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

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The economic consequences of a Tobin tax – An experimental analysis

Michael Hanke, Jürgen Huber, Michael Kirchler and Matthias Sutter

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University of Innsbruck

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Abstract

The effects of a Tobin tax on foreign exchange markets have long been disputed. We present an experiment with currency trading on two markets, where either none, one, or both markets are taxed. Our results confirm the hitherto undisputed issues: a tax reduces trading volume, shifts market share to untaxed markets, and leads to negligible tax revenues if tax havens exist. Concerning the controversial issues we find that (i) volatility effects depend on the existence of tax havens and on market size, (ii) market efficiency remains unaffected by the tax, (iii) short-term speculation is reduced, and (iv) the tax has persistent effects even after its abolishment.

JEL classification: C91, E62

Keywords: Tobin tax, Experiment, Foreign exchange, Market efficiency, Trading volume, Volatility

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1 Introduction

In this paper we present an experimental test of the economic consequences of a Tobin tax. Such a transactions tax on foreign exchange markets has first been advocated by James Tobin in the early 1970s, and it has been controversial among economists and politicians ever since.[1] The actual implementation of a Tobin tax on real-world foreign exchange markets would, of course, resolve the controversies over its alleged consequences on volatility, efficiency, and short-term speculation, to name but a few of the disputed issues. Since a Tobin tax has not been implemented on any real foreign exchange market so far, however, we use the method of experimental economics to assess the effects of a Tobin tax.

In the political debate, the Tobin tax has gained popularity as a candidate instrument to fight speculation and stabilize foreign exchange markets. Its intended effects (according to many of its proponents) include a decrease in volatility and an increase in market efficiency. These expected benefits of a Tobin tax have been the reason for the Canadian House of Commons to speak out for a Tobin tax in recent years and for several political proposals in the U.S. to introduce a securities transaction tax (Bloomfield et al., 2006). Although the tax revenues are often downplayed as "side-effects", expected fiscal benefits obviously also increase the political appeal of a Tobin tax. For instance, when taking over the EU-presidency in January 2006, the Austrian Federal Chancellor Wolfgang Schüssel proposed the introduction of a Tobin tax to provide a stable revenue basis for the EU budget.

In the academic debate, the Tobin tax has often been linked to the more general issue of how a securities transaction tax affects financial markets (e.g., Stiglitz, 1989; Summers and Summers, 1989; Schwert and Seguin, 1993; Subrahmanyam, 1998; Dow and Rahi, 2000). The economics literature has reached a consensus on several issues such as the negative effects of a Tobin tax on trading volume or market shares (see, e.g., the contributions in Haq et al., 1996; Weaver

[1] For collections of articles on various aspects of a Tobin tax see Haq et al. (1996) or Weaver et al. (2003).

et al., 2003). However, some other issues are still disputed, e.g. the impact of a Tobin tax on market efficiency and volatility.

Parts of the controversy concerning the latter issues are probably due to different modeling approaches concerning the coverage of the tax, either uniformly across all markets or applying only to a subset of markets. Assuming full coverage of the tax across all markets, Kupiec (1995) models the Tobin tax as a special case of a Keynesian transactions tax. Relying partly on the empirical evidence concerning a transaction tax on stocks in Sweden (Umlauf, 1993), Kupiec concludes that a Tobin tax would increase mispricing, i.e. decrease informational efficiency, and lead to lower liquidity. The latter result is also established in a model with only one market by Subrahmanyam (1998). Palley (1999) presents a microeconomic model with two groups of risk-neutral traders (fundamentalists and noise traders). He shows that noise traders (speculators) cause inefficiencies and higher costs for fundamentalists. Therefore, anything that reduces the volume of noise trading without harming fundamentalists would be considered positive. Palley then argues that although a Tobin tax would hit fundamentalists and noise traders alike with respect to a single transaction, noise traders would be affected more heavily due to their higher trading frequency. As a consequence, a Tobin tax would reduce noise trading and, so he claims, increase market efficiency, contrary to the conclusions by Kupiec (1995). More recent models by Ehrenstein (2002) and Westerhoff (2003) also predict that a Tobin tax will increase informational efficiency by reducing the degree of mispricing (i.e., the difference between market prices and fundamental values). In sum, the literature on the effects of a Tobin tax on market efficiency arrives at opposite ends.

Turning to the effects of a Tobin tax on price volatility we start by noting that Kupiec (1995) does not arrive at a clear-cut prediction for the influence of a Tobin tax on volatility, because a possible reduction in volatility might be wiped out by an increase in liquidity premia. Many other papers (see, e.g., Frankel, 1996; Westerhoff, 2003; Ehrenstein et al., 2005) expect a decrease in price volatility. An empirical study by Aliber et al. (2003) provides conflicting

evidence, though. They consider the Tobin tax as a particular type of transactions costs on currency markets. Therefore, they investigate the impact of the size of transactions costs on trading volume and volatility. Using an innovative approach to derive transactions costs from futures prices, they show that higher transactions costs are associated with *higher* volatility and lower trading volume on foreign exchange markets. Similar results are presented in Hau (2006). Hence, there is no general agreement on the consequences of a Tobin tax on price volatility. A recent model by Haberer (2006) may be able to resolve the contradictions, though. The crucial feature of the model is a U-shaped relationship between volatility and market volume. The reduction of market volume due to the introduction of a Tobin tax can then have different consequences for volatility, depending on the relative market volume. Taxing relatively large markets may decrease volatility, whereas a tax on relatively small markets may increase volatility.

Interestingly, the implications of tax havens have only recently been explicitly modeled. Mannaro et al. (2005) and Westerhoff and Dieci (2006) analyze models with two markets where traders can choose on which market to trade and where a Tobin tax is either implemented on both markets or on just one of them, leaving the other market as a tax haven. Both papers show that introducing the tax on only one market leads to a strong decrease in trading volume on the taxed market. Whereas Mannaro et al. (2005) expect an increase in volatility on the taxed market, Westerhoff and Dieci (2006) claim that volatility decreases on the taxed market, but increases on the untaxed market. The latter paper stresses that the interplay between liquidity and volatility (via the price impact of orders) is difficult to assess in practice, so Westerhoff and Dieci (2006) explicitly call for an experimental analysis of the question.

Bloomfield et al. (2006) run a controlled laboratory experiment to study trading behavior on markets when a securities transaction tax (STT) is introduced. They are particularly interested in the effects of a STT on three different types of traders which they call informed traders, liquidity traders, and noise traders. Their experimental results suggest that a STT leads to less noise trad-

ing, which increases informational efficiency. Market volume is driven down by the tax, whereas market volatility is hardly affected. A limitation of the setting used in Bloomfield et al. (2006) is its restriction to only a single market, though. In such a setting, it is impossible to examine how one market is affected by a Tobin tax if there are other markets that remain untaxed, i.e. if there are tax havens.[2]

In our experiment we let subjects trade currencies on two distinct markets. Initially, there is no tax on any of these markets, but then a transactions tax is either introduced on one of the two markets or on both. In order to study whether some effects of the tax persist even after its abolishment – an aspect which has not been explored in the literature so far – we consider also a scenario where the tax is abolished again after its introduction.

Our key findings for the case of a unilateral introduction of the tax are that (i) the tax causes a dramatic shift in trading volume to the untaxed market, (ii) tax revenues are negligible, (iii) volatility on the taxed market may decrease or increase, depending on market size, while (iv) volatility on the untaxed market is reduced significantly as a consequence of an increase in liquidity, and (v) market efficiency remains unchanged on both markets.

If a Tobin tax is introduced simultaneously on both markets, we find that (i) overall trading volume is reduced, (ii) price volatility remains unchanged, and (iii) market efficiency remains unchanged as well.

When a Tobin tax is abolished, the main finding is that (i) pre-tax levels of trading activity (volume as well as number of transactions) on the previously taxed market are not restored, in particular if the larger of the two markets was taxed. This finding indicates that the effects of a Tobin tax – once introduced on a market – cannot be undone (completely) by abolishing the tax later on.

Besides these aggregate effects we find through an analysis of individual

[2]A recent paper by Kaiser et al. (2007) considers also only a single market that is taxed, therefore also missing the opportunity to examine the effects of tax havens. Kaiser et al. (2007) use a deterministic fundamental value of their experimental currencies, which leads to a theoretical prediction of no trade if a tax applies. Since they allow for several tax rates, but run only one market per tax rate, Kaiser et al. (2007) consider their findings as preliminary.

trading patterns that a Tobin tax reduces speculative trading. Although this was presumably one of the motivations for James Tobin's proposal (in order to benefit those who need to trade on foreign exchange markets for *bona fide* commercial reasons; Tobin, 1978; Eichengreen et al., 1995), the effect of this reduction in short-term speculation on volatility can go in either direction.

The rest of the paper is organized as follows: In Section 2, we present our market model and the experimental design. Sections 3 and 4 report the experimental results. Section 5 concludes the paper by relating our results to previous findings and by discussing the practical implications of our results.

2 Market model and experimental design

2.1 Model description

There are two markets (denoted LEFT and RIGHT) on which a foreign currency (Taler) can be traded for the home currency (Gulden). Both markets are implemented as continuous double-auction markets with open order books. Traders can be active on both markets simultaneously and both markets are displayed on the screen at the same time. Buying a currency on one market and selling it on the other is possible, as is buying on both markets or selling on both markets. Apart from prohibiting short sales, there are no limitations to trading, meaning that traders are allowed to freely place limit and market orders. Limit orders consist of the number of Talers a participant wants to trade and the amount of Gulden offered or asked for each Taler. Price is given priority over time for the execution of limit orders. Market orders are executed immediately. For the sake of simplicity we introduce a symmetric information structure where traders know the current fundamental Gulden value of the Taler at each point in time. We implement the fundamental value of the Taler (in Gulden) as a random walk without drift: $V_k = V_{k-1} + \varepsilon_k$, where V_k denotes the fundamental value in period k, and ε_k is a standard normal random variable. V_0 is set to 40.

2.2 Experimental design

We set up groups of 20 subjects each who can trade currencies on two markets, LEFT and RIGHT. Each trader is initially endowed with 200 Taler and 8,000 Gulden. The experiment consists of 18 trading periods, each of them lasting 100 seconds.[3] At the start of each trading period, order books are empty. Subjects receive information about the fundamental value of the Taler at the start of each period. During a trading period subjects are continuously informed about all open orders, their own holdings of both currencies, the transaction prices on both markets, their individual transaction prices, and their wealth. The latter is calculated as the sum of the Gulden holdings and the Gulden value of their Taler holdings (number of Talers held multiplied by the current Taler price in Gulden).[4] When a trading period stops after 100 seconds, subjects receive a summary of the trading activities of all previous periods in a "history screen". It contains for each market the closing price, the total trading volume, the amount of taxes paid (only if applicable), and the trading volume of the subject on the relevant market. Moreover, the current holdings of Taler and Gulden are displayed, as well as a subject's wealth.

2.3 Experimental treatments

Table 1 summarizes our six experimental treatments. They differ with respect to when and on which market a (two-way) Tobin tax of 0.5% of the transaction value (price multiplied with Talers traded) is levied. A dash indicates that there is no tax. While traders are only informed that there will be 15 to 25 periods of trading, there are essentially three phases in our experiment (periods 1-6, 7-12, and 13-18). In the first phase all treatments are identical, starting with identical instructions and without any tax. We consider the absence of a tax as

[3]To avoid strategic behavior towards the end of the experiment, we told participants that the experiment would be terminated between periods 15 and 25. The 18 actual periods were preceded by 5 unpaid trial periods to accustom subjects with the trading environment. Note that the experimental instructions in the Appendix also include some screenshots.

[4]If the current Taler prices on the two markets deviate, the price on the market with the higher volume of the last transaction is used to value the Taler.

the most realistic starting condition. Only after period 6 are subjects informed about the introduction of a tax in the respective treatments. This is announced by the experimenter and indicated on a separate screen. Yet, it is not revealed at this stage that the taxation of markets will change again after period 12. The same holds for the introduction or abolishment of a tax after period 12.

Insert Table 1 about here

The treatment abbreviations in Table 1 are to be read as follows. The numbers "0" and "2" specify whether no market ("0") or both markets ("2") are taxed. If one market is taxed, we use the letters "L" and "R" to indicate whether the taxed market is the LEFT or the RIGHT one. For instance, in treatment 02R the tax is introduced on both markets from period 7 to period 12, but from period 13 onwards it is sustained only on the RIGHT market, whereas it is abolished on the LEFT market.

Table 1 shows that in the second phase of the experiment the tax is either introduced on one market (0L0, 0R0, 0L2, 0R2) or on both markets (02L, 02R). In the third phase the tax is either abolished from one previously taxed market (0L0, 0R0, 02L, 02R), or it is introduced on one hitherto untaxed market (0L2, 0R2). This design allows us to study both the effects of applying as well as abolishing a Tobin tax, and to explore the effects from the existence of tax havens.

Our treatments are also balanced in the following way. When a tax is introduced on one market from periods 7-12, we set up two treatments where the tax applies only to the LEFT market, and two treatments where only the RIGHT market is taxed. In periods 13-18 we abolish the tax in a symmetric way either in LEFT or in RIGHT.

For each treatment we ran two sessions with 20 traders each. The 240 participants in our 12 sessions were business students at the University of Innsbruck. Sessions were computerized (using zTree by Fischbacher, 2007) and lasted about 75 minutes. Traders' compensation was based on their per-period performance benchmarked by the performance of all other traders, and cumulated over all trading periods. Subjects earned on average 17 Euros.

3 Descriptive overview of results

In this section, we present descriptive data on several key market variables. This is followed in Section 4 by econometric estimations on how a Tobin tax affects the trading volume, exchange rate volatility, market efficiency, and speculative behavior.

3.1 Trading volume and transactions

Table 2 shows the development of trading volume by reporting the average volume of Talers traded in each period of the three phases of the experiment. The percentages below the figures refer to the change in the average trading volume per period of the current phase in relation to the average trading volume per period of the previous phase. Note that we do not distinguish between the tax being levied on the LEFT or RIGHT market in Table 2, but rather pool the treatments that have otherwise the same sequence of taxation. For example, we pool 0L0 and 0R0 into 010.

Insert Table 2 about here

The figures in Table 2 reveal that taxing both markets leads to a strong reduction in the trading volume (of 25% on average) in relation to the preceding phase, whereas the effect of taxing only a single market is smaller and ambiguous.

Across all treatments, the average number of transactions per period and market is 27.3 when both markets are untaxed. When both markets are taxed simultaneously, the average number of transactions drops to 20.0. In case of taxing only one market, but not the other, the average number of transactions on the taxed markets falls sharply to 4.7, while it rises to 38.3 in the untaxed market. Hence, taxing only one market has strong repercussions on both markets.

Figures 1 through 3 show the average number of transactions in the different treatments. The dashed vertical lines indicate changes in taxation (by either introducing a tax on one or both markets or by abolishing it in a hitherto taxed

market).

Insert Figure 1, Figure 2 and Figure 3 about here

When the tax is levied in periods 7-12 only on the LEFT market in treatments 0L0 and 0L2 (see Figure 1), there is a very strong shift in the number of transactions from the LEFT market to the RIGHT market from period 7 onwards. When the tax is either abolished after period 12 (in 0L0) or the RIGHT market is also taxed (in 0L2) much of the trading activity floats back to the LEFT market, without reaching pre-tax levels, though.

Figure 2 refers to the treatments where only the RIGHT market is taxed in periods 7-12. We see that the number of transactions on RIGHT is less affected by the tax than if the tax is levied on LEFT (compare the sharp kinks after periods 6 and 12 in Figure 1 with the much smoother transitions in Figure 2). This is a first indication that introducing a tax on LEFT or RIGHT has different consequences. Section 3.2 will get back to this issue in more detail.

Figure 3 presents the number of transactions in treatments 02L and 02R. By looking at the transition from period 12 to period 13, we see that abolishing the tax in either LEFT or RIGHT leads to a very strong increase in transactions on the respective market.

3.2 Market shares of LEFT and RIGHT

Figures 4 to 6 show the development of the market share of LEFT, i.e. the ratio of the trading volume on the LEFT market to the trading volume of both markets combined. A first notable fact is that in periods 1-6 the LEFT market always has a considerably larger market share than the RIGHT market. On average, 68% of trading in periods 1-6 takes place on the LEFT market, but only 32% on the RIGHT market, even though both markets are set up identically. Hence, the visual positioning of markets on subjects' screens creates one relatively big and one relatively small market.

Insert Figure 4, Figure 5 and Figure 6 about here

Figure 4 shows that the introduction of the tax in 0L0 causes a drop in the market share of the LEFT market from almost 80% in period 6 to less than

20% in period 7 and less than 10% in periods 8-11. Hence, the shift in trading volume as a consequence of introducing the tax is very rapid and very strong. Abolishing the tax after period 12 leads to an increase in LEFT's market share to about 47% in periods 13-18, but the pre-tax levels (of, on average, 68% in periods 1-6) are not reached anymore. Considering treatment 0R0, we note that LEFT gains in market share when the tax is levied on the RIGHT market in periods 7-12. The RIGHT market's share drops from 21% in periods 1-6 to 7% in periods 7-12. Abolishing the tax from the small RIGHT market brings back the market share (22%) almost exactly to pre-tax levels.

Figure 5 conveys a similar message as Figure 4. When the tax is introduced on the large LEFT market in treatment 0L2, it causes a huge drop in market share (of 82% when comparing periods 7-12 to periods 1-6). Trading does not shift back completely when the RIGHT market is also taxed from period 13 onwards. Yet, if the small RIGHT market is taxed in treatment 0R2 there are only minor effects. The RIGHT market loses only about 28% of its pre-tax market share when comparing periods 7-12 to periods 1-6. These losses are more than regained when the tax is also introduced in the large LEFT market from period 13 on. In sum, Figures 4 and 5 imply that introducing a Tobin tax on a relatively larger market leads to a stronger drop in market share than when the tax is introduced on a smaller market.

Figure 6 presents the two treatments where the Tobin tax is first levied on both markets, and afterwards abolished on one of them. The introduction of the tax in period 7 leads to a shift in market shares from the large to the small market. When the tax is abolished on one of the markets after period 12, this market captures almost the whole trading activity. For instance, when the tax is maintained on LEFT, but is abolished on RIGHT (02L, see solid line in Figure 6), the market share of LEFT drops from 65% in period 12 to 6% in period 13.

3.3 Tax revenues

Naive estimates of the revenues from a Tobin tax would multiply total turnover before the introduction of the tax by the intended tax rate (in our case, 1%,

since both buyer and seller pay a rate of 0.5%, resp.). Such an approach would be highly misleading, though, as Table 3 shows.

Insert Table 3 about here

The first column in Table 3 reports the average "hypothetical" tax revenues per period and market in phase 1, assuming that the whole turnover in these periods could have been taxed at 1%. These hypothetical revenues range from 237 Taler to 402 Taler. When both markets are actually taxed (see periods 7-12 in 02L or 02R, and periods 13-18 in 0L2 or 0R2) the tax revenues range only from 203 Taler to 271 Taler, and they are always smaller than the hypothetical revenues from periods 1-6 in the same treatment. If only one market is taxed, however, the tax revenues per period are at most 53 Taler, and on average only 25 Taler. This indicates massive tax avoidance through a shift in trading activity from the taxed to the untaxed market, as has been documented already in Figures 1 – 3.

4 Econometric analysis

The analysis in this section is based on the following panel regression equation (where y is a generic placeholder for the dependent variables that are considered separately in subsections 4.1 – 4.4):

$$y_{j,k} = \beta_{\mathrm{AR}}\mathrm{AR}(1) + \sum_{i\in\{b,t,u\}} \beta_i T^i_{j,k} + \epsilon_{j,k}. \tag{1}$$

The market[5] is denoted by $j = 1, \ldots, 24$, and $k = 1, \ldots, 18$ refers to the trading period index. $\mathrm{AR}(1) = y_{j,k-1}$ denotes the dependent variable lagged by one period. $T^i_{j,k}$ are tax dummies, where T^b equals 1 if both markets are taxed, T^u is set to 1 if the respective market is untaxed, but the other one taxed, and T^t takes on the value 1 for a taxed market when the other market is untaxed.

For each dependent variable we test for fixed or random unobserved effects both in the time domain and in the cross-section. Whenever such effects are detected, they are accounted for in the estimation procedure. We account for

[5]Note that we have two markets in every session of each of the six different treatments.

any remaining (time-) heteroskedasticity as well as autocorrelation within cross-sections by using a period SUR (PCSE) method to compute robust covariances (Beck and Katz, 1995).

4.1 Market volume

If only one market is taxed and the other one remains as a tax haven, the literature is unanimous about the likely consequences: Tax avoidance will lead to a reduction in volume on the taxed market and to a corresponding increase on the untaxed market. When both markets are taxed, a reduction in volume can be expected if the tax is successful in reducing short-term speculation (see, e.g., the contributions in Haq et al., 1996; Weaver et al., 2003).

To examine the effects of a Tobin tax on the volume of trading, we use equation (1) with the level of trading volume as the dependent variable. Trading volume is defined as the amount of Taler traded within each period. The first column in Table 4 shows that the trading volume on the taxed market is significantly reduced when only one market is taxed (see the negative coefficient of T^t), which is mirrored by an increase in volume on the untaxed market (see T^u). However, the net effect is significantly negative, indicating that taxation (even on one market only) reduces overall trading volume. This finding is perfectly in line with the literature and can be explained by tax avoidance. When both markets are taxed, the volume decreases (see T^b), and the decrease is larger than if only a single market is taxed (see the combined effects of T^t and T^u vs. T^b).

Insert Table 4 about here

4.2 Volatility

One key issue in the academic and political debate about the Tobin tax is its effect on market volatility. While some papers predict an increase in volatility (see, e.g., Aliber et al., 2003; Hau, 2006), others expect volatility to decrease (see, e.g., Westerhoff, 2003; Ehrenstein et al., 2005). We proxy volatility by the

average of absolute returns across each trading period (|Ret|):[6]

$$y_{j,k} = \frac{\sum_{\theta=1}^{\Theta} |\text{Ret}_{j,k,\theta}|}{\Theta}, \tag{2}$$

$$|\text{Ret}_{j,k,\theta}| = |\ln(P_{j,k,\theta}) - \ln(P_{j,k,\theta-1})|. \tag{3}$$

Here θ stands for each transaction and Θ measures the total number of transactions within a certain period k and market j. Previous studies of continuous double auction markets have found that the volatility of transaction prices is generally decreasing across trading periods (for a survey, see Sunder, 1995). Since the Tobin tax has only been introduced in period 7 or later in our experiment, it would be inadequate to compare the volatility of prices before and after introducing the tax without controlling for a time trend. Therefore, we include a linear trend term that absorbs any linear dependence on the number of trading periods.

The results are presented in the second column of Table 4, showing that volatility remains unchanged if a market is taxed. This holds regardless of whether the tax is encompassing (see T^b) or introduced only on a single market (see T^t). On the untaxed market, however, volatility *decreases* significantly (see T^u), supposedly due to higher liquidity as a consequence of an increase in trades and trading volume.

It seems important to note already at this point, though, that the insignificant coefficient of T^t is a consequence of two opposing interaction effects of the tax with market size. Section 4.5 will show in detail that volatility increases when the small market is taxed, but decreases when the large market is taxed. On aggregate, both effects balance each other, leading to the seeming null-effect on volatility when only one market is taxed.

4.3 Short-term speculation

We continue our analysis by looking at the effects of a Tobin tax on individual trading patterns, because one of the desired effects advocated by many

[6] As a robustness check, we repeated our estimation using the standard deviation of returns as the dependent variable. Reassuringly, our results did not change qualitatively. Details are available upon request.

proponents of a Tobin tax is to discourage the activities of short-term speculators. Bloomfield et al. (2006) find a decrease in short-term speculation in their single-market setting. With our two-market setup, we can examine the effects on speculation also in the presence of tax havens.

Given our information structure where new information arrives only at the beginning of trading periods, we can define a first measure for short-term speculation based on the number of times a trader switches from buying to selling within a given trading period. Since a currency's fundamental value remains constant within a trading period, the frequency of switching between buying and selling within a period indicates the extent to which a trader speculates on short-term price movements which are not driven by fundamentals. The validity of this measure may be adversely affected in periods when the price oscillates around the fundamental value. Therefore, we can construct a second proxy for short-term speculation from observing that short-term speculators typically favor a quick execution of orders, hence prefer market orders over limit orders.

For the first measure, we calculate the ratio of the absolute frequency of switching to the total number of trades minus one (for each trader). For example, consider a trader who first buys, then sells, then buys again and finally sells again. Hence, this trader switches three times, which is the maximum number of switches possible with four trades, yielding 3/(4–1)=100%. Our dependent variable (called "switching frequency") is constructed as the overall average per period across all 20 traders. The second proxy is calculated as the ratio of market orders to limit orders and termed "acceptance ratio". Results from the regressions using these dependent variables can be found in columns 3 and 4 of Table 4. Both proxies yield very similar results.

When only one market is taxed, short-term speculation is reduced on the taxed market (see T^t), as advocates of a Tobin tax would expect. However, the decrease in short-term speculation on the taxed market is accompanied by an increase in short-term speculation on the untaxed market (see T^u), which partly – but not fully – offsets the reduction in speculative behavior caused by the tax. Again, we can show that the Tobin tax has repercussions also on markets where

the tax is *not* levied. When both markets are taxed, we see that short-term speculation is significantly reduced (see T^b), confirming that the tax has the desired effects if no tax haven exists.

As regards our second proxy for short-term speculation, we find that the acceptance ratio decreases when a market is taxed. Yet, this decrease is not caused by a reduction in the number of limit orders (which are unaffected by a tax) but by a reduction in market orders, i.e., in the willingness to accept limit orders.

4.4 Market efficiency

Another issue on which the literature is ambiguous is market efficiency. While Ehrenstein (2002) and Westerhoff (2003) predict an increase in efficiency due to a Tobin tax, others expect the exact opposite (Kupiec, 1995; Subrahmanyam, 1998). The results of Bloomfield et al. (2006) are somewhat in between, reporting no change in efficiency following the introduction of the tax.

We measure informational efficiency by the absolute deviation between the average price within a trading period ($\overline{P}$) and the fundamental value (V), standardized over its average per market and period:

$$y_{j,k} = \frac{|\overline{P_{j,k}} - V_{j,k}|}{\frac{\sum_{k=1}^{18} |\overline{P_{j,k}} - V_{j,k}|}{18}}. \tag{4}$$

The results are shown in the last column of Table 4. We do not find any evidence of a change in market efficiency due to the presence of a Tobin tax. This holds both for the taxed markets as well as for the tax haven when only one market is taxed.

4.5 Influence of market size

The figures presented in Sections 3.1 and 3.2 have already suggested that there might be an interaction between market size and the effects of a Tobin tax. In order to substantiate this conjecture, we split our sample into two subsamples: The first (second) subsample contains those markets that had the larger

(smaller) market share in the first six trading periods.[7] In the following we discuss the interaction effects separately for the different tax regimes. The estimation results are summarized in Table 5.

Insert Table 5 about here

4.5.1 Tax on both markets

When the tax covers both markets (i.e., when there are no tax havens), the volume and market share of the large market decrease significantly as trading activity shifts to the smaller market. The market share of the small market increases correspondingly, while the volume on the small market remains unchanged (see row T^b in Table 5). Hence, an encompassing tax reduces the overall trading volume. Speculative behavior also decreases on the large market, while it does not increase on the small market (see the headings "Switching frequency" and "Acceptance ratio"). Volatility is not affected on either market, though (see the heading "Average absolute return").

4.5.2 Tax on the large market only

When the tax is levied on the large market only (see row T^t in columns "large"), we observe a massive shift in trading activity towards the small market (see row T^u in columns "small"). Both volume and market share decrease significantly on the large market, while simultaneously increasing (to a smaller extent, though) on the small market. Speculators are driven away from the large market by the tax, increasing speculative activity on the small market. However, the total effect (viewing both markets together) is a reduction in speculation. Volatility is significantly reduced on the large market in the presence of a tax, but remains unchanged on the small market (see the heading "average absolute return in %").

[7] We prefer splitting the sample to the alternative approach via dummy variables because the fixed effects transformation is not applicable for dummies that are constant for any cross-section.

4.5.3 Tax on the small market only

When the tax is levied on the small market only, two thirds of its volume are lost (see row T^t in columns "small"). About 90% of this loss in volume is due to a shift of market volume to the untaxed large market (T^u), implying that the overall reduction in trading volume across both markets is hardly noticeable. Short-term speculative behavior in the small market is significantly reduced and speculation does not shift to the large market, but simply vanishes. Volatility even *increases* on the small market when it is taxed, and decreases on the larger market.

Taken together, the results in subsections 4.5.2 and 4.5.3 are consistent with a recent model that postulates a U-shaped relationship of volatility and market volume (Haberer, 2004, 2006). While on the highly liquid large market a tax-driven reduction in volume (taken as a rough proxy for liquidity) leads to a decrease in volatility, the opposite effect is observed when a comparatively illiquid small market is taxed, thus driving out liquidity and increasing volatility.

4.6 Persistence of tax-effects when restoring equal tax regimes across both markets

So far, the literature has not addressed the possible long-term effects of a Tobin tax when it has been introduced unilaterally at first, but only later the tax regimes have been equalized again (by abolishing the unilateral tax or by introducing a tax also on the previously untaxed markets). To investigate the possibility of long-term effects that are due to being the first market to introduce a tax, we disregard periods 7-12 in those treatments where only one market is taxed in these periods (i.e. in treatments 0L0, 0R0, 0L2, 0R2). Then we compare for the market that is unilaterally taxed in periods 7-12 the volume and market share of this market in the first phase (periods 1-6) to the third phase (periods 13-18). We apply this procedure both to the large and the small market. The following regression is used (where the tax regime is either 010 or

012, and where “Phase3” is a dummy for periods 13-18 in phase 3):

$$y_{j,k} = \beta_{\text{AR}}\text{AR}(1) + \text{Phase3} \cdot \text{TaxRegime} + \epsilon_{j,k}. \quad (5)$$

We regress volume and market share separately on autoregressive terms and an interaction term of phase 3 and the prevailing tax regime. The results are shown in Table 6.

Insert Table 6 about here

The interaction terms for phase 3 and the prevailing tax regime yield the following result: If, following the introduction of a Tobin tax, this tax is abolished again later on (Phase 3 · 010), the trading volume on the large market does not recover to pre-tax levels again. On the small market, there is no such persistently harmful effect.

If the tax is first introduced on one market only, and later on the other market is taxed as well (Phase 3 · 012), the loss in market share on the large market is even more pronounced, and the small market gains permanently in market share.

When introducing a tax, possible effects from its future abolition are rarely considered. It is easy to imagine a scenario where a Tobin tax is first introduced on some markets (following, e.g., (Tobin, 1996) who suggests that taxing foreign exchange transactions at the major financial centers would suffice), but later abolished because other markets profit from their role as tax havens through massive shifts in volume from the taxed to the untaxed markets.

5 Conclusion

James Tobin has triggered a lively debate about the pros and cons of a transaction tax on foreign exchange markets. In this paper, we have examined in a controlled experiment many of the disputed issues. We have chosen an experimental approach because of the lack of empirical evidence from real foreign exchange markets.

Our experimental results confirm many of the effects expected from the introduction of a Tobin tax, while at the same time questioning some of its

alleged effects. Results on issues where there is broad consensus are, of course, easily anticipated: Trading volume is negatively affected when all markets are subjected to a Tobin tax, and the tax reduces the number of transactions. The large degree of the shift of trading and transactions from the taxed to the untaxed market – if a tax haven exists – may also be regarded as self-evident, as it is the outcome of massive tax avoidance, leading to almost negligible tax revenues in the presence of tax havens. The latter finding clearly questions many politicians' expectation of using the Tobin tax as a stable basis for tax revenues.

The more interesting issues are those where the results are difficult to anticipate. For instance, the interaction of market size and Tobin tax on market activity seems less straightforward. In fact, trading volume and trading activity are much more affected if the Tobin tax is levied on the larger of the two markets. The different positioning of both markets on subjects' screens has turned out to yield strong differences in market size (with an approximate ratio of 2:1 for the LEFT market when there is no tax), which has made it possible to detect these intricate interaction effects of market size and Tobin tax.[8] The stronger influence of the tax on the larger market seems to be driven by drying up the hitherto very liquid large market. When the tax is introduced on the small market, this relatively illiquid market recovers its rather low level of liquidity when the tax is abolished again.

One disputed key issue in the debate on the Tobin tax has been market volatility. We find no reduction in volatility due to the introduction of a Tobin tax if the tax is encompassing. This result is clearly in conflict with the hopes

[8]Though Tobin (1996) thought that it might be sufficient to introduce a Tobin tax on the large financial markets in the G7, our data clearly indicate that this might lead to huge distortions in market shares of different trading places, as long as tax havens exist. In order to tackle the possible problems associated with the existence of tax havens, Kenen (1995) proposed two strategies to avoid a massive shift in transaction volume to the tax havens. One is to tax transfers of funds to or from such locations at penalty rates high enough to deter market participants to relocate their transactions, the other is to levy the tax in the country the deal is closed rather than where the transaction occurs. Both strategies seem very difficult to implement in practice.

of the supporters of a Tobin tax. When the tax is introduced unilaterally on the larger (smaller) of the two markets, volatility decreases (increases). Noting that market size in our experiments is closely linked to liquidity, this result confirms theoretical results by Haberer (2004). Furthermore, it is important to note that a Tobin tax on one market has been found to decrease volatility on the untaxed market, which is mainly caused by a shift in trading volume. This effect has not been documented in the literature so far.

Another key issue besides volatility is the question of how a Tobin tax affects market efficiency. Confirming earlier experimental findings of Bloomfield et al. (2006) we observe no impact of the tax on informational efficiency, measured as the degree of mispricing.

We have also been able to document that a Tobin tax affects in particular the trading activities of those traders that might be classified as short-term speculators. The frequency of switching between buying and selling is adversely affected by the introduction of a tax, as is traders' willingness to issue market orders. This result is clearly in line with earlier findings of Bloomfield et al. (2006) who have shown that a securities transaction tax limits the activities of noise traders. In contrast to Bloomfield et al. (2006) we have been able to document these effects in a broader range of settings that includes both the uniform taxation of all foreign exchange markets and the parallel existence of taxed and untaxed markets. The latter case seems to be the one that is more likely – provided some politicians deem the (economic) consequences of a Tobin tax desirable and implement such a tax, whereas others abstain from it in order to benefit from shifts in trading volume towards tax havens. Our results show that speculators will mostly evade the tax, hence short-term speculation will shift to tax havens rather than vanish. Our results – in particular those in Section 4.5.2 – also show that the distortions caused by introducing a Tobin tax not worldwide, but on a subset of markets, cannot be undone completely by later on abolishing the tax again. This is possibly the most important political implication of our results, suggesting politicians should think twice before they use the financial markets in their countries for a real-time field experiment on

the economic consequences of a Tobin tax.

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Table 1: Experimental treatments.

	Phase 1		Phase 2		Phase 3	
Treatment	LEFT	RIGHT	LEFT	RIGHT	LEFT	RIGHT
0L0	-	-	0.5%	-	-	-
0R0	-	-	-	0.5%	-	-
0L2	-	-	0.5%	-	0.5%	0.5%
0R2	-	-	-	0.5%	0.5%	0.5%
02L	-	-	0.5%	0.5%	0.5%	-
02R	-	-	0.5%	0.5%	-	0.5%

Entries show the two-way tax rate for taxed markets (LEFT and/or RIGHT), dashes indicate the absence of taxes.

Table 2: Trading volume in Taler per period and market.

Tax regime	Phase 1	Phase 2	Phase 3
010 (0L0 + 0R0)	817.1	728.3	760.7
		–10.9%	+4.4%
012 (0L2 + 0R2)	650.2	693.4	572.5
		+6.6%	–17.4%
021 (02L + 02R)	880.9	596.8	737.0
		–32.3%	+23.5%

Percentage numbers represent changes in trading volume relative to the previous phase.

Table 3: Tax revenues in Gulden per period and market.

Treatment	Phase 1	Phase 2	Phase 3
0L0	*237*	18	*294*
0R0	*402*	16	*320*
0L2	*213*	29	203
0R2	*315*	53	271
02L	*340*	210	22
02R	*364*	271	14

Italic figures represent hypothetical tax revenues when both markets are untaxed, assuming that the actually observed turnover could have been taxed.

Table 4: Panel regressions (based on equation (1)).

	Volume	Average absolute return in %	Switching frequency in %	Acceptance ratio in %	Efficiency in %
intercept	283.037***	5.828***	14.161***	79.784***	98.869***
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
T^b	−66.695**	−0.542	−2.579*	−11.079***	−8.676
	(0.019)	(0.480)	(0.079)	(0.004)	(0.449)
T^t	−206.354***	0.166	−11.699***	−33.355***	15.915
	(0.000)	(0.834)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.260)
T^u	176.271***	−2.135***	5.692***	6.631	3.638
	(0.000)	(0.004)	(0.001)	(0.116)	(0.800)
AR(1)	0.258***	-	21.351***	-	-
	(0.000)		(0.000)		
lin. trend		−0.206***			
		(0.001)			
Fixed effects	CS	CS	CS	CS	P
R^2 (in %)	78.7	27.8	62.0	51.8	36.9
n	408	400	408	432	424

p-values are given in parentheses. T^b ... both markets taxed, T^u ... this market untaxed, but other market taxed, T^t ... this market taxed, but other market untaxed. CS... cross-section fixed effects, P... period fixed effects. *, ** and *** represent the 10%, 5% and the 1% significance levels.

Table 5: Panel regressions conditional on market size in phase 1 (periods 1-6).

	Volume		Market share		Av. abs. return in %		Accept. ratio in %		Switching freq. in %	
market size phase 1	large	small	large	small	large	small	large	small	large	small
intercept	552.678***	151.219***	52.080***	21.263***	5.615***	6.068***	88.919***	70.649***	26.690***	9.541***
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
T^b	−188.367***	0.962	−9.219***	9.219***	−0.888	−0.067	−13.776***	−8.382	−9.715***	−0.082
	(0.000)	(0.974)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.288)	(0.955)	(0.002)	(0.120)	(0.001)	(0.956)
T^t	−398.011***	−100.769***	−44.387***	−12.012***	−1.658**	2.268*	−42.710***	−23.999***	−23.879***	−7.200***
	(0.000)	(0.002)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.046)	(0.082)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
T^u	89.044**	263.324***	12.012***	44.387***	−2.380***	−1.824	−1.008	14.270**	−4.785	12.181***
	(0.019)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.004)	(0.110)	(0.839)	(0.013)	(0.112)	(0.000)
AR(1)	-	0.307***	-	0.267***	-	-	-	-	-	0.176***
		(0.000)		(0.000)						(0.004)
lin. trend	-	-	-	-	−0.160**	−0.261***	-	-		
					(0.024)	(0.000)				
Fixed effects	CS	CS	CS	CS	CS	CS	CS	CS	CS	CS&P
R^2 (in %)	82.3	69.6	86.4	86.4	39.5	24.4	61.2	43.1	72.2	57.2
n	216	204	204	204	215	209	216	216	216	204

p-values are given in parentheses. T^b . . . both markets taxed, T^u . . . this market untaxed, but other market taxed, T^t . . . this market taxed, but other market untaxed. CS. . . cross-section fixed effects, P. . . period fixed effects. *, ** and *** represent the 10%, 5% and the 1% significance levels.

Table 6: Effects of establishing equal tax regimes after the unilateral introduction of a tax.

	Large market		Small market	
Variable	Volume	Market share	Volume	Market share
intercept	552.646^{***}	52.939^{***}	75.421^{***}	18.392^{***}
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
$\text{Phase3} \cdot 010$	-123.333^{***}	-7.475	45.276	7.475
	(0.000)	(0.192)	(0.177)	(0.192)
$\text{Phase3} \cdot 012$	-161.792^{***}	-16.199^{***}	42.239	16.199^{***}
	(0.000)	(0.007)	(0.205)	(0.007)
AR(1)	-	28.669^{**}	0.555^{***}	28.669^{**}
		(0.033)	(0.000)	(0.033)
Fixed effects	CS	CS	CS	CS
R^2 (in %)	78.8	62.4	36.8	62.4
n	96	88	88	88

p-values are given in parentheses. Phase 3 ...dummy for last phase of experiment (periods 13-18), $012, 010$ ...tax regime dummy. CS... cross-section fixed effects. *, ** and *** represent the 10%, 5% and the 1% significance levels.



Figure 1: Transactions per period when only LEFT is taxed in periods 7-12.



Figure 2: Transactions per period when only RIGHT is taxed in periods 7-12.



Figure 3: Transactions per period when the tax is abolished on one market after period 12.



Figure 4: Market share of LEFT in 0L0 and 0R0.



Figure 5: Market share of LEFT in 0L2 and 0R2.



Figure 6: Market share of LEFT in 02L and 02R.

Appendix

Experimental Instructions

Background of the experiment

In this experiment 20 traders whose home currency is Gulden can trade Taler in two independent markets for 15-25 consecutive periods.

Market Mechanism

Each participant receives an initial endowment of 8,000 Gulden (G) and 200 Taler (T). Trading will occur through double auctions in two independent markets (called LEFT and RIGHT). In both markets the initial price of Taler is 40 Gulden. This implies that each trader holds 50 percent of his/her total wealth in Taler and 50 percent in Gulden. The price of the Taler is determined by your and the other traders' actions in the market. As orders will not always be identical on both markets, there may be two different prices for Taler. No interest is paid for Taler or Gulden. The value of the Taler is determined by a set of economic factors (not modeled here) and follows a random-walk process without drift:

$$P_k = P_{k-1} + \epsilon_k,$$

with P_k being the value of Taler in period k and ϵ_k follows a standard normal distribution. This implies that this period's value is the best estimator for next period's value. Each trader is free to buy or sell Taler at any time on any market. You can trade on both markets at the same time. You may buy in one market and sell in the other, buy in both, etc. All traders always receive the same information on the value of the Taler and everybody sees all transaction prices of the respective period.

Trading strategies

You are free to follow any trading strategy you want.



Trading

The trading mechanism is a double auction. This means that each trader can act as seller and as buyer. You are free to submit as many bids and asks (in the range of 10 to 500 with up to two decimal places) as you wish. For each order you have to enter a price and the number of Taler you want to trade. Your holdings of Taler and Gulden can not fall below zero.

Total wealth

Your wealth in Gulden is the sum of your Gulden holdings plus the Gulden value of your Taler (the number of Taler you hold multiplied with the current price; of the two markets the price with the higher volume is used). If you buy Taler your Gulden holdings are immediately reduced and vice versa. Your wealth will change during a period as the market price changes, even if you do not trade; the most recent trading price will be used to value your Taler.



Important details

- Each period lasts 100 seconds.
- The experiment will be terminated randomly between periods 15 and 25.
- Your payment at the end of the experiment depends on your trading success relative to all other participants. This incentive structure is usually used for professional funds managers. Specifically: at the end of each period your wealth will be divided to the average wealth of all participants. The resulting numbers (smaller than 1 if your wealth is below average, equal 1 if it is exactly the average and larger than 1 otherwise) for all periods are added up, yielding a final score. The higher this score, the higher your payment will be. In total we will distribute 340 Euros for this session. To determine your share of this amount the scores of all traders will be added up and 340 will be divided by the total score. Multiplying the result by your score gives your final payment.

Additional material for referees – Data for single sessions (with 20 traders in each session, not intended for publication)

0L0_Session 1

Figure A1: Development of prices, volume and trades over time.



Single transaction prices as a function of time (top panel) of market LEFT and RIGHT. Volume and number of trades per period of market LEFT and RIGHT (lower panel).

0L0_Session 2

Figure A2: Development of prices, volume and trades over time.



Single transaction prices as a function of time (top panel) of market LEFT and RIGHT. Volume and number of trades per period of market LEFT and RIGHT (lower panel).

0R0_Session 1

Figure A3: Development of prices, volume and trades over time.



Single transaction prices as a function of time (top panel) of market LEFT and RIGHT. Volume and number of trades per period of market LEFT and RIGHT (lower panel).

0R0_Session 2

Figure A4: Development of prices, volume and trades over time.



Single transaction prices as a function of time (top panel) of market LEFT and RIGHT. Volume and number of trades per period of market LEFT and RIGHT (lower panel).

0L2_Session 1

Figure A5: Development of prices, volume and trades over time.



Single transaction prices as a function of time (top panel) of market LEFT and RIGHT. Volume and number of trades per period of market LEFT and RIGHT (lower panel).

0L2_Session 2

Figure A6: Development of prices, volume and trades over time.



Single transaction prices as a function of time (top panel) of market LEFT and RIGHT. Volume and number of trades per period of market LEFT and RIGHT (lower panel).

0R2_Session 1

Figure A7: Development of prices, volume and trades over time.



Single transaction prices as a function of time (top panel) of market LEFT and RIGHT. Volume and number of trades per period of market LEFT and RIGHT (lower panel).

0R2_Session 2

Figure A8: Development of prices, volume and trades over time.



Single transaction prices as a function of time (top panel) of market LEFT and RIGHT. Volume and number of trades per period of market LEFT and RIGHT (lower panel).

02L_Session 1

Figure A9: Development of prices, volume and trades over time.



Single transaction prices as a function of time (top panel) of market LEFT and RIGHT. Volume and number of trades per period of market LEFT and RIGHT (lower panel).

02L_Session 2

Figure A10: Development of prices, volume and trades over time.



Single transaction prices as a function of time (top panel) of market LEFT and RIGHT. Volume and number of trades per period of market LEFT and RIGHT (lower panel).

02R_Session 1

Figure A11: Development of prices, volume and trades over time.



Single transaction prices as a function of time (top panel) of market LEFT and RIGHT. Volume and number of trades per period of market LEFT and RIGHT (lower panel).

02R_Session 2

Figure A12: Development of prices, volume and trades over time.



Single transaction prices as a function of time (top panel) of market LEFT and RIGHT. Volume and number of trades per period of market LEFT and RIGHT (lower panel).

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2007-18

Michael Hanke, Jürgen Huber, Michael Kirchler and Matthias Sutter

The economic consequences of a Tobin tax – An experimental analysis

Abstract

The effects of a Tobin tax on foreign exchange markets have long been disputed. We present an experiment with currency trading on two markets, where either none, one, or both markets are taxed. Our results confirm the hitherto undisputed issues: a tax reduces trading volume, shifts market share to untaxed markets, and leads to negligible tax revenues if tax havens exist. Concerning the controversial issues we find that (i) volatility effects depend on the existence of tax havens and on market size, (ii) market efficiency remains unaffected by the tax, (iii) short-term speculation is reduced, and (iv) the tax has persistent effects even after its abolishment.

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