



**HAL**  
open science

# The economic returns of bonding and bridging social capital for immigrant men in Germany

Bram Lancee

► **To cite this version:**

Bram Lancee. The economic returns of bonding and bridging social capital for immigrant men in Germany. *Ethnic and Racial Studies*, Taylor & Francis (Routledge), 2011, PP (PP), 10.1080/01419870.2011.591405 . hal-00713342


**HAL Id: hal-00713342**

**<https://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/hal-00713342>**

Submitted on 30 Jun 2012

**HAL** is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of scientific research documents, whether they are published or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in France or abroad, or from public or private research centers.

L'archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire **HAL**, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d'enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés.



**The economic returns of bonding and bridging social capital  
for immigrant men in Germany**

Journal:	<i>Ethnic and Racial Studies</i>
Manuscript ID:	RERS-2010-0101.R2
Manuscript Type:	Original Manuscript
Keywords:	Social Capital, Labour market, Immigrants, Longitudinal analysis, Germany, Inter-ethnic relations

SCHOLARONE™  
Manuscripts

# The economic returns of bonding and bridging social capital for immigrant men in Germany

Bram Lancee

**Abstract.** Using longitudinal data, this paper analyses the effect of different forms of social capital on the likelihood of employment and the occupational status of first generation immigrant men in Germany. This allows me to examine to what extent social capital of the bonding and the bridging type yield different returns. It is studied how contacts with natives, co-ethnic ties and family-based social capital are beneficial to the economic position of immigrant men. Random effects and fixed effects models show that strong inter-ethnic ties are beneficial both for employment and occupational status. There is no effect of co-ethnic ties and family-based social capital. It is concluded that, also when using panel data, bridging social capital contributes to a better economic position and bonding social capital does not.

**Keywords:** Social capital; labour market; immigrants; longitudinal analysis; Germany.

## Introduction

One of the main challenges that Western countries are faced with is how to deal with the increasing share of immigrants and their descendants. The incorporation of immigrants into the labour market of the host society is of utmost importance to social cohesion. One of the approaches to explain labour market outcomes of immigrants is to use social capital theory. Research that examines the relation between immigrants' social capital and its economic returns is scarce but growing steadily, for example with respect to employment (Aguilera 2002, Kalter 2006, Lancee 2010), income (Mouw 2002, Aguilera and Massey 2003, Aguilera 2005, Amuedo-Dorantes and Mundra 2008), self-employment (Kanas et al. 2009b) and occupational status (Sanders and Nee 1996, Kanas et al. 2009a). The general conclusion is that social capital helps immigrants to make headway on the labour market.

1  
2  
3 Recent discussions on social capital distinguish between 'bonding' and 'bridging'  
4 (Putnam 2000, Burt 2001). Loosely defined, bonding refers to within-group connections, while  
5 bridging social capital refers to between-group connections. Distinguishing between different  
6 forms of social capital seems particularly important with regard to immigrants. For immigrants,  
7 especially social capital of the bridging type is expected to yield positive returns since it  
8 implies building much needed host-country specific capital (Kalter 2006, Haug 2007, Lancee  
9 and Hartung 2011). However, returns with respect to bonding social capital may not be that  
10 straightforward. Networks of immigrants are often characterized as isolated and therefore  
11 hindering economic integration (Portes 1998b). On the other hand, immigrants are repeatedly  
12 characterized as having a social network that is based on ethnic solidarity (see for example  
13 Sanders and Nee 1996, Sanders et al. 2002, Waldinger 2005).

14  
15  
16  
17  
18  
19  
20  
21  
22  
23  
24  
25 It is often suggested that whereas bonding social capital is "to get by", bridging social  
26 capital is "to get ahead" (Putnam 2000, p. 23). This seems to hold for immigrants' social  
27 capital too (See for example Kanas et al. 2009b, Lancee 2010). However, previous studies  
28 predominantly rely on cross-sectional data. The major problem with cross-sectional data is  
29 that it cannot solve the problems of unobserved heterogeneity and reversed causality. One of  
30 the main challenges in estimating the effect of social capital is that of homophily: people  
31 connect with those who are similar to them (see for a review McPherson et al. 2001, Mouw  
32 2006). In the words of Mouw (2003, p. 869): '(...) if successful people prefer to socialize with  
33 other successful people, this would result in a correlation between friends' income and  
34 occupational status, even in the absence of a causal effect of social capital on labour market  
35 outcomes'. Many studies analysing the effect of social capital rely on cross-sectional data, or  
36 use longitudinal models that do not solve the problem of unobserved heterogeneity. Hence,  
37 estimates of social capital may be biased. There are only few studies on the economic  
38 incorporation of immigrants that analyze the impact of both bonding and bridging social  
39 capital simultaneously and none uses longitudinal data.

40  
41  
42  
43  
44  
45  
46  
47  
48  
49  
50  
51  
52  
53  
54  
55  
56  
57  
58  
59  
60  
61  
62  
63  
64  
65  
66  
67  
68  
69  
70  
71  
72  
73  
74  
75  
76  
77  
78  
79  
80  
81  
82  
83  
84  
85  
86  
87  
88  
89  
90  
91  
92  
93  
94  
95  
96  
97  
98  
99  
100  
101  
102  
103  
104  
105  
106  
107  
108  
109  
110  
111  
112  
113  
114  
115  
116  
117  
118  
119  
120  
121  
122  
123  
124  
125  
126  
127  
128  
129  
130  
131  
132  
133  
134  
135  
136  
137  
138  
139  
140  
141  
142  
143  
144  
145  
146  
147  
148  
149  
150  
151  
152  
153  
154  
155  
156  
157  
158  
159  
160  
161  
162  
163  
164  
165  
166  
167  
168  
169  
170  
171  
172  
173  
174  
175  
176  
177  
178  
179  
180  
181  
182  
183  
184  
185  
186  
187  
188  
189  
190  
191  
192  
193  
194  
195  
196  
197  
198  
199  
200  
201  
202  
203  
204  
205  
206  
207  
208  
209  
210  
211  
212  
213  
214  
215  
216  
217  
218  
219  
220  
221  
222  
223  
224  
225  
226  
227  
228  
229  
230  
231  
232  
233  
234  
235  
236  
237  
238  
239  
240  
241  
242  
243  
244  
245  
246  
247  
248  
249  
250  
251  
252  
253  
254  
255  
256  
257  
258  
259  
260  
261  
262  
263  
264  
265  
266  
267  
268  
269  
270  
271  
272  
273  
274  
275  
276  
277  
278  
279  
280  
281  
282  
283  
284  
285  
286  
287  
288  
289  
290  
291  
292  
293  
294  
295  
296  
297  
298  
299  
300  
301  
302  
303  
304  
305  
306  
307  
308  
309  
310  
311  
312  
313  
314  
315  
316  
317  
318  
319  
320  
321  
322  
323  
324  
325  
326  
327  
328  
329  
330  
331  
332  
333  
334  
335  
336  
337  
338  
339  
340  
341  
342  
343  
344  
345  
346  
347  
348  
349  
350  
351  
352  
353  
354  
355  
356  
357  
358  
359  
360  
361  
362  
363  
364  
365  
366  
367  
368  
369  
370  
371  
372  
373  
374  
375  
376  
377  
378  
379  
380  
381  
382  
383  
384  
385  
386  
387  
388  
389  
390  
391  
392  
393  
394  
395  
396  
397  
398  
399  
400  
401  
402  
403  
404  
405  
406  
407  
408  
409  
410  
411  
412  
413  
414  
415  
416  
417  
418  
419  
420  
421  
422  
423  
424  
425  
426  
427  
428  
429  
430  
431  
432  
433  
434  
435  
436  
437  
438  
439  
440  
441  
442  
443  
444  
445  
446  
447  
448  
449  
450  
451  
452  
453  
454  
455  
456  
457  
458  
459  
460  
461  
462  
463  
464  
465  
466  
467  
468  
469  
470  
471  
472  
473  
474  
475  
476  
477  
478  
479  
480  
481  
482  
483  
484  
485  
486  
487  
488  
489  
490  
491  
492  
493  
494  
495  
496  
497  
498  
499  
500  
501  
502  
503  
504  
505  
506  
507  
508  
509  
510  
511  
512  
513  
514  
515  
516  
517  
518  
519  
520  
521  
522  
523  
524  
525  
526  
527  
528  
529  
530  
531  
532  
533  
534  
535  
536  
537  
538  
539  
540  
541  
542  
543  
544  
545  
546  
547  
548  
549  
550  
551  
552  
553  
554  
555  
556  
557  
558  
559  
560  
561  
562  
563  
564  
565  
566  
567  
568  
569  
570  
571  
572  
573  
574  
575  
576  
577  
578  
579  
580  
581  
582  
583  
584  
585  
586  
587  
588  
589  
590  
591  
592  
593  
594  
595  
596  
597  
598  
599  
600  
601  
602  
603  
604  
605  
606  
607  
608  
609  
610  
611  
612  
613  
614  
615  
616  
617  
618  
619  
620  
621  
622  
623  
624  
625  
626  
627  
628  
629  
630  
631  
632  
633  
634  
635  
636  
637  
638  
639  
640  
641  
642  
643  
644  
645  
646  
647  
648  
649  
650  
651  
652  
653  
654  
655  
656  
657  
658  
659  
660  
661  
662  
663  
664  
665  
666  
667  
668  
669  
670  
671  
672  
673  
674  
675  
676  
677  
678  
679  
680  
681  
682  
683  
684  
685  
686  
687  
688  
689  
690  
691  
692  
693  
694  
695  
696  
697  
698  
699  
700  
701  
702  
703  
704  
705  
706  
707  
708  
709  
710  
711  
712  
713  
714  
715  
716  
717  
718  
719  
720  
721  
722  
723  
724  
725  
726  
727  
728  
729  
730  
731  
732  
733  
734  
735  
736  
737  
738  
739  
740  
741  
742  
743  
744  
745  
746  
747  
748  
749  
750  
751  
752  
753  
754  
755  
756  
757  
758  
759  
760  
761  
762  
763  
764  
765  
766  
767  
768  
769  
770  
771  
772  
773  
774  
775  
776  
777  
778  
779  
780  
781  
782  
783  
784  
785  
786  
787  
788  
789  
790  
791  
792  
793  
794  
795  
796  
797  
798  
799  
800  
801  
802  
803  
804  
805  
806  
807  
808  
809  
810  
811  
812  
813  
814  
815  
816  
817  
818  
819  
820  
821  
822  
823  
824  
825  
826  
827  
828  
829  
830  
831  
832  
833  
834  
835  
836  
837  
838  
839  
840  
841  
842  
843  
844  
845  
846  
847  
848  
849  
850  
851  
852  
853  
854  
855  
856  
857  
858  
859  
860  
861  
862  
863  
864  
865  
866  
867  
868  
869  
870  
871  
872  
873  
874  
875  
876  
877  
878  
879  
880  
881  
882  
883  
884  
885  
886  
887  
888  
889  
890  
891  
892  
893  
894  
895  
896  
897  
898  
899  
900  
901  
902  
903  
904  
905  
906  
907  
908  
909  
910  
911  
912  
913  
914  
915  
916  
917  
918  
919  
920  
921  
922  
923  
924  
925  
926  
927  
928  
929  
930  
931  
932  
933  
934  
935  
936  
937  
938  
939  
940  
941  
942  
943  
944  
945  
946  
947  
948  
949  
950  
951  
952  
953  
954  
955  
956  
957  
958  
959  
960  
961  
962  
963  
964  
965  
966  
967  
968  
969  
970  
971  
972  
973  
974  
975  
976  
977  
978  
979  
980  
981  
982  
983  
984  
985  
986  
987  
988  
989  
990  
991  
992  
993  
994  
995  
996  
997  
998  
999  
1000

The contribution of this paper is twofold. First, I contribute to the field by analysing the economic returns of two main forms of social capital simultaneously for immigrants in Germany. Second, the paper better estimates the effect of social capital by making use of

1  
2  
3 longitudinal data and estimation methods that account for potential unobserved heterogeneity  
4 and reversed causality.  
5  
6  
7  
8

### 9 10 **Theory and hypotheses**

11 Social capital refers to the resources that are potentially available in one's network. A social  
12 network can be considered a capital, which can produce returns in order to improve  
13 (economic) well-being. There is no commonly accepted definition of social capital. In this  
14 paper, I follow Lin (1999, p. 30) and see social capital as 'investment and use of embedded  
15 resources in social relations for expected returns'.  
16  
17  
18  
19  
20  
21  
22

#### 23 *Bridging social capital*

24  
25 Bridging social capital is referred to as the building of connections between heterogeneous  
26 groups (Schuller et al. 2000), or, in the words of Putnam (2007, p. 143) as 'ties to people  
27 "unlike" you in some important way'. In the migration literature, bridging social capital usually  
28 refers to contacts with natives (see, for example Putnam 2007, Nannestad et al. 2008, Kanas  
29 et al. 2009b, Lancee 2010). The advantage of bridging ties is that unique information and  
30 opportunities come into reach (Putnam 2000, p. 22). It is well established in the literature that  
31 for immigrants, contacts with natives are important cross-cutting ties (Portes 1998a, Heath  
32 and Yu 2005, Haug 2008).  
33  
34  
35  
36  
37  
38  
39  
40

41 Bridging social capital, seen as bridging the ethnic divide is beneficial to immigrants  
42 because it provides access to host country specific resources. Moreover, it provides unique  
43 information about labour market opportunities. The idea of social capital being a *capital* – in  
44 the sense that investments yield positive returns – is based on the assumption that social  
45 relations connect people to valuable resources (see for example Flap and Völker 2004).  
46 According to Nederveen Pieterse (2003), inter-ethnic relations help immigrants to get access  
47 to helpful resources beyond their homogenous ethnic networks. In other words, migrants with  
48 ties to the native population gain access to host-country specific resources.  
49  
50  
51  
52  
53  
54  
55  
56

57 There is ample evidence that for successful integration in the labour market of the host  
58 society, migrants need host-country specific skills (Borjas 1994, Duleep and Regets 1999,  
59 Friedberg 2000, Zeng and Xie 2004, Kanas and Van Tubergen 2009). The argument of the  
60

1  
2  
3 need for host-country specific capital is predominantly made with respect to human capital,  
4 such as educational attainment and language proficiency (Chiswick and Miller 2002).  
5  
6 However, this argument is also central to bridging social capital: by building inter-ethnic ties,  
7 migrants realize access to resources that they have typically little of themselves. Contacts  
8 with natives hence help to make headway on the labour market because it implies getting  
9 access to much needed host-country specific resources, for example by getting help with  
10 applications, translating adverts, finding vacancies, or assistance on how to present oneself  
11 to employers (Aguilera and Massey 2003).  
12  
13  
14  
15  
16  
17  
18

19 Furthermore, as Haug (2003) points out, 'since (...) in Germany most employers are  
20 Germans, it is useful for immigrants to have contacts to Germans.' Because most employers  
21 are native residents it is helpful to have ties with natives. Moreover, since natives are, on  
22 average, higher educated and have better jobs themselves, they are more likely to be well  
23 informed and able to point to better jobs. Earlier studies indeed find that contacts with natives  
24 help immigrants to make headway on the labour market, both with respect to employment as  
25 well as occupational status (see, for example, Aguilera and Massey 2003, Kalter 2006, Kanas  
26 et al. 2009b, Lancee 2010).  
27  
28  
29  
30  
31  
32  
33

34 Hence, the first hypothesis reads: *Bridging social capital positively affects both the*  
35 *likelihood to be employed and occupational status.*  
36  
37  
38

#### 39 *Bonding social capital*

40 Bonding social capital is usually referred to as within-group connections. The underlying  
41 principle is that of network closure (Coleman 1990, Burt 2005). In the case of total closure in  
42 a network, all people are connected with one another. The clearest case of a network with a  
43 high degree of closure is probably the family (Coleman 1988). In their "forms of capital" model  
44 for immigrant incorporation into the labour market, Nee and Sanders (2001, p. 388)  
45 emphasize the pivotal role of the family (see also Sanders and Nee 1996). Their general  
46 argument is that '[t]he mode of incorporation is largely a function of the social, human-cultural  
47 capital of immigrant families and how these resources are used by individuals within and  
48 apart from the existing structure of ethnic networks and institutions'.  
49  
50  
51  
52  
53  
54  
55  
56  
57  
58  
59  
60

1  
2  
3 Not only family ties contribute to a network with a high degree of closure. One could  
4  
5 classify all ties with co-ethnics as contributing to a dense network with closure (see Sanders  
6  
7 2002, for a review of studies on social relations and closure in ethnic communities). Portes  
8  
9 and Sensenbrenner (1993) identify two sources of social capital. "Bounded solidarity" involves  
10  
11 a sense of group solidarity that manifests as a reaction to real or perceived threats of a group,  
12  
13 and "enforceable trust", the monitoring and sanctioning capacity of a group. Sanders (2002, p.  
14  
15 348) concludes: '[r]esearch leaves little doubt as to the importance of social capital derived  
16  
17 through ethnic networks in promoting economic action.' Bonding social capital is hence  
18  
19 measured as ties with co-ethnics and as the strength of ties with the extended family.  
20

21  
22 With respect to its returns, there are two competing arguments. On the one hand,  
23  
24 bonding social capital may result in better labour market outcomes. The key advantage of  
25  
26 closure in a network is superior information and a high degree of solidarity. As opposed to  
27  
28 inter-ethnic ties, co-ethnic ties may profit from ethnic solidarity (Sanders 2002). Hence, the  
29  
30 more closure in a network, the more likely the sharing and exchange of resources (Lin 2001,  
31  
32 p. 66). There is evidence that, for immigrants, the main source of information on jobs is  
33  
34 through relatives and friends, particularly those who belong to the same ethnic origin (Zhou  
35  
36 1992, Waldinger 1994, Pichler 1997, Menjivar 2000). Ethnic networks can function as a  
37  
38 means to make headway on the labour market, since these networks rely on ethnic solidarity  
39  
40 and enforceable trust (Portes and Sensenbrenner 1993, Portes 1995, Waldinger 1995). Nee  
41  
42 and Sanders conclude (2001, pp. 389-90): '(...) especially for immigrants who do not possess  
43  
44 substantial financial capital, the family (nuclear and extended) constitutes the most important  
45  
46 capital asset. (...) The social capital embodied in family relationships promotes cooperation  
47  
48 needed in realizing both economic and non-economic values.' Elliott (2001, but see also  
49  
50 Stainback 2008) finds that Latinos are more likely than natives to enter jobs by matching  
51  
52 people and jobs through ethnic social networks. Patacchini and Zenou (2008) find that ethnic  
53  
54 networks in Britain increase the probability of finding employment.

55  
56 On the other hand, immigrants' bonding social capital is characterized as isolated.  
57  
58 Consequently, if jobs are found through ethnic and family networks, they are likely to be  
59  
60 inferior (Nee and Sanders 2001). The argument is that resources accessed through a network  
of co-ethnics and family members do not provide unique information; they hence do not result

1  
2  
3 in opportunities for upward mobility on the labour market. When being embedded into ethnic  
4  
5 networks only, successful upward mobility may be impeded due to social obligations,  
6  
7 pressure to conformity, or “downward levelling norms” (Portes, 1998). Such mobility traps can  
8  
9 consequently lead to ethnic segmentation or “downward assimilation” (Portes, 1995). The  
10  
11 embedding into ethnic networks may prevent contacts with the host society and thus hamper  
12  
13 integration (Haug 2007: 100). Lancee (2010) does not find an effect of family-based social  
14  
15 capital for immigrants in the Netherlands with respect to employment and income. Elliott  
16  
17 (1999) concludes that job referrals based on co-ethnic ties result in jobs that are paid worse  
18  
19 for immigrants in the US.

20  
21 It seems that bonding social capital may help to find a job; it however does not help to  
22  
23 find a *better* job. Therefore, the second hypothesis is twofold: *Bonding social capital positively*  
24  
25 *affects the likelihood to be employed* and secondly, *for employed men, bonding social capital*  
26  
27 *does not affect occupational status*.

## 30 31 **Data and measurement**

### 32 33 *Sample*

34  
35 For the measurement, I make use of the German Socio-Economic Panel Survey (GSOEP), a  
36  
37 panel study with a yearly questionnaire since 1984 (Wagner et al. 1993). In 1996, 2001 and  
38  
39 2006 the survey included a module on social networks. Because of this, the panel used in this  
40  
41 analysis is restricted to the years 1996-2007. The GSOEP oversamples immigrants and  
42  
43 contains four immigrant sub-samples<sup>i</sup> with extensive information on migration history and  
44  
45 specific questionnaire items. The initial response rate for the immigrant sample varied from  
46  
47 64.7 percent for Italians, to 70 percent for Turks. Response rates for subsequent waves were  
48  
49 considerably higher.

50  
51 As with all panels, the GSOEP is subject to attrition, which could bias the results  
52  
53 (Riphahn 2004). The main sources of attrition were refusal and unsuccessful follow-up;  
54  
55 special measures were taken to reduce attrition, such as contacting respondents again each  
56  
57 year until all members of the household refused for two consecutive years (Kroh and Spieß  
58  
59 2008). The average attrition rate of the immigrant samples is 22%. (Haisken-DeNew and  
60  
Frick 2005, p. 160). In the research sample, the attrition rate is 14.3%<sup>ii</sup>; attrition was not



1  
2  
3 related to a specific ethnic group. However, attrition could be related to return-migration and  
4 consequently bias the sample towards long-term migrants. The fact that the average years of  
5 stay in Germany is just over 23 years indicates that the sample is indeed most representative  
6 for long-term migrants. In addition, the GSOEP 'foreigner' sample is in fact a guest worker  
7 sample of which the vast part is to stay for good. When one compares the research sample to  
8 the ethnic minority population in Germany, the classic guest worker groups are indeed over-  
9 represented (Turks, Ex-Yugoslavians, Greeks, Italians, Spanish and Portuguese), the other  
10 groups are under-represented (Eastern Europe, EU Western, and non EU).

11  
12  
13  
14  
15  
16  
17  
18  
19  
20  
21  
22  
23  
24  
25  
26  
27  
28  
29  
30  
31  
32  
33  
34  
35  
36  
37  
38  
39  
40  
41  
42  
43  
44  
45  
46  
47  
48  
49  
50  
51  
52  
53  
54  
55  
56  
57  
58  
59  
60  
People are classified as an immigrant if they are born outside Germany and do not  
have a German nationality<sup>iii</sup>. The sample is restricted to men because employment careers,  
as well as social networks differ substantially among (immigrant) men and women (Hagan  
1998, Livingston 2006). The sample for the analysis of the likelihood of employment consists  
of all men aged eighteen till sixty-five. Those who are in school, performing military or civil  
service, or those retired earlier than age sixty-five are excluded from the sample. For the  
analyses of occupational status, the sample is furthermore restricted to people who work  
either full-time or regular part-time. Missing values are replaced with information available  
from earlier waves. In the years between the measurements of social capital items,  
respondents were given the last known value of this item (following Kalter 2006).

#### *Method of estimation*

One of the problems in empirical research on the effects of social capital is that of reversed  
causality. It may well be that more social capital results in better labour market outcomes, but  
it is also likely that a better position on the labour market results in more social capital (see  
Mouw 2006, for a recent review on the measurement of causality in social capital). That is,  
one could meet people just after finding a job, and this could result in a correlation between  
social capital and employment that is caused by employment, rather than by social contacts.  
For that reason, indicators of social capital are lagged one year. By doing so, social capital is  
measured at an earlier point in time than employment and occupational status.

Another problem in cross-sectional research is the problem of unobserved  
heterogeneity: an effect can be due to enduring differences between people, rather than

1  
2  
3 because of having acquired social capital. Mouw (2006, but see also Halaby 1994) reviews  
4 the studies on social capital that aim to estimate a causal relationship, and is most favourable  
5 towards studies that apply fixed effects models.  
6  
7

8  
9 The fixed effects (FE) model estimates an intercept for each individual in the model.  
10 The FE model uses each variable's difference from its within-individual mean and hence can  
11 estimate only coefficients that have within-individual variation (Mouw 2006, Rabe-Hesketh  
12 and Skrondal 2008). The big advantage of the FE model is that it controls for all differences  
13 between individuals, thereby eliminating unobserved heterogeneity (Halaby 2004). The  
14 disadvantage of FE models is that it is not possible to estimate time-constant covariates, such  
15 as ethnic origin. Another disadvantage is that, because FE models only use within-individual  
16 variation, they are –by definition– more sensitive to attrition. Last, in its logistic variant,  
17 individuals without variation on the dependent variable are excluded from the analysis since  
18 they don't provide information for the likelihood function.  
19  
20  
21  
22  
23  
24  
25  
26  
27

28  
29 The random effects (RE) model assumes a randomly varying intercept, and the  
30 intercept is a draw from some distribution for each unit, and it is independent of the error for a  
31 particular observation (Rabe-Hesketh and Skrondal 2008). The advantage of the RE model is  
32 that it uses within- and between-individual information; hence also time-constant covariates  
33 be estimated. Moreover, the RE estimator is more efficient. Last, the logistic variant of the RE  
34 model does not require within-individual variation on the dependent variable and therefore  
35 makes use of the complete sample. The major drawback is that the random intercept is  
36 assumed to be uncorrelated with the covariates; it therefore cannot control for unobserved  
37 individual characteristics. Therefore, although RE models use the panel structure of the data,  
38 they do not solve the problem of unobserved heterogeneity (Halaby 2004).  
39  
40  
41  
42  
43  
44  
45  
46  
47

48 Since FE and RE models have advantages as well as disadvantages, I estimate both.  
49 A Hausman test is performed to see which model is to be preferred from a statistical point of  
50 view.  
51  
52  
53

#### 54 55 56 *Measures*

57 The likelihood of employment is measured as being fulltime or regular part-time employed, as  
58 opposed to being unemployed, looking for a job or not working. The occupational status is  
59  
60

1  
2  
3 measured by the International Socio-Economic Index of Occupational Status (ISEI)  
4  
5 (Ganzeboom et al. 1992), which summarizes the power, income and required educational  
6  
7 achievement associated with the various positions in the occupational structure.  
8

9  
10 Three variables are constructed to measure bonding social capital. In 1996, 2001 and  
11  
12 2006 the GSOEP contains a module named 'social networks and persons to confide in'. In  
13  
14 this module, people are asked to mention up to three people outside their household that are  
15  
16 important to them. The introduction phrase reads: 'Now some questions about your friends  
17  
18 and acquaintances: Please think of three friends or relatives or other people whom you go out  
19  
20 with or meet often. Please do not include relatives or other people who live in the same  
21  
22 household as you'. Ties are subsequently classified as 'Is from another country or is  
23  
24 foreigner' or as 'Is from one of the old/new Federal states'. For ties classified as 'from another  
25  
26 country or foreigner', it is asked whether the respondent comes from the same country as the  
27  
28 person mentioned. If this is the case, the ties are included as bonding social capital.

29  
30 In 1996 and 2001, a module is available containing questions about people's relatives  
31  
32 outside the household. Respondents are asked to indicate which family members they have  
33  
34 and how strong their relationship is. The introduction phrase reads: 'Now a question  
35  
36 concerning family members who don't live at home: Which ones and how many of the  
37  
38 following relatives do you have?' Subsequently, respondents are asked 'For those relatives  
39  
40 that you do have how close is your relationship?' (no relationship, fleeting, average, close,  
41  
42 very close). From these items, a construct called "Strength of family ties" is built. Reliability  
43  
44 analysis (Cronbach's alpha 1996: .82, 2001: .81) clearly shows that these items can be seen  
45  
46 as underlying measures of a single construct. As a proxy for family network size, I also  
47  
48 include the number of family members.

49  
50 The following variables are included to measure bridging social capital. First, a variable  
51  
52 containing the ties mentioned above which are classified as coming 'from the old/new Federal  
53  
54 states'<sup>iv</sup>. The second measure for bridging social capital is a construct labelled "Visiting native  
55  
56 Germans at home". Every second year, respondents were asked whether they visited  
57  
58 Germans at their home previous year (yes / no) and whether they received visits at home by  
59  
60 Germans in the previous year (yes / no, Cronbach's alpha ranging from .80 to .87 across  
waves).

1  
2  
3 The measures of social capital have to be seen in the light of some limitations. First,  
4 since social capital is not measured every survey year, but every five years (apart from  
5 “visiting native Germans”, which is measured every second year), there is little within-  
6 individual variation. This complicates the estimation of a causal effect. Partly, this is solved by  
7 estimating RE models, which use between-individual information to obtain the estimates.  
8 Nonetheless, when FE models *do* indicate a significant impact of social capital, this is strong  
9 support for the existence of a causal relationship. A second limitation concerns the diversity of  
10 social capital measures available in the GSOEP: the measures for bonding and bridging are  
11 not symmetrical. Unfortunately, there is no indicator available for network size of one’s  
12 bridging social capital. Furthermore, bridging social capital is most likely underestimated  
13 when it concerns weak ties. There is consensus that the ties mentioned in name generator  
14 items (like the German friend item) are biased towards strong ties (see for example Van der  
15 Gaag and Snijders 2004). In that respect, weak ties in Granovetter’s (1973) sense are not  
16 included fully, insofar they are not captured by the visiting Germans at home construct. Last,  
17 none of the items used can identify the tie’s occupational position, or whether the person  
18 mentioned is ego’s employer. It is therefore not possible to test whether socio-economic  
19 characteristics are bridged in addition to ethnicity.  
20  
21  
22  
23  
24  
25  
26  
27  
28  
29  
30  
31  
32  
33  
34  
35

36 Notwithstanding these limitations, I argue that the measures are a good proxy of  
37 bonding and bridging social capital. Although the indicators do not cover all family and co-  
38 ethnic ties, somebody scoring high on the measured bonding indicators is likely to do so on  
39 the ties that are not measured. Likewise, when a respondent mentions inter-ethnic ties among  
40 the three people whom he goes out with and meets often, and/or if he visits native Germans  
41 at their home, this is likely to be a good proxy for the contacts with natives in his network.  
42  
43  
44  
45  
46  
47  
48  
49  
50

#### 51 *Control variables*

52 The following control variables are included. The educational attainment of the respondent, as  
53 measured using the CASMIN scheme<sup>v</sup>. Furthermore, a dummy variable is included indicating  
54 whether or not the respondent attended school in Germany. I also control for German  
55 language proficiency, consisting of a scale of three items, measured every second year<sup>vi</sup>. The  
56 items included are “Language usually spoken” (German, mostly that of country of origin,  
57  
58  
59  
60

1  
2  
3 equally), “Own opinion of spoken German”, “Own opinion of written German”. Furthermore, I  
4 control for the number of years of full-time working experience (also squared), the number of  
5 years since migration, marital status and the ethnic origin of the respondent. For the analyses  
6 of occupational status, a dummy for working part-time is included, as well as the number of  
7 hours worked per week. To control for differences across regions, dummies for the German  
8 federal states are included<sup>vii</sup>. These dummies intend to capture any regional factors affecting  
9 labour market outcomes, such as regional unemployment levels or job opportunities  
10 (Constant and Massey 2005). Last, to control for a time trend, dummies for each survey year  
11 are included. In table 1, the descriptive statistics are presented. It was checked for multi-  
12 collinearity, but this was not a problem.  
13  
14  
15  
16  
17  
18  
19  
20  
21  
22  
23  
24

25 <TABLES 1 AND 2 ABOUT HERE>  
26  
27  
28

## 29 Results

30 In table 2, model 1, a RE model is presented that predicts the likelihood to be employed.  
31 Inter-ethnic ties increase the likelihood to be employed. The number of family members has a  
32 negative impact on employment, but the odds ratio is very close to one, indicating the effect  
33 size is almost zero. The other measures of social capital do not significantly affect the  
34 likelihood to be employed. Coefficients estimated with an RE model are based on within- and  
35 between-individual variation. This implies that the coefficient for inter-ethnic ties expresses  
36 the difference of having more versus less social capital (the between-individual variation), *and*  
37 acquiring more (or less) social capital over time (the within-individual variation). Although  
38 theoretically this is the best estimate because all information is used, it can be the case that  
39 the between-individual variation is biased by unmeasured personal characteristics  
40 (unobserved heterogeneity).  
41  
42  
43  
44  
45  
46  
47  
48  
49  
50  
51

52 In model 2, a FE model is presented. The FE estimator is based only on within-  
53 individual variation. Hence, only over-time changes in social capital are captured. This implies  
54 that respondents who do not report changes in their social capital do not influence the  
55 estimation of the coefficient. However, since these respondents do influence the standard  
56 error, they are included in the sample. The time-constant covariates are dropped, as they  
57  
58  
59  
60

1  
2  
3 don't provide any within-individual information. Logistic FE models require within-individual  
4 variation on the dependent variable. As a result, the number of observations is much lower.  
5  
6 Therefore, the FE sample is different from the RE sample. However, as Halaby (2004) notes,  
7  
8 estimating FE models is not throwing away information, but making use of the panel structure  
9  
10 of the data. Moreover, to make sure that outliers do not drive the findings in the FE model, its  
11  
12 standard errors are obtained by bootstrapping.  
13

14  
15 As can be seen in model 2, the coefficient of inter-ethnic ties remains significant and  
16  
17 changes very little in size. Since this is a FE model, this effect is not due to unobserved  
18  
19 differences between individuals that are time-constant. Furthermore, with respect to possible  
20  
21 time-variant characteristics, the model controls for changes in marital status and working  
22  
23 experience. Since the model includes dummies for each survey year, the effect is neither  
24  
25 spurious with a time trend. In other words, it is not the case that the effect of inter-ethnic ties  
26  
27 is due to, for example, changes in economic circumstances that occurred in the observation  
28  
29 period.  
30

31 To summarize, people that reported an increase in their inter-ethnic friends are more  
32  
33 likely to be employed at a later point in time (FE and RE model); furthermore, people that  
34  
35 have more inter-ethnic friends than others, are more likely to be employed the year after (RE  
36  
37 model). The coefficient of inter-ethnic ties is slightly larger in the FE than in the RE model.  
38  
39 This can have three reasons. First, because the FE model only includes people for whom a  
40  
41 change in the dependent variable is observed, the sample is different from the RE sample. If  
42  
43 inter-ethnic ties indeed help finding a job, it seems likely that the effect is larger when a model  
44  
45 is estimated including only those people that change their employment status. Second, the  
46  
47 coefficient of inter-ethnic ties might be larger because the FE sample is selective<sup>viii</sup>, for  
48  
49 example due to attrition (Riphahn 2004). When attrition is not random, it can bias the  
50  
51 estimates. This would be the case when people that leave the panel are, for example,  
52  
53 dominantly those that report a decrease in inter-ethnic ties and find employment afterwards.  
54  
55 Third, the coefficient could be larger because there are unobserved characteristics, like  
56  
57 ability, that are not controlled for in the RE model. As discussed, both RE and FE models  
58  
59 have its (dis)advantages. The similar results with regard to significance and effect size is,  
60  
however, a good indicator for the reliability of the results.

1  
2  
3  
4  
5 <TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE>  
6  
7  
8

9 In table 3, the effect of indicators of social capital on occupational status is predicted. To  
10 make them comparable within the models, all covariates are standardized between zero and  
11 one. In addition to the variables that are included in the analysis of employment, I include  
12 three extra ones: working part-time, being self-employed and the number of hours worked in  
13 a week. In the RE model (model 4), it appears that only inter-ethnic ties affect occupational  
14 status. There is no effect of visiting native Germans. Hence, only the “strongest” inter-ethnic  
15 ties affect occupational status. Just as in the analysis of employment, diversifying one’s  
16 network with inter-ethnic ties positively impacts occupational status. As hypothesized, high  
17 closure in one’s family network and intra-ethnic ties is not associated with immigrants’  
18 occupational status. When estimating a FE model (model 5), the results are similar. Based on  
19 these models, we can conclude that having more inter-ethnic ties than other people results in  
20 a higher occupational status. Furthermore, acquiring more inter-ethnic ties over time results in  
21 a higher occupational status. The coefficient of inter-ethnic ties is slightly lower in the FE  
22 model. This is most likely because in the FE model all between-individual differences are  
23 controlled for; its coefficients are therefore not biased by unobserved heterogeneity.  
24  
25  
26  
27  
28  
29  
30  
31  
32  
33  
34  
35  
36  
37  
38

39 It could be that the returns to social capital are different for the ethnic groups included.  
40 Therefore, by including interactions with ethnic group and each of the indicators of social  
41 capital it was tested whether this was the case. None of the interactions appeared significant.  
42 Furthermore, one could argue that the effect of social capital is different for people that  
43 attended school in Germany (Kanas and Van Tubergen 2009). However, none of the  
44 interactions between attending school in Germany and indicators of social capital appeared  
45 significant.  
46  
47  
48  
49  
50  
51  
52  
53  
54  
55

## 56 **Conclusion**

57 In this paper, I analysed the effect of bonding and bridging social capital on the likelihood of  
58 employment and occupational status for first-generation male immigrants in Germany. Based  
59  
60

1  
2  
3 on the argument of access to host-country specific resources, I hypothesized that bridging  
4 social capital positively affects both outcomes. Furthermore, based on the argument of  
5 network closure I hypothesized that bonding social capital positively affects employment.  
6  
7 Using the isolation argument, I argued that bonding social capital is not associated with  
8 occupational status.  
9

10  
11  
12  
13 These hypotheses were tested with longitudinal data and by estimating both random  
14 and fixed effects models. Previous studies dominantly relied on cross-sectional data, which  
15 suffer from the problems of reversed causality and unobserved heterogeneity. By making use  
16 of longitudinal data, it was possible to estimate the effect of acquiring more social capital  
17 over-time, as well as the effect of having more social capital than others. Moreover,  
18 estimating fixed effects models ensure that the effects are not due to differences between  
19 people that are not controlled for (unobserved heterogeneity). Furthermore, indicators of  
20 social capital were measured one year before the labour market outcomes.  
21  
22  
23  
24  
25  
26  
27  
28

29 The findings partly confirmed the expectations. Having contacts with natives  
30 positively impacts both employment and occupational status. That is, immigrants who have  
31 more close friends that are native German (both over-time as well as in comparison with  
32 others) are more likely to be employed and have a higher occupational status the year after.  
33 However, there is no effect of visiting Germans at home. Based on these findings, can we  
34 conclude that there is a causal effect of bridging social capital on labour market outcomes?  
35 One has to keep in mind that only ethnic bridges are measured. Therefore, it might be the  
36 case that ties are bridging on the ethnic dimension, but bonding with regard to socio-  
37 economic characteristics. McPherson et al. (2001, p. 415) suggest that bridging the ethnic  
38 divide is more important than bridging across occupations: 'Homophily in race and ethnicity  
39 creates the strongest divides in our personal environments, with age, religion, education,  
40 occupation, and gender following in roughly that order.' However, data on the socio-economic  
41 status of the ties would be desirable in order to describe the social composition of the  
42 networks. This way, one could examine if socio-economic variables are bridged in addition to  
43 ethnicity, and refine the results related to the resource argument. A second limitation that has  
44 to be mentioned is that only strong(er) inter-ethnic ties are measured. One therefore does not  
45  
46  
47  
48  
49  
50  
51  
52  
53  
54  
55  
56  
57  
58  
59  
60



1  
2  
3 know whether the results are the same for people's entire network. Further research is  
4  
5 needed that can also include people's weak ties.  
6

7 As hypothesized, bonding social capital is not associated with occupational status.  
8  
9 Contrary to the expectations, however, also with regard to employment, immigrants in  
10  
11 Germany do not profit from co-ethnic and family-based social capital. This supports the  
12  
13 'isolation' rather than the 'closure' argument: closure may indicate a high level of solidarity  
14  
15 and enforceable trust, but it does not result in valuable information or support that is useful in  
16  
17 finding a job. Since people in the sample are dominantly long-term immigrants, an alternative  
18  
19 explanation might be the ongoing incorporation of immigrants in German society. Sanders  
20  
21 (2002, p. 348) concludes: 'When social boundaries take on less of a gate-keeper function  
22  
23 protecting ethnically generated resources and more of a bridging function encouraging  
24  
25 greater intergroup association, the identity-preserving influence of ethnic boundaries is likely  
26  
27 to decline'. Also Hagan (1998) concludes that, especially shortly after arrival, family-based  
28  
29 and co-ethnic networks offer the resources needed to find jobs. Since the sample consists  
30  
31 mostly of long term-migrants, it could hence be that bonding social capital did have its value  
32  
33 in the past, but is no longer relevant after a substantial number of years in the host society.  
34

35 Keeping in mind the conceptualization of bonding and bridging social capital, as well as  
36  
37 the limitations of the data, it seems that in the case of male immigrants in Germany, whereas  
38  
39 bridging is to get ahead, bonding is indeed to get by.  
40  
41  
42  
43  
44  
45  
46  
47  
48  
49  
50  
51  
52  
53  
54  
55  
56  
57  
58  
59  
60

## Tables and figures

Table 1. Descriptive statistics sample.

	Sample employment		Sample occupational status	
	Mean	SD	Mean	SD
Inter-ethnic contacts	0.31	0.38	0.33	0.38
Visiting native Germans at home	0.82	0.35	0.84	0.34
Intra-ethnic contacts	0.62	0.39	0.61	0.39
Strength of family ties	0.72	0.18	0.73	0.18
Number of family members	0.12	0.11	0.12	0.11
<i>Control variables</i>				
German language proficiency	0.54	0.23	0.56	0.23
Years since migration	23.59	9.58	23.31	9.25
Working experience fulltime in years	20.21	11.68	19.8	10.82
Weekly working hours	-	-	42.05	8.24
	Percentage		Percentage	
Ethnic group				
Turkish	36		36	
(Ex-)Yugoslavian	19		18	
Greek	9		9	
Italian	18		18	
Spanish/Portuguese	6		7	
Eastern Eur. (EU10)	2		2	
Other EU / Western	6		7	
Non EU	4		3	
Attended school in Germany	33		36	
Educational attainment				
Inadequately / General elementary	39		36	
Basic vocational	37		39	
Intermediate vocational, Interm. general	11		11	
General/Vocational maturity	4		5	
Tertiary education	9		9	
Marital status				
Single	10		9	
Divorced/Separated/widowed	7		7	
Married	83		84	
Part-time	-		2	
Self-Employed	-		7	
Number of observations	5,493		4,017	
Number of individuals	954		788	

Source: GSOEP 1996-2007

Table 2. Random and fixed effects logistic regression predicting the likelihood of employment among immigrant men in Germany, 1996-2007, odds ratios.

	Model 1 Random effects		Model 2 Fixed effects	
	b	se	b	se
Inter-ethnic contacts	1.485**	(.219)	1.507*	(.304)
Receives visits/visits Germans	1.034	(.103)	.989	(.125)
Intra-ethnic contacts	1.129	(.159)	1.098	(.229)
Strength of family ties	1.176	(.140)	.827	(.168)
Number of family members	.984*	(.007)	.975	(.015)
Ethnic group				
Turkish	ref.			
(Ex-)Yugoslavian	1.806	(.699)		
Greek	3.084*	(1.633)		
Italian	5.736***	(2.459)		
Spanish/Portuguese	5.184*	(3.398)		
Eastern Eur. (EU10)	.195**	(.116)		
Other EU / Western	1.128	(1.089)		
Non EU	4.311*	(3.029)		
German language proficiency	1.278***	(.058)	1.140	(.099)
Years since migration	.900***	(.019)	.881	(.172)
Marital status				
Married	ref.		ref.	
Single	.274**	(.115)	.208	(1.034)
Divorced/Separated/widowed	.785	(.254)	.959	(.527)
Attended school in Germany	7.451***	(2.969)		
Educational attainment				
Inadequately / General elementary	.805	(.178)		
Basic vocational	ref.			
Intermediate vocational, Interm. general	.852	(.262)		
General/Vocational maturity	.279*	(.155)		
Tertiary education	4.983**	(2.522)		
Working experience fulltime in years	1.478***	(.062)	1.613***	(.204)
Working experience fulltime squared	.992***	(.001)	.986***	(.003)
Constant	10.039***	(1.236)		
Log-likelihood	-1844.5		-682.2	
N observations	5,493		2,084	
N subjects	954		277	

Note: the models include dummies for each survey year; the RE model also includes dummies for the federal states.

\* p<0.05, \*\* p<0.01, \*\*\* p<0.001 (two-tailed tests). Standard errors FE model obtained by bootstrapping (100 replications).

(Hausman test between RE and FE models significant at p<0.01)

Source: GSOEP 1996-2007

Table 3. *Random and fixed effects regression predicting ISEI-score among immigrant men in Germany, 1996-2007, standardized coefficients.*

	Model 3 Random effects		Model 4 Fixed effects	
	b	se	b	se
Inter-ethnic contacts	3.233**	(1.039)	3.077*	(1.326)
Receives visits/visits Germans	.649	(.431)	.760	(.474)
Intra-ethnic contacts	1.750	(1.046)	1.311	(1.311)
Strength of family ties	.399	(1.504)	.441	(1.842)
Number of family members	1.508	(3.198)	4.045	(4.123)
Ethnic group				
Turkish	ref.			
(Ex-)Yugoslavian	.368	(.923)		
Greek	3.652**	(1.126)		
Italian	1.202	(.999)		
Spanish/Portuguese	-.424	(1.053)		
Eastern Eur. (EU10)	1.838	(1.791)		
Other EU / Western	1.564	(1.726)		
Non EU	11.614***	(2.103)		
German language proficiency	3.784**	(1.283)	-.758	(1.437)
Years since migration	20.410**	(6.428)	19.047	(64.448)
Marital status				
Single	.427	(.773)	1.061	(.991)
Divorced/Separated/widowed	-.753	(.749)	-.095	(.966)
Attended school in Germany	.613	(.949)		
Educational attainment				
Inadequately / General elementary	.774	(.486)		
Intermediate vocational, Intern. general	.196	(.773)		
General/Vocational maturity	8.291**	(2.770)		
Tertiary education	10.674***	(2.423)		
Working experience fulltime in years	.093	(.118)	.377	(.574)
Working experience fulltime squared	-.005*	(.002)	-.008**	(.003)
Actual work time per week	5.376**	(1.814)	4.725*	(1.979)
Working part-time	1.576	(1.217)	1.541	(1.281)
Self-employed	5.287***	(1.153)	4.497**	(1.363)
Constant	19.309***	(2.393)	22.644	(20.326)
Within R-Square	.03		.04	
Between R-Square	.41		-	
N observations	4,017		4,017	
N subjects	788		788	

Note: the models include dummies for each survey year and for the federal states.

\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*  $p < 0.01$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.001$  (two-tailed tests, robust standard errors corrected for clustering on the individual).  
(Hausman test between RE-and FE models significant at  $p < 0.001$ )

Source: GSOEP 1996-2007.

**References**

- AGUILERA, MICHAEL B. 2002 'The impact of social capital on labor force participation: evidence from the 2000 social capital benchmark survey', *Social Science Quarterly*, vol. 83, no. 3, pp. 854-74.
- 2005 'The impact of social capital on the earnings of Puerto Rican migrants', *The Sociological Quarterly*, vol. 46, no. 4, pp. 569-92.
- AGUILERA, MICHAEL B. & MASSEY, DOUGLAS S. 2003 'Social capital and the wages of Mexican migrants: new hypotheses and tests', *Social Forces*, vol. 82, no. 2, pp. 671-701.
- AMUEDO-DORANTES, CATALINA & MUNDRA, KUSUM 2008 'Social networks and their impact on the earnings of Mexican migrants', *Demography*, vol. 44, no. 4, pp. 849-63.
- BORJAS, GEORGE J. 1994 'The economic of integration', *Journal of Economic Literature*, vol. 32, no. 4, pp. 1667-717.
- BURT, ROBERT .S 2001 'Structural holes versus network closure as social capital', in LIN, N. , et al. (eds) *Social Capital: Theory and Research*. New York: Aldine De Gruyter, pp. 31-56.
- 2005 *Brokerage and closure. An introduction to social capital*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- CHISWICK, BARRY R. & MILLER, PAUL W. 2002 'Immigrant earnings: language skills, linguistic concentrations and the business cycle', *Journal of Population Economics*, vol. 15, no. 1, pp. 31-57.
- COLEMAN, JAMES S. 1988 'Social capital in the creation of human capital.', *The American Journal of Sociology*, vol. 94, no. supplement, pp. S95-S120.
- 1990 *Foundations of social theory*. Cambridge: Belknap Press.
- CONSTANT, AMELIE & MASSEY, DOUGLAS S. 2005 'Labor market segmentation and the earnings of German guestworkers', *Population Research and Policy Review*, vol. 24, no. 5, pp. 489-512.
- DULEEP, HARRIET & REGETS, MARK C. 1999 'Immigrants and human capital investment', *American Economic Review*, vol. 89, no. 2, pp. 186-90.
- ELLIOTT, JAMES R. 2001 'Referral hiring and ethnically homogenous jobs: how prevalent is the connection and for whom?', *Social Science Research*, vol. 30, pp. 401-25.

- 1  
2  
3 FLAP, HENK D. & VÖLKER, BEATE 2004 *Creation and returns of social capital*. London:  
4  
5 Routledge.  
6
- 7 FRIEDBERG, RACHEL M. 2000 'You can't take it with you? Immigrant assimilation and the  
8  
9 portability of human capital', *Journal of Labor Economics*, vol. 18, no. 2, pp. 221-51.  
10
- 11 GANZEBOOM, HARRY, DE GRAAF, PAUL M. & TREIMAN, DONALD J. 1992 'A standard  
12  
13 international socio-economic index of occupational status', *Social Science Research*,  
14  
15 vol. 21, no. 1, pp. 1-56.  
16
- 17 GRANOVETTER, MARK 1973 'The strength of weak ties', *American Journal of Sociology*, vol.  
18  
19 78, no. 6, pp. 1360-80.  
20
- 21 HAGAN, JACQUELINE MARIA 1998 'Social networks, gender, and immigrant incorporation',  
22  
23 *American Sociological Review*, vol. 63, pp. 55-67.  
24
- 25 HAISKEN-DENEW, JOHN & FRICK, JOACHIM 2005 *DTC. Desktop Companion to the*  
26  
27 *German Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP)*. Berlin: Deutsches Institut für  
28  
29 Wirtschaftsforschung.  
30
- 31 HALABY, CHARLES N. 2004 'Panel models in sociological research', *Annual Review of*  
32  
33 *Sociology*, vol. 30, pp. 507-44.  
34
- 35 HAUG, SONJA 2003 'Interethnische Freundschaftsbeziehungen und soziale Integration.  
36  
37 Unterschiede in der Ausstattung mit sozialem Kapital bei jungen Deutschen und  
38  
39 Immigranten', *Kölner Zeitschrift für Soziologie und Sozialpsychologie*, vol. 55, no. 4,  
40  
41 pp. 716-36.  
42
- 43 --- 2007 'Soziales Kapital als Resource im Kontext von Migration und Integration', in LÜDICKE,  
44  
45 J & DIEWALD, M (eds) *Soziale Netzwerke und soziale Ungleichheit. Zur Rolle von*  
46  
47 *Sozialkapital in modernen Gesellschaften*. Wiesbaden: VS Verlag für  
48  
49 Sozialwissenschaften, pp. 85-112.  
50
- 51 --- 2008 'Migration networks and migration decision-making', *Journal of Ethnic and Migration*  
52  
53 *Studies*, vol. 34, no. 4, pp. 585-605.  
54
- 55 HEATH, ANTHONY & YU, SOOJIN 2005 'Explaining ethnic minority disadvantage', in HEATH,  
56  
57 ANTHONY, *et al.* (eds) *Understanding social change*. Oxford: Oxford University Press,  
58  
59 pp. 187-224.  
60

- 1  
2  
3 KALTER, FRANK 2006 'Auf der Suche nach einer Erklärung für die spezifischen  
4  
5 Arbeitsmarktnachteile von Jugendlichen türkischer Herkunft. Zugleich eine Replik auf  
6  
7 den Beitrag von Holger Seibert und Heike Solga: "Gleiche Chancen dank einer  
8  
9 abgeschlossenen Ausbildung?'"', *Zeitschrift für Soziologie*, vol. 35, pp. 144-60.  
10  
11 KANAS, AGNIESZKA, *et al.* (2009a). The role of social networks in the earnings and  
12  
13 occupational mobility: a panel study of Immigrants to Germany. Paper presented at the  
14  
15 'Matching context and capacity: the economic integration of immigrants', Florence,  
16  
17 June 11-12th.  
18  
19 KANAS, AGNIESZKA & VAN TUBERGEN, FRANK 2009 'The impact of origin and host  
20  
21 country schooling on the economic performance of immigrants', *Social Forces*, vol. 88,  
22  
23 no. 2, pp. 893-916.  
24  
25 KANAS, AGNIESZKA, VAN TUBERGEN, FRANK & VAN DER LIPPE, TANJA 2009b  
26  
27 'Immigrant self-employment: testing hypotheses about the role of origin- and host-  
28  
29 country human capital and bonding and bridging social capital', *Work and*  
30  
31 *Occupations*, vol. 36, no. 3, pp. 181-208.  
32  
33 KROH, MARTIN & SPIES, MARTIN 2008 'Documentation of sample sizes and panel attrition in  
34  
35 the German Socio Economic Panel (SOEP) (1984 until 2007)'. Berlin: DIW.  
36  
37 LANCEE, B. & HARTUNG, A. 2011 'Turkish migrants and native Germans compared: The  
38  
39 effect of inter-ethnic and intra-ethnic friendships on the transition from unemployment  
40  
41 to work', *International Migration*, Forthcoming.  
42  
43 LANCEE, BRAM 2010 'The economic returns of immigrants' bonding and bridging social  
44  
45 capital. The case of the Netherlands', *International Migration Review*, vol. 44, no. 1,  
46  
47 pp. 202-26.  
48  
49 LIN, NAN 1999 'Building a network theory of social capital', *Connections*, vol. 22, no. 1, pp. 28-  
50  
51 51.  
52  
53 --- 2001 *Social capital: a theory of social structures and action*. Cambridge: Cambridge  
54  
55 University Press.  
56  
57 LIVINGSTON, GRETCHEN 2006 'Gender, job searching, and employment outcomes among  
58  
59 Mexican immigrants', *Population Research and Policy Review*, vol. 25, pp. 43-66.  
60

- 1  
2  
3 MCPHERSON, MILLER, SMITH-LOVIN, LYNN & COOK, JAMES M. 2001 'Birds of a feather:  
4  
5 homophily in social networks', *Annual Review of Sociology*, vol. 27, pp. 415-44.  
6  
7 MENJIVAR, CECILIA 2000 *Fragmented ties: Salvadoran immigrant networks in America*.  
8  
9 Berkeley: University of California Press.  
10  
11 MOUW, TED 2002 'Racial differences in the effects of job contacts: conflicting evidence from  
12  
13 cross-sectional and longitudinal data', *Social Science Research*, vol. 31, no. 4, pp.  
14  
15 511-38.  
16  
17 --- 2003 'Social capital and finding a job: do contacts matter?', *American Sociological Review*,  
18  
19 vol. 68, no. 6, pp. 868-98.  
20  
21 --- 2006 'Estimating the causal effect of social capital. A review of recent research', *Annual*  
22  
23 *Review of Sociology*, vol. 32, pp. 79-102.  
24  
25 NANNESTAD, P, SVENDSEN, G.L.H. & SVENDSEN, G.T. 2008 'Bridge over troubled water?  
26  
27 Migration and social capital', *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies*, vol. 34, no. 4,  
28  
29 pp. 607-31.  
30  
31 NEDERVEEN PIETERSE, JAN 2003 'Social capital and migration. Beyond ethnic economies',  
32  
33 *Ethnicities*, vol. 3, no. 1, pp. 5-34.  
34  
35 NEE, VICTOR & SANDERS, JIMMY 2001 'Understanding the diversity of immigrant  
36  
37 incorporation: a forms of capital model', *Ethnic and Racial Studies*, vol. 24, no. 3, pp.  
38  
39 386-411.  
40  
41 PATACCHINI, ELEONORA & ZENOU, YVES 2008 'Ethnic Networks and Employment  
42  
43 Outcomes'. Bonn: IZA.  
44  
45 PICHLER, EDITH 1997 *Migration, Community-Formierung und ethnische Ökonomie. Die*  
46  
47 *italienschen Gewerbetreibenden in Berlin*. Berlin: Edition Parabolis.  
48  
49 PORTES, A 1998a 'Economic sociology and the sociology of immigration: A conceptual  
50  
51 overview', in PORTES, A (ed.) *The economic sociology of immigration: Essays on*  
52  
53 *networks, ethnicity, and entrepreneurship*. New York: Russell Sage Foundation, pp. 1-  
54  
55 41.  
56  
57 PORTES, ALEJANDRO 1995 'Economic sociology and the sociology of immigration: A  
58  
59 conceptual overview', in PORTES, A (ed.) *The economic sociology of immigration:*  
60



- 1  
2  
3           *Essays on networks, ethnicity, and entrepreneurship*. New York: Russell Sage  
4  
5           Foundation, pp. 1-41.  
6  
7 --- 1998b 'Social capital: its origins and applications in modern sociology', *Annual Review of*  
8  
9           *Sociology*, vol. 24, no. 1, pp. 1-24.  
10  
11 PORTES, ALEJANDRO & SENSENBRENNER, JULIA 1993 'Embeddedness and  
12  
13           immigration: notes on the social determinants of economic action', *The American*  
14  
15           *Journal of Sociology*, vol. 98, no. 6, pp. 1320-50.  
16  
17 PUTNAM, R.D. 2007 'E Pluribus Unum: Diversity and community in the twenty-first century.  
18  
19           The 2006 Johan Skytte prize lecture.', *Scandinavian Political Studies*, vol. 30, no. 2,  
20  
21           pp. 137-74.  
22  
23 PUTNAM, ROBERT D. 2000 *Bowling alone. The collapse and revival of American community*.  
24  
25           New York: Simon and Schuster.  
26  
27 RABE-HESKETH, SOPHIA & SKRONDAL, ANDERS 2008 *Multilevel and longitudinal modeling*  
28  
29           *using Stata*, 2nd ed. College Station: Stata Press.  
30  
31 RIPHAHN, REGINA T. 2004 'Immigrant Participation in Social Assistance Programs: Evidence  
32  
33           from German Guestworkers', *Applied Economics Quarterly*, vol. 50, no. 4, pp. 329-62.  
34  
35 SANDERS, JIMMY 2002 'Ethnic boundaries and identity in plural societies', *Annual Review of*  
36  
37           *Sociology*, vol. 28, pp. 327-57.  
38  
39 SANDERS, JIMMY & NEE, VICTOR 1996 'Immigrant self-employment: the family as social  
40  
41           capital and the value of human capital', *American Sociological Review*, vol. 61, no. 2,  
42  
43           pp. 231-49.  
44  
45 SANDERS, JIMMY, NEE, VICTOR & SERNAU, SCOTT 2002 'Asian immigrants' reliance on  
46  
47           social ties in a multiethnic labor market', *Social Forces*, vol. 81, no. 1, pp. 281-314.  
48  
49 SCHULLER, TOM, BARON, STEPHEN & FIELDS, JOHN 2000 'Social capital: a review and  
50  
51           critique', in BARON, STEPHEN, *et al.* (eds) *Social capital- Critical perspectives*.  
52  
53           Oxford: Oxford University Press.  
54  
55 STAINBACK, KEVIN 2008 'Social contacts and race/ethnic job matching', *Social Forces*, vol.  
56  
57           87, no. 4, pp. 857-86.  
58  
59  
60

- 1  
2  
3 VAN DER GAAG, MARTIN P.J. & SNIJDERS, TOM A.B. 2004 'Proposals for the  
4 measurement of individual social capital.', in FLAP, H. & VÖLKER, B. (eds) *Creation*  
5 *and returns of social capital*. London: Routledge, pp. 199–218.  
6  
7  
8  
9 WAGNER, GERT G., BURKHAUSER, RICHARD & BEHRINGER, FRIEDERIKE 1993 'The  
10 English language public use file of the German Socio-Economic Panel', *Journal of*  
11 *Human Resources*, vol. 28, no. 2, pp. 429-33.  
12  
13  
14  
15 WALDINGER, ROGER 1994 'The making of an immigrant niche', *International Migration*  
16 *Review*, vol. 28, no. 1, pp. 3-30.  
17  
18  
19 --- 1995 'The 'other side' of embeddedness: a case-study of the interplay of economy and  
20 ethnicity', *Ethnic and Racial Studies*, vol. 18, no. 3, pp. 555-80.  
21  
22  
23 --- 2005 'Networks and niches: the continuing significance of ethnic connections', in LOURY,  
24 G.C., et al. (eds) *Ethnicity, social mobility and public policy*. Cambridge: Cambridge  
25 University Press, pp. 342-62.  
26  
27  
28  
29 ZENG, ZEN & XIE, YU 2004 'Asian-Americans. Earnings disadvantage reexamined: the role of  
30 place of education ', *American Journal of Sociology*, vol. 109, no. 5, pp. 1075-108.  
31  
32  
33 ZHOU, MIN 1992 *Chinatown: The socioeconomic potential of an urban enclave*. Philadelphia:  
34 Temple Univeristy Press.  
35  
36  
37  
38

39 **BRAM LANCEE** is Postdoctoral Researcher in the Department of Sociology and Anthropology  
40 at the University of Amsterdam, and Humboldt Research Fellow at the Social Science  
41 Research Center in Berlin.  
42

43  
44 ADDRESS: Department of Sociology and Anthropology, University of Amsterdam, Oudezijds  
45 Achterburgwal 185, 1012 DK Amsterdam, the Netherlands. Website: [www.bramlancee.eu](http://www.bramlancee.eu).  
46  
47

48 E-mail: [b.lancee@uva.nl](mailto:b.lancee@uva.nl).  
49  
50  
51

## 52 Notes

53  
54  
55 <sup>i</sup> Immigrants are either included in the “foreigner” sample, (started in 1984, consisting of Turks,  
56 Yugoslavians, Greeks, Italians and Spanish), in the “immigrant sample” (started in 1994/1995,  
57 consisting of households in which at least one member moved from abroad to Germany), or in  
58 the “refreshment” sample (1998 and 2000).  
59  
60

1  
2  
3  
4  
5  
6  
7  
8  
9  
10  
11  
12  
13  
14  
15  
16  
17  
18  
19  
20  
21  
22  
23  
24  
25  
26  
27  
28  
29  
30  
31  
32  
33  
34  
35  
36  
37  
38  
39  
40  
41  
42  
43  
44  
45  
46  
47  
48  
49  
50  
51  
52  
53  
54  
55  
56  
57  
58  
59  
60

---

ii The attrition rate is most likely lower because only the working age population is included.

iii Persons with a German nationality were not included because the construct “visiting Germans at home” was not asked in all waves to people with a German nationality. Furthermore, they were not included to make sure that the ties mentioned are measured as bridging and bonding in the same way for the whole sample.

iv. This classification effectively separates native Germans and ethnic minorities. In one case it is less clear. Ties that belong to the second generation *and* have German citizenship could be classified as either ‘from another country or as ‘from the old/new Federal states’. In the follow-up question (‘Do you come from the same country [as the person mentioned]’), it appeared that in 98% of the cases people indicate them to be from the same country as they are themselves (for people born in Germany but no German citizenship, this percentage is 93). That is, the country referred to is the country of origin. This is most likely the same when immigrants classify ties that belong to the second generation and with a German nationality.

v The categories are slightly collapsed: included are inadequately/general elementary (originally separate categories), basic vocational, intermediate vocational/general (originally separate categories), general or vocational maturity certificate and tertiary education. Models were also estimated including parental education. This did not yield different results.

vi Cronbach’s alpha ranging from .83 to .86 across waves.

vii Due to the low N in some of the states several categories are collapsed: Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania, Brandenburg, Saxony, Saxony-Anhalt and Thuringia are collapsed in one category.

viii However, the Hausman test favours the FE model. Furthermore, the standard errors of the FE model are robust.