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**THE EVOLUTION OF TURKEY'S FOREIGN POLICY:
THE TRUMAN DOCTRINE AND TURKEY'S ENTRY INTO NATO**

by

Sinan Toprak

**A Thesis
Submitted to the
Faculty of The Graduate College
in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the
Degree of Master of Arts
Department of Political Science**

**Western Michigan University
Kalamazoo, Michigan
June 1987**

THE EVOLUTION OF TURKEY'S FOREIGN POLICY:
THE TRUMAN DOCTRINE AND TURKEY'S ENTRY INTO NATO

Sinan Toprak, M.A.

Western Michigan University, 1987

This thesis examines the historical development of Turkey's foreign policy up to the period immediately following World War II, and its decision to join the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).

The study begins with a survey of Turkey's geopolitical importance. The narrative highlights political conditions from the Ottoman period to the years following World War II. Domestic political developments, as well as foreign relations of Turkey in the Republican period, are analyzed.

Turkey's current foreign policy was established during the initial years following World War II. The thesis discusses the reasons for the shift in Turkey's foreign policy, from peaceful co-existence to its entrance into bloc politics. The impact of the Truman Doctrine, how it influenced Turkish-Soviet and Turkish-American relations, and how the combination of domestic and foreign factors facilitated Turkey's alignment with the Western bloc are examined. Finally the personalities and institutions who influenced Turkey's foreign policy decisions are discussed.

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Sinan Toprak

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS	ii
CHAPTER	
I. INTRODUCTION	1
Notes	5
II. TURKEY'S STRATEGIC POSITION IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE	6
Turkey's Changing Political Geography	6
Historical Background: Ottoman Period	8
The Turkish Straits and the Post World War I Period	22
Geographic Setting of The Turkish Republic	24
Notes	26
III. THE TURKISH REPUBLIC	31
Domestic Political Developments	31
Foreign Relations of Turkey	36
Immediate Aftermath of World War II	43
Notes	50
IV. TURKEY AND THE TRUMAN DOCTRINE	56
Peaceful Co-Existence Prior to World War II	56
American Policy toward Turkey Prior to World War II	71
Notes	84

Table of Contents--Continued

CHAPTER

V. TURKEY JOINS NATO	90
From the Truman Doctrine to the Marshall Plan	90
Turkey and NATO	95
Notes	112
VI. DECISION MAKING IN TURKEY'S POLITICS: PERSONALITIES AND INSTITUTIONS	117
Post World War II Turkey: Inonu and the Passing of RPP	118
The Menderes Era, 1950-60: Promises and Performance	129
Notes	140
VII. CONCLUSION	144
Notes	150
APPENDICES	151
A. Maps	152
B. Tables	157
BIBLIOGRAPHY	160

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

After World War II, Turkey's foreign policy emphasized ties with the United States and Western Europe, and its national security necessitated full-fledged membership in Western alliances. This dependence on Europe and the United States represented a dramatic shift from Turkey's pre-World War II position. Nevertheless, the new policy was made imperative by increasing Soviet pressures that threatened the country's territorial integrity. In order to insure itself against Soviet threat, Turkey became a member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in 1952.

Thirty-five years after joining NATO, changes in the international balance of power, and crises of confidence and trust with its allies has not reduced Turkey's geopolitical significance.¹ Turkey's location bordering on the Soviet Union, Iran, Iraq and Syria makes it one of the most strategically important allies of the North Atlantic Alliance. Moreover, Turkey has become the third or fourth largest recipient of United States military and technical aid and remains a major NATO outpost in Southern

Europe and the Middle East.²

This study traces the course of Turkey's foreign policy up to the period immediately following World War II and its decision to join NATO. Turkish foreign policy, however, cannot be understood without an awareness of Turkey's socio-economic and political problems. It will therefore be necessary to examine the Turkish domestic scene and, to observe how internal conditions influence the country's foreign policy posture.

This study begins with a survey of Turkey's geopolitical importance. Efforts are made to provide historical perspective. The narrative highlights political conditions from the Ottoman period to the founding of the Republic under the leadership of Mustafa Kemal, as well as the years leading up to World War II.

The foundation for Turkey's current foreign policy was established during the initial years following World War II, and the patterns of relationships developed at that time remain to this day. This thesis discusses the reasons for the shift in Ankara's pre-World War II foreign policy. It also addresses the impact of the Truman Doctrine and how it influenced Turkish-Soviet relations and Turkish-American relations.

From the beginning of the American defense initiative, Turkey was interested in joining the western security

system. After the formation of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization in 1949 Turkey launched a campaign to associate itself with Western Europe's defenses. Internal conditions influenced Turkey's desire to be included in the Western bloc of nations. Turkey's reasons for entering NATO, as well as the reaction of the NATO countries are explored in this thesis. Finally, the decision making process, emphasizing the making of Turkey's foreign policy, is analyzed.

In this study, efforts are made to answer the question: How did domestic and foreign factors combine to facilitate Turkey's alignment with the Western bloc? In analyzing Turkey's foreign policy in the immediate aftermath of World War II the following hypotheses will be tested:

1. The combination of external and domestic factors played an important role in Turkey's association with the Western world.
2. Turkey's foreign policy was not affected during power transfers from one party administration to another. Foreign policy was immune from intense political and economic rivalries between the two major parties.
3. Foreign policy decisions in Turkey were made by a few elite foreign service advisors and diplomats.
4. Once in close relationship with NATO countries and

the United States, Turkey emerged as West's emissary among the other developing nations.

In the thesis, the sources used are primarily in the English language. For Turkey's domestic politics considerable use is made of B. Lewis's The Emergence of Modern Turkey, Karpas's Turkey's Politics, Ahmad's The Turkish Experiment of Democracy, and Berberoglu's Turkey in Crisis. For Turkey's foreign relations, I have drawn from Vali's Bridge Across the Bosphorus, and The Turkish Straits and NATO, Howard's Turkey, the Straits and US Policy, Ziring's The Middle East Political Dictionary, and Harris's Troubled Alliance.

In addition regarding diplomatic relations between several countries, I have examined the Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS) 1945-1953, Documents on International Affairs 1945-1952, Survey of International Affairs 1920-1923 and 1939-1946, and the U.S. State Department Bulletin. Turkish language studies employed are Gonlubol's Turkish Foreign Policy with Events, Sander's Turkish-American Relations, and Avcioglu's Turkey's Social Order.

Notes

1. B.R.Kuniholm, "Turkey and NATO", in L.Kaplan; R.Clawson and R.Luroghi, NATO and Mediterranean, Wilmington: Scholarly Resources Inc., 1985, p.215.
2. The Nation, April 21, 1984 p.480. W.Arkin, "Playing Chicken in Turkey, Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, October 1985, pp.4-5. The United States administration was seeking 785 million dollars in military aid to Turkey for 1986 fiscal year. New York Times, April 3, 1985. p.3.

CHAPTER II

TURKEY'S STRATEGIC POSITION IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE

Turkey's Changing Political Geography

Turkey occupies a region of strategic importance in contemporary international politics. Turkey is at once an East European, a Mediterranean and a Middle Eastern country. Although geographically a part of southern Europe, the Turkish landmass covers a large area of southwestern Asia, a region known as Anatolia or Asia Minor. (See Map I, Appendix A). Moreover, in terms of culture, racial origin and lifestyle Turkey belongs to the oriental world. Turkey has been a crossroad for two entirely distinct cultures, and has experienced numerous invasions and migrations. In order to understand Turkey's geopolitical significance today, we have to begin tracing the history of Ottoman Turkey.

In the seventeenth century, the territorial extent of the Ottoman Empire reached from Vienna in Europe to the Persian Gulf in Mesopotamia, from north of the Black Sea to North Africa.¹ (See Map II, Appendix A). Ottoman Turkey was situated on a location that allowed it to control the only waterways connecting the Black Sea to the Mediterra-

nean. For centuries, the Ottoman Empire was the largest power controlling both a central land mass and a central waterway. Ottoman expansionist policy, whether conscious or unconsciously, impeded the territorial spread and ambitions of Russia and Austria-Hungary.²

Three strategic waterways were important in the Ottoman domination of the region.³ The first was a series of deep-water passages, from the Mediterranean to the Black Sea, the Turkish Straits comprising the Dardanelles, the Sea of Marmara and the Bosphorus.⁴ The Turkish Straits separated Europe and Asia. More important, however, by controlling this waterway the Ottomans could block the passage of European merchant ships from the Black Sea to the Mediterranean, and vice-versa. Access to the Mediterranean was especially critical to semi-landlocked Russia and its closure by the Turks prompted numerous wars between the two empires.

The second waterway was the Tigris and Euphrates rivers of Mesopotamia.⁵ The struggle to control these inland waterways dovetailed with the struggle for overland routes and railways. Moreover both routes, the Turkish Straits and the Tigris-Euphrates were considered the gateways to India.⁶

The third strategic waterway controlled by the Ottoman Empire was the Danube River, long fought over by the

Ottomans and Habsburgs of Austria-Hungary. The Danube River, with its connecting canals, was a natural highway for world commerce, and provided a link between the Mediterranean and Northern Europe. It also provided cheap transportation. Rivalry between the Ottomans and Habsburgs intensified over who controlled this important trade route.⁷

Historical Background: Ottoman Period

The Ottoman Empire began its growth during the mid-fifteenth century and reached its climax in the mid-seventeenth century. The conquest of Constantinople in 1453 brought an end to the Byzantine Empire and the Ottomans transferred their capital to this city.⁸ For more than a century Ottoman armies continued to advance into central Europe. In 1516-17 they destroyed the Mamluk Sultanate in Egypt, annexed Syria and Egypt, and removed the Mamluk Caliph.⁹ The Caliphate was reassembled in Constantinople and the Ottoman Sultan assumed the title of Caliph, a religious leader of the Islamic World.¹⁰ The Caliphate remained in Ottoman hands until its abolition by Kemal Ataturk in 1924.

During the reign of Suleiman the Magnificent (1520-1566), the Ottoman Empire attained the height of its power. It extended over three continents, from the gates of Vienna

in Central Europe to North Africa and the southern entrance of the Red Sea, as well as the Caspian Sea in Asia. Thus the eastern Mediterranean, as well as the Black and Aegean Seas were controlled by the Ottomans.¹¹ (See Map II, Appendix A).

Challenge to Ottoman Power

The decline of the Ottoman Empire dates from the death of Suleiman in 1566. In Western Europe the Renaissance and Reformation, and the development of science and technology, influenced the growth of strong, centralized nation-states. The discovery of new, ocean trade routes, such as Cape of Good Hope had increased Atlantic trade in the early sixteenth century. Thus, the lands of Ottoman Empire were less important to world trade and the Ottoman economy began to deteriorate.¹² In addition, the Ottomans suffered military defeats in its wars with Russia and Austria and given the loss of territory, Ottoman decay accelerated.

A fundamental cause for the steady decline of Ottoman power were the extraterritorial privileges enjoyed by the European powers. Known as capitulations, these privileges gave the Europeans political rights, as well as economic advantage and control over specific areas within the Empire.¹³ Through the capitulations the Europeans took advantage of Ottoman vulnerability and hastened Ottoman

collapse. The Ottomans had granted extraterritorial opportunities to the Europeans when they were at the height of their power, and saw it as a means to enlisting foreign experts who could further enhance the empire. But by offering such privileges, the Ottoman rulers also exposed themselves to European exploitation. This was especially notable during the period of Ottoman decline. In the long run the capitulations ruined, they could not better conditions within the empire.¹⁴

A foreign business house could, for instance, establish itself in the country without leave of the Ottoman government and could organize according to the laws of its own country. It was likewise largely exempt from Ottoman taxation, and its foreign personnel enjoyed inviolability of person and domicile and the jurisdiction of their own consular courts. (Robinson, 1963, pp.96-97.)

The Ottoman Empire also had to face internal revolts and challenges to the authority of the central government. Perhaps the most significant challenge to Constantinople was the threat posed by Mohammad Ali, governor of Egypt, and an officer of the Ottoman court.

In 1832, Mohammad Ali observed the weakness of the Sultan and sought to spread his own power. Egyptian troops under Mohammad Ali's command, invaded Syria and Anatolia. Mohammad Ali's goal was to march on Constantinople, depose the Ottoman dynasty and proclaim himself Caliph and Sultan. Alarmed by this threat, the Ottoman Sultan (Mahmud II)

asked Britain for help. When Britain rejected this entreaty, the Ottomans sought and received aid from Russia. The landing of Russian troops near Constantinople awakened the British and the French, and they persuaded Mohammad Ali to withdraw his troops and return to Egypt.¹⁵ The Treaty of London was signed in 1840. This treaty was also the first international instrument aimed at regulating passage through the Turkish Straits. The document recognized the dual principle of "freedom of passage for commercial vessels" and "the closure of the Straits to all war ships" in time of peace.¹⁶

Imperial Russia and the Ottoman Empire experienced 13 wars with each other from 1774 to 1914. In the eighteenth century, as a consequence of the Russo-Turkish war Russia expanded its territories at the expense of the Ottoman empire.¹⁷ The treaty of Khuchuk-Kainarji, signed in 1774, gave Russia the right to sail through the Straits to the Mediterranean and brought an end to exclusive Turkish domination of the Dardanelles and Bosphorus.¹⁸

By the beginning of the nineteenth century, the only bar to Russia's supremacy was great Britain. Determined to prevent any great power from dominating the land route from Mediterranean to the Persian gulf and thereby threatening its empire in India, Britain assumed the role of ultimate guarantor of continued Ottoman rule. It wanted the Straits kept in Ottoman hands, and throughout the century the Straits question centered on British efforts to prevent the Russian fleet from gaining free access to the Mediterranean.

The Ottoman Empire became hostage to Russo-British policy. (Rubinstein, 1982, p. 2)

After the Treaty of Khuchuk-Kainarji, and following the Mohammad Ali incident, the Ottoman Empire was pressured into accepting the 1833 Treaty of Unkiar Skelessi. That treaty provided Russia with even greater access to the Turkish Straits.¹⁹ Towards the end of nineteenth century Russian and Ottoman troops confronted each other on several occasions. In the Crimean war (1853-56) Russia was defeated by an allied force of English, and French which had aligned itself with the Ottomans. Thus, the balance of power in Europe, whose essential purpose was to prevent the Russian Empire from growing and the Ottoman Empire from shrinking, was preserved. In the 1876-77 war, however, Russia defeated the Turks and occupied additional Ottoman territory. The European nations called a hurried conference, the Congress of Berlin of 1878, and once more efforts were made to prop up the "sick man of Europe." Nevertheless, the Ottomans lost the eastern Anatolian provinces of Kars, Ardahan, and Batum to Russia. In addition, the Island of Cyprus was transferred to British sovereignty.²⁰

This struggle over a declining Ottoman Empire emphasized the rivalries between Russia, Austria-Hungary and Britain. In the eighteenth century, Austria and Russia

made territorial gains in the Balkans and Black Sea area, while Britain and France were largely satisfied with commercial and diplomatic privileges.²¹

The conflict between the Ottomans and the Habsburgs of Austria had already consumed three centuries, and was a primary precipitant of World War I. Two attempts by the Ottomans to capture Vienna were unsuccessful and after the second siege of Vienna (1683), the Ottomans repeatedly lost ground to the Europeans.²² The Treaty of Karlowitz in 1699 and the Treaty of Passarowitz in 1718 confirmed the victory of Habsburgs over the Turks. In these treaties the Ottoman Empire lost Hungary and Transylvania.²³

The decay of the Ottoman State and the growing power of Russia raised a significant question among the other European powers. Known as the "Eastern Question," the European states sought to take advantage of the Ottomans, but were also fearful that one among them might acquire too much power. Austria started to support the Ottomans in 1768.²⁴ In order to prevent the break-up of the Ottoman Empire, Austria joined France and England in guaranteeing Turkey's integrity. This guarantee, however, did not prevent Austria from pursuing its annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina.²⁵ But it was not until the Congress of Berlin that the Habsburgs seized the territory. Austria then loomed large as an aggressor and sought to draw

additional Ottoman regions into its empire. The Austrian-Hungarians also provoked and exploited national feeling in the Balkans, and by their actions prompted the Balkan Wars (1912-1913). Austria's intention was to take what it could while denying Russian influence in the region.²⁶

British policy was generally aimed at preserving the Ottoman Empire. But London's primary concern was the neutralizing of the other European states.²⁷ By the nineteenth-century, Britain, with France, began playing a major role in the area. The survival of the Ottoman Empire, therefore, came to rest on relationships between the European powers.

By 1821, then, the role of Britain in the Eastern question was becoming rather clearer. Turkey's survival did not seem to damage British interests and might well be of positive value. The British did not threaten to take large stretches of Turkish territory -as did Russia, Austria and even France. Island bases (the Ionian Islands were kept in 1815 as well as Malta) would satisfy British requirements, although they would be happy to see a pro-British, rather than a pro-French government in Egypt. (Clayton, 1971, p. 35)

From the point of view of Britain, control of the eastern Mediterranean was the key to the control of Europe.²⁸ In the 1878 Cyprus convention the British government aimed at the establishment of a general protectorate over the Turkish Asiatic provinces.²⁹ Britain's occupation of Egypt in 1882 was an important extension of this policy.

Ottoman Reforms and the Growth of Nationalism

One of the causes for the decline of the empire was the failure to modernize the institutions upon which the organization of the empire had been built. Still another was Ottoman failure to participate in the industrial revolution. As Bahrampour (1967) notes, when European industrialists and merchants began to flood Turkish markets with the products of the industrial revolution, Turkish industry was unable to compete.³⁰ In addition, the rise of East European separatist and nationalist movements helped undermine Ottoman economic reforms.

The first serious attempts at reform and westernization were made in the late eighteenth century. These were predominantly in the military field.³¹ The purpose of the military reforms was to give the Ottoman State equal status with the European nations. A new Ottoman army was established, and the old Janisarry Corps was destroyed in 1826. The most significant aspect of the nineteenth century reforms was, the emergence of the idea of an Ottoman state bringing together people of diverse nationalities and religions, "based on secular principles of sovereignty as contrasted with the medieval concept of an Islamic Empire." ³²

Efforts to overcome Ottoman weakness did not work,

however, and the empire moved from crisis to crisis. The revolt of Mohammad Ali, the wars with Russia, and the Greek insurrection all undermined the state. Costly military failures resulted in heavy borrowing from Europe to cover the deficits. The empire confronted a situation of near bankruptcy.³³ By the turn of the century, the Ottoman Empire was called the "sick man of Europe" by the then powers. After the French Revolution, nationalistic ideas spread all over Europe. Encouraged by the great powers, separatist and nationalist movements in the European segments of the empire began to demand their independence.

By the twentieth century the Ottoman State faced serious challenges from every corner of the empire. The Balkan people established independent governments, Greece in 1832, Serbia and Rumania in 1878, Bulgaria in 1908, and finally Albania in 1913. In Northern Africa, the French secured Algeria (1830) and Tunisia (1881); Libya was taken by Italy, and Egypt was lost entirely in 1914.³⁴

The impact of the West on the Ottoman Empire influenced the Young Turk Movement. As Berkes (1964) points out, the Young Turk movement can be summarized in the formation of the Union and Progress. "Union meant the co-operation of all nationalities within the Ottoman unity. Progress implied the bringing about of a social revolution through education and economic measures."³⁵

These young bureaucrats, officers, and intellectuals (Young Turks) who were exposed to European ideas, and provoked by nationalist and revolutionary thinking, seized power in 1908. They forced the Sultan to reinstate the constitution, proclaimed in 1876 but abolished two years later. Ahmad (1969) emphasizes that the aim of the 1908 coup d'etat was to restore a constitution which had been granted thirty-two years earlier. It was also meant to save the state. The revolutionary nature of the movement, he argues, emerged later, as a result of the pragmatic policies, and partly as an outcome of incidental reform and the social change this brought about.³⁶

On the other hand the reaction to the Young Turk coup in Europe was not so enthusiastic. The great powers, notably Austria, took advantage of the new inexperienced government and annexed Bosnia and Herzegovina; Bulgaria declared its independence, and Crete announced its union with Greece. Preparations for a new European-Balkan campaign, against the Ottoman Empire became visible.³⁷

In the meantime, the government of Young Turks (The Committee of Union and Progress, had become the Party of Union and Progress) already ideologically divided into three groups, (Ottomanists, Pan-Islamists, Pan-Turkists) were unable to develop a strategy for the political transformation of the state, the fundamental purpose of

their movement.³⁸

Thus, when World War I broke out the armed forces of the Ottoman Empire had been destroyed in the Balkan Wars, and hence could not adequately defend the country. Given the state of turmoil, the army was politicized and sought a role in the country's politics. The armed forces, despite battlefield setbacks, sustained the state during World War I. (See Map III, Appendix A). As Ahmad (1969) puts it, the collapsing Ottoman State under the Committee of Union and Progress performed surprisingly well in World War I.³⁹

World War I and The Collapse of The Ottoman Empire

The Ottoman State aligned itself with the central powers during World War I. This alignment was a consequence of German influence over the Young Turks.⁴⁰ Before and during the rise of the Committee of Union and Progress, German influence had been steadily increasing in Turkey and the process continued under the administration of the Young Turks. German officers reorganized the Ottoman army, German businessmen and technicians expanded their hold on the economic resources and commercial relations in the country. The construction of the Berlin-Baghdad railway allowed Germans to expand their interests within the empire.⁴¹

World War I was the beginning of the end for the old

empire. Ottoman armies were defeated in almost all of the fronts by the allied forces. The only success that the Ottomans achieved was the victory in Gallipoli in which the Turkish army blocked Commonwealth forces from gaining passage through the Strait of Dardanelles. By the end of World War I, however, not only was the Ottoman Empire Turkey destroyed, control of the Turkish Straits was taken from the Turks and placed in the hands of an international commission. The shattered Ottoman government signed the Mudros Armistice which demobilized Turkish forces and allowed the allied powers to occupy some strategic parts of Turkey.⁴² (See Map IV, Appendix A). Greece, especially, sought to advantage itself from a prostrate Ottoman Empire.

Shortly after the signature of the armistice, the Entente powers, taking advantage of some of its ambiguous provisions, went ahead with their plans to dismember the Ottoman Empire by occupying the key points and by gradually extending their occupations into the heartland of Anatolia to include whole provinces inhabited predominantly by Turkish Muslim people. Thus the Straits and Istanbul, the capital, were occupied by British and French forces; Italian troops landed at Antalya (Adalia), French troops at Cilicia and Greek troops invaded the province of Izmir. Western Thrace was under Greek control, Eastern Thrace under French troops and Mosul under British forces. (Sonyel, 1975, pp.1-2.)

The Greek invasion was, in fact, designed by Britain, France and the United States, and started in earnest in May 1919 under the protection of these countries' warships.⁴³ But the war with the Greeks also stimulated Turkish

nationalism and patriotic forces, led by the former Ottoman officer corps regrouped Turkish forces and a savage encounter ensued.

National Liberation and Transformation

As B. Lewis points out, the Greco-Turkish war falls into three stages, corresponding roughly with the campaigns of 1920, 1921 and 1922. In the first world war the Turks were badly defeated and the Greeks advanced far into Anatolia.⁴⁴ In 1921, the Nationalist government, which had been formed in April 1920 under the leadership of Mustafa Kemal in Ankara, was recognized by the allied powers and the Ankara government made treaties and agreements with the Soviet Union, France and Italy.⁴⁵

Diplomatic successes were followed by military achievements during the second campaign. With the help of the Soviet government,⁴⁶ the Nationalist forces, furnished with new arms, defeated the Greek troops first in Inonu, then in Sakarya. A final victory drove the Greek army out of Izmir in August 1922. These military victories brought full recognition to the nationalist government and Turkey's prestige in the international arena increased. The Treaty of Lausanne was signed between the nationalist government and the allies. According to this treaty Turkey's independence, territorial integrity and existence as a

nation were guaranteed.⁴⁷

After the War of National Liberation, many changes took place in Turkey. Under the leadership of Mustafa Kemal (later called Ataturk) a new nation-state was born and in October 1923 the republican form of government was proclaimed.

One of the more important changes was the abolition of the Sultanate and the establishment of the Republic. Considering that the Sultan was the representative of the six century old Ottoman dynasty, the decision to abolish the institution was not easy. Moreover, Ataturk did not want to arouse religious opposition by abolishing both the Sultanate and the Caliphate. But he was compelled to abolish the Sultanate because of the social and political transformation of Turkey.⁴⁸

When the Turkish Republic was proclaimed, Ataturk became Turkey's the first president. Under his presidency the new Turkey was based on the predominantly Turkish portion of the old Ottoman Empire. The motivation for transferring the capital of the nation from Constantinople (Istanbul) to Ankara was ideological as well as geopolitical. Ataturk wished to remove government power from a city still overshadowed by the memories of the Sultanate. Istanbul was a city in which economic activities were dominated by minorities, i.e., Greeks,

Armenians, and Jews. Ankara, was a genuine Anatolian city. It was also strategically easier to protect.⁴⁹ (See Map I, Appendix A).

The Turkish Straits and Post World War I Period

Immediately following World War I, the Armistice of Mudros, signed between Ottoman Turkey and the Allied powers in 1918, allowed the victorious powers to secure access to the Black sea through the straits. This gave the Europeans strategic control Bosphorus and Dardanelles.⁵⁰ The Ottoman government was also forced to sign the Treaty of Sevres which brought the partition of Turkey in 1920. (See Map IV, Appendix A). Under the terms of the Treaty, the Istanbul government was forced to recognize Armenia as a free and independent state and accept the grant of autonomy to the predominantly Kurdish areas. The treaty also included the transfer of the area around the city of Izmir (Smyrna) to the Greek government. Thus, the Allied powers divided Turkey among themselves.⁵¹ Furthermore, the straits were demilitarized, and Britain, France and Italy assumed responsibility for guaranteeing free and unfettered access to the straits for the ships of all powers.⁵² Although the Treaty of Sevres was never ratified, its stipulations served as a model for the final settlement of the Straits in the Treaty of Lausanne.⁵³

The resurgence of Turkish nationalism followed by the successful War of National Liberation, led to the Lausanne Peace Conference in 1923. In Lausanne, the Turkish Straits became a bargaining issue and an international regime was established which provided freedom of navigation to be supervised by an international commission. As Vali (1972) points out, the new regime in Lausanne opened an entirely new page in the history of the Straits.⁵⁴

In the 1930s when the hopes of disarmament and collective security began to fade, the Turkish government began to discuss the idea of the revision of the Lausanne Straits Convention. By 1936, the Italian invasion of Ethiopia and Germany's occupation of the Rhineland produced a diplomatic atmosphere for the rethinking of Turkey's demand for changes in the Straits' regime.

And the combination of these two events necessitated a fundamental rethinking of those positions which had dominated the diplomatic landscape for over a decade. Moreover, those unmistakable changes in the post World War I status quo disposed of many of the arguments the Western powers had employed in opposing the Turkish thesis on the Straits. (Deluca, 1981, p. 25)

Turkey's objective was to remilitarize the Straits and abolish international control. In July 1936 an international conference composed of the original Lausanne signatories, with the exception of Italy, met in Montreux and drew up a new convention regulating the regime of the

straits. In the Montreux Conference Turkey won a substantial diplomatic victory. Not only did it regain its sovereign rights over the straits, Turkey also was permitted to fortify the area and to close the straits to warships of all countries when Turkey was at war or threatened by aggression.⁵⁵ (See Map V, Appendix A).

Geographic Setting of the Turkish Republic

The Republic of Turkey, replaced a six century-old monarchy. It also inherited a devastated country whose national resources had been eaten up by the wars. The country had been reduced in size, had less population than the old Empire, but represented more cultural and geographical unity. The Ottoman Empire was a multi-national state based on the co-existence of several ethnic, religious and social groups. Modern Turkey inherited much from the past, but its institutions and political culture were significantly altered.⁵⁶ Geographic regions were combined under a centralized national government. Modernization and reform movements took a new direction and gained impetus within well defined national boundaries.⁵⁷

Turkey remained a land bridge and an important trade route between Europe and Asia. Looking towards the Aegean and Mediterranean Seas, Turkey has been very conscious of

its links with Europe. Today, although the political geography of Turkey is quite different from the Ottoman period, its strategic importance has not diminished. On the contrary, the Republic of Turkey became a major interest of the great powers, especially after the Second World War. Protecting its right to control passage through the Dardanelles and Bosphorus, bordering on the Soviet Union, Turkey holds an important place in the balance of power in Europe as well as the Middle East.⁵⁸

Notes

1. G.E.Pearcy, World Political Geography, New York: Thomas Crowell Company, 1957. p.466. The area of 4.7 million square kilometers included in Ottoman Empire in 1867, which had been reduced to 1.85 million sq. km. by 1914, the Turkish Republic inherited 771.600 sq.km. Z.Y.Herslag, The Challenge of Growth, Leiden: E.J.Brill, 1968. p.1.
2. R.Olson argues that during the sixteenth century the Ottomans were successful to stave off the Christian attacks in the Indian Ocean but, they could hardly suppress the internal rebellion and the attacks of the Safavid State under Shah Ismail. R.Olson, The Siege of Mosul and Ottoman-Persian Relations, Bloomington: Indiana University, 1975. p.12.
3. E.Jackh, The Rising Crescent, New York: Farrar & Rinehart, Inc., 1944. p.56.
4. G.E.Pearcy, op. cit. p.464. The Dardanelles is 41 miles (63 km) long and only 1 to 4 miles (1.6-6.2 km) wide. The Bosphorus is less than 19 miles (30 km) long, and its width varies from approximately 0.3 to 2 miles (0.5-3.2 km) across. L.Ziring, Middle East Political Dictionary, Santa Barbara: ABC-Clio, 1984. pp.41-42.
5. E.Jackh, op. cit. pp.60-61.
6. Ibid. pp.60-63.
7. G.E.Pearcy, op. cit. p.477. Further for the geopolitical position of Ottoman Empire, A.J.Toynbee, "The Ottoman Empire's Place in the World History" in K.H.Karpat (Ed.) The Ottoman State and its Place in the World History, Leiden: E.J.Brill, 1974. p.41-42.
8. W.L.Langer, An Encyclopedia of World History, Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1968. p.352.
9. Ibid.
10. Ibid. p.1087.
11. G.E.Pearcy, op. cit. p.466. W.Langer, op. cit. pp.450-452. Also for the rise and extension of Ottoman power, see J.A.R.Marriott, The Eastern Question, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1940. pp.73-105; B.Lewis, The Emergence of Modern Turkey, London: Oxford University Press, 1961. pp.24-28.

12. R.Olson, op. cit. p.13.
13. G.E.Pearcy, op. cit. p.468.
14. L.Ziring, op. cit. p.318.; E.J.Cohn, Turkish Economic, and Political Change, New York: Praeger, 1970. p.4. The first trading privileges granted to the Europeans in 1352. France was the first of the maritime states of Western Europe to seek capitulatory privileges from the Ottoman Empire in 1535. J.C.Hurewitz, The Middle East and North Africa in World Politics, New Haven: Yale University Press, 1975. pp.1-2. For the first commercial privileges granted to the British merchants, see Ibid. pp.5-6.; pp.8-10; pp.34-41 and pp.140-141.
15. G.L.Eversley & V.Chirol, The Turkish Empire, New York: Howard Fertig, 1969. pp.281-282.; A.S.Esmer, "The Straits: The Crux of the World Politics", Foreign Affairs Vol.25 Jan.1947, p.292.; Lord Kinross, The Ottoman Centuries, New York: Murrow, 1977. pp.467-470. For the rise of Mohammad Ali, see P.M.Holt, Egypt and the Fertile Crescent, Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1966. pp.176-192.
16. A.Deluca, Great Power Rivalry at the Turkish Straits, New York: Columbia University Press, 1981. p.3.
17. B.Kuniholm, The Origins of Cold War in the Near East, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1980. p.6.; A.S.Esmer, op. cit. pp.290-291.
18. A.Z.Rubinstein, Soviet Policy Toward Turkey, Iran and Afghanistan, New York: Praeger, 1982. pp.1-2.; A.Deluca, op. cit. pp.1-3. For the articles of the Treaty of Khuchuk-Kainarji, see H.Howard, "Problem of the Turkish Straits: Principal Treaties and Conventions (1774-1936)", Department of State Bulletin, Vol. 15, No.383 November 3, 1946. pp.790-797.
19. According to a secret article of the Treaty of Unkiar Skelessi the Sultan was to open the Straits to Russian war ships while keeping them closed to the warships of the other powers. However this treaty was abrogated in the London Conference in 1841 and the Straits were proclaimed as closed once more to foreign warships of all nations. A.S.Esmer, op. cit. pp.292-293.
20. A.Z.Rubinstein, op. cit. p.3.

21. B.Jelavich, The Ottoman Empire, The Great Powers and The Straits Question, 1870-1877, Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1973. pp.3-5.; J.A.R.Marriott, op. cit. pp.129-130; 142-143 and 151-164.
22. The first siege of Vienna by the Ottomans was in 1529 under Suleiman the Magnificent.
23. K.A.Roider, Austria's Eastern Question, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1982. pp.4-5.
24. C.A.Macartney, The Habsburg Empire, New York: Macmillan Company, 1969. p.117.
25. See M.D.Stajonavich, The Great Powers and the Balkans, 1875-1878, London: Cambridge University Press, 1939. pp.12-29.
26. M.S.Anderson, The Eastern Question, 1774-1923, New York: St. Martin's Press, 1966. pp.287-309.; C.A.Macartney, op. cit. pp.785-790.; R.A.Kann, A History of Habsburg Empire 1526-1918, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1974. pp.415-417.
27. G.D.Clayton, Britain and the Eastern Question: Missologhito Gallipoli, London: University of London Press, 1971. pp.23-24.
28. Ibid. p.70.
29. D.E.Lee, Great Britain and Cyprus Convention Policy of 1878, Boston: Harvard University Press, 1934. pp.160-161.
30. F.Bahrampour, Turkey: Political and Social Transformation, Brooklyn, NY: Theo-Gans' Sons, 1967. pp.4-5.
31. Ibid. pp.5-6. B.Lewis, op. cit. pp.53-64.
32. N.Berkes, The Development of Secularism in Turkey, Montreal: Mc Gill University Press, 1964. p.90.; B.Lewis compares the early Ottoman reforms of Peter the Great of Russia and explains the difficulties in Ottoman Empire: " Peter was already an autocrat; Mahmud had to make himself one, overcoming the resistance of the old, deeply rooted Ottoman society and government, the opposition of well-entrenched and popularly supported classes both in the capital and the provinces, and most of all, the ancient and profound contempt of Islam for the infidel and its rejection of anything bearing the taint of infidel

- origin. B.Lewis, op. cit. p.101.
33. E.Cohn, op. cit. p.4.
 34. G.E.Pearcy, op. cit. p.468.
 35. N.Berkes, op. cit. p.325.
 36. F.Ahmad, The Young Turks, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1969. pp.15-16.
 37. B.Lewis, op. cit. pp. 209-210.
 38. R.Robinson, The First Turkish Republic, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1963. pp.16-19. For the ideologies in the Ottoman Empire, see N.Berkes, op. cit. pp.337-356.
 39. F.Ahmad, op. cit. p.164. More about Young Turks, K.H.Karpat, "The Transformation of the Ottoman State 1789-1908", International Journal of Middle East Studies, No.3 1972. pp.243-281.
 40. G.L.S.Eversley & V.Chirol, op. cit. pp.373-374.
 41. G.E.Pearcy, op. cit. p.477. Through the process of railway construction European capital not only did gain access to vast resources of the empire and extract surplus value from wage labor employed, but even the financing of this projects was locally based and came directly from the Ottoman State treasury. R.Luxemburg, The Accumulation of Capital, New Haven: Yale University Press, 1951. pp.439-445. For more about Berlin-Baghdad Railway, see M.Jastrow, The War and The Baghdad Railway, Philadelphia: J.B. Lippincott, 1918.
 42. W.L.Langer, op. cit. p.973.; p.979.; p.1085. For foreign invasion of Turkey and the Treaty of Sevres, H.Howard, The Partition of Turkey, Norman,Ok.: University of Oklahoma Press, 1931. pp.242-249. and G.L.S.Eversley & V.Chirol, op. cit. pp.394-407.
 43. S.R.Sonyel, Turkish Diplomacy, London: Sage, 1975. p.8.
 44. B.Lewis, op. cit. pp.247-248.
 45. W.L.Langer, op. cit. p.1086. For the Treaty of Friendship between Turkey and the Soviet Union on 16 March 1921, see J.C.Hurewitz, op. cit. Vol.II, pp.250-253.; and Ankara Agreement for the Promotion of

- peace with France, see Ibid. pp.262-265.
46. H.Howard, The Partition of Turkey, pp.263-264.
 47. W.L.Langer, op. cit. pp.1086-1087.; G.E.Pearcy, op. cit. pp.470-471.
 48. A year later the abolition of Caliphate became inevitable. B.Lewis, op. cit. pp.252-256.; N.Berkes, op. cit. pp.446-460.
 49. F.A.Vali, Bridge Across Bosphorus, Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1971. p.45.
 50. H.W.V.Temperley, The History of the Peace Conference of Paris, London: Oxford University Press, 1920. Vol.I, pp.495-497.; J.C.Hurewitz, op. cit. pp.128-130.
 51. S.Sonyel, op. cit. pp.77-83.
 52. A.Deluca, op. cit. p.6. For political clause of the Treaty of Sevres and the agreement of British Empire, France, and Italy on Anatolia, see J.C.Hurewitz, op. cit. pp.219-228.
 53. J.T.Shotwell and F.Deak, Turkey at The Straits, New York: Macmillan Company, 1940. p.106. For the articles concerning the Straits in the Treaty of Sevres, H.Howard, The Problem of Turkish Straits, pp.797-799.
 54. F.A.Vali, The Turkish Straits and NATO, Stanford,CA: Hoover Institution Press, 1972. p.33. For the articles of Treaty of Lausanne, concerning the Straits, see H.Howard, op. cit. pp.325-337.
 55. Ibid. pp.134-135.; H.Howard, op. cit. pp.435-446.; J.C.Hurewitz, op. cit. pp.480-486.
 56. K.Karpat, Social Change and Politics in Turkey, Leiden: E.J.Brill, 1973. p.47.
 57. E.Cohn, op. cit. pp.6-7.
 58. G.E.Pearcy, op. cit. pp.464-466. and pp.477-478.

CHAPTER III

TURKISH REPUBLIC

Domestic Political Developments

The Ataturk Period (1923-1938)

After the Republic of Turkey was proclaimed, the task of building a modern Turkish nation was essential. Mustafa Kemal saw the solution to Turkey's problems through the process of rapid westernization of the country. He initiated a series of reforms which changed the country's political, legal and educational structure and had far-reaching effects on the social, economic, cultural and religious life of the society. The first radical change was the scrapping of the Sultanate. The Caliphate, remained as a separate religious office, but it too was scheduled for elimination.¹

Weiker (1963) cites the Ataturk reforms as the "six arrows" of Kemalism. They were: (1) Republicanism; (2) Nationalism; not based on race or religion but on common citizenship; (3) Secularism, separation of religion from state affairs; (4) Populism, which meant popular sovereignty, mutual responsibilities of the state and citizens toward one another; (5) Statism, meaning

constructive intervention of the state in the national economy; and (6) Revolutionism (Reformism), meaning the determination to depart radically from tradition and precedent if they did not serve national interest. These six principles also became the platform for the Republican People's Party (RPP).²

Among these six principles, secularism had the most significant impact on the lives of the people. Islam not only had been a reactionary force against westernization, it was also deemed an obstacle for development. In March 1924, the Caliphate was abolished, and the country's legal system was shifted from a religious to a secular basis.³ Religious schools, orphanages, hospitals, and libraries were secularized. Religious courts were outlawed.

In abolishing the Caliphate, Kemal was making his first open assault on the entrenched forces of Islamic orthodoxy. The traditional Islamic state was in theory and in the popular conception theocracy, in which God was the sole legitimate source of both power and law, and the sovereign His vice-gerent on earth. The faith was the official credo of the established political and social order. The same Holy Law, coming from the same source and administered through the same judicature, embraced, civil, criminal and constitutional as well as ritual and doctrinal rules. (B. Lewis, 1961, p. 259)

In 1925 the Republican government forbade individuals to wear religiously oriented clothing. An official order made compulsory the replacement of the traditional Ottoman fez by the western brimmed hat. Veiling of women was also

discouraged. Sharia Law -Islamic legal law, was considered ill-suited to the requirements of modernization. It was prohibited in 1926. Subsequently the Swiss Civil Code, the Italian Penal Code and the German Commercial Law were adopted. The new Civil Code ended Islamic polygamy and introduced civil marriage. The western time system and calendar replaced the Islamic lunar calendar and time system. Turkey's educational system was secularized and removed from religious and Arabic influences. In 1928 Kemal made his most dramatic reform by replacing the Arabic alphabet and script with the Latin alphabet and script.⁴ As B. Lewis (1961) explains, the basic purpose of this change was social and cultural rather than pedagogical and practical. "Mustafa Kemal, in forcing his people to accept it, was slamming a door on the past as well as opening a door to the future."⁵ In addition, women were given the right to vote and to hold public office. Moreover, the Turkish people were required to adopt surnames.

The 1929 world economic depression also affected Turkey. Turkey's export earnings were significantly diminished by the fall in prices of agricultural products.⁶ The government searched for new methods to control and improve the economy. Newly created Turkish private enterprises were too weak to provide the capital needed to fuel the economy. Mistrust of foreign capital as well as

minority enterprises led the government to enact a new economic program.⁷

The transformation of the Turkish society and Kemal's reforms were not welcomed by all groups. The opposition representing reactionary religious elements sought the continuation of Ottoman tradition and they urged Mustafa Kemal to take the title Caliph rather than dissolve the Caliphate.⁸ The frustration over abolition of the Caliphate led a group of Kemal's close collaborators from the War of National Liberation to form an opposition party in 1924. They called their organization the Progressive Party. The Progressives drew their support from among the religious and reactionary sects. Nevertheless, they were no match for the Republican People's Party.

In 1925 an armed revolt broke out in the Kurdish provinces of eastern Anatolia.⁹ The government took rapid military action against the insurgents and crushed the rebellion. When it became clear that there were connections between the Progressive Party and the Kurdish dissidents, the party was outlawed and its leaders sent into exile.¹⁰

In 1930, during the first years of the statist economic policies a new opposition organization called the Free Party emerged. Kemal personally encouraged his closest associates to form the new organization. As B.

Lewis (1961) points out the Free Party not only had Kemal's blessings, it also operated under his close supervision.¹¹

The period between the end of the Progressive Party and the establishment of the Free Party (1925-1930), witnessed the most significant secular reforms. The Republican Party government fostered the prohibition of religious education, the adoption of European Civil and Penal Codes, the transformation of social and cultural symbols and practices, and finally, the removal of Islam from the Constitution. The conservative and fundamentalist Islamic leaders, incensed by the Ataturk program, found common alliance with the country's landlords who were also angry over the government's agricultural policies.¹² Together these disgruntled elements formed the Free Party.

The initial program of the Free Party publicized freedom of thought and Press, a reduction in taxes, a lessening of state control in the economy, the importing of foreign capital for development, more agricultural credit, and political rights for women.¹³ In practical terms, however, Free Party rallies developed into anti-Republican assemblies of reactionary forces. Three months after its establishment, when the Free Party leaders despaired of reversing the Kemalist reforms, they dissolved their organization. The experience of the Free Party neverthe-

less demonstrated that the government's reforms had yet to touch the masses. Moreover, the people still followed the reactionary, religious leaders.¹⁴

After the dissolution of the Free Party, education for all became the main emphasis of government policies. In 1931, the Congress of the Republican People's Party decided to set up a "people's house" in every city and town to eliminate ignorance and to give the people political as well as practical education. The activities of the people's houses were to stimulate language training, develop awareness of Turkish literature and history, fine arts, dramatics, and encourage sports, rural activities, library attendance, and museum interests. As G.L.Lewis (1955) points out the people's houses served as true community centers by arranging lectures, excursions, film-shows, and concerts. They also published books and other reading matter.¹⁵

Ataturk's major achievement was secularism, the total exclusion of religious influence from public life. He turned his back on the Ottoman and Islamic past, and directed the Turks to follow a revolutionary program of nationalism and westernization.¹⁶

Foreign Relations of Turkey

The main purpose of the Ataturk reforms was to create

a strong and modern state capable of defending Turkey's territorial integrity and political independence. Ataturk wanted to make Turkey a full-fledged and equal member of the Western community of nations. Thus, in this period of reconstruction, peace and the maintenance of friendly relations with all nations were the main objectives of Turkey's foreign policy.¹⁷

Ottoman Turkey lived by conquest. It relied upon the spoils of conquest to live rather than internal development. Kemal, who realistically appraised the Turkish power position, explicitly disavowed any interest to expand Turkey's territory as defined in National Pact and over which Turkish sovereignty was recognized at Lausanne in 1923. (Robinson, 1963, p. 173)

In the early years of the Republic, Turkey's foreign policy aimed at resolving three problems which had not been settled in the Lausanne Conference: (1) Mosul, (2) the Turkish Straits, and (3) Hatay.

The Treaty of Lausanne left the destiny of Mosul, a former Ottoman province in Mesopotamia, to be decided by the League of Nations. The League recommended attaching Mosul to Iraq which was administered by a British mandate. Turkey disputed the League's ruling because the population of Mosul was Turkish-Kurdish, not Arab. Britain was interested in the region's extensive oil fields, however, and the ethnic question was brushed aside. The Ankara government therefore was pressured to sign a treaty with

Britain and Iraq, and in June 1926, Ankara accepted the League's decision.¹⁸

In 1936, the other unsettled question left by the Treaty of Lausanne, the control of the Straits, was adjusted. The Lausanne Conference had provided for an international commission to supervise the freedom of passage through the Straits. Turkey was a member of the commission, but this did not give her the right to control a waterway which in fact ran through its territory. In a convention signed in Montreux the international commission was abolished and its functions transferred to Turkey. Thus full Turkish sovereignty over the Straits was restored in July 1936.¹⁹

The last problem that had not been resolved was the Hatay Question. Ankara had recognized French authority over Syria-Lebanon, including the Sanjak of Alexanderatta (Hatay), in a 1921 Agreement. In 1937, the growing influence of Italy in the Mediterranean led France to declare its willingness to grant autonomy to Hatay. This event was followed by the brief independence of Hatay before it was absorbed by Turkey in June 1939.²⁰ As Robinson (1963) notes: Ankara bargained with France to yield Hatay in exchange for a Franco-Turkish Treaty of Mutual Assistance.²¹

The 1930s demonstrated Turkey's peaceful intentions

and its support of the status quo in Europe. In 1932, Turkey entered the League of Nations.²² Turkey's efforts to maintain its territorial integrity and security led her to join regional pacts. Towards the mid 1930s, the increasing pressure of Fascist-Italy on the southeastern European states, and the expansionist policy of Bulgaria, resulted in the solidarity of the Balkan nations. In 1934, a Balkan Entente was formed by Yugoslavia, Greece, Rumania and Turkey.²³

After Italy violated the League of Nations' system by invading Ethiopia, Mussolini's designs seemed directed at Southwest Asia. Thus, in 1937, Turkey joined with Iran, Iraq, and Afghanistan to form the Saadabad Pact. The Saadabad Pact was the first alliance formed by Middle Eastern states without European participation. One of the purposes for joining such an alliance was to facilitate the settlement of border disputes between the member states, and to promote regional self-reliance.²⁴

As Mango (1975) points out both the Balkan and Saadabad Pacts were paper defenses against impending disaster.²⁵ After World War II spread from Europe to the Middle East, the members of the Balkan and Saadabad Pacts went their separate ways. Turkey's entry into these pacts, however, helped to mold its future policies. Later, the sanctions applied against Italy, led Turkey to distance

itself from that country: Turkey also drew closer to Britain and France.²⁶

World War II and Turkey

Ataturk died in 1938 and was succeeded by Ismet Inonu as president and leader of the Republican People's Party. Inonu had been Ataturk's principal military and civilian associate and had served as his prime minister. Inonu maintained Ataturk's policies and identified with his reforms. When World War II broke out, Turkey emphasized its neutrality. Although the country avoided becoming a belligerent, the adoption of a war-time economy forced suspension or modification of the Ataturk reforms.

Statism, an economic formula, was adopted in 1933, and had become part of the Republican People's Party Program in 1935. It was incorporated into the Constitution in 1937.²⁷ Statism, was another term for state capitalism. The government assumed a direct and active role in stimulating and developing the national economy, primarily through the accumulation and investment of capital.²⁸

To the Kemalist regime, authoritarian, bureaucratic and paternalistic, the idea of state direction and control in economic life came as a natural and obvious extension of the powers, prerogatives, and functions of the governing elite.
(B. Lewis, 1961, p. 464)

Statism in Turkey evolved as an alternative model of

development. Karpas (1959) emphasizes that the goal of statism was to develop the national economy by liberating it from dependence on foreign capital, and supplementing and encouraging locally owned private industries through state action.²⁹ Thus, during the period of 1931-1944, railways, transportation and port facilities, mines and factories, owned by foreign capital, were nationalized by the state.³⁰ However, while statism placed the main responsibility for developing the national economy on state capitalism it did not prohibit private enterprises.³¹

The war served to reinforce the statist regime, although the emphasis in economic policy shifted from development to security and defense. During the war the government, which had already controlled large segments of the economy, acquired even greater powers through the National Defense Law of 1940.³²

Turkish industry benefitted from the extraordinary market conditions created by the war. While the foreign demand for Turkish primary products increased, foreign competition in local industrial production decreased.³³ Hence the economic measures enacted by the government during the war did not affect the population equally. People with fixed incomes were affected by inflation. But a handful of exporters and producers made large profits, often through unorthodox means.³⁴ As Keyder (1979) puts

it, at home "the war economy was characterized by shortages, rapidly rising prices, falling real wages and salaries and large profits for semi-legal black market operations."³⁵

In 1942, the government took extra-ordinary measures to increase state revenues by introducing a Capital Tax. The Capital Tax was originally designed to tax exorbitant wartime profits of large property owners, big landlords, and businessmen. This "new" source of government revenue was originally designed to promote industrialization.³⁶ However, due to the opposition of the Turkish business circles and land owners, the Capital Tax never achieved its goals. Instead it fell hardest on non-muslim minority merchants and businessmen. As a consequence, taxpayers were classified in two lists: "M" list for Muslims and "G" list for Non-Muslims. In addition, two different lists were formed later, one representing foreigners and the other Jewish converts to Islam. Accordingly, the non-Muslim minority paid ten times the amount levied on a Muslim of the same wealth.³⁷

The Capital Tax imposed the minorities was also a manifestation of German influence in Turkey.³⁸ The pro-German, Fascist, Pan-Turanian Turkish officials adopted repressive and discriminatory laws. They not only brutalized the population, they also ruined the

economy and bankrupted many minority and foreign business establishments. German influence, however, diminished as the war drew to a close. In 1944, with Germany in retreat, the Turkish Government terminated the Capital Tax.³⁹ Turkey entered World War II on the allied side during the last months of the conflict.

Immediate Aftermath of World War II

By the end of World War II, a combination of external and internal factors led Turkey to promote a multi-party system. Until 1946, Turkey was ruled as a single-party dictatorship. World War II was instrumental in the transformation of the political system. The liberalization of the political system was primarily supported by Turkish business circles. Their increasing discontent with the RPP's statist policies, accompanied by the demand for recognition of individual rights and freedoms motivated the more sophisticated to search for a democratic system.⁴⁰ The transition to a multi-party system was also backed by various religious, cultural and social groups which had been suppressed by the single party government. While these groups did not have any direct influence on the government, they contributed to the unpopularity of the existing regime.⁴¹

The government's efforts at rural development were

initiated with the introduction of a new Land Reform Bill in 1945.⁴² Earlier attempts at distributing land to the landless peasants had been unsuccessful because of the resistance of the big landowners. The new bill granted land to peasants, and provided them with twenty year interest-free loans. The government was to provide land from unused state lands, municipal and other publicly owned land, reclaimed land of unknown ownership and land expropriated from private individuals.⁴³ Berberoglu (1982) points out that the expropriation of land from private individuals threatened the power of the big landlords. Thus, a new confrontation was created between the Kemalist side of the RPP and the opposition forces representing the landowners.⁴⁴ Naturally the latter side of the party aligned itself with the merchants who had been hurt by the Capital Tax, and the clergy who were opposed to secularism. The new commercial and industrial class that had developed under statism also joined forces with the popular opposition. Generally speaking, the dissidents claimed to represent democracy and free enterprise. As B. Lewis (1961) comments, the revolt of newly emerged middle class against the RPP regime was a demonstration of their desire to establish of democracy and expanding capitalist economic system.⁴⁵

The government's introduction of multi-party activity

in 1946 hastened the transformation of Turkey's statist economy and politics. Karpas (1959) notes that within the context of a multi-party system, the peasants provided the votes which could decide the fate of the government, while the business circle had the finances, and the intellectuals possessed the ability to lead a movement opposed to statism.⁴⁶

The Democratic Party (DP) was formed in 1946 under the leadership of Celal Bayar, an economist and former prime minister. Because they had a very limited time to organize, the Democrats did not do well in the elections held in July 1946. They only won 61 seats in a 465 seat parliament.⁴⁷

The Democratic Party, however, was undaunted and concentrated its criticism on the government's statist economic policies and the restrictions on civil liberties. As Weiker (1963) observes: the disagreement between the two parties was not simply statism versus private enterprise or the restriction of political freedom

but rather the relationship of these ideas to the larger framework of the Ataturk revolution. Etatism had been one of the RPP's basic policies, reflecting among other things a distrust of the ability or willingness of private entrepreneurs to undertake the economic activity needed to develop the nation as a whole. (Weiker, 1963, p. 7)

Moreover, the rural and religious elements in the DP were not happy about the RPP's economic and social

programs. Besides the Land Reform Bill, the establishment of the Village Institutes caused panic among the landlords.⁴⁸ After the election in 1946, the RPP encountered solid opposition from the Democrats in the parliament. Under increasing pressure from business circles, the government gradually relaxed restrictions on private enterprise and allowed it to compete with state enterprises on an equal basis.⁴⁹

The defeat of the authoritarian-Fascist regimes in World War II, and the spread of democratic ideas throughout the world, also affected Turkey. The post-war international climate was favorable to democratic liberalization. The fear of diplomatic isolation, especially after Moscow's renunciation of its Treaty of Neutrality and Non-Aggression with Ankara in March 1945, also led Turkish leaders to search for diplomatic support from the western powers.⁵⁰ By signing the United Nations Charter, Turkey seemed to demonstrate a commitment to bring the Turkish regime into line with democratic principles.⁵¹

In addition, by adopting a liberal multi-party system, Ankara sought economic assistance from the West and acceptance by the western community. Turkey seemed to have a better chance of receiving post-war aid from the United States if it represented democratic values.⁵² Karpas (1959) examines the thinking of the Ankara government which

realized that without democratization of the political system, Turkey would not gain the necessary moral recognition.⁵³

In 1950, Turkey experienced its first truly-free elections. The DP won a landslide victory by getting 408 out of 487 deputies in the parliament and the twenty-seven year old RPP rule came to an end.⁵⁴ The Democrats received the support of a variety of groups: Liberals who envisioned a less authoritarian administration; the business community which expected an end to statism; the labor movement that hoped to gain the right to organize; religious fundamentalists who promoted an expanded role for Islam; and finally, the general public who blamed war-time shortages and inflation on the Republican government.⁵⁵

Under statism, Turkey's foreign policy had been cautious and limited. But following the Second World War, the most significant aspect of Ankara's foreign policy was aimed at securing its territorial integrity, especially against the Soviet threat. Thus, the main Turkish foreign policy objective was to enlist the United States in the defense of Turkey against the Soviet Union.⁵⁶ When the Soviets claimed the eastern Anatolian provinces of Kars and Ardahan, and sought privileges over the Straits, Turkey's search for international support intensified.⁵⁷

Turkey also increased its economic cooperation with

the Western countries and with Western sponsored economic and financial organizations. Ankara adjusted its economic policies to correspond with western and predominantly American economic models. Robinson (1963) notes the presence of the ECA (Economic Cooperation Administration) mission in Ankara, and how its constant harping on free enterprise had an influence on Turkish policy.⁵⁸

There is no doubt that American pressure was exerted rather strongly in favour of private enterprise and against etatism, and the moves of the People's Party government in this direction were no doubt due in large measure to the terms of American loans and the advice of American advisers. (B. Lewis, 1961, p. 309)

Substantial American military and economic aid began to flow to Turkey under the Truman Doctrine and Marshall Plan.⁵⁹ Republican Party governments came to rely on foreign aid for long term development projects as well as for current expenditures, including defense spending.⁶⁰ As Turkey became more dependent on American economic aid and military assistance, Ankara's receptivity to Western influence increased proportionally. In its efforts to obtain foreign funds, the Turkish government also sought western advice regarding the reorganization of the national economy.⁶¹

It was now apparent that World War II dramatically changed Turkey's domestic and foreign policies. Fear of Soviet intentions, as well as internal and external attacks

on the government's, statist program put considerable pressure on the administration. These pressures had been largely responsible for the gradual liberalization of the economic system. They were also instrumental in shaping Turkey's post-war external relations.

Notes

1. The last Ottoman Sultan Mehmed IV, who had already fled to Malta, was declared deposed and his cousin Abdulmecid was elected as Caliph by Ankara government. B.Lewis, op. cit. pp.250-254. Also see N.Berkes, op. cit. pp.444-446.; K.Karpat, Turkey's Politics: The Transition to a Multi-Party System, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1959. pp.40-44.
2. W.F.Weiker, The Turkish Revolution, Washington D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1963. pp.3-4. and Political Tutelage and Democracy in Turkey, Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1973. pp.241-256. Six arrows of Kemalism also became the emblem of the Republican People's Party.
3. N.Berkes, op. cit. pp.446-460.; B.Lewis, op. cit. pp.256-260.; R.Robinson, The First Turkish Republic, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1963. pp.78-82.; K.Karpat, op. cit. pp.40-44.; G.L.Lewis, Turkey, New York: Praeger, 1955. pp.81-85.; E.Jackh, The Rising Crescent, New York: Farrar & Rinehart, Inc., 1944. pp.175-177.
4. R.Robinson, op. cit. pp.85-86.; B.Lewis, op. cit. pp.270-274.; G.L.Lewis, op. cit. pp.97-100.
5. B.Lewis, op. cit. p.273.
6. B.Lewis, op. cit. p.276.; C.Keyder, "The Political Economy of Turkish Democracy", New Left Review, (115) May-June, 1979 pp.10-11. Turkish economy was heavily depended on agricultural exports.
7. B.Lewis, op. cit. p.277.; C.Keyder, op. cit. pp.10-11.; B.Berberoglu, Turkey in Crisis: From State Capitalism to Neo-Colonialism, London: Zed Press, 1982. pp.28-31. The government also saw that the Soviet economy had not been affected by the depression. More details for origins of Turkish statism, see Z.Y.Herslag, op. cit. pp.61-76. For the development of the Turkish private enterprise, see D.Avcioglu, Turkiye'nin Duzeni (Turkey's Social Order Vol.I), Istanbul: Tekin Yayınevi, 1976. pp.340-351.
8. G.L.Lewis, op.cit. pp.86-87. As D.Avcioglu points out after the War of Liberation even the closest colleagues of M.Kemal, notably Fevzi, Kazım, Rauf, Refet, and Ali Fuat were very far from the idea of revolutionary changes and westernization of the country. They were the first ones to opposed Kemal's basic reforms. D.Avcioglu, op. cit. pp.315-323.

9. The Kurds are the largest ethnic minority in Turkey. Turkish governments have never recognized their existence. But their first revolt in 1925 and two other Kurdish uprisings during Ataturk period (1930 and 1937) were largely of feudal and religious inspiration. They were mainly against secularist, bureaucratic and centralized policies of the government. Kurdish rebellion had been led by dervish seyhs, who had urged their followers to overthrow the "godless" republic and restore the Caliph. A.Mango, Turkey: A Delicately Poised Ally, The Washington Papers Beverly Hills, CA: Sage Publications, 1975. pp.51-57.
10. K.Karpat, op. cit. pp.44-48.; B.Lewis, op. cit. pp.260-261.; G.L.Lewis, op. cit. pp.86-89. and W.Weiker, The Turkish Revolution, pp.4-5. For more information about Progressive Party, see W.Weiker, Political Tutelage and Democracy in Turkey, pp.44-51.
11. B.Lewis, op. cit. pp.275. The Maintenance of Public Order Law, which was declared during the Kurdish revolt expired in 1929. Therefore the relaxation of the political atmosphere gave the opposition to raise its voice. Ibid.; W.Weiker, Political Tutelage and Democracy in Turkey, pp.55-56.
12. W.Weiker, The Turkish Revolution, pp.4-5.; B.Lewis, op. cit. p.398.
13. G.L.Lewis, op.cit. pp.104-105.; W.Weiker, Political Tutelage..., p.71.; D.Avcioğlu, op. cit. p.319.
14. Ibid. Also see W.Weiker, op. cit. pp.141-151.
15. G.L.Lewis, op. cit. p.107. and W.Weiker, op. cit. p.151. L.Ziring, Iran, Turkey, and Afghanistan, New York: Praeger, 1981, pp.75-76. For more details about People's Houses see W.Weiker, op. cit. pp.168-183.
16. W.Weiker, The Turkish Revolution, p.4.; D.A.Rustow, "Ataturk as an institution builder." in E.Ozbudun and A.Kazancigil, op. cit. p.71.
17. F.Vali, Bridge Across the Bosphorus, pp.44.; E.Weisband, Turkish Foreign Policy, 1943-45, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1973. pp.3-4.; G.Lenczowski, The Middle East in the World Affairs, Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1962. p.128.; M.Gonlubol and et.al, Olaylarla Turk Dis Politikasi (Turkish Foreign Policy With Events), Ankara: SBF Yayinlari, 1974. pp.63-65.

18. University of Ankara, Turkey and the United Nations, New York: Manhattan Publishing Company, 1961. pp.24-26.; G.L.Lewis, op. cit. 114-116.; M.Gonlubol, op. cit. pp.75-82. According to the treaty signed on 5 June 1926, the Iraqi government agreed to pay ten per cent of the profit over Mosul oil to Turkey for the next 25 years.
19. F.Vali, The Turkish Straits and NATO, Stanford,CA: Hoover Institution Press, 1972. pp.34-57.; U.of Ankara, op. cit. pp.43-46.; M.Gonlubol, op. cit. pp.129-137.; H.Howard, Turkey, The Straits and U.S. Policy, Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1974. pp.147-157. Also see A.Deluca, op. cit.
20. G.L.Lewis, op. cit. pp.117-118.; U.of Ankara, op. cit. pp.46-48.; R.Robinson, op. cit. pp.173-174.; M.Gonlubol, op. cit. pp.137-144.; For more details, see A.Toynbee, Survey of International Relations, 1936. pp.767-783.
21. R.Robinson, op. cit. p.174.
22. G.Lenczowski, op. cit. pp.132-133.; B.Kuniholm, The Origins of Cold War in the Middle East, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1980. p.16.; U.of Ankara, op. cit. pp.32-36.; M.Gonlubol, op. cit. pp.102-106.
23. B.Kuniholm, op. cit. pp.16-17.; U.of Ankara, op. cit. pp.50-54.; M.Gonlubol, op. cit. pp.106-114.; O.Sander, Balkan Gelismeleri ve Turkiye (Developments in Balkans and Turkey), Ankara: SBF Yayini, 1967, pp.7-11.; A.Toynbee, op. cit. pp.502-504.
24. L.Ziring, Middle East Political Dictionary, pp.341-343.; H.Howard, op. cit. p.158.; M.Gonlubol, op. cit. pp.114-117.
25. A.Mango, op. cit. p.32.
26. U.of Ankara, op. cit. pp.56-57.
27. D.Avcioglu, op. cit. pp.445-451.
28. Z.Y.Herslag, op. cit. p.72.; K.Karpat, op. cit. p.88. D.Avcioglu, op. cit. pp.445-464.
29. K.Karpat, op. cit. p.85. Also, B.Lewis, op. cit. pp.280-282.; Z.Y.Herslag, op. cit. pp.71-73.; R.Robinson, op. cit. pp.103-114.; D.Avcioglu, op. cit. pp.445-464.

30. B.Berberoglu, op. cit. pp.35-37.; Z.Y.Herslag, op. cit. pp.72-79.; D.Avcioglu, op. cit. pp.367-384 and pp.453-459.
31. Z.Y.Herslag, op. cit. p.72.; D.Avcioglu, op. cit. pp.459-462.
32. B.Lewis, op. cit. p.290. National Defense Law, empowered the government to take control of the economy in the event of war or general mobilization. The government's economic powers under the law included among other things, determining production, consumption, and distributing quota, fixing prices, enforcing compulsory labor, regulating foreign trade, administering or nationalizing private industries and mines. Z.Y.Herslag, op. cit. pp.132-133.; K.Karpat, op. cit p.91 and p.103.
33. Z.Y.Herslag, op. cit. pp.170-171.
34. B.Lewis, op. cit. p.291. and p.465.; K.Karpat, op. cit. pp.114-115.; D.Avcioglu, op. cit. pp.471-479.
35. C.Keyder, op. cit. p.15.
36. B.Lewis, op. cit. pp.291-292.; G.L.Lewis, op. cit. pp.120.; B.Berberoglu, op. cit. p.57.; K.Karpat, op. cit. pp.114-117.; D.Avcioglu, op. cit. pp. 471-478.
37. B.Lewis, op. cit p.292. L.Ziring, op. cit. p.76.; L.V.Thomas and R.N.Frye, The United States and Turkey and Iran, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1951. pp.95-98.; G.L.Lewis, op. cit. pp.119-121.
38. In 1936, 51 per cent of Turkey's exports were purchased by Germany while Turkey obtained 45 per cent of its imports from the same country. When the war broke out and Turkey chose to be neutral, Germany was the only country which was benefited from because of the collapse of international exchange. C.Keyder, op. cit. p.15.
39. L.Ziring, op. cit. pp.76-77.; B.Lewis, op. cit. pp.291-296.; G.L.Lewis, op. cit. pp.119-121.; E.Weisband, op. cit. pp.230-236. For further information on Pan-Turanian movement during that period, see E.Weisband, op. cit. pp. 237-256. and F.G. Weber, The Evasive Neutral, Columbia, MS: University of Missouri Press, 1979. pp.107-141.

40. K.Karpat, op. cit. pp.293-294.; B.Lewis, op. cit. pp.310-311. At the beginning of the multi-party system, there were unsuccessful attempts to form left wing political parties. B.Lewis, op. cit. p.304.
41. B.Lewis, op. cit. p.310-311.; F.Frey, op. cit. p.349.
42. B.Lewis, op. cit. p.467.; B.Berberoglu, op. cit. pp.55-56.; D.Avcioglu, op. cit. pp.491-498.
43. B.Lewis, op. cit. p.468.
44. B.Berberoglu, op. cit.; D.Avcioglu, op. cit.
45. B.Lewis, op. cit. p.311.
46. K.Karpat, op. cit. p.295.; L.V.Thomas and R.Frye, op. cit. pp.102-108.
47. B.Lewis, op. cit. pp.300-301.; K.Karpat, op. cit. pp.152-164. L.V.Thomas and R.Frye, op. cit. p.104.
48. B.Berberoglu, op. cit. p.46.; D.Avcioglu, op. cit. pp.498-502. Village Institutes were opened in 1939 for the purpose of educate peasants in modern techniques of agricultural production and provide general education to the village youth. At the Village Institutes, children of either sex who had completed their course at a village primary school were trained as teachers. The period of instruction was five years. G.L.Lewis, op. cit. p.110.
49. R.Robinson, op. cit. pp.134-135.; B.Lewis, op. cit. pp.302-303.
50. D.Avcioglu, op. cit. pp.540-541.
51. B.Lewis, op. cit. p.307.; M.Tamkoc, The Warrior Diplomats, Salt Lake City: University of Utah Press, 1976. p.220.; K.Karpat, op. cit. pp.140-141.; U.of Ankara, op. cit. pp.69-80.; F.Frey, The Turkish Political Elite, Cambridge: The MIT Press, 1965. p.349.
52. D.Avcioglu, op. cit. pp.515-519.
53. K.Karpat, op. cit. p.140.
54. B.Lewis, op. cit. pp.306.; L.V.Thomas and R.Frye, op. cit. pp.108-112.
55. E.Cohn, op. cit. p.15.

56. G.S.Harris, Troubled Alliance, Washington,D.C.: AEI-Hoover Policy Studies, 1972. pp.17-18.; M.Gonlubol, op. cit. pp.207-209.; D.Avcioglu, op. cit. pp.540-544.; O.Sander, op. cit. pp.41-44.; F.Ahmad, The Turkish Experiment in Democracy, 1950-1975, London: C.Hurst and Company, 1977. p.389.
57. G.S.Harris, op. cit. pp.19-20.; M.Gonlubol, op. cit. pp.207-209.; O.Sander, op. cit. pp.49-52.; A.Rubinstein, op. cit. pp.9-10.;F.Vali, The Turkish Straits and NATO, pp.69-76.; L.V.Thomas and R.Frye, op. cit. pp.99-101. The Soviet pressure and demands will be examined in detail in Chapter Four.
58. R.Robinson, op. cit. p.146; O.Sander, op. cit. pp.53-55. Also, M.Gonlubol, op. cit. pp.467-475.
59. Truman Doctrine and Turkish-American relations will be examined in the next chapter.
60. M.Gonlubol, op. cit. pp.474-476.; D.Avcioglu,op. cit. pp.556-562.
61. Z.Y.Herslag, op. cit. pp.134-135.; B.Lewis, op. cit. p.309.; R.Robinson, op. cit. p.156. Also, M.Gonlubol, op. cit. pp.475-476.; D.Avcioglu, op. cit. pp.533-556.

CHAPTER IV

TURKEY AND THE TRUMAN DOCTRINE

Peaceful Co-Existence Prior To World War II

Turkey and USSR

In the aftermath of World War I, both Turkey and the Soviet Union found themselves isolated and in opposition to the great powers in Europe. Turkey was defeated in World War I and struggled to maintain its independence and territorial integrity in the wake of the allied occupation of Constantinople and the western section of the country. The Soviet Union, following the Bolshevik revolution, plunged into civil war. It also was challenged by economic-diplomatic encirclements established by the capitalist countries. Thus Turkey and the Soviet Union were drawn into cooperative embrace. Under Lenin's anti-imperialist foreign policy the Soviet Union supported Turkey's war of National Liberation and furnished the nationalist government with military supplies.¹ Although the nature and amount of Soviet assistance is not clear, the Bolsheviks contributed gold, arms and moral support.²

Two major issues stood in the way of good relations between the two countries. These were the disputes over

territory and frontiers, as well as the question of control over navigation through the Turkish Straits.³ The territorial question was resolved when governments in Ankara and Moscow signed a Treaty of Friendship in March 1921. In this first treaty of Kemalist Turkey, the governments voiced solidarity in their struggle against foreign powers. The friendship of revolutionary Russia seemed important to Ataturk. It secured Turkey's eastern front and ruled out a possible attack from the Caucasus. The Soviet Union, on the other hand, was concerned with its the central Asian Republics, heavily populated by Turkic people. By the terms of Treaty Turkey's support for central Asian Pan-Turanists and Pan Islamists ended.⁴ The Turkey-USSR treaty also drew new boundaries between the two states and declared all former treaties between the Czarist and Ottoman rulers null and void. As a demonstration of its good intentions, the Soviet Union ceded the provinces of Kars and Ardahan (annexed by Russia in 1878) to Turkey. Batum, however, remained part of the Soviet Union.⁵

Nevertheless, the Straits problem continued to affect Turkish-Soviet relations. Turkey's possession and control of the Dardanelles and Bosphorus had been a principal point of contention between Turkey and Russia since the Treaty of Khuchuk Kainarji in 1774. The Ottoman Empire allowed navigation to foreign commercial vessels until 1918. After

World War I the victorious Allied powers occupied the Straits and instituted international control over them.⁶ In 1921, with the Straits still under Allied occupation, Ankara and Moscow agreed that final determination of the regime of the Straits should be delegated to a conference composed of representatives of Black Sea States.⁷

In the 1923 Lausanne Convention the Soviet and Turkish governments stood together against the European powers. Moscow defended Turkish sovereignty over the Straits with greater zeal than Ankara. As Fischer (1960) argues, the Soviet Union was seeking to protect itself. Moscow's only guarantee of safety in the Caucasus, the Crimea and the Ukraine lay in closing the Straits to non-Black Sea powers.⁸ However, the establishment of an International Straits Commission, and the emphasis given to freedom of passage for all ships in the Lausanne Convention neither satisfied Turkey or the Soviet Union. The Lausanne Straits Convention of 1923 at best represented a compromise between the western position on the one hand and Turkish-Soviet thinking on the other.⁹

Since the Ankara government fell in with the demands of the western powers in the Lausanne Conference, the intimate friendship between Turkey and Soviet Union temporarily cooled. But the Soviet-Turkish Treaty of Friendship and Neutrality, signed in December 1925, put an

end to this coolness. Under the treaty, each party undertook to abstain from aggressive actions or hostile coalitions and alliances against the other.¹⁰ The treaty which was originally valid for four years was broadened and extended for two more years in December 1929. Each signatory affirmed that there were no secret agreements or negotiations between itself and other states in the proximity of the other. Furthermore, both parties pledged not to enter into any commitments with such states without the consent of the other. The treaty was again broadened in March 1931, and prolonged for five years in November 1935.¹¹

Growing international tension in the Mediterranean area in 1930s put a new complexion upon the historic problem of the Straits. Thus, when the Turkish government called for the revision of the Lausanne Convention in 1936, the Soviet government was fully supportive.¹² The Montreux Convention of 1936 was a product of a compromise that sought to accommodate Turkey's security requirements as well as the conflicting viewpoints of Britain and the Soviet Union concerning the international legal status of the Black Sea and the Straits. For Britain, the convention reaffirmed the principle of free international navigation for commercial vessels as well as warships. The Soviet Union, on the other hand, gained substantial advantages in

Montreux. While the Convention was granting preferential rights for the Black Sea powers, it strictly limited the passage of non-littoral navies into the Black Sea.¹³ In addition, the Montreux Convention restored to Turkey the rights denied at Lausanne as the territorial state guarding the Straits. Turkey was allowed to remilitarize the Straits area, was given the powers of the international commission to control and supervise navigation through the Straits and was empowered to restrict naval traffic through the Straits in the event of a war, or if it was threatened by an imminent danger of war.¹⁴ As Vali (1972) points out Turkey was given these far reaching rights at Montreux because the Western powers were sensitive to Ankara's security concerns in view of the deteriorating political and military situation in Europe and Eastern Mediterranean. Also in the mid 1930s the Soviet Union was willing to allow a friendly Turkey to control passage to and from the Black Sea at a time when Soviet foreign policy was essentially defensive.¹⁵ The Montreux Convention provided that no major fleet of a non-Black Sea power would enter the Black Sea to threaten the Soviet Union. Nevertheless it also restricted the Soviet fleet's access to the Mediterranean from the Black Sea by requiring Turkey's consent in time of war, or imminent danger of war.¹⁶

In the 1930s, Turkey also accepted Soviet technical

and economic assistance. The Soviet Union provided Turkey with the idea of a state controlled and planned industrialization. The Turkish Five Year Plan started in 1934. It aimed at industrializing the Turkish economy. A Soviet credit of eight million dollars enabled Turkey to begin expanding its system of state enterprises.¹⁷ The purpose of state planned economy was to make Turkey self-sufficient through the rapid acquisition of industrial equipment. Turkish leaders did not believe it necessary to adopt Marxist philosophy in order to operate the state run economic system. The main objective of the Kemalist reforms-including statism- was to transform Turkey from an Asian into a European state. Thus, Turkey took the European countries, rather than the Soviet Union, as their model. On the other hand, from the Soviet point of view, the progressive nature of the new Turkish mercantile-industrial bourgeoisie, which was the main force behind Kemalism caused the Soviet Union to give economic assistance to Turkey.¹⁸

Security considerations were also bringing Turkey and the West closer together during this period. The aggressive territorial ambitions of Germany and Italy led Turkey to seek the friendship and support of Britain and France. At the same time, the Turks believed it necessary to placate Germany, to identify with that power which

seemed to enhance Turkish security.

Departures from Turkish neutralism occurred in the late 1930s and led to a cooling of Soviet relations. Not only had the success of modernization along Western lines strengthened the power of the political and economic elite who feared Communism and tended to favor a pro-western foreign policy, but the external environment looked more threatening. (Sezer, 1981, p. 12)

By the end of 1930s, Turkish-Soviet relations were strained by Ankara's increasing acceptance of Hitler Germany. Improvements in economic relations with Germany resulted in the growth of Nazi influence and as Laqueur (1959) wrote, this "weakened the popular (left-wing) forces, strengthened the reactionary wing and thus opened the door to infiltration by Fascist elements" in Turkey.¹⁹

Sources of Soviet-Turkish Conflict

Turkey's concern with German and Italian policies, however, had initially aligned the government with Britain and France. Moscow at first welcomed a Tripartite Alliance between Ankara, London and Paris.²⁰ But even before this Tripartite Alliance could be signed, in August 1939, the Soviet government entered into a non-aggression pact with Germany. Having taken this action, Moscow assumed a different role and heavily criticized Turkey for its association with Britain and France.²¹

After the outbreak of war in Europe, Turkey's control

of the Straits came into conflict with Soviet interests as a Black Sea power. The Montreux Convention had granted extensive powers to Turkey to restrict naval traffic through the Straits in time of war.²² Ankara's wartime alliance with Britain and France caused great anxiety in Moscow. Under the Tripartite Alliance, signed in October 1939, the three signatories pledged to render assistance to each other in the event of a Mediterranean war arising from an aggression by a European power, or in case of a war arising over Anglo-French guarantees to Greece and Rumania. Upon Turkish request, the treaty contained a special escape clause which stated obligations under the treaty did not require Turkey to engage in armed conflict with the Soviet Union.²³

Nonetheless, because Moscow declared its opposition to the Tripartite Alliance, the possibility of a confrontation with the Soviet Union worried the Turkish government.

Dallin wrote:

The Russo-German Pact, signed on the eve of the outbreak of European hostilities, complicated Turkey's position enormously. Until August 23 Turkey could be simultaneously pro-Ally and pro-Soviet. After the signing of the Russo-German Pact, however, the political situation was radically changed. With Moscow now directing its policy against the "warmongers", Great Britain and France, Turkey could no longer remain both pro-Soviet and pro-Ally. Nor could she choose sides without grave risks. (Dallin, 1942, p. 106)

When Italy declared war on the Western Allies in June 1940, Ankara declared its non-belligerency on the grounds that Turkey's entry into the war might entail a confrontation with the Soviet Union. Turkey's neutrality throughout the period of Nazi-Soviet collaboration was thus based on Ankara's fear of the combined Axis military and the possibility of a Soviet attack on Turkey in the event of a Turkish-Axis war.²⁴

At the beginning of 1941, Turkey was already in the center of the spreading conflict. The war in North Africa threatened to turn into a war for the Near East. Italy was moving toward Greece. Germany, on the other hand, was ready for a new campaign in the East. Under these circumstances, Turkey signed a non-aggression pact with Bulgaria and concluded a Treaty of Friendship with Germany. When Hitler's troops invaded the Soviet Union in June 1941, Ankara declared its neutrality.²⁵

Initially, Turkey's neutrality worked to the Soviet Union's advantage by guaranteeing the security of its southwestern flank. Consequently, Moscow not only approved Ankara's policy, but in August 1941, along with London, extended formal assurances to Turkey. In a joint declaration, the British and Russians reaffirmed their fidelity to the Montreux Convention and their observance of Turkey's territorial integrity. They assured Ankara they

had no aggressive intentions or claims to the Straits, and offered Turkey every assistance in case it was attacked by the Axis powers.²⁶

In the meantime Turkey continued to maintain close relations with Germany, and increased its economic cooperation with Berlin after July 1941. In fact, this close relationship was one of the areas of disagreement in Soviet-Turkish relations in the World War II period. The growing German influence in Turkey during the 1930s and early 1940s not only caused the revival of the Pan-Turanian movement in the country, it also affected Turkey's economic policies as noted in chapter II.²⁷

As the war dragged on, the Allies were increasingly angered by Turkey's continued neutrality. The Allies also opposed Ankara's diplomatic and trade relations with Germany, including Turkey's export of strategically valuable materials like chromium to Germany.²⁸ Moscow especially desired Ankara's entry into the war since this would ease German pressure on the Soviet front, deprive Germany of Turkish markets, and facilitate the consignment of Allied aid to the Soviet Union through the Turkish Straits.²⁹ The major consideration in Ankara's reluctance to enter the war was Turkey's military weakness and vulnerability to German attack. The Turkish government was also suspicious of Soviet designs and was reluctant to be

drawn into the war in the absence of military and political safeguards against a possible Soviet drive into Turkey through the Balkans.³⁰

As the war drew to an end, Ankara was increasingly disturbed about the future of Turkey within the new order contemplated for Europe by the Allied powers. In early 1944, the Turkish government took several important measures to bring its policy more in line with Allied demands without taking the final step of becoming an active belligerent. It discontinued chromium exports to Germany and instituted stricter controls over the transit of Axis ships through the Straits. Then, after severing relations with Berlin, in February 1945, Turkey entered the war on the Allied side.³¹

Soviet Demands in the Post-War Period

Turkey's relations with the Soviet Union continued to be cool after the war ended. In March 1945, Moscow notified Turkey that it did not have any intention to extend the Treaty of Neutrality and Non-Aggression which would expire in November 1945. When the great powers met in Potsdam in the summer of 1945, the Soviets raised the question of revising the Straits Convention. The Soviet proposal was that Turkey grant the bases on the Straits and cede the two north-eastern provinces Kars and Ardahan.³²

Although the Allied leaders failed to reach an agreement on the Straits Question, the Potsdam Conference was significant in highlighting the viewpoints of the three great powers. Moscow used the occasion to inform London and Washington for the first time of the nature of the changes in the Straits regime after the war. The Soviet proposals called for nothing less than the abrogation of the Montreux regime and its replacement by a new regime to be determined solely by Ankara and Moscow. The new regime would establish effective Russian control over the Straits through joint Turkish-Soviet defense of the Straits and the presence of Soviet bases in the area. As for the question of territorial revisions between the two countries, the Soviets took a softer attitude by admitting their desire for such a revision but indicated settlement of this question must occur prior to the conclusion of a treaty of alliance.³³

The United States was also interested in the regime of the Straits, but not in the territorial question between Turkey and Soviet Union in Potsdam. President Truman committed the United States, and it became a party to the new regime of the Straits.³⁴ The British took a conciliatory approach on the Straits question, although Churchill expressed opposition to the question of territorial revisions and the establishment of Soviet bases

on Turkish soil. He agreed to a revision of the Straits regime, but not to the specific proposals of Moscow.³⁵

The Potsdam Conference revealed that both the United States and Britain were willing to accommodate the Soviet Union's security interests in the Black Sea so long as western interests in the area were not endangered. Neither state was prepared to antagonize the Soviet Union on the Straits question at a time when the three powers were still united against a common enemy in the Pacific.³⁶ When Moscow revealed its demands on Turkey in June 1945, the Turkish government had been trying to enlist the support of Britain and the United States to counterbalance the Soviet threat. Of the two western countries, Britain had been the more sensitive to Russian pressures on Turkey. Not only did London retain well established interests in the Middle East, it was also bound to Ankara by its wartime alliance. The United States, on the other hand, had gradually moved from a position of uncommitted observer prior to Potsdam, to that of concerned participant. Yet, it still did not support Turkey publicly.³⁷

Throughout the spring and summer of 1946 the Soviet military pressure reached a disturbing point. Moscow assumed that an increasing campaign against Turkey would exacerbate that country's domestic problems and a weak Turkey would be more susceptible to pressure. Apparently

when Russian pressure failed to bring Ankara into submission, Moscow once again turned to diplomatic methods. In August 1946 a formal Soviet note was delivered to the Turkish government. The Soviet note, which was also submitted to Washington and London, commenced by stating that the events which had occurred during the war had demonstrated that the Montreux regime of the Straits did not meet the security interests of the Black Sea powers.³⁸ The note then set forth the following Soviet requirements for the establishment of a new regime.

1. The Straits should be always open to the passage of merchant ships of all countries.
2. The Straits should be always open to the passage of warships of Black Sea powers.
3. Passage through the Straits for warships not belonging to the Black Sea powers shall not be permitted except in cases specially provided for.
4. The establishment of the regime of the Straits, as the sole sea passage leading from the Black Sea should come under the competence of Turkey and other Black Sea powers.
5. Turkey and the Soviet Union as the powers most interested and capable of guaranteeing freedom to commercial navigation and security in the Straits, shall organize joint means of defense of the Straits by other countries for aims hostile to the Black Sea powers.
(Foreign Relations of the United States 1946, Vol.VII, pp.827-829)

The Soviet note intensified diplomatic consultations between Ankara, Washington and London. The three recipients of the note agreed that Moscow's initiative

should be acknowledged only as a preliminary exchange of views called for by the Potsdam Conference.³⁹ Washington's note of 19 August to Moscow indicated that the American leaders were taking a firm stand against the perceived Soviet threat to western interests. The American note acknowledged, however, the Soviet proposals for the revision of the Montreux Convention. There was substantial agreement between the United States and the Soviet Union on the first three Russian proposals. But it strongly disagreed with the fourth proposal arguing that the regime of the Straits is not the exclusive concern of the Black Sea powers. Washington rejected the idea that the defense of the Straits was a joint Turkish-Soviet matter. The United States also expressed its conviction that the regime of the Straits should be brought into line with the United Nations. It further stated its readiness to participate in a conference called to revise the Montreux Convention.⁴⁰

The American reply to Moscow was followed by an equally firm note from Britain three days later. Finally the Turkish government made its own detailed reply to the Soviet note on 22 August 1946. Ankara proposed that "the surest guarantee" of Soviet security in the Black Sea rested in the renewal of Turkish-Soviet friendship rather than in the establishment of a privileged Soviet position in the Straits. Moreover, it noted that the security of

each country was guaranteed under the United Nations of which both States were members. The note ended by informing Moscow that Ankara was communicating its views to other Montreux signatories and the United States. American participation in an international conference on the revision of Montreux Convention was particularly desired by the Ankara government.⁴¹

Turkey, backed by the United States and Britain argued that Soviet wishes on the matter of regulating the Straits had to be balanced against the requirements of its own security and independence, made the cover of security, the USSR aimed at Turkey's submission and a base on Mediterranean. (Rubinstein, 1982, p. 11)

By the end of 1946, Soviet pressures on Turkey subsided somewhat but Moscow remained an everpresent danger. Western demonstrations in support of Turkey pointed to a new and intimate relationship between Washington and Ankara.

American Policy Toward Turkey Prior to World War II

Turkey and USA

The first diplomatic relations between the United States and Ottoman Turkey were established in 1830 when the two governments signed a Treaty of Commerce and Navigation.

⁴² In the second half of the nineteenth century, although the European powers had a growing interest in the Middle

East, the United States demonstrated little political interest.⁴³

Before and during World War I, American-Turkish relations diminished as a consequence of the influence of Armenian immigrants in the United States. The Armenians- a Christian minority living mainly in the northeastern Anatolia- had been the target of Ottoman discrimination and injustices. They had faced genocidal acts of the Ottoman government in the mid 1890s as well as during World War I. Many Armenian survivors of the massacre fled to the United States and publicized the atrocities committed against their co-religionists.⁴⁴

In the years following World War I, the United States did not participate actively in major international forums that dealt with the reallocation of the territories of the former Ottoman Empire. Washington only sent observer delegations to the two major conferences, the Treaty of Sevres in 1920, and the Lausanne Conference in 1923. Formal diplomatic relations between the Turkish Republic and the United States were not established until 1927.⁴⁵ Moreover Armenian-Americans actively opposed accommodation with the Republic of Turkey. The Armenians played an important role in the defeat of the Lausanne Treaty in the American Senate in early 1927. But as Trask (1971) points out this defeat was only a temporary setback in Turkish-

American relations, and was motivated by partisan politics in the United States Congress.⁴⁶

In the 1930s diplomatic and commercial relations between the United States and Turkey were improved. The treaty of commerce and navigation signed in late 1929 was an important milestone in the program of regularizing Turkish-American relations and it served as the basis of the commercial relations between the two countries until 1939.⁴⁷ American technical advisers worked in helping Turkey's five year plan and economic development programs.

Although accomplished by private persons who did not represent any government agency, the efforts of these individuals were pre-cursory to the Point-Four program of technical assistance that followed World War II. Their accomplishments also contributed to better Turco-American relations and were indicative of the American willingness to adjust to Turkish nationalism.
(Bryson, 1977, p. 84)

In 1936, however, the United States, as a result of an isolationist foreign policy, did not consider its political interests in Turkey sufficiently important to participate in the Montreux Conference. While the conference marked the issues of security and access through the Turkish Straits, Washington believed that it would be included in the new regime, although it was not a participant.⁴⁸

World War II and American-Turkish Relations

Until World War II, American interests in the Middle

East, including Turkey, were limited mainly to economic, philanthropic, religious and educational concerns. When the war began, there was some similarity between the United States and Turkish positions. Both wished to stay out of the war although they sympathized with Britain and France. Turkey remained officially neutral until early 1945, while the United States entered the war after the Japanese attacked Pearl Harbor in December 1941. Only after its entry into the war did the United States begin to take cognisance of the strategic importance of the Mediterranean area. Even then, however, and throughout the war years, Washington considered the Middle East as a British sphere of influence. American policy makers assumed a minor role in the region.⁴⁹

Thus, when the Turkish-Soviet crisis erupted in the immediate aftermath of the war, the United States was slow to become involved. American policy toward Turkey followed a conflicted course because Washington was not prepared to assume an active role in the Middle East. Moreover, in the early stage of the Turkish-Soviet dispute, the United States was unwillingly to be drawn into regional conflict. Washington was also concerned that the Iranian crisis could exacerbate existing tensions among the great powers.⁵⁰

American policy toward the Straits question and the Turkish-Soviet dispute emerged slowly and without drastic

changes.⁵¹ In November 1945, Washington suggested that the Montreux regime be revised along the following lines.

1. The Straits to be open to merchant vessels of all nations at all times.

2. The Straits to be open to the transit of the warships of the Black Sea powers at all times.

3. The Straits to be closed to warships of non-Black Sea powers at all times except with the specific consent of the Black Sea powers or when acting under United Nations authority.

4. The elimination of Japan as a signatory and the inclusion of references to the United Nations instead of the League of Nations.⁵²

The Turkish government was disturbed by the fact that the American proposal did not envisage any special mechanisms to ensure Turkey's security which could be jeopardized by the free transit of littoral navies through the Straits in time of peace and war. Moreover, Ankara argued that the American proposals would turn the Black Sea into a secure Soviet base. In its view, the Soviet fleet could enter the Mediterranean through the Straits, engage in belligerent activities, and then return to the Black Sea for safety. In such case, Turkey would find its territory dangerously exposed if the retreating Soviet navy were pursued by a non-littoral navy which was denied entry into

the Black Sea.⁵³

The American proposal for the unlimited right of transit for Black Sea navies through the Straits deprived Turkey of the most important measure of security granted to her at Montreux: The right to close the Straits in time of war and under imminent threat of war. For tactical reasons, however, the Turkish government found it convenient to agree with Washington's proposals. The Ankara government accepted the American proposals, announcing that Turkey would participate in an international conference and accept the decisions which would secure its independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity.⁵⁴

Ankara's search for firm support against the Soviet Union in early 1946 coincided with an increasing resolve on the part of the United States to adopt a hard-line position in its dealings with Moscow.⁵⁵

In his Army Day address of April 6 1946, Truman reiterated the American intention to "press for the elimination of artificial barriers to international navigation, in order that no nation by accident of geographic location, shall be denied unrestricted access to seaports and international waterways." Truman also pointedly referred to the significance of the Near and Middle East, an area which presented "grave problem." (Howard, 1974, p. 241)

A demonstration of American support for Turkey was given when Washington announced that the USS Missouri, one of the world's most powerful battleships, would sail to Istanbul in March 1946.⁵⁶ The Missouri's mission was the

introduction of an American naval presence in the Mediterranean, and concrete evidence of growing American involvement in the Middle East. Washington's response to Turkey's request for support, however, did not have a stabilizing effect on the Soviet-Turkish crisis. In fact, the disturbing signs of Soviet pressure on Turkey continued throughout the spring and summer of 1946.

The Truman Doctrine and its Implications

The cold war between Turkey and the Soviet Union throughout 1945-46 was only one of the post-war crises that threatened to throw the world into another war. The crises in Turkey, Greece, and Iran were interrelated to the extent that they eventually became the objects of the regional and global contests for power among the great powers. The Soviet desire was to gain influence in areas of the Middle East and Eastern Mediterranean. The Anglo-Americans, on the other hand, wished to stop Soviet expansion into an area that had traditionally been a British sphere of influence. These were the basic great power policies in the post-World War II period.⁵⁷

Being aware of the broader political and strategic implications of the Soviet threat, the Ankara government appealed for support from the Anglo-Americans. Turkey emphasized its crucial role within the context of Western

interests in the Middle East and Eastern Mediterranean. Washington responded affirmatively to this overture, and given Western display of support for Ankara, Soviet pressures on Turkey diminished towards the end of 1946. In February 1947, however, when Britain decided to retire from its important role in the Eastern Mediterranean, Turkey was inevitably drawn into great power politics again.⁵⁸

Throughout 1945-46, Britain carried the major political, economic and military responsibility in supporting weaker countries in the Mediterranean region. Until 1947, the United States refrained from assuming a role in a region determined to be within the British sphere of influence. When it became evident that Britain could no longer play the role of a major world power, the United States filled the vacuum.⁵⁹

Washington's response to the impending British retreat from Turkey and Greece, however, was not simply confined to the Eastern Mediterranean. In a dramatic message to Congress on 12 March 1947, President Truman announced American determination to support Turkey and Greece as part of a broader commitment to the principle of assisting countries of the "free world" judged to be threatened by communist aggression. This new policy came to be known as the Truman Doctrine. The Truman Doctrine opened a new era in post-war international relations. It put the power of

the United States opposite that of the Soviet Union throughout the world.⁶⁰

The Truman Doctrine, itself originally applied to a specific geographically limited emergency concerning Greece and Turkey, erected this traditional and geographically limited commitment into a general principle of universal application by stipulating that the United States would come to the assistance of any nations threatened by Communist aggression or subversion. (Morgenthau, 1969, p. 130)

Truman's message to Congress contained a radical interpretation of American interests and responsibilities in the post-war world. In the introduction of his message the President underlined the gravity of the international situation. Truman then emphasized the conditions in Greece and Turkey as one aspect of the broader problem. After describing the critical situation that Greece faced, and the necessity of American assistance to solve that country's problems, the president focused on Turkey. He argued that although conditions in Turkey were considerably different, Turkey also needed aid "for the purpose of effecting that modernization necessary for the maintenance of its national integrity." In Truman's words, Turkey's integrity was "essential for the preservation of order in the Middle East." The president concluded that since the British could not extend further aid to Turkey, it was up to the United States to provide such help.⁶¹

Truman asserted that history now required every nation

to choose between two ways of life. One of those was based upon the will of the majority and entailed the preservation of individual freedom, while the other was based upon the will of a minority, forcibly imposed upon the majority through terror oppression, and the suppression of individual freedoms. In the light of this framework, the president outlined certain policy guidelines for the United States which constituted the essence of the Truman Doctrine.⁶²

The President further asked Congress to authorize the dispatching of American civilian and military personnel to Greece and Turkey to assist in the task of reconstruction and supervision of the use of American aid. He asked Congress to provide authority for assistance to Greece and Turkey for a total of 400 million dollars for the period ending 30 June 1948.⁶³

The Truman Doctrine had far-reaching and radical implications not only for the United States, Turkey and Greece which were affected by it in the first instance, but also for the international system as a whole. Turkey's role in Washington's anti-Soviet strategy had dramatically increased in importance. Under the Truman Doctrine, American aid to Turkey had two objectives. First, it sought to strengthen the Turkish decision to resist Soviet pressures; and secondly, it was intended to improve Turkish

military potential to a point where it could oppose Soviet aggression, or, at least delay a Russian military advance in the Middle East.⁶⁴

The Truman Doctrine not only publicized the division of the world into two hostile camps, it also declared United States intentions to defend the "free world." The Truman Doctrine extended the boundaries of American interests, and it eventually included any country faced with internal subversion or external aggression from the communist world.⁶⁵ Truman's message implied that any change in the status quo had to be in harmony with principles held by the United States.

The Truman Doctrine, in effect, committed the United States to a world it did not understand, and the consequences were predictable. The United States became the champion of the status quo. It was not in the vanguard of change movements. It also could not adapt to, let alone resolve, local conflicts between racial, religious, ethnic, tribal or linguistic groups. It did not accept the reality that states gaining their independence after a lengthy period of European imperialism were still inchoate entities, lacking in national consciousness and thus failing to achieve political unity. (Ziring, 1984, p. 351)

Politically, economically and militarily, the Truman Doctrine illustrated the bipolar nature of the post-war world. It urged the states to make a choice between the two opposed systems of "totalitarianism and democracy." According to the Truman Doctrine, there was no room for countries to pursue independent policies. As Morgenthau

(1951) points out: the Truman Doctrine claimed to defend the free, democratic nations against communist aggression; it also assumed the containment of the Soviet Union in the European heartland.⁶⁶

The Ankara government reacted favorably to Washington's assumption of responsibility as well as its offer of aid to Turkey. This reaction stemmed mainly from an appreciation that the United States had committed itself to support Turkey's independence and security. Turkey had been seeking such a commitment from Washington ever since the Soviet threat had become evident in 1945. Furthermore, the American offer of aid was expected to ease the financial pressures created by large scale military expenditures. It also enabled the government to expand its program of economic development.⁶⁷

Moreover, there were several domestic considerations that reinforced the country's acceptance of American aid. After World War II, Turkey had embarked upon a political and economic liberalization program. American aid was considered a step in the defense of democracy. The establishment of closer relations between Ankara and Washington was expected to contribute to the consolidation of democracy in Turkey.⁶⁸ And since the country's two major political parties were fully supportive of American aid, there was little room for a strong opposition. The

absence of a strong opposition in Turkey was also linked to a fear that criticism of American aid might be interpreted as communist inspired. By early 1947, due to the Cold War with the Soviet Union, Ankara launched an anti-communist campaign that had the support of the opposition Democratic Party.⁶⁹ Thus, substantive criticism of the Truman Doctrine did not take root in Turkey.

In the final analysis, the Soviet threat forced Turkey to seek aid and protection from the Western world, and in particular from the United States. The Truman Doctrine not only extended American military and economic assistance to Turkey, it also provided the framework for NATO, and ultimately for Turkey's inclusion in the alliance.

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CHAPTER V

TURKEY JOINS NATO

From the Truman Doctrine to the Marshall Plan

The Truman Doctrine of 1947 marked the beginning of Turkey's long term relationship with the United States and its decision to join NATO. After two years of lobbying for admission, Turkey joined the North Atlantic Treaty Organization in February 1952. That decision has been the key to Turkey's post World War II foreign relations.

Under the Truman Doctrine, American assistance to Turkey had two immediate objectives. The first assisted Turkey in resisting Soviet aggression; the second reduced the burden of military expenditures on the Turkish economy.¹ Turkey could not defend itself against a Soviet attack without outside aid. The Turkish Army's weaknesses were so great that a limited aid program could not guarantee the country's security. The American assistance program, therefore, aimed at the gradual, long-term reorganization of the Turkish military. Washington's support for Ankara was also directed at deterring the Soviet Union from a possible attack on Turkey.² It is impossible, however, to determine whether the Soviet Union

was in fact prepared to attack Turkey in the immediate post-war years. It is also not clear to what extent the Truman Doctrine and American support for Turkey may have deterred such an attack. Thus, the short-term impact of American aid to Turkey was psychological rather than material.

Ankara obviously appreciated the deterrent effect of American aid. Although the expected economic benefits of the military aid program were questionable, American aid did not significantly strengthen Turkey's military capabilities or economy. Nevertheless, its impact on Turkish foreign policy was immediate and far reaching. The Turkish-American embrace produced changes in Ankara's relations with the western European countries as well as the Soviet bloc.

The Soviet Union opposed the Truman Doctrine and the extension of American military aid to Turkey. But the Turkish Government ignored Moscow's criticism.³ Confident of the deterrent value of Washington's policy and assured of American support, Turkey became a militant advocate of bloc politics. The most significant aspect of Turkish foreign policy after 1947 was Ankara's total identification with the dualistic world view enunciated by the Truman Doctrine, and its enthusiastic association with the western bloc.⁴

Turkey and the Marshall Plan

In the two years following the end of the war, economic conditions in Europe had deteriorated to such an extent that by the spring of 1947 several European countries were on the verge of collapse.⁵ It was increasingly evident that the problem of European recovery went far beyond the economic revival of individual countries. What was required was the reorganization on a continental scale of the war-ravaged European economic system.⁶

An economically viable and politically stable Europe lay at the heart of American foreign policy. Thus, when post-war relief aid failed to solve the growing economic and political crisis in Europe, American policy makers were forced to reassess their policy toward Europe.⁷

The United States had been disbursing huge sums in various directions to save European economic life from collapse, and were faced with the prospect of the disbursing more and more. It was becoming abundantly clear that hand-to-mouth expedients were not merely wasteful but even abortive. On 5 June 1947 General Marshall, the Secretary of State, made his famous speech offering aid to Europe, but stipulating that there must be some agreement among the countries of Europe as to the requirements of the situation and the part these countries themselves will take "agreement on a joint programme." (Calvocoressi, 1952, p. 68)

The Marshall Plan was the product of the ongoing search for a solution to the European problem. The Plan

was a far-reaching proposal for the rehabilitation of Europe's economic structure under American supervision.⁸ Essentially, the Marshall Plan sought to accomplish three interrelated tasks: (1) to alleviate the plight of the individual European countries and peoples, (2) to revive and integrate the European economy, and (3) to check the spread of communism in Europe. Washington had concluded that the deterioration of the European situation would not only bring further economic distress to the Europeans, but could also inspire social and political unrest and invite domestic takeovers by Communists in several European countries.⁹ (See Table 1, Appendix B).

Like the other states affected by post war dislocation, Turkey had little understanding of the Marshall Plan. Thus along with these other countries, Turkey found it necessary to formulate its own policy, and to bring it into harmony with the American initiative. Turkey reacted enthusiastically to the American offer of aid. At the time of the Truman Doctrine, economic aid to Turkey had been considered, but was rejected by Washington on the grounds that Turkey's economic and financial position did not justify such assistance. On the other hand, the benefits of military aid were favorably received from the outset.¹⁰ The Marshall Plan sought to balance the overall aid program as it held out the hope that economic

aid would become available under the proposed joint European recovery program.

The Marshall Plan sought close and beneficial collaboration between the United States and the war-damaged European countries. Not having suffered the physical destruction of war, and the resulting collapse of its economy Turkey viewed the Marshall Plan primarily as an instrument of national development. Ankara tried to justify Turkey's inclusion in the joint European program on the grounds that by developing its own economy Turkey would be in a position to contribute to European recovery.¹¹

Although the Marshall Plan was not designed to deal with Turkey's particular situation, Ankara's desire to receive economic aid was finally accepted by the American policy makers.¹² American aid to Turkey under the Marshall Plan had two economic objectives: (1) to enable Turkey to increase its agricultural and mining production, and (2) to revitalize the Turkish economy in general.¹³

In order to ensure the success of the European Recovery program and to work for the achievement of a sound European economy through the cooperation of its members, the organization for European Economic Cooperation (OEEC) was established in April 1948.¹⁴ Turkey participated actively in the creation of the subsequent operation of the OEEC. Thus, Turkish-European relations intensified to an

unprecedented degree. By adopting Western models for the re-organization of its political and economic life, Turkey established intimate political and economic ties with the European community of nations. As Karpat (1959) notes, a closer approach to the west would best serve Turkey's political and economic interests.¹⁵ Ankara also followed the lead of western countries, and especially the United States, in formulating its policies in the United Nations.¹⁶

Turkey's policy-makers advocated the necessity of strengthening western defense and solidarity against the Soviet Union. As a recipient of military aid under the Truman Doctrine and economic aid under the Marshall Plan, Turkey had already become a member of the American-led western bloc. During the Marshall Plan the European countries turned their energies to create joint defense systems, first with the Western Defense Union and subsequently with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.¹⁷ It was Turkey's long term desire to be accepted as a fully-integrated member of Europe and to maintain strong ties with the United States which led Ankara to seek full membership in NATO.

Turkey and NATO

When NATO was established on April 1949, Turkey was

excluded from this organization. As the Turkish Government had long advocated a western security organization, keenly followed developments leading up to the formation of the Atlantic Pact. Because Turkey regarded itself as Europe's front line of defense against the Soviet Union, exclusion from the Atlantic Alliance was surprising and a blow to Turkish security. It was also a serious setback to the realization of Turkey's quest for integration with the western community of nations.¹⁸

The Formation of NATO

After the end of World War II, Europe continued as the main stage of confrontation between the super powers. European states devoted themselves to security concerns. In March 1947, Britain and France signed the Dunkirk Treaty which provided for a fifty year treaty of mutual assistance and alliance against a possibly resurgent and aggressive Germany. However, with the break-up of the war time alliance, the European countries increasingly came to view the Soviet Union as the major threat to their security.¹⁹ Fear of Soviet aggression was intensified by the Soviet sponsored coup d'etat in Czechoslovakia in February 1948, which drew Czechoslovakia into the Soviet orbit. The European states, therefore, moved rapidly to establish a union which formed the nucleus for the Atlantic

Alliance.²⁰ As Henderson (1983) notes, the Czech coup gave a sudden urge for the formation of a pact of self-defense under Article 51 of the United Nations Charter.²¹

In March 1948, representatives of Britain, France, Belgium, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands signed the Brussels Treaty. This treaty provided for the establishment of a common system of defense and for stronger cultural and economic ties among its five signatories. In April 1948, the Brussels Treaty countries discussed their military capabilities and their dependence on outside assistance.²²

In the meantime, Canada and the United States became interested in establishing a closer association with the Brussels Treaty powers. Shortly thereafter, representatives of the United States and Canada began attending meetings of the Brussels Treaty powers as observers. In early 1949, these seven countries extended invitations to Iceland, Italy, Norway, and Portugal to join them in an Atlantic Alliance. By mid-March 1949, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, combining twelve European and North American nations was formed.²³

The North Atlantic Treaty was a collective self-defense organization sanctioned under Article 51 of the United Nations Charter. In a broader sense, it was also an agreement promoting cooperation in political, economic and

military affairs between the contracting parties. NATO, therefore was both an instrument for defense, and a framework for continuing cooperation among its members.²⁴

Thus the United States was then forced with the task not of maintaining an existing balance of power or of shoring up one that was in danger of being disturbed, but of restoring a balance of power that was in acute disarray and could not be restored from within Europe alone. In order to be able to support this balance the United States had to become a European power by adding its resources in virtual permanence to those of the European nations threatened by Soviet hegemony. These were the factors of interest and power that led to the formation of the Atlantic Alliance.
(Morgenthau, 1969, p. 164)

The treaty consisted of a preamble and fourteen articles. The Preamble established the intention of the contracting parties, "to safeguard the freedom, common heritage, and civilization of their peoples,... to promote stability and well-being in the North Atlantic area." NATO aimed at uniting the western nations for purposes of collective defense and for "the preservation of peace and security."²⁵

The parties undertook to settle their international disputes by peaceful means and to refrain from the threat or use of force inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations. To further peaceful international relations, they agreed to strengthen their free institutions, to promote conditions of stability and well being, to eliminate conflict in their international

economic policies, and to promote international collaboration.²⁶ As Morgenthau (1969) notes the fear of communist aggression and subversion neutralized the separate and divergent interests of the members and prevented them from obstructing the common policies of the Alliance.²⁷

Member countries were to maintain and develop their individual and collective capacity to resist armed attack. They resolved to consult together whenever the territorial integrity and political independence or security of any member state was threatened. Under Article 5, the treaty's most significant feature, the allies agreed that an armed attack against one or more of them would be considered an attack against them all. This article further stipulated that if such an armed attack occurred,

each of them in exercise of the right of individual or collective self-defence recognized by Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, will assist the Party or Parties so attacked by taking forthwith, individually and in concert with other parties, such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force, to restore and maintain international peace and security. (Henderson, 1983, p. 119)

Admission of new members into the alliance was made conditional upon the unanimous consent of all the signatories. The treaty was to remain in force for ten years after which date the parties could consult together to review the treaty in the light of new realities. After

the treaty had been in force for twenty years any party could cease to be a member one year after giving notice of intent.²⁸

The North Atlantic Treaty was a landmark in post-war international relations. It had far-reaching implications for the defense and foreign policy of its own members, its adversaries, and all of the other states who found themselves situated between the Western Alliance and the Soviet Bloc.

Turkey Seeks Membership in NATO

When deliberations for a European defense system were initiated, the Turkish Government expected to be included. Policy-makers in Ankara considered such a framework an effective barrier against the Soviet Union.²⁹ It soon became apparent, however, that the proposed Western Alliance was not intended to include Turkey. Ankara's earlier enthusiasm, thus turned to apprehension. In Ankara's view, a limited security organization committed to the defense of only part of Europe, left the rest of Europe, including Turkey, more vulnerable to Soviet attack. Since the Brussels Pact was limited to the five west European countries, Turkey did not expect to associate itself with the Brussels Treaty Powers.³⁰

Ankara explored the prospects for a formal Turkish-

American Alliance. On June 1948, Turkish Foreign Minister Sadak declared that Turkey wanted to crystallize its relations with Washington through an alliance. The United States, however, rejected this proposal. At a press conference in July 1948, Secretary of State Marshall stated that the United States had a deep interest in Turkey but that a formal alliance would require a full reappraisal of American foreign policy.³¹

Despite dissatisfaction with the American position Turkey continued to press its objective. The American government could not evaluate the effect of Turkey's association with the West European countries. But the State Department's office of Near Eastern and African Affairs (NEA) was in the process of defining Washington's policy toward Middle Eastern and Mediterranean states. NEA asserted they could be vulnerable to Soviet threats, especially if they were excluded from the contemplated military alliance. NEA also held the view, that isolation could undermine pro-West governments, and possibly force friendly leaders out of office.³²

By late 1948, details of the contemplated Atlantic Alliance began to circulate. It was clear that the Scandinavian countries, Portugal and Italy would be invited to join the projected pact. Turkey, therefore, redoubled its efforts to secure membership in the alliance. Ankara

argued that if Italy could participate, there was no reason to exclude Turkey.³³

The Ankara regime hastened to renew pressure on the Department of State, demanding that Turkey receive equal treatment. But Washington, while expressing sympathy, continued to insist that the time was not ripe for Turkey to join; the United States undertook merely to "accord friendly and careful consideration to the security problem of the Turkish Republic. (Harris, 1972, p. 36)

In mid December both Washington and London informed Ankara of their opposition to Turkey's inclusion in the Atlantic Alliance. The American and British governments justified their stand by indicating that they were not prepared to extend their commitments. They urged the Turkish Government not to pursue the question further.³⁴ The reluctance of the American Government stemmed from the fear of disapproval by the American people and Congress regarding the further extension of its commitments in Europe.³⁵

Although it opposed Turkey's inclusion in the forthcoming Atlantic Pact, Washington was not unconcerned with Turkey's security. By early 1949, following extensive deliberations, the State Department decided that it was advisable to insert a declaration in the Atlantic Treaty specifically supporting the independence and integrity of Turkey, Greece and Iran.³⁶

In spite of these difficulties Ankara did not change

its foreign policy, or its pro-West orientation. Turkey's policy-makers remained irrevocably committed to a policy of explicit cooperation with the United States even though that policy failed to provide Turkey with the security guaranties that it required.³⁷

NATO's primary contribution to European security was seen in terms of American military power. The atomic bomb was expected to deter the Soviet Union to keep it from engaging in overt military action. Given the American military deterrent and the substantial military aid from Washington, the European states concentrated their efforts in economic recovery.³⁸ Turkey already enjoyed a type of deterrent guarantee under the Truman Doctrine. In fact, in terms of security, inclusion in a western defense system was likely to jeopardize Turkey's security. In case of a conflict not directly involving Turkey, Ankara would be a target for Soviet attack without the requisite advantages. Thus, in the short run, Turkey did not stand to enhance its security by joining the alliance.³⁹ Ankara appeared to press its membership for other reasons. The government feared a significant reduction in American economic aid. Furthermore, since Turkey had become dependent on American assistance under the Truman Doctrine and Marshall Plan, any diminution of economic aid would have created serious problems for the Turkish government.⁴⁰

Ankara's persistent search for a formal American association, therefore, stemmed not only from the continuing Soviet threat, but from domestic political and economic considerations.⁴¹ Ankara's search for formal ties with the Atlantic Alliance was also the result of the intense popular sentiment in favor of such an association. Turkey's two major political parties were agreed on the necessity for seeking a formal and permanent association with the western world. The country's semi-official and overwhelmingly private newspapers strongly encouraged Turkey's participation in joint western ventures.

Therefore, failure to make Turkey a part of the Atlantic Alliance could have jeopardized the government's political position.⁴² When the Democratic Party won the general election in May 1950, the country's foreign policy was already on an unalterable course. As Ahmad (1977) states, foreign policy had become a logical step arising out of domestic policy.⁴³

Following the 1950 elections, the new Democratic Party administration raised the tempo of Turkey's campaign to join NATO. Coincidentally, the outbreak of war in Korea served as an unprecedented opportunity for Turkey to demonstrate its close collaboration with the western powers. When the United Nations Security Council called for troops to go South Korea, the Turkish Government, even

without consulting the National Assembly, decided to participate in the war.⁴⁴

The Democratic enthusiasm for America's cause in Korea has been generally interpreted as being motivated by their anxiety to enter NATO. Strong and unwavering support of the type that was not forthcoming from even the NATO allies would weaken resistance to Turkey's membership. What was needed was a quick and dramatic decision to send troops to fight in Korea. (Ahmad, 1977, p. 391)

Turkey's policy-makers had demonstrated their right to membership in the western alliance. In spite of criticism from members of the fringe opposition and some sections of the Turkish press, the Democratic Government committed its forces to the West and won the plaudits of many in the Atlantic community.⁴⁵ The Korean war reinforced and virtually guaranteed Ankara's request for membership in western defense system.⁴⁶

The Korean war impressed the leaders of the North Atlantic Alliance in several areas. The "cold war" could suddenly and dangerously turn hot; communist strategy in remote areas could seriously weaken the defensive strength of the Western Alliance; the eruption of local, limited wars did not justify the use of atomic weapons; and western thinking about the scale and speed their re-armament needed to be overhauled.⁴⁷ In order to shore up their defenses, the NATO members decided to open their organization to Turkey and Greece.

Admission to NATO

In August 1950, Turkey officially applied to join the NATO alliance.⁴⁸ In its application, the Turkish Government contended that Turkey's contribution to NATO would be material, political and moral. It pointed out that Turkey would strengthen European defenses, and help to increase the morale in Middle Eastern countries. Ankara indicated that as a NATO member, Turkey would play a positive role in support of the West's position in the Near East. The Turkish leaders also argued that the effect of Turkey's admission into NATO would strengthen Turkish public opinion in favor of the West. Turkey, they stated, would resist an attack with or without western aid. But rather than go it alone, Turkey's membership in the Atlantic Pact made for a more powerful defense in Asia Minor, and overall, improved the capability of NATO forces.⁴⁹

Turkey's application still was not accepted immediately. Washington examined the Turkish request ever so carefully. The State Department questioned how Turkey's admission into NATO would impact on Greece and Iran. After considerable discussion, the State Department concluded that while Iran would be excluded from the Alliance on the grounds that it was not a European country, Turkey was

almost a European state. It was decided to admit both Greece and Turkey, the one as it were balancing the other.⁵⁰

In September 1950 the North Atlantic Council agreed to extend an invitation to Turkey and Greece. The two countries were allowed to associate with the appropriate North Atlantic bodies engaged in planning the defense of the Mediterranean. In view of the geopolitical importance of both countries in the eastern Mediterranean, the North Atlantic Council finally agreed that Turkey and Greece would contribute significantly to the defense of the area.⁵¹ Turkey accepted the NATO invitation in October, announcing it would give major attention to strengthening the alliance.⁵²

Turkey provided the opportunity to establish American bases within easy range of the Soviet Union's most important Caucasian and Central Asian regions. American experts pointed out that in the event of a Soviet attack on Europe, American air forces based in Turkey could easily hit the trans-caucasian oil fields, the industries of the Ural region and Soviet supply lines.⁵³ These considerations changed Washington's earlier opposition to Turkey's membership in NATO.

American support for Turkey in NATO also opened a new way of thinking about the NATO countries. As noted above,

the majority of the members of the Atlantic Pact were opposed to Greek and Turkish entry into NATO for several reasons. The smaller European members were reluctant to assume additional commitments. They also feared Turkish and Greek entry would enlarge their security risks and introduce military problems unrelated to European defense. Moreover, concern was registered that Greek and Turkish membership in the alliance would create a precedent for the admission of other geographically remote countries. It might also decrease their individual share of American aid.⁵⁴

Strategic and ideological objections were voiced against the membership of these two countries, since they had no territorial links with the other European participants. It was even pointed out that Greece and Turkey were connected with one another only by a narrow land-bridge in Thrace. Arguments were raised against Turkey's membership because of her eastward extension deep into the Middle East and to the Caucasian border of the Soviet Union. Nor could Greece or Turkey be considered "Atlantic" powers, although this criterion had already been abandoned to admit Italy. Finally, while the Greeks were Orthodox Christians, the Turks professed the Islamic faith and were often regarded as Asians. (Vali, 1972, p. 83)

Strongest objections to the new membership, however, came from Britain. British objections were based mainly on London's conception of the requirements of Middle Eastern defense.⁵⁵ Britain attached more importance to the creation of a Middle East defense system that Turkey could lead. In London's view, if Turkey became a full NATO

member, it might not have the desire or the strength to act as a moving force in the Middle East. Nevertheless, as a result of the deterioration of the political situation in the Middle East in the early summer of 1951, Britain's opposition to Turkey's and Greece's membership weakened.⁵⁶

After the removal of the British objections, Washington proposed to the other NATO members that Greece and Turkey be accepted as full members. The United States emphasized the disadvantages of Turkish neutrality, a likely prospect if Turkey was excluded from the alliance.⁵⁷

A Neutral Turkey could even represent a positive danger to the treaty powers. Such a political situation might encourage the Soviet Union, in the case of a new war, to attack only across northern and central Europe, initially ignoring Balkans and possibly Italy, with the intention of gobbling them up later.
(New York Times, 2 June 1951, p. 10)

Under American pressure, the membership issue was brought before the seventh session of the North Atlantic Council meeting in Ottawa, and was unanimously approved.⁵⁸ The Council issued a communique on 21 September 1951 stating:

The Council, considering that the security of the North Atlantic area would be enhanced by the accession of Greece and Turkey to the North Atlantic Treaty, agreed to recommend to the member governments that subject to the approval of National Parliaments under their respective legislative procedures, an invitation should be addressed as soon as possible to the Kingdom of Greece and the Republic of Turkey to accede to the Treaty. (Harris, 1972, p. 42)

Following the National Assembly's approval of Turkey's accession to the North Atlantic Treaty, Turkey became a member of NATO on 18 February 1952.

Turkey's membership in NATO drew formal protests from the Soviet Union. In November 1951, following the publication of the protocol of accession, Moscow delivered a note to Ankara. In the Soviet view, the Atlantic Alliance was "instrument of the aggressive policy of the imperialist states headed by the United States." Moscow also focused attention on the question of establishing NATO bases on Turkish soil.⁵⁹

Turkey's response to the Soviet note was brief and to the point. It stated that the country's purpose in joining NATO was to assure its own security within a framework of common defense. Ankara reminded Moscow that it had been the aggressive policies of the Soviet Union and its East European satellites that required Turkey to insure its security.⁶⁰

Domestic Turkish reaction to the North Atlantic Council's September 1951 invitation was overwhelmingly positive. After three years of active campaigning and repeated rebuffs in its efforts to become a full member of the western defense system, admission to NATO was a great victory for Ankara. The country's political parties and press were united in praising the realization of Turkey's

major foreign policy objective.⁶¹

Turkey's post-war foreign policy evolved in response to far-reaching international developments, i.e., the threat posed to Turkey's security by the Soviet Union, the American offer of assistance under the Truman Doctrine, Marshall Plan, and the establishment of the multilateral Atlantic Pact. After 1945, Ankara's foreign policy had been increasingly geared toward integrating Turkey with the western bloc. Yet it was not until 1952, that Turkey was welcomed as a full member of the West European-American alliance. Turkey's accession into NATO marked a departure from Ataturk's policy of non-alignment and moderation to bloc politics. A new era had begun in Turkey's foreign policy.⁶² (See Tables 2 and 3, Appendix B).

Notes

1. FRUS, 1947: V, p.173.; M.Gonlubol, op. cit. p.234.; O.Sander, op. cit. pp.34-37.
2. O.Sander, op. cit. pp.30-31.; M.Gonlubol, op. cit. pp.234-235. and pp.475-476. American assistance to Turkey far surpassed the limited one-shot aid proposed by the Truman Doctrine. Because of the need for extensive and careful planning before the aid program could become operative, the first years program had a slow start. By December 1947 only million dollars had been expended. In the next six months, the value of the aid increased gradually, but even then by the end of June 1948, only 38 million dollars out of original 100 million dollars had been used. U.S. Department of State, Reports to Congress on Assistance Greece and Turkey, Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office 1947-1949. See appendices to the second and sixth reports.
3. O.Sander, op. cit. pp.36-38.; M.Gonlubol, op. cit. pp.231-233.
4. M.Tamkoc, op. cit. p.220.; O.Sander, op. cit. p.37.
5. P.Calvocoressi, Survey of International Affairs, 1947-48, pp.19-20. and pp.63-65.; M.Gonlubol, op. cit. p.235.; O.Sander, op. cit. p.46.
6. W.A.Brown and R.Opie, American Foreign Assistance, p.119.; M.Gonlubol, op. cit. pp.476-477.
7. W.A.Brown and R.Opie, op. cit. pp.19-22.
8. FRUS, 1947: III pp.199-247. O.Sander, op. cit. p.46. Jones, op. cit. pp.239-256. For the speech by the Secretary of State General Marshall, see Documents on International Affairs, 1947-1948. pp.23-26.
9. Jones, op. cit. pp.239-256. Documents on International Affairs, op. cit. pp.23-26.
10. M.Gonlubol, op. cit. p.477.; O.Sander, op. cit. pp.47-48.
11. M.Gonlubol, op. cit. pp.236-237. and pp.478-480.; O.Sander op. cit. pp.48-49.
12. G.Harris, Troubled Alliance, pp.31-35.; M.Gonlubol, op. cit. pp.476-484.
13. Z.Y.Herslag, op. cit. pp.149-152.

14. P.Calvocoressi, op. cit. pp.84-89.
15. K.Karpat, Turkey's Politics, p.140.
16. Ankara's readiness to align itself with the western powers not only on issues involving an East-West conflict but also in cases where there was a conflict of views of colonial and more advanced western group of states on the one hand, and the anti-colonial and underdeveloped Asian, African or Arab group of states on the other hand.; M.Gonlubol, op. cit. pp.269-273
17. O.Sander, op. cit. pp.44-54.; M.Gonlubol, op. cit. pp.239-241. and pp.467-468.
18. M.Gonlubol, op. cit. pp.241-242.; O.Sander, op. cit. p.55.
19. N.Henderson, The Birth of NATO, pp.4-9.; L.Ismay, NATO: The First Five Years, pp.7-9.; Nato Information Service, NATO: Facts and Figures, p.18.; M.Gonlubol, op. cit. pp.239-241.
20. G.Harris, op. cit. p.35.; C.Rose, Campaigns against Western Defence, p.22.; M.Gonlubol, op. cit. p.239. L.Kaplan, The United States and NATO, Lexington, Kentucky: University of Kentucky Press, 1984. pp.49-64.; T.Ireland, Creating The Entangling Alliance, Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1981. pp.48-61.
21. N.Henderson, op. cit. pp.10-11.
22. N.Henderson, op. cit. pp.6-14.; Nato Information Service, op. cit. pp.18-19. L.Ismay, op. cit. pp.6-7.; T.Ireland, op. cit. pp.71-74.
23. L.Ismay, op. cit. pp.10-11.; Nato Information Service, op. cit. p.20.; L.Kaplan, op. cit. pp.65-92.; T.Ireland, op. cit. pp.74-76.
24. H.Morgenthau, A New Foreign Policy ..., p.164.; C.Rose, op. cit. pp.21-23. Chatham House, op. cit. p.155.; N.Henderson, op. cit. pp.101-102.; L.Kaplan, op. cit. pp.115-116.
25. N.Henderson, op. cit. p.115.; It was decided to have a new form of Preamble which would avoid the oratorical flourishes of traditional preambles and state briefly in simple prose the main objectives of the parties in concluding the North Atlantic Treaty.

Ibid. p.101.

26. N.Henderson, op. cit. p.119-122.; Nato Information Service, op. cit. pp.21-22.;
27. H.Morgenthau, A New Foreign Policy..., p.165.
28. N.Henderson, op. cit. pp.94-98. and p 117.; North Atlantic Treaty Organization, NATO Handbook, p.19.
29. M.Gonlubol, op. cit. p.240.; O.Sander, op. cit. p.68.
30. M.Gonlubol, op. cit.
31. New York Times, 1 July 1948. and 3 July 1948.; G.Harris, op. cit. p.36.; P.Calvocoressi, Survey of International Affairs, 1945-50. p.46.; O.Sander, op. cit. pp.67-68.
32. FRUS, 1948: IV pp.172-176.; M.Gonlubol, op. cit. p.242.
33. L.Kaplan, op. cit. pp.141-142.; O.Sander, op. cit. p.69.; M.Gonlubol, op. cit. p.241.
34. FRUS, 1948: IV pp.213-215.; FRUS, 1948: III pp.332-333.
35. FRUS, 1948: IV pp.21-25.
36. FRUS, 1948: III pp.64, 74, 95, 97, 205. and pp.102-103.; FRUS, 1949: IV pp.175-178.
37. N.Sadak, Turkey Faces the Soviets, Foreign Affairs, April 1949, pp.449-461.
38. R.Osgood, NATO: The Entangling Alliance, pp.28-51.
39. Under Article 5 of North Atlantic Treaty, every country is free to take whatever action is necessary. Every armed attack does not of necessity to call for an automatic declaration of general war. Nato Information Service, op. cit. p.23.
40. G.Harris, op. cit. pp.35-38.; A.Rubinstein, op. cit. p.12. O.Sander, op. cit. pp.65-66.; M.Gonlubol, op. cit. p.241.
41. O.Sander, op. cit. pp.70-73.
42. G.Harris, op. cit.; FRUS, 1950: V pp.1231-1232.and pp.1272-1273.

43. F.Ahmad, The Turkish Experiment in Democracy, pp.389-390.; O.Sander, op. cit. pp.70-73.
44. G.Harris, op. cit. pp.38-39.; F.Tachau, pp.175-176. M.Gonlubol, pp.243-244. F.Ahmad, op. cit. p.390. M.Tamkoc, p.230. and p.246. O.Sander, op. cit. p.74.
45. G.Harris, op. cit. pp.38-41.; FRUS, 1950: V p.1320.
46. D.Sezer, op. cit. p.20.; Chatham House, op. cit. p.13.
47. R.Osgood, pp.50-51. and pp.74-77.; Chatham House, pp.10-15. and p.47.
48. F.Vali, op. cit. p.83.; O.Sander, op. cit. p.76.; M.Gonlubol, p.245.
49. FRUS, 1950: V pp.1296-1299. and pp.1306-1309.; M.Gonlubol, pp.245-246.; O. Sander, op. cit. pp.76-77.
50. FRUS, 1950: III pp.257-261.
51. U.S. Department of State Bulletin, 26 November 1951, p.841.
52. FRUS, 1950: III pp.326-327. and p.1218; G.Harris, op. cit. p.41.; F.Ahmad, op. cit. p.392.
53. D.J.K. "Greece, Turkey and NATO", World Today, April 1952, Vol.8 (4), p.163.; O.Sander, op. cit. pp.57-58.
54. G.Harris, op. cit. p.43.; D.J.K., op. cit. p.163. P.Calvocoressi, op. cit. p.34.; F.Vali, op. cit. p.83. New York Times, 2 June 1951.
55. O.Sander, op. cit. p. 75.; M.Gonlubol, pp.247-248.
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CHAPTER VI

DECISION MAKING IN TURKEY'S POLITICS: PERSONALITIES AND INSTITUTIONS

After the establishment of the Republic, Turkey was ruled by a small, national elite. Military and civilian bureaucrats controlled the state apparatus. But the dominant personalities of Ataturk's administration were army officers. They assumed the task of nation-building, which for them, meant strengthening central control over local authorities and securing loyalty to the state.¹ The Republican People's Party, also dominated by army leaders, was made responsible for modernizing the political process. Ataturk and his colleagues believed only a unified party organization could foster a program of radical reform.² The RPP, together with the bureaucrats played an important role in the new Republic and the success of Ataturk reforms rested on their efficiency and skill. During the period of the one party state the bureaucrats enjoyed dominant decision-making powers in the Interior, Finance and Foreign Ministries.³ In the period 1923-1945, all reforms were introduced by the RPP. As Weiker (1981) points out, however, many Kemalist ideas only superficially touched the general population.⁴ Ataturk sought to respond to this problem by stressing governmental functions.⁵

Post World War II Turkey:
Inonu and the Passing of the RPP

After the Second World War, the same national elite that had conducted the country's domestic and foreign policies in the early years of the Republic, remained in power. In fact the transformation of the society and democratization of the political system in the aftermath of the war was pursued by the same decision-makers. It was during the four years of the Republican People's Party administration, 1946-1950, that multi-party politics gradually had its effect on Turkey's decision making mechanism. More importantly, it was under the RPP administration that major foreign policy decisions were rendered.

Ismet Inonu, a former army officer, enjoyed primary influence over Turkish affairs since the early days of the Nationalist Movement. After Ataturk's death in 1938, his influence was further reinforced. Inonu was directly involved in the establishment of the Republic, however, during Ataturk's presidency, he played a secondary role and followed his leader's directives in domestic as well as foreign affairs.⁶

Inonu's involvement in foreign policy making was largely a product of his background and special interest in world affairs. He served as Turkey's Foreign Minister, was

chief negotiator at the Lausanne Conference, and was Prime Minister in 1923-24 and 1925-27.⁷ Once he assumed the presidency, Inonu became Turkey's chief foreign policy-maker. He personally charted the course of Turkey's foreign policy. As Tamkoc (1976) points out, he was in absolute control of the foreign relations of Turkey in the period, 1938-1950.⁸ Inonu's dominance in foreign affairs continued until 1950. During this period he was also president and chairman of the Republican People's Party. The power of the state thus focused on the office of the president.⁹

As chief decision-maker, Inonu was faced with the problem created by the Second World War and the threat it posed to Turkey's security. He was determined to keep Turkey out of the war. Turkey remained neutral until the waning days of the war, and the President worked in close cooperation with his Prime Minister, Cabinet members, high officials of the RPP, and top military leaders. Yet, it was apparent that Turkey's war time foreign policy was managed by the "National Chief" himself.¹⁰

Inonu's dominant role in the decision-making process, especially in foreign affairs, was a consequence of RPP's organizational weakness. Nevertheless, throughout his presidency, Inonu ruled Turkey through legally elected governments, and always with the approval of the National

Assembly. Although the recognized maximum leader, he stressed the importance of developing coherent governments in which the Prime Minister and Council of Ministers determined policy, and bore responsibility for further actions.

In the period of 1945-50, five successive RPP governments headed by four different Prime Ministers ruled Turkey. The war-time cabinet of Prime Minister Sukru Saracoglu, formed in March 1943, was dissolved following the 1946 multi-party elections. It was replaced in August 1946 by a new cabinet headed by Prime Minister Recep Peker. The Peker cabinet only survived for one year and was followed by the first and second Hasan Saka cabinets. Each of the two Saka cabinets served for less than a year. Following Saka's resignation in January, 1949, the last Republican government was formed by Semsettin Gunaltay. The Gunaltay cabinet was essentially a caretaker government pending the 1950 elections. It was replaced in May, 1950, by the Adnan Menderes government, after the electoral victory of the Democratic Party.¹¹

Each of the above cabinets engaged in intense domestic, political struggle. This made it essential for President Inonu to formulate and conduct Turkey's foreign policy. As a consequence, Turkey's foreign policy was not seriously affected by repeated turnovers in top

governmental posts. In fact Turkey's foreign policy followed a consistent course throughout the period, and following the defeat of the RPP at the 1950 polls.¹²

The Military and Foreign Policy

Turkey emerged from World War II with its armed forces undamaged, but the possibility of a confrontation with the Soviet Union prevented the return of the army to its peace time status. Military mobilization during the war exposed the defects of the country's armed forces in terms of combat readiness, organization and planning. Therefore when the Soviet threat became visible, questions of national defense received greater attention.¹³

The Turkish military faced radical transformation. The army had been headed by Chief of General Staff Marshal Fevzi Cakmak since 1922. Cakmak, who was considered "the second most important man" in the country after President Inonu had maintained a strong hold over the army.¹⁴ Under Cakmak the army developed a unique relationship with the government. The Chief of General Staff reported directly to the President, and the military avoided party politics. Thus, Cakmak controlled the army, and he kept it free from civilian interference.¹⁵ After Cakmak's retirement in 1948, the government began to change the generally independent status of the military. The Chief of the General Staff was

made directly responsible to the Prime Minister, and subsequent reorganization of the military establishment enabled the government to bring the armed forces under its review. Since the Chief of Staff was made a political appointee and subjected to cabinet approval, the civilian government enjoyed reasonably effective control over the military, at least in theory.¹⁶

On the other hand, up until the Democratic Party victory in 1950, members of the National Assembly and particularly its top leadership, had military backgrounds. As Frey (1965) notes: under RPP single-party assemblies, from 16 to 20 percent of the deputies were retired or active military officers. After 1950, however, the military contingent in the Assembly gradually decreased.¹⁷

The military was fully supportive of Turkey's major foreign policy decisions. The military also advocated the modernization of the armed forces, and was eager to obtain American financial, technical, and military aid.¹⁸ The gradual departure of the more conservative and highly nationalistic army officers, whose military experiences generally dated to the War of Liberation, facilitated Turkish-American military co-operation. During the Democratic Party administration, US-Turkey relations reached their highest and most enduring level. Given American training, after 1947 the Turkish military was

increasingly receptive to American aid and advice.¹⁹ (See Table 3, Appendix B).

Since 1948 United States aid, both in modern weapons and in training was dramatically changing the Turkish military establishment. Thousands of young officers were sent abroad for training, not only to the United States but to the European countries as well. A Turkish regiment fought in Korea; Turkish officers were assigned to NATO commands and engaged in multi-national maneuvers. (Harris, 1965, p. 170)

Undoubtedly, it was Turkey's entry into NATO that affected the Turkish military most profoundly. The military leaders embraced the government's policies of military integration into the Atlantic Alliance. Considering that the efforts to join NATO extended over three years and two administrations, the military was in accord with the government policies to bring the Turkish Army under the NATO umbrella.

The association of Turkish officers with American and European military personnel at NATO schools and exercises, also exposed these officers to Western influences, and made them more aware of Turkey's relative backwardness. As a result, the Turkish army officers believed they had a unique role in promoting and safeguarding Turkey's interests both externally and internally. They also concluded the Turkish army had an important political role, and if necessary, should not hesitate to govern the country. Therefore, the Turkish military consolidated its

power and exercised influence over the political system. It also secured leverage in the determination of Turkey's economic development. The Turkish military assumed the role of entrepreneur in 1961 with the establishment of Army Mutual Aid Society (Ordu Yardimlasma Kurumu, OYAK). Originally organized to create pension programs and provide welfare for the officers of the armed forces, in a short period of time OYAK became one of the country's largest and most diversified conglomerates.²⁰ The military was an integral part of the Turkish economy, and it had a substantial stake in the maintenance of economic and social stability. As Ahmad (1977) underlines, "the armed forces could no longer afford to be neutral or above politics."²¹

The Kemalist officers who overthrew the Menderes government in May 1960 did not discard his pro-American foreign policy. They were opposed to the Bayar-Menderes administration, not the United States. They did not seek a change in foreign policy, but rather wished to reinstate the Kemalist state. In fact the moderate pro-American generals who formed the military junta of 1960, approved the American connection. Thus, despite the introduction of radical domestic changes, they pursued the same foreign policy of their predecessors.²²

Foreign Ministry and Diplomatic Corps

During World War II and its aftermath the Foreign Minister occupied a very high position, second only to the Prime Minister in the cabinet. After 1950, however, the Foreign Minister could be replaced by the Finance and Interior Ministers in the ministerial hierarchy.²³ In the Inonu Presidency, the Foreign Minister also enjoyed a relatively uninterrupted tenure in office in the midst of cabinet crises. Only two Foreign Ministers served from 1944 to 1950. Hasan Saka was appointed as Foreign Minister in September 1944 and served in the Saracoglu and Peker cabinets for three years. When Saka assumed the post of Prime Minister in September 1947, he appointed Necmettin Sadak as his foreign minister. Sadak served in the first and second Saka cabinets as well as the caretaker Gunaltay cabinet until the Democratic Party took over in May 1950.²⁴

Saka's uninterrupted tenure in office from September 1944 to January 1949, first as Foreign Minister, and then as Prime Minister, suggests that he must have had an important influence in the conduct of Turkey's postwar foreign policy. The threats posed by the Soviet Union and the announcement of the Truman Doctrine by the United States, coincided with his terms in office.²⁵

Necmettin Sadak was the last Foreign Minister of the RPP Administration. Although he had been a deputy since 1927 and served the Assembly's Foreign Affairs Committee,

Sadak had not joined Inonu's close circle until his appointment as Foreign Minister in 1947. Sadak was a prominent journalist. He consistently followed the RPP Party line. He was an active Foreign Minister who apparently enjoyed Inonu's confidence throughout his term in office.²⁶ Foreign Minister Sadak represented Turkey in post-war diplomatic gatherings and made frequent visits to Western capitals, particularly in connection with the operation of the Marshall Plan and the establishment of NATO. Although he was not a career foreign service official, Sadak headed a very professional Ministry. The highest permanent official of the Ministry was the Secretary General. In the years 1945-1952, this office was successively held by Feridun Cemal Erkin, Fuad Carim, and Faik Zihni Akdur, all of whom were career diplomats. After the 1950 elections Akdur continued to serve as Secretary General under the DP administration.²⁷

In the aftermath of World War II and throughout the 1950s Turkey had a formidable corps of diplomats. Having inherited a highly developed diplomatic tradition from the Ottoman Empire, the Republic was able to train a new generation of career diplomats. Karpas (1979) states that the foreign service personnel represented the best educated, the most westernized elite, "but also the most aristocratic and farthest removed from the country's

realities."²⁸ As Szyliowicz emphasizes, the role of the "Mulkiye" (Political Science Faculty in Ankara) was also crucially important in the development of Turkey's administrative elite. The graduates from the Mulkiye became civil service career officers, and they were concentrated in the Interior and Finance Ministries, as well as the Foreign Ministry. Moreover, 70 percent of all civil servants who served in the National Assembly in this period were graduates of the Mulkiye.²⁹

Hence a select group of foreign service officers represented Turkey in the most important western capitals, i.e., Washington D.C., London, Paris, Rome, and the United Nations. Ambassadors H. R. Baydur (1945-48) and F. C. Erkin (1948-55) served in Washington. Ambassador N. Menemencioglu (1944-56) in Paris, Ambassador C. Acikalin (1945-52) in London, Ambassadors S. Sarper (1946-47), F. C. Erkin (1947-48) and H. R. Baydur (1948-52) in Rome, and Ambassador S. Sarper (1947-57) played an important role in the United Nations.³⁰ Five ambassadors, circulating among themselves, represented Turkey's interests in the five most important western diplomatic posts. Their educational, social and career background also showed a very homogeneous picture. All of them were either graduates from the Mulkiye, or got their degrees from well known universities in the West. Obviously they admired

Western ideas and culture. Thus, it was not surprising that after the changeover to the Democratic Party administration in May 1950, none of these career diplomats were removed from their positions. This also illustrates the continuity in Turkey's foreign policy, despite deep changes in the country's domestic politics. It is also evident that these career ambassadors not only supported the Western and American orientation of Turkey's foreign policy, actively contributed to its development.³¹

During the same period Turkey's embassy in Moscow was also a sensitive and important post. Selim Sarper was ambassador in Moscow at the time of the Turkish-Soviet crisis of 1945-46. When Turkish-Soviet negotiations reached an impasse, Sarper was replaced by Faik Zihni Akdur. Akdur, a career diplomat was instructed not to take any initiative in the ongoing conflict over the Turkish Straits.³² In 1949, Akdur was appointed Secretary General of the Foreign Ministry, an indication of his value to the Turkish government and the importance that Ankara attached to his Moscow experience.

The Menderes Era, 1950-60: Promises and Performance

In 1950, Celal Bayar succeeded Inonu as President of Turkey when the RPP was defeated at the polls. He could not fill Inonu's role, having neither the personal prestige

nor the political power that Inonu commanded. Under the Democratic Party administration of Bayar it was in fact the Prime Minister, rather than the President, who was the chief decision-maker.³³ Bayar came to occupy a position second to his Prime Minister, because it was the Prime Minister who was the chairman of, and dominated the ruling party.³⁴ No less important, the defeat of the RPP brought civilians into the principal decision-making circle, and the military leaders were forced to accept a lesser role. The Democratic Party, supported by the large landowners and commercial-industrial class, appeared to have the necessary leverage to govern the country free of military interference. The DP favored private enterprise and foreign investment in Turkish economy, this too solidified its coalition and power. But this also moved Turkey to a different path of development, at variance with that pursued earlier under its statist economic system.³⁵

Prime Minister Adnan Menderes was the key figure in implementing Turkey's new economic and political decisions. He was a graduate of the American College in Izmir and also had a law degree from the University of Ankara. Although Menderes had been a member in the National Assembly since 1930, he did not come to public attention until 1946. With the introduction of multi-party politics, he joined Celal Bayar--a banker who served as Prime Minister and Finance

Minister under Ataturk's administration--and others in forming the Democratic Party. When the Democrats won the election in 1950, Menderes was appointed Prime Minister by Celal Bayar, who was elected President of Turkey after Inonu's resignation.³⁶ As both RPP and DP experiences indicate, it was the concentration of governmental power, party control, and their driving personalities, that made President Inonu and Prime Minister Menderes key decision-makers of their respective administrations.

As they promised in the election campaign, the DP administration introduced new economic and social programs. At first they cut government expenditures, transferred state-owned enterprises to the private sector, and encouraged foreign investments. In the first years of the DP regime, millions of dollars worth of investment poured into the country from foreign firms, and foreign capital seemed to benefit the Bayar-Menderes administration. Turkish industrialists, acting as the representatives of foreign capital, pursued policies to turn Turkish industry into transnational monopolies. Large landowners also benefited from the change in government. The capitalist transformation of Turkey also produced the mechanization of Turkish agriculture.³⁷ Imports were promoted like never before. But none of these developments were without cost. The Turkish economy was severely strained. As Ziring

(1984) points out, under the Democratic Party "state-managed industrialization was pressed to its outer limits. Inflation reaped havoc in all sectors of society, and Menderes' dictatorial tactics only added to the suffering."³⁸ Trade deficits followed. The country became overly dependent on foreign borrowing, and with the expansion of credit came an ever increasing debt.³⁹

While the economic policies of the DP regime enriched the industrial-commercial class and the landlords, it hurt the working classes. Peasants lost their lands, small and medium size businesses were driven to bankruptcy, and workers were underpaid or not paid at all. These developments produced a series of severe economic crises, which coupled with enormous military expenditures, resulted in the adoption of publicly distasteful austerity measures. The latter were forced on the country by the International Monetary Fund, IMF, which deepened the crises.⁴⁰

Turkey's membership in the NATO and CENTO military pacts (both of which it joined when they were set up when the cold war arose after World War II) posed an additional burden on the national budget. Although in return for its participation Turkey received US \$2.4 billion in 'aid' from the United States between 1951 and 1960 (with over US \$1.4 billion of it allocated for military purposes), the money spent by the Turkish Government on projects connected with these operations (such as the construction of air bases, roads, ports, etc.; the purchase of military aircraft, weapons, ammunition, and spare parts from the United States and other NATO countries; and meeting

the expenses of US military personnel stationed in Turkey) far surpassed this amount, causing severe difficulties in balancing its budget. (Berberoglu, 1982, p. 73)

The ongoing inflationary policies of the Menderes Government also lowered the living standards of those who were on fixed salaries such as public employees and officers in the army.⁴¹ Therefore the economic crises were rapidly transformed into social and political nightmares.

Unrest in the universities and among the urban population sparked a military reaction, and the soldiers were returned to political prominence. Criticism against the DP regime assumed country-wide proportions, but it was the liberal journalists and intellectual groups who brought the matter to a climax. The government, however, continued to compound error. Instead of revising its policies, the Menderes government resorted to more repressive methods, adopting Fascist type measures against the opposition.⁴² Following the 1958 elections, the government passed restrictive legislation, that isolated it from all public institutions. Even the one time enthusiastic supporters of the Menderes administration, the cotton farmers and businessmen joined in the criticism of the government.⁴³

Moreover, the relationship between the increasingly authoritarian DP government and an alienated RPP opposition led by Inonu sharpened. Inonu's RPP criticized the

government's inflationary and partisan economic policies. For the first time, it criticized the country's great dependence on the United States.⁴⁴ Amidst growing social discontent and mass protests, in the face of gross repression by the Menderes government, and a worsening economy, the army staged a coup in May 1960. Menderes was ousted from office and arrested. The Turkish Constitution was abrogated, and the country was placed under martial law.

The DP and Foreign Policy: The American Connection

When the Democratic Party took over the government in 1950, Turkish foreign policy had already been charted by the RPP, and in particular by Inonu. Although Turkey did not gain admission to the North Atlantic Pact during Inonu's presidency, the RPP governments had prepared the ground for Turkey's entry into the western alliance. Thus, despite the change in the ruling circle, in foreign affairs, the major advisors in the diplomatic corps remained at their posts. Prime Minister Menderes, however, assumed the role of the chief foreign policy maker.

In his term in office, from May 1950 until he was overthrown by the military in May 1960, Menderes had two Foreign Ministers. His first Foreign Minister was Fuad Koprulu, a historian and one of the founders of the

Democratic Party. He resigned from the party in 1955 due to disagreement over the Prime Minister's domestic policies. He retired from politics and returned to academic life.⁴⁵ It was during Koprulu's term as foreign minister that Turkey made its decision to send troops to Korea. Turkey also gained admission to NATO during Koprulu's Foreign Ministry. Thus, he must have worked very closely with Prime Minister Menderes, as well as Turkey's career ambassadors in the western capitals. After Koprulu's resignation, Fatin Resit Zorlu was appointed Foreign Minister. Zorlu was an ex-diplomat who, during the formation of the DP, had joined its ranks.⁴⁶

Under DP rule Turkey developed its closest association with the West since the establishment of the Republic. Ankara's identification with Washington's foreign policy started with Turkey's involvement in the Korean War. In July 1950 United Nations Secretary General Trygvie Lie requested UN member states to consider offering effective assistance to resist the North Korean aggression against the South. The Turkish Government interpreted this request as an opportunity to demonstrate its support for the American-backed United Nations effort. As noted in Chapter V, Ankara expected its Korean policy to influence Washington's consideration of Turkey's participation in the Atlantic Alliance. On July 22, 1950, Foreign Minister

Koprulu told American Ambassador Wadsworth that Turkey wanted its reply to the United Nations appeal to conform with United States policy and public opinion.⁴⁷ Two days later the Americans suggested that Turkey could best support the United Nations by dispatching a fully equipped combat regiment consisting of 4,000 to 4,500 officers and men.⁴⁸ The next day President Bayar, Premier Menderes, Defense Minister Refik Sevket Ince, and Foreign Minister Koprulu, met with Turkey's Ambassador to the United States and the United Nations. They unanimously agreed that Turkey would support the United Nations military action in Korea and send Turkish troops to Korea. Only two days later, Prime Minister Menderes handed an aide-memoire to Ambassador Wadsworth stressing the importance of bringing close cooperation between their two countries "to a contractual stage." Menderes pleaded that the "moment is propitious for the admission of Turkey as a member of the system of defense and security instituted by the Atlantic Pact." He requested that, the "United States Government kindly see to it that the necessary measures be taken to that end, that this question be examined and resolved with the shortest possible delay."⁴⁹

The DP government led by Menderes went out of its way to establish Turkey as a loyal outpost of the West on the borders of the Soviet Union. Not only did Turkey join NATO, but it also furnished the U.S. with a string

of military bases and dispatched a military contingent to fight in Korea. (Keyder, 1979, p. 24)

Turkey's western orientation was reinforced by other security arrangements. Turkey signed the Tripartite Alliance (Balkan Pact) with Greece and Yugoslavia in 1953, with open encouragement from the United States.⁵⁰ This pact was clearly directed against the Soviet Union and its socialist allies. It proved shortlived, however, as western-oriented Turkey and Greece, and socialist-oriented Yugoslavia, could not agree on the common danger.⁵¹

In its relations with the Third World countries, the Menderes Government reflected its overall inflexible stance in the Cold War. Turkey attended the first non-aligned nations' conference held in Bandung, Indonesia, in 1955. Ankara proved to be more an observer than an active participant, however. Turkish representative Zorlu seemed to assume the role of NATO's emissary as he defended the interests of the Western Alliance. At the Bandung conference Zorlu rejected neutralism as a "Third force" in world politics insisting it would only help to advance Communism.⁵² His statement also demonstrated Ankara's loyalty to the West and in particular to Washington. It also appeared to weaken Turkey's relations with Third World countries. Turkey's lack of support for colonial liberation movements satisfied its NATO partners but made

Ankara unpopular and even resented among the Third World nations.⁵³

In 1951 Turkey joined the United States, Britain and France in proposing a Middle East Defense Organization (MEDO) to the Arab States. According to the proposal MEDO's function would be to link Middle East defense with NATO and the containment of Soviet communism. But MEDO did not materialize due to reluctance of the Arab countries to join the pact, especially Egypt.⁵⁴

Turkey also became a founding member of the Baghdad Pact in 1955. The alliance included Iraq, Iran and Pakistan in addition to Britain. The Baghdad Pact was renamed the Central Treaty Organization (CENTO) following the 1958 Revolution in Iraq. CENTO lost Iraq but brought in the United States as a non-signatory participant. Both the Baghdad Pact and CENTO represented the "Northern Tier" countries and were set up as defensive arrangements against the Soviet Union.⁵⁵ As Ziring (1984) notes, CENTO was viewed by Washington as a link in the chain of alliances between NATO and SEATO (Southeast Asia Treaty Organization). But the Alliance never served the interest of its signatories. So long as the Soviet Union was not directly involved, the United States avoided assisting the CENTO countries in their regional conflicts, notably the India-Pakistan and Turkey-Greece-Cyprus disputes.⁵⁶

In 1957 the American Congress authorized President Eisenhower to supply military and economic aid to any country in the Middle East threatened by the Soviet Union. This policy was known as the Eisenhower Doctrine.⁵⁷ The Eisenhower Doctrine was first put to the test in the summer of 1958 when a Lebanese crisis erupted simultaneously with the revolution in Iraq. The Turkish government once again demonstrated its close association with the United States by providing the use of Turkish bases for American troops. Although NATO bases were not to be employed outside the purview of NATO, Incirlik base was used for the airlift of U.S. Marines to Lebanon.⁵⁸ It could be argued, the DP Government's identification with the United States policy, cost Turkey friendly relations in the Arab world.

In the final analysis, Turkey's established elites conducted the nation's affairs relatively free from popular pressures through 1946. Following the establishment of the multi-party system, however, the ruling elite retained its predominant position, but it now had to respond to popular demands in formulating the country's policies. Throughout the period under study, Turkey's foreign policy was determined and directed by a handful of people whose power derived from their occupation of high military, governmental, and party posts. And although challenged in the domestic arena by an emerging political opposition, the

elite continued to enjoy a relatively free hand in managing the nation's foreign affairs.

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38. L.Ziring, op. cit. p.126.
39. C.Keyder, op. cit. p.23.; D.Avcioglu, op. cit. V.I pp.570-573.
40. Berberoglu notes that the government's IMF engineered "anti-inflationary" policy, which enforced the devaluation of the currency, further worsened the balance of trade and the balance of the payments. B.Berberoglu, op. cit. p.79.; D.Avcioglu, op. cit. pp.561-562.
41. B.Berberoglu, op. cit. ; D.J.Simpson, "Development as a process: Menderes Phase in Turkey.", Middle East Journal, V.19 Spring 1965, pp.150-151.
42. W.Weiker, The Turkish Revolution, pp.8-13.; R.Robinson, op. cit. pp.190-194.; F.Ahmad, op. cit. pp.52-63.; B.Berberoglu, op. cit. pp.79-80.; L.Ziring, Iran Turkey, and Afghanistan, pp.79-80.; F.Ahmad, op. cit. pp.44-48.
43. F.Ahmad, op. cit. p. 59.
44. D.Avcioglu, op. cit. p.582.; L.Ziring, op. cit. p.81. Avcioglu notes that Inonu also criticized the United States for its support a corrupt and staggering government. The opposition was also strongly against the use of Incirlik air base for the United States airlifting operations during the Lebanese crisis. D.Avcioglu, op. cit. pp.582-585.

45. M.Tamkoc, op. cit. pp.244-245.; F.Ahmad, op. cit. p.299.
46. M.Tamkoc, op. cit. pp.244-245.
47. FRUS, 1950: V, pp.1280-1281.
48. Ibid. pp.1281-1282.
49. FRUS, 1950: v, pp.1285-1289.; FRUS, 1950: III, p.175. F.Ahmad, op. cit. pp.390-391.
50. O.Sander, Balkan Gelismeleri ve Turkiye (Balkan Developments and Turkey), pp.83-90. According to this pact, the signatories were to consult on matters of common interest so as to establish continuous co-operation. The three countries were to bolster their co-operation in technical and cultural matters. U. of Ankara, op. cit. pp.171-174.
51. Ibid.; For details on Balkan Pact, see O.Sander, op. cit. pp.83-124. and M.Gonlubol, op. cit. pp.255-268.
52. M.Gonlubol, op. cit. pp.293-297.; O.Sander, op. cit. pp.121-123.
53. Ibid. Turkey's unpopularity among the underdeveloped countries especially increased when Ankara supported colonialist France against the liberation Movement of Algeria and voted against the Algerian independence in the United Nations in 1956.
54. L.Ziring, op. cit. pp.312-313. and p.321.; F.Ahmad, op. cit. pp.393-394.
55. L.Ziring, The Middle East Political Dictionary, pp.312-314. and pp.321-324.; M.Gonlubol, op. cit. pp.269-291.; O.Sander, Turk-Amerikan Iliskileri (Turkish-American Relations), pp.125-134.; F.Ahmad, op. cit. pp.395-397.
56. L.Ziring, op. cit.
57. Ibid. pp.327-329.; O.Sander, op. cit pp.145-155.; M.Gonlubol, op. cit. pp.309-328.
58. D.Avcioğlu, op. cit. p.577.; O.Sander, op. cit. pp.166-170.; M.Gonlubol, op. cit. pp.328-329.; F.Ahmad, op. cit. p.397.

CHAPTER VII

CONCLUSION

In the opening chapters of this study, an effort was made to present the historical and geopolitical background of Turkey up to the end of World War II. This section also examined Turkey's domestic political context. I, then, tried to describe the formulation of Turkey's foreign policy after the second World War, relating it to the Truman Doctrine, and Turkey's entry into NATO. Finally, an attempt was made to reveal Turkey's decision-making process, and the personalities who shaped the country's foreign affairs.

One of the major conclusions that emerges from this study is that Turkey, although a non-belligerent, was deeply affected by World War II. In the immediate post-war years, Ankara revised its domestic and foreign policies. In fact Turkey's post-war domestic and foreign policies moved in tandem. With an orientation and dependence on the Western world, Ankara simultaneously re-arranged Turkey's domestic system, so that it too harmonized with Western conceptions. Turkey discarded its statist economy and introduced a multi-party political system, not only as an

act of modernization, but also to satisfy expectations in the West, and especially in the United States.

The process of economic and political liberalization as well as identification with the Western bloc were clearly interrelated. Domestic and foreign factors had combined to facilitate Turkey's alignment with the Western world.

This thesis suggests that the evolution of Turkey's foreign policy after World War II occurred in two stages. From the end of the war to the announcement of the Truman Doctrine in March 1947, external factors played a dominant role in shaping Ankara's foreign policy. After the institutionalization of the Truman Doctrine, domestic factors became more significant in the foreign policy making process. The Truman Doctrine was also a turning point for Turkey's foreign policy. The Truman Doctrine not only satisfied Turkey's security concerns, it also enabled Ankara to turn its attention to pressing economic and developmental questions.

A major consequence of the Truman Doctrine appeared to be Turkey's increasing dependence on the United States. Turkey became one of the most enthusiastic supporters of Western bloc policies. The American led Western alliance was viewed as the only option open to Turkey's leaders. Following the establishment of NATO in 1949, Turkey

aggressively sought entry in the Atlantic Pact. Despite Ankara's participation in the Truman Doctrine, the Marshall Plan and the Council of Europe, Turkey's initial exclusion from NATO signified its secondary status in the Western scheme of things. Undaunted by this treatment, Ankara persisted in its quest for NATO membership, especially as it appeared to be the key to a vast aid program that would ensure Turkey's progressive growth. Ironically, however, it was military and strategic considerations that finally facilitated Turkey's admission to NATO. Following the outbreak of war in Korea, NATO revised its military policy, adopted a "forward strategy," and envisaged a place for Turkey in the West's containment of international communism.

Ankara's abandonment of its independent foreign policy in favor of an exclusive association with the Western bloc inevitably influenced Turkey's relations with other states. After 1947, Ankara's international relations could only be understood in the context of the Western Alliance.

Geographically Turkey's immediate foreign contacts were with the Balkan states of Eastern Europe, the Islamic states of the Middle East, and the Soviet Union. After World War II, the Balkan countries were among the first to be drawn into bloc politics, identifying primarily with the Soviet Union. Albania, Bulgaria, Rumania, and Yugoslavia

established communist governments,¹ another consequence of their foreign policy orientation. Greece almost fell to the communists in its civil war, but later looked to the West. Ankara, therefore, viewed its marxist neighbors with considerable suspicion, and sensed that Turkey was also threatened by communist forces. Soviet troops in Bulgaria also caused Turkey to be more cautious about its communist neighbors.² Ankara's post-war contacts with its traditional rival, Greece, improved after the Greek civil war, particularly as both countries sought to ward off what they perceived to be communist inspired and expansionist ventures. Unfortunately, this period of goodwill would be shortlived as Greece and Turkey, despite their NATO association competed for control over Cyprus.

After its inclusion in the Western bloc, Ankara followed an active policy in the Middle East. The Turkish Government initially supported the Arab States on the Palestine question. It actively opposed the 1947 United Nations' partition plan for Palestine.³ However, as Turkey drew closer to the western powers, Ankara modified its policy toward the Palestine problem and developed another that paralleled those of the Western states, and especially the United States. After the establishment of Israel, Ankara recognized the new state, the only Islamic nation to do so formally. This change in Turkey's stand on the

Palestine question undermined Ankara's credibility in Arab countries. Turkey's efforts to involve the Arab states in a Middle East Defense Organization was unsuccessful due to anti-Western feeling, and to the view that Turkey merely served Western interests.⁴

Turkey supported the Western powers in general and the United States in particular on all issues brought before the United Nations involving the East-West conflict.⁵ Turkey's decision to participate in the United Nations military action in Korea, for example, was largely calculated to win the favor of the United States and other Western powers. Turkey's pro-Western policies at the United Nations, however, went further than this act. Turkey adopted policies guided solely by Western interests, even if it meant a conflict of interest with third world Asian, African and Arab States. Turkey avoided the Non-Aligned Movement and displayed little patience for the problems of developing countries.

The Cyprus crisis which erupted during the 1960s proved the inconsistency of the belief that Turkey and Greece, as members of NATO, could avoid bitter rivalry. Moreover, Ankara was deeply distressed by Washington's apparent preference for Greece when Turkey invaded Cyprus. Johnson's critical letter of June 1964 to Inonu proved that economic and military dependence on the United States did

not guarantee the country's security.⁶ The American role raised questions about Washington's willingness to defend Turkey against possible Soviet aggression. Ankara was forced to reassess its foreign policy vis a vis the United States. Nevertheless, Ankara's basic western-Nato oriented policy was sustained. Although, Ankara has opened relations with the Soviet bloc countries, as well as the Arab Middle East, there is little reason to believe that Turkey is seriously modifying its pro-West posture.


It can be argued that, after the second World War, Turkey's leaders overreacted to the bi-polarization of the international system. Ankara did not make any effort to diversify Turkey's relations. Instead, Turkey's policy-makers intensified their efforts to place the country totally within the Western camp. As Ahmad (1977) points out, Turkey's leaders wanted to make Turkey "a little America."⁷ By joining NATO, Turkey contributed to the dualistic perspectives of the Cold War. It is now evident that Turkey's current foreign and domestic policies are extensions of economic, political, and international commitments that immediate postwar Turkish governments undertook to enhance the country's security vis a vis the Soviet Union.

Notes

1. F.Vali, op. cit. p.199.
2. For further details on the communist regimes in Balkans and their relations with Turkey, see, O.Sander, Balkan Gelismeleri ve Turkiye (Balkan Developments and Turkey) pp.23-49.
3. U. of Ankara, op. cit. pp.91-92.
4. F.Vali, op. cit pp.306-307.; G.H.Jansen, Zionism, Israel and Asian Nationalism, Beirut: Institute of Palestine Studies, 1971, p.220, 231 and pp.240-241.
5. F.Ahmad, op. cit. pp.395-397.
6. President Johnson called the attention of Turkish Prime Minister to the possibility of a direct involvement by the Soviet Union. In his letter he added: "I hope you will understand that your NATO Allies have not had a chance to consider whether they have an obligation to protect Turkey against the Soviet Union if Turkey takes a step which results in Soviet intervention without the full consent and understanding of its NATO allies". Johnson informed Inonu that bilateral agreements between the United States and Turkey in the field of military assistance required American consent for the use of American-supplied arms. Ankara, reluctantly yielded to American pressure. F.Vali, op. cit. pp.129-132.; F.Ahmad, op. cit. pp.406-407.; M.Gonlubol, op. cit. pp.354-357.; O.Sander, op. cit. pp.229-239. For the full text of President Johnson's letter to Prime Minister Inonu, and Inonu's response, see Middle East Journal, 20, (3) Summer 1966 pp.386-393.
7. F.Ahmad, op. cit. p.398.; M.Gonlubol, op. cit. p.358.


APPENDICES

MAP I




SOURCE: G. Harris, Troubled Alliance, Stanford: AEI-Hoover Policy Studies, 1972, p.i.

MAP II




SOURCE: R.R. Sellman, The Outline Atlas of World History, New York: St. Martin's Press, 1970, p.39.

MAP III




SOURCE: M. Gilbert, First World War Atlas, New York:
The Macmillan Company, 1970, p.5.

MAP IV



SOURCE: M. Gilbert, First World War Atlas, New York:
The Macmillan Company, 1970, p.5.

MAP V



SOURCE: F. Vali, The Turkish Straits and NATO,
Stanford, CA: Hoover Institution Press, 1972,
p.i.

TABLE 1


U.S. MILITARY AND ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE TO NATO ALLIES, 1946-1966 *
(In Millions of Dollars)

COUNTRY	POSTWAR RELIEF	MARSHALL PLAN	MUTUAL SECURITY ACT		FOREIGN ASSISTANCE ACT		TOTAL
	1946-48	1949-52	1953-57	1958-61	1962-65	1966	1946-66
France.....	\$1,909.1	\$ 3,561.8	\$ 3,467.1	\$ 352.0	\$ 96.4	\$ 11.8	\$ 9,398.2
United Kingdom.....	3,836.9	3,252.8	1,290.3	289.0	289.8	86.0	9,044.8
Italy.....	1,271.2	1,690.0	1,852.5	642.1	564.4	68.0	6,088.2
Turkey.....	113.3	461.0	1,374.3	1,287.6	1,280.2	257.5	4,773.9
Federal Republic of Germany.....	1,344.4	2,491.8	759.9	395.5	3.3	2.4	4,997.3
Greece.....	723.6	1,056.9	707.3	594.8	461.6	85.5	3,629.7
Netherlands.....	238.2	1,121.6	835.2	178.3	94.0	0.1	2,467.4
Belgium-Luxembourg.....	163.4	740.9	891.4	112.5	73.8	19.2	2,001.2
Norway.....	75.0	354.7	428.8	151.3	124.2	42.8	1,176.8
Denmark.....	21.0	346.7	315.5	120.7	89.4	20.1	913.4
Portugal.....	...	61.8	241.2	64.1	133.0	5.4	505.5
Berlin.....	101.9	30.0	131.9
Iceland.....	...	29.4	16.7	23.1	7.0	7.7	83.9
Canada.....	...	14.4	12.7	9.1	36.2
Total.....	\$9,696.1	\$15,183.8	\$12,294.8	\$4,250.1	\$3,217.1	\$606.5	\$45,248.4

* U.S. Overseas Loans and Grants and Assistance from International Organizations: Obligations and Loan Authorizations, July 1, 1945-June 30, 1966 (Special report prepared for the House Foreign Affairs Committee). Based on U.S. fiscal years.

SOURCE: F. Beer, Integration and Disintegration in NATO, Columbus, OH: Ohio State University Press, 1969, p.130.

TABLE 2



SOURCE: A.J. Broadhurst, The Future of European Alliance Systems, Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1982, pp.290-291.

TABLE 3

U.S. MILITARY ASSISTANCE TO TURKEY, 1948-1971
(dollars in millions)

Fiscal Years	Authorized Program ^a	Deliveries or Expenditures ^b	Excess Defense Articles ^c	Military Sales
1948	100.0	68.8		
1949	95.0	83.5		
1950	102.0	7.3	7.1	
1951	150.0	43.1		
1952	240.0	102.0		
1953	175.0	151.8		
1954	235.8	238.2	19.5	
1955	87.7	178.2		
1956	98.5	191.3		
1957	152.3	152.4		
1958	136.8	249.4		
1959	141.0	196.3		
1960	90.5	92.6		
1961	180.3	85.9		
1962	179.3	156.4	1.6	
1963	166.0	172.2	2.6	
1964	115.1	101.6	2.0	
1965	96.7	118.4	4.4	*
1966	115.1	100.5	12.9	.5
1967	133.3	118.5	25.7	.3
1968	96.3	130.9	13.4	.4
1969	100.5	108.8	27.7	.4
1970	92.2	116.6	33.6	3.4
1971	99.6			
Totals	3,232.0	2,964.7	150.5	5.2

^a Figures for 1949-1952 are from Richard D. Robinson, "Impact of American Programs," p. 24. Cumulative totals do not reflect the sum of annual commitments as programs were changed retroactively in some instances.

^b Figures for 1950 and 1951 do not appear to reflect earlier programs, hence may understate deliveries.

^c Surplus equipment delivered to the Turks, who paid only transportation costs. The value shown here is 33 percent of the original acquisition value.

* Less than \$50,000. In years prior to 1966 a total of \$200,000 worth of

SOURCE: G. Harris, op. cit., p.155.

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