



The Effect of Influence Type and Performance Outcomes on Attitude toward the Influencer

Author(s): Lisa K. Scheer and Louis W. Stern

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The authors demonstrate that a target's attitude toward an influencer is affected by both (1) the influence type used by the influencer to achieve the target's compliance and (2) the performance outcomes that result from the behavior adopted by the target in compliance with that influence. Before performance outcomes are known, the target's satisfaction and trust are strongly affected by the type of influence exercised; more dominating influence types result in less positive attitude. When outcomes of compliance become evident, however, favorable outcomes appear to ameliorate negative attitudes, whereas unfavorable outcomes seem to undermine positive attitudes. These findings indicate the significance of performance outcomes for understanding the ramifications of successful influence.

The Effect of Influence Type and Performance Outcomes on Attitude Toward the Influencer

In commercial exchange, when one party attempts to influence another to take specific actions (e.g., purchase a product, erect a display, increase space in a catalog), a dynamic ensues that can change the course and content of their relationship. First, the target's attitude toward the influencer is affected by the way in which the influence attempt is presented. Second, the target decides whether to comply and enact the requested behavior. If compliance is selected, then, third, performance outcomes result from the action undertaken and, fourth, the target's prevailing attitude is reinforced or altered, depending on the nature of those outcomes.

Though an infinite number of extensions could be added to this simple "model" of the influence process, the main effects depiction identifies some extremely important issues that can best be resolved through empirical research using experimental designs. Marketing channel research has relied primarily on cross-sectional surveys to investigate the issue that has been a central theme for channel management over the past decade—the attitudinal effects of influence attempts (e.g., Frazier, Gill, and Kale 1989; Frazier and Rody 1991; Frazier and Summers 1986;

Gaski 1986; Gaski and Nevin 1985; John 1984; Kale 1986; Lusch and Brown 1982). Though some laboratory (e.g., Anand and Stern 1985; Dwyer and Walker 1981; McAlister, Bazerman, and Fader 1986; Stern, Sternthal, and Craig 1973) and field (Anand 1987; Keith, Jackson, and Crosby 1990) experiments have been conducted, only Keith, Jackson, and Crosby (1990) have directly addressed attitudinal effects of channel influence. Moreover, to the best of our knowledge, the ramifications of the performance outcomes of compliance have never been confronted by marketing scholars. In fact, with the exception of the work by Shaw and Condelli (1986), the issue has not been addressed in *any* discipline. Its neglect is very surprising, because improved outcomes are the ultimate objective of influence attempts.

We addressed both issues by using an experimental design in a laboratory setting. To examine the first, we borrowed from the marketing channels literature in developing an influence framework that is generalizable across all power resources. The central thought is that the allocation of every resource can be contingent on compliance or noncontingent to encourage compliance; each resource also can be used positively or negatively, in a rewarding or punishing manner. The way in which influence attempts are constructed will directly affect the target's attitude toward the influencer.

To address the second key issue, we manipulated the performance outcomes derived as a result of compliance with an influence attempt and gauged the effect on target attitude. Most particularly, we wanted to find out whether

*Lisa K. Scheer is Assistant Professor of Marketing, College of Business and Public Administration, University of Missouri-Columbia. Louis W. Stern is the John D. Gray Distinguished Professor of Marketing, J. L. Kellogg Graduate School of Management, Northwestern University.

favorable outcomes could overcome negative attitudes generated by an influence attempt. If such a result were obtained, it might indicate that, in the context of a long-term relationship, the ends might justify the means irrespective of how harsh or threatening the means might be. Hence, the primary objective of our research is to understand more clearly the effects of a successful explicit influence exercise (Brown and Frazier 1978) by examining both the *type of influence exercised* and the *performance outcomes* generated by the behavior adopted in compliance with that influence.

THEORY

In marketing channel relationships, the study of one firm's (*S*'s) influence over another firm (*T*) has been dominated by four basic streams of research. Research on *potential power* has focused on "bases of power." *S* has power over *T* when *T* perceives that *S* has expertise, information, attractiveness, a right to prescribe *T*'s behavior, or the ability to mediate punishments and rewards for *T* (e.g., French and Raven 1959; Gaski 1986; Gaski and Nevin 1985; Wilkinson 1979). Research on *power source exercise* or *attempted influence* typically has used either the assistances-punishments framework (e.g., Gaski 1986; Gaski and Nevin 1985; Hunt and Nevin 1974; Lusch 1976; Lusch and Brown 1982) or the influence strategy approach (e.g., Brown and Frazier 1978; Frazier, Gill, and Kale 1989; Frazier and Rody 1991; Frazier and Summers 1984, 1986; Kale 1986). Other researchers have focused on *successful influence*, examining the extent to which *T*'s compliance was motivated by threatened punishments, promised rewards, *S*'s expertise, information provided by *S*, *T*'s obligations, or *T*'s attraction to *S* (e.g., Busch 1980; John 1984).

In our study, we focused on the mechanisms through which *S* may attempt to influence *T* and the effects of successful influence on their relationship. We present a contingency-valence conceptualization of influence exercise that is consistent with, and encompasses, the preceding research streams (Stern and Scheer 1992). Unlike the power base framework that tends to confound power resources with the manner in which they are used, our categorization explicitly separates the two. Unlike the assistances-punishments framework that centers on the valence of influence, our categorization acknowledges that whether power resources are used contingently or noncontingently can also affect the relationship. Our research runs parallel to that on influence strategies in that a positive (negative) resource exercise need not always be presented by using a "promise" ("threat") influence strategy.

Power Resources

Power is obtained through the possession and control of resources that are valued by another party (Patchen 1974; Tjosvold, Johnson, and Johnson 1984). Power resources, the raw material of influence attempts, include financial resources, expertise, information, services, le-

gitimacy, or status (Dwyer, Schurr, and Oh 1987), as well as *S*'s possession of attributes (e.g., attractiveness) or rightful claims on *T* (e.g., *T*'s contractual obligations) that may motivate *T*'s compliance. "The same underlying resources can serve as the foundation for more than one base of power" (Frazier 1984, p. 71). When attempting influence, *S* must select the resources to use as well as the manner in which those resources are exercised. Exercising the same power resource(s) in different ways is expected to have different attitudinal effects.

The Influence Attempt

Typically, it is claimed that reward and coercive power differ from other bases of power in that *S* mediates some consequences for *T* (e.g., Frazier 1984; John 1984; Kasulis and Spekman 1980; Raven and Kruglanski 1970). Hinkin and Schriesheim (1989), however, contend that *each* power base is defined best as the ability to administer tangible (things) or intangible (feelings) consequences for a target. They define legitimate power as "the ability to administer to another feelings of obligation or responsibility" and referent power as "the ability to administer to another feelings of personal acceptance or approval" (p. 562). Similarly, we maintain that every influence situation involves some influencer-controlled consequences mediated by *S* and other outcomes derived from the marketing environment. The crucial distinguishing features of influence attempts are the valence of *S*'s resource exercise and whether *S* exercises those resources contingently or noncontingently.

A *positive* influence attempt involves reward, the bestowal of consequences that *T* evaluates as desirable, or relief, the withdrawal of consequences that *T* evaluates as aversive; a *negative* influence attempt involves punishment, the bestowal of aversive consequences, or penalty, the withdrawal of desirable consequences (Hinkin and Schriesheim 1989; Woods 1974).¹

In a *contingent* influence attempt, *S* uses promises or threats to signal explicitly that it mediates positive or negative consequences that it will bestow or withhold contingently after *T*'s behavioral response. When *S* attempts contingent positive influence, *S* indicates that an available reward/relief will be provided only if *T* complies. In a contingent negative influence attempt, *S* links punishment/penalty with *T*'s noncompliance. *T*'s compliance decision may also be affected by its expectations of potential performance outcomes and environmental consequences associated with compliance versus rejection. In a *noncontingent* influence attempt, *S* again mediates consequences for the target, but it bestows those

¹It is possible for an influence attempt to contain no explicit reference to desirable or aversive consequences, but often such explicitly neutral influence carries an implicit valence. For example, when *S* makes a suggestion, *T* is rewarded with the information that *S* perceives one of *T*'s behavior options as preferable. If *S* exercises legitimate authority and demands *T*'s compliance, *S* bestows an aversive consequence on *T*, the obligation to comply.

consequences unilaterally in the hope that *T* will subsequently adopt the behavior sought by *S*. *S*'s resource exercise takes place prior to *T*'s compliance (Baldwin 1971; Harsanyi 1962). In a noncontingent positive influence attempt, *S* solicits *T*'s compliance through the unconditional provision of reward/relief such as when *S* unilaterally provides *T* with economic or noneconomic rewards (Frazier 1984; Frazier and Sheth 1985) or when *S* noncontingently provides advice (suggestion, recommendation, warning, normative plea) or valued information (information exchange) about environmental consequences not mediated by *S* (Angelmar and Stern 1978; Frazier 1984; Frazier and Sheth 1985; Tedeschi, Schlenker, and Bonoma 1973). *S* attempts noncontingent negative influence when it unilaterally provides economic or noneconomic punishment/penalty without prior warning in the hope of modifying *T*'s behavior (Frazier 1984; Frazier and Sheth 1985).

S controls the explicit content of its influence attempt, but the effect of an influence exercise depends on *T*'s perceptions. Though *T* may sometimes perceive contingency where none is indicated or intended, an explicit contingent influence attempt is expected to generate stronger perceived contingency than a noncontingent influence attempt.² Similarly, the verbal framing may affect *T*'s perception of the influence exercised and thus potentially alter the effect of an influence exercise. In a positively framed influence attempt, the relative benefits associated with compliance are emphasized ("if you comply"), whereas in a negatively framed attempt, the relative detriments associated with rejection are emphasized ("if you don't comply").

Effects of Influence Type at the Time Influence Is Exercised

Channel power base research has consistently demonstrated that the use of coercive power results in more negative target attitudes than the use of expert, referent, or information power (Busch 1980; Gaski 1986; John 1984; Keith, Jackson, and Crosby 1990; Shaw and Condelli 1986; Wilkinson 1979), but that finding can be viewed as evidence of a valence effect, a contingency effect, or both. Research using the assistances-punishments framework generally has found that the provision of assistances is related positively to target satisfaction, whereas the threat or use of punishment has the opposite effect (Gaski 1986; Gaski and Nevin 1985; Hunt and Nevin 1974; Lusch 1976). Those studies demonstrate valence effects, as they examine rewards and punishments but not the manner in which those sanctions are provided. All else being equal, positive influence attempts are expected to result in more positive target

attitude toward the influencer than negative influence attempts.

However, rewards may result in negative effects similar to those associated with threats and contingent punishments (Balsam and Bondy 1983). Though some evidence indicates that reward power is similar to the "noncoercive" power bases (Busch 1980; Gaski 1986; Gaski and Nevin 1985; Wilkinson 1979), other studies demonstrate similarity between reward and coercive power (John 1984; Keith, Jackson, and Crosby 1990; Shaw and Condelli 1986). Both promises and threats have been found to have a negative effect on *T*'s attitude (Brown and Frazier 1978; Frazier, Gill, and Kale 1989; Frazier and Rody 1991; Frazier and Summers 1986). Circumstances in which positive influence has been found to have negative attitudinal effects often involve the contingent exercise of positive influence. When a contingent reward is provided, *T*'s intrinsic motivation is likely to be undermined by the external explanation for the behavior (Bem 1967; Staw 1976), and reactance may occur (Brehm 1966). Noncontingent rewards are less likely than contingent rewards to undermine intrinsic motivation, interest, and positive attitudes (Deci and Ryan 1985, 1987). If we assume that positive influence positively affects *T*'s attitude, negative attitudinal effects of contingent rewards must be caused by the contingency of the influence. Hence, contingent influence is expected to result in more negative target attitude toward the influencer than noncontingent influence.

Any contingent influence exercise will employ a positive frame ("if you comply"), a negative frame ("if you don't comply"), or both. Typically, the framing and valence of the resource exercise match, but what happens when framing and valence do not match? Kahneman and Tversky (1979), discussing decision making under uncertainty, note that framing can alter the reference point, the baseline from which potential gains and losses are assessed. A positive, compliance-based frame is likely to foster *T*'s perception of a positive sanction, that is, the relative gain associated with compliance. A negative, rejection-based frame, in contrast, is likely to promote *T*'s perception of a negative sanction, that is, the relative loss associated with noncompliance. All else being equal, positive framing is expected to result in a more positive attitude toward the influencer than negative framing.

The influence type exercised is also expected to affect *T*'s autonomy and motivation for compliance. Autonomy is the freedom to be one's own boss and to make independent decisions (Schul, Little, and Pride 1985, p. 16); it "connotes an inner endorsement of one's actions, the sense that they emanate from oneself and are one's own" (Deci and Ryan 1987, p. 1025). Motivation for compliance involves *T*'s beliefs about its reasons for engaging in the behavior sought by *S* (e.g., Busch 1980; John 1984). Though many motivations can be identified (e.g., information, legal obligations, performance expectations, etc.), we focus on partner-contingent moti-

²Personal or legal pleas may be used to imply contingency without explicitly contingent promises or threats (Frazier and Sheth 1985), but such intentional, implicit contingency is beyond the scope of our research.

vation for compliance, that is, *T*'s admission that its behavior was motivated by contingencies controlled by *S*. When *T*'s autonomy is low, partner-contingent motivation for compliance is likely to be strong. However, even when *T* has strong autonomy, its compliance may still be motivated by influencer-controlled contingencies.

Kale (1986, p. 392) speculates that "low pressure" influence promotes *T*'s belief that it is acting autonomously. Noncontingent influence enhances *T*'s autonomy by making a wide range of reactions feasible. Positive sanctions may be interpreted by *T* in alternative ways that will be perceived to infringe on *T*'s autonomy in varying degrees. Alternate interpretations of a reward may include, for example, a bribe or incentive to make an unpalatable choice more acceptable, a well-deserved payment for past activities, or a bonus added to an already preferable option. Contingent influence and negative sanctions are more likely to be perceived as pressuring *T* to adopt the advocated behavior, thereby infringing on *T*'s autonomy. Similarly, more contingent and more negative influence will stimulate greater partner-contingent motivation for compliance because the source of the compliance behavior is more clearly the influencer. More intrinsic motivations are discounted when an extrinsic source is present to explain behavior. Hence, more contingent and more negative influence are hypothesized to result in lower autonomy and greater partner-contingent motivation for compliance. As negative framing is expected to promote perceptions similar to those due to negative influence, negatively framed influence is expected to have similar effects.

- H₁: When the performance outcomes of compliance are unknown, the target experiences less positive attitude toward the influencer when
- (a) more contingent influence is exercised,
 - (b) more negative influence is exercised, and
 - (c) contingent influence is framed negatively rather than positively.
- H₂: The target experiences lower autonomy when
- (a) more contingent influence is exercised,
 - (b) more negative influence is exercised, and
 - (c) contingent influence is framed negatively rather than positively.
- H₃: The target experiences stronger partner-contingent motivation for compliance when
- (a) more contingent influence is exercised,
 - (b) more negative influence is exercised, and
 - (c) contingent influence is framed negatively rather than positively.

Effects When the Performance Outcomes Resulting From Compliance Are Known

The conclusion drawn from previous research, that more contingent and more negative influence result in more negative attitudes, seems very logical. However, a channel member's attitudes are affected also by its performance outcomes (Frazier 1983). Successful influence results in the modification of *T*'s behavior, which subsequently may result in two types of outcomes for

the target—consequences bestowed by *S* and *T*'s performance outcomes. *T*'s performance outcomes are external consequences that result from the behavior adopted by *T* in compliance with the influence. For example, if *T* is influenced to adopt a new product, performance outcomes would include the sales and profits derived from that product. Various channel studies have examined the antecedents of channel performance (e.g., Gaski and Nevin 1985; Lusch 1976), but none have examined the effects of the performance outcomes *T* receives as a result of its compliance. Given the retrospective reports used in field research, *T*'s attitudinal reactions could be explained by the nature of the influence, *T*'s performance outcomes, or both. Therefore the effects of the influence type exercised must be disentangled from the effects of the performance outcomes resulting from compliance. At the time influence is exercised, more contingent and more negative influence are expected to result in more negative attitude toward the influencer, but when performance outcomes resulting from *T*'s compliance are realized, that initial attitude is expected to be modified by those outcomes.

Outcomes have been found to affect attitudes through attributions (Russell and McAuley 1986; Weiner, Russell, and Lerman 1979). In their research on influence, Shaw and Condelli (1986) found that targets are more likely to have internal attributions for favorable than for unfavorable outcomes that result from compliance. Many studies (e.g., Bettman and Weitz 1983; Schoeneman et al. 1986; Weiner 1974) provide evidence for the self-serving bias in attribution, the tendency for one to attribute success to internal causes and failure to external causes (Bradley 1978). More favorable relationship outcomes therefore are expected to result in weaker partner attributions. The self-serving bias may not always occur, however (Anand and Stern 1985). Though *T* may be predisposed to take responsibility for favorable performance outcomes and to find excuses for unfavorable outcomes, the relationship will be strongest when a firm receives favorable performance outcomes *and* attributes those outcomes to its partner.

The contingent use of coercion and reward has been found to result in stronger influencer attributions than the noncontingent exercise of referent, expert, and information influence (Litman-Adizes, Fontaine, and Raven 1978; Shaw and Condelli 1986). When noncontingent influence is exercised, *T* is expected to be more inclined to take credit for favorable outcomes and less likely to blame *S* for unfavorable outcomes. When more contingent influence is exercised, however, *T* is expected to be more aware of *S*'s role and thus more likely to give *S* credit or blame. Hence, influence type and outcomes are posited to have an interactive effect on *T*'s attitude toward the influencer.

Outcomes also affect attitudes directly; favorable outcomes are generally associated with positive attitudes, whereas unfavorable outcomes are associated with negative attitudes (Russell and McAuley 1986; Weiner,

Russell, and Lerman 1979). Shaw and Condelli (1986) found that more favorable outcomes of compliance increase *T*'s attraction to *S*, regardless of the influence type involved. Therefore, in spite of whatever influence type effects or influence by outcome interactions are found, more positive target attitude is expected when favorable rather than unfavorable performance outcomes are obtained.

- H₄: The target has stronger partner attributions when
- (a) more unfavorable performance outcomes are received and
 - (b) more contingent influence is exercised.
- H₅: When the performance outcomes of compliance are known, the type of influence exercised and the performance outcomes received have an interactive effect on the target's attitude toward the influencer. Specifically, when favorable (unfavorable) performance outcomes result from compliance, the target experiences more (less) positive attitude toward the influencer when more contingent influence is exercised.
- H₆: The target experiences more positive attitude toward the influencer when more favorable performance outcomes are received as a result of compliance.

METHOD

In ongoing relationships, attitudes have been shaped by prior influence episodes, performance outcomes received, and many other factors. Given our objective of disentangling influence type and performance outcomes, internal and construct validity are of paramount concern. We conducted laboratory research because it enabled us to manipulate influence type and performance outcomes and isolate their effects for examination. Our experiment was designed to separate the type of influence exercised from the performance outcomes received, test the research hypotheses, and further develop a theoretical model for later testing in the field.

Subjects

A total of 233 MBA students enrolled at a midwestern United States university completed the experiment. A pilot test with 32 executives enrolled in executive education programs was used to develop materials. In a separate prestudy with 74 MBA students and 26 executives as subjects, no significant differences were found between MBA students and executives in the key dependent variables of interest, which suggests that MBAs at this university, most of whom have a minimum of several years' work experience, are able to approximate executives' responses to the issues examined in the experiment.

Procedure

The subjects were assigned randomly to the 12 treatment conditions in a 4 (influence type) × 3 (performance outcomes) factorial design. The first page of the experiment booklet described the subject's role as the marketing manager for a company facing a strategic decision. Subjects were instructed to relate how they would

actually react if they experienced a similar situation. Background information was provided:

You are the Marketing Manager for *Diagnostix Distribution Company*, a distributor of medical diagnostic equipment. Diagnostix distributes a variety of products for 15 manufacturers. It is your responsibility to select the products that Diagnostix sells.

Two firms, *Image Manufacturing* and *MDS Inc.*, have independently developed competing versions of a new, innovative diagnostic machine. Image has formally offered distribution rights for its new product, BIOSCAN, to Diagnostix. MDS sells its equipment via its own salesforce and does not use distributors. It will take at least 12 months for another company to be ready to go to market with a competitive product.

It was also noted that approximately 20 independent distributors sell Image equipment in North America. Diagnostix has been selling Image products for 10 years, and those products currently generate 25% of Diagnostix's gross profit. The contingent penalty condition included the additional sentence: "The last 2 years Diagnostix has been honored as one of only 4 'Premium Image Distributors'." The background information then reminded the subject, "As Marketing Manager, you must decide whether or not Diagnostix should carry BIOSCAN."

Next was an internal product evaluation from Diagnostix's purchasing department. BIOSCAN scored higher on some dimensions and the competing product scored higher on others, but overall the products had roughly equivalent, fairly high ratings. It was also reported: "Due to the innovative and unique nature of this equipment, 5-year sales and profitability projections are uncertain. Some experts think that this equipment will revolutionize the industry, but other experts are skeptical."

A letter from the distribution manager of Image followed. It began:

Diagnostix has been a valued partner in the distribution of Image equipment. We at Image want our distributors to carry our new diagnostic machine BIOSCAN, a technological breakthrough with tremendous sales potential. Concurrent with the introduction of BIOSCAN, we have revised our distribution program. This new program includes the following key elements:

The body of the letter then presented the appropriate influence induction.

Influence Attempts

Noncontingent reward, contingent reward (positively framed), negatively framed contingent reward, and contingent penalty were examined.³

³Because rewards are considered more justifiable and socially acceptable than punishments, we focused on reward and penalty. Noncontingent penalty was omitted to conserve experimental resources for the other three influence types.

The *noncontingent reward* influence attempt stated that Diagnostix

- had been selected** as a Premium Image Distributor,
- would be** one of the four Premium Distributors **specialy featured** in Image advertising campaigns, and
- would receive** this marketing support **whether or not Diagnostix distributed BIOSCAN.**

The *contingent reward* influence attempt stated that Diagnostix

- would be selected** as a Premium Image Distributor **if it agreed to sell BIOSCAN,**
- would be** one of the four Premium Distributors **specialy featured** in Image advertising campaigns **if it carried BIOSCAN,** and
- would receive** that marketing support **only if it distributed BIOSCAN.**

The *contingent reward (negatively framed)* influence attempt stated that Diagnostix

- would not be selected** as a Premium Image Distributor **if it refused to sell BIOSCAN,**
- would not be** one of the four Premium Distributors **specialy featured** in Image advertising campaigns **if it did not carry BIOSCAN,** and
- would not receive** that marketing support **if it did not distribute BIOSCAN.**

The *contingent penalty* influence attempt stated that all Premium Distributors must carry BIOSCAN and that Diagnostix

- would not be retained** as a Premium Image Distributor **if it refused to sell BIOSCAN,**
- would no longer be** one of the four Premium Distributors **specialy featured** in Image advertising campaigns **if it did not carry BIOSCAN,** and
- would lose** Image's marketing support **if it did not distribute BIOSCAN.**

The same set of power resources was involved in each influence attempt; only the nature of the influence exercise and the conditions under which Diagnostix would receive the resources differed. Each letter concluded:

Because our competitor is ready to enter the market, we must finalize our BIOSCAN distribution plans. We at Image hope that you will become part of our BIOSCAN network. Does Diagnostix want to distribute BIOSCAN?

Given the mental role-playing in the experiment, one can question whether the subjects were sufficiently involved to internalize the manipulations and provide valid responses to the measures. The approach we adopted was modeled to a large extent after that used in psychology experiments studying attributions or influence, in which subjects are asked to offer their own perspectives about a hypothetical situation (e.g., Litman-Adizes, Fontaine, and Raven 1978; McGraw 1987; Russell and McAuley 1986; Schmidt and Weiner 1988; Weiner, Russell, and Lerman 1979) or to speculate about a hypothetical third party's reactions to a given scenario (e.g., Forgas, Bower,

and Moyley 1990; Hamilton et al. 1990; Shaw and Condelli 1986). Subjects in our experiment, however, were not simply given information about a situation in which successful influence was a *fait accompli*. Instead, they were given a role and the responsibility to decide whether or not to comply. Subjects were required to commit Diagnostix to distributing the product by indicating "YES, Diagnostix will distribute Image's BIOSCAN" or "NO, Diagnostix will not distribute Image's BIOSCAN." Approximately 89% of the subjects indicated Diagnostix should distribute BIOSCAN.⁴ After indicating their decisions, subjects responded to perceived contingency, autonomy, and expectation items and then received the performance outcome manipulation.

Performance Outcomes

Favorable and unfavorable outcomes were examined, as was a condition in which outcomes were not specified. Subjects in the favorable and unfavorable outcome conditions were informed that 5 years had passed since Diagnostix had chosen to distribute BIOSCAN. Performance outcomes resulting from Diagnostix's distribution of BIOSCAN were described in relation to benchmarks for comparison. The *favorable (unfavorable) outcome* information stated:

1. Research indicates that customer satisfaction with BIOSCAN is **greater (lower)** than with other products carried by Diagnostix.
2. BIOSCAN's introductory sales performance is **better (worse)** than that achieved by most new products. Originally BIOSCAN sales were projected to increase 20% per year for the next 3 years. Now, however, BIOSCAN sales are expected to increase **35% (5%)** per year.
3. This year Diagnostix's BIOSCAN distribution is forecasted to result in a net profit that is approximately **double (half)** the projected profit.

Subjects randomly assigned to the *unspecified outcome* condition received no information about BIOSCAN performance outcomes; after completing the first battery of measures, they were simply instructed to proceed to the second battery. The experiment concluded with attitude, attribution, motivation, and literal manipulation check items. All measures except attributions were assessed on 7-point agree-disagree Likert scales.

Measures

Though *T*'s general attitude toward the influencer may be of interest in itself, marketing researchers usually have examined specific attitudinal variables. We examined satisfaction, trust, and commitment. *Satisfaction* has been defined as the overall approval of and positive affect to-

⁴The proportion of subjects deciding in favor of BIOSCAN was: noncontingent reward 53/59, contingent reward 55/58, negatively framed contingent reward 47/57, and contingent penalty 53/59. Only contingent reward and negatively framed contingent reward resulted in different compliance rates ($t = 2.11, p = .019$, one-tailed).

ward another party (Anderson and Narus 1984; Gaski and Nevin 1985; Rusbult, Johnson, and Morrow 1986; Schul, Little, and Pride 1985). *Trust* is the belief that one's partner can be relied on to fulfill its future obligations and to behave in a manner that will serve the firm's needs and long-term interests (Anderson and Narus 1990; Dwyer, Schurr, and Oh 1987; Larzelere and Huston 1980). *Commitment* is a party's intention to continue a relationship (Lund 1985; Michaels, Acock, and Edwards 1986) and thus represents an implicit or explicit pledge of relational continuity between exchange partners (Dwyer, Schurr, and Oh 1987).

Autonomy involves a perception of independence, freedom of action, and lack of outside interference (Schul, Little, and Pride 1985). Autonomy reflects the subject's belief that its decision about BIOSCAN was made voluntarily, freely, and without pressure. *Partner-contingent motivation for compliance* is the extent to which the subject's compliance behavior was motivated by partner-controlled contingencies. Items similar to John's (1984) motivation for compliance operationalization of reward and coercive influence were used. *Partner attributions* reflect the extent to which the firm perceives its partner as responsible for performance outcomes it receives. Attributions concern causes of outcomes; motivations for compliance concern reasons for behavior. A firm in a marketing relationship may attribute causality to itself, its partner, or causes external to the relationship (Holtzworth-Munroe and Jacobson 1985). Because our preliminary studies had indicated that subjects attributed outcomes to both internal and partner loci if given the opportunity, subjects in the main experiment were not given that option. Attributions were assessed by two items requiring a forced choice among Diagnostix, Image, or neither (e.g., Hamilton et al. 1990) and two items on 7-point scales anchored by Diagnostix and Image with a midpoint of "neither."

Influence type can affect attitudes toward the influencer and about the behavior undertaken. Attitude about BIOSCAN measured the subject's evaluation of BIOSCAN and willingness to make the same decision again. No systematic differences in expectations were anticipated, but expectations about BIOSCAN were measured to determine whether there were systematic differences across treatment conditions. Anderson and Narus (1984, 1990) demonstrated that outcomes given comparison level can affect a channel member's cooperation and satisfaction. Because of our emphasis on performance outcomes, different expectations generated by influence type could mask treatment effects or provide rival explanations for some of the hypothesized effects.

Manipulation checks assessed the subject's perceptions and literal recognition of the manipulations. Any influence attempt will be either explicitly contingent or noncontingent, but the target's perceived contingency also can be assessed. Perceptions of positive and negative contingencies were uncontaminated by the performance outcome manipulation as they were obtained in the first

battery. Literal contingency and performance outcome manipulation checks were measured at the end of the experiment.

RESULTS

Data analysis was conducted in three stages. First, independent variable manipulations were evaluated and the construct validity of dependent variable measurement scales was assessed by principal components factor analysis with varimax rotation and standard reliability checks.⁵ Second, hypotheses were tested by analysis of variance and correlation analysis. Third, *a posteriori* cell mean comparisons were conducted by the Tukey-hsd procedure at the .05 significance level to investigate hypothesis rejection.

Manipulation Checks

Analyses of variance indicated that subjects in the noncontingent and contingent conditions were significantly different on perceived contingency ($F_{1,204} = 69.84$, $p < .001$) and the literal contingency manipulation check ($F_{1,192} = 346.61$, $p < .001$). On the outcome manipulation check, subjects receiving favorable outcomes had higher values than those receiving unfavorable outcomes ($F_{1,135} = 989.08$, $p < .001$); subjects receiving no outcome information had lower values than those in the favorable outcome condition ($F_{1,125} = 274.43$, $p < .001$) and higher values than those in the unfavorable outcome condition ($F_{1,124} = 381.38$, $p < .001$).

Scale Construction

In a factor analysis of the items measured in the first battery, autonomy and expectation factors emerged (Table 1). Factor analysis of the attitude, attribution, and motivation items resulted in one factor composed of both satisfaction and trust items and four factors apparently representing attitude about BIOSCAN, partner-contingent motivation, partner attributions, and commitment (Table 2). Given the strong positive correlation expected between satisfaction and trust, it is not surprising to find those items loading on a common factor. There is a clear distinction between satisfaction and trust, however, as satisfaction assesses affect toward the influencer whereas trust examines beliefs about the influencer and its actions. Consequently, separate satisfaction and trust variables were retained. Subsequent individual factor analyses confirmed the unidimensionality of all scales with the exception of that for the partner-contingent motivation items, which generated two factors. Separate scales were formed, representing negative and positive motivations. Items were averaged to create the variables used in hypothesis testing. For the purpose of our research,

⁵One could argue that oblique rather than orthogonal rotation is more appropriate. In this case, the two rotations provide similar patterns of factor loadings.

Table 1
PRINCIPAL COMPONENTS FACTOR MATRIX FOR AUTONOMY AND EXPECTATIONS MEASURES^a

	<i>1</i>	<i>2</i>
<i>Autonomy</i>		
I was <i>not</i> pressured to recommend that Diagnostix distribute BIOSCAN	<u>.751</u>	-.171
My decision was primarily motivated by the potential and quality of the product rather than Image's actions	<u>.641</u>	.318
My decision about BIOSCAN was made voluntarily	<u>.850</u>	.114
My decision regarding BIOSCAN was <i>not</i> made freely	<u>.853</u>	.114
<i>Expectations</i>		
BIOSCAN is a product that most distributors would be eager to sell	.290	<u>.646</u>
There is a good chance that BIOSCAN will <i>not</i> generate acceptable sales	.052	<u>.623</u>
Carrying BIOSCAN would be a reasonable strategy under almost any circumstances	.038	<u>.645</u>
Distributors that carry BIOSCAN probably will <i>not</i> make a profit	-.021	<u>.678</u>
Disregarding Image's new distribution program, carrying BIOSCAN would be a good decision	.056	<u>.733</u>
Eigenvalues	2.99	1.90
Percentage of variance	33.2	21.1

^aFactor loadings greater than .5 are underlined.

Table 2
PRINCIPAL COMPONENTS FACTOR MATRIX FOR ATTITUDE, ATTRIBUTION, AND MOTIVATION MEASURES^a

	<i>1</i>	<i>2</i>	<i>3</i>	<i>4</i>	<i>5</i>
<i>Satisfaction</i>					
Diagnostix is <i>not</i> satisfied with the actions of Image	<u>.668</u>	.452	-.039	-.003	-.168
Diagnostix has a satisfactory business relationship with Image	<u>.749</u>	.286	-.160	.036	.168
Diagnostix is unhappy with Image	<u>.720</u>	.448	-.081	-.016	.046
Diagnostix likes the way Image conducts its relationship with Diagnostix	<u>.819</u>	.142	-.208	-.029	.042
<i>Trust</i>					
Image does <i>not</i> give Diagnostix the respect it deserves	<u>.758</u>	.042	-.235	.038	.051
Image is fair in its dealings with Diagnostix	<u>.790</u>	.197	-.076	-.001	.058
Image can be trusted	<u>.754</u>	.137	-.040	.048	.257
Image is sincere in its dealings with Diagnostix	<u>.733</u>	.131	-.018	.029	.302
<i>Commitment</i>					
Diagnostix should <i>not</i> end its relationship with Image	.227	.251	-.033	.035	<u>.789</u>
Diagnostix would be better off if it stopped distributing all Image products	.182	.181	-.012	.143	<u>.739</u>
<i>Attitude about BIOSCAN</i>					
Diagnostix is satisfied with BIOSCAN	.320	<u>.772</u>	.023	-.092	-.157
Diagnostix would be better off if it did <i>not</i> sell BIOSCAN	.159	<u>.815</u>	.021	-.135	.102
Adding BIOSCAN to the product line was a good decision	.280	<u>.819</u>	-.041	-.062	.146
If I could do it again, I would <i>not</i> recommend that Diagnostix distribute BIOSCAN	.088	<u>.730</u>	-.084	.059	.311
The decision to distribute BIOSCAN was the right choice	.190	<u>.743</u>	-.036	-.004	.368
<i>Partner outcome attributions</i>					
Image is most responsible for BIOSCAN's sales and profit performance	-.123	-.003	-.011	<u>.768</u>	.164
BIOSCAN's sales performance is primarily due to Image's ability or skill	.043	-.072	-.069	<u>.811</u>	.060
BIOSCAN's sales performance is primarily determined by Image's efforts	.077	-.069	.050	<u>.788</u>	-.062
BIOSCAN's sales performance is caused by factors that are predominantly under Image's control	.060	-.025	.012	<u>.811</u>	.023
<i>Partner-contingent motivation for compliance</i>					
*Diagnostix's decision to distribute BIOSCAN was motivated by the desire to be more closely associated with Image	.307	-.179	<u>.531</u>	.054	-.081
Diagnostix decided to carry BIOSCAN in order to keep Image satisfied	-.274	-.055	<u>.791</u>	.065	-.073
*Diagnostix decided to carry BIOSCAN in order to receive benefits that Image offered	.111	-.002	<u>.634</u>	-.102	.070
Diagnostix agreed to carry BIOSCAN to avoid penalties that Image could impose	-.405	.024	<u>.748</u>	.086	-.129
Image's ability to punish Diagnostix motivated Diagnostix to carry BIOSCAN	-.409	-.031	<u>.753</u>	-.032	-.133
Diagnostix's relationship with Image would have been damaged if Diagnostix refused to distribute BIOSCAN	-.335	.102	<u>.662</u>	-.040	.216
Eigenvalue	7.76	3.11	2.68	1.90	1.25
Percentage of variance	31.1	12.4	10.7	7.6	5.0

^aFactor loadings greater than .5 are underlined.

*Items loading on a separate factor in a subsequent factor analysis of motivation items. Reliability = .57.

.60 was considered the minimal acceptable reliability.⁶ With the exception of the positive partner-contingent motivation measure, all scales were unidimensional and reliable. Only the negative partner-contingent motivation scale was used in hypotheses testing.

Hypothesis Testing

Our theory pertains to successful influence, so testing was conducted with the 208 subjects who complied. Because cell sizes were unequal, the model comparison procedure for nonorthogonal analysis of variance was employed (Appelbaum and Cramer 1974). Cell means

of dependent variables are given in Table 3. Correlation and reliability coefficients are provided in Table 4.

Main effect tests indicate satisfaction was affected by both influence type ($F_{3,196} = 16.12, p < .001$) and outcome type ($F_{2,196} = 41.37, p < .001$). Influence type ($F_{3,196} = 14.23, p < .001$) and outcome type ($F_{2,196} = 9.28, p < .001$) also affected trust. No effects on commitment are found. Attitude about BIOSCAN was affected strongly by outcome type ($F_{2,191} = 158.64, p < .001$), but an influence type by outcome type interaction of small magnitude also was present ($F_{6,191} = 2.35, p < .05$). Influence type effects are found for autonomy ($F_{3,203} = 13.12, p < .001$) and negative partner-contingent motivation ($F_{3,194} = 13.92, p < .001$). No significant effects on attributions among subjects receiving performance outcomes and no effects on expectations are found. Though main effect and interaction tests provide useful information, planned contrasts directly tested the hy-

⁶Nunnally (1967) initially suggested that minimum reliability of .50 to .60 is sufficient for early stages of research, but he later (1978) recommended that a minimum of .70 be sought.

Table 3
CELL MEANS

Dependent variable	Outcome condition	Noncontingent reward	Contingent reward			All influence
			Contingent reward	(negative frame)	Contingent penalty	
Sample	Favorable	19	19	18	18	74
	Unspecified	15	19	13	16	63
	Unfavorable	19	17	16	19	71
	All outcomes	53	55	47	53	208
Satisfaction	Favorable	5.84 ^a	5.22 ^{ab}	4.89 ^b	4.78 ^b	5.19 ^x
	Unspecified	5.53 ^a	5.09 ^a	3.56 ^c	3.52 ^c	4.48 ^y
	Unfavorable	4.07 ^c	3.60 ^c	3.22 ^c	2.96 ^c	3.47 ^z
	All outcomes	5.12 ^x	4.68 ^y	3.95 ^z	3.75 ^z	4.39
Trust	Favorable	5.46 ^a	4.71 ^{bc}	4.47 ^b	4.46 ^b	4.78 ^x
	Unspecified	5.40 ^a	5.05 ^{ac}	3.54 ^b	3.58 ^{bc}	4.45 ^y
	Unfavorable	4.50 ^d	4.15 ^{bd}	3.98 ^{bcd}	3.16 ^c	3.94 ^y
	All outcomes	5.10 ^x	4.65 ^y	4.05 ^z	3.73 ^z	4.39
Commitment	Favorable	6.45 ^a	6.39 ^a	6.58 ^a	6.44 ^a	6.47 ^x
	Unspecified	6.47 ^a	6.29 ^a	6.08 ^a	6.00 ^a	6.21 ^x
	Unfavorable	6.42 ^a	5.97 ^a	6.41 ^a	6.00 ^a	6.20 ^x
	All outcomes	6.44 ^x	6.23 ^x	6.38 ^x	6.15 ^x	6.30
Attitude about BIOSCAN	Favorable	6.42 ^a	6.34 ^a	6.36 ^a	6.40 ^a	6.38 ^x
	Unspecified	5.93 ^{ab}	5.76 ^b	5.47 ^b	5.31 ^b	5.63 ^y
	Unfavorable	3.79 ^{cd}	3.54 ^c	4.46 ^d	4.01 ^{cd}	3.94 ^z
	All outcomes	5.34 ^x	5.29 ^x	5.47 ^x	5.22 ^x	5.32
Partner outcome attributions	Favorable	4.25 ^a	4.21 ^a	4.99 ^a	4.45 ^a	4.47 ^x
	Unfavorable	4.85 ^a	4.75 ^a	5.08 ^a	5.03 ^a	4.93 ^x
Expectations	All outcomes	4.82 ^x	4.71 ^x	4.90 ^x	4.73 ^x	4.79
Autonomy	All outcomes	4.88 ^x	4.49 ^x	3.70 ^y	3.41 ^y	4.13
Perceived contingency	All outcomes	4.22 ^x	5.30 ^y	5.37 ^{yz}	5.80 ^z	5.17
Negative partner-contingent motivation	All outcomes	3.64 ^x	4.30 ^y	4.54 ^y	5.35 ^z	4.44

NOTE: For each dependent variable, two cell means in the same row or column, two influence means in the same row, and two outcome means in the same column are significantly different ($p < .05$) only when they do not share a common superscript.

Table 4
CORRELATIONS AND RELIABILITY VALUES^a

	SATIS	TRUST	COMMIT	BIOATT	ATTRIB	AUTON	NEGMOT	PERCON	EXPECT
Satisfaction	.89	.86*	.29	.51*	.09	.61*	-.57*	-.54*	.42*
Trust	.86*	.86	.32**	.41*	.13	.53*	-.42*	-.47*	.36**
Commitment	.32*	.34*	.70	.60*	-.10	.05	-.05	-.04	.38**
Attitude about BIOSCAN	.58*	.38*	.35*	.88	-.06	.36**	-.34**	-.18	.74*
Partner outcome attributions	-.05	.01	.14	-.14	.79	.09	-.14	-.05	-.11
Autonomy	.49*	.50*	.05	.15	-.02	.80	-.76*	-.74*	.52*
Negative partner-contingent motivation	-.47*	-.46*	-.07	-.11	.02	-.78*	.89	.76*	-.48*
Perceived contingency	-.28*	-.30*	.01	-.01	.05	-.55*	.64*	.67	-.37**
Expectations	.26*	.31*	.26*	.25*	.00	.36*	-.36*	-.10	.71

^aReliability values are reported on the diagonal. Correlations above the diagonal are for those in the unspecified outcome condition. Correlations for the entire sample are given below the diagonal.

* $p < .001$.

** $p < .01$.

potheses. The *contingency effect* (contingent reward compared with noncontingent reward), the *valence effect* (contingent reward compared with contingent penalty), and the *framing effect* (contingent reward compared with negatively framed contingent reward) were examined. The *outcome effect* compared the favorable and unfavorable outcome conditions.

H₁. Tests of the hypotheses about attitudinal effects when outcomes are unknown were conducted on the responses of subjects in the unspecified outcome condition. Significant valence and framing effects on satisfaction and trust are found, but no contingency effect is found. When outcomes were unknown, subjects influenced by contingent reward reported greater satisfaction ($F_{1,33} = 25.94, p < .001$) and greater trust ($F_{1,33} = 21.46, p < .001$) than those influenced by contingent penalty. Contingent reward also resulted in greater satisfaction ($F_{1,30} = 14.33, p = .001$) and greater trust ($F_{1,30} = 13.86, p = .001$) when it was positively framed than when it was negatively framed. No effects on commitment are found. Though *H_{1a}* is rejected, *H_{1b}* and *H_{1c}* are supported for satisfaction and trust.

H₂. No contingency effect is found, but subjects influenced by contingent reward reported greater autonomy than those complying with contingent penalty ($F_{1,105} = 16.48, p < .001$) or negatively framed contingent reward ($F_{1,99} = 8.89, p < .01$). *H_{2a}* is rejected, but *H_{2b}* and *H_{2c}* are supported.

H₃. There was a valence effect, as contingent penalty resulted in greater negative partner-contingent motivation for compliance than contingent reward ($F_{1,100} = 17.14, p < .001$). There was also a contingency effect, as contingent reward influence generated greater negative partner-contingent motivation than noncontingent reward ($F_{1,102} = 7.23, p < .01$). *H_{3a}* and *H_{3b}* are supported, but *H_{3c}* must be rejected as no framing effect is found.

H₄. There were no influence effects on attributions. Unfavorable outcomes resulted in slightly stronger part-

ner attributions than favorable outcomes ($t = 1.88, p < .04$, one-tailed), though the analysis of variance planned contrast is not statistically significant ($F_{1,129} = 3.39, p < .07$). *H_{4a}* is marginally supported and *H_{4b}* is rejected.

H₅. No interaction of influence type and performance outcomes is found for satisfaction or trust, and no effects are found for commitment. Hence, *H₅* is rejected, but evidence is found for the contingency effect hypothesized within the favorable outcome condition. Among subjects receiving favorable outcomes, trust was lower for those in the contingent reward condition than for those in the noncontingent reward condition ($F_{1,36} = 7.67, p < .01$). A similar, though marginally significant, effect within favorable outcomes is found on satisfaction ($F_{1,36} = 4.01, p < .06$). When unfavorable outcomes were received, no contingency effects were found.

H₆. As expected, favorable BIOSCAN outcomes resulted in greater satisfaction ($F_{1,137} = 75.69, p < .001$) and greater trust ($F_{1,137} = 16.88, p < .001$) than did unfavorable outcomes. Though no effects on commitment are found, *H₆* is strongly supported for satisfaction and trust.

DISCUSSION

Influence Effects When Outcomes of Compliance Are Unknown

At the time influence is exercised, before outcomes of compliance are received, satisfaction and trust are affected by the type of influence exercised. Typical, positively framed contingent reward resulted in greater satisfaction and trust than did either contingent penalty or negatively framed contingent reward influence. *Post hoc* analysis revealed that noncontingent reward also resulted in greater satisfaction and trust than did contingent penalty or negatively framed contingent reward. No difference in satisfaction or trust is found between contingent penalty and negatively framed contingent reward. Thus, negative framing can alter the effects of a positively va-

lenced resource exercise; negatively framed contingent reward may behave much like a contingent penalty.

A potentially serious deficiency of the contingency effect tests conducted is that they assess the explicit contingency exercised by the influencer, rather than the contingency perceived by the target. As expected, *post hoc* analyses reveal that the explicit contingency of contingent reward influence resulted in stronger perceived contingency and negative partner-contingent motivation than did noncontingent reward. However, our results indicate that negative valence also heightened contingency perceptions; contingent penalty resulted in even stronger perceived contingency and partner-contingent motivation than did contingent reward. Though we find no explicit contingency effect, there is evidence of a *perceived contingency* effect on satisfaction and trust when outcomes were unknown. Both perceived contingency and negative partner-contingent motivation are correlated negatively with satisfaction and trust within the unspecified outcome condition (Table 4).

Negative influence and negatively framed influence reduced the target's autonomy. Though there is no explicit contingency effect, both perceived contingency and partner-contingent motivation are correlated with lower autonomy. Consistent with the findings of Schul, Little, and Pride (1985), subjects with lower autonomy also reported lower satisfaction and trust.

Effects When Outcomes of Compliance Are Known

We hypothesized, when outcomes of compliance are known, a contingency by outcome interaction on attitude toward the influencer based on mediating attribution effects. Contrary to expectations, attributions were not affected by influence type and only a slight self-serving bias is found. Problems with the attribution measures may account for part of the failure to obtain attribution effects. Another possibility is that cues in the common background information provided to all subjects may have created consistent partner attributions that overwhelmed any attributional effects of influence type. Alternatively, the potentially low involvement of the subjects or the subjects' perceptions that the reported performance outcomes were artificially generated and unrelated to either party's actions may have inhibited the formation of attributions. Whatever the reason, given the absence of influence effects on attributions, failure to achieve the hypothesized influence by outcome interaction on satisfaction and trust is not surprising.

Though no interaction is found, satisfaction and trust were affected by *both* the influence exercised and the performance outcomes received as a result of compliance. The valence and framing effects on satisfaction and trust found when outcomes were unknown seemed to be diluted when the outcomes were received. Neither a valence nor framing effect on satisfaction is found when outcomes were received. For trust, valence and framing effects are not found in the favorable outcome condition, but a valence effect is found when unfavorable outcomes

were received ($F_{1,34} = 5.58, p < .03$). No explicit contingency effects are found in the unspecified outcome condition, but noncontingent reward results in greater trust and marginally greater satisfaction than contingent reward when favorable outcomes were received.

Collapsing across all three outcome conditions, we see that the contingency, valence, and framing of the influence all affected both satisfaction and trust. Evidence is found for both explicit and perceived contingency effects, as contingent reward influence results in lower satisfaction ($F_{1,102} = 6.03, p < .02$) and lower trust ($F_{1,102} = 5.78, p < .02$) than does noncontingent reward, and both perceived contingency and negative partner-contingent motivation are negatively correlated with satisfaction and trust (Table 4). This contingency effect is consistent with previous research associating negative attitudes with both contingent positive (e.g., Brown and Frazier 1978; Frazier, Gill, and Kale 1989; Frazier and Summers 1986; Wilkinson 1979) and contingent negative (e.g., Busch 1980; John 1984; Wilkinson 1979) influence.

Collapsing across all outcome conditions, we see that contingent penalty resulted in lower satisfaction ($F_{1,102} = 18.78, p < .001$) and lower trust ($F_{1,102} = 17.30, p < .001$) than did contingent reward. This valence effect is consistent with previous research demonstrating that positive influence is associated with more positive target attitudes than is negative influence (e.g., Frazier, Gill, and Kale 1989; Frazier and Summers 1986; Gaski 1986; Gaski and Nevin 1985; Hunt and Nevin 1974; John 1984; Keith, Jackson, and Crosby 1990; Lusch 1976). Similarly, negatively framed contingent reward resulted in lower satisfaction ($F_{1,96} = 8.44, p < .01$) and lower trust ($F_{1,96} = 5.87, p < .02$) than did contingent reward. Therefore, alternative framing can modify a contingent reward influence exercise such that the use of negatively framed contingent reward can have effects similar to those of contingent penalty.

Our research thus provides an experimental replication of the major findings of previous field research on influence. A unique aspect of our study, however, is that the *same* set of power resources underlies all influence attempts. Identical power resources had different effects on the target's satisfaction and trust when they were exercised negatively rather than positively and contingently rather than noncontingently.

Consistent with previous research (Shaw and Condelli 1986), our study demonstrates that favorable performance outcomes resulted in greater satisfaction and trust than unfavorable outcomes. This robust outcome effect on satisfaction is found within each of the four influence conditions. Though not surprising, this outcome effect has important implications for the interpretation of previous power research. For example, in channel studies using the assistances-punishments framework, it has been asserted that the exercise of "noncoercive" power has positive effects on the target's attitude whereas "coercive" power has negative effects (e.g., Gaski 1986; Gaski and Nevin 1985; Hunt and Nevin 1974; Lusch 1976; Lusch

and Brown 1982). However, the provision of assistances presumably contributed to improved performance outcomes for the target, whereas past threats and/or punishments probably negatively affected the target's performance. In other words, the type of influence exercised is potentially confounded with the outcomes the target received as a result of complying with that influence. Given the retrospective nature of the reports, the attitudinal effects may have been caused by the type of influence exercised, the outcomes received, or both.

In our experiment, the unspecified outcome condition represents the target's situation and attitude at the time influence is exercised. Consequently, comparing satisfaction in the unspecified condition with that in favorable and unfavorable outcome conditions gives a representation of attitudinal change over time as performance outcomes resulting from compliance become known. *Post hoc* investigation within the various influence conditions reveals surprising patterns that generate interesting speculation.

When noncontingent reward and contingent reward influence were exercised, subjects in the unfavorable outcome condition, as expected, reported lower satisfaction than did those for whom outcomes were unknown. Contrary to expectations, however, those in the favorable outcome condition did *not* report greater satisfaction than those in the unspecified outcome condition. We offer one explanation for those results, though additional testing is needed to examine our hypothesis. When the target is already positively disposed toward the influencer, actions and events that reinforce that attitude, such as favorable outcomes, should not significantly alter the target's attitude toward the influencer, but that attitude can be undermined by actions and events that do not attain the current standard. Immediately after the exercise of noncontingent and contingent reward influence, the target was relatively satisfied with the influencer. Favorable outcomes reinforced that attitude, but unfavorable performance outcomes reduced the target's satisfaction.

Consistent with this reasoning, opposite effects were found in the other two influence conditions. When contingent penalty and negatively framed contingent reward were exercised, subjects receiving favorable outcomes reported greater satisfaction than did those for whom outcomes were unknown, but those receiving unfavorable outcomes did *not* report lower satisfaction than those in the unspecified outcome condition. At the time contingent penalty and negatively framed contingent reward influence were exercised, satisfaction was comparatively low. The subsequent receipt of unfavorable outcomes was consistent with, and did not worsen, the prevailing attitude, but when favorable outcomes were received, the initially low satisfaction improved. A similar pattern of effects is found for trust, though trust is affected less extremely by the performance outcomes received than is satisfaction.

These findings suggest that the immediate negative effects of more negative and contingent influence may be

overcome if sufficiently favorable subsequent outcomes are received; similarly, the immediate positive effects of more positive and noncontingent influence can be undermined by unfavorable outcomes. Our study demonstrates, therefore, that satisfaction with and trust in the influencer are affected by *both* the influence type exercised and the outcomes received through compliance with that influence. What is even more important from a managerial perspective, however, is our finding that outcomes may sometimes be *more* critical to the improvement, maintenance, or decline of a relationship than the way in which behavior is motivated. In some cases, the ends may justify the means.

LIMITATIONS

Some scholars argue that laboratory studies have minimal external validity because of the artificiality of the experimental universe. Any single research study is of limited external validity; only through a program of research can external validity truly be obtained (Calder, Phillips, and Tybout 1982). Insights from our laboratory experiment should be explored in field studies involving a variety of subjects, settings, and operationalizations.

Several additional limitations of our study should also be noted. Difficulty with the attribution measures prevented rigorous testing of the influence type by outcome interaction. Further research is needed to examine effects on attributions and the effects of those attributions on marketing relationships. In addition, only influence involving reward and penalty was investigated. We cannot assume that the findings will extend to the use of punishment or relief. The use and effects of explicitly noncontingent, but implicitly contingent, influence also warrant future attention.

The involvement level of the subjects is of concern. If subjects were insufficiently involved in the experiment, we would expect to find either null effects, because of random responses, or a pattern of effects that can be explained as a demand artifact. The random response explanation is ruled out because significant effects were found. If hypothesis-guessing had driven subjects' responses, we would expect satisfaction, trust, commitment, and attitude about BIOSCAN to show similar patterns of effects. As they do not, it is difficult to offer a parsimonious explanation of the results based on demand characteristics. Allowing the subject to accept or reject BIOSCAN may have solidified the subject's personal involvement in the experiment. Though a physical role-playing simulation or field experiment would be expected to evoke greater realism and involvement than the procedure we employed, we believe sufficient involvement was obtained to test the hypotheses. It is possible, however, that involvement was low. Subjects with low involvement are more likely to form judgments based on peripheral cues such as framing (Maheswaran and Meyers-Levy 1990); hence the framing effects observed in our experiment might not have been obtained had highly

involved subjects carefully examined the content of the negatively framed contingent reward.

More important, however, is the fact that influence in any marketing relationship occurs within the context, background, and history of the relationship. In our experimental study we did not attempt to, and indeed could not, replicate the complexity of true marketing relationships. The unexercised power resources of the parties, the nature of the outcomes received through the course of the relationship, and the influence exercised in previous episodes all may outweigh or modify the effect of any single influence episode. Though a single influence episode will seldom have a substantial impact in ongoing marketing relationships, a series of episodes involving similar influence types could come to characterize the partners' interaction and greatly affect attitudes.

CONCLUSION

Our study provides an experimental replication of the influence type effects observed in prior field studies. It goes beyond previous marketing research by demonstrating that different influence effects can be obtained by exercising an identical set of power resources via different types of influence. It also demonstrates the importance of considering both the type of influence exercised and the outcomes the target receives as a result of compliance. Before outcomes of compliance are received, the target's satisfaction with and trust in the influencer are strongly affected by the valence and framing of the influence attempt and by the target's perceptions of contingency. When outcomes of compliance become evident, both influence type and outcomes affect target attitudes, though the influence effects are generally weakened after outcomes are received. Apparently, as the outcomes become more salient, influence type effects are often diluted. Future field research should have a broader focus to examine not only the effects of influence type, but also the effects of performance outcomes resulting from compliance.

If various influence types are available and equally effective in achieving compliance, the use of more positive and noncontingent influence promotes more favorable attitude toward the influencer. However, all influence types may *not* be equally effective. In the short term, influence attempts that create contingency perceptions and/or infringe on the target's autonomy result in lower satisfaction and trust. If the relationship can survive that initial attitudinal reaction, however, it may not be severely damaged as long as the target ultimately receives favorable outcomes. Our findings suggest that using harsher influence may be advisable if it is necessary to achieve compliance and if the influencer is confident that the target's compliance will ultimately generate favorable target outcomes. The influencer must also take into account the costs of the influence exercise. The use of contingent negative influence, for example, will incur greater surveillance and enforcement costs than will the use of contingent positive influence. Additional research

is needed to examine the efficacy of various types of influence attempts in achieving compliance, the attribution and attitudinal effects of those influence types, and the circumstances under which the attitudinal effects of the performance outcomes resulting from compliance overpower the influence type effects.

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