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The French tradition in pragmatics: From structuralism to cognitivism

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Abstract

The following paper provides an overview of the origins of the French tradition in pragmatics (FTP). This linguistic tradition originated in the French structuralist paradigm, mainly in the work of Saussure and Benveniste. This contribution presents a general survey of the work of one of the most famous French pragmaticists, Oswald Ducrot. Ducrot's work on argumentative scale, presupposition, negation, and polyphony are all explored. According to Ducrot, the general comprehension procedure of an utterance is called Y-Theory, and belongs to what is known as "integrated pragmatics" (pragmatics integrated with semantics). His way of describing and explaining meaning is similar to Gricean pragmatics in terms of his usage of discourse rules, which are equivalent to Grice's maxims of conversation. However, the design of the general comprehension procedure defines FTP as a framework belonging to a different scientific paradigm. The paper concludes with a section on the relationship between current work on pragmatic markers originating in FTP (connectives, referential expressions, prepositions, tenses) and the new lexical pragmatic framework developed by Deirdre Wilson and Robyn Carston within relevance theory.

1. Introduction

The question has been raised whether there is such a thing as a separate French tradition in pragmatics (FTP). To deny its existence would deny the relevance and interest of a semantic-pragmatic French paradigm that is, as we shall see, indirectly connected to the current mainstream in pragmatics. The view that there is no FTP is difficult to justify because French pragmatics includes research programs, reviews, textbooks, workshops, and special issues of international journals.¹ Moreover, all contributors

of this special issue have been educated in FTP, so the denial of such a tradition would be non-sense.

An affirmative position is preferable, but it should be elaborated and defended with substantive arguments. The purpose of this paper is to propose a plausible approach to the origin, content, and future of FTP. The FTP approach that will be presented is not a classical historical perspective, but an epistemological one. I will try to show how FTP originates from the mainstream of French linguistics, and suggest an answer to the following question: Why is the Gricean tradition of pragmatics almost totally ignored by French linguists?

As a final introductory remark, I would like to emphasize the subjective and personal nature of this contribution. My intellectual and professional age coincides with the emergence of FTP. As a witness and then a contributor to FTP, the way in which I will present and discuss this tradition cannot be distinguished from my personal experience in and contributions to the domain of pragmatics.

This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the basic concepts in French linguistics from which FTP has emerged. Sections 3 and 4 give a first empirical set of examples from which FTP has emerged, data which are mainly linked to presupposition, semantic scales, and negation. Section 5 draws conclusions based on empirical data about a theory of language use. Section 6 further develops theoretical issues defining FTP, mainly TAL (theory of argumentation in language) and TP (theory of polyphony). Finally, section 7 will draw conclusions based on these theories, and make some proposals for a future integration of the positive contribution of FTP in a general pragmatic and cognitive framework.

2. Theoretical and conceptual origins of FTP

French linguistics was mainly influenced by the continental structuralist tradition that originated in the work of Ferdinand de Saussure (Saussure 1978; see Ducrot 1968 for a general overview). One of the most influential consequences of Saussure's work was an internal view of language. His famous distinction between *langue* and *parole*, where *langue* is defined as a structured system of signs (*signes*) whose components are the *signifié* (concept) and the *signifiant* (acoustic image), resulted in a radical separation between language and reality. According to Saussure, a language is not a repertory of word-object pairs, but a set of meaning-form pairs. This definition of language, which does not greatly differ from the classical definition of language given by generative linguistics (Hauser, Chomsky & Fitch 2002),² has become widespread and has generated a radical

separation between linguistics and philosophy. From a structuralist point of view (Hjelmslev 1971), linguistic meaning has no connection with the world. One famous example (Hjelmslev 1971: 113) involves a systematic comparison between languages and the words used to denote the same concept (wood), illustrating a “lack of congruence”:

Table 1. *Comparison of lexical system for the concept “wood”*

French	German	Danish
<i>arbre</i>	<i>Baum</i>	<i>træ</i>
<i>bois</i>	<i>Holtz</i>	
	<i>forêt</i>	<i>Wald</i>

The conclusion drawn by Hjelmslev (1971: 114) is that “the constitutive relation of sign, the semiotic function constitutive of language, changes from one state of language to another, and thus the structure of content as well as the structure of expression differs according to the observed states of language.” This argument had a very strong impact on semantics from a structuralist point of view: meaning (that is, the structure of content) is dependent on the structure of expression, which implies that if languages have different lexical sub-systems, they should differ in the structure of their content. In other words, the division of reality in different languages results in a correspondingly varied division of meaning. Thus, no precise comparison can be made between languages. In other words, languages merely consist of expressions correlated to meanings and not of words to objects.

During the 1950s and the 1960s, research in semantics was significantly modified by Emile Benveniste, another structuralist linguist. Benveniste (1966; 1974) originated a unifying trend among all French linguistic schools of thought for forty years: the *théorie de l'énonciation* (literally, the “theory of uttering”). Benveniste’s work was crucially linked to a new structuralist view of language. The fifth part of the first volume of *Problèmes de linguistique générale (L’homme dans la langue)* introduced the main topics that the FTP paradigm would develop, that is: the structure of personal pronouns, the structure of the temporal system, the expression of subjectivity, and the analysis of performative and delocutive verbs.

In his article “L’appareil formel de l’énonciation,” Benveniste summarized his ideas (1974: 79–88). He distinguished between the conditions of

use of forms and the conditions of use of language. The latter implies what he called *énonciation* (utterance as an act); that is, “the functioning of language through an individual act of uttering,” “the act of producing an utterance.” Different aspects of the act of uttering can be taken into account: (i) the vocal realization of language; (ii) the individual conversion of language to discourse; and (iii) the formal frame of its relations. As the first point is not relevant here, I will concentrate on the other two.

The second aspect concerned the “semantization of language”; that is, the way in which meaning is “formed in words.” It is a surprising fact that Benveniste’s terms are very close to Chomsky’s: “‘Transformational grammar’ aims to codify [the linguistic forms of utterance] and to formalize them in a permanent frame, and from a theory of universal syntax, proposes to link the latter with the functioning of the mind” (Benveniste 1974: 81).

The third aspect of the utterance act is what Benveniste calls its formal frame. This implies the necessary condition of the uttering act. Three factors define the formal frame of utterance: (i) the emergence of the personal pronouns (first and second persons, *I* and *you*), referring respectively to the speaker and the addressee; (ii) the indices of ostension (*this*, *here*, etc.) implying a gesture designating the object “at the same time as the token of the term is spoken”; and (iii) the temporal forms, mainly the verb tenses, defined with respect to the EGO, which is the center of the act of utterance.

Benveniste gave a general account of how the personal pronoun system is organized. The relationships between the first, second, and third persons are based on two correlations, the personal correlation and the subjective one: the first person pronoun includes the features [+personal] and [+subjective], the second person pronoun includes [+personal] and [–subjective], and the third person pronoun includes [–personal] and [–subjective]. The first two persons are *indicators* (deictic pronouns), while the third personal pronouns are *substitutes* (anaphoric pronouns, or more precisely, non-persons). This relationship can be schematized as follows (Moeschler & Reboul 1994: 82):




Figure 1. Benveniste’s personal pronouns system

One of the implications of this analysis is the restriction of subjectivity in language to the first person. But Banfield's (1982) and Reboul's (1992) analyses of fiction have showed that subjectivity can be expressed by the third or even the second person: the first case is represented by free reported speech and the second by examples of *skaz* ("discourse" in Russian).

The second aspect of the theory of uttering act can be illustrated by Benveniste's analysis of the French temporal system; namely, the way in which French is organized in terms of verb tenses. The classical view of tenses in French is directly linked to the opposition between simple vs. compound forms, such as *présent* (present) vs. *passé composé* (perfect), *imparfait* (imperfect) vs. *plus-que-parfait* (pluperfect), *passé simple* (preterit) vs. *passé antérieur* (past anterior), *futur* (future) vs. *futur antérieur* (future perfect), *conditionnel* (conditional) vs. *conditionnel passé* (conditional perfect). Benveniste demonstrated that the distribution of tenses is correlated to the distribution of personal pronouns, and depends on two layers of uttering: the historical level, or story (*histoire*), and the discourse (*discours*). The historical level is "the mode of uttering excluding any autobiographical linguistic form," and has as its main tenses the aoristic (*passé simple*), the imperfect, the conditional, and the pluperfect; first person pronouns and present tense are excluded. The discourse level can use every tense and person, except the aoristic. This level implies the presence of a speaker and an addressee. The distribution of tenses and persons at these two levels follows:

Table 2. *Distribution of French tenses*

	Tenses	Persons
Story	<i>passé simple</i> (preterit)	*1 st person
	<i>imparfait</i> (imperfect)	2 nd person
	<i>conditionnel</i> (conditional)	3 rd person
	<i>plus-que-parfait</i> (pluperfect)	
Discourse	<i>présent</i> (present)	1 st person
	<i>passé composé</i> (perfect)	2 nd person
	<i>futur</i> (future)	3 rd person
	<i>imparfait</i> (imperfect)	
	<i>plus-que-parfait</i> (pluperfect)	
	<i>conditionnel</i> (conditional)	
	* <i>passé simple</i> (preterit)	

The first conclusion of Benveniste's approach is that the organization of the linguistic system is not autonomous, but has a function correlated to two levels of uttering represented by the *story* and the *discourse*. Even

if this approach is functional, it is not functional in the modern sense (Newmeyer 2002). Indeed, functionalist explanations try to explain linguistic changes through a pressure of communication on linguistic structure, which gives rise to a general process called *grammaticalization*. In a very restricted sense, Benveniste proposed to explain the changes of forms and functions in diachrony by a much more restricted concept: “delocutivity” (*délocutivité*). This concept explicates how meaning in usage must be associated with the lexical item as part of a structural and historical process.

Benveniste’s work is certainly the base of FTP. His linguistic theory is structural, in that it adopts the two main theses of Saussurian structuralism: (i) the independence of the form relative to the substance (linguistic form is an autonomous system of internal dependencies, a structure; Hjelmslev 1968); (ii) the independence of language with respect to reality. This second thesis is one of the major components of continental structuralism, which, like Saussure, defines a linguistic sign as the correlation of a signifier (*signifiant*) or acoustic image, and a signified (*signifié*) or concept. Therefore, language is not a system connecting words and objects, as the formal tradition of philosophy argues (Quine 1960). This separation between language and the world had a very strong impact on the study of meaning in the continental structuralist tradition. The thesis of independence of language logically results in the thesis of independence of meaning: meaning is not outside language, or as Bach (1989) defined it, “something which is not language,” but in the words. This ontological separation between language and reality is at the core of the cultural conflict between English pragmatics and FTP. In classical FTP, any discussion related to the possible link between language and reality is outside the scope of linguistics, except when language creates reality, as in performative utterances (Austin 1962; Searle 1969). Thus, any traditional question of language use falls either in the domain of sociology (Bourdieu 1982), or in the domain of psychoanalysis (Milner 1978; Authier-Revuz 1995).

I believe that this conceptual background of FTP is at the core of the current state of FTP: apart from exceptions like the works of François Récanati, Dan Sperber, and Anne Reboul, French pragmaticists are mainly anti-realist and outside the Gricean paradigm. The consequence of this conceptual substratus also explains why pragmatics has been trapped in the analysis of speech acts and has turned to discourse analysis. Before the first translations of the works of Austin and Searle (Austin 1970; Searle 1972), French structuralism gave rise to derivative structuralist paradigms: literary structuralism (Barthes 1966), literary semiotics (Greimas 1966), political discourse analysis (Pêcheux 1975), Marxist socio-linguistics (Marcellesi 1971; Marcellesi & Gardin 1974), lexical semantics

(Rastier 1987), and textual linguistics (Adam 1990). All these approaches to language are pre-Gricean and structuralist, in that they try to capture meaning solely through the linguistic code.

What I would now like to discuss is the linguistic school influenced by Benveniste's work; that is, what Ducrot called "integrated pragmatics" (*pragmatique intégrée*). His approach treated several issues: presupposition, speech acts, connectives, argumentation, and "polyphony" (*polyphonie*). I have chosen to dedicate the next sections of this paper to Ducrot's approach because he was the only French linguist in the domain of semantics³ who was influenced by analytical philosophy, and because almost all French pragmatics research is based on his work.

3. Presupposition and discourse rules

We will begin with presupposition. In a very important book, which was the starting point of Ducrot's program in semantics,⁴ the author defined a new concept of presupposition. Presupposition is no longer defined as a condition of content, nor as a condition of use. It should be recalled that in the logical definition of presupposition (Frege, Russell), presupposition is the part of the content of the sentence that must be true: if the sentence is to be either true or false, its presupposition must be true. If the presupposition is false, the sentence is false (Russell) or cannot be used; the question of its truth or falsehood is a non-sense (Strawson).

On the contrary, in Ducrot's view, presupposition plays a crucial role at the level of discourse and not at the level of truth or falsehood. In other words, presupposition is a condition for the coherence of discourse. Ducrot attributes three discourse functions to presupposition:

- (i) Presuppositions are preserved in question-answer pairs;
- (ii) They ensure redundancy in discourse;
- (iii) They are external to the connection between utterances.

The first function is a well-known property of presupposition pointed out by Jackendoff (1972) thirty years ago in his focus-presupposition distinction. Whereas (1) is a well-formed question-answer pair (the question and its answer share a common presupposition), (2) is not, because its parts do not share common presupposition:

- (1) A: *Does John write poetry?*
B: *No, Paul does (write poetry).*
- (2) A: *Does John write poetry?*
B: *?? No, Paul writes narratives.*

The second property of presupposition is called “isotopy” (*isotopie*) according to structural analysis of discourse (Greimas 1966; Rastier 1987). According to Ducrot, a well-formed discourse must satisfy a “condition of progress” (*condition de progrès*), which ensures an increase of the amount of information as the discourse progresses, and a “condition of coherence” (*condition de cohérence*), which is responsible for a certain amount of redundancy in discourse. If one of these conditions is not met, discourse is not coherent, as in examples (3) and (4):

- (3) ?? *Max is a bachelor. He is not married.*⁵
 (4) ?? *Some friends are coming to dinner. Calderon was a great writer.*⁶

It is the third function of presupposition that is the new element in the description of this semantic phenomenon. According to Ducrot, a discourse connection must bind a new utterance to the asserted content, not to the presupposed one. This principle is called the “sequencing rule” (*loi d'enchaînement*).⁷ Examples (5) and (6) illustrate this contrast:

- (5) *Jean ne mange plus de caviar au petit déjeuner, parce qu'il doit payer ses impôts.*
 ‘John no longer eats caviar for breakfast, because he has to pay his taxes.’
 (6) ?? *Jean ne mange plus de caviar au petit déjeuner, donc il en mangeait autrefois.*
 ‘John no longer eats caviar for breakfast, so he used to eat it.’

What appears in this description of presupposition is that a classical semantic problem is treated at a discourse level. This strategy was applied systematically in the description of negation.

4. Semantic scales, negation and presupposition

Ducrot’s analysis of negation is representative of one crucial aspect of FTP methodology: the explanation of a semantic phenomenon (in this case, negation) through discourse principles or rules.⁸ To describe the pragmatic effect of negation, called argumentation, Ducrot introduced five discourse rules: the negation rule, the argumentative reversal rule, the weakness rule, the lowering rule, and the exhaustivity rule.

1. **Negation rule:** If an argument p belongs to an argumentative class determined by a conclusion r , that is, if utterance p is an argument for r , then utterance $non-p$ will be an argument for $non-r$. This rule is a pragmatic one, since there is no logical rule connecting ($p \rightarrow q$) to ($non-p \rightarrow non-q$). If (7) is an acceptable argument, so is (8):

- (7) *Max est intelligent: il a réussi ses examens.*
 ‘Max is intelligent: he passed his exam.’
- (8) *Max n’est pas intelligent: il n’a pas réussi ses examens.*
 ‘Max is not intelligent: he did not pass his exam.’

2. **Argumentative reversal rule:** This rule states that the scale of a negative utterance is the reverse of a positive one. For instance, if p' is a stronger argument than p in order to conclude r , then $non-p$ is stronger than $non-p'$ for $non-r$, which is illustrated in Figure 2:




Figure 2. *The argumentative reversal rule*

For example, if having an HDR degree (p') is a better argument than having a Ph.D. degree (p) for a conclusion r —for instance, to be better qualified for a tenure-track position—the inverse relation holds for the opposite conclusion:

- (9) a. *Max a une thèse de doctorat, et même une thèse d’habilitation (HDR).*
 ‘Max has a Ph.D., and even an HDR.’
- b. *Max n’a pas de HDR, ni même de thèse de doctorat.*
 ‘Max doesn’t have a HDR, nor even a Ph.D.’

3. **Weakness rule:** This rule states that if p is a weak argument for r , in some circumstances p can be an argument for $non-r$. If a speaker tries to convince his audience that a theater ticket is cheap, he can use either a positive or a negative utterance (*the seat costs 10 euros* or *the seat does not cost 10 euros*):

- (10) a. *Tu ne te ruineras pas: la place coûte 10 euros.*
 ‘You don’t have to spend very much, the seat costs 10 euros.’
- b. *Tu ne te ruineras pas: la place ne coûte pas 10 euros.*
 ‘You don’t have to spend very much, the seat does not cost 10 euros.’

4. **The lowering law:** This rule explains why descriptive negation means “less than.” So (11) means (12) and not (13):

- (11) *Il ne fait pas froid ici.*
‘It’s not cold in here.’
- (12) *Il fait chaud ici.*
‘It’s warm in here.’
- (13) *Il fait plus que froid.*
‘It’s more than cold in here.’

5. **Exhaustivity rule:** This rule is an argumentative counterpart of the Gricean first maxim of quantity (which requires the speaker to give the strongest information). According to Ducrot, the argumentative use of this rule obliges the speaker to use the most informative utterance; that is, the strongest one. This explains why a speaker who wants to convey that the temperature is pleasant will not say (14), but (15) or (16):

- (14) ?? *La température est agréable: il ne fait pas très froid ici.*
‘The temperature is pleasant: It’s not awfully cold in here.’
- (15) *La température est agréable: il ne fait pas froid ici.*
‘The temperature is pleasant: It’s not cold in here.’
- (16) *La température est agréable: il ne fait pas frais ici.*
‘The temperature is pleasant: It’s not warm in here.’

According to the lowering rule, (14) should be a better argument for a positive conclusion than (15). By contrast, the exhaustivity rule requires the speaker to give the strongest argument, that is, (15).

What are the implications of these examples and Ducrot’s list of discourse rules? The conclusion is that the description of a single semantic phenomenon, negation, triggers a series of discourse rules, each $n+1$ rule correcting the previous n rules. The increasing set of discourse rules requires an explanation. Does it satisfy any empirical test, and does it have any theoretical consistency? I will give a positive answer to these questions, but I will also emphasize the theoretical cost of such assumptions.

The first question (the empirical issue) receives a positive answer because discourse rules explain counterexamples of new data. For instance, the role of the exhaustivity rule is to eliminate one implication of the lowering rule. The weakness rule explains counterexamples of the argumentative reversal rule, and so forth. But this has a cost, known as “theoretical cost.” I will give a classic example of this result, which is connected to a pair of argumentative markers to which Ducrot referred throughout his career: the opposition between *peu* (little) and *un peu* (a little).

The basic insight in Ducrot’s work is that the opposition between *peu* and *un peu* is neither a quantitative nor a modal one. The quantitative interpretation would claim that the opposition between (17a) and (17b) is a

question of quantity: the speaker has drunk less when he describes the situation (a) than when he describes the situation (b):

- (17) a. *J'ai bu peu de vin.*
 'I drank little wine.'
 b. *J'ai bu un peu de vin.*
 'I drank a little wine.'

In (18), the quantitative reading is inappropriate, therefore the interpretation is known as modal:

- (18) a. *Cette situation est peu gênante.*
 'This situation is not very embarrassing.'
 b. *Cette situation est un peu gênante.*
 'This situation is a little embarrassing.'

In both readings, there should be a quantitative or modal scale represented as in Figure 3:




Figure 3. *Quantitative scales*

Ducrot objected to this analysis, because it does not capture the argumentative properties of *peu* and *un peu*: *peu* is negatively oriented, and *un peu* is positively oriented. These properties are illustrated in the contrast of (19) and (20):

- (19) a. *Max semble devenir sobre: il a bu peu de vin hier soir.*
 'Max appears to be sobering up: he drank little wine last evening.'
 b. *Max semble devenir moins sobre: il a pu un peu de vin hier soir.*
 'Max appears to be becoming less sober: he drank a little wine last evening.'
- (20) a. ?? *Max semble devenir sobre: il a bu un peu de vin hier soir.*
 'Max appears to be sobering up: he drank a little wine last evening.'
 b. ?? *Max semble devenir moins sobre: il a bu peu de vin hier soir.*
 'Max appears to be becoming less sober: he drank little wine last evening.'

If we accept (and this is Ducrot's main point) that drinking wine is an argument for the conclusion that someone is becoming less sober and not drinking wine is an argument for the conclusion that someone is becoming sober, then the behavior of (19) allows *peu* to be associated with a negative orientation, and *un peu* to a positive one. Therefore the quantitative scale in Figure 3 must be split into two argumentative scales (an argumentative scale being an ordered set of arguments for a set of conclusions):




Figure 4. *Peu and un peu argumentative scales*

Here, *un peu* and *peu* are located on both scales in a weak position. Therefore the argumentative analysis predicts that *un peu* and *peu* will introduce weak arguments for different sets of conclusions defined by their polarity (respectively positive and negative).⁹

Ducrot proposed another analysis that captures this difference of polarity. His analysis is based on the difference between semantic and pragmatic presuppositions.¹⁰ The definitions of semantic and pragmatic presupposition given by Ducrot are as follows:

- (i) **semantic presupposition:** q is a semantic presupposition of p if p and $\text{non-}p$ imply q ¹¹;
- (ii) **pragmatic presupposition:** q is a pragmatic presupposition if, by uttering p , the speaker implies q , and if he supposes his addressee has enough information allowing to derive q from the utterance.

In Ducrot's terms, a semantic presupposition is derived from the linguistic component, whereas a pragmatic presupposition derives from the rhetorical component (see section 5).

How do these contrasts elucidate the difference between *peu* and *un peu*?

- (a) Let us call the utterance *Max a bu du vin hier soir* ('Max drank wine last evening') *a* and the utterance *Max a bu peu de vin hier soir* ('Max drank little wine last evening') *A*. The description is the following: *A* presupposes what *a* asserts, and asserts that the quantity of wine is small.
- (b) Let us call the utterance *Max a bu un peu de vin* ('Max drank a little wine last evening') *B*. In this instance, *B* asserts that *a* is the case, and restricts the quantity of wine that has been drunk. This restriction implies a small quantity of wine.

One way to confirm this analysis is as follows: if we complete an utterance containing *peu* vs. *un peu* by *même* (even), we obtain the following results:

- (21) a. *Max a bu peu de vin hier soir, il n'en a même pas bu du tout.*
 'Max drank little wine last evening, he didn't even drink at all.'
 b. ?? *Max a bu un peu de vin hier soir, il n'en a même pas bu du tout.*
 'Max drank a little wine last evening, he didn't even drink at all.'
- (22) a. *Max a bu un peu de vin hier soir, il en a même bu beaucoup.*
 'Max drank a little wine last evening, he even drank a lot.'
 b. ?? *Max a bu peu de vin hier soir, il en a même bu beaucoup.*
 'Max drank little wine last evening, he even drank a lot.'

So *peu* is compatible with "none at all," and *un peu* with "a lot." This confirms the hypothesis that *peu* is negatively oriented, whereas *un peu* is positively oriented.

What are the advantages of Ducrot's analysis? The first advantage is to allow the descriptions of *peu* and *un peu* to be compatible with the use of discourse rules. Ducrot's general system stipulates that the semantic description does not have to take into account all pragmatic effects derived from the use of discourse rules. Two discourse rules are relevant here: the litotes rule and the exhaustivity rule.

Litotes rule: say as little as you need.

Exhaustivity rule: say the most you can.¹²

Ducrot claims that if a speaker utters (23) in case he has a lot of money, he could not be reproached for having lied, but for having implicated a limited interpretation through the exhaustivity rule, whereas in (24) there is no contradiction in saying that a book is of little interest when it is not interesting at all, *via* the litotes rule:

- (23) *J'ai un peu d'argent sur moi.*
 'I have a little money on me.'
 (24) *Ce livre est peu intéressant.*
 'This book is of little interest.'

The first advantage of the presuppositionalist analysis of *peu/un peu* is therefore to make it compatible with the general discourse rule approach. The second advantage is to explain relevant phenomena that would remain unexplained according to classic (quantitative) analysis.

Here is a very good example of such a phenomenon: (25) implicates (26), which is not the case with (27). In other words, the use of *peu* triggers a pragmatic presupposition that is not triggered by *un peu*:

- (25) *Max a bu peu de vin blanc.*
 'Max drank little white wine.'
 (26) *Max a bu autre chose que du vin blanc (du vin rouge, par exemple).*
 'Max drank something other than white wine (for instance, red wine).'
 (27) *Max a bu un peu de vin blanc.*
 'Max drank a little white wine.'

A precise presuppositionalist analysis of (25) and (27), given in (28) and (29), is as follows:

- (28) Presupposition Max drank white wine.
 Assertion The amount of white wine was small.
 (29) Assertion Max drank at least a small amount of white wine.

The general strategy is to explain the pragmatic effect (26) through a discourse rule as well as the semantic description of *peu*. Ducrot called the discourse rule in question "the rule of economy in determination" (*loi d'économie de détermination*).

Rule of economy in determination: every specific determination introduced in the utterance must have informative content.

Here is the explanation: Let's let *A* be a sentence and *b* a determinative expression (the adjective *white* in *little white wine* and *a little white wine*). *b* has an informative value in *A* if one of the two conditions satisfied:

- (i) The addressee cannot conclude *A* from *A-b*.
 (ii) The speaker cannot guarantee the truth of *A-b*.

Discourse rules only apply to asserted contents, not to presupposed ones. Thus, if *A* contains an expression *b* that can be removed without changing the structure of the sentence, the rule of economy of

determination predicts that the use of *A* generally requires, and thus implicates, either that *A*–*b* is uncertain, or that the asserted information conveyed by *A* cannot be concluded from *A*–*b*. In (27), no pragmatic presupposition can be inferred (because the assertion *A* is not inferable from *A*–*b*), and the rule of economy of determination is satisfied. By contrast, in (25) the assertion *A* can be inferred from *A*–*b*, and condition (i) is not satisfied. Consequently, condition (ii) implies that the information ‘Max drank little wine’ cannot be inferred from saying ‘Max drank little white wine’: this information is merely a pragmatic presupposition (*sous-entendu* in Ducrot’s terms), which is compatible with its assertive content: Max can have drunk a small quantity of white wine or a lot of red wine too.

What are the conclusions of these analyses? It can be said that the framework of the description of meaning is very precise, but also very complex. This is known as a two-stage analysis, which Berrendonner (1981) referred to as the “Y-Theory.” I will now give a general picture of this theory.

5. Theoretical implications: Ideal discourse structuralism and integrated pragmatics

What is a Y-Theory? It looks like the letter Y. The left branch represents linguistic information, and the right one contextual information; the vertical line represents the result of the combined linguistic and contextual information. This analysis is typical of what is known as “integrated pragmatics” (*pragmatique intégrée*). The general picture of integrated pragmatics as a Y-Theory follows:




Figure 5. Y-Theory (Ducrot 1984, La description sémantique en linguistique)

This figure defines two stages of the utterance's description: the linguistic stage and the rhetorical (or pragmatic) stage. The opening input of this linguistic component is utterance *U*. At this point, it is necessary to introduce a very important distinction between a *sentence* and an *utterance*. A sentence is, according to Ducrot, an abstract unit, produced by a set of linguistic rules (a rewriting system of rules in classical generative grammar, for instance). As previously mentioned, an utterance is the result of an act of uttering by a speaker. Therefore, the opening input of the process of interpretation is an utterance. The semantic description yields a linguistic meaning (*signification*) that results from the linguistic component, while the rhetorical component, combined with information inherent in the situation, results in the contextualized sense of the utterance (*sens*).

Two questions arise from this semantic-pragmatic device: (i) what sort of information is contained in the description of linguistic meaning; and (ii) what exactly is the sense of an utterance?

(i) Linguistic meaning (*signification*) is defined in a highly original way by Ducrot: it is not equal to the literal meaning or to the sentence meaning of the utterance.¹³ Neither is it equal to the truth-conditional meaning, as it would be according to Grice (see Gazdar 1979 for an explicit version of the Gricean program). According to Ducrot, truth and inference are properties of propositions; that is, propositions are the basic units of logic, and have nothing to do with language. This anti-realist position is one of the consequences of the structuralist background of Ducrot's approach: a linguistic sign does not receive its meaning through the relation to the world, but *via* the arbitrary relation between the *signifiant* and the *signifié*. Linguistic meaning in Ducrot's view is fundamentally the result of a set of instructions carried by linguistic expressions. For instance, *un peu* contains as instruction to locate the utterance on an argumentative positive scale, and to signal that the argument is a weak one. In the discourse segment *X mais Y, mais* (but) contains the instruction to identify the semantic content *p* and *q* linked by *mais* (*p mais q*); to draw the conclusion *r* inferable through *p*; to draw the conclusion *non-r* from *q*; and to eliminate the conclusion *r*. For instance, the utterance (30) has as linguistic meaning (31):

(30) *Max est intelligent, mais paresseux.*

'Max is intelligent, but lazy.'

- (31) a. p (*Max is intelligent*) $\Rightarrow r$
 b. q (*Max is lazy*) $\Rightarrow non-r$
 c. p *mais* $q \Rightarrow non-r$

At this stage, there is no way to determine the value of *r* and *non-r*. This attribution (saturation of variables) results from both the rhetorical component and the situation.

(ii) The sense of *U* is defined as a pragmatic meaning because it results from the combination of an (a) instructional meaning, (b) discourse rules, and (c) information belonging to the situation. The first case is illustrated by the *mais* example: in a situation where the speaker and the addressee are arguing about the possible nomination of Max to a TA position in the Department of Linguistics, *r* would receive the value ‘Max is an eligible candidate’ and *non-r* the opposite proposition. Therefore the sense of utterance (30) would be (32):

- (32) a. (*Max is intelligent*) ⇒ Max is eligible for the TA position
 b. (*Max is lazy*) ⇒ Max is not eligible for the TA position
 c. (*Max is intelligent*) *mais* (*Max is lazy*) ⇒ Max is not eligible for the TA position

It should be noted that the description of *mais* predicts that the reversing order of *p* and *q* will make it possible to draw the opposite conclusion:

- (33) *Max est paresseux mais intelligent* (‘Max is lazy but intelligent’) ⇒ Max is eligible for the TA position

The second case is again illustrated by *un peu*. In (23), repeated here in (34), if the speaker uses (34) when in fact he has a lot of money on him, he cannot be accused of lying, because the sense of his utterance (35) differs from its linguistic meaning through the litotes rule:

- (34) *J’ai un peu d’argent sur moi.*
 ‘I have a little money on me.’
 (35) *J’ai beaucoup d’argent sur moi.*
 ‘I have a lot of money on me.’

I will now explain why this interpretive device is called “integrated pragmatics” (*pragmatique intégrée*), and what the object of integrated pragmatics is.

(a) **Integrated pragmatics:** Integrated pragmatics is a device that represents meaning as integrating conditions and effects of the use of utterances. In other words, integrated pragmatics implies that pragmatic meaning (*sens*) is contained within (or integrated with) semantics. This implies that from a linguistic point of view, the thing known as meaning (*signification*) contains the conditions of use of the utterance. A well-known Ducrot quote claims that meaning is an image of its utterance

act. What is surprising about this approach is that it should not contain, as suggested by Figure 5, any contextual information. But if we examine the function of *S* (the situation in which *U* is uttered), we can conclude that its only function is to saturate propositional variables and to check for any mismatch between linguistic meaning and the sense of the utterance. If any mismatch appears, the discourse rule will apply.¹⁴ In other words, the sense *is* the (argumentative) value, the function *is* the linguistic meaning and the situation *is* the argument, as in (36):

- (36) a. linguistic meaning (situation) = sense
 b. function (argument) = argumentative value

(b) **Structuralism of ideal discourse:** Although the general picture of integrated pragmatics is relatively clear (see Figure 5), its object is not easy to define. One of Ducrot's constant preoccupations was to explain contrasts such as those in (37 and 38):

- (37) a. *Catastrophe à Roissy: tous les passagers, sauf un, ont péri.*
 'Catastrophe at Roissy Airport: all passengers, except one, perished.'
 b. *Miracle à Roissy: un des passagers a pu être sauvé.*
 'Miracle at Roissy Airport: one passenger safe.'
- (38) a. ?? *Catastrophe à Roissy: un des passagers a pu être sauvé.*
 'Catastrophe at Roissy Airport: one passenger safe.'
 b. ?? *Miracle à Roissy: tous les passagers, sauf un, ont péri.*
 'Miracle at Roissy Airport: all passengers, except one, perished.'

The issue is why (37a) and (37b) are an appropriate discourse, whereas (38a) and (38b) are not. It is a curious fact that (37a) and (38a) contain the same information; that is, that all passengers except one perished, and this information is a catastrophe. The explanation given by Ducrot is that the correspondence in (37) between presupposition and assertion is good, whereas the presupposition is bad in (38). This is because (37a) presupposes that one passenger survived and (37b) asserts that one passenger survived, whereas (38a) asserts that one passenger survived and (38b) presupposes the same thing.

As previously mentioned, Ducrot claims that in discourse, the sequence of utterance *B* must be based on the asserted vs. presupposed content of utterance *A*. Therefore the sequencing rule is observed in (37), but violated in (38). What is interesting in this case is that sequencing rules and principles as well as discourse rules are formatted in such a way as to distinguish not only between truly well-formed and badly-formed discourses,

but between potentially well- and badly-formed discourses. In Ducrot's terminology, such well-formed discourse is called "ideal discourse." The object of integrated pragmatics, therefore, is not actual discourse, but ideal discourse. This explains why integrated pragmatics is not a theory of discourse, although it exercised an influence on many discourse analysis theories (for example, the Geneva model of discourse analysis, Roulet et al. 1985; Moeschler 2001, for a general overview; Moeschler 2002, for a critical analysis). In other words, ideal discourse is a by-product of linguistic instructions and discourse rules.

6. Empirical and theoretical implications

Ducrot's approach can therefore be called pragmatic in the sense of an integrated theory of meaning, but it is in fact principally a semantic theory of meaning, in that it is instructional, non-compositional, and non-truth-conditional. These properties have important consequences, both on the empirical and theoretical levels.

On the empirical level, the field of particles has been explored. That is, argumentative operators like *presque* (almost) and *à peine* (scarcely), quantifiers like *peu* (little) and *un peu* (a little), argumentative connectives like *mais* (but), *d'ailleurs* (moreover), *car* (for), *parce que* (because), *puisque* (since) (cf. respectively, Anscombe & Ducrot 1977; Ducrot et al. 1980: chaps. 3, 6; Groupe λ -1 1978). Only a little research has been carried out on the verbal lexicon and tenses, the exceptions being Récanati's book on performatives (Récanati 1981), the analysis of the performative verb *trouver* (to find) in expressions like *je trouve que* (I find that), and a highly original description of the French *imparfait* tense (respectively, Ducrot et al. 1980, chaps. 2, 3; Ducrot 1979). The area of French connectives has been one of the major topics in French pragmatics since the publication of *Les mots du discours* in 1980. Almost all French pragmaticists have published on this topic (Récanati 1982; Roulet et al. 1985; Cornulier 1985; Jayez 1988; Moeschler 1989; Rossari 2001; Luscher 2002).

At the theoretical level, integrated pragmatics has been the common ground for a number of sub-theories, the most important being the theory of argumentation in language (*théorie de l'argumentation dans la langue*, TAL) and the theory of polyphony (TP). I mentioned above a very general outline of the first version of TAL, known as the "theory of argumentative scales" (Ducrot 1980a), which was followed by a second version in the 1980s, the "theory of topoi" (*théorie des topoi*) (Anscombe 1995; Raccah 1996; Moeschler & Reboul 1994: chap. 11), and which has

now developed into the so-called “theory of semantic blocks” (*théorie des blocs sémantiques*) (Carel & Ducrot 1999; Carel 2004; Ducrot 2004).

Ducrot (1984) proposed TP as a general theory of meaning that was never explicitly connected to TAL and that defines meaning as a layer of voices—the author, the speaker, and the voice (*sujet parlant*, *locuteur*, and *énonciateur*, respectively). The idea that generated the theory of polyphony is that many voices can be expressed in an utterance, some of which are the speaker’s responsibility, some of which are not.

The first distinction between the author and the speaker can be illustrated by very particular use of the first person pronoun. In a circular letter signed by a parent as in (39), the person who signs and is responsible for his involvement in the matter is not the author of the letter:

(39) *I hereby authorize the student Axel Moeschler to go on a study visit to the Louvre.*

The second distinction is more precise and opposes the person responsible for the speech act (the speaker) against the voices included in his utterance. Negative utterances are thus the expression of two voices: the first voice, which belongs to the assertion, and the second, which belongs to the denial. Therefore, a speaker producing a negative utterance expresses two things, a positive proposition and a negative one, and is only responsible for the second one. A classic example of polyphonic negation follows:

(40) *Il ne pleut pas.*

‘It isn’t raining.’

(41) Voice 1: *il pleut* (it is raining)

Voice 2: *il ne pleut pas* (it isn’t raining)

S is responsible for Voice 2

It is not unreasonable to assert that TAL and TP had a very strong influence on French linguistics, mainly in semantic and pragmatic studies. This is still occurring, as a recent book edited by Laurent Perrin (2006) shows. Nevertheless, the influence of FTP has progressively decreased, and I will now explain how and why.

7. From structural pragmatics to cognitive pragmatics


Integrated pragmatics is a semantic theory rather than a pragmatic one. Two facts explain why. First, the difference of levels between linguistic meaning and pragmatic meaning is not motivated by a procedure based on pragmatic principles, equivalent to the Principle of Cooperation

(Grice 1975) or the Principle of Relevance (Sperber & Wilson 1995). The use of discourse rules is simply a matter of consistent interpretation; that is, a way of yielding a possible interpretation in situation S. The use of the litotes rule for the interpretation of (34) is a good illustration. Second, from the theoretical and descriptive points of view, the main thrust is not the derivation of pragmatics effects (for instance, the computation of implicatures), but the formulation of semantic instructions of linguistic markers responsible for pragmatic interpretation. Semantic value is thus a general template that must be filled by contextual or situational information. Consequently the economy of the description is not, as in Gricean and neo-Gricean strategies, a minimalist semantic description, but rather a rich and complete semantic one. The pragmatic procedure therefore depends on limiting possible interpretation in order to yield appropriate readings.

The question of economy of descriptions is thus subject to its empirical field. In analyzing connectives like *mais* and *d'ailleurs* (Ducrot et al. 1980), Ducrot and his colleagues tried to show how a general semantic template must be modified in order to produce appropriate interpretations. One of the consequences, which is generally evaluated as a positive one, is that these general templates yield unpredictable and new readings of texts in which such markers appear (see Ducrot 1980b for a good illustration). However, one of the limitations of this theory is the derivation of simple descriptive usage as a consequence of the argumentative value of lexical items. For instance, a subjective adjective like *intelligent* receives its descriptive meaning as a consequence of its argumentative usage. Generally speaking, *intelligent* is used in positive argumentations, and receives a descriptive meaning from its argumentative uses. The general formula described in integrated pragmatics is as follows:

Argumentative use > descriptive meaning.

This theory provides a further illustration of the basic assumptions claiming that semantic meaning is not truth-conditional, but argumentative. Furthermore, it implies that semantic scales are not a property of lexical items that organize the whole procedure allowing for the derivation of Q-implicatures (Gazdar 1979; Horn 1972, 1984, 1988, 2004; Levinson 1983, 2000), but an epiphenomenon of argumentative properties. For instance, there is no quantitative scale such as $\langle \textit{certain, probable, possible} \rangle$, but rather an argumentative scale such as in Figure 6 where the addition of *même* (*even*) shows the argumentative force relationship: *même* introduces a stronger argument, not a weaker one, as illustrated in (42) and (43):

Figure 6. *Argumentative scale for certain, probable, and possible*

- (42) a. *C'est possible, et même probable.*
'It's possible, and even probable.'
b. *C'est probable, et même certain.*
'It's probable, and even certain.'
- (43) a. ?? *C'est probable, et même possible.*
'It's probable, and even possible.'
b. ?? *C'est certain, et même probable.*
'It's certain, and even probable.'

The relationship between the argumentative value of a lexical item and its descriptive value is the result of a (diachronic) process that Benveniste called delocutivity. In this process, a lexical item receives its value when it is uttered, as in delocutive expression like (44a–d):

- (44) a. *un je-m'en-foutiste* = someone who says: "*je m'en fous!*" ('I don't care!')
b. *un m'as-tu vu* = someone who says: "*m'as-tu vu (dans X)?*" ('did you notice me [in X]?')
c. *une sainte-ni-touche* = someone who says: "*ni touche pas!*" ('don't touch me!')
d. *une Marie-couche-toi-là* = someone to whom one says: "*Marie, couche-toi là!*" ('Mary, go to bed!')

Although this process is clearly at the origin of the meaning of performative verbs (see Anscombre & Ducrot 1983), it is doubtful whether it is a general process applicable to any lexical item (see Moeschler & Reboul 1994, chap. 14, for the discussion of the consequence of the delocutivity hypothesis on the semantic description of subjective terms), because the conclusion would then be that the attribution of a semantic property to a lexical item is caused by the mere act of uttering.

Although some of the claims of integrated pragmatics seem overly strong and generate empirical, diachronic and theoretical difficulties, it is still true that Ducrot's research has had a crucial influence on empirical and theoretical research in French pragmatics. This type of research began twenty years ago at Geneva, and was based the framework of a cognitive approach to pragmatics; that is, Relevance Theory. The empirical

domains investigated were mainly referential expressions (Reboul 1994, 1998), argumentative connectives (Luscher 2002), tenses and temporal expressions (Moeschler 1994; Moeschler et al. 1998; Saussure 2003; Tahara 2004), causality (Reboul 2003; Moeschler 2003), and spatial prepositions (Asic forthcoming). All this research has in common the assumption that the semantics of non-descriptive expressions (pronouns, connectives, tenses, prepositions) is minimalist, and that the rich and varied meanings they acquire in discourse are the result of a by-product of minimal semantics as well as a process of enrichment whose content is specific and different from one marker to another.

The crucial issue at the present time in the semantic-pragmatic interface is therefore taking a new direction compatible with the major theoretical approaches in pragmatics; that is, neo-Gricean and post-Gricean approaches. To give a very simple example, the use of *maintenant* (now) with the French *imparfait* tense is described as one of its interpretive uses, representing not an event but the representation of the representation of an event, such as the point of view of an agent/perceiver (a character in a literary style). The variety of uses of these expressions (often called procedural) is no longer the effect of polysemy, but the result of different types of enrichment. For instance, the forward, inclusive or backward reading of the French *passé simple* tense depends on the accessibility of relevant information concerning the nature of the event as well as encyclopedic knowledge. As a final example, the argumentative use of *mais* is one of the possible contrasts a proposition can entertain with another one.

The original goal of this new research program was to argue for a very fine-grained pragmatic description of some of the most highly varied linguistic items; that is, lexical items encoding not only conceptual information (information about concepts, with very rich encyclopedic entries) but also procedural information (information about the way of processing conceptual information). As mentioned above, this research proceeded in the same direction as the lexical pragmatics research of Deirdre Wilson and Robyn Carston (Wilson 2003; Carston 2002), and offered new insights on extremely well-known data. Another major benefit of integrated pragmatics is to have generated many new issues for the semantic-pragmatic interface, as well as very precise intuitions about how language works in usage.

Acknowledgments

This article is dedicated to Charles Fillmore, who wished he could have had a crash course on Ducrot's theory when we first met in 1985 at

Berkeley. Twenty years later, I am pleased to offer him this modest contribution. The author thanks Marcia Hadjimarkos for her patience and care in revising this paper.

Notes

1. Roulet et al. 1985 and Moeschler et al. 1994 and 1998 are examples of publications accounting for the main results of the research project by the Swiss National Scientific Foundation; The Cahiers de Linguistique Française (Geneva) and the Semantic and Pragmatic Review (Orléans) are Swiss and French international publications; the *Dictionnaire encyclopédique de pragmatique* by Jacques Moeschler and Anne Reboul (1994); the nine Geneva Pragmatic Workshops (*Colloques de Pragmatique de Genève*); special issues in *Argumentation* and *Journal of Pragmatics*, and so forth.
2. The main difference is that generative linguistics defines a language as a set of rules, and not as a set of signs.
3. The major exception is Gilles Fauconnier's work (e.g., Fauconnier 1984). Nevertheless, Fauconnier was influenced by generative grammar and cognitive linguistics.
4. There is a true ambiguity as to whether Ducrot's research program belongs to semantics or to pragmatics. He often claimed to be a semanticist, but his semantics is directly linked to language usage and uttering acts. It is not surprising that he called his research program "integrated pragmatics" (*pragmatique intégrée*), that is, pragmatics integrated within semantics.
5. A pragmatic analysis would claim that the explicature of the second utterance strengthens the implicature of the first one, and that the discourse is not a tautology.
6. This example receives an appropriate coherent interpretation, if the second sentence is an explanation of the first. In Moeschler et al. (2006), we argue that the causal reading is processed more rapidly when no strong association relates the two sentences.
7. This rule is the first of a series of discourse rules belonging to Ducrot's theory known as "structuralism of idealized discourse" (*structuralisme du discours idéal*). It does not mean that such rules cannot be violated, but that an ideal discourse should respect them. The concept of idealized discourse is equivalent to grammaticality at the sentence level.
8. The analysis of negation corresponds to the analysis of descriptive negation, having neither wide scope nor metalinguistic effects (negation of presupposition or negation of implicature); see Moeschler 1992.
9. It should be noted here that as these are weak arguments, the lowering rules should apply to rule out the argumentative orientation. In this case, (i) and (ii) should be equally acceptable:
 - (i) *Tu ne te ruïneras pas: la place coûte un peu d'argent.*
'You don't have to spend very much, the seat costs a little money.'
 - (ii) *Tu ne te ruïneras pas: la place coûte peu d'argent.*
'You don't have to spend very much, the seat costs little money.'
 Nevertheless, if *peu* and *un peu* modify oriented adjective like *cher* (expensive), the lowering rule does not work and produces strange results:
 - (iii) ?? *Tu ne te ruïneras pas: la place est un peu chère.*
'You don't have to spend very much, the seat is a little expensive.'
 - (iv) *Tu ne te ruïneras pas: la place est peu chère.*
'You don't have to spend very much, the seat is little expensive.'

10. I propose translating the original difference between *presupposé* and *sous-entendu* in terms of “semantic presupposition” and “pragmatic presupposition.”
11. Ducrot’s terminology is: “*q* is conserved.”
12. These rules are very similar to Horn’s R-principle and the Q-principle (Horn 1984, 1988).
13. Recall that in Searle’s theory (Searle 1979), literal meaning is the by-product of linguistic information and background assumptions.
14. The question addressed by Cornulier (1984) is the *ad hoc* status of discourse rule. To avoid this issue, he proposed a minimalist approach of discourse rules; see Moeschler & Reboul 1994: 294–299 for a synthesis.

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