring?’ from the interviews with news makers.

Figure 4.1. The Triangulation Process of Analysis



4.5. Conclusion

The mapping out and planning of a methodology is possibly one of the most significant processes in constructing a research framework. In order to resolve the specific research questions, this study adopts not only quantitative methods, but also qualitative methods. Consequently, this will not only restrict the possible limitations of a study that heavily

depends on a single method, but will also add depth to the analysis. More specifically, first of all, 364 news articles have been selected as analysis subjects and I will conduct a quantitative analysis arranged by news order, frequency of ethnic minorities' appearance, nationality range of ethnic minorities, gender and occupation through content analysis. Furthermore, through this process, the results will be classified into specific themes. Based on this, upon completing the analysis of the most salient news discourses through CDA as a qualitative method, the meaning of the results will be discussed. Lastly, the research seeks to answer the question of what causes the results of the textual analysis in the news-making process from the interviews with ten news makers.

This triangulation of methods can be seen as one of advantages of this study as the use of quantitative analysis and qualitative analysis simultaneously can help to overcome the constraints particular to a singular research method. This was achieved by employing content analysis, discourse and visual text analysis, and semi-structured interviews, allowing for triangulation of results which enables results to be cross-checked. This methodological attempt will enrich the research results and potentially influence academic practice around this subject, which currently displays a tendency for research centred on single methodologies. This study especially has potential significance in initiating an alternative approach within Korean academia of media and communications studies, where American quantitative methods of statistic analysis are dominant. This mainstream approach often leads to the quantification of all social phenomena and an attempt to place them within one single framework.

Chapter Five

Representation of *Others*: Quantitative Approach

5.1. Introduction

The aim of this chapter is to examine how ethnic minorities are represented on *KBS News 9* through a news content analysis. Analysed in the chapter are 364 news items related with ‘non-nationals including ethnic minorities and migrants in Korea’ for five years between 1st January 2004 and 31st December 2008. This is a surprisingly small number of items for such a long period, especially as more than a million non-Koreans live in the country. The average number of news items on *KBS News 9* is thirty-five per day. It is estimated that around 63,875 news items were produced during the five years being studied (35 items x 365 days x 5 years = 63,875 items). During that period only 364 news items relating to non-national minorities were broadcast, which means only one news item per five days or an average of 0.2 per day. According to the Korea Ministry of Justice (2010), the non-nationals residing in Korea represent approximately 2.8 per cent of the whole population (approximately 49 million). This equals 1.3 million according to June 2010 estimates. In addition, around 15 per cent of all marriages in the country were intercultural marriages in 2008 (KNSO, 2009). The number of non-nationals in Korea has greatly increased in the last decade. Considering this sudden increase in the number of non-nationals, the fact that so little news attention is paid to them could be an indication of a marginalisation of these populations within the public national imaginary. Statistical data collected for this study confirms this lack of visibility of non-nationals in public service television, with only seventy news items dealing with relevant issues in 2008, when these groups represented 1.15 million people. This is even fewer than the 71 relevant news stories in the news recorded in 2004, when their numbers totalled 0.75 million. This chapter focuses on a quantitative analysis as hard data reflects a phenomenon with relevance to news representation of difference, but which also has wider implications for participation and visibility of diversity in Korean society.

The discussed news items have been gathered with the use of the online VOD system on the official website of KBS (www.kbs.co.kr). All news contents were measured by contents analysis and the results classified in six specific frames as follows: ‘non-nationals as migrant workers’ (84 items), ‘non-nationals as celebrities’ (76 items), ‘non-nationals as criminals’ (69 items), ‘non-nationals as members of multicultural families’ (51 items), ‘non-nationals as visitors’ (57 items), ‘Koreans as compassionate people’ (15 items) and ‘Other’ (12 items).

5.2. Newsworthiness of Non-nationals

From a media and communications studies’ point of view there are two significant traditions in studying news. The first is to understand news as a means of selective representation of reality through gatekeeping (Shoemaker and Vos, 2009; Berkowitz, 1990; Dimmick, 1974). Another area of studies has focused on the interpretation of news as a social construction of reality. In both cases, the study of news values is a core issue. Not every event or piece of information counts as news. News has to be notable according to particular principles of selection, paradigms of relevance, and frames for including and excluding material (Montgomery, 2007). Selecting news to report is one of the most important practices of text production. There is a process of selecting news and knowing what to weed out and what to publish or broadcast. In terms of criteria for such selection, according to Carruthers (2000: 16) and Eaman (1987: 51), ‘newsworthiness is not an inherent characteristic of events and news items’. Rather it is determined by the news production and institutional practices. Newsworthiness is created and not discovered through its act of publication. It follows, then, that news is whatever the editor or the journalist says it is (Halberstam, 1992).

Television news reflects both the televisual cultures and journalistic practices. In other words, news reflects features of television reporting – difficulties of in-depth report due to time limits, reproduced scenes, news packages – but also production practices associated with the norms that apply across the medium and its specific incarnations in public broadcasting. Thus, as noted by major studies, the notion of news values in

television news should be considered separately from that of newspaper journalism. In the long tradition of news values systems it has also been emphasised that these are not only associated to the specific medium and professional practice but also contextualised politically and temporally (Harris and Johnson, 1955; Warren, 1959; Crump, 1974; Golding and Elliott, 1979; Itule and Anderson, 1987; Mayeux, 1993).

Korean PSB has long been associated with the government and it cannot free itself from the accusation of being its tool. As public television broadcasting found itself under military dictatorship for most of the 1960s through to the 1990s, KBS news was government-friendly, focusing on praising the dictatorial regime (Kang, 2003). In 1980, the new military leader, Chun Doo-hwan, blatantly displayed his ambition to use the media as means of propaganda by implementing a new media policy, forcibly shutting down or consolidating media agencies.¹⁶ Many journalists were forced to resign, only to be replaced by pro-government personnel. As a result, the two major broadcasters KBS and MBC were criticised for their ‘Ddeng-Chun News’, a neologism to mock the government-focused news, with ‘ddeng’, an onomatopoeic word referring to the sound of the clock chiming after the music, and ‘Chun’ obviously referring to the president, Chun Doo-hwan (Choi, 2010). The sarcasm lay on the word ‘ddeng-chun’, a homonym with the meaning of ‘penny’. This word originated in the contents of the nine o’clock prime time news, as the very first news item after the chime always began with the words ‘President Chun’. A radical example of this phenomenon was the news broadcast related to the Korean Airlines Flight 007 incident. The news on the flight, shot down by Soviet interceptors on 1st September 1983, causing a death toll of 269, was broadcast after the news of ‘President Chun visiting an area of Seoul and personally cleaning it up’.¹⁷ The general conception of Korean journalism scholars is that a similar back-scratching relationship between the government and the media has continued

¹⁶ In late 1980, the Chun government established more thorough control of the news media than had existed in South Korea since the Korean War. Independent news agencies were absorbed into a single state-run agency, numerous provincial newspapers were closed, central newspapers were forbidden to station correspondents in provincial cities, the Christian Broadcasting System (CBS) network was forbidden to provide news coverage, and two independent broadcasting companies were absorbed into the state-run Korean Broadcasting System (KBS). In addition, the Defense Security Command, then commanded by Roh Tae Woo, and the Ministry of Culture and Information ordered hundreds of South Korean journalists to be fired and banned from newspaper writing or editing. The Basic Press Act of December 1980 was the legal capstone of Chun’s system of media control and provided censorship and control of newspapers, periodicals and broadcast media (Kang, 2003).

¹⁷ Available on <http://www.sisa-news.com/read.php3?no=26223§ion=44> accessed 02/05/2010

throughout the democratic era of the late 1990s and the 2000s (J Kang, 1996; H Lee, 2000). KBS, although a public service broadcaster, receives public funding from the Korean government instead of collecting fees itself. Moreover, there have been occasions when the president of KBS was under pressure to resign before the end of term when a new government came to power, since the President of Korea has the power to designate the position. With the structure of the television industry remaining basically unchanged, news broadcasts of KBS are not free from direct or indirect governmental intervention.

The importance of the value system behind the news can be measured in various ways. In television news, it is firstly evaluated based on the frequency and the order of broadcast. The frequency means how often a news item relating to a specific topic is aired; news items that have a high value appear frequently and low-valued news items appear less frequently. Jones (2008) reveals in his study that the news frequency is related to the population distribution. Major ethnic and race-related news features most frequently in the news, thus giving an indication of the ethnic and political relations of the country. Jorge (2008) compared different internet news websites under the assumption that the more frequently featured types of news have a higher value. The most common topics were money, conflict/power, leisure, celebrities, crimes and mystery, and he revealed that these types of news were present on all news websites; the only difference between them was their frequency. This means that frequency of appearance reflects one of the important elements in the analysis of values as it is directly relevant to the frequency in which audiences are exposed to a topic.

The order and hierarchy of time broadcasted are also key indicators of importance in television news, whereas newspaper articles are measured by hierarchy of space. As Williams (1974) points out, because television should be interpreted as a flow, 'television news is delivered to the consumers in a linear arrangement, not allowing consumers to select or arrange the order of viewing' (cited in McQuail, 2000: 235). Both news makers and audiences assume a correlation between broadcasting order and newsworthiness, since television news is produced, positioned and received within specific temporal frames. It is a fact that, due to the limited amount of news items a programme can broadcast within the allotted time, among the selected items those

considered of greater importance by the news makers are placed closer to the beginning.

This study adapted the notion of ‘newsworthiness points’ in order to evaluate the news values of items regarding non-nationals, including ethnic minorities. In an effort to assess the news values of international news, Lee and Son (1999) utilised the concept of ‘broadcast order’ to calculate an average value. This method, however, does not allow an absolute comparison when the total number of news items is different. This means that, for example, in a simple analysis of order, the tenth news item within totals of both forty and twenty news items is erroneously perceived as having the same value. For this reason, this study has adapted the existing analysis method to develop a new concept of newsworthiness points. The proposed newsworthiness points are the result of the evaluation of importance according to the broadcast order of the news items. The formula to calculate a newsworthiness point is as follows:

Newsworthiness point = (news order about non-nationals / whole numbers of news items)

Using this analysis method, the newsworthiness point of the tenth news item from a total of twenty results in .500 whereas the newsworthiness point of the same tenth news item within forty news items is .250, meaning the news value of the latter is much higher than the former. Thus, a newsworthiness point closer to zero reflects that the news item is placed closer to the beginning of the programme, and a newsworthiness point near one refers to a position towards the end. In other words, a lower newsworthiness point, closer to zero, indicates higher value of the news, and a higher newsworthiness point, closer to one, indicates lower value of the news. The average newsworthiness point of the 364 analysed news items from KBS news was .698, which means that, if the total number of news items was ten, news related to minority groups in Korea is broadcasted seventh turn on average. This result is significant as it serves as an indicator to reveal on the surface how KBS approaches these subjects, why it considers these frames less or more important, and why these items have high or low news values. This will be elaborated on further in the study.

The news frame which is regarded as the most valued item was ‘non-nationals as migrant workers’, with a newsworthiness point of .641, whilst ‘non-nationals as criminals’ showed a similar value of .649, closely followed by ‘non-nationals in multicultural families’ (.749), and ‘non-nationals as visitors’ (.753). ‘Koreans as compassionate people’ recorded the lowest newsworthiness point of .930. Looking at the details, the number of news items on ‘non-nationals as migrant workers’ has decreased since its peak in 2005 with 24 items. However, its newsworthiness point begins to soar when the conservative government came into power in 2007, scoring .534 in 2008. This can be interpreted as an example of the shift of perception from the usual negative news values of stories related to migrant workers due to the new government. News items on ‘non-nationals as criminals’ can also be read in a similar way, as this category’s newsworthiness point increased rapidly to .520 in 2008. Considering the fact that crimes related to non-nationals are mostly minor offences such as illegal immigration, forgery of documents, light violence, drugs, phony marriage and fraud, it could be said that an unusually high news value was imposed upon this frame. On the other hand, the newsworthiness point regarding crimes committed by non-nationals was considerably low at 2006, a time when positive discourse on ethnic minorities such as non-nationals and mixed-heritage people was sparked by the visit of Hines Ward.¹⁸ However, the number of stories on ‘non-nationals in multicultural families’, which tend to be reconstructed with a positive tint, dramatically increased until 2007, compared to the minimal presence of three items in 2004. Its newsworthiness point also continued to rise until 2006, only to drop sharply in 2007 and 2008. Considering the fact that the number of marriages with migrant women has exploded from 2005 onwards, and that in 2008 more than half of Korean men in the countryside married migrant women, the drop will be even larger than the record.

These results reflect the Korean news producing system which evaluates negative news towards non-nationals as comparatively high value. Especially under the conservative

¹⁸ Korean-American American football player and 2005–6 NFL Super-Bowl MVP, Hines Ward visited Korea for the first time in April 2006. His visit sparked a sudden interest in mixed-heritage people, leading to the Korean media dubbing the phenomenon the ‘Hines Ward Syndrome’. Since his visit, many mixed-heritage athletes were brought to the Korean sports scene, some even managing to get into the national basketball team after naturalising. However, interests for mixed-heritage citizens still tend to be limited towards sports celebrities only.

government, which has repeatedly expressed its hostility towards ethnic minorities and migrants and stresses nationalism,¹⁹ the sudden increase of the newsworthiness of migrant workers and criminal-related news which represents people with foreign nationalities negatively can be seen as indicative of nationalism and of KBS news not being free from government power. In addition, under the conservative government news items relating to multicultural families also declined in their newsworthiness. It must be noted that nearly half of the total newly married men in rural areas in 2007 and 2008 are in intercultural marriages. As to the underlying causes, the following can be suggested; i) intercultural marriages are seen as problematic within ideological frames of Korean nationalism which stresses ethnic origin and relations of blood as defining 'Korean-ness'; ii) the majority of intercultural marriages take place in rural areas and as such they are dealt within an ideological frame that emphasises the divides between us (urban middle classes) and them (rural agricultural, working class families); and iii) producers and audiences have lost interest in these stories because of the similarity of these news segments over the past years.

¹⁹ Available on *Hankyoreh*, <http://www.hani.co.kr/arti/opinion/column/434455.html>, accessed on 27th October 2010

Table 5.1. News Items about Non-nationals in Korea Year by Year and Newsworthiness Points

Form of government	Progressive government (2003–2007)				Conservative government (2008–present)		
	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	Total	N/P
Frames							
Non-nationals as migrant workers (N/P)	16 (.693)	24 (.655)	16 (.708)	15 (.553)	13 (.534)	84	.641
Non-nationals as criminals (N/P)	20 (.605)	8 (.716)	10 (.757)	11 (.676)	20 (.520)	69	.649
Non-nationals in multicultural families (N/P)	3 (.783)	8 (.678)	14 (.727)	14 (.778)	12 (.801)	51	.749
Non-nationals as visitors (N/P)	16 (.712)	12 (.895)	15 (.677)	10 (.798)	4 (.692)	57	.753
Non-nationals as celebrities	13	7	28 ²⁰	13	15	76	²¹
Koreans as compassionate people (N/P)	1 (.818)	3 (.976)	6 (.953)	1 (.846)	4 (.917)	15	.930
Other (N/P)	1 (.719)	4 (.765)	4 (.621)	1 (.920)	2 (.893)	12	.741
Total	71	66	92	65	70	364	.698

5.3. Iconography of *Others*

The total number of non-nationals who appeared on *KBS News 9*²² from 1st January 2004 to 31st December 2008 is 511. This includes interviewees and non-interviewees (Table 5.1). Although the sample is relatively small, especially for a five year period, it

²⁰ 15 out of 28 news items are related to Hines Ward.

²¹ Because celebrities are mostly sports stars who run for the team under the title of ‘foreign players’, stories of them are usually broadcasted on sports news programmes, aired after the main news. Thus, regarding the difficulty of assessing this frame’s newsworthiness point in the same way as other news items, this study has decided to exclude the news frame from analysis.

²² *KBS News 9* is the KBS prime time news programme which is broadcasted nationally every evening at nine o’clock. *KBS News 9* airs on the national television channel KBS 1 and three radio channels (KBS Radio 1, KBS Radio 3, Korean people broadcast). On September 2010 it had an average viewer rating of 18.7%, the highest of all television news programmes (TNmS, <http://www.tnms.tv/ratings/>, accessed on 2nd October 2010).

represents the very first substantial evidence available on the representation of minorities in the PSB. Besides its limitations, it systematically records the predominant tendencies within the representation of minorities. Of these appearances, 58.2 per cent were Asians, who can be divided into further categories. South and Southeast Asians – called ‘Dong-Nam-A’ in Korean society, literally meaning ‘Southeast-Asia’ – who have significant differences in appearance compared to Koreans, comprised 30.9 per cent of the total. East Asians – Chinese, Japanese and Mongolian – occupied 25 per cent of the total. Furthermore 70 per cent of East Asians on the news were Chinese, with 43 of them, which is nearly half of the total number of Chinese, being ethnic Koreans with Chinese nationality, which means that they are no different to Koreans except for the fact that their place of birth is China. Of the remaining East Asians, twelve were categorised as other Asians, including eight interviewees from Uzbekistan. The group with the next highest percentage were *Whites*. It should be taken into account that the category *White* in Korean society does not refer to the conventional Caucasian, but rather takes the meaning of *White* and non-*White*, which is a concept generally perceived by the Korean people as a divide between Western people (of European origins) and non-Western Europeans (which includes a whole range of people of various origins and heritages). From the 128 *Whites*, 55 were Americans, followed by Australians, Canadians and Russians, each with eight people respectively. *Blacks* took up the smallest proportion of 5.9 per cent among different ethnic minority groups, with half of the percentage originating from the US. From the total 511, 53 people (10.4 per cent) were ‘half-Koreans’,²³ a conventional category in the popular imagination referring to people with mixed-heritage. Appearance of ‘mixed-heritage Koreans’ included 15 news items broadcasted in 2006, telling the story of Hines Ward. In analysing presence according to nationality, China accounts for the most appearances with 94 people (50 Chinese, 44 Korean-Chinese) followed by the U.S. with 70 people (55 *Whites*, 15 *Blacks*). Successively, 35 Vietnamese, 26 Bangladeshi, 19 Filipino, and 16 Sri-Lankan nationals appeared in the news programme.

For the purpose of analysing how non-nationals are depicted in the KBS nine o’clock news, 511 non-national appearances were sorted according to professions to examine

²³ In fact, the term ‘half-blood’ or ‘half-Korean’ is mainly used in Korean society. In this study, however, the expression ‘mixed-heritage Korean’ is mainly used for the objective and scientific purpose of this research.

their social and economic class. One of the earliest studies analysing television content focusing upon ethnic minority representation in terms of class was reported by Sydney Head in 1954. In terms of specific occupations, minority members were more often portrayed in domestic and service roles and seldom in white-collar jobs (Head, 1954). In 1959, Wright found that in a week of television viewing only 10 members of minority groups appeared, and they were in supporting roles (Wright, 1959). Seggar and Wheeler (1973) explored job stereotyping and the use of minority group members in network television programming. They found that there was a gross underrepresentation of females, and ethnic minorities, more than American *Whites*, were concentrated in fields of personal service and were most likely in this field to suffer from stereotyped images; and ethnic groups with especially small numbers tended to be portrayed homogeneously. Among more recent studies, Cottle (1999) focuses upon the British television news media's representation of ethnic minorities. According to his article, many external factors influence the representation or misrepresentation of ethnic minorities, such as the prejudices of journalists, outsider pressures and news values. The news programmes produced under these influences, feature stereotypes and intentional and unintentional discrimination, and the discussion instigated by them affects the public social and political interests. Downing and Husband (2006) noticed a dominance of textual research on the representation of ethnic minorities in the media. They emphasise that the actual term 'representation' is most often used to signal either the presence or absence of people of colour in the media in a constructive or unconstructive way. They argue that, for a long time, television has produced specific – mainly negative – discourses about ethnic minorities and has thus discriminated against them. The discourses on ethnic minorities produced in media representations have extended to the cultural and political arenas and have led to a social bias towards them.

With the case of East Asians, in this study, 35.9 per cent were portrayed as criminals, 12.5 per cent as the afflicted or victims of crimes, and 10.9 per cent as housewives. With South and Southeast Asians, 45.6 per cent appeared as manual labourers, 32.3 per cent as housewives, and 10.7 per cent as the afflicted and victims of crime. 76.7 per cent of *Blacks* were illustrated as sports players, ten per cent as criminals, and 6.7 per cent as soldiers. Mixed-heritage Koreans were also mostly portrayed as sports players,

accounting for 45.3 per cent, with the rest being children or victims of crime, accounting for 39.6 per cent and 7.5 per cent respectively. Notably, with the case of *Whites*, the top three groups defined on the basis of their presence in Korea consist of professionals (33.6 per cent), visitors or tourists (18.7 per cent) and sports players (17.2 per cent), showing no significant difference in the presence in other categories in the news. The reason certain ethnic minorities are linked to certain professions does not lie in the characteristics of the ethnic groups, but in the stereotypes of society and the fixed routines of the news makers who represent stereotypes in an exaggerated way.

Table 5.2. Top Three Roles Played by Non-nationals on *KBS News 9*

	East Asians (Chinese)	South and Southeast Asians	Other Asians	Blacks	Mixed- heritage Koreans	Whites
1	Criminals (35.9%)	Manual Labourers (45.6%)	Manual Labourers (66.7%)	Sports Players (76.7%)	Sports Players (45.3%)	Professionals ²⁴ (33.6%)
2	Afflicted or Victims (12.5%)	Housewives (32.3%)	Housewives (25.0%)	Criminals (10.0%)	Children (39.6%)	Visitors (18.7%)
3	Housewives (10.9%)	Afflicted or Victims (10.7%)	Unclear (8.3%)	Soldiers (6.7%)	Afflicted or Victims (7.5%)	Sports Players (17.2%)
Total	59.3%	88.6%	100.0%	93.4%	92.4%	69.5%

Another important category studied is whether non-nationals are depicted as individuals or as groups in the news. It would seem to matter a great deal as to whether we are dealing with an image which someone holds of his/her own character as an individual or instead with an image which he/she maintains of his/her own ethnic group. The latter type would be more pervasive and it would require a greater effort to modify or eliminate the image (Samuels, 1973). Social majorities are capable of defining and framing minority group identity based on hegemonic ideological discourses of inferiority and their own superiority (Appadurai, 2006). In this context, the normalisation process is carried out through ‘discourse practice’ by the media, where it plays a crucial role in favouring, repeating and emphasising selected norms, values and

²⁴ Sports managers (7.8%), lecturers (6.2%), CEOs (5.5%), academic specialists (4.7%), clergymen (4.7%), politicians and administrators (3.1%), journalists (0.8%), and sports referees (0.8%).

meanings, and transmitting certain values systems throughout the society (Hall, 1997). The discussion about whether the group image is positive or negative doesn't help much when it rationalises the group image. The assertion that 'Blacks are musical and athletic' is in itself a positive stereotype in a society where music and sport are positively valued. Nonetheless, the image of the 'musical, rhythmical or athletic Black' if adhered too strongly can serve to shut out other perceptions of the Black group and of individual Blacks from the minds of Whites. The media also tend to generalise specific group images presented only in particular situations, establishing them as an inherent characteristic of the ethnic group. More than half of East Asians and South and Southeast Asians were represented as members of racialised groups rather than as individuals, accounting for 52.3 per cent and 52.5 per cent respectively. Thus, the representation of the individual is projected through a generalisation of characteristics associated with an ethnic group, resulting in the recreation of specific stereotypes. A small percentage of Blacks, on the other hand, were depicted as a group (13.3 per cent), due to their main appearance in individual-focused celebrity-related news on sports players. Forming a striking contrast to the Asians, 94.5 per cent of Whites were represented as individuals, and a mere 5.5 per cent were depicted as groups. The percentage of mixed-heritage Koreans represented as a group was slightly high at 30.2 per cent because mixed-heritage Koreans had to be discussed as a group in regards to the discussion about discrimination against mixed-heritage citizens. Mixed-heritage people were described as individuals mostly in celebrity-related news items. The ways of representation of specific ethnic groups as images of individuals or images of groups play an important role in forming positive or negative stereotypes for these specific ethnic groups.

Table 5.3. Non-nationals Portrayed as Groups or Individuals

	East Asians (Chinese)	South and Southeast Asians	Other Asians	Blacks	Mixed-heritage Koreans	Whites
	N (%)	N (%)	N (%)	N (%)	N (%)	N (%)
As groups	67 (52.3)	83 (52.5)	2 (16.7)	4 (13.3)	16 (30.2)	7 (5.5)
As individuals	61 (47.7)	75 (47.5)	10 (83.3)	26 (86.7)	37 (69.8)	121 (94.5)
Total	128 (100.0)	158 (100.0)	12 (100.0)	30 (100.0)	53 (100.0)	128 (100.0)

5.3.1. *Non-nationals as Migrant Workers*

For a single topic, ‘non-nationals as migrant workers’ was the most broadcasted, with 84 news items. This reflects the preoccupation of news makers with the representation of non-nationals as *Others* temporarily residing in the country for financial reasons. A total of 123 migrant workers and non-nationals appeared in the 84 news items. On 31st March 2006, the mid-point of the study period (from 2004 to 2008), the total number of registered migrant workers in Korea was 530,555 (Ministry of Justice, 2007). Chinese migrant workers were the largest single ethnic group, registering 321,406 workers, including 193,637 Korean-Chinese workers, followed by 43,320 Vietnamese, 42,325 Filipinos, 33,972 Thais, 24,926 Mongolians, 23,751 Indonesians, 14,831 Bangladeshis and 13,965 Uzbek migrants. However, far from the reality revealed by the statistics, 88 out of the 123 workers (71.5 per cent) who appeared on *KBS News 9* were from Southeast Asia, and only 28 including 18 Chinese-Koreans were of Chinese nationality (Table 5.5). Major ethnic groups represented in the news were Bangladeshi and Sri Lankans, with 23 and 14 appearances respectively. Considering the fact that only 2.8 per cent of the registered migrant workers are Bangladeshi and less than two per cent are Sri Lankans, there is a significant gap between reality and representation in the news.

This is related to the representation of Southeast Asian migrant workers as the cause of certain social problems when the development of discourse about migrant workers was still in the early stages. As Korean nationalism based itself on an ideology of ethnic homogeneity, Koreans were more threatened by Southeast Asians due to their different appearance, whereas East Asians with similar looks to Koreans were relatively well-received. After undergoing a process of repeated media representations of these negative discourse, the acquisition of ‘migrant workers in Korea = Southeast Asians’ became a concrete statement. The establishment of this definitive form functions very effectively in composing a positive image of *Others*, in opposition to the form of *Us*. That is, it is more effective in constructing a negative discourse of migrant workers, the main group of which cause a social and national crisis, as it highlights the significant

physical dissimilarity of *Others* from *Us* (K Park, 2008). In terms of visual media, the external appearance of *Others* is different from that of *Us*, who are the social mainstream, and this packages the media discourse in a more provocative and sexual way (Ross, 1996). Therefore, excessive weighting of the news discourse production towards migrant workers from Southeast Asia can be interpreted as ‘emotional division into separate groups’ which attempts to dichotomously simplify and classify *Us* and *Others*.

Another interesting finding is unequal distribution of gender representation. 67 per cent of the migrant workers represented in the news were men, whereas female workers only accounted for 21.1 per cent. The gendered bias of the news is interesting as actually women have a much more significant presence in the society than that recorded in the news. According to the statistics of the Ministry of Justice (2009), the official number of female migrants on March 2009 was 502,665, 43 per cent of total migrants. Around a fifth of these women had immigrated through marriage and the rest of the 400,000 migrant women had migrated to Korea in order to seek employment. It must be noted that, according to the NGOs, including illegal migrant workers the gender distribution is almost fifty-fifty. Men are more often represented when talking about migrant workers, which can lead to stereotypes about migrant workers. Especially when considering the social mood, which favours female non-nationals over male ones, the overrepresentation of men can cause negative perceptions towards migrant workers. Also Korean patriarchal culture is one of the reasons why female migrant workers are ignored by the media. Compared to the multicultural family news, which I will discuss later, most married migrant women are represented as common housewives; this representation limits the women’s role in society and has led to a twofold segregation between women and men in this discussion.

In addition, most non-nationals represented as migrant workers were regarded as unskilled/manual labourers, as the definition of ‘migrant workers’ for Koreans refers almost directly to men from poor Southeast Asian countries with no skills who engage in manual labour. And also, because the meaning of the word ‘labour’ itself is mostly understood within the limits of manual work, these social perceptions were reflected in the news representations. There were a couple of cases of representations where

migrant workers are described as victims. However, the report focuses on his or her identity as a victim of ill treatment, rather than the social function of the subject as a migrant worker. As to visual frames, the most popular choice was a bust-shot, the typical preference for interviews, accounting for 42.3 per cent of the total frames. However, negative representations using techniques such as crowd-shots (17.9 per cent), mosaics (14.6 per cent), extreme close-ups (14.6 per cent), back-side views (5.7 per cent), long-shots (3.2 per cent), and scenes showing the subject lowering his/her head (1.6 per cent) accounted for 57.6 per cent of the total, showing that the occurrence of negative visual frames were higher than positive. Regarding the matter of representation of migrant workers as part of a group or as individuals, 56.1 per cent were portrayed in a group or as a member of a group, while 43.9 per cent were interviewed as individuals (Table 5.6).

On the other side, a total of 51 Koreans appeared in the news, consisting of 42 men (82.4 per cent) and 8 women (15.6 per cent), displaying a severe imbalance of gender, with an average of 0.5 men and 0.1 women appearing per news item, calculated out of 84 total analysed news items. Korean men were mainly represented as government authorities (31.4 per cent), NGO officers (25.5 per cent), religious leaders (11.8 per cent) and professionals (7.8 per cent), a stark contrast to the representation of migrant workers. However, with much difference as to the professionalism displayed by Korean men, four Korean women were interviewed as ordinary citizens and one woman as a co-worker of a migrant. The stereotyping by gender partly comes from social reality, as there are far fewer females in high-ranking positions and more significantly males are consistently represented as the majority of *Us*, instilling strong trust in an authoritative and professional context. With regards to this, a detailed discussion will be undertaken in the discourse analysis chapter. In terms of visual framing, the bust-shot was the major technique used to interview the Koreans, accounting for 90.1 per cent. The rest consisted of negative visual frames, with 5.9 per cent being back-view shots, 2.0 per cent extreme close-up shots, and 2.0 per cent showing heads covered with clothes, where the Korean interviewees were factory owners who did not clear overdue wages or those who abused the migrant workers (Table 5.7). However, we should pay attention to arguments based on the data analysis, as this, remains relatively small in size. This attention has to be counter-posed to the fact that this is all the data available

on the actual representations of minorities in the main Korean PSB news broadcasts.

5.3.2. Non-nationals as Criminals

Following the stories on migrant workers and celebrities, the third most frequent representation of non-nationals was as criminals. Considering the positive after-effects of the Hines Ward Syndrome of 2006 and the consequent increase in news about non-national celebrities, when compared by yearly statistics, news about non-nationals as criminals surprisingly accounted for the highest proportion in 2004 and 2008; 21 instances were recorded in 2004 followed by a steep decline in 2005, 2006 and 2007, with eight, nine and eleven broadcasts respectively, only to jump back up to 20 cases in 2008. This tendency has no relevance to the steady growth of the non-national population since 2003 or the subsequent increase in non-national crimes. Rather, the decline seems to be the result of the politicisation of issues related to mixed-heritage or non-national residents in 2005 and 2006,²⁵ stimulated by the visit of Hines Ward.

The increase in news broadcasts on foreign criminals consequently encourages negative discourse on non-nationals, such as opinions that the growth in the non-national population will most definitely cause more social problems. In the news texts, non-nationals, non-Whites in particular, are frequently considered as potential criminals in Korean society. Whites are also increasingly being associated with crimes involving drugs and sexual harassment. A key aspect of the representation of non-nationals as criminals associates them with an increased crime rate among non-nationals, said to be due in part to the increasing influx of foreigners, which is regarded as a social phenomenon threatening Korean society. The most critical premise here is whether there is an actual increase in the crime rate among non-nationals, and consequently whether non-national residents in Korea are actually committing more crimes proportionately than native Koreans. In 2007, when the number of non-nationals living

²⁵ The very first news on Hines Ward was broadcast on 31st October 2000, a short item about how a Korean-American football player contributed to the success of his team. Later, on 16th January 2004, the news about the second generation Korean-American playing at the All-Star game was broadcast, followed by a story of his brilliant performance on 4th January 2005. It was after his team won the NFL championship and he became the MVP of the season in January 2006 that he began to attract media attention.

in Korea passed one million for the first time, according to the Korean Ministry of Justice, crimes committed by non-national residents amounted to 23,351 cases, accounting for 1.18 per cent of the total number of crimes in Korean society. Recognising the fact that in 2007 the total number of recorded non-national residents was 1,066,291, making up 2.03 per cent of the total population in Korea, the relative crime rate for foreign residents is actually half of the rate for native Koreans. It is also important to point out that, out of the total 74 on the news, 22 non-nationals, accounting for roughly 30 per cent, were guilty of illegal immigration or forgery of documents, an issue that may not be broadcast in a prime time news programme if the criminal was not a non-national. Thus, a certain tendency to overplay crimes related to non-nationals compared to incidents involving Koreans could be found in news broadcasts.

A total of 74 non-nationals made an appearance on the news related to crimes, consisting of 60 non-Whites and 14 Whites, accounting for 81.1 per cent and 18.9 per cent respectively. According to national background, 46 were Chinese (including 16 Korean-Chinese), accounting for 62.2 per cent of the total, showing Chinese migrants to be the major offenders. Chinese migrants were involved in various crimes, including 11 respective cases of 'illegal migration or forgery of documents' and 'violence', and 5 respective cases of 'murder' and 'phony marriage'. White criminals were mostly English teachers who were involved in criminal acts such as forgery of documents, drugs and child abuse (Table 5.8).

Among the non-nationals represented as criminals, 62.2 per cent were men and 20.3 per cent were groups including both men and women. The news stories on crime delivered negative images of non-nationals, with 24.3 per cent of the scenes showing non-nationals with lowered heads or faces covered with clothes, and 18.4 per cent showing random individuals gathered in groups. Showing pictures of criminals with their faces covered is a common representation of suspects in news, which continues to be practised although it contains elements of violation of human rights.²⁶ Other visual

²⁶ By the time reporters arrive for the news of convicted criminals, they are already locked up, waiting to be dispatched to the prosecutor, thus not allowing the reporters to record images of the criminal. However, the news industry came up with the idea of asking the police to cover the criminal's face and recreate a police interrogation scene, to be filmed and broadcasted. This is one of routines in the news-making process of Korea.

frames displayed similar occurrences, with 14.8 per cent being mosaic scenes, 12.2 per cent close-up shots, 12.2 per cent CCTV materials and 12.2 per cent back-view shots, totalling negative presentations of 97.3 per cent. In addition, 62.2 per cent of the non-nationals were presented as a group image, which may mislead the viewers into believing an individual misdeed was a group crime (Table 5.9).

On the other side, among the 69 Koreans who appear in news on crime committed by non-nationals, only three were women, and the remaining 95.7 per cent were men. In contrast to the results of K Kim's study (2003) on the relationship between coverage routines of gender reproduction and gender differences in the Korean national television networks, where 80.7 per cent of interviewees filmed for the evening news programme were men and 19.3 per cent women, the proportion of men in news related to crime by non-nationals is considerably higher. This reveals the mechanism of symbolic annihilation of females in which women are underrepresented and their images are biased by the journalistic routines like source use and information channel selection. Furthermore, 80 per cent of the visual frames used on interviewees are bust-shots, emphasising stability and authority, whereas only victims and accomplices to the crime were pictured using frames such as extreme close-up shots (8.6 per cent) and mosaics (7.2 per cent), to suggest an impression of instability. Another significant difference in the Korean interviewees from the non-nationals is that every single one of them was portrayed as an individual. In particular, the majority of Koreans appear as policemen or prosecutors (32.0 per cent), followed by figures of authority such as religious leaders and professors (26.7 per cent), and government officials (13.0 per cent), encouraging the viewers to believe in the veracity of the interview. As for women, one person appeared as a victim, and the other two as ordinary citizens, which is a meaningful difference compared to the status of authority represented by male interviewees (Table 5.10).

The most common crime²⁷ committed by non-nationals in the KBS news report is 'illegal migration or forgery of documents'; 16 out of 22 non-national suspects were

²⁷ The term 'crime' in this sentence is certainly debatable. This is because it is supposed that illegal migrants are not necessarily criminals. Nevertheless, in this thesis, illegal migrants and undocumented migrants are included in a wide range of crimes in order to show how Korean media and society understand illegal migrants.

Asians and the remaining 6 were *Whites*, who were mostly caught in an attempt to enter or work in Korea through an illegal channel. In the case of Asians, stories about those who forged their entry visa to engage in manual labour in Korea, who changed their visa status (entering by travel visa and illegally prolonging their stay to work), and incidents of Chinese or Korean-Chinese people illegally arriving by boat were mostly considered in the news. On the other hand, except in a case of a Bulgarian who worked as a fashion model with a travel visa, other *Whites* were mainly prosecuted for fabricating academic degrees or visa forgery with the purpose of working as an English teacher (Table 5.11).

Crimes of violence reported were mostly associated with Chinese people, accounting for 9 out of 13 news items, and Korean-Chinese for 2 items. The remaining 2 news stories on violent crimes were about US armed forces. In news items on drug related crimes, 4 Asians, 4 *Whites*, and 2 *Black* interviewees made appearances, of which 3 Korean-Chinese and 2 *Blacks* were represented as drug providers, while 1 Korean-American and 4 *Whites* were described as drug users, displaying a stark contrast in roles. Felonies such as murders and frauds were all represented by Asian criminals, including marriage scams, which started to surface due to increased cases of international marriages between Korean men and foreign women. Crimes such as pick-pocketing, robbery and smuggling were all shown as committed by Asians, and stories related to child abuse were all done by *Whites*.

A certain difference could be found between news representations and the reality of proportional involvement of ethnic groups in crime. The crime rate among non-nationals has been on the increase since the remarkable increase of migration at the beginning of the twenty first century. Chinese and Americans continued to be the major ethnic groups with the most recorded crime from 2000 into 2007. A certain correlation was to be found between the increase in the total non-national population and the increase in Chinese (including Korean-Chinese) related crimes, as they account for nearly half of the total number of non-nationals. Since 2005, however, crimes committed by Chinese migrants started to increase, being recorded as comprising more than half of the total number of non-national related crimes, a significant increase compared to other ethnic groups. The reason behind the increase seems to be due to the

strengthened visa policy to stop the invasion of migrant workers; incidents of undocumented immigration and illegal stays have increased, subsequently causing illegal money transfers.²⁸ Another reason is that, because of the increase in the Chinese population, Chinese criminal organisations have also expanded their influence to Korea.²⁹

Crimes caused by Americans had the highest proportion among other ethnic groups until 1998, accounting for 33–65 per cent of the total crimes committed by non-nationals during the period of 1990 through 1998 (KNSO, 2009). Americans stepped down from first place in 1999, the time when the explosion in Chinese migration started. Crimes are mostly committed by members of the US army. These are investigated and prosecuted by the US military police rather than by Korean law, as a result of SOFA (Status of Forces Agreement). Thus, as the Korean law enforcement forces are only involved in serious crimes such as murder or sexual assault, minor crimes committed by the US army are seldom broadcast in news programmes. The number of Americans who reside in Korea for positions as English teachers is also significant, and continues to show a tendency to increase.

5.3.3. Non-nationals as Members of Multicultural Families

Issues about ‘non-nationals as members of multicultural families’ have become some of the major news topics on non-nationals over the years, increasing from 8 broadcasts in 2005 to 14 in 2006. Although 14 stories a year still seems to be a small number, this is due to the surge of intercultural marriages between Korean men and migrant brides at the start of the twenty first century, regarded as a common social phenomenon by the time of mid-2000s. This rapid increase of intercultural marriages subsequently raised issues regarding mixed-heritage children (with different features to native Koreans), leading to more stories being broadcasted on PSB news. It is a fact that the number of

²⁸ *Segye Daily*, 18th October 2004, ‘China prosecutes 53 cases of illegal money transfers’;
Hankyorhe, 2nd February 2005, ‘Money changer arrested for illegally transferring 37.1 billion to China’

²⁹ *Kyunghyang Daily*, 23rd November 2005, ‘Chinese criminal organisations specialising in illegal entry by faux marriages, exposed’;
Seoul Daily, 25th November 2005, ‘Chinese criminal organizations diversifies business in Korea’

married migrant women brought to Korea was approximately 7,000 in 2000, which more than doubled to nearly 19,000 in 2003 (KNSO, 2007). This trend continued, as statistics reveal that, in 2004, marriages to non-national women accounted for 27.4 per cent of all marriages in rural areas, which rose to 30.6 per cent in 2005, 41.2 per cent in 2006 and, in 2007, 43.8 per cent of total marriages were to foreign women (KOSIS, 2008).

A total of 55 news items were broadcasted regarding non-nationals as members of multicultural families, featuring 77 interviewees. Southeast Asians accounted for 59.7 per cent of the total, followed by 16.9 per cent East Asians and mixed-heritage Koreans respectively. Sorted by ethnic groups, 17 Filipinos, 15 Vietnamese, and 6 Cambodians made appearances on the news (Table 5.12). This order of appearance, however, is an inaccurate representation of the actual statistics of migrant women in Korea. Throughout the period of research, 2004 to 2008, women with Chinese nationalities were the dominant group, taking up 74.6 per cent in 2004, 66.2 per cent in 2005, 48.4 per cent in 2006, 49.8 per cent in 2007 and 46.9 per cent of the total intercultural marriages in 2008. Yet, Filipinas who most frequently appeared on television news only accounted for 3.2–6.6 per cent over the period from 2001 to 2008. Vietnamese women were the second largest group in the statistics occupying 18.7 per cent of the total in 2005, 33.5 per cent in 2006, 22.7 per cent in 2007, and 29.4 per cent in 2008 (KOSIS, 2009). As mentioned in the earlier section, this tendency can be interpreted as being interlinked with the news representation, which stresses visible physical differences, such as skin colour, in setting up *Others* who are different from *Us*.

Among the 77 interviewees in the news about non-nationals in multicultural families, 62 were women and only 5 were men, demonstrating how the term ‘multicultural family’ is understood in mainstream Korean society (Table 5.13). In other words, from the point of view of a typical Korean, ‘multicultural family’ consists of a Korean husband and a Southeast Asian wife. Interestingly enough, married migrant women were only portrayed within limited roles, either as non-national brides (37.7 per cent) or as daughters-in-law (29.9 per cent). The fact that only two major roles are imposed on these women on the PSB programme reveals that the common Korean perception based on patriarchal cultures and Confucian traditions looks at the married migrant women

from the position of husbands or parents-in-law. Married migrant women in this context are expected to provide a service to the Korean husbands and parents-in-law, and to give birth to boys, who would then continue the family legacies.

As most married migrant women reside in Korea as legal migrants, 66.2 per cent of the visual frames used for interviews were stable bust-shots. However, non-national women who divorced their Korean husbands and some of the mixed-heritage children and adults were framed through negative angles such as extreme close-up shots and mosaics, including 28 per cent back-view shots. Mixed-heritage children (11.7 per cent) were mostly described in a negative manner, as the related topics were mostly of bad side-effects of intercultural marriages, such as problems of basic education or children's psychological disorders.

Unlike other news frames, Koreans who appeared in this news category show a relatively even gender ratio: 52.8 per cent for males and 44.3 per cent for females (2.9 per cent of children excluded). Characteristic of this representation is the fact that a relatively greater number of female scholars majored in women's studies as experts, who suggested professional opinions about social problems, and NGO officers, who helped married migrant women to appear in the interviews, along with mothers-in-law as educators and assessors of daughters-in-law. Native Korean men who appeared in the news were mostly those who married migrant women, government officials or professionals. Korean women were represented as NGO officers who helped married migrant women or mothers-in-law. Most of the Koreans are described as individuals aiding or analysing multicultural families and the related issues, filmed in stable visual frames. While Korean men occupy most of the other news frames, news items regarding multicultural families tend to include a relatively high proportion of interviews with female Korean human rights activists or NGO officers. Korean male government authorities or those married to migrant women were interviewed for negative issues such as mixed-heritage children or overabundance of marriage migrants, whereas interviews with parents-in-law or NGO workers delivered positive testimonies in regards of married migrant women. The discourse of the interviews will be further analysed with the use of CDA in the next chapter.

5.3.4. *Non-nationals as Visitors*

News featuring non-nationals as visitors accounted for 16 cases in 2004, 12 in 2005 and 15 in 2006, but dropped to 4 cases in 2008. The concept of 'visitor' in this study refers to foreign tourists, those who are invited to various events, international students staying for a limited period of time, and members of foreign embassies and their families. A total of 57 news items were broadcast, in which 97 non-nationals appear as interviewees in this category. The most remarkable factor in this news frame is that the proportion of *Whites* was considerably higher (67.4 per cent) than in other frames. This is quite different from the reality, as 38 per cent of the total visitors were from Japan, 17.3 per cent from China and 14.6 per cent from Taiwan, according to the travel statistics of 2007. Japanese, Chinese and Taiwanese tourists occupy approximately 70 per cent of the total foreign tourists arriving in Korea (KOSIS, 2008), while tourists from the U.S. who mostly fall in to the *Whites* category only account for 9 per cent of the total. Moreover, the fact that approximately 90 per cent of the international students come from Asian countries, with 20,080 Chinese students accounting for 61.7 per cent of the total, proves the distance between news representation and the reality (Table 5.15).

A total of 59 per cent of the non-national interviewees who are categorised as visitors were male, occupying a slightly higher percentage than female interviewees, who accounted for 41.3 per cent. Details reveal that *White* males accounted for 42 per cent of the total foreign visitors and 72.5 per cent of the total male interviewees. *White* females occupied 25.4 per cent of the total foreign visitors which is a higher figure than the percentage of non-*White* males within the total number of foreign visitors, who accounted for 16.7 per cent. Except for one instance of news regarding an international student, all interviewees were filmed using a bust-shot, with most of them carrying out the interview in English. Furthermore, 90.2 per cent were represented as individuals, while only 9.8 per cent were introduced as groups or members of certain groups. The major role of the non-national visitors was as tourists, making up 38 per cent of the total, followed by 18.5 per cent international students, 18.5 per cent professionals including 7.6 per cent CEOs, and 6.5 per cent religious figures (Table 5.16). Notably,

most of the non-national visitors, excluding students and tourists, were upper-class professionals. Although the tendency of the representation of these non-national professionals will be discussed further in the discourse analysis chapter, in presenting *White* visitors, the distribution by socio-economic class is significantly different from the non-*White* group which was examined earlier. This difference is rooted not only in racial differences between *White* and non-*White* but also the social meaning of tourists. Bauman (1998) categorises mobility into two major types in the era of globalisation: ‘tourists’ and ‘vagabonds’. He defines tourists as members of elite groups, those who travel by choice, taking advantage of all forms of mobility available. As opposed to this, vagabonds are defined as groups that are not welcomed in mainstream society, as those who travel in order to escape from their unbearably inhospitable homelands. This contrasting characteristic is interpreted as one of the causes of the stark difference in representation between migrant workers or married migrant women and visitors in this section.

On the other side, more than half of the Koreans who appear in the frame of ‘non-nationals as visitors’ were men, scoring 64.8 per cent, a much higher percentage than the appearance of women, only occupying 35.2 per cent of the total. A notable difference in role according to gender was noticed, as 15 out of the 19 Korean women were mostly pictured as non-professionals, while 27 out of 35 men were professionals, government officials, religious figures and CEOs. Of the Koreans, 83.3 per cent were represented with a bust-shot, whereas 13 per cent were negatively portrayed by extreme close-ups, as they were government workers, travel guides and street vendors who received negative evaluations from the non-national visitors. Continuing the trend of other news frames, 96.3 per cent of the Koreans appeared as individuals and only 3.7 per cent as groups (Table 5.17). Another aspect in the representation of Koreans in this section is that 13 per cent of Koreans were negatively described. In the news related to ethnic minorities, such as migrant workers or married migrant women, Koreans had absolute authority as assessors. However, in the section with a high rate of *White* appearances, although they were not the majority representation, *Whites* often evaluate Koreans as reviewers. With regard to this, it can be a critical starting point in discussing racial hierarchies which are prevalent in Korean society.

5.3.5. *Non-nationals as Celebrities*

The second most frequently broadcast news frame was items regarding non-national celebrities. A total of 78 non-national figures appeared in 76 news items where, excluding five Americans (two governors, two educators, and one chancellor of a university), 73 of them were sport personalities, managers and referees. A Brazilian football player named Jose is recorded as the first non-national player in South Korea, when the import system for foreign football players was first established in 1983. Non-national players were then introduced in stages within the professional basketball, baseball and volleyball fields, and currently limited numbers of import players are accepted in all professional sports leagues.

The number of registered non-national players in the major four professional sports leagues (football, baseball, basketball and volleyball) for the 2007–2008 season was 76, with 18 *White* players (23.7 per cent) and 58 non-*White* players (76.3 per cent), revealing higher proportions of non-*Whites* participating in the sports leagues. However, KBS news featured 34 *White* players, who account for 46.3 per cent of the total, followed by 24 mixed-heritage Koreans (30.7 per cent) and 18 *Black* players (23.1 per cent). Although it is true that the proportion of *Whites* within managers was higher than for other ethnic groups, compared to the actual percentage, a higher number of *White* appearances in the news are certainly a contradiction to reality (Table 5.18). Moreover, most of the celebrity-related news includes interviews with the players, which were conducted in English except nine mixed-heritage Koreans, one Serbian and one Spaniard, with eight Brazilian players occasionally speaking in Portuguese. This is in contrast to the attitude towards ethnic minorities represented by migrant workers and married migrant women, who were interviewed mostly in Korean.

Because the import player system in Korea is generally limited to men's professional leagues, 85.9 per cent of the news appearances were males, and only 14.1 per cent were female players. Foreign women players are currently accepted only in volleyball and basketball leagues, with further limitations caused by only one import player being allowed per team. The fact that, throughout the world, men's leagues are much more

popular than women's seems to be another contribution to the gender gap. A positive eye-level angle and bust-shot were used to represent 90 per cent of the interviewees, while 6.4 per cent were shot using a low-angle, a technique seldom used in other news frames. This is the counterpart of the high-angle technique, which makes the character look more powerful and mighty. This can make the audience feel vulnerable and small by looking up at the character (Chun, 1994). This technique has an effect of representing stability, but also evokes awe and respect of the viewers. The foreign celebrities are all represented as individuals, a method to emphasise the players' uniqueness and independence. Almost 80 per cent of the celebrities were sports players and 12.8 per cent were sports managers, meaning that around 93 per cent of the total celebrities were sports-related. This suggests that the roles of foreign celebrities in Korea are limited to specific fields, carrying the implication that one of the limited ways of mixed-heritage Koreans or non-*Whites* gaining fame in Korea is being a sports player (Table 5.19). The celebrity culture in Korea will be discussed more in the discourse analysis chapter.

Koreans who appeared in non-national celebrity related news were also mostly men, taking up 83.3 per cent of the total, whereas women only occupied 14.8 per cent. Because Korean interviewees related to foreign players or managers had to be team mates or fellow managers, Korean males naturally occupied most of the appearances. Korean interviewees, 51.8 per cent of them being sports managers and 11.1 per cent sports players, played the role of providing positive comments (negative comments were rarely presented). Citizens, who accounted for 13 per cent of the total, were interviewed on topics regarding positive after-effects of the visit of Hines Ward, or on negative effects of the influx of foreign sports players, such as sports violence and deprivation of opportunities for Korean players. Interviews of mixed-heritage Korean sports players and their Korean mothers, who mainly tell the proud success story of overcoming discrimination and becoming a sports star, accounted for 9.2 per cent of the total appearance of Koreans (Table 5.20).

5.3.6. *Koreans as Compassionate People*

Lastly, the news frame ‘Koreans as compassionate people’ deals with stories of Koreans helping non-nationals who face difficulties or are in imminent danger. Of the non-nationals appearing in these 15 news items, all 20 were Asians. In this frame of news, all of the interviewees were people who were given some help from Koreans and all were from South or Southeast Asian countries (Table 5.21). It is an apparently arbitrary situation that particular migrants from specific Asian countries – among hundreds of non-national ethnic groups from around 170 countries in Korean society – receive help from Koreans. Apparently it can be interpreted that the economical poverty of their country of origin is linked to individual treatment. Moreover, as examined earlier, this shows that migrants are represented as ‘visible *Others*’ due to significantly distinctive physical appearances, such as darker skin compared to Koreans.

Among the 20 non-nationals, 65 per cent were men, 25 per cent were women, and 10 per cent were children. Bust-shots, occupying 55 per cent of the total visual frames used, were mostly chosen in scenes where the non-nationals thank the Koreans for help. In 20 per cent of the scenes, close-up shots were used to maximise the effects of scenes where non-nationals are moved to tears or where they are suffering from a difficult situation. Another 20 per cent presents scenes of non-nationals receiving medical treatment, to emphasise the reality and vividness of the news. More than half of the non-nationals were described as individuals (55 per cent) and almost half were introduced as part of a group (45 per cent), with the percentage of group representation relatively higher than in other frames. Furthermore, 85 per cent of the non-nationals were migrant workers and 10 per cent were international students (Table 5.22).

The number of Korean helpers who appeared in the news was 20, 75 per cent of these were men and 25 per cent women. Half of the appearances were interviews filmed as bust-shots, followed by 30 per cent visual frames featuring Koreans giving medical treatment and 15 per cent scenes of Koreans having conversations with non-nationals. Considering previous representation trends demonstrated in other news frames, where Koreans were mostly filmed using bust-shots, different visual frames were used here to emphasise the role of Koreans as counsellors and caregivers. As for the professions of

the Koreans, 45 per cent were doctors giving free treatments, and 20 per cent were religious figures such as pastors or priests. The lopsided role of Koreans not only reflects the limited number of organisations providing assistance to non-nationals, but also indicates the level of influence of the news-making routines of the media, looking at specific groups to find representations of compassionate people in Korea (Table 5.23).

5.4. Conclusion

Although this chapter requires the circumspection due to limitations of small-scale sample, the content analysis of news items on non-nationals residing in Korea can lead to a number of conclusions. First of all, clear differences were found in the number of broadcasted items and newsworthiness points of the six news frames, which is the result of influences of complex social and political issues. For instance, in 2006, when public opinions regarding ethnic minorities started to change, leading to a social phenomenon named the ‘Hines Ward Syndrome’, the number of negative and crime-related stories of migrant workers being broadcast on television news decreased, while these frames’ newsworthiness points saw a slight rise. However, when the conservative government came to power in 2008, the newsworthiness points of frames, such as ‘non-nationals as migrant workers’ and ‘non-nationals as criminals’, increased, with crime-related news doubling its numbers. After the change of government, the newsworthiness point of news regarding multicultural families continued to drop, and was gradually considered as having less importance. This case shows the political relationship of the conservative government with ethnic minorities, migrant workers and multiculturalism, and its involvement with the *KBS News 9* productions. On the whole, news frames about ‘non-nationals as migrant workers’ recorded the highest number of items and had the highest average newsworthiness point (.641), followed by stories of ‘non-nationals as criminals’ (.649), reflecting that these two frames are regarded as the most common issues in news items related to non-nationals.

Secondly, specific trends in hierarchical representations of non-nationals were found according to ethnicity, nationality and gender. Southeast Asian men were mainly portrayed as manual labourers due to their difference in appearance from Koreans and

other East Asians. Southeast Asian women were also mostly represented as marriage migrants. Among East Asians, who share similar facial features with Koreans, Chinese were often described as criminals, whereas most Korean-Chinese appeared as the afflicted, victims of crime or housewives. *Black* and mixed-heritage Korean interviewees were mostly sports players, with some of the mixed-heritage children also being interviewed. *Whites* were mostly represented as visitors, professionals or sports players. These differences were also found in visual representations, where more than half of East Asians and Southeast Asians being represented as a group, while 94.5 per cent of *Whites* were treated as individuals, focusing on their unique characteristics. These fixed representation routines recreate stereotypes against certain ethnicities, misleading the viewers into thinking the social discrimination originates from the innate differences in racial backgrounds.

Thirdly, certain tendencies were found in methods of representation when specific ethnicities or nationalities were spotlighted according to related news topics. In the case of migrant workers, 71.5 per cent were represented by Southeast Asians, with 60 per cent of the visual frames containing negative intentions. Moreover, 62.2 per cent of the non-nationals who appeared in crime-related news were Chinese, where they were pictured in a negative way, such as mosaics, crowd-shots, and head dropping scenes in 97.3 per cent of the frames. In addition, 62.2 per cent were portrayed as part of a group, which as a result strengthens the negative image of certain ethnic groups. As for married migrant women, Chinese women only accounted for 16.9 per cent of the total news appearances while taking up more than half of the actual population of marriage migrants. It was the Southeast Asian women who dominated the news regarding intermarriages, occupying an approximate 60 per cent of the total.

Fourthly, Koreans who appeared as counterparts of the non-nationals in the news were mostly represented as individuals and males, with their professional status also being in contrast to the non-nationals. Koreans who appear in news items regarding migrant workers were generally government authority figures and NGO workers, and Koreans in foreign criminal-related news were mostly policemen, government officials or victims of crime. In the news about marriage migrant women, Koreans were portrayed as NGO workers who help the afflicted women, government officials, husbands or

parents-in-law. Looking at broadcast trends of the above news frames more closely, it becomes clear that a typical opposition in the social roles of Koreans and the non-nationals exists. In other words, it can be said that there are different positions and roles for Koreans and non-nationals in the social hierarchy, represented in the news by non-nationals as non-professional manual labourers and Koreans as professional and authoritative, non-nationals as being in need of help and Koreans as being able to provide that very necessity, non-nationals as criminals and Koreans as the law enforcement forces, and married migrant women as service providers and Korean husbands and parents-in-law as giving evaluative statements on the interviews. On the other hand, non-nationals as visitors were free from the binary opposition of the other news frames, as foreign visitors were mostly *White* men, who were in Korea as tourists, students, professionals, CEOs and religious figures. The foreign visitors were mostly in a position of assessing Koreans and the Korean system, sitting in a higher place than ordinary Korean citizens, street vendors and government officials who caused bureaucratic problems. Korean professionals add authority to the assessment, appearing on the news to agree with or support the comments of the *White* non-nationals.

Chapter Six

Mediated Discourses of Discrimination: A Critical Discourse Approach

6.1. Introduction

In the previous chapter content analysis was used to outline the main themes and ideological frames in which KBS news features about ethnic minorities are constructed. It shows that non-nationals in the KBS news are mostly marginalised, homogenised and stereotyped against, in opposition to the complex context of migration in Korea. Following these findings, the aim of this chapter is to analyse Korean public news media discourse on non-nationals and to critically discuss the trends in representation. Traditional approaches to the role of media representation in the reproduction of racism and stereotyping of minorities have largely been analytical in content (Hartmann and Husband, 1974; Keever et al., 1997, cited in van Dijk, 2000). For the last couple of decades, however, especially in Europe, there has been an increased interest in the linguistic, semiotic, cultural, or ideological analysis of media texts on minority groups (van Dijk, 1988, 1991, 1993; Fairclough, 1995; Wodak and Reisigl, 1999; Chouliaraki, 2006).

Many scholars in Europe and North America, where Caucasians form the social majorities, have already focused on the representations of racialised minorities in the mass media. Most often, findings show that ethnic minorities are underrepresented and that the majority of these representations are stereotypical and discourse plays a prominent role in the reproduction of racism (Fowler, 1991; van Dijk, 1991, 1993; Fairclough, 1995; Wilson and Gutierrez, 1995; Chouliaraki and Fairclough, 1999; Wet, 2001). Discourse expresses, persuasively conveys and legitimates ethnic or racial stereotypes and prejudices among *White* group members, and may thus form or confirm the social cognitions of *Others* (van Dijk, 1992). Van Dijk (1991, 1992, 1993) defined this as an 'elite discourse'. That is, media discourse that is produced to disguise social

class as invisible and having a social majority and minority taking specific but rigid positions in these social systems. Based on these findings it is possible to set up a hypothesis: Korean society and Korean PSB, which forms the most influential medium in that society, stress the single race national ideology and the pure blood myth and, as a consequence, reproduces an elite discourse that consolidates the ruling power and social, racialised hierarchies.

Throughout this chapter we will deal with broadcast news as a specific type of discourse. In order to investigate the research hypothesis, this chapter will employ two analytical methods combined as introduced in Chapter Four: CDA and visual analysis. Although visual analysis can be considered one part of it, CDA will focus on the linguistic and narrative structure of the television news discourse in particular. Following this, visual images of television news will be examined by visual analysis drawing from analytical categories and methods as developed by Rose (2001), Kress and van Leeuwen (2006) and Zettle (2005).

6.2. A Three-dimensional Framework for Analysis

The news that projects socially negative effects associated with ethnic minorities can be categorised into three frames: ‘dehumanisation’, ‘pathologisation’ and ‘victimisation’. These are the three dimensions of framework that emerged as central in my analysis and which I discuss below.

6.2.1. Dehumanisation

Dehumanisation is one of the oldest ways by which the majority media exclude *Others*, including ethnic minorities, and distort their representations (Singh, 2009). Dehumanisation, according to Baron and Richardson (1994), occurs when an individual views another person in negative ways, which leads to the belief that they are undeserving of the respect and kindness usually afforded to another person. It is as if that individual is compared to non-humans (Haslam, Kashima, Loughnan, Shi, and

Suitner, 2008). In comparing groups under the same situation, Esses, Veenvliet, Hodson, and Mihic (2008) state that, for example, if group B is seen as failing to uphold values belonging to group A, then group B must be immoral and less than human. This results in group B being less deserving of humane treatment. The fate of the members of group B is less relevant to group A, and their interests may be ignored. The implication is then that dehumanisation of a target increases aggressive behaviour because dehumanised group members have no moral standards applied to them (Castano and Giner-Sorolla, 2006).

Bandura (2002) adds that strangers can be more easily depersonalised because of the lack of moral obligation to try and comprehend them. There are three different ways in which people are dehumanised. Haslam et al. (2008) point out that people can be compared to animals, in which uniquely human attributes are denied and the person is described as being coarse, uncultured, amoral, irrational and childlike. Bandura (2002) adds that attributing demonic or bestial qualities to a person also makes them less than human. A second way in which people are dehumanised is by comparing a person to a machine (i.e. 'mechanistic dehumanisation'), in which human attributes are removed, and the person is perceived to be unfeeling, cold, passive, rigid and lacking individuality (Haslam et al., 2008). By doing this, the person is denied of emotionality and desires (Haslam et al., 2008). Controlling or manipulative interpersonal relationships have been identified as one antecedent of mechanistic dehumanisation (Moller and Deci, 2010). The third way that a person can be dehumanised is by perceiving the other person as being the enemy. Esses et al. (2008) state that the enemy is constructed to exemplify manipulation and is described as being opportunistic, evil, immoral and motivated by greed. The enemy is shown to take advantage of the weak, which in turn justifies any action taken against the enemy. Esses et al. (2008) go on to describe the barbarian image, which includes the perceptions of a ruthless, crude and unsophisticated individual that is willing to cheat to reach glory.

6.2.2. Pathologisation

According to D'Souza (1995), media strategy is the combined implementation of the positive presentation of the in-group and the negative presentation of the out-group. In this sense, the principal rhetorical means are those of hyperbole and metaphor, that is, the exaggerated representation of social problems in terms of illness ('pathologies', 'virus'), and the emphasis of the contrast between the 'civilised' and the 'barbarians' (van Dijk, 1998). To put it concretely, in terms of 'the New Racism' (Barker, 1981; van Dijk, 2000), minorities are not biologically inferior, but different. They have a different culture, although in many respects there are deficiencies, such as single-parent families, drug abuse, lacking achievement values and dependence on welfare and affirmative action – 'pathologies' that need to be corrected of course (van Dijk, 2000). The concept of difference in this sense is needed to distinguish the healer from the patient as well as the 'healthy' from the 'sick'. Order and control are the antithesis of 'pathology'. 'Pathology' is disorder and the loss of control, the giving over of the self to the forces that lie beyond the self. It is because these forces actually lie within and are projected outside the self that the different is so readily defined as the pathological (Gilman, 1985). Since almost all ideas of nation and people-hood rely on some idea of ethnic purity or singularity and the suppression of the memories of plurality, ethnic minorities are regarded as an impurity, as Jews were seen as a 'cancer' or 'pest' for the purity of German-Aryan blood in Nazi propaganda (Appadurai, 2006).

6.2.3. Victimisation

Racist victimisation, as opposed to 'conventional' victimisation, involves that interaction of the offender and the victim, who are not being victimised in their capacity as individuals but in their capacity as representatives of the community to which they belong (Witte, 1996 cited in Winterdyk and Antonopoulos, 2008). In racist victimisation, whole communities are the 'collective victims' (Karydis, 1994). Romer et al. (1998) investigated victimisation using a power relationship perspective. They contended that television news tends to overrepresent *Whites* as victims because of an ethnic-blame discourse in which people of colour are blamed for the problems of

Whites (van Dijk, 1993). This discourse affects news makers such that they produce crime stories that emphasise the harm that people of colour cause to *Whites*. As a result of such a discourse, people of colour are relegated to roles of perpetration, whereas *Whites* are portrayed as victims. The majority of the media research about racial victimisation mainly focuses on news reporting crime cases; therefore, the terminology of ‘victim’ can be understood as a victim of crime. In this study, however, the concept of victim is not limited to crime, but includes a diversity of meanings of what it is to be a victim, as victimisation is produced through a variety of structures, such as social power relations, economic conditions and living environments. Moreover, this study will look into media representations of the victimisation of non-nationals, and also focus and look intently at the representations of victimised non-nationals. This is because Korean news reporting, compared to other studies of victimisation, does not openly victimise ethnic minorities, but instead undermines them in a more subtle way, leading to victimisation. However, looking closely into produced discourses, a discourse of duplicity can be found as it shifts responsibility on to them. Specific examples of this will be described in this chapter.

This chapter will develop a critical discourse analysis on the themes and frameworks that were introduced in the previous chapters.

6.3. Dehumanisation of *Others*

6.3.1. *Migrant Workers as Ornaments for Korean National Holidays*

Any society experiences, whether positive or negative, changes when migration and settlement of new populations takes place (Legrain, 2006; Castles and Davidson, 2000; Castles and Miller, 2003). However, in most cases, the positive effects of labour migration go unnoticed because they are often not considered to be newsworthy. On the other hand, studying coverage of labour migration can have consequence on issues such as social inclusion and participation in the public sphere. That is because the many side-effects and conflicts associated with labour migration news coverage reflects and records social ideologies and the restriction or potentials of inter-cultural communication (Hartmann and Husband, 1974; van Dijk, 1988; Downing and Husband,

2005; Montgomery, 2007).

Approximately twenty per cent of news related to migrant workers in Korea is produced during the Korean traditional holiday period. Therefore, cultural diversity is one of the most common topics of news representation at this time. It is interesting to note that it is during the Korean traditional holiday season that minorities are most conspicuous and news items of this type are most prevalent. Minorities are socially most conspicuous during the holiday season through the media and they are restrictively humanised during that period. Chouliaraki and Fairclough (1999) argue that media have a tendency to drive people to feel sympathy towards socially vulnerable groups, such as the homeless, the poor and orphans during holiday seasons like Christmas. It is important to note here that holiday seasons become almost unique periods for ethnic minorities to be represented as ‘humanised *Others*’ in the news. Chouliaraki (2006) argues:

Humanisation is a process of identity construction that endows sufferers with the power to say or do something about their condition, even if this power is simply the power to evoke and receive the beneficiary action of *Others* and the humanisation of subalterns occurs either via the verbal mode or the image (2006: 88–89).

In terms of her argument, narration of news presenters, storytelling by reporters, the existence of sufferers’ voices and camera angles are requisites of humanisation of *Others*. Therefore, it is very important to analyse discourses and images of *Others* in the news during such periods. They can provide significant occasion for studying how media manipulate and humanise *Others*.

Traditional holidays have a special meaning in Korean society. Koreans are very proud of their holidays. Their pride is the result of the fact that they see holidays as key occasions for national uniqueness and reaffirmation of the significance of tradition. There are two main national holidays in South Korea, the biggest one is *Seol* which is the lunar New Year’s Day and the other one is *Ch’usŏk*, the Korean Thanksgiving Day.

Most Koreans visit their hometown in order to pay respect to their ancestors and spend time with their extended family. It is interesting that ethnic minorities appear more than usual in the media during these periods. It is important to note that the headlines of these sorts of news stories can be categorised into two different groups. Firstly, there is news about migrant workers who are learning the Korean traditional and cultural activities. Secondly, there are the stories about miserable migrant workers whose hardships are in stark contrast with the pleasant holidays that everyone else is enjoying. The latter concerns the victimisation of migrant workers and I will describe it later in more detail. At this point I will focus on the former news discourse.

KBS news not only emphasises Korean traditional holidays as a special time for migrant workers, but also reinforces ideologies of cultural superiority based on the Korean holidays' special value. Migrant workers are portrayed in these news categories as passive, receiving and enjoying Korean food, games and overall cultural benefits. A sub-text of the stories is that the minorities are 'uncivilised' and 'unemployed wanderers' and 'bystanders' and 'lonely aliens' until they learn Korean traditional culture. They are shown at the point of participation in the national ritual. Migrants come onto the screen through interviews, where they often demonstrate awkwardness with the Korean culture, which can be interpreted as cultural inferiority.

The voice of *Others* has an important role in indicating the relationship between minority groups and the majority. According to Spivak (1988), speech does not refer strictly to talk, but more generally to the capacity of suffering *Others* to call attention to their unfortunate condition and engage their addressees with their condition. Chouliaraki (2006) adds that interviews in broadcast news provide a real opportunity for *Others* to be humanised as individuals. The interviews mentioned here, however, are extremely standardised and migrants only use their voices to reaffirm viewpoints of the majority. These are little removed from the level of discourse of saying 'This Korean food is delicious', 'Those Korean traditional games are fun' or 'I love Korean holidays'. These kinds of interview with the minorities contribute news content that represents the migrant workers as 'pity', using words such as 'unemployed', 'wanderers' and 'lonely aliens', while the interviews depict Koreans as 'thankful beings who held the festival for poor migrant workers'. Some of the news stories emphasise directly –

through the interviews – how migrant workers feel thankful to Koreans. Although this topic will be discussed more specifically in the next chapter focusing on the news-making process, *We* who have hegemony intentionally adopt or reject the discourse produced during interviews depending on whether it reproduces hegemonic superiority or not. To sum up, even though the voice of *Others* is quantitatively presented in news reports, that does not produce representation of them, but a representation of *Us* as superiors. In this way, the question, ‘Who are they?’ reflects the answer ‘Who are we?’ (Pack, 2001).

Figure 6.1. Portrayals of Migrant Workers as Interviewees



In a similar context, the superiority of Korean culture is demonstrated in stories about migrants learning traditional games. Korean traditional games such as *Yut-nori*³⁰ and *Jegi*³¹ superficially play a big role in aiding migrant workers by making them forget about their everyday troubles and worries in these news stories. However, these appear as culturally complex experiences that migrants can only grasp with difficulty. The reason for these attitudes can be found in Fanon’s (1986) analysis of minority ethnic psychology. He used as an example the fact that Caucasians pride themselves on having the best cultural values whilst Africans try to prove that their culture is just as valuable as the Western one and even better in some cases (Fanon, 1986). Korean public media contain both the attitudes of Caucasians and Africans, as recorded by Fanon. That is, it

³⁰ *Yut-nori* is a traditional board game played in Korea, especially during Korean New Year.

³¹ Playing with a *Jegi*, which involves kicking a shuttlecock-like object with the inside of the foot, is an interesting traditional Korean game (Jo and Kim, 2001).

appears that their attitude to prove the superiority of Korean culture stems from the fact that a Korean majority is anxious about the potential comparative inferiority of its culture. They argue that their culture internalises better values than most migrant workers' cultures. However, Koreans seem insecure about the value of their culture compared to Western cultures. These cultural attitudes have also been present in the Korean government's slogan since the 1990s, which projects a national superiority as globally relevant: 'The most Korean thing is the most Global thing.' In this campaign the government also tries to prove the superiority of Korean culture by stating the achievements of gigantic Korean companies such as Samsung, LG and Hyundai in the global market. In the process of discursive construction, as Hall (1996) and Laclau (1990) argue, Korean traditions of pre-modern cultural forms were given civilised and globalised superiority, whereas ethnic minorities in modernised society are characterised as uncivilised inferiorities. By setting up the visual scenes that show their mistakes and difficulties playing Korean traditional games, they are characterised as *Others*, not like *Us*. This portrayal often stems from the narcissistic reasoning that Korean culture contains unique elements, which are difficult for foreigners to grasp.

6.3.2. Voiceless and Faceless Illegals

Representing the migrant workers as 'illegal' could be included in the discourse of dehumanisation. This is the way of the 'new racism', as van Dijk (2000) mentions, which tries to avoid explicitly racist terms, yet uses negative words to describe the properties or actions of migrants or minorities. The news discourse describes them as passive and dangerous beings that should be managed and controlled. Especially in the news reports related to the domestic labour market, they are categorised not as human beings but as social ills or threats in need of control by the government. The fire accident at the Yeo-su Immigration Detention Centre on 11th February 2007 was a tragic disaster where, of the migrant workers, who had been arrested because they lacked the necessary documents and were waiting for deportation, nine died and eighteen and more were severely injured because of the fire that broke out. The news reports about this disaster described the people who either got injured or died in the fire as 'illegal residents':

Twenty-seven people died or were injured at an immigration detention centre in Yeo-su, Jun-Nam. These people were all foreign illegal residents ... Fire officials stressed the possibility of arson by these illegal residents who were committed there ... Yeo-su Immigrant Detention Centre accommodates a total of fifty-five illegal residents ('Nine people dead, eighteen people injured', 11th February 2007).

As can be seen from the report above, the term which consistently defined the migrant workers who died or were injured by fire was 'illegal residents'. This can give the impression that their sanctity of life and values are lower than those of nationals. That is, the migrant workers shown on this news report are dehumanised as illegal residents and the worth of their lives is treated as less than that of Koreans' lives. News coverage of this tragedy was very limited. Although it was an extraordinary disaster, KBS news broadcast items about it only for two days, the day of the accident itself (11th February 2007) and the next day. The total amount of news stories was just nine. It can be argued that its news value was lower than that of a similar incident resulting in the death of Korean citizens. The *Ye-Ji Hakwon* fire accident (16th May 2001, ten dead and twenty-three injured) was reported 28 times during six days whilst the *Icheon* warehouse fire accident (5th December 2008, seven dead) was reported 18 times during five days. The case reflects the dominant view of the inferiority of migrant workers in the Korean mainstream media and is again part of the dehumanisation of migrant workers. Chouliaraki (2006) interprets the distorted perspective shown by the media as a concept of hierarchies of human life. She takes the example of natural disasters in Bangladesh and Indonesia, which took the lives of thousands of the inhabitants, yet the coverage given to the deaths of two or three Americans suggests their life-worth is of a greater value. It is hardly ever the case that the former lives are valued more than the latter (Chouliaraki, 2006).

There is another striking example of a similar news discourse. The news report 'When receiving wages for labour during the cultivating season...', aired on 30th April 2007, dealt with issues related to three Thai migrant workers who had lost their lives during a

fire in their accommodation whilst working in the countryside. In the introduction of *KBS News 9*, the item was presented as below:

Three illegal immigrants who sought employment in the countryside lost their lives due to a blaze. Recently the amount of foreigners who work in the countryside has increased. However, hardly anything has been done to manage these illegal aliens ('When receiving wages for labour during the cultivating season...', 30th April 2007).

It is clear that the presenter focuses on how we should manage the increase in illegal aliens in the countryside, and not on the accident, the tragic deaths and the cause of the fire. Clearly using the words 'illegal immigrants', instead of migrant workers or just people who experience a tragedy when referring to the dead, frames the discourse strongly in a specific way, that of the victims' *Otherness*. In other words, the news discourse was only focusing on how the migrant workers can be effectively managed, with a view of the accident as a result of the mismanagement of illegal aliens, rather than the miserable deaths of worthy individuals. The power structure originated here is eventually divided into *Us* as 'subject', 'humanised' and 'manager', and *Others* as 'object', 'dehumanised' and 'managed'.

Over-lexicalisation can be another pragmatic strategy of encoding ideologies in news discourse, as shown. According to Fowler et al. (1979), over-lexicalisation results when a surfeit of repetitious, quasi-synonymous terms is woven into the fabric of news discourse, giving rise to a sense of 'over-completeness' in the way participants in the news discourse are described. It is characteristic, according to Fowler et al. (1979), that powerless people are over-lexicalised. Seen in this light, over-lexicalisation often has a pejorative effect as it signals a kind of deviation from social convention or expectation and reflects perceptions and judgements from the essentially biased standpoint of such cultural norms or social expectations (Teo, 2000). The lexical cohesion, such as 'illegal resident' or 'illegal alien', frequently appearing in the news relating to migrant workers suggests that the very existence of migrant workers in Korea is in itself an illegality and

an anomaly. The frequent expression of ‘the foreign labourer’ also consolidates the stereotype of migrant workers as foreigners and manual labourers. This stereotypical generalisation forms an opposition structure of ‘foreigner’ versus ‘domestic’ and ‘labourers’ versus ‘employer’, strengthening the binary opposition relationship of *Others* as foreigners and labourers, and *Us* as domestic and employers. On one level, this kind of stereotypical generalisation offers reporters or news makers a convenient means to ascribe certain key qualities to the main participants of the news discourse without encumbering the reader with tedious details; on another, the selection and repetition of a particular generalising attribute also hints at an underlying ideology that might have motivated the choice in the first place (Teo, 2000). Van Dijk (1987) explains this stereotypical generalisation as a concept of homogenisation. The homogenisation of the migrant workers as ‘illegal residents’ or ‘foreign labourer’ parallels the kind of categorical generalisation that is often symptomatic of stereotyping or cognitive prejudice (van Dijk, 1987): the larger the category, the more sweeping the generalisation and hence the more ‘severe’ the stereotyping.

The news discourse which dehumanises migrant workers as illegal residents is also revealed in visual representations. As can be seen in Figure 6.2, the migrant workers portrayed as illegal residents are all faceless. The first image on the top-left shows the image of migrant workers as illegal immigrants being ‘educated’ in a small, confined space with prison-like steel bars. In fact, they are waiting to be deported after being accommodated at the immigration detention centre. They probably have not committed any crime. However, the image of them being ‘educated’ behind barred windows by a Korean manager creates an image of them being deviants and criminals. The formation of superiority and inferiority on the value of human life can be part of the dehumanisation process, which devalues migrants’ lives. The second image on the top-right presents a migrant worker who has been severely injured at work, but who could not receive any adequate treatment due to not being able to pay the hospital fees. In both cases, migrants are described as illegal residents and their faces are not shown. They are also not given the opportunity to speak, but rather are shown aimlessly strolling away. Although they are human beings who suffer in society, the space and time in which they exist are unclear, as are their identities which are hidden. The way of representation at this point makes those migrant workers be imagined as faceless people

in the virtual time and space. In fact, the space represented in the second image is presumed to be a slum or backward suburban or rural area, rather than a location in a major Korean city. The difference of social class between urban and rural areas is highlighted at this point and is reproduced in the Korean/migrant divide. This divide suggests that the urban is the space of majority Koreans and they view the incident as happening in the territory of *Others* rather than *Our* territory, establishing a system of double exclusion.

Figure 6.2. Portrayals of Dehumanisation of Migrant Workers as Illegal Residents



Another significant point is that the migrant workers in Figure 6.2 are represented as a dark and anonymous group. They, as voiceless and faceless beings, are principally shown as working in factories or watching television programmes from their accommodation in small and insular residential communities. In other words, they are given limited social roles within a restricted space. They are treated as an accessory of the machinery in the factory, even sometimes described as living together in an

unhygienic and dilapidated environment. Visual portrayals describing the migrant workers' accommodation reproduce the sense of extreme poverty as the camera uses high-angle and zoom-out techniques. Moreover, they appear only in groups, deprived of eye contact, faceless and somewhat out of focus. These visual grammars make them seem inferior lonely *Others* and strangers. The shots of the camera are out of focus and images are filtered with mosaics; the techniques of long-shots and close-ups of specific body parts of workers are used. This type of screening makes the news audience feel uncomfortable and emotionally negative about the migrant workers who appear in the scene. Chouliaraki (2006) argues that 'the deprivation of a sufferer's voice, the representation of subjects in large, non-descript groups, long-shots of the devastation of an unknown landscape – such visual effects relegate sufferers to the realm of the *Other*, alienating them from the existential order of Western viewers' (2006: 87–89). This tendency of visual representation can be understood as a way of depriving them of their own identity, which causes the dehumanisation of migrant workers.

6.3.3. The Non-national Criminals Held up to Mockery

As was already shown by Western scholars, such as Hartmann and Husband (1974), Hall (1978) and van Dijk (1987), the mass media are apt to represent ethnic minority groups as being associated with crime, while under-representing crimes against them. Early Chinese settlers in Britain faced racial hostility from national newspapers with persistent references to the 'yellow peril'. Newspaper exposés of 'Chinese vice' sought to link gambling, drug abuse and objections to sexual relations between Chinese men and *White* women (Law, 1981; Clegg, 1994). Criminal activities of non-nationals have become an important issue through media since 1990s when migrant workers started immigrating in large numbers.³² Criminals who have entered the country have become an important issue in the media. This fascination is overwhelmingly showing migrants in the media in a specific light, even if the growth of such stories over-represents a

³² *Seoul Daily*, 7th November 1990, 'Foreign criminals increase rapidly this year';
Dong-A Daily, 24th September 1991, 'Foreign criminals in extreme – many of them are Southeast Asians who entered by tourist visa';
Hankook Daily, 31st March 1992, 'Foreign criminal methods are becoming increasingly brutal';
Hankyoreh, 21st May 1992, 'Foreign criminals increase rapidly – estimated 60 thousand illegal immigrants'.

relatively small reality of migrant life.

One of the most frequent ways of dehumanising non-nationals involved in crime is the representation of them as faceless and voiceless. Most of them are represented wearing a cap or are represented covering themselves with their jumper or coat, or alternatively are represented using a mosaic effect, making them hardly recognisable (Figure 6.3). News makers ostensibly insist on shielding a suspect as a device for his/her safety. However, when looking into its producing procedure the representation of anonymous individuals turns out to be apparently contradictory. As was mentioned in the previous chapter, it is practically impossible to film a suspect being arrested and taken to the police station for investigation unless reporters are positioned in every police station in Korea 24 hours a day, 365 days a year. Therefore, almost all scenes of suspects with their head down or under investigation on the news are intentionally directed once the film crew arrives at the police station. A police officer in charge of the case, as he/she is required, may allow enough time and space for the reporters' filming of non-national offenders who are temporarily in prison. Next, the officer may be asked to skilfully act like they are investigating the lawbreaker, facing each other over a desk, at the same time as the investigated individual may be ordered to conceal his/her face (43 out of 69 news reports). Cumulatively, the production procedure is taken as a whole result in a pseudo-portrayal of non-national criminal suspects.

Figure 6.3. Portrayals of Non-nationals as Criminals



This tendency of visual representation is broadly similar to one which portrays the dehumanisation of migrant workers. Sometimes news makers attempt to obscure the non-nationals through techniques such as out-of-focus shots or extreme long-shots, but most of the time they try to clarify the existence of the suspect through a close-up shot. One of the most important visual functions especially found in this context is a visual frame which exploits a contrasting relationship between non-national criminals under investigation and the Korean police examining them. This visual can be interpreted as a reflection of the authority structure in reality. This dichotomous representation of authority and subordinate reflects that of a judge versus a criminal, a master versus a servant or a conqueror versus the defeated, and has been constantly reproduced through imagery and this can be a type of visual discourse which is usefully applied in media nowadays.

Figure 6.4 shows another type of visual material which contains this dichotomous power relation. The pictures below connotatively describe power relations between authority and sinners. Noteworthy is the fact that, like the traditional dichotomous expression of the authority and sinners in religious painting, the image describes authority as the subject who imposingly lifts his or her head and stares straight towards the front, whereas sinners are described as the objects who avert their eyes or cover their faces, not being able to look straight at the authority. It is particularly interesting because this traditional visual expression has an influence on today's representation of television news.

Figure 6.4. Portrayals of the Power Relations between *Us* and *Them*³³



6.3.4. Feminisation of Others in the Context of Family-centrism

Recently in Asia, where migrant and gender research is conducted, the character of gender immigrants has become more obvious and one of the extreme examples is the increase of inter-cultural marriages in Asia. H Kim argues that ‘Asian women choose marriage as a migration route in order to move to the developed countries in North-East Asia (South Korea, Japan and Taiwan)’ (2006: 16). It is a fundamental fact in the migration mechanism that defines the feminisation of migration. This is not only

³³ 1) Rogier van der Weyden (1446–1452). *The Last Judgment* polyptych. Available online from <http://www.wga.hu/frames-e.html?html/w/weyden/rogier/08beaune/00beaun1.html>, Accessed 19th October 2010.

2) *Citizens and a soldier*. 18th May 1980. From The May 18 Democratic Uprising in Gwang-Ju, South Korea. Available online from <http://www.518.org/main.html?TM18MF=A0303>, Accessed 18th October 2010.

3) Anja Niedringhaus. 12th November 2004. Pulitzer Prize for Breaking News Photography 2005, First Place awarded to the Associated Press, Iraq team. Available online from <http://www.pulitzer.org/archives/5499>, Accessed 19th October 2010.

because of a result of the quantitative aspects of the women's position and the increase in their numbers, but also because of a result of the increased globalisation of gender relationships. Although the total amount of discourse is still small, the feminisation of *Other* is something that is increasing rapidly through the discourse of multiculturalism in the Korean PSB news. However, when we consider the number of domestically residing non-nationals, we cannot explain why married migrant women, who only constitute ten per cent of the total, have become the focus of the multicultural discourse led by researchers, media, NGOs, and local and central government. The main point is that migrant workers as males are still treated as aliens in society, whereas married migrant women, despite demographically representing a smaller group, gain from government interest. This tendency displays a Korean trait of the multiculturalism discourse, which shows a close relationship with the gendered framing of national identity and multiculturalism. That is, the masculine is constructed as the custodian and the superior of the *Other*, while the feminine is connected to the subjugated and the inferior. Looking into the background of this phenomenon, the national policy drive towards multiculturalism seems to be to assimilate the new family compositions resulting from an increased number of married migrant women. The multicultural policy of the Korean government, for example, is limited to educating married migrant women about Korean culinary traditions, etiquette and culture, yet this is without accepting cultural diversity, but in fact emphasises homogenous Korean culture and focuses on assimilating migrant women into Korean society. This shows how it is a function of maintaining patriarchy to control rather than respect or humanise the migrant female population. The Korean bureaucrats and the elite majority lead the multicultural discourse constructed through these processes (S Lee and J Ahn, 2007).

This is ideology learnt from 'family-centrism', which is regarded as an absolute virtue in Korean society. Behind family-centrism, alienation and objectification of married migrant women are closely related to such many complex ideas, as demonstrated in examples such as the traditional patriarchal system of society, the Korean concept of pure blood and the myth of a single-race nation. Despite the fact that family-centrism is connected to the economy and relationship within the family in Korean society, paternal authority and power based traditions of family-centrism have coexisted with the continued dissolution and modification of it. Family relationships which have a primary

economical purpose are difficult to form and maintain for those who lack the economical resources. It first appeared in the 1990s as a marriage problem for farming industry bachelors, and then it spread to the men who work in small businesses in the city and serve in the service industry and who are comparatively worse off economically. The marriage of Korean men with migrant women means obviously a lower-class marriage within the dominant situation where class differences between couples are common, but this helps men to sustain a dominant position in the relationship. Considering these points, the increase of married migrant women can cloud the concept of pure blood and single-race nationalism but it can also consolidate the patriarchal tradition based on paternal power. Married migrant women are heavily relied upon in families that have assimilated and adapted into the husband's family system. It is not an exaggeration to say that married migrant women are called upon to maintain the patriarchal family in Korean society. This demand and expectation are strong enough to define their legal and social existence.

How does KBS construct the feminisation of the *Other*? In terms of the representations of married migrant women, KBS employs three main frameworks: daughters-in-law, mothers of mixed-heritage children and housewives in rural areas. These patterns are the stereotypes of traditional femininity, which stresses the passive and self-sacrificing role of obedience to parents-in-law, dedication in bringing up children, assisting the husband and devotion to the household. The visual discourse of married migrant women only focuses on this traditional concept of femininity. The married migrant women who appear on *KBS News 9* are mainly shown cooking in the kitchen wearing traditional outfits on national holidays, or being with children or looking after their immobile parents-in-law (specific examples will be discussed in the following section). This limited stereotypical discourse, which positions the women as objects of traditional femininity, reports favourably about their adaptation to Korean society. The married migrant women who accept this subjectification of the ideal feminine freely are often on the verges of society, such as in an urban slum or in rural communities. On the other hand, those who are not able to adapt themselves to fatalistic roles within their Korean marriages are branded as potential criminals or social deviants. Moreover, the news discourse limits the difficulties that they experience in Korea to mundane everyday instances, such as cooking Korean meals and learning Korean. This implies

that if they can cook Korean meals and speak Korean well, they will have no problems fitting into Korean society. This shows the limitation of the multicultural discourse in Korea that excludes the real cultural diversity and traditions of the married migrant women. The discursive tendency of feminisation is closely linked to another case of the dehumanisation of married migrant women.

6.3.4.1. Daughters-in-law as Maidservants

As we saw before, a high ratio of news reports related to foreigners in Korea is produced during the Korean traditional holiday season. For instance, after 2005 there were a number of reports relating to migrant women who had been married into rural Korean communities. In the build up to the main two holidays of *Ch'usŏk*, the Korean Thanksgiving, and *Seol*, the Korean New Year's Day, *KBS News 9* showed married migrant women preparing traditional Korean holiday food or learning how to prepare for the holiday:

The foreign daughters-in-law clearly had a busy day as they learned how to make holiday food and prepare ancestral ceremonial rites. Even though everything seemed strange and new, they enthusiastically learnt the unfamiliar culture ('Even though everything seemed strange and new', 6th February 2008).

The foreign daughters-in-law learned how to prepare the memorial service table and make traditional stuffed rice cakes ('Foreign daughters-in-law memories', 12th September 2008).

As can be seen above, during the holiday season most of the married migrant women shown in the Korean public media are represented as 'foreign daughters-in-law'. To understand this nature of reporting we must also understand the dominant social structures within Korean society. 'Foreign daughters-in-law' appeared a total of 53 times in the news reports and was the most frequently used term to describe them. The second most used term was 'foreign women who married into Korean families' and this

appeared a total of 45 times. Both expressions were used based on the viewpoint of parents-in-law of married migrant women and it indicated that these women are subordinate.

In the news, they are portrayed as people who prepare meals for the family, take care of their retired parents-in-law and give birth to and educate their children. These human characters are defined by the specific term ‘daughters-in-law’. It is important to notice that in conventional Korean society, the daughter-in-law has the lowest position in the family relationships. The daughter-in-law should be sincere in regards to her duties which include solving every uneasiness within family life whilst repressing her own desires, and it is even the case that they need to look out not only for their household but also their parents-in-law and the children’s lives if the husband is absent due to war or accident (I Lee, 2010). Therefore, the traditional concept of the daughter-in-law in Korea includes their destiny being to sacrifice their own lives for the family and to become passive, deserting their own identity.³⁴

It is noteworthy that the terminology used in the KBS report largely renders the social position of married migrant women as being ‘daughters-in-law’, rather than independent human beings. This reflects the hierarchical structure of Korean society, which stresses that daughters-in-law must learn the domestic culture from parents-in-law, who have the dominant right to educate and assess their daughter-in-law’s performance. Parents-in-law, representing typical Korean culture, are constructed as taking the lead in maintaining cultural identity, whereas married migrant women, portrayed as foreign daughters-in-law, are represented as unintelligent and passive, and as having an inferior culture which needs to be adapted to the superior Korean culture to support the family. As such, married migrant women are doubly dehumanised as women controlled by patriarchal ideology and as non-nationals from a developing country by the nationalistic ideology.

³⁴ There is a famous Korean proverb which describes this passive daughter-in-law, that is: ‘If woman marry, she must live three years as mute, other three years as deaf, and another three years as blind.’ It was a lesson from the time when woman were needed to be patient to the hardness of marriage through endurance and with a submissive attitude and it refers to the view of society towards daughters-in-law at the time.

Dehumanisation is also formed through restricting the linguistic usage of married migrant women. According to Bodemann and Ostow (1975, cited in Dittmar and von Stutterheim, 1985), foreigner talk expresses disdain, and continuously reaffirms the degradation of the foreigners. Widespread foreigner talk in the general discourse features founded by Ferguson and De Bose (1977); are 1) simplification, 2) short sentences, 3) wrong orders, 4) unclear meanings, 5) hypercorrect use of the language standard, and so on. Habermas (1971) also points out that linguistic and communicative inequality distorts and represses real patterns of socialisation. From this viewpoint of the linguistic ability of non-nationals, the migrant is usually in the subordinate position and the native in the superior. A total of 62 married migrant women interviewees appeared on *KBS News 9* during the five years, and 60 women were interviewed in the Korean language. Among them there were very few people who could speak Korean fluently despite having lived in Korea for more than ten years. Most of them had difficulty speaking Korean after having lived in the country for one to five years. Despite this fact, the interviews were conducted in the Korean language and they gave subtitles in order to deliver the meaning clearly to the audience. Many were curious as to why it was necessary for the interviewer to speak Korean in a situation where clear communication cannot be achieved; the fact that they included subtitles, unlike when they interviewed Koreans, means that these married migrant women's Korean was still at a very basic level. The fact that they had difficulty speaking Korean and were called foreigners can be interpreted in various ways, the most logical being that this was because the majority of the news audience feel superior compared to foreigners who mimic the language which is part of Korean culture. This will be discussed later on; it is closely related to 'the narcissism of minor difference' which is endemic in Korean society. Through these communicational disadvantages, married migrant women are forced to answer in a passive way, such as yes or no, to the reporters' closed questions.

Reporter: Are you happy?

Yujin (from Vietnam): Yes, I am.

(‘More than half of them live in poverty’, 14th July 2005)

Reporter: Aren’t you tired?

Pung Kim Mai (from Vietnam): No, that’s OK

Reporter: Isn’t it difficult to cook (tofu fry)?

Pung Kim Mai: No, that’s fine.

(‘I am happy although I am clumsy’, 5th October 2006)

There are many Korean daughters-in-law who are suffering from the inequality of married life in the home of the husband’s parents. However, the difference between married migrant women and Korean married women appearing in the news is whether they have got their own voice in the news or not. This is a considerable margin between *Us* and *Them*. As Chouliaraki (2006: 88–89) argues, ‘speech – initially formulated in Spivak’s critique of colonial discourse – does not refer strictly to talk, but, more generally, to the capacity of suffering others to call attention to their unfortunate condition and engage their addressees with this condition ... Spivak asserts the fact that sufferers who are deprived of their “voice”, of the appellative power to make others aware of their misfortune, remain forever subalterns or “*Others*”.’ Thus, voiceless married migrant women in the KBS news not only display their insufficient ability to speak the Korean language, but also reflect the power structure between *Others* and *Us* in Korean society.

6.3.4.2. Localisation: *The Wives in the Countryside*

Another process of dehumanisation is underway at this point, in the ruralisation of married migrant women. This is understood as ‘standardisation’ of married migrant women as farmers’ wives who live in rural areas. In regard to the KBS news discourse, married migrant women’s partners or potential partners are restrictively defined as ‘rural bachelors’ or ‘countryside and seaside men’, and it observed that the increase of inter-cultural marriage has also led to a centralisation of the countryside or seaside.

These news reports suggest that in rural areas there is a much higher percentage of inter-cultural marriages and that there are significantly more married migrant women compared with the capital and other major cities. According to the data presented in 2007 by the statistics office, actually 41.2 per cent of the men who are employed in primary industries get married to migrant women; a KBS news report has supplied us with the same numbers. However, if it is focused on the total amount of inter-cultural marriages, men working in primary industries make up only 11.7 per cent of all inter-cultural marriages. In other words, among all the inter-cultural marriages in Korea, only one in ten is a countryside or seaside man in an inter-cultural marriage. The data presented by the Ministry of Government Affairs and Home Affairs (2008) is similar: 70.3 per cent of married migrant women in Korea live in seven major metropolitan cities and one metropolitan province, with 56.9 per cent of them living in the capital city, Seoul. When considering this data, it is important to notice the bias of the reporters in suggesting that inter-cultural marriage is limited to men and women who live in rural areas, which obviously contradicts the real situation.

It should be acknowledged that a similar form of power structure as between male-female and majority-minority exists, and that is urban-rural. Local identity, similar to gender and ethnicity, is formed and accumulated over a long period of time and has an influence on contemporary political and social contexts. This can be explained by applying the concept of 'Domestic Orientalism'. Said (1979) pays particular attention to the colonial discourse. He analysed how the viewpoint from which the West looks at the East has been formed and defined it 'Orientalism'. Piterberg (1996) derived the concept of 'Domestic Orientalism' from Said's research. He highlights that, in the process of representation in which European-Israeli Jews who hold the hegemonic initiative depict the 'Oriental Jewry' who lives in the old territory affected by Islamic culture, the Oriental Jewry is defined as those who must be 'modernised' in order to join the new imagined community, which is part of Western civilisation, and their culture is portrayed with a specific sense of values such as being intellectually frozen, primitive and degenerated, superstitious, lazy, poor and filthy, physically unfit and unhealthy, uneducated and uncivilized, and humiliated and inferior (Piterberg, 1996). This is an outstanding example of the way in which a hegemonic narrative is dynamically and continuously constructed on the basis of the displacement and

negation of powerless groups and of the construction of a new identity for these groups – in the name of pluralism of course – which is well integrated into the hegemonic narrative (Piterberg, 1996). In KBS news, the concrete discourse of this localisation of married migrant women is represented as the discourse of natural and positive, rather than negative.

Most frequently migrant women in the public media in Korea belong to rural areas and some of them are even represented as ‘a local source of new energy’. But it is easy to notice that these ‘heroic migrants’ can only exist when they have internalised Korean values of being a woman (including communication problem solving, taking care of parents-in-law, supporting husband, children’s education, well-kept household, etc.), which minimises their identity not only as a foreigner but also as a human being. The following news article contains this discourse:

Because of foreign brides, rural areas have become cheerful where for once I cannot hear babies crying (‘They are also Koreans’, 30th March 2006).

Foreign daughters-in-law have become the new energy of rural places which once were hollow due to low fertility and aging (‘Foreign daughters-in-law lead rural area’, 23rd September 2007).

These discourses represent married migrant women as *Others*, who are living in a different space from *Us*; even though they live within wider Korean society, the news discourses limit them to a specific space such as a rural area. Not only rhetoric discourse but also visual discourse contributes to the localisation of married migrant women in this specific perspective. In Figure 6.5 below, typical examples of the news programme’s portrayals of localised married migrant women are shown. Here television attempts to express the image of ‘provincial’ or ‘provincial-like’, as much as it relates to Korean society. These attempts include describing married migrant women in a Korean traditional house or doing agricultural chores or duties, in the front yard of a disorganised house in a typical rural area, or a leafy area. In the context of Korean

localism, therefore, married migrant women are only accepted into Korean society as localised housewives, that is to say, as the second-class citizens of Korea.

Figure 6.5. Portrayals of Locally Married Migrant Women



6.3.4.3. *Clumsy Inferiors*

Due to the patriarchal and centralised view of Korean culture, married migrant women are represented as *Them*, who are fundamentally different from Koreans in the related news stories. These representations merge together when married migrant women experience traditional Korean culture, when multicultural families prepare for the Korean holidays, and when children from multicultural families learn about Korean traditions at school. The common element in these news segments is that they all stressed the ‘difficulty’ for married migrant women and children from multicultural families to learn Korean culture; therefore, it exposed their limitations as being part of their identity as *Them* as non-national, and it illustrated subliminally the message that Korean culture is not something anyone can easily grasp. Most reporters simply presented their own subjective opinions rather than objective facts during such news segments. As we will see in the news clippings below, many expressions, such as ‘foreign brides who want to be born again as Koreans’, ‘they have sincere filial love’, ‘truly learning women’, are obviously the result of a reporter’s impressions based on subjective opinion. The term ‘clumsy’, which frequently appeared in these types of news report, is also a very subjective expression whose meaning can change depending

upon the standards of the interpreter. For some it may lead to believe in the existence of countless ‘clumsy’ non-nationals who are not familiar with Korean culture. For example, what these married migrant women learn about wearing a *Hanbok* or making traditional Korean dishes, is equally unfamiliar for Korean women of the same age because many of the things that they are taught have almost disappeared from modern life:

Although still clumsy the foreign brides want to be born again as Koreans (‘They are also Koreans’, 30th March 2006).

Pung kim mai who married and came to Korea two years ago from Vietnam fries Tofu clumsily (‘I am happy although I am clumsy’, 5th October 2006).

She is clumsy when pounding rice (‘Soothing longing...’, 7th December 2008).

These kinds of situation can be explained in terms of ‘the narcissism of minor differences’ based on Freud’s theory. Freud argues that the smaller the actual difference between groups, the larger it is likely to loom in their imaginations (Kolstø, 2007). Freud’s tentative statements were in line with the insights of Simmel, Durkheim, Lévi-Strauss, Dumont, Elias and Girard. Bourdieu (1984) writes in his classic *La Distinction* that social identity lies in differences, and differences are asserted against what is closest, which represents the greatest threat. Appadurai (2006) defines as predatory those identities whose social construction and mobilisation require the extinction of one another, proximate social categories, defined as threats to the very existence of the group, defined as *Us*. In other words, the reason Koreans can keep their composure and have the narcissism of ‘foreigners also enjoy our traditional culture’ is created because there is the ‘difference’ that they are not familiar with Korean culture like the Koreans on the premises. Therefore, their number increases and they hold enough social power to get into the step of enjoying ‘our culture’ as ‘their culture’, that is, when they have the sense of crisis of disappearing ‘minor difference’, such pride will disappear. Blok (1998) argues that the loss of differences – especially cultural differences – represents a

threat and can lead to explosive situations. Social identity lies in differences, and differences are established, reinforced and defended against what is closest – and what is closest (in different meanings of the word) represents the greatest threat. Thus, in this symbolic economy, ‘the hatred of *Others* is the necessary complement to the narcissistic idealisation of the “national self”’ (Morley, 2000: 221). At this point, the Korean tradition has a motivational urgency, which means that it is appropriated as a ‘means of power’ (Hobsbawm, 1983) to legitimate Korean rule over non-nationals, especially daughters-in-law.

This discourse is clearly constructed through pictures on the television screen. Figure 6.6 shows visual portrayals displaying such subjectification of married migrant women, as they prepare Korean holiday food. Each of the news reports presents very similar images. The scene of married migrant women wearing traditional Korean clothes, following the instructions of their mothers-in-law is clearly indicative of the power structures within society. The mother-in-law could be constructed as the judge or educator, with the non-national woman as a novice and juvenile, being taught simple daily tasks.

Figure 6.6. Portrayals of Married Migrant Women Making Korean Food during Holiday



6.3.5. *Non-national Sports Celebrities: Monsters or Superhuman?*

Sport is the only field in Korea in which non-nationals can officially work and become famous in the media for their achievements. In Korea, there are four major pro-league sports (football, baseball, basketball and volleyball) which permit registration of non-national players although it is very limited.³⁵ Non-national players who work in the Korean sports leagues generally stay in Korea for anywhere from a few months up to five years depending on various situations, and very few of them naturalise as Korean citizens. *KBS News 9* representation has the tendency toward categorising them into two parts: monsters or superhuman.

Within this narrow framework of representation, the first saw ‘the Negro’ only as a sub- or infrahuman figure, while its successor has sometimes been prepared to identify the same incredible subspecies as superhuman and even godlike in its physicality (Gilroy, 2005). Michael Jordan, Mike Tyson, Halle Berry and the tennis star Williams sisters are some of the iconic presences that embody the latter possibility (Gilroy, 2005). As Hacker (1992) writes, ‘*White* America still prefers its *Black* people to be performers who divert them as athletes and musicians and comedians’ (1992: 34). Campbell (1995) argues that the coverage of the *Black* performers was intended to ‘balance’ the station’s coverage of the inauguration of US president; because so few minority subjects were featured in other inauguration stories, coverage of the pre-inaugural ball gave stations a chance to show the ethnic diversity that many of the reporters in attendance described.

One of the most universal pieces of rhetoric used in signifying non-national sport players in KBS news is the term ‘monster’. The terminology of ‘monster’ is mainly used towards non-human animals, rather than a humanised identity, specially stressing physical ‘abnormality’. This discourse implies that the outstanding achievement of non-national players is rooted in their biological physical condition – extreme height, long arms and legs, extraordinary elasticity and athletic ability. The biological conditions presented here are not regarded as a result of their effort, but natural ability due to birth, a kind of endemic racial trait. The media discourses mainly focus on physical traits as

³⁵ Since 2010, the Korean football and baseball leagues have allowed two non-national players to play in each team. The Korea basketball and volleyball leagues are restricted to only one non-national player in each team.

benefits which, in turn, cause deficiency in the mentality and identity of *Others*, limiting their ability in the physical field (Campbell, 1995). This can be regarded as a stereotype from Western society that has been learned, reproduced and modified in Korean society. Monster is mainly applied to *Black* or mixed-heritage non-*White* players.

A monster appeared in the pro-volleyball league. A new foreign player named Leandro, the Samsung volleyball team player. His power comes from his extreme height which is 208 cm and from his long arms which are 94 cm long ('Secret of high flying hit', 26th December 2006).

Monster attacker Palaska, who dreams of winning for the first time has been defeated by the competing team ('Monster attacker Palaska', 10th December 2007).

Garcia, the monster power slugger who even broke the baseball bat ('I like Korean barbecue', 2nd June 2008).

On the other hand, the visual portrayals of *White* non-national sports players are close to describing them as superhuman, as shown in Figure 6.7. There is a somewhat similar textual meaning of monster, yet the visual representations of them produce a completely different meaning. Their high height and bulky builds are maximised through low-angle shots. This camera angle enables the subject to look superior and be perceived as triumphant. Therefore, non-national celebrities appear here as superhuman, not just extraordinary humans, and they are likely to be interpreted in a positive light, unlike the monster analogies discussed earlier.

Figure 6.7. Portrayals of Non-national Sports Celebrities



The double perspective around *White* non-nationals and non-*White* non-nationals can be also found in mixed-heritage Korean celebrities. As K Park (2008) points out, in Korean society it is very rare that mixed-heritage individuals enter the entertainment industry, and only in recent days has their story become an issue taken seriously. The number of mixed-heritage entertainment celebrities, typified by Insuni,³⁶ is very small but is also limited to singers or sports players; therefore, it focuses on their biological abilities such as their natural-born voice, height or physical flexibility. In this process they are described as if they have a dominant voice and physical nerve because they inherited something from African blood, unlike Koreans and *Whites*. On the other hand, *Whites* started working as actors or models, but were an ignored class in society in the past; however, since 2000, discrimination based on looks has become endemic in Korean society and the trend for seeking the Western *White* appearance has become strong. In this process several *White* mixed-heritage people became celebrities for being actors or models in the Korean entertainment business. Despite having the same condition of being mixed-heritage, the perspective towards them largely depends on whether one of their parents is *White* or non-*White* in Korean society. This can be interpreted as a result of apparent racial discrimination structures, which ranks them according to physical appearance and skin colour.

³⁶ She is the most successful mixed-heritage (African-American father and Korean mother) Korean pop singer in Korean history so far. She held her concert at the Carnegie Hall, New York in 1999, which was the first time a Korean pop singer had ever performed there. Today, she is an icon of success through overcoming severe discrimination for all mixed-heritage people in Korea.

6.4. Pathologisation of *Others*

6.4.1. *Nosophobia: The Deadly Pathogenic Others*

A major part of pathologisation of ethnic minorities in the media is related to focusing on those who are carrying serious diseases. These can be portrayed as physical or psychological diseases. The former mainly focuses on ‘contagiousness’, whereas the latter highlights a vague fear of the ‘uncontrolled being’ of power and authority. First of all, physical pathologisation of ethnic minorities starts from the viewpoint of regarding them as potential carriers of fatal diseases. Particularly, there has been the discursive relationship between HIV/AIDS and Southeast Asia in the Korean news media. HIV/AIDS has been regarded as not only a physical disease, but also a moral and mental disease. According to Lean’s research (2007) on the media discourse on HIV/AIDS, one of the means in which HIV/AIDS can be transmitted is through sexual intercourse. As such, the disease has been implicated with questions of morality. Many religious leaders and conservatives have voiced their opinions with regards to HIV/AIDS and morality, and they have concluded that the disease is linked with immoral behaviour. The representation of ‘immorality’ is contextualised in terms of the link between HIV/AIDS and homosexuality or sexual abuse. Therefore, it is believed that the infected should be permanently expelled and segregated. Their existence is completely denied in Confucian society, which is shown as being morally and mentally superior. A person infected with HIV is a stranger and an *Other* to Korean society.

Construction of discourses about HIV/AIDS has brought Southeast Asian migrants into a perceived close relationship with the disease. ‘Blind spot of AIDS management’ which was aired on 1st April 2005 featured a HIV-infected Thai female migrant worker who had worked in South Korea for four years. HIV/AIDS is still considered something more common amongst Southeast Asians due to the Korean mass media framing it such that most HIV/AIDS sufferers have become infected whilst visiting prostitutes in Southeast Asian countries such as Thailand and Philippines. In addition, there is a bias against foreigners from Southeast Asia, who are believed to be very promiscuous.³⁷ Thus, overall these news reports about the HIV infections amongst Southeast Asian

³⁷ *Dong-A Daily*, 12th July 1993, ‘Developing countries in Southeast Asia, AIDS alert’; *Kyung-Hyang Daily*, 16th November 1995, ‘Southeast Asian Game, AIDS alert’.

migrant workers consolidate the bias of an increased risk of HIV/AIDS infection in Korea by these sexually promiscuous Southeast Asian migrant workers.

There have been a series of cases where a number of migrant workers came into Korea and were infected with HIV while living in the country. A Thai woman who entered the country four years ago, and who illegally stayed and worked at factories around the Pyeong-taek and Kim-po areas, was diagnosed as HIV-positive last September. Last July, another Thai woman who came to the country as a guest worker died one month after being diagnosed ('AIDS control blind spot', 1st April 2005).

The above case is a good example of how the media connects HIV/AIDS to migrant workers and presents them as a threat. If we look at the expression used in the first sentence we see that it states 'a series of cases of AIDS-infected migrant workers'. As reported in the news, it is estimated that around 300 foreign residents in Korea were infected with HIV in 2005. In fact, it is difficult to estimate the actual statistics of infected individuals; therefore, it is arguable that the statistics produced in this report are guesswork. In spite of this fact, it is noteworthy that they report a specific group among foreigners – those of migrant workers – and expressions of frequency, such as 'a series of infections', are used to lead to the stereotyping of this particular group. In detail, the news reported a case of two Thai women. From this, it is noticeable that news reports put disproportionate emphasis on certain countries in Southeast Asia. Furthermore, unlike other news discourses around migrant workers, which are male-dominated, in HIV/AIDS-related news it is interesting to note that the migrant workers are presented as women. This is closely linked to sexual morality in Korean society, as we can see that polygamy was socially accepted until the 1960s when modernisation started in earnest, and sexual morals were enforced upon women more than men, such as the forbidding of pre-marital sex and Confucian traditions banning the remarrying of a widow. Although it should be more cautious to approach these samples due to the small scale, the frequent appearance of female cases of HIV/AIDS

in news is related to sexual immorality in Korean society and can be interpreted as an expression of long-standing social conventions.

On the other side, we can find another discourse which represents migrants as having a close correlation to mental illness. 'Madness' has been one of the major perspectives that Western society has adopted towards other races and civilisations (D'Souza, 1995). It has been used as a convenient measure in dichotomously classifying 'normality' and 'abnormality', 'control' and 'out of control', and 'civilised' and 'primitive'. Even in modern medicine, however, mental illness is still difficult to clearly investigate and diagnose and can be also judged differently depending on the degree of medical development or cultural difference. This can especially be seen to be the case in news discourse, as it is seldom suggested that Korean husbands suffer from madness when committing violence against married migrant women who are badly injured and even killed, even though such incidences have occurred often in recent years. On the other hand, KBS news represents the mental illness of married migrant women, especially those from Southeast Asia, as a serious social threat.

Many mentally ill Vietnamese women go to Korea (to marry).
Their Korean husbands hardly know ('If money received,
everything is normal', 28th November 2006).

Some Southeast Asian brides who have been caught had serious
diseases including mental illness ('Urgent inquiry for checking
facility', 12th February 2008).

This discourse towards a certain migrant group can function as justification for governmental limits on immigration, constructing cynical and discriminative attitudes towards them, and moreover justify in part the violence of Korean men towards them. Furthermore – and crucially – it can shift the responsibility of social malfunction on to *Others*.

6.4.2. *The Numbers Game*

The counting of illegal migrant workers can also be understood as one of the practices of the pathological view. Rhetorically, this well-known numbers game of much immigration reporting in the media does not imply that these numbers are necessarily correct. Rather they signal subjectivity and hence credibility, whereas the numbers themselves imply the size of the threat (van Dijk, 2000). The represented portrayals of migrant workers are similar to the news discourses seen about the time of epidemics, such as Swine Flu in 2009–2010. The common components of this news discourse are as follows:

- i) It spreads rapidly and is expressed in numbers in order to transmit the spectacle.
- ii) It is shown as having a detrimental impact on society, especially the menacing threat to the right to life of *Us*.
- iii) Therefore, this threat should be expelled and segregated from *Us*.

The constant numbering and monitoring of the increasing volume of migrant workers, especially illegal residents, in the news discourse is similar to the repetitive reproduction of the numbers of victims and the spread of infection to maximise the perception of the outbreak when looking at epidemic discourse. There was a dormant fear of the existing threat that tries to impinge on the territory of *Us* as shown in the discourse construction (Appadurai, 2006).

In sum, the typical numbers game of immigration reporting has one main semantic objective: to associate immigration with problems and threats, if only by quantity (van Dijk, 2000).

Huge numbers of illegal foreign labours debase the level of wage for natives (25th July 2006).

Illegal residing migrant workers in domestic areas are over 180,000 people (1st February 2007).

Illegally residing foreigners reach 230,000 people (12th September 2008).

The first example refers to ‘huge numbers’, an obvious hyperbole because not only was there an exact numerical statement about illegal migrant workers, but also the report was supported by an interview with only three angry Korean workers. As Clark (1998) sharply observes on the press representation of refugees, ‘the use of numbers and the language associated with it become very clear by the reporting in the media, and terms such as “exodus”, “flood” and “invasion” become the standard descriptors’ (1998: 2). In the KBS news reports, the abuse of statistics is significantly found. This is seen most frequently in news related to migrant workers, which claims increasing numbers of migrant workers. Moreover, expressions such as ‘huge numbers’ and ‘rapid increase’ are often emphasised in reporting the phenomenon of increasing migrant workers. Most significantly, the negative term ‘illegal’ is constantly used in describing migrant workers in this ‘numbers game’, which, as a result, constructs a discourse reflective of the dramatic spread of an epidemic. The production of this media discourse promotes negative perceptions towards migrants, creating social anxiety (Gordon, 1996).

6.4.3. The Lunatic Mob

There are also news discourses that are produced by the psycho-pathological view, which identifies the migrant workers as having few educational skills but a wide range of learning difficulties. In the news reports, migrant workers are shown to be less skilled, less responsible, impossible to communicate with, and low skilled as members of the labour force. This rhetoric is in opposition to those values regarded as positive in the labour market, such as being skilled, responsible, communicative and quality, again

constructing difference and abnormality between the *Others* and *Us*.

Pathologisation of migrant workers can be seen in the visual discourse as well. Visual analysis confirms the tendency to portray migrant workers who have participated in cultural activities during Korean holidays as a group type. They were mostly shown in chaotic and discursive images rather than personal images and their clothes looked quite informal and inadequate. As Schroeder (2002) insists, group portraits reflect and inscribe a strict social hierarchy within the ideology of the group portrait. Wearing informal clothes, some migrant workers talked loudly while they eating and playing games, got drunk and made a lot of noise. Even though they were celebrating Korean holidays, their behaviour confirms the fact that they have a lower status in this society. In the news portrayals, their way of playing traditional games was so clumsy and less professional that Koreans had to teach them how to play properly. In general, the images of migrant workers represented them as being happy and cheerful; however, most of them are represented as a group wearing their working uniforms and their images were represented as chaotic and lacking in personal identity. This tendency of representation may enable the behaviour of the *Others* to be perceived as an expression of group wildness. As Gilman (1985) argues, the wildness of ‘uncivilised’ aliens was generalised as madness to the eyes of ‘civilised’ Westerners. The chaotic group dancing of the migrant workers compared to the traditional Korean activities of the traditional holiday season can be said to be working through a similar discourse. While the group are attempting to learn ‘civilised’ behaviour, they are also simultaneously showing their inherent wildness in the mediated discourse.

Disease is considered a threat to the health of the nation state and in particular to the health of the traditional fatherland of Korea. Disease sees migrant workers constructed not only as problems, but as deadly problems. In becoming linked to the transmission of disease an analogy is created: migrant workers threaten the life of the host society – a society that is repeatedly presented as healthy and robust and the migrant workers are represented as the pest, the polluted enemy that potentially compromises the health and endangers the wellbeing of the healthy nation (Pickering, 2001).

Contrary to this, in the visual discourse *We*, dressed in Korean traditional attire display, are calm, devoted and disciplined in behaviour, which implies *We* are the worthy heirs of such a high and civilised Korean culture and civilisation (Figure 6.8). The camera techniques used to capture the two opposing groups also show divergence as the migrant groups are captured by extreme long-shots and high-angles from a distance to signify powerlessness and insignificance. These images show the migrant workers as daunted and distinct from the main culture of *Us*, who are shown by medium-shots and low-angles, to imply more respect and intimacy towards the object from the perspective of the viewers. From a visual aesthetics point of view, migrant workers are shown in mostly dark and black-coloured clothing, whereas Koreans are distinguished by varied and multi-coloured apparel. According to Gilman's argument (1985), racial pathologies are formed through the complete dichotomous distinction between 'order' vs 'disorder' and 'control' vs 'loss of control'. Although the samples are not large in this study, the fact that they record an obvious contrast representing *Us* and *Others* is of great significance.

Figure 6.8. Portrayals of 'Their Tradition' as 'Disorder' and 'Our Tradition' as 'Order'



6.4.4. *The Natural-Born Cruelty*


The pathologisation of non-national criminals, especially Chinese and Korean-Chinese, is reflected in a variety of forms in the news discourse. The most prominent tendency is

the construction of a natural-born deviancy among the group. The news 'Foreign criminals increase, become truculent' (8th December 2008) reported the situation that the number of Chinese who stay in Korea has quickly increased, exceeding 0.6 million and as a result of this criminal activities have increased as well. This news especially focused on the Korean-Chinese who constitute the largest group of people with Chinese nationality residing in Korea. During an interview in the middle of the news a Korean emphasised that: 'Their fighting itself is far from the Korean way. During the fighting if one says "kill you", it will actually happen.' This example projects a universalistic viewpoint of Korean society towards the Chinese and Korean-Chinese. The core of the discourse is that their crimes come from their cruelty and the cruelty is endowed in them from their embryological and cultural environment, which is fundamentally different from those of the Koreans.

Highlighting the cruelty of non-national criminals through visual representation is also one of the important characteristics of television news media. In Figure 6.9 we can see images that appeared on news reports about serious cruelty in crimes committed by foreigners. The top-left image shows the confiscated weaponry used in a massive demonstration conducted by Chinese students. Despite most of the weapons possessed by the demonstrators being ordinary objects like umbrellas and bottles filled with sand, the camera only focused on a single big wire-cutter. Even if there was no reporting of how this object was used or was intended to be used, it can be perceived as a visual representation to dramatically illustrate the cruelty and gravity of the Chinese students' demonstration. The top-right image is also similar to the first, in which a Korean police officer who was dealing with Chinese illegal immigrants was portrayed while patrolling Korean waters. The image shows one of the suspected Chinese crew under investigation, alongside a multiple image showing weaponry, including a shovel and club. This implied visual grammar embraces non-verbal content of the cruelty and inhumanity of the Chinese crew under investigation. The lower-left image of a bleeding Korean police officer implicitly represents the seriousness of non-nationals' violence while also prompting suggestions of the critical situation being brought upon Koreans from outside, by zooming in on the police officer who is a symbol of government power. The lower-right CCTV image that was taken in an everyday convenience shop would increasingly reproduce the significance of non-national crime due to the realism

of CCTV imagery. This style of portrayal by news media outlets may encourage viewers to encounter the imagery in an emotional way rather than under logical consideration, due to the manner in which the outsider is framed as dangerous and threatening.

Figure 6.9. Portrayals of Non-national Criminals' Cruelty



6.5. Victimisation of *Others*

6.5.1. Miserable *Others* Who Should Be Sent Back to Their Families

Another frame of the news produced during the Korean traditional holiday season is related to the victimisation of non-nationals. It can be seen that many news items are also produced in order to illustrate the miserable migrant workers who have miserable and gloomy holidays, whilst the other migrant workers enjoy the Korean holidays. In the news reports in this category, the reporter puts emphasis on the fact that *Others'* appearances differ from us, especially in regards to their skin colour. This can be clearly

seen in his commentary that many different skin colours of foreigners are gathered here, which has led to an anxious mood.

Firstly, discourse around the family will be discussed. Although family-related discourse in the news of migrant workers tends to predominate during the holiday season, it is also frequently featured in other types of news as well. In the family-related discourse, family is presented as the absolute good and the most important thing in life. Therefore, this leads to the conclusion that the Korean resident migrant workers are also sojourners who need to return to their hometowns in order to spend time with their families. This tendency can be easily found in news segments that depict migrant workers as objectified service providers and miserable beings. Miserable representations are associated with one of the three dominant discourses, i.e. victimisation. Victimisation emphasises the moral superiority of Koreans as subjects that can help these people – who are suffering financially and physically – to return to and meet with their families because their suffering and struggles in Korea are the result of living in a culture they do not belong to. Within Korea many do not consider the idea of helping them to fit into the society as a solution for their problems. These discussions are directly supported through news. News repeatedly conveys indirectly the following message ‘what they want is to return to their families’. Through these entreaties, migrant workers are recognised as aliens who need to leave the country someday instead of becoming members of Korean society. Direct discourses are reproduced by the interview with migrant workers. The following news interview is typical:

A Sri Lankan migrant worker: My mum cried looking at the picture of my injured hand. She begged me to return home. I do not have any friends here (Korea) and I miss my mum (‘Migrant workers in the shade’, 14th December 2005).

A Sri Lankan migrant worker: My father and brother, who are still in my homeland, are sick. At the moment no one is earning any money in my household ... I miss my family so much (‘I feel homesick for my family’, 16th February 2007).

News stories such as those above are based on migrant workers who expressed their longing for their family located in distant places. A particular reportage was interesting in that a Sri Lankan man was hospitalised and appeared on the screen wearing a patient gown. While the appearance of nine patients in the news represents the victimised migrant discourse, eight of them were Southeast Asians. All the migrant workers with whom the above interviews were conducted were staying in hospitals or at home after they had to quit work either after becoming sick or getting injured at their workplace. Figure 6.10 shows a visual representation of the tendency towards victimised *Others*. Most migrant workers who were hospitalised because of accidents or injuries in their workplaces held interviews whilst staying in bed. In these cases the visuals supported the idea that they were miserable and inactive migrants. One more important representative tendency was producing dramatic images through the use of extreme close-up. These types of images can cause audiences to see the represented objects more emotionally, and in a subjective way, rather than rationally and objectively (Zettle, 2005). All of them were depicted as being ‘miserable’ and ‘lethargic’ beings that cannot do anything without the aid of Koreans and who cannot become fully independent away from their homeland.

Figure 6.10. Portrayals of Migrant Workers Suffering from Injury or Illness



This should be regarded as a function of the vital discourse of reproducing the

victimised migrant workers. Combining the victimisation of migrant workers and family ideology superficially maximises the sympathy of viewers towards migrant workers through an emotional representation of their lives. This is proved by the fact that a number of sponsors actually offered to help some of the migrant workers after the news had aired. Korean viewers humanised the migrant workers, whom they saw in tears when thinking of their families, making the viewers feel they are the same as Koreans with families in their homeland. Figure 6.11 shows the images of migrant workers who miss their families. It contains images such as a Southeast Asian migrant worker who shed a tear whilst calling his family in his hometown, an Uzbek migrant worker who delivered a message to his daughter in his hometown via a news interview, and a Korean-Chinese migrant worker's daughter crying because of the overwhelming emotions of a family reunion. Television news dramatised these events by showing close-ups of their crying faces. Sometimes sad background music was even added in order to illustrate the migrant workers' lives and how being separated from their families is a source of misery. According to Bogart (1980), who discusses news as a drama genre, as well as an ongoing fictional drama, a continuing news story, incomplete, is more likely to arouse our propensity for role-playing, our imagination and our emotions than a news report of a completed event; and not only do battles and wars have this character, but so also do significant events in our society, such as serial murders, kidnappings or touching stories about the socially vulnerable. These dramatic ways of portrayal depict the migrant workers, namely the representative objects, in a more dramatic way, and this results in the exaggerated empathy of the audience.

Figure 6.11. Portrayals of Migrant Workers Who Miss Their Families and Homelands



Away from the tendency of emotional news reproduction, however, a different conclusion can be drawn from analysing this news discourse in more detail. This can be easily picked up during the interview of the chief of the Immigration Detention Centre. During his interview, he said that ‘they should live in their own country with their family, not here (Korea), because they are causing trouble with health, hygiene, housing and childcare.’ This statement can also reflect the family-centralised discourse and a single-dimensional ethnical code centralised and associated with the conception of the state as a synonym for the Korean societal framework. These discourses are often mentioned as being the main causes of migrant worker discrimination in Korea (D Seol, 2000; K Park, 2008); especially in a Korean society that is based around a family-centred Confucian ideology, migrant workers who come to seek jobs, leaving their families behind, can be branded as cruel and money-seeking. They are also seen as temporary – only in Korea to earn money before returning to their family and homeland. Simultaneously, the visual discourse represents them as weak and powerless patients, dehumanising them as passive and spiritless beings.

Taking a practical approach, there is an important factor missing in the news discourse, which is that many migrant workers appearing in the victimisation discourse get seriously injured due to excessive work in factories, with little or no safety procedures. Subsequently, they are unable to get adequate medical treatment due to the lack of medical insurance for migrant workers. What is more, exploitation in a workplace with low pay is common practice. Even though the Korean government and the employers, who are responsible for the institutional management of migrant workers, are actually responsible for the victimisation, this fact is hardly mentioned in the news. Instead, the suffering of the migrant workers is represented as an affair of personal circumstance. Thus, it appeals to viewers’ sympathy and concern at an individual level while being de-contextualised. As such, it is possible to say that KBS serves a specific function within the ideological state apparatus (Althusser, 1971), speaking for the government rather than public interest.

6.5.2. Victims as Obstacles of Economic Profit

The victimisation of married migrant women is divided between domestic violence in the multicultural family and the educational problems of their children. Although there have been several married migrant women who have died as result of domestic violence in the last decade, the Korean public media have focused less on this kind of problem in the multicultural family. In this case many news reports focus more on the anxiety about the negative image of Korea in the eyes of the victim's countries, such as Vietnam and Cambodia, in terms of trade economy rather than criticising racism, domestic violence or lax marriage management system in Korea. In particular, KBS news has mentioned the negative effects on the level of business, which illustrates the attitude that KBS news has towards human rights.

Reporter: It often happens that Vietnamese women who marry a Korean man die after domestic violence. Because of this in Vietnam negative views about Koreans have become widespread.

Korean Consul General in Vietnam (interview): When we do business with Vietnamese partners it is not like in the past ... In the past it was very friendly but I heard from many reports that it is very cold these days ('Anti-Korean movement caused by domestic violence' 2nd September 2007).

This discourse produced by the news is similar to a national crisis theory where the 'Nation brand, Korea' decreased its position and therefore got economic damages as well due to domestic violence to these women. This can be interpreted as human rights having become a means by which we can keep *Our* benefits and position rather than approach *Their* human rights. It gives a strong impression that we need to develop a system to protect their human rights because we are scared of the business problems and the outside views. This discourse can be seen as a result of the typical principals of nationalism. That is, all social issues and problems are perceived and judged from a macro-discourse perspective through national interests. 'Individual' human rights and even death can be largely neglected by the overriding discourse of 'national' interests.

More seriously, this media discourse, produced in the system of nationalism, reduces social structural problems, such as domestic violence in multicultural families, to individual moral deformity, and consequently acts as a steering device away from the fundamental problem.

6.5.3. Mum Unqualified for Domestic Education

The media repeatedly bring up the fact that married migrant women and their children, especially those that have ceased living in the undeveloped areas, face various difficulties. In particular, problems with children's education in multicultural families have been regarded as one of the most serious side-effects caused by married migrant women within Korean society. In the news items this research focuses on, there were a total of 16 cases of KBS news reports that treated inter-cultural marriage problems, and nine of them were about the education of inter-cultural marriage families' children. In fact, education itself has been treated as one of the most crucial issues in Korean society. Because of the demand for high education in Korea, a phenomenon of avoiding 3D industry (dirty, dangerous and demeaning) has been caused due to the high college entrance rate and the following education inflation; thus, it brought about the situation which demanded migrant workers. Against this background, this issue of multicultural family children's educational problems has become a point of dispute that opposes inter-cultural marriage itself.

Five year old Hye-young, who hardly recognises simple words such as bread and milk, has a Filipino mother. She has lost an essential stage in the process of learning the language due to her mother's lack of Korean ('Urgent request for language education support', 1st December 2006).

Owing to the mums' poor Korean, children's development of language is very slow ('Foreign bride protection law', 3rd February 2007).

As we can see in the above news scripts, Korean media consider education as not being a public affair, but rather a private area and the academic ability of children is up to each family, especially mothers. Although children are raised by both their mother and father, their position that the children's language development has been delayed because their mother is foreign reflects a conventional patriarchal idea, that is, the mother should take care of the children's education and the household while the father should feed his family. The reproduction of these types of idea through media can transform the issue to the level of individual morality; that is, regarding the intercultural families' educational problems as a private matter, being mostly the non-national mother's responsibility. They are sending out the message that in order to help married migrant women to learn to be Korean society members they should be supported with a personal interest. These news stories mostly argue that overcoming the ignorance and the indifference of society members is the key to solving these problems; however, no news item could be found which would suggest a demand for a public or political solution to this problem. This news broadcasting situation can be interpreted as having originated because the producers believed that the issue constituted an interesting theme or a curious story; therefore, they didn't put any positive spin on the subject in order to propose a solution or treat it earnestly. Also these types of news are limited to one time reportages and show the calendar news symptom, which is that it circulates annually by nature.

The news discourse stresses that the economic deficiency of migrant mothers and multicultural families has a detrimental impact on children's education through expressions such as:

The more serious problem is not that the mother is poor at our language, but that there is no economic affordability for the education of children ('I want to learn the language', 14th October 2007).

This is the discourse that implies the reason for the educational problems of multicultural families' children is the non-national mother's clumsy Korean ability on

the one hand. On the other hand, the more significant problem is that they do not have any extra funds for children's education because they mostly belong to lower-income groups. Both discourses restrict the problem of children's education of multicultural families to the only issue of the private sector. In other words, this can be interpreted as reflecting the dominant discourse of the Korean ruling class, which does not want to put children's education within the public sector. On the other hand, some news reports have approached the benefit of being a multicultural society and have pointed out the fiction of a single-race nation in terms of functionalism or unionism in order to develop national wealth. Both views, which use the inter-cultural children as a useful resource of various languages for the development of Korea and see multiculturalism as a chance to develop Korea, erase the errors and obstructions of the past race-related discussions or interpret the benefits of a multicultural society from a strong functionalist point of view.

A more significant way of representing the domestic educational problem is making the married migrant women's under-educated children appear mentally handicapped. This tendency of discourse is deeply linked with the pathologisation of them as well. The educational problems of multicultural families' children, which KBS news essentially represents, are most seriously represented when converted into mental illness. The discourse about the causative link between language learning difficulties and mental illness of mixed-heritage children is reproduced in articles from news reports. Furthermore, it is consolidated by the supportive comments of a psychiatrist. In the news, mixed-heritage children suffering difficulties in linguistic ability are described as mentally retarded children with mental disabilities and the only solution for the children is treatment, rather than quality education or governmental support for them. According to Gilman (1985), the concept of difference is needed to distinguish the healer from the patient as well as the 'healthy' from the 'sick'. Order and control are the antithesis of pathology. Pathology is disorder and the loss of control, the giving over of the self to the forces that lie beyond the self. It is because these forces actually lie within and are projected outside the self that the different is so readily defined as the pathological. That is, they are portrayed as mentally retarded, in opposition to Korean children who are mentally healthy, and this is shown to be overcome through treatment and their behaviour is classified as a disorder. This constructs a pathological understanding of

migrant children and poverty:

Multicultural family children exceed forty thousand. Among them, mental disorders have been increasing because they cannot learn the language at the proper stage ('I want to learn language' 12th October 2007).

To sum up, the media discourse of victimisation is produced through a sympathetic perspective towards migrants on the one hand. However, looking closely at it, the discourse implies that discrimination, exclusion, inequality and anti-humane acts towards the group are fundamentally self-inflicted and provoked. From this perspective, ethnic minorities experience double victimisation – being victimised by a series of systematic and discriminative attitudes in everyday life, and again being victimised by media discourse reporting these facts.

6.6. Koreans as Binary Opposites: The Almighty Superiors and Lawful Judges

Koreans in the news about non-nationals are represented in a completely different light compared to ethnic minorities. First of all, representation of Koreans mostly involved interviewees of high professional status with strong opinions about non-nationals. More specifically, most of the Koreans appearing in the news frame are high-class males who work in professional fields, such as police officials, representatives of NGOs, researchers, executives or scholars. This tendency of discursive representation can be understood as a process of reproducing traditional gender stereotypes in order to reinforce racial discrimination. That is, as Devitt argues (1999), women are often marginalised and portrayed limitedly in the 'private sphere' – as housewives, mothers, victims, etc. – whereas men are represented in the 'public sphere' – as social elites, political/economic leaders, representatives of the public sector, and so forth. This strictly limits gender roles between men and women. Compared to non-nationals, who were described as law violators, most of the Koreans were law enforcers or interpreters, who are portrayed as holding the moral high ground and virtue. In the interviews with Koreans, many of the techniques, such as medium-shots and standard angles, contribute

to the stress of the Koreans' authority over the foreigner. According to van Dijk (1988), generally in news articles, *White* males, as the mainstream of the society, speak about or for ethnic minorities, whereas ethnic minorities' opinions are not asked for. In the same manner, Korean males, as the majority of the society, are represented as speakers who have got their own professional opinion about or for ethnic minorities in Korean society. The majority of those interviewed wore formal suits and ties, and looked comfortable and settled. For the ultimate result, techniques of medium-shots and standard-angles were applied to the scenes of their interviews (Figure 6.12).

Figure 6.12. Portrayals of Koreans in Ethnic Minority Related News Reports



While these professional Koreans have more stable social status than migrant workers, the technique of visual grammar helps to reaffirm the inequality of status. It is noted that the professional Korean interviewees had their interviews in quiet and familiar settings, such as research rooms or an office. This presents a striking contrast to where migrant workers' interviews took place, i.e. in messy and noisy places such as festival sites, factories and homes which were mostly dark and untidy. The level of linguistic

expression of Korean interviewees meets the expected standard, revealing upper-class status. These linguistic expressions reinforce the authority of the dominant social group and they function within the discourse to conclude and judge the behaviour of migrant groups. They simplify the issues at hand related to migrant workers, using expressions such as ‘the main point of the matter is’, ‘we should/must do’ or ‘they are/want’, which are intended to advise on the attitude of *Us* towards *Others*, defining them and their behaviour. The interviews of high-class professionals showed their authority and power as the interviews were carried out in a quiet and comfortable atmosphere and interviewees used sophisticated vocabulary, whereas migrant workers raised their voices during their interviews and often used grammatically wrong Korean. Their voices were mostly close to mechanical sounds because their voices were disguised in the broadcast and their images were not clear because of dark environments and the filtering by mosaics.

Moreover, one of the big differences in visual grammars lies in the gaze at the camera. Most Korean interviewees directly faced the focusing point of the camera or looked at reporters who stood next to the camera, unlike migrant workers who often showed their backs or specific parts of their body. Their images often had mosaics or were just close-ups of specific parts of their bodies, excluding the scenes of their interviews at the festival. There is a fundamental difference between images from which represented participants look directly at the viewer’s eyes, and images in which this is not the case. When represented participants look at the viewer, vectors, formed by participants’ eye lines, connect the participants with the viewer. The participant’s gaze (and the gesture, if present), following Halliday (1985), demands something from the viewer, demands that the viewer enter into some kind of imaginary relationship with him/her. In each case, whether the participant gazes or not, the image wants something from the viewers – wants them to come closer or stay at a distance or to form a pseudo-social bond of a particular kind with the represented participant (Kress and van Leeuwen, 2006: 118). The audience, therefore, feels a certain kind of association and identification with Korean interviewees while they were watching the interviewees’ calm and confident attitude through eye contact. In contrast, the audience stay at a distance while watching the migrant workers, who were not introduced individually and did not gaze at the camera in such an unstable background.

6.7. Conclusion

The key findings in this chapter can be summarised as follows. Firstly, as a result of analysing the news discourse, it can be seen that *KBS News 9* has three significant representation tendencies when representing ethnic minorities in Korea – dehumanisation, victimisation and pathologisation. First of all, as the most common method of representation, dehumanisation of ethnic minorities was found in the news of all the critical categories – non-nationals as migrant workers, criminals and married migrants. Migrant workers were defined mainly as ‘illegal residents’, ‘uneducated’, ‘people who must be managed by authority’ and portrayed with the negative image of a mosaic and with a dark background. In terms of non-nationals as criminals, ethnic minorities were represented as potential criminals and their humanity was ignored and reduced, although the vast majority of the migrant population is not involved with any form of crime. News reporting, which refers to potential terror attacks from Muslims, or simply defines undocumented foreigners as illegal entrants and individuals who have overstayed their visas, has a particularly controlling effect on the portrayal of the whole migrant group and their human rights. Lastly, in the other tendency of the dehumanisation of crime suspects, the suspected criminal acts of ethnic minorities are highlighted in KBS news, and often collective guilt is implied for their nation or ethnicity as a whole, rather than the individual culprit. Also, suspects are treated the same as those individuals convicted of crimes. In this way a stereotypical discourse about people from specific regions – such as migrants from Southeast Asia – is produced. Labels and names for particular ethnic groups carry particular and changing ideological baggage. Use of categories and terminology requires sensitivity to the people concerned. The Korean public news media operate in a confused position, often retaining spurious racial categories and using ethnicity with little understanding. Overall, race thinking pervades news coverage of migrant workers and ethnic relations and the thoroughly mistaken notion that races are real is continually reinforced. Dehumanisation of married migrant women is represented in a variety of ways. First of all, they are presented through a very narrow framework of feminine roles in the patriarchal Korean society, rather than as equal human beings. During this process,

married migrant women are mostly represented as daughters-in-law or farmers' wives who have to work hard, often with the caricature of being inarticulate and uneducated, due to their limited proficiency in the Korean language.

In terms of the victimisation of non-nationals, there are two contrasting tendencies in representing ethnic minorities superficially as victims or perpetrators. It is interesting that the tendencies of these two discourses are closely related. First of all, migrant workers who get injured at work and have had long-term medical treatment in hospital can represent this well. In news discourse, they are reflected as 'victims' who have suffered from poor working conditions and Korean companies that delay paying their salary and medical expenses, while at the same time, they are depicted as 'perpetrators' who have left their family in their homeland, neglecting their responsibilities. This discourse, all in all, contains a monitoring function which strongly promotes migrants to promptly return to their home countries, rather than suffering from family separation in a far-flung country. This clearly does not include a critical eye on immoral Korean companies which leave dangerous working conditions and do not pay proper salaries for migrant workers. This dual perspective can also be seen in the case of married migrant women. In reporting the case of a murdered foreign wife from Vietnam, due to the domestic violence of the Korean husband, the report is more concerned with how the national brand could be damaged economically, rather than offering condolences over her death from a human rights perspective. Moreover, it is pointed out that there is a problem of language education and deficient learning capabilities of mixed-heritage children in multicultural families, and reports blame married migrant women. They are blamed for being uneducated and not fluent in Korean, even though education is a nationally driven public service and both parents are equally responsible.

Lastly, the discourse of pathologisation of non-nationals can be mainly divided into physical and psychological perspectives. In terms of physical pathologisation, the representation of Southeast Asians as a group potentially at risk of HIV is often the case. People with HIV in Korean society are regarded as sexually promiscuous due to the strong sexual conservatism under the influence of Confucian culture. Therefore, giving pathological characteristics to ethnic minorities from specific regions can be the most significant stereotypical discourse. For example, the news discourse reporting the

dramatic increase in immigrant numbers is similar to that of the drastic spread of epidemics, like Swine Flu. This type of discourse encourages fear and wariness towards *Others* within society (Appadurai, 2006). With regards to psychological pathologisation, the most critical discourse is related to the ‘natural born something’ of *Others*. For instance, a series of discourses report tendencies, such as ‘immigrants have brutal inclination by nature’, ‘they are naturally aggressive’ or ‘they naturally lack learning abilities’. These discourses simply dichotomise ethnic minorities as ‘very cunning to deceive Koreans’ or as being ‘impossible to normally live with Koreans due to mental illness, or lack of learning ability’, with both cases making it difficult to accept them in the society of *Us*.

Secondly, in opposition to the negatively stereotypical and distorted representation of ethnic minorities, Koreans in news programming appear as distinctively different from ethnic minorities from a binary opposition perspective. Koreans as *Us*, in opposition to *Them*, allows for the construction of a clear and concrete argument which is logically presented. Additionally, the concise dichotomous terminologies of *Us* and *Them* are used throughout the interviews. Moreover, Koreans are naturally charged with authority and the position of representing Korean society and government, being represented as moral and proud male law enforcers, parents-in-law or husbands in a patriarchal society, and intellectual educators in a developed society. This binary opposition division of *Us* and *Them* has already been seen in *White*-centric Western societies and it is interesting that the racial ranking and stereotype towards other ethnicities among non-Caucasians has been constructed, absorbed and reproduced intact.

Table 6.1. Binary Oppositions: *Us* and *Them* in the PSB News Reports on Ethnic Minorities

<i>Us</i>	<i>Others</i>
Dehumanisation	
Individual	Group
Names given	Anonymous
Husband	Wife
Intellectual	Emotional
Standard language	Poor language
Legal	Illegal
Urban	Countryside
Victimisation	
Law enforcer	Perpetrator
Victim	Assailant
Good	Cruel
Carer	Miserable
Moral	Immoral
Solution	Troublesome
Pathologisation	
Order	Disorder
Doctor	Patient
Moral	Immoral
Sane	Insane
Clean	Filthy
In Sum	
Superiority	Inferiority
Bourgeoisie	Working class
Authority	Subordinated
Proud	Shame
Educator	Educatee

Chapter Seven

Discourse Making: Institutional Voices

The gatekeeping process determines the way in which we define our lives and the world around us, and therefore gatekeeping ultimately affects the social reality of every person.

(Shoemaker and Vos, 2009: 3)

7.1. Introduction

In the previous textual analysis chapters, the methods by which KBS news as Korean PSB represents ethnic minorities were examined using quantitative and qualitative analysis methods. These two chapters uncovered that KBS news has specific tendencies in representing ethnic minorities and the media discourse reproduces power and functions as a reinforcement tool in the process of presenting *Others* who are excluded in power from *Us* who have political, social and cultural power. In this chapter there will be in-depth analysis, through interviewing KBS news makers, of how media, as a reproduction tool of power, produces specific discourse in the process of selection, production and editing in order to distinctively classify *Us* and *Others*.

Hall (1973) contends that the journalistic tenet of objectivity is itself a myth which is magnified by the structure of news production. According to his argument, the news is not only a cultural product: 'it is the product of a set of institutional definitions and meanings, which, in professional shorthand, is commonly referred to as news values' (Hall, 1973: 87). Those values, he says, dictate a 'status quo' production of news that reflects the 'informal ideology' of journalism, which is based on common sense understandings as to what constitutes the news in the journalistic discourse (Hall, 1973). In seeking to explain the misrepresentation of ethnic minorities in the British news media, Cottle (1999) warns of the 'problem of inference', that is simply reading off racist motivation on the part of media producers from the identification of racially

demeaning news items. Overcoming this problem, for Cottle, requires analysis of the process of the news production, involving an investigation of determinate factors such as journalist and proprietor prejudice, news value and organisation of news production.

News value, 'one of the most opaque structures of meaning in modern society' (Hall, 1981: 234), has long been noted as helping to select, order and prioritise the production of news representations (Galtung and Ruge, 1981). In the context of ethnic minority reporting, then, it is perhaps surprising that news often brings to do the forefront images of ethnic minorities in terms of conflict, drama, controversy, violence and deviance (Halloran 1974, 1977; Hartmann and Husband, 1974; Troyna, 1981; Cottle, 1991, cited in Cottle, 2000).

The news that is featured through newspapers, televisions and the Internet is obviously chosen through a reproductive process and then is reported to the audiences. This news selection process is called gatekeeping and the people who are in charge of this process are called news makers. Gatekeeping is the process by which the billions of messages that are available in the world get cut down and transformed into the hundreds of messages that reach a given person on a given day (Shoemaker, 1997). Donohue, Tichenor and Olien (1972) have suggested that gatekeeping be defined as a broader process of information control that includes all aspects of message encoding: not just selection but also withholding, transmission, shaping, display, repetition and timing of information as it goes from the sender to the receiver. On a more microscopic level of analysis, gatekeeping can also be thought of as the process of reconstructing the essential framework of an event and turning it into news (Shoemaker and Vos, 2009). News makers can be divided into 'editors', whose responsibility is the selection and the broadcasting of the news contents, and 'reporters', who supply and report the contents of the news. News contents broadcast on television are the result of the news makers' reasoning; this means that the news reflects the news makers' conscious or unconscious opinions. The direction and structure of news contents are shaped by the regulations and the production guidelines of the broadcast corporation. During this process, gatekeeping is practised, which means that the value of the news and its point of view are judged by specific standards, to decide whether or not the news should be broadcasted. Halloran, Elliott and Murdock (1970) state that gatekeeping begins as

soon as the reporters start covering a case and not afterwards in the office when the news has already been covered. This means that the reporter's point of view, perception and his or her specific agenda shape the character of the news. The resulting news is then filtered again in the editing process. Thus, news value is not an inherent characteristic of events and news items. It is rather determined by the news production and institutional practices (Eaman, 1987).

Before the interviews, I also consulted the 2007 edition of KBS's production guidelines. I found only one paragraph³⁸ that deals with news coverage relating to non-nationals and foreign countries in a way that is useful for this research. KBS has an informal culture and the majority of the guidelines and regulations are implicit. This explains why I found only one paragraph addressing this specific issue. The lack of explicit guidelines has granted producers and employees greater creative influence when making decisions about the contents of the news. This also means that the results of the interviews that I have conducted with news reporters and news makers become a key reference in trying to establish why they have opted to produce those specific news items.

The purpose of this chapter is to try to understand the choices that were made by news reporters when producing news that was related to ethnic minorities in the Korean society. This was done by interviewing ten reporters who are currently working inside KBS; the results were then used to reveal their ideas about cultural diversity, foreigners and ethnic minorities. All reporters that were chosen had covered news stories related to foreigners at least twice between 1st January 2004 and 31st December 2008; differences in workplace, gender, age, experience and position were taken into account. The interviews were conducted between 5th December 2009 and 14th January 2010.

Nine out of the ten interviewees were university graduates and one held a Master's degree. Seven majored in communications, media or journalism and another three studied social sciences, such as sociology or economics. Like other broadcasters, KBS

³⁸ <Chapter 1 - 5. (5)> Foreigners: ... the human rights of foreigners are to be respected and discrimination should not be supported. We should be careful to not make the people and their children who have received Korean nationality through marriage objects of ridicule or curiosity. We have to put effort into encouraging mutual understanding and cultural adaptation (p. 25).

also has its own employment exam. The majority of successful candidates hold degrees from prestigious universities and high Test of English for International Communication (TOEIC) scores, as set by ETS (Educational Testing Service) in the United States. KBS selectively employ professional journalists specialising in certain fields, such as law and medicine. However, most journalists rotate between different desks for a certain period, including police reporting to social, political, economic desks, and therefore gain diverse experience. Therefore, the ten interviewees were not specialised journalists on issues of multiculturalism, migration or ethnic minorities, but most of them had experience in reporting related issues while working in the social affairs desk.

Table 7.1. Interview Participants

Name	Gender	Workplace	Position at KBS	Experience	Interview date
S. Choi	F	KBS Jinju	Reporter	4 years	05/12/2009
J. Ji	M	KBS Suncheon	Reporter	4 years	07/12/2009
B. Im	M	KBS Gwangju	Senior Reporter & Documentary Director	13 years	07/12/2009
K. Kim	F	KBS Ulsan	Reporter	7 years	08/12/2009
J. Kim	F	KBS Seoul	Reporter	7 years	10/12/2009
S. Lee	M	KBS Seoul	Chief & Editing Reporter	16 years	11/12/2009
H. Lee	F	KBS ChunCheon	Reporter	7 years	12/12/2009
J. Sun	F	KBS Seoul	Senior Reporter & Current Director Affair	14 years	14/12/2009
W. Kong	M	KBS Busan	Reporter	5 years	21/12/2009
J. Yoon	F	KBS Seoul	Reporter	9 years	14/01/2010

In this chapter, the interviews are analysed within five thematic levels following Shoemaker and Vos's (2009) classification: the individual level, the routines or practices of communication work level, the organisational level, the social institutional level, and the social system level. This is an essential research process in order to understand the news makers' personal attitudes and the news-making process inside KBS, as well as how the general consensus, emotions or ideologies of the Korean population or political/economic power affect news making. These different levels are discussed in detail below.

7.2. The Individual Level of News Makers

Although the declared purpose of the news is to reflect the general interests of a society, the news is not a mirror of reality because the reporters' personal points of view can distort the contents (Tuchman, 1978; van Dijk, 1988; Schudson, 2003). It is a representation of the world, and all representations are selective (Husband and Downing, 2005). This means that some human beings must do the selecting; certain people make decisions about what to present as news and how to present it (Schudson, 2003). *The Washington Post* columnist David Broder writes that 'the process of selecting what the reader reads involves not just objective facts but subjective judgements, personal values and prejudices' (Schudson, 2003: 33). Therefore, understanding the concept or value, stereotypes towards a certain group or issue at the individual level of KBS journalists has important significance as it is closely linked to the tendency and direction of the news content.

7.2.1. Internalised Racial Hierarchy

As discussed in the section above, ethnocentrism functions as a reference point to classify *Us* and *Others* in news production. As seen in the textual analysis chapters, interestingly not all non-nationals are represented as *Others*. This includes the racial hierarchy that is prevalent in wider Korean society and can be confirmed in the content of the interviews. KBS reporters adopted just as easily the discriminating perceptions

that are rampant in Korean society and easily make a distinction between *White* and non-*White* people. The majority of them insisted that news becomes more ‘vivid’, ‘dynamic’, ‘high-quality’ and ‘elegant’ when interviewing *White* people.

For example, if some interviews are needed to describe cold weather, interviews with *Whites* tend to make the report more vivid. So I have sometimes interviewed *Whites* because their different viewpoints often make my news reports dynamic. (J. Kim)

I guess that I prefer interviews with *Whites* to others. I think I choose *Whites* as interviewees who look intelligent. Well, due to their gentleness or kindness? I believe other Koreans also consider them as I do. In my case, I would prefer to interview a gentle *White* person in his 50s because I may think he can raise the quality of my report with a sort of elegant feeling. (Sun)

It is also discovered that the KBS reporters pose different questions when interviewing *White* and non-*White* interviewees. This is part of their practice of choosing to cover different news items depending on whether the people involved are *Whites* or non-*Whites*. They choose non-Korean interviewees according to skin colour depending on what type of opinion they would like to receive. If they want to cover a casual and light topic, such as traditional Korean culture, or they want to show society in a positive light they choose to get the opinion of a *White* person. If they want to hear how difficult and hard life in Korea is or they want to tackle more serious and controversial topics like discrimination, on the other hand, they will choose to interview someone non-*White*. The questions posed will be directed to obtain the answers that the reporters wanted to have beforehand and this method is an integral part of setting the mood of the news that will be aired.

First and foremost, I have a premise that *White* people may come from developed countries. Based on the prejudice or premise, I usually ask their opinions, for example, about cultural phenomena. Interview subjects are also obviously different. When I interview non-*White* migrant workers

who are in difficulties in Korea, I ask them to talk about their difficulties or opinions about the structural problems in Korean society. (Yoon)

These are just some examples of stereotypes of *White* people. This attitude reflects upon the news and is also a general tendency of representation in Korean PSB. The reporters interviewed had an obvious tendency to favour *White* people.

7.2.2. Can You Speak English? Otherwise Just Speak Korean

KBS journalists' tendency towards favouring Caucasians is reflected in the news preference, and this news text can be used as a tool to highlight the reproduction of other racial preferences. The racial preference of KBS journalists has an impact on linguistic limitations and access due to internalised racial stereotypes. That is, due to the limitations in the linguistic skills of the reporters, foreigners were interviewed in either Korean or English because they assumed that *White* people naturally speak English. On the other hand, they do have prejudices against Arabs, Indians or any other non-*Whites* who are regarded as not being able to speak English; this is why they prefer interviewing *White* people.

There were thousands of foreign customers who entered Korea to supervise the shipbuilding process of Hyundai Heavy Industries Co. They held end of year parties annually. If I had to interview participants in the party, I preferred *Whites* from the English-speaking world because I thought they were more appropriate for the atmosphere. Of course, there were also a lot of Arabs and Indians but I hesitated to select them as interviewees in comparison with *White* people. (K. Kim)

The reporters' biased view towards *White* and non-*White* people influenced the choice of language in which they conducted the interviews. In the case of *White* people, the interviewees were mostly regarded as tourists or professionals and the interviews were usually conducted in English on the assumption that the person being interviewed could not speak Korean. When interviews were being conducted with non-*White* people, on the other hand, especially migrant workers or married migrant women who had

emigrated from Southeast Asia, the interviewers conducted the interviews in Korean. Their interviewees often did not speak the language all that well in order to give the audience an impression of ‘friendliness’ and ‘closeness’. This was done on the assumption that ‘they’ (non-*Whites*) had to assimilate into Korean society and therefore must learn Korean.

First, they (Asian migrant workers and married migrant women) are considered as those who should deservedly adapt themselves to Korea ... When a reporter faces a *White* person, he/she may assume that the interviewee can speak English. But in the case of non-*White* people, the assumption can be different. (Choi)

Even if foreign migrant brides speak in poor Korean, the scene can move viewers: ‘Ah! They are desperately making efforts to become Korean.’ (Sun)

When we interview Southeast Asian people, they want to learn Korean with enthusiasm and we also want to teach them with good will. So, for them, the interview is a sort of opportunity by which they can learn Korean or Korean culture. They may try to speak Korean, and we think the interview atmosphere will be better with their words in Korean. But *White* people are supposed to be unable to speak Korean, naturally, so we do not ask them in Korean. (Kong)

Summarising the interview content, most *White* people are not regarded as migrants and, as they can barely speak Korean because they have not lived in Korea for a long time, most people assume that they can only speak English. On the other hand, non-*White* people, treated as migrant workers or married migrant women, try to learn Korean because they will stay in Korea for a long time, and many believe that they should do so. However, one important fact is being forgotten here. According to the government announcement made in December 2008, the amount of non-nationals in Korea whose purpose is to live in Korea instead of travelling shows that Americans are the second biggest group (117,986), after Chinese, which adds up to approximately 170,000 when

including migrants from the USA, Canada, the UK, France, Australia, Germany and Russia, generally known as *White* centralised countries (KNSO, 2009). Most of them work as English tutors in educational institutes in Korea following the English education syndrome which originated in the 1990s. In short, the Korean perception of *Whites* being tourists rather than migrants is no longer based on reality. Thus, the interview approach of KBS reporters can be seen more as being based on personal stereotype about race rather than anything else.

An important issue, however, is the negative stereotype about ethnic minorities that the news media have created. In the past few years, migrant workers from Southeast Asia have been ridiculed because of their pronunciation of the Korean language, which has become the butt of many jokes as well as a target for ridicule and sometimes a downright hostile attitude towards them. Recently stories that are meant to generate empathy towards ethnic minorities have become part of the South Korean news. These stories are often presented in such a way that they become nothing more than caricatures specifically designed to generate sympathy often because of the pronunciation of the migrants. This practice may result in the fact that ethnic minorities are separated and ghettoised from the general society of Korea. Both the public as well as the political parties regard them as nothing more than a ‘special’ object which results in a lack of representation of their opinions in both the news and political decisions. The feeling of their *Otherness* will become even stronger in the long term. Public service broadcasters are sensitive towards the opinions of people and the current political climate because they are a social communication medium. There is a need for people to become more critical towards these kinds of topic. The focus of these interviews needs to be expanded and the reporters and KBS’s willingness to cover news stories of a different and higher calibre needs to grow. This way the quality of the news will increase and create a culture that is more accepting of differences.

7.2.3. The Compassionate Professional

One of the major themes of news coverage that features ethnic minorities that KBS reporters have covered was ‘ethnic minorities under poor conditions’. This kind of

news is limited to one-time reports when an incident happened, and is less in-depth than the actual or planned news coverage. Moreover, the simplified account of the incident might easily lead to a misinterpretation of the facts as well. The reporters that had covered such news items easily remembered them and wanted to help the underprivileged foreigners whose grave conditions they had exposed. And they often said that they were ashamed on behalf of the whole South Korean community, who they felt had abandoned these migrants. Evidence shows that the reporters' emotions, which were often founded on very few actual facts, had the tendency to influence the news broadcasts. The same situation can be easily presented in either a negative or positive light depending upon the reporter's intentions.

A Filipino woman divorced from her husband, and her child entered an elementary school. But due to the child's black face, the child has been maliciously alienated from fellow classmates. Since the mother was the only provider of the family, the home was poor. So, from the bottom of my heart, I wanted to help them escape their extreme poverty. (J. Kim)

It was the year 2007. At that time, the story of the Yeo-su Immigration Detention Centre was prominent. This was an office that arrested illegal migrants before being deported from Korea. One day, a fire broke out there killing about ten and injuring many more. It was a tragic accident. A real tragedy ... I think it was a great shame on Korea. (Im)

Television news coverage links the report to strong visual images and sound effects, which have the ability to make a far more lasting and stronger impact than the same contents in a newspaper would (Campbell, 1995). This is the reason why the reporters' personal opinions can sometimes construct a whole new social reality (Berger and Luckmann, 1966). Therefore, the sympathy of KBS reporters towards ethnic minorities can be shown directly or indirectly through the news, and in this way their bias towards ethnic minorities can be reproduced.

7.3. The Routines of Communication Work

The role of the news media in the system of racial discrimination is not limited to news reports or editorials, but already begins with routines of news making (Tuchman, 1978; van Dijk, 1988). Routines in the process of news production are defined as ‘patterned, routinised, repeated practices and forms that media workers use to do their job’ (Shoemaker and Reese, 1996: 105). These routines are developed as a way to minimise the organisational risk of being involved in a libel suit and to protect individual communication workers from criticism by their peers at an organisational level (Shoemaker and Vos, 2009). Moreover, these critically influence decisions for major news items and the formula for such news reports among news makers and gatekeepers at an individual level (Hirsch, 1977). Therefore, understanding routines in the process of news production is crucial in connecting individual level and organisational level functions, as well as analysing a definitive form of news representation (Shoemaker and Vos, 2009).

7.3.1. Formula for Making Ethnic Minority News

Every KBS reporter that I interviewed has covered at least two news reports relating to ethnic minorities and had interviewed non-nationals in the past, including *Whites*. They recalled the news items that they had covered as being limited to mainly two subjects: the first being about ethnic minorities participating in traditional Korean holidays and the second being about ethnic minorities suffering from poor conditions. The first case consisted of nearly identical news items that were repeated during holidays such as *Ch’usök* (Korean Thanksgiving Day) or *Seol* (Lunar New Year’s Day). These news items are generally called ‘The Calendar News’ by Korean reporters.

Most news reports feature holiday experiences of married migrant women during traditional holidays. (K. Kim)

I have dealt several times with foreign daughters-in-law during traditional holidays. (Kong)

As known from the textual analysis chapters, ethnic minorities who appeared in those news items were mainly migrant workers who had joined in celebrating the Korean holidays or married migrant women (usually described as a ‘foreign daughter-in-law’ in the KBS news reports) who were preparing holiday meals for their family. Ethnic minorities are featured only within this context in the news and are otherwise absent. They are being objectified in this way and the news often presents their view of Korean culture as ‘positive’, ‘they are also enjoying the holidays’ and ‘they are adapting to Korean culture’. This is because KBS reporters understand that such news stories fit right into the holiday atmosphere.

In the Korean society, there are common thoughts that foreigners may experience difficulties in adapting themselves to Korean culture during traditional holidays such as *Ch’usŏk* or *Seol*. Reporters tend to focus on the positive aspect that foreigners really enjoy Korean culture. For example, in reports, it is often shown that foreign daughters-in-law go to markets and prepare food. (Choi)

There are only two cases of when we highlight migrant workers. First, we make them simple participants in traditional holidays to emphasise that they also enjoy holidays like us. Such an aspect is used in news reports related to migrant workers. In the report, they say ‘we also love *Ch’usŏk*’, or we say ‘migrant workers also enjoy the holiday’. I have those experiences. (J. Kim)

In this case, why is it that this kind of news is being reproduced every year? Most reporters explained that it is a kind of ‘routine’. Every year it is repeated over again because of this reason. Routines play no small role in that accomplishment. News organisations and news makers are faced with an overwhelming stream of events and information that must be culled and crafted into news.

I think it is just a routine. It is customary to show various groups. (Yoon)

The fact that they referred to it as a routine means that this kind of news broadcasting is deeply rooted within KBS's culture and news-making process. This is because routines economise effort in the mass news-making process (Shoemaker, 1997). As the Glasgow Media Group (1978) argues, however, routine news practices lead to bad news. According to Golding (1981), routines simplify the task of news judgement – events that are more easily accessible, 'manageable technically' or 'ready prepared for easy coverage' than others will routinely be told as news stories (1981: 75). Tuchman (1997: 188) notes that typifications are used to 'decrease the variability of events as the raw material processed by newsmen and news organisations'. Or journalists, in a similar way, use 'frames' as an efficient way to 'process large amounts of information quickly and routinely' (Gitlin, 1980: 7). Television news, in particular, has more dependency on planned issues due to the limitations of the production technology, mainly its mobility.

For instance, in *Ch'usŏk*, reporters tend to show scenes of a traditional Korean village, traditional Korean-style houses and people of Ansan (migrant workers). That is a sort of fixed frame that reporters hold. Those scenes are reported to emphasise that *Ch'usŏk* is a national holiday which all Koreans, even foreigners, enjoy. (J. Kim)

It would have been difficult to repeat this type of news every year if the audience's reaction was negative towards it or if it suffered from criticism for being unbeneficial to society. According to the journalists, the responses have mostly been positive towards such news items and the reporters themselves think that such news is funny. This illustrates that KBS reporters have internalised the dominant discourse around multicultural society and the reporters have agreed that the use of this term is limited and is generally only used during these specific occasions. The reporters' way of thinking naturally does not differ that much from the general consensus. The news that the reporters have the tendency to describe as 'funny' includes allusions to aliens who are unfamiliar with Korean culture, married migrant women who can barely cook Korean food and migrant workers who have barely mastered traditional Korean games such as *Jegi-Chagi*³⁹ and *Tuho*.⁴⁰

³⁹ *Jegi-Chagi*: The purpose of this game is to try to keep a shuttlecock in the air as long as possible by kicking it up in the air with one's feet.

Since viewers find it funny that foreigners with blue eyes or black faces also enjoy our traditional holidays, such items are often chosen as news items. And such news reports have relatively higher audience rates. Therefore, annually, reporters suggest those items, and then the editorial staffs permit them. This is the regular process. (S. Lee)

It is not funny for viewers to watch only Korean people on television during traditional holidays. The people want to see foreigners enjoying the holidays together. Then, even if we intended to interview only two Koreans, we can interview foreign children playing the traditional ‘*Tuho* game’ in order to get a sentence from them that it is interesting, to make the report colourful. (Kong)

These routine customs seem critically focused on ethnic minorities who remain in Korea and it seems that this is so because the news makers are of the opinion that Koreans should be interested in them. They are usually shown making and eating Korean dishes and playing traditional Korean games during Korean holidays. It appears that this type of news is interesting for Koreans. Reportages about *Them* who are enjoying ‘*Our* festival’ are often there for the purpose of self-satisfaction for Korean news audiences and will reinforce the *Otherness* of ethnic minorities, even though these kinds of news give ethnic minorities the opportunity to be featured in the limelight. In other words, news which shows foreigners enjoying Korean culture during the holiday season is a sort of seasonal item for the amusement of Korean audiences; I would define it as being mainly ‘holiday entertainment’.

It is a kind of routine only for our satisfaction, not for them. It appears to be based on our self-satisfaction that we pursue diversity. (K. Kim)

⁴⁰ *Tuho*: This game is similar to darts and is played by competing teams. The main difference between *Tuho* and darts is that the target is laid down upon the ground instead of set upright.

7.3.2. Limited Application of the Term Multiculturalism

What do the terms ‘multiculturalism’ and ‘cultural diversity’ mean to KBS reporters individually? How is it understood within the Korean public media productions and how is it used routinely in the news? Through conducting the interviews, it was discovered that, when describing non-nationals who had immigrated or were living in Korea, the terms ‘multicultural society’ or ‘multicultural family’, which are frequently used in the discourses in Korea, actually carry a very limited meaning. A new term should be considered since the Western counterpart does not specifically refer to a certain ethnic group, whereas the South Korean use of the term does.

I made two observations concerning the usage of the term ‘multicultural’. Firstly, the reporters considered the term ‘multicultural’ to be designated to foreigners of non-Korean origin, particularly non-*White* non-nationals and their cultures. Secondly, they perceived it as a ‘different’ or ‘other culture’ situated within the Korean culture; the term carried a ‘positive’ and ‘objective’ meaning to them. This point of view was to be expected because it could also be seen within the news items that the reporters had created.

I think that the word ‘multicultural’ is based on the premise of different nationalities or cultures of various foreigners. Other cultures, different from Korean culture ... (Yoon)

With a growing number of married migrant women, many foreigners who are not *White* people or Westerners have entered Korea. In this situation, I think the words multicultural and multicultural society are used as objective as well as positive terms by the news media. (H. Lee)

As seen in the interview content, the terminology of ‘multiculturalism’ is perceived by KBS journalists to be highly limited and reflects the results of the news textual analysis in the previous chapter. This showed that terminologies such as ‘multicultural’ and ‘cultural diversity’ are restrictively used in reference to Southeast Asian married migrant women and their families. It is also observed that the usage of the term

‘multicultural family’ was still generally limited to a family living in the countryside of which at least one member had married a female migrant from Southeast Asia such as Vietnam and Cambodia. Although its usage should have extended to include a family that includes at least one male migrant worker who had recently married a Korean woman, the term ‘multicultural family’ is still very limited in use.

Since Korean men in rural farming regions find it difficult to marry Korean women, they try to marry foreign women. Then, they form families with their children in local communities. This is the common understanding of multicultural family in Korean society. (Sun)

In this sense, the term ‘multicultural family’ is not a term focusing on ‘cultural diversity’ but on specific space, a ‘rural area’, and the ‘Korean male resident of a rural area married to a foreign women’, as ‘lower class’ and outside Korean mainstream society.

Few reporters recognise the uniqueness of this phenomenon in society, which is very different from the multicultural society formulation process that has happened in Western societies. In this case, the term ‘multicultural’ in Korean society is understood by KBS journalists as a concept which is used to lessen the serious discrimination towards migrants of specific nationalities – migrant workers or married migrant women from Southeast Asia.

The term multicultural society was introduced as migrant workers and brides from Southeast Asian countries such as Vietnam entered Korea. So, the term appears to have a concept different from that in Western societies such as Europe. In Korea, the word was introduced due to Koreans’ severe discrimination against those foreigners, aiming at relieving the discrimination. (Kong)

However, as known from the textual analysis, a very important fact that cannot be overlooked is that the term ‘multicultural’ is being used not to explain a phenomenon in Korean society objectively, but to be a means of dividing the society in two: *Us* and *Them*, and is not an indication of events currently happening in South Korea. That is, the terminology of ‘multicultural’ or ‘cultural diversity’ is used to define *Others* who

flow into Korean society and simplify a series of social phenomena occurring while they are living in society from the news makers' perspective. In this sense, as Wasburn (2002) argues, ethnocentrism, as one of the news-making decisions, uses arbitrary definitions of *Others* or other cultures as the abnormal, assuming that *Our* culture is most important, most valued and most powerful. As Hall (1997a) has phrased it, this means that the majority of society is aware that there are *Others* with 'differences' present in the society and uses this knowledge as a means of strengthening a self-image.

7.3.3. Standardisation of News Representation of Ethnic Minorities

I looked at KBS reporters as being viewers of news relating to a multicultural society or ethnic minorities that had been made by KBS and not as producers. Overall it is argued that two polar opinions within the group existed: a negative attitude which limited the production of this type of news content and a positive attitude, especially compared to the general consensus in the past. Concerning the reporters that harboured negative opinions, it must be noted that the news that they presented about migrants was limited in both amount and scope. These limited frames have a negative effect upon the objectivity of the news because they allow the group to be easily represented in a certain way to suit an agenda and create a cultural bias toward them in this way. The specific approaches towards ethnic minorities that the reporters were recognised to have the most could be summarised as 'sympathetic views', 'warm hearted for them', 'conflict between us and them'. The two most featured types of news stories were those that were focused on the poor conditions of migrant wives and were presented with much sympathy and stories that focused on the social conflicts with migrant workers. I exposed the fact that news items that presented a sympathetic point of view were apt to have no follow-up items, due to this they were never discussed when a similar incident or event happened again. It was also pointed out that this type of story sends out the message 'it is each individual's duty to help those people with their problems but not the societies as a whole', rather than trying to instigate a discussion in order to try to provide an institutional-level strategy to solve the problem.

Generally, there appears to be two major themes in news about ethnic minorities or the multicultural society: conflict and sympathy ... Conflict becomes news when ethnic minorities suffer severe racial discrimination or labour exploitation while sympathy becomes news when foreigners are chased by the Immigration Office or are in miserable conditions due to lack of social security. However, such news reports do not suggest solutions of providing more benefits or systematically changing things. The media only strategically and formally says that migrants are so poor that Koreans should support them personally, instead of arguing that we should institutionally change related public policies. That is all of the news reports about ethnic minorities. (Yoon)

Most television programmes and news reports are warm-hearted towards them. For example, the KBS TV programme *Love in Asia*⁴¹ showed such warm stories of poor people so that we help them. And another famous TV programme *Asia! Asia!*⁴² is a case in point. Our news reports also have mainly focused on problems of migrant workers or mixed bloods suffering discrimination in school. So far, those subjects have been the main view point on them, I think. (S. Lee)

On the other hand, opinions have come forward that the scope of the news relating to migrants has become broader and there is a stronger emphasis on positive news. With the increase of the percentage of ethnic minorities in society, reporters have become more observant of them and Korean society has become more accepting of foreigners, and because of this the general view of the future has become more positive as well. Some interviewees thought that KBS has started broadcasting more quality news about discrimination and about foreigners' real lives and their human rights during the last two or three years.

⁴¹ A documentary-style television programme which began on 5th November 2005 on KBS. It is aired once a week and has a 55-minute running time for one episode. The majority of them are based on the stories of multicultural families who stay in Korea, because of free speech they can talk about the difficulties that they have experienced during their stay in Korea. Also they often give married migrant women the chance to travel back to their motherland with their Korean family.

⁴² A social campaign programme which was aired on MBC from 15th February 2003 until 5th November 2007. It aired during a section of a programme called 'The Exclamation Mark' and mainly featured interviews with migrant workers staying in Korea; they often invited their family from their motherland for a week in Korea.

I think there would be no notable gap between Korean society's level and Korean media's level. Ethnic minority groups are starting to speak with their own voices, as citizens rather than just poor people. There are a lot of ethnic minorities now. Korean society has begun to accept them as its regular members. This is why the upcoming stage is expected. (Kong)

News subjects have varied in terms of their areas or contents ... Recently there has been relatively various and quality reports upon them, dealing with their human rights or discrimination against them. (H. Lee)

It will take time to reconcile the desirable direction and the current situation. Anyway, reports appear to be headed in a positive direction where Koreans and migrants share their ideas and understand each other. Things are changing gradually. (K. Kim)

As can be found in the interview content, however, the positive direction that KBS journalists feel is somewhat relative compared to the past, and mainly comes from an individual perspective, therefore it is hard to say if it is an actual fact. Due to the positive direction of representation, what they say has been discussed in limited frames, as discussed in the next section.

Limited frames in representing Others

As has been previously mentioned, reporters have noticed themselves the limited amount of time and effort that they spend and the limited amount of coverage that news items produced concerning ethnic minorities receive on KBS. If they are aware of this situation then why do they continue to limit their reports in size and depth? The reasons for this are threefold. Firstly, the limited coverage may be the result of a lack of data. South Korea's first real migrant wave took place only around 2000. The fact that news stories containing nearly identical subjects and contents are being repeated might be because of the lack of news items and the fact that they are forced to cover social phenomena that they have never experienced before.

It is only recently that the concept of multicultural society has been introduced. For example, in comparison with France, where many Arabs live, Korea is just at an early stage so that there are no various sources. If I try to show a successful foreign migrant, it is hard to find an appropriate case. There are insufficient sources. (J. Kim)

Secondly, the cause might be the working routines and priorities. KBS's reporters are used to focusing on daily events and incidents of a fleeting nature and have developed a shrunken timeframe because of this. Often they have to cover the incident the very same day that it occurs. These working conditions do not allow the reporters the time that is necessary for a long-term, in-depth investigation. The breakneck speed at which they have to work contains the danger of superficial and possibly distorted coverage.

If an accident or event takes place, reporters start to concentrate on that. So, since they have to take care of current accidents or events, they have no real room for designing other reports, actually. (Ji)

Reporters are people who have no choice but to find new items every day. But it is difficult for them to always produce new, fresh ideas. In the process, customarily, officials at the head office sometimes give items related to the issues to reporters, being reminded of their previous items that are not new but familiar because they had been dealt with before. (Im)

Finally, there is sometimes the opinion that this is because KBS reporters lack a personal interest in these cases. KBS reporters often belong to the upper class of Korean society in terms of influence and often they might not have real interest in the more vulnerable individuals in society, such as migrant workers, migrant wives and mixed-heritage people. The distance of their realities to those of migrants sometimes makes empathy less likely and stereotypes are common repertoires they draw from.

It is not a matter of structure but of the personal limit of each reporter because they are also members of Korean society. They cannot be free from the viewpoint most Koreans have. KBS news reporters already have socially vested rights. Therefore, it is easy for them to ignore minorities in

society and belittle their problems. Those reporters tend to be recognised and receive wages higher than the average wage. So, if they do not intentionally pay attention to multicultural issues and they have no personal experience or interest, it is easy for them to become far from the issues. No interest, no sight. (Yoon)

The social circumstances that translate into a demand for this particular type of news encourage its production. In those cases when KBS produced news with a different point of view they were pressured to return back to the previous situation in order to appease the public which in general has a negative opinion about migrants. This is the reason why the news stories concerning foreigners that are produced are generally in line with the public opinion.

7.4. The Organisational Level of News Production

It is essential in studying the news-making process to focus on the organisational level (Shoemaker and Vos, 2009). This is because, ‘although individuals and routines generally determine what gets past the gate and how it is presented, the organisations hire the gatekeepers and make the rules’ (Shoemaker and Vos, 2009: 62). Chomsky’s (2006) research of mid-20th century memos between the publisher and editor of *The New York Times* shows that the organisation explicitly intervened with news content on a routine basis. Donohew (1967) also found a high correlation between the publisher’s attitude and newspaper content and concluded that ‘publisher attitude appeared to hold up as the greatest single “force” operating within the news channel’ (1967: 67). Regarding the organisational level, this research will try to determine the attitude that KBS as PSB maintains in the representations of non-nationals and ethnic minorities. This research is also going to explore the influence of the upper management and the government upon the news content about ethnic minorities. Their influence can be either explicit or implicit or even hidden from the rest of the employees. The influence of the desk and guidelines within the group will be examined as well.

7.4.1. The High Value of the White Interviewee

The majority of the KBS reporters that I interviewed stated that news relating to foreigners – this specifically means news items covering *White* people to the KBS reporters in this chapter – has a high value because of its uniqueness. High news value can be interpreted in more than one way. First of all, it can be interpreted as being of high value because *White* non-nationals have a ‘special’ status in South Korea. As I stated earlier, news about ethnic minorities does exist in Korea but they are presented in it as being ‘not ordinary’, *Other*, and about ‘someone who is different from Koreans’.

I think *White* non-nationals apparently have higher news values than Koreans to some extent. I believe most reporters may think so. If a reporter is willing to interview *Whites* and is capable of it, he appears to be evaluated highly. (Ji)

Secondly, they can be used as a means of putting South Korea in the spotlight. In this case, interviews with non-nationals are used in such a way as to reinforce the ideas that are being presented in the main article, which deals with South Korea rather than focusing on the non-nationals themselves as human individuals with a multi-level existence. In this case they just figure as a ‘funny’, ‘novelty’ or ‘special’ elements. This issue will be explored in more detail later.

If I interviewed foreigners in the street, for example, the interview can give editorial staff the image that the reporter made efforts for the report. It was effective especially when the interview was unusual or made Korea look better. (S. Lee)

It is thought that the amount of improvement in the value of the news is judged by looking at the audience’s reaction. How desk and chief executives view news items relating to foreigners has a tremendous impact upon the reporters’ decisions. It is evident that the show desk’s decisions and atmosphere within the group play a central role when the value of the news is judged and not the reporter’s personal interest in ethnic minorities. During the course of the interview it became evident that recently this specific type of news has become an important part of the station’s main strategy. The

reason for this is that KBS has become aware of the fact that social and political interest in such news items is increasing and that the public has developed an interest in them, which is something that did not exist in the past. This is clearly illustrated by the fact that foreigners are being introduced by their previous foreign name when featured in the news even though they have already been naturalised and have adopted a Korean name.

I once interviewed a person who was naturalised as a Korean citizen. So, he has a Korean name so that I wrote his name in Korean. But, from the view point of the desk, it was impossible for Korean readers to know whether or not he is a pure Korean or a naturalised Korean citizen. Therefore, my boss ordered me to write his foreign name. (Choi)

Around the time I reported the news story, there was a growing concern that Korean society should sympathise with migrant women who married Korean men because their children will play leading roles in Korea due to its suffering from a low birth rate. Based on this sympathy, most news items related to the issue were reported on *News 9*. Items about foreign brides usually came out in *News 9*, indeed. The chief executives appeared to understand the importance of those items as new issues. (Sun)

7.4.2. The Guidelines for News on Ethnic Minorities

As I have already mentioned previously, within the KBS group there exists a specific approach towards reporting on foreigners and especially ethnic minorities which is embedded within KBS's system and culture. In connection with this issue, I wish to investigate deeper the emotional motivations that are hidden in the institutional dimension. This is done by first asking the reporters about whether or not KBS has any specific guidelines or formal regulations about news reports dealing with multicultural issues or ethnic minorities. Ten reporters in total replied that they were uncertain about whether or not such guidelines existed. This lack of knowledge regarding this is to be expected given their lack of any instructions or education about such rules. Overall they thought that such regulations didn't exist. It can be concluded that the point of view

KBS presents when broadcasting news about ethnic minorities depends mostly upon the reporters' personal opinions.

No official guidelines for news reports exist reportedly. No special directions ... (J. Kim)

I do not know where it is. I guess it is quite possible that there are words of non-discrimination against foreigners in the code of ethics or the code of news report. However, I cannot remember. I have no recognition of it. I believe detailed guidelines depend on each reporter's view point. (Kong)

The Korean Broadcasting Act, which should be upheld by all broadcasting stations, includes features in a similar passage (Act No. 8568. 27th July 2007). The passage deals with non-nationals and minority groups specifically, which is mentioned in one sentence:

<Chapter I – Article 6. (Impartiality and Public Interest Nature of Broadcasting)>:

...

(2) A broadcast shall not be discriminatory in programming on account of gender, age, occupation, religion, belief, class, region, race, etc.: Provided that this shall not apply in case where a broadcasting business operator engaged in a specialised programming with respect to a missionary work of religion within the limit of a relevant broadcast field.

...

(5) A broadcast shall strive to faithfully reflect the interests of the groups or classes that are relatively small in number or at a disadvantage in realisation of the pursuit of their interests.

This regulation, however, is only understood from an ideal perspective; in reality there have not been any actual discussions on how to apply this in a practical way. As a result, KBS journalists are not aware of the existence of such a regulation at all. Even if they acknowledge it, it is very difficult to maintain consistent reporting attitudes in a situation with an absence of concrete and practical schemes.

7.4.3. Limitation to Reporting Issues about Ethnic Minorities

The problems caused by the increase in interest in such issues and the absence of a policy can be rephrased as the problem of KBS reporters struggling with an internal conflict. They are feeling torn apart between two different perceptions, which are listed below.

Only one time: Curiosity broadcasts

The majority of KBS reporters pointed out that news concerning a multicultural society or ethnic minorities is still being aired as one-time content and this is a critical point. This tendency is the result of the fact that KBS does not have professional reporters that are stationed in other countries and it does not employ any foreigners or people that are members of ethnic minorities. The majority of their time and effort is spent on daily updates on the state of politics, economy and culture. In this situation, news relating to ethnic minorities is limited to the holiday seasons when there is less political news to report and more incidents involving them tend to occur. It is the custom in Korea to degrade ethnic minorities for personal amusement and give people the impression that they occupy a special position since they usually appear during special events.

Every reporter is in the same situation. They are interested in foreigners only when they are faced with special events. Reporters just explain foreigners' lives during Korean traditional festival season, showing that they make Korean rice cakes, pan-fried *Jeons* (Korean style pizza), and so on. And if an incident breaks out, it just comes out in reports. Those reports end up in single shots, regrettably. (Ji)

KBS does not recognise migrants as members of society

The majority of the employees in KBS did not perceive ethnic minorities residing in South-Korea as a significant social issue. Less attention is spent on migrants at the headquarters of KBS in Seoul because they have less chance of contact with ethnic

minorities than the local departments do. This may be seen as a form of discrimination and their existence is a serious problem; eliminating them from the media is a form of ignoring the issue. KBS reporters think in the same way about foreigners as most Koreans do and this influences the news content.

The deep-rooted discrimination against other Asian people not only exists in KBS but also prevails in Korea. The prejudice seems to influence news values to some extent. (K. Kim)

I believe if we recognise ethnic minorities as official members in Korean society, we should report them sympathetically and stipulate how we report on the multicultural society, migrant workers or Korean citizens by naturalisation. So far, however, there has not been such an atmosphere when they are sincerely accepted as official members in Korean society. (Yoon)

In the end the two elements mentioned before are an example of circular reasoning. KBS reporters are not immune to the prejudice and indifference towards ethnic minorities that Koreans in general have. This in turn leads them to produce news items that only cover incidents that have just transpired. People that watch the news in turn internalise the image of foreigners that is presented thus reinforcing it and making sure that it continues existing within Korean society.

7.5. The Social Institution Level

Although it is true that news making is processed through communication organisations and its news makers, from a social structural perspective, communication organisations belong to a social system alongside other social institutions. Therefore, social institutions in a social structure directly or indirectly influence each other (Shoemaker and Vos, 2009). Shoemaker and Vos (2009) maintain that social institutions that influence the news-making process include ‘markets’, ‘audiences’, ‘advertisers’, ‘financial markets’, ‘government’, ‘interest groups’ and ‘other media’ among others.

Here ‘governmental politics’ and ‘audiences’ will be analysed, as these were selected as the most critical factors among KBS journalists.

7.5.1. Governmental Politics in the Representation of Ethnic Minorities

Although markets are often seen as the most appropriate means of regulating the mass media, the government nevertheless influences gatekeeping in the news-making process (Shoemaker and Vos, 2009). Political power, media intervention and numerous historical events produce consequences which have been revealed in a number of media and communication studies and remain one of the most revealing research topics today. Despite the numerous references to this topic, the most simple and salient political rhetoric shows how political power attempts to control the mass media by managing the flow of information as ‘control of information is central to power’ (River, 1965: 129). It is discussed in the previous theoretical review chapter that Korean PSB has conformed and adapted to changes and flows of power, and is therefore not free from governmental power. What importance do issues relating to multicultural society or ethnic minorities carry within the social institutional dimension of KBS? It is true that if the issue is prone to being influenced by the government or the chief of the group then policy and politics will be capable of easily swaying it. This kind of influence is reflected more in the informal culture of the company than in the formal processes and documents. Thus, the personal experiences and emotions of the reporter carry more weight than the data when it comes down to the final shape and content of the news. This was acknowledged by the majority of the interviewees; they acknowledged that they had been influenced by the governmental changes. The remainder of the interviewees downplayed the impact of any political pressures.

Under the power of government

There were not many reporters who responded to the questions about the influence of the government on ethnic minorities or multiculturalism related news. Many reporters answered that, whilst these types of news items are influenced, the influence is minor and indirect. The main reason the reporters have been granted so much influence is because the general consensus seems to be that issues concerning migrant workers,

migrant wives and racially mixed people are not politically sensitive issues at the moment. Currently both the progressive and conservative parties are under the impression that the number of ethnic minorities in Korea is still so small that their presence is of little importance. They do recognise that migrants live miserably and need some help. The fact is that news items covering issues concerning them are treated as soft news and are often devoid of political issues, which is in tune with the political climate in South Korea. Occasionally this particular brand of news has been known to be used to pacify politically sensitive agendas.

Those causes can have a little influence over such reports. For example, I made a report about the issue last year but it has not been aired since the foundation of the Lee administration. There was influence. (Choi)

There is a possible influence even if it is just little. It seems to be a little influence. It is possible. (J. Kim)

Government policy, however, can steer the news intentionally or unintentionally in a certain direction. Government and government instances depend upon the information supplied to them by news reporters – even if the information is limited in scope and amount – for their decision making. Their dependence in turn reinforces and enlarges unjustly the influence of the news presented. Assuming that KBS's reporters have similar customs to reporters in Korea in general, when the government presents reports they will immediately submit it for publication without first checking the facts stated. This is due to their lack of time and because there is severe competition within this sector. In the case of migrants in Korea, the theme of and the point of view presented in the article can be altered by reporting the data that the government has released. This cannot be done if in-depth analysis is to be done by the media company itself. The influence of the government upon the content of the news was acknowledged by several of the reporters interviewed.

When under the Roh administration (a progressive party), the government tried to emphasise the matters of human rights or weak minorities so that a social consensus also appeared. A sort of influence on news or broadcasting comes out according to the government. The current

administration focuses on regulation, reform and advancement, by which news reports are affected. (S. Lee)

The dynamics are changed according to the government, I believe. The government now is conservative and right wing. The right wing considers nationality important. Those news reports may be under severe pressure from the rightwing government with no benefits. In this sense, given that KBS is also an organisation vulnerable to political influence, its news reports will be affected indirectly. (Yoon)

Not even a politically essential issue

On the other hand, some of the reporters interviewed stated that neither the government nor management possesses the power to change the representation of ethnic minorities in the news. However, this does not mean that KBS is immune to outside influences or that it has a strict policy regarding this type of issue. The majority of the reporters interviewed argued that the shaping of the final form in which the news is presented is not influenced by changes in politics because news regarding a multicultural society or ethnic minorities is not one of the big social issues at the moment. Neither is it a sensitive issue for the progressive or conservative parties. Meanwhile, it must be noted that KBS reporters not stationed in Seoul had been influenced less by the political climate than their colleagues working in Seoul. I discovered two reasons as to why KBS reporters not working in Seoul feel less political pressure: (i) they rarely meet representatives of political parties or the managers in person, whilst their colleagues in Seoul often do have to deal with them in person; and (ii) the news items that are most sensitive towards political and economical pressures and any kind of outside influence are produced in the headquarters stationed in Seoul. The reason for this is because all the major institutions are located in Seoul. Local departments usually deal with lighter topics and news stories relating to local events.

Never ... The issues are not politically crucial in Korea so only a few people try to talk about the matters. So the issues would not be affected by those governmental factors. (Kong)

There would not be considerable repercussions in this field in comparison with others. Taken as a whole, the viewpoint on social minorities would not be affected significantly because the themes are not politically sensitive. (H. Lee)

Although the issues related to ethnic minorities can be considered as being less of a politically sensitive and critical issue in Korean society, as examined in previous content analysis, news related to ethnic minorities and especially migrant workers and non-national criminals has clearly shown differences in how news is reported. Therefore, news items about ethnic minorities are not free from direct political pressure, and also there is the possibility of unknowingly internalising self-censorship among journalists at an individual or desk level.

7.5.2. Focusing on the Audience

As audiences are sold to advertisers, their size and composition is very significant for media organisations (Shoemaker and Vos, 2009). In the case of KBS, to be exact the case of KBS One, although advertising does not present a challenge, producers are still extremely keen to sustain their large audience. This is based on the very competitive realities of the Korean media market. In this context, even PSB producers and programme makers are under pressure in terms of the audience ratings. KBS news is ultimately meant to target the domestic audience. The broadcasts that are aired about ethnic minorities and multicultural issues are the result of the work of reporters and editors that had the audience's reaction and interest in mind.

Negative responses – news reports about migrant workers

Viewers have the tendency to voice their dissatisfaction directly about news reports concerning ethnic minorities. They voice their opinions by sending emails, by leaving a comment on the KBS official website or by calling in. There is a high level of audience involvement. The majority of the people that have voiced complaints are often stuck in the same situation as social minorities and belong to the lower income class or are blue collar workers as the interviewed reporters presume. Their reactions are often the result

of their fear that migrants will eventually take jobs away from Koreans. They also believe that the media has a secret agenda whose intent is to aid migrant workers in doing so. In general, it is found that there is a feeling of *Us*, the licence-fee payers, the public, the pure-blood sharers and the upper classes, versus the *Others*, those who do not pay the licence fees, from indigent countries, the plunderers and those who are not part of society.

I think some people may say ‘Why does KBS side with foreigners even though it receives licence fees from Koreans? Do you know how much they are troublesome and bothersome in Korea?’ In fact, I have received emails saying so. (H. Lee)

When news reports about migrant workers are aired, some articles are posted on the official website. Instead of positive viewers, negative viewers actively post things, you know. They hold negative view points against migrant workers, arguing that those migrants only make trouble in Korea. (K. Kim)

If a report showing the situation of migrant workers is reported, quick-tempered people make phone calls to KBS. They emphasise the number of unemployed people, saying that they have taken all the jobs of Koreans and asks why KBS sides with them despite its status as a public service broadcaster. They demand that KBS should not give such news reports. (Yoon)

Sympathetic responses – news reports about multicultural families

On the other hand, there is a more positive attitude towards news about married migrant women, multicultural families and children of mixed heritage. This change has taken place only recently and possibly took place as a response to various conflicts that are present in Korean society. The most important of these is the social gap caused by low birth rates as well as the gap caused by the fact that the majority of younger people are moving out of the countryside and the marital difficulties caused by the problems of the males living in the countryside. Although it cannot be denied that some of the news being produced is prone to pitying them, reporters have noticed an increase in news

stories over the past few years that have abandoned this point of view in favour of a different one. The new approach consists of providing moving stories with a high production value. The image that they are trying to paint is of people who are struggling to help their families and to assimilate as best as they can. This is because in recent years people's perception of ethnic minorities has started to change. This does not mean that the quality of news has improved; neither does this mean that the news has become more impartial. This topic has been discussed in more detail in Chapter Six.

I think the attitudes from audiences were quite positive. Personally, I once received a good evaluation (award). I think so. (Im)

Given that the executives have constantly allowed me to report things related to multi-ethnic matters and that they strategically put those reports in the right position, they appear to be interested in the issue and think the audiences are also interested in it. (Sun)

7.6. The Social System Level

Lastly, the effects of social system as a structure in the newsmaking process will be discussed. Aday et al. (2005) found that the Iraq War as a fact was represented entirely differently between two media groups – Al Jazeera and CNN – which were based in totally different societies, the Middle East and America (cited in Shoemaker and Vos, 2009). Evidently, this shows that television news can be constructed and restricted by social structures and systems, ideologies and cultures, and the findings reflect this. In other words, as Head (1985) argues, it is thought that 'a country's broadcasting system mirrors national character, expressing a particular political philosophy and cultural identity' (1985: 2). Therefore, studying social structures, ideologies and cultures at the last stage is essential in the process of understanding the very core of a subject.

7.6.1. The Dualism between Nationalism and White-centrism

Lastly, I asked interviewees which ideology influences these specific tendencies of news the most in terms of production. Roughly half the respondents answered that no such ideology exists but the other half replied without any hesitation: ‘nationalism’ or ‘ethnic supremacy’. It would be more correct to use the term ‘the myth of pure blood’ here rather than ‘ethnic supremacy’. Ethnic ideology not only results in a specific way of news presentation but it also affects the audience who watch it. The term nationalistic ideology refers here specifically towards a hatred and discrimination of countries and races that are different from *Us*. The idea of ‘the pure-blood myth’ is closely related with the Korean foundation myth, which is an important contributor towards nationalistic pride despite the lack of basis for it. This often results in the belief that the nation must be composed of only one ethnic group. This leads to discrimination directed towards other ethnic groups, especially towards non-*White* people. It should come as no surprise that Koreans are opposed towards marriage with people of other ethnic groups and their resulting offspring.

Well, it is the pure-blood ideology. Most Koreans think that foreigners who live in Korea should adapt themselves to Korean culture, instead of us adapting to them. This is a problem ... For example, in the case of the news reports on foreign daughters-in-law, the reports focus not on their motherlands’ cultures, but instead on how they have adapted themselves to Korean culture. (Choi)

A sense of superiority to non-*White* races ... Of course, we Koreans are also non-*White* people but we feel superiority to most other non-*Whites*. It’s true, there is economical or social prejudice based on migrant people’s state, but Koreans seem to look at them as wretched people. (J. Kim)

Korean people have strongly held nationalism for a long time. (Kong)

However, the nationalism that appears here is somewhat different from the ethno-centrism which fosters exclusive attitudes towards other ethnic groups, and only places

emphasis on the Korean race. That is because there co-exists *White*-centrism as an object of admiration of Koreans towards Caucasians, as experienced in the process of Korean modernisation. As shown in the earlier chapters, Koreans in general are positively inclined towards *White* people and look down upon non-*White* people. The reporters themselves have recognised the existence of their own stereotypical views about different races and this duality also exists within Korean society. However, they refuse to change their opinions or to accept the idea that news making might be in need of overcoming this point of view.

Among Koreans, there are obviously dual viewpoints of being generous to *White* people and looking down on non-*White* people. I am sure it exists.
(Im)

As you can see in the TV programme *Chitchat of Beautiful Ladies*,⁴³ *White* women are much more focused on than *Black* or Asian ones, who are just participating for the beauty of form. The same is true of ordinary Koreans who think *White* people are superior. I have heard that it is same in foreign language institutes. If an English teacher is a *Black* person, students' parents complain about the teacher, I have heard. There is obviously prejudice against non-*White* people while *White* people win Koreans' confidence. (Sun)

This dual attitude of Koreans towards *White* and non-*White* people, as explained in Chapter Three, can be a compound result of the internalisation of the racial hierarchy of *White – Yellow – Black*, which was acquired from Japanese and Western missionaries during the modernisation process, and admiration towards *White* Americans during the Korean War in the aftermath of independence from Japanese colonisation. KBS journalists perceive this *White*-centrism as a prevalent ideology in society and they are also not free from this ideology as we look into the interview results. Therefore, it can be said that *White*-centric points of view at the social system level, once again, influence the individual level. In other words, the five-stage interview analysis adopted

⁴³ This programme focuses on how foreign women in particular view Korean culture and Korean men. The guest panel comprises sixteen women from various countries who have lived in and experienced Korea. Their stories of Korea and Koreans are unveiled through witty questions and discussions.

– individual, routines, organisation, social institution and social system – is rotationally connected and has close interconnections.

7.7. Conclusion

The aim of this chapter was the examination of the professional practice and opinions of media practitioners reporting on foreigners, including ethnic minorities. I managed to pinpoint what these elements are by interviewing editors and reporters as news makers and gatekeepers. As a result of five different levels of involvement came forward the individual, routines, organisational, social institution and social system levels. I was able to draw five main conclusions in the analysis of the interviews. These are listed below.

The first conclusion that I drew was that most KBS reporters had a vaguely positive perception of ‘multiculturalism’. The first time that this term began being used positively was when the term was used to describe a family consisting of a Korean male who had married a woman of foreign origin (frequently from one of the Southeast Asian countries). Such a family is referred to as a ‘multicultural family’. When the media first started using this term, they often emphasised that such families were living in poverty and that they possessed a lower level of education. The majority of reporters believed that a ‘multicultural society’ was being formed due to an increasing number of such families. Such topics were considered to be a source of entertainment because their culture differs from ‘ours’. Some reporters explained that the last part was beneficial for society. In terms of positive perspective, it is generally evaluated that most KBS reporters have humanistic and empathetic attitudes towards migrant workers and ethnic minorities. On the other hand, however, it must be noted that migrant workers, who constitute more than half of all migrants in South Korea, are generally not viewed as being members of the ‘multicultural society’. These are two sides of the same coin represented in the hegemonic discourses associated with ‘multicultural society’ in South Korea. This illustrates that the meaning of the term ‘multicultural’ has a rather constricted use. If we look back at the discussions about multicultural families and inter-cultural marriage that have taken place between the media and the

government since 2005 they show that, whereas migrant workers have been consistently excluded from all discussion, inter-cultural marriages have been accepted as a part of Korean society. Even though this discussion concerns a complex and diverse set of opinions that are intertwined in complex ways, it can be deduced that it is at odds with the male-centred Korean society.

Secondly, KBS reporters noted that news reports relating to ethnic minorities are usually produced routinely, using a set of rules that have become part of KBS culture. This is especially true for news stories that focus on migrants who are participating in the celebrations for national holidays and news items about the poor living conditions of ethnic minorities. These types of story are reproduced every year at the same times. It was also found that there are differences in the content of news reports about *White* and non-*White* people. When they are featured in the news, they are often objectified in order to bring forward a different subject (cultural issues vs. difficulty of living in South Korea). Interviews are conducted in different languages (Korean versus English), and different types of question (open versus closed) are posed in order to receive different kinds of answer. These customs are an unfortunate integral part of KBS because they pose restraints upon the reporters. Consequently, the resulting news items have remained virtually unchanged over the years; the same can be said of the ethnic views of Korean society.

Thirdly, within the KBS group no specific guidelines exist concerning broadcasts that feature ethnic minorities, nor are there any demands from the editors for them. It can be certain that such news does possess a high news value because KBS could have made the choice to air different news items instead of choosing ones that focus on this subject. Ethnic minorities are still subject to ridicule by Korean society. News items about them are still being used for strategic purposes; they are often far from impartial. There is also the question of whether or not the content of news about ethnic minorities is influenced or altered by the political power or administrators. Six out of ten reporters that were interviewed insisted that those in high positions had no interest in ethnic minorities and had therefore no policy to influence the contents of news concerning them. They claimed that they used their influence to limit the amount and length of news items concerning these topics. The reporters who claimed there was no control

from their superiors in the way they cover these stories believed the way the coverage was shaped reflected public opinion.

The fourth observation was that reporters generally wanted to improve the content of news items being aired about ethnic minorities. That is to say, they wanted to place them in a more positive light (but still within hierarchical discourses and nationalist hegemony). The first thing they wanted to do was to cease making broadcasts that made fun of foreigners. Secondly, they felt that it was necessary to challenge KBS's refusal to acknowledge ethnic minorities as being part of society. They agree in principle that ethnic minorities in Korea should be given more attention and treated with more dignity. It was through these proposed changes that they wanted to change Korea's discriminatory view towards these groups of people. As a public broadcaster, KBS enjoys many benefits, such as access to a network system and being relatively independent from viewer ratings or monetary concerns. They also have an ethnic obligation as a public broadcaster to support diversity. All of this combined can aid them in their coverage of a multi-ethnic and multicultural society, only if they use these advantages effectively.

Lastly, KBS reporters recognise that the audience's reactions can be divided in two, based upon their view of news about ethnic minorities. News about migrant workers usually gets negative responses, whereas news about wives who have emigrated in order to join their husbands in Korea can usually count upon positive reactions. The cause of these widely different emotions is the difference in the topics covered and the different approaches used for the different groups. A major influence upon those reactions is an overwhelming feeling of nationalism, especially due to the fear of losing one's job to migrant workers. Whereas the feeling towards migrant workers is rather uniform throughout all layers of society, no real uniform view exists towards married migrant women. The audience is aware of their poor living conditions and their need to support their parents-in-law and family. They have a higher number of children at a time when the birth rate is at an all-time low, but they are not accepted as members of society, the *Us*, because Koreans strongly believe in the superiority of their fellow countrymen.

Chapter Eight

Conclusions

This is not a fairy tale, nor is it at an end.

(Appadurai, 2006: 136)

8.1. Introduction

This study has explored the representation of ethnic minorities in Korean PSB news and the role of the public media in (re)constructing nationalism, ethno-centrism and racially stratified social order. While there is no doubt that KBS is central to the evolution of PSB, my claim is that issues of cultural diversity and social inclusion go to the heart of contemporary public media practices around the world, especially in developed countries. More specifically, this thesis has examined television news discourse towards ethnic minorities to understand the relationship between media power and ethnic minorities. This is an important focus as most people understand their world through discourses that media represented (van Dijk, 1988). Within this focus, PSB presents core elements of the study as it represents a medium that has a clear commitment to represent all elements of a society, in a fair and an impartial manner. In the age of globalisation and multi-channel television, in a situation where most societies are becoming multi-ethnic and multicultural, PSB's social role and responsibility to represent diversity is greater than ever. Therefore, my empirical study has examined how Korean PSB represents non-nationals in a society that has rapidly transformed into a multi-ethnic one.

Using quantitative and qualitative textual analysis and semi-structured interviews, I tried to uncover the complex apparatus of minorities' representation, the ideological framework of these representations and the relevance of the decision-making process when these representations are produced. Interviews with ten KBS journalists revealed

the persistence of racial and nationalist stereotypes among individual producers which inform the process of production and the representations themselves. Institutional practices and socio-political hegemonic ideologies clearly have an impact on the way minorities are represented (or not represented) in the media.

In the following sections I will summarise my findings, discuss the implications of this study and make recommendations for further research and policy.

8.2. Key Findings

This study has three key findings. Firstly, PSB news coverage of ethnic minorities and migrants is marginal as such stories are judged as marginal in their news value by their producers. Secondly, the discourse and iconography in news stories on migrants and minorities reaffirms these groups' *Otherness* vis-à-vis the mainstream society. What textual analysis shows is that when relevant stories are covered they are framed very narrowly within a set of themes mostly associated with crime, pity and the affirmation of the national culture's superiority. Ethnic minorities and migrants' representations are most often limited, distorted and highly stereotypical. Lastly, the representations are the outcome of news makers' personal viewpoints, which more often than not reaffirm hegemonic nationalist ideologies and racialised stratification of 'newsworthy' subjects.

8.2.1. Multi-ethnic, Mono-cultural Society

One of the critical questions of this research project is how cultural diversity and impartiality, which PSB seeks to achieve, should be applied in a multi-ethnic society. This is important because PSB is now in the situation of coping with the conflicts between the two pervading values of cultural pluralism and national identity as Korean society changes rapidly as a result of globalisation. As can be seen in Chapter Two, the concept of the public is contextual and dependent on the apparatus of hegemonic power. In Korea, nationalism has long presented a core ideological frame in the construction of national identities. Thus, the production and reproduction of new minorities' and recent

migrants' symbolic and economic marginalisation fits within a longstanding discourse of national superiority. However, PSB, as a formal system of representation of the nation, is facing a contradictory reality. On the one hand, the reproduction of minorities' *Otherness* builds and reinforces the dominant and celebrated nationalist ideology. On the other hand, the mandate of the national broadcaster for fairness and impartiality poses challenges to the broadcaster when it merely reproduces minorities' symbolic marginalisation.

As this research has shown, Korean PSB newscasts undoubtedly (re)produce nationalism as a ruling ideology and as a familiar theme in the broadcaster's role in reinforcing national identity. Although there is far less direct interference from the government due to political democratisation in the 1990s, the production of national and governmental ideologies is still not only reproduced in the routinisation of the ways news items are chosen and produced but is also reflected in the internalised nationalistic attitudes and racial stereotypes of the reporting journalists. In this process, *Others*, such as ethnic minorities, are identified as less important in terms of news value and, even if they appear in the news, their viewpoints and opinions are excluded and framed through the words of Korean nationals. Depriving ethnic minorities' of the right to have a prominent voice in the stories that concern them only furthers their position as strangers and *Others* in the national imagination. The tendency of news to position migrants as inferior *Others* within the national context (e.g. when they 'eagerly' appear as desiring to take part in Korean traditional celebrations) narrows even further the visibility of minorities' agency. Such representations not only silence minorities but also reinforce ideologies of Korean national superiority. *Others* are mobilised as a tool for reconfirming and reinforcing the national identity and are subject to limited and incidental roles in the process.

One more poignant aspect is that the discourse produced by Korean PSB does not overtly emphasise national identity but it causes an optical illusion of reflecting cultural diversity by actively producing 'pseudo-diversity'. One of the most important cultural phenomena in Korea, which can be illustrated by examining news relating to ethnic minorities, is the news items produced during the holiday seasons. In these items, which the Korean media regularly reproduce, concepts of diversity and

multiculturalism are stripped of the complexity associated with recognition and participation of minorities in the public sphere. Largely through the apolitical use of these concepts in the media these concepts are now widely used in Korea. However, what these concepts refer to is merely differences in 'skin colour' and difference in origin. Yet, it is in the case of the celebratory use of such concepts that we most visibly see the lack of recognition. Migrants, still voiceless and without agency, are only invited guests that confirm the significance of the national celebrations. Korean society's multiculturalism partly includes married migrant women but totally excludes migrant workers. It exists in rural areas, but not in the metropolis. It is open-minded towards *White* Westerners, but less so towards non-*White* ethnic minorities. It affirms globalisation as a market process, but denies it as an exchange system of human resources. Most conclusively, it includes delivering education about 'our culture' to them, but disapproves of 'their culture' being delivered to us. From this perspective, Korea is a society rather based on 'assimilationism' forcing others to adapt into our culture, not on 'cultural diversity' as a basis of a multicultural society. In these occasions migrants become momentarily accepted in the Korean society, only of course as a result of their desire to assimilate and celebrate the national culture's superiority. Such representations illustrate the media strategy of 'pseudo-diversity' that is produced on only specific terms and conditions as a nationalistic process of narcissism. These narrow definitions of multiculturalism and diversity only inspire cultural chauvinism and a (re)production of narrow and limited views on the culture of ethnic minorities from developing countries as inferior and uninteresting.

In the long term, Korean society is predicted to become a 'multi-ethnic, mono-cultural society'. That is, it is significant that there will be an increase in number of the migrant population and mixed-heritage people resulting from multicultural marriages, but the exclusion of other cultures, especially among non-*Whites* and people from less developed countries, is not expected to easily change. The final discussion in this study is to show the vital role PSB plays in mediating cultural diversity and how Korea can be aided in transforming into a multi-ethnic society through specific solutions.

8.2.2. *Selective Globalisation: Visible Globalisation, Invisible Others*

When it comes to discourse and the ideologies it reproduces, this study has demonstrated the selective, nationalist and classist framework in which concepts such as diversity and globalisation are interpreted in Korea. This discourse can be defined as ‘visible globalisation, invisible *Others*’. In other words, although the discourse of globalisation is now prevalent in Korean media and society, internal debates around equality, participation and inclusion of differences in a society that has changed as a result of globalisation remain marginal. Although some discourse of empathy to ethnic minorities as sufferers might relate to a humanitarian ethos, circulated through global communications, in terms of terminology, the hegemonic discourse of globalisation in the Korean media has been restrictively used to refer to market liberalisation, the promotion on the world market of Korean companies and products, and support for the Korean culture within the country and beyond. For instance, *White* male actors in Italian suits and *White* female actresses with French designer bags modelling in Prague while driving expensive German cars are often visible in Korean commercials. Moreover, *White* top models who choose Korean products are used in television advertising as evidence of the Korean culture’s and Korean capitalism’s value. These representations are only some of the examples that reflect the most widely accepted and celebrated understanding of globalisation in Korean society. On the other hand, migrant workers from Asia or Africa who toil at work in small factories with poor conditions, migrant women married to Korean men or mixed-heritage people from multicultural families are rarely seen in the media. While their lives are closely tied to globalisation, they are silenced and ‘irrelevant’ to the representations of globalisation.

This representational tendency has been explained in detail. First of all, representation of non-nationals as criminals is identified as the most threatening, posing a direct risk factor. They are usually located in urban spaces. This emphasises that non-national criminals are a practical risk factor and an absolute ‘social evil’ located near our living space, influencing the discourse of fear to a serious level. On the other hand, the news discourse of migrant workers and married migrant women is represented in a rural context although approximately 90 per cent of them actually live in urban or suburban areas. That is, the influx of *Others* in Korean society is restrictively represented in the

countryside as an excluded space and as an *Other* space within the national imagination that promotes urban over-development. This limited discourse functions as a ‘double exclusion’ device which excludes *Others* as discriminated non-nationals and once again excludes them as rural people.

Finally, as a result of analysing the news discourse, it can be seen that Korean PSB has three primary tendencies when representing ethnic minorities in Korea – dehumanisation, victimisation and pathologisation. In terms of dehumanisation of ethnic minorities, they are represented as ‘illegal residents’, ‘uneducated’ and ‘people who must be managed by Korean authority’. The term victimisation contrastingly represents ethnic minorities as ‘perpetrators’ or ‘poor victims’. Lastly, the discourse of pathologisation of ethnic minorities can be divided into physical and psychological perspectives. All these tendencies of news discourse are in direct contrast to media discourses when it comes to representations of Koreans.

8.3. Korean PSB: Towards a Multicultural Public Sphere

As I conclude this thesis, I feel the need to reflect on the challenges presented to Korean PSB and the possibilities for it to play a positive role in a multicultural society. KBS occupies a special position in Korean society as a public service broadcaster. KBS’s position as a corporation influenced by governmental authority can be a disadvantage to the organisation because, as most reporters pointed out, it makes it difficult for them to present a point of view that diverges greatly from the norm of national ideology. This is particularly limiting in South Korea because the public are rather conservative and they give priority to national interests, as often demonstrated in the result of social surveys, academic research and elections. Many of the reporters that I interviewed emphasised that the society as a whole is not willing to take a different approach to the current one when it comes to news coverage. On the other side, their position lends KBS three distinct advantages in this situation. These advantages can be summarised by their key terms of ‘network system’, ‘relative freedom from commercialism’ and ‘moral duties concerning the issue of diversity’. The interviewed

reporters stated that these advantages can serve as a way of measuring KBS's potential to produce news of a higher quality than their competitors.

The first advantage, 'network system' refers to the infrastructural aspect. One of the biggest benefits of KBS is that it has a single network that connects all the major cities in Korea. At the moment, KBS has eighteen local stations,⁴⁴ all of which are connected to KBS Seoul. The other major terrestrial broadcaster in Korea, MBC (Munhwa Broadcasting Corporation), has nineteen stations located throughout the whole country but each station is run by a different company and answers to different management and has different affiliates. That is, unlike KBS, MBC is not a unified whole. The other broadcast stations use regional correspondents to cover incidents that have happened in their allotted regions. The local offices often struggle with limited facilities and limits in human resources. KBS possesses the largest network system in Korea. No other station has an equally well-designed infrastructure.

If it is seen that multicultural families including married migrant women are usually shown by media discourse to live in rural areas, the fact that news segments that involve them are produced locally is a big advantage because local reporters would be more familiar with the local circumstances and culture. The downside, however, is that the news that is produced locally and broadcast in that same region is seen only by the local inhabitants. This is harmful for the perception of ethnic minorities because it creates the illusion that any problems associated with ethnic minorities are concentrated in certain places, most of them being ghettos.⁴⁵ Although approximately 90 per cent of multicultural families live in urban/suburban areas, it creates the impression of the existence of large ghettos in the countryside of Korea. It is important that the broadcaster airs these locally produced news segments throughout the whole country to give a sense of balance. This way multi-ethnic and multicultural phenomena can become more than just a local problem and become a national issue.

⁴⁴ There are nine main local stations: KBS Busan, KBS Changwon, KBS Daegu, KBS Gwangju, KBS Jeonju, KBS Daejeon, KBS Cheongju, KBS Chuncheon and KBS Jeju. And there are nine sub-local stations: KBS Ulsan, KBS Jinju, KBS Andong, KBS Pohang, KBS Mokpo, KBS Suncheon, KBS Chungju, KBS Gangneung and KBS Wonju.

⁴⁵ The term 'ghetto' was originally used in Venice to describe the area where Jews were compelled to live. A ghetto is now described as an overcrowded urban area often associated with a specific ethnic or racial population, especially because of social, legal or economic pressure.

The second advantage is that KBS is subject to less pressure about attracting large amounts of viewers than commercial broadcasting companies. KBS suffers less from economic pressure because it is stably supported by television licence fees.⁴⁶ This can be a crucial advantage when dealing with television contents concerning multi-ethnicity and multiculturalism. As I stated previously, multi-ethnic related issues have low news value in Korean society and these subjects are not supposed to be attractive to public. Therefore, Korean PSB affords to spend more time and effort on presenting ethnic minorities impartially than commercial broadcasting stations would.

The final advantage is that KBS as a public service broadcaster has an ethical obligation not to exclude the socially vulnerable from their news coverage because their broadcasts should serve the wellbeing of the society. Naturally this hasn't been expressed explicitly in the form of a regulation or in guidelines but it clearly influences the content of their reportages about social minorities. Reporters and KBS as a whole are aware of the existence of this moral obligation. This is one of the main reasons that KBS, unlike most commercial media, does have an interest in social minorities including ethnic minorities. This is also why they have produced news segments about them in order to aid their general strategy. This moral obligation provides the necessary motivation to set up the necessary institutes to aid the socially disadvantaged. And without any doubt, this is a significant step to the right direction for a multiethnic society.

The advantages of a multi-ethnic society which journalists claim, however, remain at an abstract and ideal level, rather than being applicable and anticipated from visible results. Therefore, there is some distance to go before the concrete future prospect of KBS in fairly representing a multi-ethnic society. Accordingly, I maintain that there should be concrete and detailed guidelines for the public media, especially PSB productions, in order to directly and visibly improve cultural diversity in Korean society. Although it is reasonable to consider the distinctiveness of individual nations, I will take the European

⁴⁶ As at February 2010, no commercials were aired on KBS 1, some of the programmes on KBS 2 did feature commercials. KBS also generates income from their daughter companies: KBS N sports, KBS drama, KBS joy and KBS prime. The current licence fees are very low (around £15 per year) and have been frozen for the last thirty years. They are exceptionally small considering the magnitude of South Korea's GDP and national income.

case as a useful starting point for discussing PSB in a multicultural society.

8.4. The British Case: Right on the Mark

As discussed in Chapter Two, South Korea itself has particular social traits associated with its history, culture and politics. These socio-cultural particularities are revealed throughout this study. Although Western social scientific research tends to have a Eurocentric bias and cannot be directly applied to the Korean socio-cultural reality, there are some key arguments and practices that inform our understanding of the Korean particularity within the universal context of multi-ethnicity and of the PSB. Within this perspective, it is argued that this study finally contemplates the British case of PSB in the multicultural society. During the early times of PSB in the UK, national interest was at the core of its concerns. The linking of culture with nationalism – the idea of a national culture – was given new expression in broadcasting through those kinds of programme that had the effect of, in the words of Reith, who was the first Director-General of the BBC, ‘making the nation as one man’ (Scannell, 2000: 48). However, it was a notable change that the British Government enhanced the public sphere role of broadcasting at the beginning of the 1980s, particularly by authorising Channel 4 to give special attention to the interests of minority groups (Scannell, 2000). Today, PSB in the UK is committed to representing all audiences impartially, including ethnic minority groups (BBC, 2007). This is not just because PSB has a responsibility to meet the needs of all licence payers, but because PSB is one of the key institutions through which a picture is formed of the kind of society Britain is; whether it is inclusive or exclusive; whether it recognises and celebrates the value of cultural and ethnic diversity or falls back on old stereotypes and prejudices; whether it strives to increase mutual understanding and equality of opportunity or is content to allow hostility and disadvantage to persist.

Ethnic diversity and multiculturalism are highly salient and contested issues in the contemporary British public media (Georgiou and Joo, 2009). Cottle (1998) describes the responsibility of PSB towards Britain’s ethnic minorities as primarily being one of enhancing their representation through ‘multicultural programming’. For many years,

the BBC and Channel 4 in particular, the representative public service broadcasters in the UK, have been publicly committed to serving their ethnic minority audiences properly, both ‘through targeted programmes and services and through fair representation in mainstream radio and television output’ (Ofcom, 2005; BBC, 1995: 163). This is because section 264(4)(i) of the Communications Act (2003) requires that public service broadcasters ‘reflect the lives and concerns of different communities and cultural interests and traditions within the UK’. The communications regulator Ofcom has recently been conducting a review of public service broadcasting and has sought to define it more closely. One of the four purposes of public service broadcasting has been identified as follows:

To support a tolerant and inclusive society, through programmes which reflect the lives of different people and communities within the UK, encourage a better understanding of different cultures and, on occasion, bring the nation together for shared experiences (Ofcom, 2005).

This regulation for PSB is reflected in the detailed and practical schemes of each broadcasting organisation. One of the good examples of this is the ‘BBC Race Equality Scheme’. It forms a part of the BBC’s overall commitment to equality and diversity. The scheme outlines the framework the BBC uses to systematically assess or reassess its public functions and policies in respect of race equality. It also shows how the BBC will now develop, implement, monitor and review its work towards achieving equality for people who belong to different ethnic and/or cultural groups, in relation to the BBC’s relevant public functions. The scheme is a tool to help promote racial equality at the centre of the BBC’s work and specifically across relevant areas such as TV licensing, digital switchover and the BBC Trust’s operations (BBC, 2007).

There are some critiques about cultural diversity in the UK’s PSB as a matter of course. A report of Ofcom, for instance, shows the total volume of multicultural programmes on the five public service broadcasting channels, including the BBC, in 2002 was 2.0 hours a week on average, a figure that has gradually reduced – by 42 per cent since 1998 (Georgiou and Joo, 2009). Additionally, Ofcom estimates the total spend on such programmes to be £5.2 million in 2002, compared with £6.8 million five years earlier.

In spite of this, the institutional definition of multicultural issues and the minimum amount of effort to put it in action in British PSB can be a good initial role model for Korean PSB during the period of transition into a multi-ethnic society. Therefore, a practical alternative is to study countries which have already experienced a multi-ethnic society prior to Korea, and analyse how they have represented cultural diversity in PSB and finally edit, supplement and apply the cases to the Korean situation.

8.5. Suggestions for Further Research

In completing this discussion I make a number of suggestions for further research. During the last four years of conducting this research, the terminology ‘multicultural’ has come to be more and more widespread throughout Korean society and academia like a torrential downpour. Perhaps some recent studies form part of this torrent themselves. As revealed earlier, however, the multicultural agenda that has been discussed in Korean society and academia has significant limitations in its understanding of cultural difference and the challenges diversity presents to democratic societies. Therefore, I sincerely hope that this study will be not treated as one of the many other studies that are part of a growing trend, and I would hope to contribute to discussions around the distorted and misused term ‘multiculturalism’ which is prevalent in Korea. Taking this study as a starting point, I hope that a number of researchers, including myself, will shed new light on multi-ethnicity and cultural diversity as a new cultural phenomenon and establish the paradigm of a new discussion. In particular, research about media policy for cultural diversity in the Korean context, ethnographic studies of ethnic minority media as examples of resistance to nationalistic discourses, and studies of the diverse audiences within Korean society are well overdue. In spite of this being the last step of a four-year research project, it is hopefully also a point of reflection. It will hopefully contribute to current and relevant academic and policy debates on the future of PSB and its public democratic commitment.

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APPENDIX I: Tables from Chapter Five

Table 5.4. The Total Number of Non-nationals who Appeared on *KBS News 9* (2004–2008)

	Non-Whites					Whites	Total
	Asians			Blacks	Others	Whites	
	East Asians	South & Southeast Asians	Other Asians				
N A T I O N A L I T Y	50 Chinese, 44 Korean Chinese, 14 Mongolians, 12 Japanese, 5 Hong Kongers, 2 Taiwanese, 1 Korean Kazakhstani	35 Vietnamese, 26 Bangladeshis, 19 Filipinos, 16 Sri Lankans, 14 Thai, 12 Cambodians, 7 Indonesians, 6 Pakistanis, 4 Burmese, 4 Nepalis, 3 Indians, 2 Malaysians, 10 Other Southeast Asians	8 Uzbekistanis, 3 Iranians, 1 Middle-eastern	15 Americans, 7 Brazilians, 2 Dominicans, 1 Tunisian, 1 Colombian, 1 Tanzanian, 1 Senegali, 1 Cuban	53 Mixed-heritage Koreans, 1 Peruvian, 1 Turkish	55 Americans, 8 Australians, 8 Canadians, 8 Russians, 7 Germans, 3 Frenchs, 4 Portuguese, 4 Dutch, 2 Ukrainians, 2 Uzbekistanis, 1 Bulgarian, 1 English, 1 Greek, 1 Swedish, 1 Italian, 1 Kyrgyzstani, 1 Azerbaijani, 1 Polish, 1 Hungarian, 1 Belgian, 1 Serbian, 1 Croatian, 1 Armenian, 1 Spanish, 2 Brazilians, 1 Mexican, 10 Unknown	511
Total (%)	128 (25.0%)	158 (30.9%)	12 (2.3%)	30 (5.9%)	55 (10.8%)	128 (25.0%)	511 (100.0)

Table 5.5. Interviewees Sorted by Nationalities (Non-nationals as Migrant Workers)

	Non-Whites				Whites	Total	
	Asians			Blacks	Other		Whites
	East	Southaast	Other				
N A T I O N A L I T Y	18 Chinese- Koreans, 6 Mongolians, 4 Chinese	23 Bangladeshi, 14 Sri-Lankans, 9 Filipinos, 7 Indonesians, 7 Thais, 4 Pakistanis, 4 Nepalis, 3 Burmese, 3 Indians, 3 Vietnamese, 2 Cambodians, 9 Unknown	1 Iranian, 1 Kazakhstan- Korean, 1 Uzbekistani	1 American	2 Russians, 1 American	123	
Total (%)	28 (22.8)	88 (71.5)	3 (2.4)	1 (0.8)	3 (2.4)	123 (100.0)	

Table 5.6. Non-nationals as Migrant Workers

Gender	N(%)	Visual frames	N(%)	Representati on as individuals or groups	N(%)	Types of work	N(%)
Females	26 (21.1)	Mosaic	18 (14.6)	Individuals	54 (43.9)	Manual Labourer	108 (87.8)
Males	83 (67.5)	Lowering head	2 (1.6)	Groups	69 (56.1)	Prostitute	2 (1.6)
Males & Females	14 (11.4)	Extreme close-up	18 (14.6)			Job seeker	2 (1.6)
		Long-shot	4 (3.2)			Soldier	2 (1.6)
		Crowd-shot	22 (17.9)			Unclear	2 (1.6)
		Back view	7 (5.7)			Victims	7 (5.7)
		Medium-shot	52 (42.3)				
Total	123 (100.0)	Total	123 (100.0)	Total	123 (100.0)	Total	123 (100.0)

Table 5.7. Koreans in the Frame of Non-nationals as Migrant Workers

Gender	N(%)	Visual frames	N(%)	Representati on as individuals or groups	N(%)	Roles	N(%)
Females	8 (15.6)	Back-view	3 (5.9)	Individuals	50 (98.0)	CEO	2 (3.9)
Males	42 (82.4)	Extreme Close-up	1 (2.0)	Groups	1 (2.0)	Religious leader	6 (11.8)
Males & Females	1 (2.0)	Medium-shot	46 (90.1)			Criminal	1 (2.0)
		Covering heads	1 (2.0)			Citizen	4 (7.8)
						Government authority	16 (31.4)
						Professional ⁴⁷	4 (7.8)
						NGO member	13 (25.5)
						Policeman	3 (5.9)
						Colleagues of migrant workers	2 (3.9)
Total	51 (100.0)	Total	51 (100.0)	Total	51 (100.0)	Total	51 (100.0)

Table 5.8. Interviewees Sorted by Nationalities (Non-nationals as Criminals)

	Non-Whites					Whites	Total
	Asians			Blacks	Other	Whites	
	East	Southeast	Other				
Nationality	30 Chinese, 16 Korean- Chinese, 4 Mongolians, 1 Hong Konger	1 Bangladeshi, 1 Malaysian, 1 Unknown	1 Uzbekistani, 1 Middle Eastern	1 Tunisian, 1 Colombian, 1 American	1 Peruvian	3 Canadians, 4 Americans, 2 Australians, 1 Bulgarian, 1 Russian, 3 Unknown	74
Total (%)	51 (68.9)	3 (4.1)	2 (2.7)	3 (4.1)	1 (1.3)	14 (18.9)	74 (100.0)

⁴⁷ 1 professor, 1 doctor and 2 lawyers.

Table 5.9. Non-national as Criminals

Gender	N(%)	Visual frames	N(%)	Representation as individuals or groups	N(%)
Females	9 (12.1%)	Mosaic	11 (14.8%)	Individuals	28 (37.8%)
Males	46 (62.2%)	Lowering/covering head	18 (24.3%)	Groups	46 (62.2%)
Females & Males	15 (20.3%)	Extreme close-up	9 (12.2%)		
Unknown	4 (5.4%)	Long-shot	2 (2.7%)		
		CCTV	9 (12.2%)		
		Crowd-shot	14 (18.9%)		
		Back view	9 (12.2%)		
		Medium-shot	2 (2.7%)		
Total	74 (100.0%)	Total	74 (100.0%)	Total	74 (100.0%)

Table 5.10. Koreans in the Frame of Non-nationals as Criminals

Gender	N(%)	Visual frames	N(%)	Representation as individuals or groups	N(%)	Roles	N(%)
Females	3 (4.3%)	Mosaic	5 (7.2%)	Individuals	69 (100.0%)	Crime victim	9 (13.0%)
Males	66 (95.7%)	Back view	2 (2.8%)	Groups	–	Accomplice	5 (7.2%)
Unknown		Extreme close-up	6 (8.6%)			Police or prosecutor	22 (32.0%)
		CCTV	1 (1.4%)			Civilian	5 (7.2%)
		Bust-shot	55 (80.0%)			Government authority	9 (13.0%)
						Professional ⁴⁸	19 (27.6%)
Total	69 (100.0%)		69 (100.0%)		69 (100.0%)		69 (100.0%)

⁴⁸ 4 religious leaders, 3 professors, 3 NGO officers, 3 teachers, 1 researcher, 1 businessman, 1 banker, 1 doctor and 1 member of parliament.

Table 5.11. Types of Crimes and the Dispersion by Ethnicities and Nationalities

Categories of crimes	The dispersion by ethnicity & nationality	Total
Illegal migration or entries / forgery of documents	16 Asians (8 Chinese, 3 Korean-Chinese, 1 Bangladesh, 1 Malaysian, 1 Hong Konger, 1 Mongolian, 1 Unknown) 6 Whites (1 Canadian, 1 Bulgarian, 2 Americans, 2 Australians)	22
Violence	11 Asians (9 Chinese, 2 Korean-Chinese) 2 Whites (2 Americans)	13
Drugs	4 Asians (3 Korean-Chinese, 1 Korean-American) 4 Whites (1 Russian, 3 Unknown) 2 Blacks (1 Anonymous, 1 Tunisian)	10
Disguised marriages	6 Asians (4 Chinese, 1 Korean-Chinese, 1 Mongolian)	6
Murders	5 Asians (3 Chinese, 2 Korean-Chinese)	5
Frauds	5 Asians (4 Chinese, 1 Korean-Chinese)	5
Counterfeiting/illegal remittances	4 Asians (2 Korean-Chinese, 1 Chinese, 1 Mongolian) 1 White (1 Canadian)	5
Abusing children	1 White (1 Canadian)	3
Pickpockets	1 Black (1 Colombian) 1 Other (1 Peruvian)	2
Robbery	1 Asian (1 Korean-Chinese)	1
Smuggling	1 Asian (1 Korean-Chinese)	1
Illegal gambling	1 Asian (1 Chinese)	1
Terrorism	2 Asians (1 Bangladesh, 1 Middle-Eastern)	2
Total	56 Asians / 14 Whites / 3 Blacks / 1 Other	74

Table 5.12. Interviewees Sorted by Nationalities (Non-nationals as Multicultural Family Members)

	Non-Whites				Whites	Total	
	Asians			Blacks	Other		Whites
	East	Southeast	Other				
Nationality	5 Chinese, 3 Korean-Chinese, 4 Japanese, 1 Mongolian	17 Filipinos, 15 Vietnamese, 6 Cambodians, 4 Thais, 1 Nepalese, 1 Sri Lankan, 2 Unknown	13 Mixed-heritage Koreans		1 Uzbekistani	3 Russians, 1 American	77
Total (%)	13 (16.9)	46 (59.7)	13 (16.9)		1 (1.3)	4 (5.2)	77 (100.0)

Table 5.13. Non-nationals in the Frame of Non-nationals as Multicultural Family Members

Gender	N(%)	Visual frames	N(%)	Representation as individuals or groups	N(%)	Roles	N(%)
Females	62 (80.5%)	Medium-shot	51 (66.2%)	Individuals	64 (83.1%)	Foreign brides	29 (37.7%)
Males	5 (6.5%)	Mosaic	15 (19.5%)	Groups	.13 (16.9%)	Foreign daughters-in-law	23 (29.9%)
Children	10 (13.0%)	Extreme Close-up	3 (3.9%)			Divorced women	10 (13.0%)
		Back view	3 (3.9%)			Mixed-heritage children	9 (11.7%)
		Daily life	5 (6.5%)			Mixed-heritage adults	4 (5.2%)
						Non-national men married to Korean women	1 (1.3%)
						Parents of foreign brides	1 (1.3%)
Total	77 (100.0)		77 (100.0)		77 (100.0)		77 (100.0)

Table 5.14. Koreans in the Frame of Non-nationals as Multicultural Family Members

Gender	N(%)	Visual frames	N(%)	Representation as individuals or groups	N(%)	Roles	N(%)
Females	31 (44.3%)	Medium-shot	62 (88.6%)	Individuals	68 (97.1%)	NGO member	15 (21.4%)
Males	37 (52.8%)	Mosaic	4 (5.7%)	Groups	2 (2.9%)	Government official	13 (18.6%)
Children	2 (2.9%)	Back-view	1 (1.4%)			Korean men married to non-national women	11 (15.7%)
		Daily life	3 (4.3%)			Parents-in-law of foreign brides	8 (11.4%)
						Professionals ⁴⁹	10 (14.3%)
						Businessmen	5 (7.1%)
						Foreign brides	3 (4.3%)
						Citizens	3 (4.3%)
						Friends	2 (2.9%)
Total	70 (100.0)		70 (100.0)		70 (100.0)		70 (100.0)

⁴⁹ 6 professors, 2 doctors, 1 teacher and 1 Member of Parliament.

Table 5.15. Interviewees Sorted by Nationalities (Non-nationals as Visitors)

	Non-Whites					Whites	Total
	Asians			Blacks	Other	Whites	
	East	Southeast	Other				
Nationality	7 Chinese, 6 Japanese, 4 Hong Kongers, 1 Taiwanese, 1 Mongolian	3 Thais, 3 Filipinos, 2 Bangladeshi, 1 Malaysian, 1 Pakistani		1 Tanzanian		21 Americans, 5 Australians, 5 Germans, 3 Canadians, 3 Frenchs, 2 Uzbekistanis, 1 Belgian, 1 Ukrainian, 1 Hungarian, 1 Polish, 1 Greek 1 Portuguese, 1 Italian 1 Swedish 1 Dutch 1 Briton 13 Unknown	92
Total (%)	19 (20.6)	10 (10.9)		1 (1.2)		62 (67.4)	92 (100.0)

Table 5.16. Non-nationals in the Frame of Non-nationals as Visitors

Gender	N(%)	Visual frames	N(%)	Representation as Individuals or groups	N(%)	Roles	N(%)
Females	38 (41.3)	Medium-shot	91 (98.9)	Individuals	83 (90.2)	Tourists	35 (38.0)
Males	54 (58.7)	Extreme close-up	1 (1.1)	Groups	9 (9.8)	International students	17 (18.5)
						Professionals ⁵⁰	17 (18.5)
						Religious figures	6 (6.5)
						Migrant workers	3 (3.3)
						Employees of foreign companies	3 (3.3)
						Foreign brides	2 (2.2)
						US Army	1 (1.1)
						Foreign ambassadors	1 (1.1)
						Families of US soldiers	1 (1.1)
						Unknown	6 (6.5)
Total	92 (100.0)		92 (100.0)		92 (100.0)		92 (100.0)

⁵⁰ 7 CEOs, 4 professors, 4 teachers, 1 interpreter and 1 journalist.

Table 5.17. Koreans in the frame of non-nationals as visitors

Gender	N(%)	Visual frames	N(%)	Representation as Individuals or groups	N(%)	Roles	N(%)
Females	19 (35.2)	Medium-shot	45 (83.3)	Individuals	52 (96.3)	Citizens	19 (35.2)
Males	35 (64.8)	Extreme close-up	7 (13.0)	Groups	2 (3.7)	Professionals ⁵¹	16 (29.6)
		Daily life	2 (3.7)			Government officials	9 (16.7)
						Street vendors	5 (9.2)
						Religious figures	3 (5.5)
						NGO figures	1 (1.8)
						CEOs	1 (1.8)
Total	54 (100.0)		54 (100.0)		54 (100.0)		54 (100.0)

Table 5.18. Interviewees Sorted by Nationalities (Non-nationals as Celebrities)

	Non-Whites				Whites	Total	
	Asians			Blacks	Other		Whites
	East	Southeast	Other				
Nationality	1 Chinese			8 Americans, 7 Brazilians, 2 Dominicans, 1 Cuban	24 Mixed- heritage Koreans, 1 Turkish	21 Americans, 1 Canadian, 1 Serbian, 1 Russian, 1 Croatian, 1 Ukrainian, 1 Armenian, 1 German, 1 Spanish, 1 Brazilian, 2 Mexican, 1 Dutch, 1 Portuguese	78
Total (%)	1 (1.3)			18 (23.1)	25 (32.0)	34 (43.6)	78 (100.0)

⁵¹ 7 professors, 2 teachers, 1 pharmacist, 2 researchers, 3 chefs and 1 travel guide.

Table 5.19. Non-nationals in the Frame of Non-nationals as Celebrities

Gender	N(%)	Visual frames	N(%)	Representation as individuals or groups	N(%)	Roles	N(%)
Males	67 (85.9%)	Medium-shot	70 (89.7%)	Individuals	78 (100.0%)	Sport players	62 (79.5%)
Females	11 (14.1%)	Part of the frame	2 (2.6%)	Groups		Sport managers	10 (12.8%)
		Up-shot	5 (6.4%)			Governors	2 (2.6%)
		Close-up	1 (1.3%)			Educators	2 (2.6%)
						Chancellor	1 (1.3%)
						Referee	1 (1.3%)
Total	78 (100.0)		78 (100.0)		78 (100.0)		78 (100.0)

Table 5.20. Koreans in the Frame of Non-nationals as Celebrities

Gender	N(%)	Visual frames	N(%)	Representation as individuals or groups	N(%)	Roles	N(%)
Males	45 (83.3%)	Medium-shot	54 (100.0%)	Individuals	54 (100.0%)	Sports managers	28 (51.8%)
Females	8 (14.8%)			Groups		Citizens	7 (13.0%)
Children	1 (1.9%)					Professionals ⁵²	7 (13.0%)
						Sports players	6 (11.1%)
						Korean mothers	5 (9.2%)
						Politicians	1 (1.9%)
Total	54 (100.0)		54 (100.0)		54 (100.0)		54 (100.0)

⁵² 3 professors, 2 journalists and 2 sports governors.

Table 5.21. Interviewees Sorted by Nationalities (Koreans as Compassionate People)

	Non-Whites				Whites		Total
	Asians			Blacks	Other	Whites	
	East	Southeast	Other				
Nationality	3 Korean-Chinese, 3 Mongolians, 1 Chinese	2 Indonesians, 2 Sri Lankans, 2 Indians, 2 Thais, 1 Bangladeshi, 1 Filipino	3 Uzbekistanis				20
Total (%)	7 (35%)	10 (50%)	3 (15%)				20 (100%)

Table 5.22. Non-nationals in the Frame of Koreans as Compassionate People

Gender	N(%)	Visual frames	N(%)	Representation as individuals or groups	N(%)	Roles	N(%)
Males	13 (65.0%)	Medium-shot	11 (55.0%)	Individuals	11 (55.0%)	Migrants workers	17 (85.0%)
Females	5 (25.0%)	Close-up	4 (20.0%)	Groups	9 (45.0%)	Students	2 (10.0%)
Children	2 (10.0%)	Back-view	1 (5.0%)			Government officials	1 (5.0%)
		Receiving treatment	4 (20.0%)				
Total	20 (100.0)		20 (100.0)		20 (100.0)		20 (100.0)

Table 5.23. Koreans in the Frame of Koreans as Compassionate People

Gender	N(%)	Visual frames	N(%)	Representation as individuals or groups	N(%)	Roles	N(%)
Males	15 (75.0%)	Medium-shot	10 (50.0%)	Individuals	19 (95.0%)	Doctors	9 (45.0%)
Females	5 (25.0%)	Providing medical care	6 (30.0%)	Groups	1 (5.0%)	Religious figures	4 (20.0%)
		Having conversation with non-national	3 (15.0%)			Government authorities	2 (10.0%)
		Low-angle	1 (5.0%)			Citizens	2 (10.0%)
						Educators	1 (5.0%)
						Colleagues	1 (5.0%)
						Producers	1 (5.0%)
Total	20 (100.0)		20 (100.0)		20 (100.0)		20 (100.0)