

# The Europeanisation of Local Government

Mike Goldsmith

## 1. Introduction

The year 1992 provides an excellent occasion to review trends in intergovernmental relations in Western Europe and particularly within the European Community. This review is designed to highlight some of the main changes taking place in the relationships between central governments and lower-level tiers of government in the main Western European countries and to focus upon the impact which the European Community (EC) has had on the behaviour of local governments at the regional and sub-regional levels. The essence of the argument is that changes at the supranational level, and especially at the EC level, are bringing and will continue to bring about an increasing focus by sub-national governments on Brussels. Additionally, these changes are leading local governments to form partnerships with their counterparts in other EC countries, creating an increasing number of general and specific networks able to lobby Brussels directly, leading their members to by-pass national governments. The subsidiarity principle at the heart of the Maastricht Treaty reinforces these trends—one reason for its unpopularity in certain parts of the EC.

Throughout Europe, and indeed throughout the world, there are a series of changes taking place which impact on regional and local governments, forcing them to adapt their behaviour and to change their relationship with other levels of government, vertically and horizontally. Academic identification of these changes dates almost uniformly from the early 1970s. Analysis

of them continues through to today. There is little sign of the importance of the topic as a research subject diminishing in the foreseeable future. Some of the changes are political—such as the events in Central and Eastern Europe since the mid 1980s or the development of the Community; some are social—greater migration, and social segregation in cities; but the major driving force has undoubtedly been that of economic change.

## 2. Economic Change: Internationalisation and Globalisation

These two ideas have become commonplace in the 1980s. They usefully summarise a number of common worldwide trends. First, there is the increasing interdependence of the world economy. Second, there are changes in the balance of economic power: the decline of the US versus the emergence of Japan and Germany. Third, there are shifts in the location of industrial/manufacturing activities: the move from Europe and North America to the Pacific Rim countries. Fourth, there is the changing balance in economic activities, with the growing importance of the financial and service sectors. Fifth, is the continuing growing importance of multinational economic interests—the Top 500 companies, for example. Probably the most important factor aiding these changes has been the communications revolution: no longer messages in bottles, but messages by e-mail and fax

machine. Managers no longer travel by horse and cart, but by airplane.

However, it is easy to over-emphasise some of these trends. For example, some activities are site-specific—especially primary extraction industries—coal, brick manufacture, etc. It is partly this factor which helps to explain why *locality* persists as an important dimension of politics, and why it is important within the EC context. Understanding the relationship between these macro trends and the micro level remains an important issue, (Pickvance and Preteceille, 1991), but is outside the focus of this present review.

However, the processes of globalisation and interdependence have local impacts, at both national and sub-national levels. Undoubtedly they have also been a force behind developments within the EC, the creation of the SEM being one. At national level, the competition to attract inward investment from multinationals (Japanese car producers in the UK for example) indicates the way in which even national-level governments find it important but difficult to deal with multinationals. For example, the strength of international finance helps to explain the difficulties which Britain and Italy have had with their currencies within the EC, or the problems faced by Finland and Sweden outside the EC, notwithstanding debates and referenda about the Maastricht Treaty.

All the local level, globalisation impacts most heavily in terms of jobs and economic well-being. Internationalisation can give rise to both terminal decline in primary industry in some cases (European iron and steel restructuring, the British coal industry) and to the emergence of the branch plant economy on the other. The town of Leyland in Lancashire provides an excellent example. In the mid-1970s it was the headquarters of the truck, bus and car company, British Leyland. The subsequent move of the headquarters away from the town was quickly followed by the break-up of the company into its component parts. The truck and bus divisions were sold off, the former to the Dutch manufacturer DAF, and the latter to a management

buyout, and then on to Volvo, a company now closely linked with Renault. From employing around 20,000 workers at its peak in the town, the collapse of Leyland DAF in early 1993 left fewer than 2000 jobs in the local vehicle industry. By contrast, there is the growth of Nissan in the North East of Britain where, following the attraction of inward investment from Japan, the company now has a major plant which is a success story in terms of growing employment and output.

Though the general process of internationalisation; the changing nature of capital; the growth of multinationalism and the communications revolution are increasingly well-understood, we still have limited detailed case-studies of their impact. More importantly, our forecasting of future developments remains limited (though improving). And most importantly, the development of governmental institutions and strategies, both at national and multinational levels, remains weak, though arguably such development is necessary if political institutions are to match the development of economic structures.

### 3. The EC as an Internationalising Agent

In this context it is important to consider the role of the EC *as an example* of this process of political adaptation. Notwithstanding the persistence of nationalism as a limiting factor on the development of the EC, the creation of a pan-Western-European integrating level almost 40 years ago has done much to break down national barriers and to bring about economic integration within Western Europe. The economic integration process has probably gone too far to be undone, even if Maastricht were to fail. The experience of Yugoslavia is both a sign of the political weakness of the EC at present, but also a warning of the dangers of political fragmentation. Beyond these points, however, it is important to realise and to remember that the EC as a political institution has internationalising interests of its own.

First, it is important to remember that the most important objective of the EC, espe-

cially from the point of view of the Commission in Brussels, is the economic and political integration of its constituent countries. Otherwise the Commission has little reason for existence. Continued enlargement of the Community only increases the desire on the part of Brussels to achieve this objective. The creation of the Single European Market (SEM) only made "promotion of the Community's economic and social cohesion a key requirement", and reform of the structural funds in 1989 an important mechanism for achieving the objective.

In developing policy as part of the reforms of the structural reforms, the EC adopted three key principles:

- (1) concentrating financial assistance on five priority objectives. These involved promoting the development and adjustment of underdeveloped regions within the Community; converting areas seriously affected by industrial decline; combating long-term unemployment; integrating young people into employment, and promoting the development of rural areas.
- (2) stressing *partnership* as the mechanism which would determine the implementation process. In so doing, the EC acknowledged that partnership might take many forms.
- (3) aiming for consistency in strategies adopted at local, regional and national levels, particularly through the process of economic co-ordination implied by the ERM.

To achieve the first and major objective, funds were doubled between 1987 and 1992 and supposedly to be used in such a way as to "secure maximum value for money from each ecu spent" (EC, 1988, p. 19) through a mix of grants and loans. The Commission recognised that a doubling of the fund would mean that a large part of the resources would be effectively channelled to a limited number of regions. It also clearly expected that member states would match Community contributions—i.e. that EC contributions were expected to be additional to anything

that member states might themselves be spending (EC, 1988, p. 21). Although the regional and social funds (ERDF and ESF) were to remain the largest funds, there remain a large number of action programmes, from which local governments might be expected to benefit. Some of these are aimed at particular economic sectors, such as RECHAR (economic conversion of coal-mining areas); RESIDER (conversion of steel areas), RENAVAL (shipbuilding) and REGEN (energy networks). Others were aimed at particular groups, such as small and medium enterprises (CRAFT—for research), or energy areas (VALOREN—indigenous energy in less well-favoured regions); STAR—continuation of telecommunications improvements also in less well-favoured regions; or INTERREG—the development of frontier areas of the Community. As Toonen (1992) notes this programme has tended to reinforce the notion of the Euregion, in which regional demarcations cross existing national boundaries, and provide a stimulus to institutional reform to give form to the concept of 'Europe of the Regions'. Still others are general, such as LEDA (local economic development action) and STRIDE (science and technology for regional and innovation and development). In addition, there are the well-known research programmes, of which BRITE/EURAM and ESPRIT are perhaps best known, but of which there are over 50 others in operation, spending over 6 bn ecus up to 1994. And to encourage the partnership dimension, a special fund was established to encourage, *inter alia*, twinning arrangements and the development of networks for economic purposes—DGXVI's Special Action Programme for Inter-Regional Co-operation.

An important element in this process, which also serves to recognise *national* interests but which is also designed to promote the sub-national level, is the *subsidiarity principle*—namely, that activity should be organised at the lowest appropriate level of government. This idea has given rise to the vision of a *Europe of the Regions* or the alternative of a *Europe of the Cities*. In this

context, whilst under Objective 1 the main beneficiaries of the new funding arrangements were expected to be Ireland, Greece and Portugal, both Objective 2 and that concerned with rural development ensured that some assistance would go to levels below that of a region, such as urban communities and municipalities, as well as to areas of high unemployment. Thus not only would the EC follow its traditional practice of seeing that new members benefit from funding, together with the less developed, but older areas in crisis were also likely to benefit.

However, in identifying European regions, the Commission's Nomenclature of Statistical Territorial Units (NUTS) scheme bore little relationship to the structure of sub-national institutions within member states, though they might have provided an incentive for inter-institutional co-operation, both sub- and cross-nationally (see Goldsmith, 1991; Anderson, 1991; Cheshire *et al.*, 1991). Suggesting that there was no ideal size for regions, however, the EC provided confused guidance to those seeking funding, even if the overall objectives of economic, social and political integration remain clear, and if the belief that such integration is best achieved by a process of co-operation cross-nationally amongst member states, be that co-operation by individual firms, local governments or whatever.

Whatever the objective, however, most EC programmes are likely to have long- as well as short-term benefits for particular sectors or regions. For example, Cheshire (1990; Cheshire *et al.*, 1986) has been monitoring the performance of over 100 Functional Urban Regions within the EC. His data suggest that those urban regions which ranked badly at the start of his review period (1971) continued to do so throughout it up to 1988. Only seven cities overall showed any improvement—Bordeaux, Birmingham, Lille, Rotterdam, Genoa, Glasgow and Taranto—whilst several (amongst them Seville, Barcelona, Sheffield, Liverpool, Naples and Palermo) actually worsened, and some former FRG cities (e.g. Dortmund and Bochum, Essen and Bremen) were amongst the group

which had deteriorated most quickly over the period. (Cheshire, 1990, p. 319). Larger cities appear to have done better than small ones (p. 323), and it appears that factors leading to economic integration and falling transport costs have a significant effect on who performs well or badly. The overall results is that

there is now very strong statistical evidence confirming the fact that European integration is of much greater benefit to the more central regions of Europe than it is to the more peripheral ones; and that those peripheral regions... are not just in southern Europe but also in north-eastern and particularly north-western Europe... (Cheshire, 1990, p. 327).

Cheshire suggests that over 80 per cent of the variation in performance of the major urban regions of the EC can be explained by their characteristics, including the country in which they are located. In seeking to explain the remaining 20 per cent unexplained variation, he suggests three particular factors, two of which are of interest here.<sup>1</sup> The first is variation in local urban policy, a view supported generally by the EIVA study for the Commission (EIVA, 1992). Paris thus outperforms London, perhaps because it has pursued a more coherent plan. Other high-performing cities include Lyon and Bologna—both cities with long-standing urban policies. Glasgow emerges as the sixth most successful city over the period and is another example of a city which formulated a relatively early response to its problems. Less spectacular gains were recorded by Rotterdam and Birmingham, though both cities have developed more coherent strategies more recently. Cities in the south-west of France, such as Bordeaux and Toulouse, have done well, as have most cities in the south and south-east of the former West Germany. Second and by contrast the problems of poor backward regions in southern Europe now appear to be urban rather than rural: as much the problems of Naples and Cagliari as the regions in which they are located (Cheshire, 1990, pp. 330–331).

#### 4. Changing Intergovernmental Relations

In the context of this article, it is important to realise that throughout Western Europe and many other developed countries, the relationships between levels of governments within nation states and within the EC have been constantly and rapidly changing for all of 25 years at least. In some cases, processes of structural adaptation of local government systems have been necessary because of developments in the nature of the welfare state (Northern Europe); in others, they have reflected both a need to modernise sub-national government structures as well as a need to reflect territorial interests at the sub-national level. This seems generally true for Southern Europe and for Spain in particular. In the latter case, one can highlight the impact of the Basque and Catalan regions on the introduction and development of the autonomous communities. In other cases, problems of governmental overload and fiscal stress (especially in the period following the oil crises of the mid 1970s) have been a driving force for change (the US and Australia, possibly France), whilst in other cases ideological change has also been a major force (Eastern Europe and Britain). It is not possible to summarise the details of all these changes here, but for present purposes it is important to recognise some of the key organising forces.

##### *a. State Decentralisation:*

Since the 1970s, the key feature in nearly all countries, with the notable exception of Britain, has been the trend towards the decentralisation of activity away from the central level of the state towards the lower levels. Amalgamation of municipalities and communes may be part of this process; and/or the creation of an intermediate tier (region, county or province) is another feature. Reforms along these lines can be found in Scandinavia and the Netherlands in the mid to late 1970s; France, Spain and Italy in the 1980s; and are likely in Greece and Portugal in the 1990s. Some measure of

financial and local tax reform is also likely to follow the transfer of various functions to the lower levels, such as the introduction of a general or block grant system; development of more buoyant local tax systems, or else some form of fiscal crisis (Italy). Territorial pressures play a part—the autonomous communities, especially the Basque and Catalan regions in Spain, as well as the Flemish and Walloon communities in Belgium, have been important pressures for change. In other cases, the importance of locality in national politics may act as a barrier to the amalgamation or abolition of municipalities: compare France (still containing 36 000 communes) with Denmark, for example, or consider current debates in Norway, where it is proposed to abolish all municipalities below 5 000 population.

Whilst federal systems, such as Germany and the US, complicate description somewhat, pressures for change are similar. Reagan's America, for example, followed a decentralist strategy in the early 1980s, designed to reduce the (relatively) heavy involvement of the federal government in local affairs. Reagan's justification lay in his constitutional claim that he was merely returning responsibilities to where they should be according to the US constitution—namely at state and local levels. The overall result was not too dissimilar in many cases from those achieved in Thatcher's Britain (see Goldsmith, 1992; Stoker, 1992).

##### *b. Marketisation and Consumerism*

The British case presents the best example of this development, though it has been echoed in Denmark and more recently in other parts of Scandinavia. Goldsmith (1992) and Stoker (1992) provide some of the argument and details, which can only be briefly summarised here. The following elements should be stressed:

- (1) British central government has generally lacked a consistent policy towards sub-national government, especially in relation to English local government.

Cochrane's 1992 description of the period between 1979 and 1990 as being one in which Britain moved from being a welfare state to an enterprise one comes closest to what is involved. For English local government, the period has involved an enforced shift from welfare producer and provider to reluctant enabler of market forces. In other parts of the UK, especially in Scotland, the change has been less dramatic, though there have been significant local conflicts.

- (2) The disappearance of Mrs Thatcher and the re-election of the Conservative government in the spring of 1992 have made the future of British local government less clear. Far from clarifying things, the emergence of Mr Major as Prime Minister has muddied the waters. The British have a new council tax to replace the much-hated poll tax; the English a Local Government Commission; the Welsh and Scots a review; and the Scots and Northern Irish are also threatened with changes to the funding formula which ensures a reduction in their share of public expenditure below the proportion agreed in mid 1970s.
- (3) The signs are that British local government will continue to be characterised by future uncertainty. Two features are likely to remain: first, continued distrust and conflict between centre and locality, a reflection of both the highly partisan and political nature of intergovernmental relations in Britain. Secondly, the push towards marketisation will continue. The introduction of the Citizen's Charter, whereby local governments will be measured for service performance, and the further emphasis on compulsory competitive tendering, under which more and more local government activities will be put out to tender to private firms rather than simply remaining in-house, will both reinforce the privatisation trend.

Most commentators agree that the British example is one of centralisation as much as a move towards the market. Elected local government has decreased in status, not only from the forces moving towards the market and the continued conflict with central government, but also from the growth of non-elected local government in the form of special-purpose single-function agencies, most often dominated by representatives of business interests. Examples include TECs (responsible for training and some aspects of further education) and UDCs (responsible for urban regeneration).

In the context of this article, however, the major doubt is whether or not Britain has got the kind of structure which is best suited for the new Europe as envisaged by the Commission in Brussels. Arguably, the peripheral regions (Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland) have done well out of the EC's structural funds, due both to the supportive attitude of their Ministerial departments and to the pro-active activities of their development agencies, all of which have helped local governments to exploit the EC's funds (Keating and Boyle, 1986). By contrast, English local authorities regard central government as one of the main barriers to successful exploitation of EC funding opportunities. Dealing with two central departments (trade and industry and the environment); the uncertain position and role of regional offices of central government in England, linked to the difficult interpretation placed by the British government on issues such as additionality and subsidiarity, have all made things difficult for local governments seeking to prise out extra monies from Brussels. Link this to the level of distrust British central government departments have for local government, and one might well expect much of British local government to be ill-prepared to deal with the EC. Surprisingly enough, however, and perhaps a reflection of the high degree of professionalism and innovative ability exhibited by most British local government paid officials, British local government seems to be as well, if not better,

prepared to exploit EC funding opportunities as local government elsewhere.

### 5. Local Government and the EC

At the outset of this article it was suggested that the EC had an interest in sub-national government, both because of its desire for greater political, social and economic integration within the Community and because of the nature of its funding mechanisms (limited though they may be) and because of its emphasis on subsidiarity as an organising principle for its work.

Given what it has to do and the overall size of the Community, it is as well to remember that the size of the EC bureaucracy in Brussels is relatively small. The EC has less than 3 500 senior administrators collectively responsible for the drafting of its policies. It is also less coherent than one might expect: different parts of the Commission emphasise different elements of policy and administration. Thus one sector might have a regional dimension to its policy; another will not. As authors like Rhodes (1992) and others have noted, the EC is characterised by large numbers of policy communities, each more or less stable. EC officials have a particular interest in developing these corporate-style policy communities, since such groupings allow the officials to manage an increasingly burdensome consultation process, as well as taking initiatives in new areas—as the Single European Market Act effectively allows them to do.

Both this policy community diversity and the small size of the bureaucracy give the Commission at least two reasons for wanting to deal with sub-national government. First, like all bureaucracies, it needs information, both about what should be its policy objectives and about how its programmes are operating. The main source of such information is undoubtedly national governments, but their advice and information may well reflect their own special interest. But the EC bureaucracy also needs alternative sources of information to counterbalance this national bias—regional and local governments can

provide such sources. Indeed, in so far as most EC programmes are spatially located at levels below the national state, dealing direct with regional or local levels of government may improve policy operations.

Secondly, and no less important, the small size of the Brussels bureaucracy also makes policing its policies difficult. Working through regional or local agents may help the regulation side of its work—for example, in relation to environmental and public health regulations—or may secure better implementation of its policies designed to secure its five objectives. But as Majone (1992, p. 306) points out:

the relationship between central and sub-national governments is significantly affected by Community regulations, especially in countries with a federal or regional structure such as Germany, Belgium, Italy and Spain. Sub-national governments are understandably reluctant to comply with European regulations on whose substance they had no influence, even when the regulations concern matters such as education or the environment which are reserved to the state or regional governments by the national constitution.<sup>2</sup>

Nevertheless, as Mazey and Richardson (1992, p. 2) note, “as power shifts to Brussels and Strasbourg, few policy areas—whether domestic or international—are not subject to some degree of EC influence”. This view is echoed by Crawford (1992, p. 83) when he writes:

There is no doubt that the link between EC powers and the local authorities is becoming greater in terms of substantive issues. . . . Europe has found it useful to bypass recalcitrant central governments . . . and deal directly with local governments . . . Indeed as central regulation . . . increases, the greater the need for diversity and responsiveness at local level.

Crawford goes on to point out that it is at this stage the importance of the subsidiarity principle—namely, that functions and policies should be carried out at the most appropriate

(i.e. lowest) level within the EC and its member states—comes into play.

An additional reason why the Commission may wish to deal directly with sub-national governments lies in the essentially clientelistic nature of its programmes. Although it may be against the will of many EC officials, the EC has many dependents, for whom it can produce many benefits—in return for support for its overall policies, perhaps? As Mazey and Richardson (1992, p. 24) note, such a relationship may not only be true in terms of the EC's dealings with the limited number of groups which are able to keep up with Commission developments and to respond to Commission proposals, but might also be in the interest of the Commission itself in securing its own objectives. For example, if it can bind regional and local governments to it in some way—for example, through encouraging cross-national partnerships and networks as a condition of funding—it may help to break down the nationalistic elements in much of EC work. As such, the EC can be seen as adopting a strategy of incorporation not dissimilar to that adopted by national governments seeking to bind sectional interests to them.

Thus, in order to secure better information on which to base policies, to obtain co-operation in the implementation of policies, and to gain support for its operations, the EC in Brussels has a great incentive to deal with sub-national governments through the elaboration of an ever-increasing number of networks. If such networks also help to bring about the EC's primary objective of securing greater integration amongst the community's members, so much the better. What evidence is there that such processes are occurring?

Anderson (1991, p. 429) reports that "the Commission has sought to increase the participation of sub-national actors in the formulation and implementation of EC regional policy". He considers that the extension of regional programmes widens the scope for long-term relationships between Brussels and sub-national governments to develop, and notes how the Commission itself has deliberately set out to encourage such

participation by directly drumming up interest in its activities and through its requirement that national governments consult with their local and regional authorities in the drafting of programme applications. Furthermore, in 1988 the Commission established the Consultative Council of Local and Regional Authorities, which is consulted on both matters relating to regional development as well as the sub-national implications of Community activities. The Consultative Council has met on several occasions and also called for wider sub-national participation in Community affairs. Similarly, several regional governments within member countries have convened 'Europe of the Regions' conferences making similar claims.

The other major shift in Community activity is an increasing use of regulatory powers. Anderson (1991, p. 430) reports DGIV making substantial use of its competition policy powers to police member's regional programmes. Similarly DGXI, concerned with environmental matters, has involved a development of regulatory powers likely to bring it into a direct relationship with local authorities and regional governments (Johnson and Corcelle: 1989).

Developments like these mean that sub-national units are presented with alternative funding sources—especially to national government—and have new channels through which to influence policy, and may well find a sympathetic ear supportive of their objectives in Brussels. However, it is very easy to over-emphasise the current importance of these developments—the amounts of money available from the EC structural funds continue to pale into insignificance when compared with those covered by the Common Agricultural Policy.

The changes in EC policy over the years could be expected to have considerable effects on the operation of local governments. In the first place, the creation of the Single European Market affects the local economy. Many of the macro-economic benefits of the Single Market, for example, are like to flow from increased competition, which in turn will lead to industrial restruc-



turing and adjustments in labour markets. As local governments have increasingly been involved throughout the 1980s in the promotion of their local economies, they will continue to have regard for the impact of these macro-economic changes on their localities. Though some impacts may be regarded as a primary result of changing EC priorities, others can be expected to follow from other European influences. For example, new standards or procedures may be introduced, such as those concerned with public-sector purchasing, whilst the increased demand for information may have an impact on something as simple as the local library service.

It is clear that, whilst the Single Market may well enhance competition, there are serious doubts about the distribution of costs and benefits which will follow. Heightened competition may well lead to problems for the weaker regions of Europe or for specific economic sectors. Local governments can expect to have to understand the extent to which they are potential gainers or losers, or which sectors will be affected—either positively or negatively. Some areas, dependent on certain economic activities, may be more vulnerable than others—car production seems to be one such example. In Britain, for example, one might expect areas in the South East (defined broadly as running from the Wash to the Bristol Channel) to do better because of its proximity to Europe, whilst the North West might be expected to do less well, if only in part because of its dependence on certain industries currently undergoing rapid change (such as aerospace) and in part because of its distance from Europe and the new Channel Tunnel link. Labour mobility might be expected to increase, although language barriers and the introduction of special job qualifications may limit the extent of mobility. Finance capital can be expected to become increasingly rootless (Hutton, 1989, p. 3), whilst reduced border controls can be expected to reduce road haulage costs, perhaps helping peripheral areas marginally (Emerson, 1988, p. 9). Some industries, such as food products,

medical equipment, pharmaceuticals, heavy engineering, etc, are expected to become more competitive (Cecchini, 1988). Increased competition can be expected to lead to increased relative poverty between areas and to continuing regional disparities (Hutton, 1989, p. 7).

## 6. Local Government Response

It was suggested earlier that local governments had been able to exploit EC funds successfully in the past. Glasgow, for example, has been a notable EC beneficiary, as have cities like Birmingham and Belfast. Similarly, Barcelona probably owed as much to the generosity of the EC as it did to the impact of the 1992 Olympic games for the substantial regeneration it has achieved in recent years. In its report for the EC, the European Institute for Urban Affairs highlights the way in which cities like Rotterdam, Seville and Dublin appear as winners of funds from EC competitions and how some of the cities located in the relatively poorer peripheral regions of the south and north-west of Europe also acquired significant funding over the years (EIUA, 1992, p. 172). Similarly, despite the early slowness of the UK government in responding to the re-introduction of Integrated Development Operations, an idea re-invented by Delors in 1986 following their earlier use in places like Belfast, Naples, the Western Isles, South East Belgium and Lozère (France), Britain had several IDOs in operation by 1990, including Birmingham; Corby; Manchester, Salford and Trafford (MST); Merseyside; South Humberside and South Yorkshire (SHSY); Strathclyde (Scotland); and Clwyd (Wales). These followed the first 'new generation' IDO in the Oost-Gröningen/Oost Drenthe region in the Netherlands.

Redmond and Barrett (1988, p. 23) report that places like Birmingham and Lothian (Scotland) had similarly done well from earlier applications to the ERDF; as had Merseyside, Glasgow and some coal communities—a point to which we shall return. Reviewing the experience of the ERDF, Red-

mond and Barrett (1988, p. 31) comment that the Commission's approach seems to owe much to French indicative planning experience, a reflection perhaps of Delors' links with national, regional and local government, as well as possible French and other Socialist party penetration and occupation of the key points in the IDO and regional funding networks.<sup>3</sup> However, in this context it is also important to note the existence of another predecessor programme, itself not without influence—the Integrated Mediterranean Programme, spending some 2 bn Ecus in Greece and 2.1 bn in France and Italy, with aid being targeted at the regional levels. Montpellier was a particular beneficiary of this programme, since the Languedoc-Rousillon region received EC contributions of 620 million ecus between 1968 and 1988. Montpellier played a key role in the negotiations with Brussels, and as a result obtained support for the enlargement of its airport, the construction of a conference centre, and the development of a number of 'technological poles' (EIUA, 1992, p. 169). By contrast, however, Cesarati and Torquati (1990, p. 90) note (ruefully) that:

In all cases, Italian IMP appear on the whole to have been drawn up less efficiently than the French ones, with which they (will) have to compete when it comes to financing

again suggesting strong French influence on both the form of support and its actual distribution within the IMP. Another Italian commentator, Latella (1990, p. 237) also notes that:

if it is true that some of the southern Italian regions, some of the Spanish regions, some of the Portuguese and Greek regions participate with sizeable percentages in the distribution of ERDF funds, it is also true that the United Kingdom in particular and other regions of Europe account for the use of these funds by absorbing more than a quarter of them.

However, Nevin (1990) reports that Italy had received between 22 and 29 per cent of all

ERDF funds since 1986, and in the late 1970s had been receiving an average of 40 per cent of such funds. In terms of the period after 1986, Spain was the second major beneficiary (18–24 per cent), with the UK in third position (14–19 per cent).

How do different regions and local governments come to both play and win in the EC funding and resource game? Understanding the rules of the game is a key to appreciating why or why not local governments may be interested in what the EC has to offer. For example, if by some mysterious quirk, a local government does not qualify for any of the funds available under any of the programmes, its degree of interest in EC matters is likely to be minimal. Such a case is difficult to imagine, but it is clear from a number of surveys that many local governments do not appreciate quite what the EC has to offer. Small municipalities in particular appear less likely to benefit from EC programmes generally, and thus are less likely to evince an active interest in EC matters, even at the elementary level of seeking funds for a twinning arrangement. Thus, for example, whilst almost 60 per cent of the respondents to a recent British survey had some twinning arrangement, only 14 per cent had sought EC funding to promote such arrangements (EUROLOG Survey: 1992)<sup>4</sup>.

But as moves towards integration increase and as EC funding become scarcer (in real terms) and more targeted, and as regional and local disparities persist if not widen, we might reasonably expect much greater co-operation between local authorities, not only nationally as suggested by the IDO experience, but also cross-nationally.

As far as Britain is concerned, an Audit Commission Report in late 1991 suggested that two-thirds of British local authorities were not sufficiently organised to make use of the opportunities presented by the EC (Audit Commission, 1991, p. 3). A more recent survey, carried out over the summer of 1992, suggests some improvement. This survey, undertaken as part of the EUROLOG project, suggested that 60 per cent of English and Welsh local authorities now had special-

ist staff working on EC matters, a higher proportion than that generally found in other European countries. For example, Klaussen (1991) reports that just 8 per cent, or 17 out of 205 Danish local governments, have such specialist staff. In Ireland, most negotiations at the regional level are conducted by the national government, which managed to be designated the appropriate regional unit by the EC (Coyle, 1992). Coyle, however, goes on to report increasing dissatisfaction amongst Irish local governments with this arrangement and an increase in the number seeking to open a direct relationship with Brussels (Coyle, 1992, pp. 14–17).

Just under half of the English survey respondents had special arrangements for co-ordinating EC matters internally and externally, and over half had sent elected and paid officials abroad on EC matters, though fewer than a third were involved in direct co-operation with their counterparts in European countries. Co-operation with other UK authorities, however, was high—90 per cent of our respondents claimed to be involved in such activity, again a higher figure than that found for other countries. For example, Klaussen reports a figure of 25 per cent for intergovernmental co-operation at all levels for Denmark (Klaussen, 1991, p. 10).

Whereas local governments in other countries often suggested that lack of trained personnel was a major limitation on their EC participation, lack of finance was the major limitation for British municipalities—hardly surprising given the cutbacks of the last decade. British local governments are active across a range of EC programmes, though less active in areas like social and competition policy, as well as agricultural policy, than might be expected. However, it is important to make a distinction between pro-active local governments and reactive ones—and it is clear that not only the majority of British, but also other countries', local governments are generally reactive towards the EC. In other words, most local governments react to EC initiatives rather than seeking to shape them.

Understanding this point is important,

since most of the literature, hardly surprisingly, draws attention to the pace-making local governments—those who are the most active—and as such perhaps gives a misleading impression of the impact of the EC on European local governments and *vice versa*. Clearly it is the larger, probably more urban municipalities who are most active, or else those levels most able to relate to the idea of peripheral regions. Balme and LeGales (1992) draw attention to the distinction between the activities of French regions and cities, with the former particularly active in using the EC as a means of establishing regional identity through the attraction of EC funds for projects. Regions such as Nord-Pas de Calais; Languedoc-Rousillon, the Atlantic Arc (21 regions) have all been active in promoting Euroregions, the latter particularly active in lobbying Brussels for an integrated programme as well as for a north-south Atlantic motorway. The best-known group is that comprising the Four Motors—Rhône-Alpes; Catalonia; Lombardy and Baden-Württemberg. Balme and LeGales draw attention to the stronger position of many German, Belgian, Italian and Spanish regions in comparison to the French, or the way in which frontier regions are better able to exploit EC opportunities. The case of Baden-Württemberg is a good example. Cooke and Morgan (1990, p. 46) describe how:

Baden-Württemberg places enormous emphasis on transnational partnerships with regions (especially in Europe), whose research, technology and economic structures are likely to offer synergies. Such transnational partnerships are also mandatory for access to EC collaborative R and D programmes.

Baden-Württemberg has been one of the most aggressive sponsors of regional alliances in Europe. By May 1990 it had concluded collaborative agreements with Rhône-Alpes; Lombardy; Catalonia and Wales, covering technological collaboration, research and development links, and economic and cultural exchange in general.

Cooke and Morgan stress the importance of the regional dimension, suggesting this level is able to act much more flexibly than their national counterparts whilst being much closer to the development problems of their locales. The Baden-Württemberg initiative also involves public-private partnerships (for example, Bosch is heavily involved with South Wales in training and technology transfer) as well as educational and research centres—Welsh HE institutions are involved with Max Planck Institutes and regional German universities in technology transfer and R&D programmes and in bringing together industrial associations and chambers of commerce into a technical links programme.

Cooke and Morgan stress the importance of the political commitment given to the exercise by the *Lände* leader, Herr Spath. They suggest that Spath sees value in “learning by interacting on a wider spatial scale, exchanging information about market opportunities, and from new forms of technological alliance at the regional level” (Cooke and Morgan, 1990, p. 48). Such leadership commitment is also one of the main factors identified by the European Institute of Urban Affairs in their report on cities in the EC (EIUA, 1992) and is also associated with writers like Judd and Parkinson (1990).

The Community encourages such initiatives and leadership commitment, most notably with its programme for cross-frontier co-operation (INTEREG). This programme has brought together regions like Nord-Pas du Calais in France with Kent County Council in Britain and also with the West Flanders province in Belgium. Dutch, Belgian and German border regions are also involved in a range of such Euroregional collaborations, with policy objectives including such areas as economic development and the promotion of tourism. One example would be the Maas-Rijn Euregion. As De Rynck notes, the EC has been a powerful stimulant to such developments (De Rynck, 1992, p. 12).

Balme and LeGales similarly draw attention to the idea of *entrepreneurial cities*, many of whom have become heavily involved in European activities, listing

amongst others places like Rennes, Grenoble, Strasbourg, Lille, Toulouse, Montpellier and Angers. They identify the mayor as a key factor in this movement, even though many French cities are quite small as compared with their European counterparts. In this respect, their small size provided an impetus to some French cities to become involved with partners in European activities. Cities sought a link with Brussels either to find an alternative source of finance to the French government, or to place themselves better in the economic market-place, or to promote the political status of their local political leaders. As Balme and LeGales note, the main “ambition of these cities is economic development and urban competition” (Balme and LeGales, 1992, p.10). Obtaining new investment—whether from the public or private purse—has been a major political priority for such cities, with places like Lyon, Montpellier, Rennes and Nantes being to the fore amongst French cities—alongside such places as Milan, Frankfurt and Barcelona.

For many local political leaders of these entrepreneurial cities, being identified as a European or, better still, an international city, was the major objective. Brussels was seen as important in this development—cities could approach the EC with projects adapted to the needs of the latter’s programmes. Balme and LeGales quote the example of Lille, whose “collective ambition is to transform the city into a European city and to get involved in as many European projects as possible to strengthen this claim” (Balme and LeGales, 1992, p. 15). Through a cross-frontier co-operation programme (PACTE) and via regional aid, about 2 bn francs were used to improve the Lille infrastructure. Lille also obtained another 20 million francs to support its cultural policy, and smaller funds followed to finance training and social programmes aimed at young people. Such a strategy involved Lille in developing links with a number of other cities, a strategy also followed by Montpellier, which quickly developed links with Barcelona after Spain’s entry into the EC. It also played a key role in the integrated Mediterranean programme—

and the mayor developed close links with the various EC directorates and with the President of the Commission, Jacques Delors. As a result, the Montpellier science park and its associated research and innovation centre; the airport and its cultural centre all benefitted from EC aid. (see Donzel, 1990).

Clearly, many cities hope both to promote themselves and to benefit from EC aid for what might best be called flagship projects, such as cultural centres, airports and science parks. Similarly they may seek to bring their universities and higher education institutions into projects which are aimed at programmes such as COMETT, FAST, DRIVE, SPRINT and ESPRIT. Such links may be crucial in obtaining aid—the Manchester, Salford and Trafford IDO bid stressed the higher and further education capacity of the region. Winning such competitions not only adds to the strength of the city's reputation, but also to those of the HE institutions involved. In cases like these, co-operation with private-sector industry is also of vital importance.

Equally important—certainly in both Britain and France—have been the attempts by cities to attract European funding for restructuring purposes. Here, as far as one can judge, there is a major difference between British and French cities, in that the latter, such as St Etienne and Le Havre, have generally depended on the activities of central government to secure funding for them, whereas their British counterparts have frequently succeeded in spite of government lack of support or interest. For example, the British government's attitude to additionality led to the relevant commissioner holding up funds due to coal communities in Britain, such as Barnsley, under the RECHAR programme, until the British government agreed *not* to deduct the funds being used under the programme. However, albeit for different reasons, both sets of cities seem to resent the role played by central government, much preferring increasingly to develop their own direct relationship with Brussels. Some regions and cities maintain their own lobby office in Brussels: Manchester, Sheffield and

Lille are examples. Klaussen (1991) reports the efforts of Aalborg, Aarhus and Odense in Denmark to join forces and establish an office in Brussels. The office's main function is to keep track of EC developments, provide feedback to their regions, and to co-ordinate contact and initiatives on behalf of both private enterprise and their localities (Klaussen, 1991, p. 11). In effect, the office acts as a kind of local commercial attaché (Andersen and Eliassen, 1991) as much as a lobbying body—and the cost of doing so is not small. Aarhus estimated it spent about 2 million krone in 1989 (Klaussen, 1991, p. 11). Other localities employ consultants, Montpellier for example, and many consultants offer such assistance to local governments, often as a result of also working for the EC itself. British examples include bodies like Lancashire Enterprises plc, the highly successful enterprise agency initially established by the Labour-controlled Lancashire County Council in the early 1980s. Privatised in 1989 to comply with government legislation, it made a profit of just under £1 million in 1990 on a turnover of £6.5 million. Amongst its activities, it lists working for Europe and European Services under its European package as important elements in its work for both private-public-sector bodies. It also undertakes work for such diverse bodies as the Council of Europe; the International Union of Local Authorities, the European Business Network and the EC. Another example is that of the Centre for Local Economic Strategies, sponsored in the mid 1980s by a group of left-wing Labour authorities. Based in Manchester, it survives as a consultancy organisation—and with a strong European element in its work. Organisations such as these have been particularly active over the last two or three years in helping to promote an increasing number of *European networks*. Some have come about with EC support, but most have been developed by regions and cities themselves. For example, the Local Government Information Bureau (1992) reports British involvement in no less than 23 such networks—a number no doubt increasing monthly. Such involvement undoubtedly

helps to encourage local governments to think along broader lines than simply the administration of nationally-determined services.

The creation of these networks is one of the most important developments in terms of EC and sub-national governments in recent years. They permit greater co-operation between local authorities, not only nationally but also cross-nationally. Such networks, sometimes supported by EC funds as part of the moves towards integration, frequently have the objective of lobbying Brussels as well as providing information and technical assistance to municipalities and regions seeking financial support. As such, they help the transfer of knowledge and best practice both within and across borders, and also help to act as a catalyst for economic co-operation. For example, the main spokesman for local government in relation to the EC is now the Council of European Municipalities and Regions, which in December 1990 became the "fully representative European section of the International Union of Local Authorities (IULA)". Its members include Eastern Europe and the former USSR, as well as Israel. Its first president was the Mayor of Mainz, his deputy the Mayor of Frederiksborg in Denmark, along with the Mayor of Mellac (Brittany). Britain is represented by a councillor from Test Valley—spokesperson for the Association of District Councils, and supported by the chair of the Local Government Information Bureau—another British-based lobbying body. The impetus for the new body was very much British-led, and the new organisation is "expected to speak up loud and clear for a united Europe which respects local choice and diversity" and to press for local government to be guaranteed its proper place in the revision of the Treaty of Rome. (European Information Service, No. 117, p. 24, 28/1/91).

Not to be outdone in the lobbying and recruiting stakes, the French, through the Paris-based foundation for the Management of Cities, have launched the European Local Authorities Research and Study Centre (CERCLE) with 125 founder members

drawn from large European municipalities (85) and from business (45 leading European firms are claimed as members), with the aim of sharing experience between the leaders of major European local governments; promoting interaction between such leaders and their business counterparts; providing expertise and a think-tank; and, of course, lobbying on behalf of members. Its head office is located in Brussels, and in its first year (1990) the organisation had a budget of 500 000 ecus, which is expected to rise to around 800 000. Aimed at only the largest municipalities, its target membership is between 400 and 500. Its major leaders include Jacques Chirac (Mayor of Paris); the President of Andalusia and the Mayors of Cologne, Strasbourg and San Sebastian, as well as those from Marseilles, Barcelona, Rennes, Nancy and Southampton, as well as such regions as Rhônes-Alpes and Nord-Pas du Calais. It likes to describe itself as the "premier European club for local government" (*Les Echos*, 31/10/89). Amongst its business members are la Compagnie des Eaux; Dumez-GTM; KPMG and Honeywell Bull, so that the organisation reflects a strong public-private partnership. Paralleling these two transnational general associations is a third—the Committee of European Cities, or EUROCITIES—which includes some of those already listed, together with places like Birmingham and Lyon—very much a network of second cities. Then there is the Commission de Villes, a network for small and medium-sized cities up to 50 000, as well as the European Gateway network, bringing together cities like Glasgow, Dortmund and our now-familiar friend—Montpellier.

Other transnational groupings are more *specific networks*, and include the Coal Communities Campaign, based on localities facing restructuring in the coal industry who successfully lobbied Brussels to set up the RECHAR programme. This network was led initially by places like Barnsley and Lothian, together with Derbyshire. It was subsequently extended across the Channel, bringing in North Rhine-Westphalia in the

spring of 1990. (*CCC News*, Summer, 1990). Another network is MILAN based on the motor industry areas, linking particularly British and Spanish interests. It was "designed to share experience, to build links with manufacturers abroad, and to promote common objectives between MILAN municipalities at the European level". (MILAN, 1987, p. 8). It has sought to become an effective lobbying organisation at both national and international levels, but its politics have become somewhat complicated by the opening up of Eastern Europe and vehicle production possibilities there, as well as by the problems posed by Japanese investments, particularly in the UK. European producers have expressed concern at the fact that such UK-produced vehicles will count as European after 1992. Doubts have also been expressed about the extent to which such vehicles contain the appropriate amount of locally-produced (i.e. European) components (Sadler, 1992). As a result, the network suffers from conflicts of interest amongst its members.

There are a host of other similar networks—indeed networking is very much the name of this particular game. Some have been created around shipbuilding and aerospace as a result of problems thrown up by the expected peace dividend. The former have sought aid under the RENAVAL programme: Cherbourg was one winner. Still others are linked to specific EC programmes, like the EXCHANGE network dealing with the EC poverty programme. Here the aim is on creating transnational teams which can effectively work against poverty (EXCHANGE, October 1989, p. 5). Another local government network has emerged around the HORIZON programme designed to improve possibilities for the handicapped. It came out of meetings in Brussels and Lille in early 1991 to discuss some of the issues involved. The programme for Local Economic Development (LEDA) promoted by DGV of the EC, has encouraged the development of a network of municipalities involved in relatively small-scale initiatives—in Britain the main

players are Durham, Nottingham and Strathclyde. Then there is the RETI network, largely comprising Objective 2 regions—those concerned with the restructuring of traditional industries—in which local governments in Britain, France, Belgium and Spain have been the main actors. Others include RECITE (Regions and Cities in Europe) which has public transport as one focus; POLIS, which groups new technologies and traffic congestion as its main concern, and Quartiers en Crise, which is an initiative designed to tackle problems of severe urban decline in particular cities. The emergence of such sectoral networks is hardly surprising—they mirror the sectoral nature of much EC policy-making and implementation, as people like Rhodes (1992) have noted.

Other networks are emerging in new areas, such as the GREEN LINKS network constructed around transport issues and designed to open up new transport corridors and to promote new green technology. Cities like Sheffield, Hull and Rotterdam are all involved—and link up with their opposite numbers in East Europe. Goldsmith (1991) draws attention to the important role played by consultants in establishing these networks: of course, many of these consultants also undertake work for the EC, so can help both the EC and local governments achieve their objectives.

### Conclusions

Lobbying is not new to the EC or to local government. As Toonen (1992) notes "it is something one has to get used to, since 'everyone seems to do it'". The EC has both corporatist and clientelistic elements in its policy-making style, and the private-sector and voluntary groups have known this from early days (Greenwood and Ronnit, 1991, 1992; Streeck and Schmitter, 1991). Agricultural interests were quick to turn their attention away from national governments towards Brussels once the EC was formed and additional members joined, in order to

influence the shape of the Common Agricultural Policy, and Greenwood and Ronnit (1991) demonstrate more than adequately the activities of the pharmaceutical industry in relation to regulation. But it is possible to over-emphasise the importance of Brussels as a centre of decision-making and to ignore the continued importance of the intergovernmental relationship within the nation state. Though individual localities may win benefits for themselves by negotiating directly with Brussels, they are as likely to win if they go to the EC in partnership both with other local governments from other countries and with the support of their own national government or sponsoring ministry. Such a strategy is one which is clearly understood in countries like Spain and Portugal, for example, and is increasingly understood by other member countries. And of course, as Mazey and Richardson (1992, p. 28) comment: "there is a recognition that a common and co-ordinated strategy between group and national administrations is desirable".

So national governments remain the main route by which the EC can be lobbied, so local governments will be nervous about upsetting their sponsoring ministry when dealing with Brussels. How supportive such ministries may be in practice is open to question: the British respondents to the EUROLOG survey suggested that the majority of British local governments still regard central government as one of the barriers in their dealings with Europe, though the same is not true of other countries like France, Denmark and Ireland.

However, local and regional governments have come relatively late to this EC lobbying game. The important point to note about the developments discussed in detail here is that they increasingly cross national boundaries and by-pass central governments, permitting if not directly encouraging localities and regions to deal directly with Brussels and vice versa. As such they represent the most important development in intergovernmental relations in the European context in recent years—one which in all probability will markedly shape those relationships in the foreseeable future.

## Notes

1. The third factor is the presence of large service sectors in particular regions, which enhances performance, as expected.
2. The reason, as Majone correctly notes (1992, p. 311) is that local governments "are unlikely to make a clean separation between providing public goods for their citizens and engaging in policies designed to advantage the locality at the expense of their neighbours". He quotes methods of air pollution control as an example.
3. I am grateful to Michael Ward, Director, Centre for Local Economic Strategies, Manchester, for suggesting this point.
4. The EUROLOG survey was undertaken by the author as part of a wider study of local governments and the EC, part financed by the Commission and coordinated by K. K. Klaussen, Odense University, Denmark.

## References

- ANDERSEN, S.S. and ELIASSEN, K.A. (1991) European community lobbying, *European Journal of Political Research*, 20, pp. 173–187.
- ANDERSON, J.L. (1991) Sceptical reflections on a Europe of the Regions: Britain, Germany and the ERDF, *Journal of Public Policy*, 10, pp. 417–447.
- AUDIT COMMISSION (1991) *A Rough Guide to Europe: Local Authorities and the EC*. London: HMSO.
- BALME, R. and LEGALES, P. (1992) *Is Europe an alternative to the Jacobin state? French local and regional government and the EC*. Paper presented to the EUROLOG Conference, Odense, September.
- CECCHINI, P. (1988) *The European Challenge, 1992: The Benefits of the Single Market*. Aldershot: Gower.
- CERCLE (1990) *Prospectus*. European Local Authorities Study and Research Centre.
- CESARATI, G.P. and TORQUATI, B.M. (1990) The European community and the regions, *Journal of Regional Policy*, 10, pp. 79–104.
- CHESHIRE, P.C. (1990) Explaining the recent performance of the European Community's major urban regions, *Urban Studies*, 27, pp. 311–333.
- CHESHIRE, P., CAMAGNI, J.P., DE GAUDEMAR, J.R. and UADRADO ROURA (1991) 1957 to 1992: moving towards a Europe of regions and regional policy, in: L. RODWIN and H. SAZANAMI (Eds) (1991) *Industrial Change and Regional Economic Transformation*, pp. 268–300. London: Harper Collins.
- CHESHIRE, P.C. CARBONARO, G. and HAY, D.G.



- (1986) Problems of urban decline and growth in EEC countries, *Urban Studies*, 23, pp. 131–149.
- COCHRANE, A. (1992) The changing state of local government: restructuring for the 1990s, *Public Administration*, 69, pp. 281–302.
- COOKE, P. and MORGAN, K. (1990) *Learning from-networking*. Regional Industrial Research Report No. 5, Cardiff.
- COYLE, C. (1992) *European integration and local administration in Ireland*. Paper presented at EUROLOG conference, Odense, September.
- CRAWFORD, C. (1992) European influence on local self-government, *Local Government Studies*, 18, pp. 69–85.
- DE RYNCK, S. (1992) *The changing role of Belgian local authorities in the European integration process*. Paper presented to EUROLOG Conference, Odense, September.
- DONZEL, A. (1990) *The Case of Montpellier*, in: M. PARKINSON (Ed.) *Urbanisation and the Functions of Cities in the European Community*. EIUA Report to DGXVI.
- EC (1988) *Guide to the Reform of the Community's Structural Funds*. Brussels: The European Commission.
- EMERSON, M. (1988) 1992 and European integration, *Local Government Studies*, 16(6), pp. 1–9.
- EUROPEAN INSTITUTE FOR URBAN AFFAIRS (1992) *Urbanisation and the Functions of Cities in the European Community*. Liverpool: John Moores University.
- GOLDSMITH, M. (1991) *Beyond the blue banana: British local governments and the EC*. Paper presented at ECPR Workshop on Policical Integration and Institutional Change Towards the EC, Colchester, Essex, March.
- GOLDSMITH, M. (1992) Local Government, *Urban Studies*, 29, pp. 393–410.
- GREENWOOD, J. and RONNIT, K. (1991) Organised interests and the European internal market, *Government and Policy*, 9, pp. 467–484.
- GREENWOOD, J. and RONNIT, K. (1992) *Interest groups and the meso dimension in Brussels*. Paper presented at PSA Annual Conference, Belfast, April.
- HUTTON, S. (1989) 1992 and European integration, *Local Government Studies*, 16(6), pp. 1–9.
- JOHNSON, S.P. and CORCELLE, G. (1989) *The Environmental Policy of the European Communities*. London: Graham and Trotman.
- JUDD, D. and PARKINSON, M. (Eds) (1990) *Leadership and Urban Regeneration*. London: Sage.
- KEATING, M. and BOYLE, R. (1986) *Restructuring Urban Scotland: Strategies for Local Economic Development*. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press.
- KLAUSSEN, K.K. (1991) *Danish local government and the EC*. Paper presented to ECPR Workshop on Political Integration and Institutional Changes towards the EC, Colchester, Essex, March.
- LAFFAN, B. (1989) While you're over there in Brussels, get us a grant—the management of the structural funds in Ireland, *Irish Political Studies*, 4, pp. 43–57.
- LATELLA, F. (1990) Backward areas and Community politics, *Journal of Regional Policy*, 2, pp. 227–261.
- LOCAL GOVERNMENT INFORMATION BUREAU (1992) *International Local Authority Networks Linking to the UK*. London: LGIB.
- MAJONE, G. (1992) Regulatory federalism in the European Community, *Government and Policy*, 10, pp. 299–316.
- MAZEY, S. and RICHARDSON, J. (1992) *Interest groups and European integration*. Paper presented to PSA Annual conference, Belfast, April.
- NEVIN, E. (1990) *The Economics of Europe*. New York: St Martins Press.
- PICKVANCE, C. and PRETECEILLE, E. (1991) Conclusion, in: C. PICKVANCE and E. PRETECEILLE (Eds) (1991) *State Restructuring and Local Power*, pp. 197–223. London: Frances Pinter.
- REDMOND, J. and BARRETT, G. (1988) The European Regional Development Fund and local government, *Local Government Studies*, 14(5), pp. 19–34.
- RHODES, R.A.W. (1992) *The Europeanisation of sub-central government: the case of the UK*. Mimeograph.
- SADLER, D. (1992) Beyond '1992': the evolution of European Community policies towards the automobile industry, *Government and Policy*, 10, pp. 229–248.
- STOKER, G. (1992) *The Politics of Local Government*, 2nd ed. London: MacMillan.
- STREECK, W. and SCHMITTER, P. (1991) From national corporatism to transnational pluralism: organised interests in the single European market, *Politics and Society*, 19, pp. 133–164.
- TOONEN, T. (1992) Europe of the administrations: the challenges of 92 and beyond, *Public Administration Review*, 52, pp. 108–115.