

The Future U.S. Military Presence in Europe

**Forces and Requirements for
the Post–Cold War Era**

Richard L. Kugler

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PREFACE

Research for this Report was begun on October 3, 1990, the day Germany unified. Final writing was completed on February 1, 1992, the day President Bush and Russian President Yeltsin met at Camp David to call for a new era of partnership. Both dates are auspicious, for during the intervening months, epochal changes occurred at a blinding speed, transforming Europe even beyond the monumental upheavals of 1989–1990. A major war was fought in the Persian Gulf, the Soviet state was dissolved, and a new democratic Commonwealth of Independent States was declared. These changes raised the prospect of a hopeful future, but this period also saw disturbing events, including a bitter civil war in Yugoslavia, fighting in Georgia and Azerbaijan, mounting tensions between Russia and Ukraine, and signs of fissures in both NATO and the European Community. During this period, the much-heralded post–Cold War era was launched, and it got off to a shaky start toward an uncertain future.

These contradictory trends, unfolding so dramatically in such a short period of time, raise profound questions about Europe's future. Is Europe headed toward an era of enduring peace, or is it drifting toward fragmentation and chaos, which would create entirely new and worrisome dangers? And what about the nearby Middle East and Persian Gulf? The disturbing fact that these questions are difficult to answer underscores the need to think hard and clearly about the future U.S. military presence in Europe. Because the threat of a NATO-Warsaw Pact war has passed into history, the large U.S. posture maintained to underwrite containment and deterrence during the Cold War can now be reduced appreciably. Yet the U.S. forces that remain in Europe will have an important effect on developments within the Western alliance and on European security affairs as a whole. Especially because uncertainty and possible turbulence lie ahead in Europe and nearby regions, the size and nature of the U.S. posture left behind are an important policy choice that must be made wisely.

This study, which addresses the future U.S. military presence in Europe, was prepared for the U.S. European Command (EUCOM). Funding assistance was provided by the Defense Department's Office of Net Assessments. The purpose of the study is to identify future missions and requirements for U.S. forces in Europe and to evaluate force posture alternatives in light of them.

The research was carried out within the International Security and Defense Strategy Program, a component of RAND's National Defense Research Institute (NDRI). The director of this program is Dr. Charles Kelley. NDRI is a federally funded research and development center sponsored by the Office of the Secretary of Defense and the Joint Staff.

The material presented here is intended to be helpful to U.S. government officials who deal with European security affairs and U.S. force commitments to NATO. It also will be of interest to other analysts who deal with these subjects. Appendices A and B were written by James A. Winnefeld.

SUMMARY

With the Cold War ended and European security affairs undergoing a profound upheaval, the future U.S. military presence in Europe has emerged as an important issue on the national agenda. Over the next few years, the United States will be significantly reducing its military forces in Europe from their late-1980s strength of about 300,000 troops. The policy issue is this: How far should this drawdown go and how many troops should be left behind? In other words, how much will be enough for the post-Cold War era? This study addresses this issue, focusing on the post-1995 period.

The theme of this study is that the future U.S. presence should be determined only on the basis of careful analysis. Because the fluid situation in Europe makes the task of evaluation far more complex than it was during the previous era, the choices ahead are anything but easy. The proper approach is to assess future force requirements as a function of U.S. goals and the evolving situation in Europe, NATO's defense strategy, and appropriate military missions in peace, crisis, and war. Using this theory of requirements, judgments can then be made about force commitments, which in turn can permit decisions on manpower¹ levels.

This study endeavors to follow this approach to strategic planning. It does not try to prescribe a fixed blueprint for the United States to follow. Instead, its goal is to provide the kind of balanced analysis that identifies the key factors at work and evaluates the options objectively.

OPTIONS

In order to bound the range of choices ahead, this study develops four options for sizing the future U.S. presence, each representing a distinct choice in terms of policy, strategy, and capability:

- *Forward Presence.* This posture would provide 150,000 U.S. troops in Europe, dominated by a U.S. Army corps and 3.5 tactical air wings. This posture would also create a support establishment for performing command, control, communications, and intelligence (C³I) functions, keep essential bases open, and provide reception facilities for absorbing reinforcements.
- *Dual-Based Presence.* This posture would provide 100,000 troops, which would include a corps formation, but with nearly one-half of its units dual-based in the United States. The same dual-basing arrangement would apply to the tactical air forces: 2.3 wings would be based in Europe.
- *Limited Presence.* This posture would provide 70,000 troops with a single Army division, 1.5 air wings, and a bare-bones support structure.
- *Symbolic Presence.* This posture would provide 40,000 troops. It would be composed principally of C³I and support units, which would maintain a military infrastructure for ab-

¹I use the term "manpower" for convenience throughout the Report to refer to both male and female personnel.

sorbing reinforcements in a crisis. The U.S. combat presence would be very small; less than an Army brigade and one air wing.

Figure S.1 displays the key characteristics of all four options.

REQUIREMENTS

Future U.S. military requirements in Europe will be shaped by the following factors, all of which create a need to retain a sizable military presence in Europe.

- *U.S. Security Goals.* In the years ahead, the United States evidently will pursue an activist agenda in Europe aimed at:
 - Preserving its own influence.
 - Maintaining NATO's unity.
 - Fostering a cooperative European security architecture anchored on a stable balance of power.
 - Preserving a sound NATO military strategy and defense posture.
 - Providing a military capacity to react to threatening situations in the Middle East and Persian Gulf.
- *Threats and Contingencies Ahead.* U.S. force requirements will be determined partly by the specific contingencies that will need to be taken into account in NATO force plan-

U.S. force posture in Europe	150-165K forward presence	100K dual-based presence	70K limited presence	40K symbolic presence
<i>Central Europe</i>				
Ground HQ	Corps	Corps	Division	Division
Basing mode	Forward	Dual-based	Forward	Dual-based
Forward BDES	7	4	2.4	.5
TFW	2.5	1.7	1.2	.6
POMCUS	2-3	2-3	2-3	2-3
<i>Southern Region</i>				
Ground forces	BN	BN	0	0
TFW	1	.6	.3	0
Naval bases	3	3	2	2

NOTE: BDES = Brigades.

Figure S.1—Box Score on U.S. Force Postures

ning. Although the threat of a short-warning and all-out Soviet attack has faded, this study identifies 27 plausible contingencies that could occur over the next decade. Many of these contingencies would require only small U.S. forces, including peacekeeping operations, disaster relief, and minor incidents (e.g., dealing with terrorists). Other contingencies, however, could require commitment of sizable U.S. forces, possibly on a time-urgent basis that would make it unwise to rely fully on reinforcement from the United States. These include:

- A major regional war in Central Europe.
 - A radical Arab attack on Turkey.
 - Interstate conflicts in Eastern Europe and the Balkans.
 - Major operations in the Middle East or Persian Gulf.
- *NATO's Military Strategy.* NATO's newly emerging military strategy, MC 14/4, recognizes the importance of maintaining extended nuclear deterrence but also calls for nuclear weapons to become instruments of last resort for dealing with nonnuclear aggression. In order to defend NATO's borders and deal with other potential threats, NATO will require continued coalition planning aimed at creating a viable conventional military posture composed of quick reaction, main defense, and reinforcing forces. Because the West European nations will be unable to meet the full spectrum of requirements for this strategy, the United States will be called on to make significant commitments of ground, air, and naval forces.
 - *Military Missions.* In order to provide an adequate defense posture for supporting NATO's military strategy, U.S. forces in Europe will be called on to perform a variety of demanding military missions in peace, crisis, and war. During peacetime, they will be required to monitor the situation in Europe, prepare plans, train with allied forces, and perform normal tasks that arise on an almost daily basis. During a crisis, they would be required to deploy rapidly to the scene and engage in precombat operations aimed at supporting U.S. and NATO crisis-management policies. During wartime, they would be called on to conduct combat missions aimed at executing U.S. and NATO war plans for defending NATO's territory and pursuing its political-military objectives.

Based on the detailed analysis of these four determinants, Figure S.2 displays an estimate of future time-phased requirements for U.S. forces, including units based in Europe and reinforcements. In total, these requirements are about 25 percent less than during the Cold War; for peacetime deployments in Europe, they are about 50 percent less than for the previous era.

ASSESSMENT OF THE OPTIONS

The strategic planning methodology thus suggests that although the Cold War has ended, the United States will continue to confront important, if reduced, military requirements in Europe. Just because force requirements exist does not mean that they must be matched to the letter to prevent disaster from befalling. But they do provide a useful standard by which to gauge the options ahead, including their benefits, costs, and trade-offs.

The core issue facing the United States is deciding how it intends to manage uncertainty and change in Europe. Should it be a passive witness to Europe's evolution, or should it actively try to guide Europe down the path to stability? If it does opt for an activist stance, as now




Figure S.2—Future U.S. Force Requirements in Europe

seems likely, then its own demanding agenda and the challenges ahead seemingly will create powerful reasons for keeping large forces in Europe for the foreseeable future.

This situation will change only if the United States successfully transforms its visions for a peaceful Europe into reality. Russia and the Commonwealth would need to become a truly benign partner of the West or else permanently collapse into impotency, and Europe's other stresses and tensions would have to be alleviated. Also, the Middle East and Persian Gulf would have to stabilize to the point where major war there would become unlikely. Additionally, there would have to be solid grounds for believing that the transatlantic relationship will remain healthy if U.S. troops depart. Short of these changes, the requirements portrayed here will remain factors to be taken seriously in U.S. defense planning. To the extent that its forces are capable of meeting these requirements, the U.S. national interest will be adequately protected in this uncertain era; to the extent the forces are not capable, the United States will find its efforts in Europe rendered more difficult.

Figure S.3 summarizes how the four options compare in terms of their ability to support U.S. policy goals in Europe in eight key areas. A check mark means that the requirements in this area are adequately met and that, insofar as military forces affect final results, the United States will enjoy a good position for pursuing the goal under review. A question mark means that the outcome—in terms of meeting requirements and thereby attaining the goal—is uncertain. A negative mark means that requirements are not met and are seriously deficient, and that, accordingly, the United States might be hard-pressed to achieve its goal in that area.

Security goals in Europe and peripheral areas	Postures			
	1. Forward presence (150k)	2. Dual-based presence (100k)	3. Limited presence (70k)	4. Symbolic presence (40k)
U.S. influence	√	?	—	—
NATO unity	√	√	?	—
Balance of power	√	√	?	—
Adequate NATO strategy	√	?	—	—
Adequate U.S./NATO defense posture				
Peace	√	√	?	—
Crisis	√	?	—	—
War	√	?	—	—
Options for Middle East/Persian Gulf contingencies	√	?	—	—

NOTE: Evaluations assume Europe and Middle East/Persian Gulf remain potentially unstable.

Figure S.3—Impact of Alternative Postures on U.S. Security Goals

As the figure suggests, a strong case can be made for a posture of forward presence, which alone meets the requirements flowing from all U.S. goals while maintaining flexibility for the future. This case is especially persuasive because recent trends suggest that both Europe and the Middle East/Persian Gulf remain turbulent regions, with a continuing potential for interstate conflict and major war. In Europe, the collapse of communism and the Soviet state has produced a major Cold War victory for the West and great opportunities ahead. But in the wake of this victory, the end of bipolar confrontation also has given rise to a host of new strains, including resurgent nationalism, fragmentation, and chaotic conditions in Eastern Europe, the Balkans, and the new Russian/Commonwealth nations. The time might come when these negative trends are overtaken by democracy, free enterprise, prosperity, and collective security. But that time has not yet arrived, and the future is genuinely uncertain, with an unfavorable outcome to any of these trends a prospect to be taken seriously.

Senior U.S. military authorities favor a posture of forward presence because it provides an operationally coherent force that can conduct major independent combat missions in Europe on short notice. Especially because the corps is the basis for U.S. Army combat operations and an accepted symbol of a meaningful military contribution to NATO, the presence of a powerful U.S. Army corps and several air wings figures heavily in this calculus. Also, this posture provides a wide range of diverse capabilities for meeting peacetime needs, while fulfilling the broad spectrum of crisis and wartime requirements—small and large—that might arise on a time-urgent basis.

Politically, this posture is attractive because it projects a weighty U.S. military presence onto the European continent, thereby reminding all nations that the United States is a European power with vital interests there. Further, this posture would help maintain NATO's unity under U.S. leadership, reassure allies, and credibly warn potential adversaries. It would contribute to maintaining a military balance of power and encouraging a cooperative security architecture in Europe. Equally fundamental, this posture would help foster the kind of geostrategic stability that encourages progress toward a peaceful and united continent in close partnership with the United States.

Conversely, any wholesale U.S. military withdrawal from Europe could leave still-existing American nuclear commitments in Europe that are no longer credible to allies or adversaries. Meanwhile, there would be no U.S. military presence in Europe to exert influence over security affairs in peace, crisis, and war. Beyond this, withdrawal could have destabilizing consequences that would reverberate across the entire continent. The NATO alliance could be weakened and perhaps fractured, thereby producing a military and political power vacuum in Europe at a time of great change, stress, and uncertainty. Deterrence could be eroded, potential aggressors would face fewer incentives to exercise restraint, and crisis management would be rendered more problematic. Prospects for democracy, free enterprise, cooperative diplomacy, and smooth trade relationships also could suffer.

Over the long term, total withdrawal could contribute to the emergence of a highly unstable and competitive multipolar security system. Because U.S. withdrawal would occur long before an effective West European security pillar has arisen, Germany and other nations lacking adequate national defense postures might be compelled to pursue potentially disruptive policies. This development alone could have dangerous consequences, but the risks would be magnified greatly if reform in the former Soviet Union fails, thereby producing an authoritarian government motivated by hostility toward the West. Faced with the prospect of a downward European spiral minus the alliance partnership that NATO provides, the United States might lack the means to rectify the situation.

If a forward presence of 150,000 troops provides the means to pursue U.S. security goals confidently, to what degree would a smaller posture weaken our nation's performance in Europe? Because the answer is unknowable in advance, experts differ in their appraisals. Whereas some contend that any significantly smaller posture would bring about major negative consequences, others believe that, as long as sizable forces are retained, the drop-off would be slight. This analysis concludes that the United States faces a negative slope that would get steadily steeper as ever-deeper withdrawals are pursued. That is, small reductions below 150,000 probably would not have severe consequences because large forces would remain in Europe. But as the number of troops left behind becomes smaller, and less meaningful in operational and political terms, the negative consequences would magnify.

A dual-based posture of 100,000 troops would prevent the United States from pursuing its security goals as effectively as it could with a forward presence. This posture would leave behind a military force that, in absence of outside reinforcement, is not fully effective in operational terms and would be less politically credible. Overall, this posture's performance would be uncertain, open to interpretation, and subject to shortfalls in several policy areas. While experts disagree on the exact impact, a dual-based posture might not cripple U.S. policy in Europe, but it would render execution more difficult and positive results more prob-

lematic. Its chief advantage lies in providing a fallback position if a forward presence, despite its advantages, proves politically infeasible.

The two lower-choice options would alter the character of the U.S. military presence in Europe far more dramatically. A limited presence of 70,000 troops would leave at least some combat forces in the form of a single Army division and almost two fighter wings. But it would seriously deprive the United States of the operationally effective, nationally independent, and politically weighty force in Europe that is the core concept underlying a forward presence. A posture of 40,000 troops would leave virtually no combat forces at all. By making the United States entirely dependent on outside reinforcement in a crisis, it could undercut the U.S. political and military goals across the board.

Apart from saying that a limited presence would be far better than a symbolic presence, it is impossible to know in advance the degree to which these two postures might damage an activist U.S. policy agenda in the current European environment. Much would depend upon the pace of the U.S. reduction far below 150,000 troops, the explanations offered, and the accompanying reassurances. Much also would depend upon exactly how Europe and the Middle East/Persian Gulf evolve during the 1990s, and on overall U.S. relations with European nations. What can be said is that if U.S. forces are cut too deeply and rapidly, the risk would increase that Europe, presently standing at a historic crossroad, might travel down the path of instability, with unpredictable but worrisome consequences.

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1. INTRODUCTION

Now that the Cold War has ended, the U.S. military presence in Europe has emerged as an important issue on the policy agenda. For the past four decades, the United States has maintained a sizable troop presence in Europe as part of its commitment to NATO's security and its global strategy for managing international affairs. As of the late 1980s, about 300,000 Army, Air Force, and Navy personnel were deployed at a variety of installations across Europe. With the Russian/Commonwealth of Independent States Army withdrawing from Eastern Europe and NATO itself committed to a smaller defense posture for the era ahead, this force level is slated to come down. The policy question facing the U.S. government and NATO is this: How far should this drawdown go and how many U.S. forces should remain behind in Europe? In other words, How much will be enough for the post-Cold War era?

This Report addresses this important issue for the post-1995 period, after Russian/Commonwealth forces have withdrawn entirely behind their own borders. As matters now stand, NATO's security requirements for this period are open to a variety of interpretations, and judgment inevitably will play a large role in the policy decisions that lie ahead. As a result, this Report does not try to prescribe a fixed blueprint for the United States to follow. Instead, its goal is to provide the kind of balanced analysis that identifies the key factors at work and evaluates the options objectively, thereby allowing the reader to reach his or her own conclusions.

DIMENSIONS OF THE PROBLEM

The Department of Defense (DoD) plans to reduce U.S. forces by about 50 percent by 1995: from 300,000 now to about 150,000. In his *Annual Report to the President and Congress* of early 1991, Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney announced that a "dramatic reduction in U.S. forward-based forces will occur."¹ He went on to say that "a continuing forward-deployed presence will be maintained in sufficient strength to deter aggression and fulfill mutual security treaty obligations." Cheney did not spell out how many forces are required for this purpose. The DoD's *Total Force Policy Report to the Congress* (December 1990), however, indicated that the U.S. presence in Europe is likely to include an Army Corps, about three tactical fighter wings, naval forces, and support units.² Similar statements have been made in subsequent official publications, and the 150,000 figure has since become part of the public dialogue.

The NATO defense ministerial meeting in late May 1991 broadly confirmed this plan and indicated that U.S. manpower³ levels would be cut by about 50 percent. These reductions were announced amidst other changes intended to revamp NATO's defense posture. Allied active forces also are to be cut appreciably, and greater reliance is to be placed on mobilizable re-

¹See the Secretary of Defense's *Annual Report to the President and the Congress* of January 1991, GPO, Washington, D.C.

²See DoD's *Total Force Policy Report to the Congress*, GPO, Washington, D.C., December 1990.

³I use the terms "manpower," "airmen," and "seamen" for convenience throughout the Report to refer to both male and female personnel.

serve formations. In essence, NATO is aspiring to create a three-tiered posture of small, highly ready forces, main defense forces, and augmentation forces. NATO's ready forces are to be provided primarily by a newly created "Rapid Reaction Corps" composed of about four or five divisions, with air units, that could be employed on short notice. NATO's main defense forces in Central Europe are to be provided by five multinational corps formations, one of which is to be United States-led. NATO's augmentation forces are to be provided primarily by American reserves in the continental United States (CONUS). The guiding concept is to reduce NATO's forces in response to the diminished threat, but to also preserve a posture that can respond in a timely fashion to any crises ahead.⁴

Although this plan for a U.S. presence of about 150,000 troops represents current official thinking, it is not fixed in concrete. It serves as an appraisal of security needs for a period that lies several years in the future. Especially because Europe is in a state of flux, a great deal can change between now and then. Barring a major downswing in Europe, a requirement for a U.S. posture larger than 150,000 seems unlikely. But if Europe stabilizes more rapidly than NATO now judges will be the case, some observers believe a smaller presence might become appropriate.

Already, the official plan is being challenged in several quarters. For example, a report issued by the Johns Hopkins Foreign Policy Institute has called for a smaller presence of 100,000 troops or less. A 1991 congressional resolution reached a similar conclusion. Some members of Congress are calling for a presence substantially lower than 100,000. For example, Congresswoman Patricia Schroeder (D-Colo.) has endorsed a rotational basing scheme that would permanently deploy only a few thousand troops. Similar thoughts are being expressed elsewhere, including in Western Europe. There, allied governments currently endorse the present plan, but outside critics openly advocate a quite small U.S. presence.⁵

For these reasons, the future U.S. presence in Europe will likely be debated extensively in the years ahead. This Report accordingly considers a wide spectrum of options for sizing the future U.S. presence for the post-1995 period. The options examined here range from a continuation of the officially projected 1995 level to a posture as low as 40,000 soldiers, along with points in between. This spectrum has been selected because it represents what is being debated currently, within official and unofficial circles, in the United States and Western Europe. Virtually all experts are unanimous in their belief that some forces should remain to underwrite Europe's stability and protect American interests. Where they disagree is in their appraisal of exactly how many forces are needed for this purpose.

The postures covered by this spectrum vary a great deal not only in their personnel levels but also in their internal force composition and their potential political-military impact on Europe's security affairs. As official plans currently envision, a posture of 150,000 troops would leave the United States with a still-large and visible forward presence that would have significant combat capabilities even in the absence of major outside reinforcement. At the other extreme, a posture of 40,000 would leave little more than an infrastructure of com-

⁴See Paul L. Montgomery, "NATO Is Planning to Cut U.S. Forces in Europe by 50%," *New York Times*, May 29, 1991; R. Jeffrey Smith, "NATO Reforms Seen as Response to Loss of Foe," *Washington Post*, May 30, 1991; "NATO's New Structure," *London Financial Times*, May 30, 1991.

⁵See "The United States and NATO in an Undivided Europe: A Report by the Working Group on Changing Roles and Shifting Burdens in the Atlantic Alliance," Johns Hopkins Foreign Policy Institute, School of Advanced International Studies, 1619 Massachusetts Ave., N.W., Washington, D.C. 20036, 1991.

mand, intelligence, communications, and base-maintenance focus with almost no combatants. In this case, the United States presumably would rely far more heavily on outside reinforcement to generate combat power for contingencies in Europe. Between these two extremes lie varying levels of forward capability.

THE NEED FOR ANALYSIS

The core policy issue here is whether, and to what degree, the United States should adopt a strategy of forward military presence in Europe or, alternatively, a significantly less visible, less powerful posture. Which strategy, or combination of strategies, makes the most sense? Under what conditions will a large presence be needed to underwrite U.S. goals, NATO's security, and Europe's stability? Under what conditions will a smaller posture suffice?

As will become apparent below, the answers to these questions are anything but self-evident. For this reason, policy decisions regarding the future U.S. presence in Europe should not be made hastily or on the basis of impressionistic judgments. Similar to most of the important items on the contemporary agenda, this issue should be subjected to thorough analysis.

Because the subject of the future U.S. military presence is enormously complicated, sound force plans can be forged only by carefully considering a host of factors, including:

- U.S. policy goals in Europe and overall global strategy.
- Western relations with the former Soviet Union, Europe's political evolution, the future military balance in Europe, and developments within the European Community (EC) and the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE).
- Future threats to peace in Europe, including potential crises and wartime contingencies.
- NATO's internal cohesion, and requirements for sustaining the transatlantic alliance as it evolves in the directions outlined by the London and Rome Summit Declarations.
- NATO's future military strategy, force goals, command arrangements, assignment of roles and missions, and burden-sharing practices.
- Events outside Europe, especially trends in the Middle East and Persian Gulf.

Careful analysis is particularly needed because this issue cannot be settled on the basis of lofty generalizations: It requires the marrying of the abstract with the concrete. Broad political-military policy judgments must be linked to the specific programmatic details of military manpower levels and force composition. The difficulties that arise in performing this task are partly responsible for the confusion already apparent in the public debate. For example, some observers agree with the idea of maintaining a U.S. Army corps in Europe, but call for far less than 150,000 troops. By contrast, others dispute the military need for sizable U.S. combat formations, but nonetheless argue that a presence of 150,000 soldiers makes political sense. Incompatible assertions of this sort bar the way to a clear understanding of how military forces relate to national policy. What is needed here is the capacity to see the forest, the trees, and the grass—and to understand how they all fit together.

Further complicating the analytical task is the need to grapple with the major uncertainties ahead. Throughout the Western world today, experts sharply disagree about where Europe is headed. Their assessments range from bright optimism to dark pessimism, and cover all

points in between. What unites the views is that none is being made with confidence. The complex dynamics and contradictory trends at work in Europe today make forecasting an almost impossible art. That NATO's nations are resorting to the ambiguous phrase "post-Cold War era" indicates their confusion. While this phrase declares that Europe is undergoing a major transformation, it does nothing to define what lies ahead. By leaving everything open, it rules nothing out.

Uncertainty of this sort can be a powerful factor in the policy equation. The uncertainties of the Cold War led NATO to adopt a conservative stance in defining its military priorities, which was inclined toward maintaining strong defenses as a hedge against improbable but dangerous events. Whether NATO will continue to prefer a well-endowed military insurance policy remains to be seen. What can be said is that the current uncertainty compels the United States and NATO to base their military decisions on the kind of sophisticated analyses that take multiple possibilities into account.

Equally important, the end of the Cold War has swept away the well-oiled planning "paradigm" that has guided NATO's defense policies and programs for the past several decades. Gone are NATO's old planning contingencies, crisis management practices, mobilization policies, coalition plans, operational concepts, and employment doctrines. Under review are the very foundations of alliance defense strategy, including such fundamental concepts as deterrence, defense, and the control of escalation. The absence of established standards of reference creates a risk that NATO defense policy decisions will be made prematurely. At a minimum, it makes the task of settling upon a U.S. presence all the more difficult. NATO wisely has launched a full-scale strategy review aimed at creating a new set of defense plans, but it will take time to complete. Until then, this tenuous state of affairs makes the need for careful analysis all the more apparent.

RESEARCH OBJECTIVES AND METHODOLOGY

This Report, which conducts a political-military analysis, aims to help satisfy this need for careful and informative appraisal. An especially important point developed below is that the future U.S. military presence should not be viewed as a dependent variable: something to be settled upon passively in response to an assessment of where Europe is headed. Rather, the American presence should be viewed as a causal agent of change, a policy instrument that the United States and NATO can actively use to help channel Europe's future in healthy and stable directions. For this reason, an assessment of U.S./NATO goals, visions, and expectations is as fully important as an appraisal of where the external political-military environment seems headed on its own.

Prepared with an activist perspective in mind, this Report has three broad research objectives. First, it analyzes the manpower options presently under review in sufficient detail to determine, with some specificity, what they imply for future U.S. military capabilities in Europe. Second, it develops a "strategic planning framework" for analyzing future U.S. military missions and requirements in Europe that takes into account both U.S./NATO goals and environmental trends. Third, it uses this framework to analyze the options comparatively in terms of their marginal benefits, costs, and trade-offs. This Report thus endeavors to identify the military options ahead and to provide the analytical tools for evaluating them in coherent, activist terms. The components of this methodology are displayed in Figure 1.1.




Figure 1.1—This Study's Analytical Process

This Report employs the methodology of "systems analysis." This methodology, which simultaneously treats both resource inputs and performance outputs as variables, is expressly designed for dealing with complex decision problems. As is the case here, normally these problems involve the use of numerous policy instruments to pursue multiple incommensurable goals in an multifaceted and uncertain environment. Systems analysis accordingly does not rely on a single operations research technique but rather employs an array of techniques for addressing the task at hand. The specific techniques that appear in the following pages include classical cost-benefit comparisons, long-range forecasting, sensitivity analysis, and explicit delineation of variables and constants. Also employed are war-gaming and simulation analysis, military requirements analysis, matrix analysis, and management approaches to handling uncertainty. The overall goal is to use these techniques to build a weighty intellectual superstructure of inputs and outputs that illuminates the options and analyzes their relative merits.

In employing this methodology, this Report performs analyses at three separate but interacting levels. First, the analysis at the "geopolitical level" assesses how military forces are likely to influence the future European security system. Second, the analysis at the "military operational" level assesses the relationship between NATO's future military strategy and force posture. Third, the analysis at the "programmatic level" examines how manpower levels translate into specific military force postures. Only by conducting analyses at all three levels, and relating them to each other, can a study hope to provide the insights needed to permit discriminating policy choices. By employing the methodology of systems analysis in this way, this Report endeavors to provide this kind of assessment.

ORGANIZATION

Following this introduction, Section 2 analyzes the present and future trends in European security affairs. Section 3 develops this Report's spectrum of alternative options for the future U.S. force presence in Europe as a function of available resources and desired combat

capabilities. Sections 4 through 8 develop this Report's strategic planning framework for assessing future U.S. military missions and force requirements in Europe. Section 9 synthetically analyzes the effectiveness of Section 2's options in relation to this framework.

2. PRESENT AND FUTURE TRENDS IN EUROPEAN SECURITY AFFAIRS

This Report is anchored on the premise that the United States has vital interests at stake in Europe that transcend the favorable outcome of the Cold War and carry over into the future. These enduring interests create strong reasons for the United States to remain involved in Europe as the old era gives way to the new. Military forces are one policy instrument by which the United States pursues its interests and goals in Europe. Although they no longer will dominate U.S. policy as in the past, they will remain an important consideration in American diplomacy and security planning in Europe for many years to come. At issue now is the role that U.S. forces are to play in the coming era, during which the overt threat of aggression will be far less dominant than it was in the Cold War era but where security issues of a different sort will appear on the transatlantic agenda.

During the 19th century, the United States largely remained aloof from Europe's problems but gradually came to recognize that its interests extended far beyond its shores. Early in the 20th century, it entered World War I in an effort to help end that destructive war and prevent Europe from being dominated by a hostile power. After temporarily withdrawing into isolationism in the aftermath, it re-entered Europe in World War II to help stem the tide of aggressive Nazi totalitarianism. Following the defeat of Hitler, the United States resisted the impulse to withdraw again, and when the Cold War broke out, it led the Western democracies in forging a NATO alliance aimed at containing expansionist Soviet communism. This effort at alliance formation and coalition planning was initially animated by a traditional geopolitical calculus aimed at keeping Western Europe free from control by a hostile hegemonic power espousing unacceptable values. In time, however, this calculus gave way to a broader view that recognized the increasingly important role that shared democratic values, transatlantic partnership, commitment to collective security, and growing economic interdependence played in shaping a larger conception of U.S. interests and European security affairs.

As a result, the successful end of the Cold War and the fading of the Soviet threat to Western Europe do not translate into a rationale for American disengagement from Europe. Nor do the end of the bipolar confrontation and the collapse of Soviet communism automatically mean that Europe has entered an era of permanent stability and peace. This may be the outcome, but it remains a goal to be achieved rather than a condition of nature. Until political conflict among nations has diminished to the point where it no longer requires conscious management by governmental authority, history has not come to an end in Europe or elsewhere. Rather, history has entered a new period, with an entirely new chapter to be written.

The stage for appraising the future U.S. military role in Europe can best be set by examining the changes that recently have occurred in Europe and where the Continent seems headed. In essence, the events since 1989 have witnessed the end of the old bipolar order, and the accelerating spread not only of democracy and free-market capitalism but also of multipolarity, rising nationalism, and internal fragmentation. Some of these changes are highly stabilizing, but others are potentially destabilizing. The same can be said of the Middle East and Persian

Gulf, a region whose developments also have an important bearing on the U.S. military presence in Europe.

Any effort to gauge the future must take into account this complex mixture of stabilizing and destabilizing trends. Because these conflicting trends create great uncertainty, they render difficult the task of forging any credible single-point estimate of the future. Recognition of uncertainty, however, can be a valuable contributor to long-range planning. In particular, it calls attention to the need to continue working hard to encourage positive change and to maintain a safeguarding hedge against the negative developments that could occur. U.S. military forces are part of this hedge, as well as a contributor to Europe's peaceful evolution to democracy and community.

TRANSFORMATION IN EUROPE: HOPEFUL TRENDS

Beyond a doubt, the massive upheaval that occurred during 1989–1991 has strongly benefited American interests as well as the larger cause of democracy and peace in Europe. The year 1989 witnessed the dramatic collapse of communism in Eastern Europe, the emergence of democratic governments in several nations there, and the unraveling of the Warsaw Pact. In 1990 came German unification, Soviet acceptance of military withdrawal from Eastern Europe, and the signing of the Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) agreement aimed at dramatically reducing Soviet conventional military power. Early 1991 witnessed a temporary swing back toward authoritarian rule in the USSR. In August, however, came the failed coup in Moscow followed shortly thereafter by the banishing of the Communist party in the USSR. Despite Gorbachev's efforts to retain a viable union, the Soviet state was disestablished in late fall. In its place came a new Commonwealth of Independent States composed of sovereign republics espousing capitalism, democracy, demilitarization, and friendly intentions toward the West.

Amazingly, Russia's new president, Boris Yeltsin, brought 1991 to a close by expressing a desire to join NATO eventually, an act that symbolized the profoundly changing political scene in Moscow. Attending the United Nations (UN) Security Council meeting in early January 1992, Yeltsin pledged cooperative policies in the years ahead while also asking for external aid to help Russia and the Commonwealth successfully reform. Then on February 1, Yeltsin met with President Bush at Camp David, where the two leaders discussed further nuclear reductions and prospects for close partnership on ever-broadening policy fronts.

Despite the fading power of its former Soviet adversary, the Western alliance experienced no similar unraveling and indeed emerged with an agenda for the future. At their 1990 London Summit, NATO's leaders expressed their intent to retain NATO while transforming it into a less military and more political alliance capable of playing a constructive role in building a stable European security architecture. They also vowed to continue with collective defense planning aimed at protecting member nations' borders and advancing the West's larger interests. Several months later, Germany unified amidst a firm intention by Bonn to remain within NATO's fold. At this time, the Western allies also signed the Charter of Paris, a document aimed at enhancing the CSCE and extending the hand of peaceful cooperation to the East.

Early 1991 saw the United States, Britain, France, Italy, and other alliance partners collaborate under United Nations auspices to roll back Iraq's military occupation of Kuwait. NATO

entered the picture by dispatching alliance forces to Turkey to protect that nation's exposed borders while Desert Shield/Storm was in progress. The overpowering coalition victory and the destruction of Iraq's military forces, accomplished with the political support of the Soviet government, underscored the West's continuing ability to defend its vital interests even in regions beyond NATO's borders.

Several important Western initiatives came during the following months. In spring 1991, the NATO ministers met in Copenhagen and reached agreement on harmonizing Western Europe's emerging defense identity with existing alliance defense planning procedures. During the summer, the Group of Seven (G-7) nations held a summit meeting in which they decided to provide the Soviet Union technical and economic assistance to aid its efforts to achieve democracy and free market prosperity. Following the failed Moscow coup in September, President Bush announced major changes in the readiness and overseas deployment of U.S. nuclear forces directed at promoting a more stable nuclear balance. In the wake of this announcement came discussions aimed at ensuring positive control of nuclear weapons in the former Soviet Union. Also, the Strategic Arms Reduction Talks (START) treaty was signed, which called for significant reductions in the strategic forces on both sides, amidst calls for further negotiations aimed at even deeper cuts.

Fall 1991 saw an important NATO summit in Rome, where alliance leaders adopted a new strategic concept for the post-Cold War era. During this meeting, West European leaders underscored the need for U.S. military forces to remain in Europe for the post-Cold War era. The new strategic concept reaffirmed the need for NATO to remain as a cohesive defensive alliance, to retain a deterrent shield including nuclear weapons, and to preserve a military balance of power in Europe. Additionally, it advanced the goal of becoming more actively involved in building community and partnership with the nations to the east. Also affirmed were new initiatives to build a NATO Rapid Reaction Corps, to reorganize into multinational formations, and to forge new coalition plans aimed at preserving viable conventional defenses while further reducing reliance on nuclear weapons.

Following NATO's Rome Summit came an important EC summit in Maastricht, Netherlands. Since 1985, the EC's drive toward integration, fueled by the 1992 project, has been accelerating rapidly. At Maastricht, EC members took steps to achieve economic unity by deciding to create a European Monetary Institute with a central bank and a new European currency. This process is to unfold during the 1990s and to reach completion in 1999. Maastricht also endorsed decisions to proceed further toward political union, including efforts to achieve a joint foreign and security policy. The long-dormant West European Union (WEU) is to be revived to act as the EC's defense body. Significantly, however, the WEU is to be linked to NATO. Both at Rome and at Maastricht, EC members vowed that while they aspire to create a stronger West European security pillar, they had no intention of dismantling NATO or severing their security connection to the United States.

WORRISOME TRENDS TOWARD INSTABILITY

These monumental changes not only ended the dangerous Cold War military standoff but also effectively swept away communism from Europe while leaving the Western alliance intact. While these changes contributed to Europe's enduring stability, negative developments also appeared in 1991 that are worrisome causes for concern about Europe's future. Perhaps

the least serious, in any immediate sense, are the initial appearances of fissures in the Western alliance. Nonetheless, the futures of NATO and the EC depend on whether the competing expectations for these institutions and the way they relate to each other can be harmonized.

At the forefront of the alliance's mounting troubles have been growing strains in Franco-American relations, where conflicting judgments about whether to emphasize NATO or the EC are most evident. Whereas the United States is a strong proponent of retaining NATO, France has been a vocal advocate of the EC and a separate West European pillar. French President Mitterand has made clear his desire for the United States to remain in Europe, but he also has expressed the view that American troops will soon depart and the EC should prepare accordingly. To many observers, France has seemed intent on relegating NATO and the United States to the backwaters of European security affairs by confining them to involvement only in now-fading traditional defense missions. Supported by Germany and Britain, Washington has been resisting France's efforts to downplay NATO and to marginalize the United States. Unresolvable conflicts over EC agricultural protectionism in the General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs (GATT) negotiations have further strained relations between Paris and Washington, raising questions about whether transatlantic barriers will be fully eliminated or, alternatively, the EC will evolve into a closed trading bloc.

Problems surrounding Germany's role in NATO, the EC, and Europe also have begun to appear. Largely causing these problems are conflicting judgments about how this powerful nation should conduct the increasingly assertive foreign policy called for by Chancellor Kohl and Foreign Minister Genscher. In contrast to France, Germany has been a proponent of both NATO and the EC and apparently plans to use both institutions in accordance with their relative effectiveness. To a degree, however, Germany's specific policies are rubbing up against the predilections of its allies in both arenas.

Within NATO, Germany is striving for greater influence over alliance policy and for greater recognition of coequal status. This effort, however, is complicated by emerging friction with the United States and Britain over leadership roles. Both nations remain sensitive about the interrelationship between NATO's nuclear and conventional defense plans and are reluctant to cede dominant control over them. In past years, moreover, influence within NATO has been allocated on the basis of any single nation's capacity to lead and willingness to commit resources to alliance defense preparedness. Especially since Germany will remain heavily preoccupied with the massively expensive task of rebuilding its eastern *Länder* (lands), questions remain about its future behavior. For example, Germany has remained reluctant to participate in military missions other than protecting its own borders, thereby suggesting hesitancy to accept that NATO exists for broader purposes than defending that nation. The result has been stress over future command relationships, membership in NATO's Rapid Reaction Corps, and basic defense and security policy.

Within the EC, the events leading up to Maastricht primarily focused on Britain's reservations about accepting federalism, but post-Maastricht trends have drawn attention to emerging Franco-German disagreements. Among the key issues are partially conflicting views about broadening versus deepening of the EC, and about parliamentary versus executive authority. Also involved are disputes over industrial, economic, and trade policy. For example, Germany recently increased its interest rates in an effort to dampen internal inflation, but this step worked against policies by other EC members aimed at combating recession. Joint

security policy also has become an issue as a result of Germany's proclivity to adopt a more activist stance than France in Central and Eastern Europe. In particular, early 1992 saw a clash between Bonn and Paris over recognizing Slovenia and Croatia, with Germany using its weight to persuade reluctant EC members, including France, to follow its lead.

Underlying these disputes is mounting debate about how the EC is to be led. In past years, France has been an EC leader, but Germany is rapidly emerging as a dominating power that promises to lead the EC in quite different directions than those that Paris traditionally has preferred. With Germany now playing a more assertive role in the East, some French leaders have been voicing growing concerns that a "Teutonic Bloc" may be emerging under Germany's leadership. As with NATO, the EC's future will be shaped by whether these conflicting visions can be accommodated.

Surveying these trends, some American observers have expressed concern that the United States and NATO will be replaced by an ineffective EC/WEU pillar that, even with the CSCE, is not capable of managing Europe's complex security affairs. In the worst case, some fear that both NATO and the EC could be fractured, the United States might disengage, and Germany could be propelled to reemerge as a heavy-handed rogue elephant in Central Europe. Perhaps these fears are exaggerated; no participating nation has a vested interest in seeing events deteriorate nearly this far. Nonetheless, the fading of the Soviet military threat does lessen external pressure for cooperative alliance policies, especially in combined defense planning. At a minimum, a slow drift toward renationalization could dilute both NATO and the EC, thereby weakening the impetus of community building within the Western alliance.

These fissures in the Western alliance pale by comparison with emerging negative developments to the east. In Eastern Europe, newly installed democratic regimes in Poland, Hungary, and Czechoslovakia now face the imposing task of presiding over the transition to free-market systems at a time of deteriorating economic conditions and social upheaval. Especially dangerous has been the outbreak of civil war in Yugoslavia. Pitting Serbia against Croatia, the growing conflict stubbornly resisted EC efforts to end widespread fighting and seemingly brought Yugoslavia's existence as a nation-state to an end. Observers worried that the virus of revolutionary upheaval, nationalism, and economic decay could spread elsewhere in the Balkans and even to the northern-tier nations of Eastern Europe, thereby producing the kind of unstable power vacuums that spelled trouble so often in the past.

The dangers of fragmentation and chaotic upheaval appear even more serious in the former Soviet Union. There, Yeltsin's rise to power at the expense of Gorbachev and the agreement to form the new Commonwealth did little to conceal the mounting friction between the now-independent republics. By late 1991, the three Baltic states had severed their ties with the old union, and Moldova and Georgia had pulled away as well. More ominously, Russia and Ukraine seemed at loggerheads about the future, with Russia viewing the Commonwealth as a permanent union and Ukraine (and other republics) apparently regarding it as a transition to disunion. Reports of social strains, growing economic protectionism, conflicting territorial claims over the Crimean Peninsula, and mounting disputes about Ukraine's long history fueled additional concern about Russian-Ukrainian relations.

Especially at issue has been the disposition of military forces. The December 1991 agreement at Minsk seemingly resolved the problem of controlling strategic nuclear forces by placing them under the control of a central Commonwealth authority, with all missiles and bombers

to be based in Russia. Kazakhstan, however, remained stubbornly recalcitrant about yielding the roughly 100 SS-18 ICBM missiles on its territory. Even more at odds was the question of conventional forces. Evidently, Yeltsin went to Minsk with a plan to retain nearly all the forces under Commonwealth control, with units still to be based in Ukraine and other republics. Ukraine's President Kravchuk rejected this demarche, arguing instead that forces remaining on his nation's soil must be turned into a large Ukrainian military establishment. Other republics supported this position, insisting on national forces under their own control. Only eight republics agreed to Commonwealth control, and shortly thereafter, the number dropped to five. In any event, the Minsk meeting resulted in an agreement to study the issue in further detail, but prospects for an accord remained cloudy. Particularly controversial are the naval forces and bases in the Black Sea at Ukrainian ports.

These thorny military issues, the presence of large Russian minorities in many republics, and the economic entanglements across the entire former Soviet Union may be the seedbed for enduring conflicts among the republics. Even under Yeltsin, Russia aspires to a degree of influence and control within the Commonwealth that violates the sovereignty aspirations of several smaller republics, especially Ukraine. Whether Russia will evolve into a tranquil neighbor or something less benign is a worrisome uncertainty in many republic capitals. Meanwhile, by early 1992, violence already had broken out within several smaller republics. In Georgia, a democratically elected government that turned authoritarian was overthrown by a violent revolution that saw severe fighting in Tbilisi. At the same time, Armenia and Azerbaijan, focal points of clashes between Christians and Muslims, witnessed an upsurge of ethnic and religious violence.

Looming over all these tensions has been the unsettled problem of Russia's internal future. By late 1991, Russia was beset by huge economic problems including a major drop-off in productivity and gross national product, rising unemployment, unstable monetary policies, rapid inflation, a mammoth but now-useless defense industry, sluggish foreign investment, and shrinking foreign trade. Especially worrisome has been the lack of food in large cities and mounting fears of unemployment, poverty, and even famine. As part of an ambitious program of radical economic reform, Yeltsin in early 1992 lifted price controls in Russia. The ultimate hope is that this step will lead to increased production and distribution, but its immediate effect was a major rise in prices of food and other scarce goods, which further magnified Russia's economic crisis. Moreover, this step was taken long before Russia had completed the difficult transition to privatization of its centrally managed economy. As of early 1992, over 90 percent of Russia's industries and manufacturing capacity remained under state control, and in the rural areas, the changeover from collective farming had only just begun. Especially to Yeltsin's critics, the combination of free prices and centrally managed production seemed an uncertain recipe for quick economic fixes.

The future seemingly will be determined by whether Russia can reform fast enough to produce a viable economy before social and political cohesion break down. If this effort succeeds, Russia might emerge as a viable democracy with a free enterprise economy. If it fails, mounting instability and decline could produce chaos and violent civil war that might spell the end of democracy in this traditionally nondemocratic nation. Out of this turbulence could come an eventual return to authoritarian rule, possibly accompanied by an angry stance toward the Western democracies. For the simple reason that Bolshevism is now even more discredited than capitalism, a reassumption of Communist rule appears unlikely. But what could appear

is a conservative regime with the trappings of fascism: an alliance of the military, corporate leaders, and reactionary forces. Emergence of a Russian nation of this nature, to put matters mildly, would not have benign consequences for Europe's stability or the Western alliance.

SCENARIOS FOR THE FUTURE

Faced with these complex trends, virtually no European nations currently want U.S. military forces to depart the Continent in some wholesale way. The NATO allies are broadly comfortable with the withdrawal of about one-half of U.S. forces, but many fear for the worst if the United States were to disengage entirely. This judgment certainly holds true for Britain, which continues to place high stock on its special relationship with the United States. Although Germany is seeking a new transatlantic bargain in which it will have a more co-equal status with the United States, it continues to rely on American nuclear deterrence and on Washington's weighty, stability-enhancing presence in Europe's affairs. As for France, it apparently wants to dilute the influence of both the United States and NATO, but it also wants the Americans to continue having a "seat at table" in shaping policies for NATO, the CSCE, and the G-7.

Interestingly, many East European nations actively want the United States to remain heavily involved and NATO to remain cohesive. Caught between an increasingly assertive Germany and a potentially turbulent Russia, while facing internal troubles, the fledgling democracies of Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Hungary all see high value in a continued American military presence. If anything, their collective preference would be to establish strong bilateral ties to the United States while joining both NATO and the EC. As for the Commonwealth of Independent States, the various republics all want enhanced American economic and technical aid. For the most part, they have been too internally preoccupied to involve themselves in the debate over the U.S. troop presence. However, they can be relied upon to prefer to deal with a Western alliance led by the United States rather than a less palatable alternative.

For the United States, the estimative task is to determine where Europe as a whole is headed in the years ahead. In principle, the need for a strong U.S. military presence will seem to remain high if the Continent continues to face potential turmoil and will decline if prosperity and tranquility take hold. Unfortunately, the countervailing trends in Europe today permit no confident estimate of the future. Indeed, uncertainty increases as the time horizon is extended into the future: an ever-widening range of possibilities must be taken into account. Accordingly, this analysis will sketch out three different scenarios for the decade ahead, all of which should be granted some degree of plausibility. These scenarios by no means exhaust the full range of possibilities, but they do provide a useful frame of reference for thinking about the future U.S. military presence.

No Appreciable Change

In this scenario, Europe would remain roughly as it stands in early 1992. To the extent change occurs, it would be linear and incremental. That is, NATO would remain about as it exists today, and the EC would proceed steadily down the path of economic union and expand somewhat, but it would move far more slowly toward political union. The East European na-

tions, meanwhile, would remain as increasingly stable democracies beset by uncertain economic conditions, and the Balkans would continue to be a festering sore that does not threaten larger instability. To the east, the Commonwealth would remain as a weak union of independent republics, and Russia would still be a quasi-democracy with troubling economic problems. In essence, Europe would be left suspended somewhere between stability and instability, in a state of shaky equilibrium but with no impending catastrophe looming on the horizon.

Major Progress Toward Unity, Stability, and Prosperity

In this rosy scenario, the transatlantic alliance would remain intact and the EC would achieve both broadening and deepening, in the process attaining harmony with its own members and the United States. In Eastern Europe, democracy would have flowered, growing prosperity would be achieved through free market mechanisms, and healing would have begun in the Balkans. Meanwhile, the Commonwealth would have emerged as a stable and benign union, led by independent republics that are democratic and increasingly prosperous, and are steadily being integrated into Europe. In particular, Russia would have successfully passed through its turbulent transition and emerged as a democratic nation with constructive policies toward its neighbors. As a result, Europe would have emerged as a unified community of democratic, peaceful, and prosperous nations, with little among the major powers to fight about and sufficient commitment to collective security to contain minor incidents.

Major Plunge Toward Turbulent Conflict and Chaos

In this bleak scenario, NATO would have lost its cohesion, the United States would have been largely marginalized in Europe, and Britain's influence would have declined. In the extreme case, signs of adversarial conflict, caused by a drift toward rival trading blocs, would have begun appearing in the transatlantic relationship. For its part, the United States would be steadily sliding toward isolationism. Meanwhile, the EC would have fallen far short of its aspirations, and growing Franco-German friction would have produced major doubts about the durability of the Paris-Bonn axis. To the east, the East European nations would have steadily deteriorated into political instability and economic turmoil, with their attempts to embrace capitalism having failed. Concurrently, an angry, economically troubled but militarily powerful Russia would have emerged under authoritarian rule to lead a partly reconstituted union pursuing a troublesome agenda beyond its borders. Thus, the European continent would find itself facing a quite dangerous situation, with the prospect of renewed conflict with Russia, a dangerous power vacuum in Central Europe, a disengaged United States, and a strong Germany left without credible security ties to its allies. A less troublesome version of this scenario envisions a unified Western alliance facing mounting chaos in the East, but even this situation would hardly be tranquil.

IMPLICATIONS

These three scenarios can be placed along a wide spectrum stretching from the pole of optimism (i.e., major progress) to the pole of pessimism (i.e., chaos), with "no change" and a number of other points in between. Although experts disagree on their appraisals of the fu-

ture, this Report's judgment is that the trends today are so confusing and contradictory that none of these scenarios can confidently be ruled out or accorded vastly higher status than the others. Much will depend on hard-to-predict future events that could evolve in any direction. In essence, the West today faces strategic uncertainty of vastly greater dimensions—for good or ill—than it experienced during virtually any stage of the Cold War from the early 1950s onward.

Added to this uncertainty is confusion about exactly where the Middle East and Persian Gulf are headed. The successful outcome of the Persian Gulf War at least temporarily has driven a dagger into the heart of military expansionism by radical Arab powers. Comprehensive Arab-Israeli peace talks are now under way, with signs of progress. On the negative side, however, anti-Western Islamic fundamentalism continues to threaten to spread far beyond its present boundaries, including into Northern Africa. Moreover, the threat of nuclear proliferation in this turbulent region is growing and is magnified by the chaotic situation in the former Soviet Union, which may produce an outward drift of nuclear scientists and even nuclear warheads.

It is possible to construct a wide spectrum of credible scenarios for the Middle East, ranging from a peaceful settlement of existing problems to the emergence of an angry and heavily armed Islamic world, with all points in between. As in Europe, much will depend upon how ongoing events play themselves out. Throughout most of the Cold War, the Middle East/Persian Gulf security system remained mostly static, impaled on a chronic Arab-Israeli conflict that produced constant tensions but little confusion about where the national players stood. Like Europe, this region has left stasis behind and has entered a far more fluid and far-reaching era of change. As a result, the end point is almost impossible to foresee.

This uncertainty in Europe and the Middle East/Persian Gulf makes it especially difficult to design the future U.S. military presence in Europe. The Cold War permitted U.S. force requirements to be designed in response to a confrontational but remarkably static and predictable political setting in both Europe and the Middle East/Persian Gulf. The era ahead will compel force requirements to be analyzed amidst great fluidity, with the future inherently unknowable. The central issue therefore is no longer one of managing a bipolar standoff in Central Europe through the mechanisms of containment and deterrence. Rather, the issue now is one of preserving stability across all of Europe amidst an amorphous and potentially turbulent multipolar setting.

The term "stability," however, should not be defined in terms of an absence of change, for major change in Europe is unavoidable in the years ahead, and constructive change is desirable. With communism now dead, an epochal shift is occurring in ideology and fundamental political values. The transatlantic partnership is mutating in new directions, toward an altered balance. In Western Europe, national sovereignty is giving way to supranational institutions, whereas to the east, some nation-states are dissolving while others are reacquiring long-suppressed national identities amidst the emergence of market economies and democracy. New security issues are arising. Superpower rivalry and military competition are being replaced by economic strain, resurgent nationalism, ethnic tensions, social unrest, and political upheaval.

"Stability" therefore is best defined in terms of guiding the direction and pace of change toward positive goals and away from negative downturns. In the years ahead, the United

States and its allies will be actively striving to promote democracy, widening prosperity, community building, and peace. What they will be aiming to prevent are authoritarianism, aggressive nationalism, irredentism, militarism, destructive economic competition, tension, conflict, escalatory crises, and war.

The U.S. military agenda in Europe will be shaped by this activist policy of promoting the good, discouraging the bad, and remaining insured against the worst. Because the United States has vital interests in Europe, at a minimum it will remain obligated to continue providing extended nuclear deterrence coverage over its NATO allies, especially nations that do not possess their own national deterrence postures. Of all the developments that could destabilize Europe, any withdrawal of the American nuclear and conventional deterrent shield would rank near the top in negative consequences. This would be the case particularly in the absence of nuclear disarmament in Europe and emergence of a collective security system that makes major conventional war highly unlikely. Barring Bonn's willingness to rely on uncertain French reassurances, Germany especially could be driven in the direction of militarization, nuclearization, and chronically insecure policies. Thereafter, a downward slide in Europe would be hard to avoid, and doubly so if Russia emerges as anything other than a benign democracy.

Even in the coming post-Cold War era, the risks created by providing extended nuclear deterrence coverage compel the United States to remain heavily involved in European defense planning, crisis management, and security affairs. As in the past, this involvement can best be achieved through NATO and the American military presence in Europe. The design of the future U.S. posture in Europe will be heavily affected by technical military issues, discussed below. But it also will be animated by three larger policy questions: How can the Western alliance be held together, and the roots of community deepened, in a period of diminished external threat? How can the hopeful but potentially chaotic situation in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union best be managed? And how can security conditions in the Middle East/Persian Gulf best be influenced from Europe? The answers to these questions will have a large bearing on determining future requirements for the U.S. military presence in Europe.

3. OPTIONS FOR SIZING THE FUTURE U.S. FORCE PRESENCE

Before future requirements can be addressed, we need to develop a sense of the future options open to the United States. This section develops a spectrum of options for sizing the post-1995 U.S. military presence in Europe and displays these options in terms of their manpower levels, combat forces, major weapon systems, and support units. It illuminates the complex factors that must be considered in designing a force posture at any given level of resources. Equally important, it presents options that offer distinct policy and strategy choices.

The most important analytical point developed in this section is that the task of identifying future options is far more complicated than merely determining how many troops are to be deployed in Europe. Currently, the public debate is being cast in terms of manpower, and because manpower is a visible symbol of national commitment, it undeniably has weighty political significance. Nevertheless, manpower is not an end in itself. If the United States is to design an intelligent post-Cold War force presence in Europe, it needs to keep manpower's limited role in the planning equation firmly in mind.

Manpower is a means, an instrument to achieve the larger end of building a sound force posture. Moreover it is only one resource input among many (including equipment) that goes into constructing a posture. Also, it is not always a good indicator of military strength. For example, a force posture can have many troops and still be militarily weak and politically impotent if it lacks adequate weapons, training, doctrine, and leadership. For these reasons, proper force planning does not begin with manpower nor end there.

Ideally, proper force planning unfolds in a formal and deductive fashion that works from ends to means, not vice versa. It begins with a clear sense of policy, threats, and strategy. It then identifies missions and requirements. It goes on to define an appropriate military posture in terms of needed units and combat capabilities. Only then does manpower enter the planning equation as one resource input. In reality, of course, force planning always is affected by resource issues—including manpower—in ways that produce a constant tug-of-war between desired capabilities and available assets. But degree matters. The inevitable presence of constraining realities does not mean that the planning process should be turned on its head to the point where resource levels are arbitrarily chosen first, posture second, and policy and strategy third, as an afterthought. To violate the logic of planning in this extreme way is to guarantee the loss of coherence and vision.

The core issue facing the United States and NATO therefore is not primarily one of American military manpower in Europe. Rather, it involves how force posture relates to policy and strategy, how means affect ends, and how resources match requirements. Above all, it is an issue of the U.S. political-military role in Europe, about whether the United States should remain heavily involved in Continental security affairs even though its original reason for being there has passed into history. Now that the Cold War is over, a sizable U.S. drawdown is possible, but not because declining political tensions make a continued U.S. presence of 300,000 soldiers seem anachronistic. The real reason is that NATO's security policy and military strategy no longer will require the specific set of U.S. forces and capabilities that formerly were needed. For the future, the task at hand is to determine exactly what forces and

capabilities should be deployed in Europe to execute U.S. alliance policy and strategy in the years ahead.

This does not mean that references to manpower should be banished from the public dialogue. But if the debate is to be cast in terms of manpower, each level under consideration should have strategic meaning. Each should represent a distinct plateau that responds to a carefully articulated vision of force posture and military capability. These are the terms in which this section frames its analysis of future U.S. manpower levels.

THE U.S. MILITARY PRESENCE IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE

An analysis of how manpower levels translate into specific force capabilities can best begin by placing the U.S. presence in Europe in historical perspective. As Table 3.1 shows, the United States had relatively small forces in Europe at the time NATO was formed in 1949. Shortly after the Korean War broke out in 1950, the United States made a landmark decision to substantially bolster its presence, a step that coincided with NATO's decision to arm itself against the Soviet military threat. From that point forward, the U.S. presence remained remarkably constant in both its size and internal configuration. This consistency comes partly from a political judgment that a large and reassuringly stable U.S. presence was needed to underwrite Western Europe's security during the Cold War. But it also stems from a set of more specific calculations about the important roles played by U.S. forces in NATO's evolving military strategy, operational doctrine, and coalition plans.

This emphasis on NATO military missions as a core rationale for the U.S. presence began in the early 1950s. At that time, the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff conditioned their support for a large American force deployment on NATO's willingness to breathe life into its defense preparations. Specifically, they asked that NATO create an integrated command structure, a coherent military strategy, and a sound force posture. With the Cold War at a particularly tense stage, the West European nations responded in a positive manner.

The result was that, as the 1950s unfolded, the U.S. force presence and NATO grew to maturity in tandem. During these years, NATO steadily acquired an imposing structure of forces and command staffs. Meanwhile, U.S. forces heavily involved themselves in NATO's military affairs to the point where they became indispensable to the alliance's daily functioning. A U.S. general occupied the Supreme Allied Commander, Europe (SACEUR) position, other American officers performed critical NATO staff roles, and U.S. combat forces provided the main retaliatory arm of NATO's then nuclear-oriented military strategy. Largely because of

Table 3.1
Trends in the U.S. Military Presence in Europe

	Manpower	Division Equivalents	Combat Aircraft
Late 1940s	150,000	2	150
Late 1950s	370,000	6	750
Late 1960s	330,000	5	700
Late 1970s	310,000	5	640
Late 1980s	323,000	5	640

NOTE: Includes specialized aircraft: reconnaissance, electronic warfare, and defense suppression.

this impressive military contribution, the United States emerged as NATO's unquestioned leader, a role that gave it considerable influence over alliance policy and strategy.

During the 1960s and 1970s, at American instigation, NATO switched its military strategy from massive retaliation (MC 14/2) to flexible response (MC 14/3). The new strategy called for NATO to preserve its traditionally strong nuclear deterrent while developing better conventional defenses. This change further magnified the United States' role in NATO's military preparations. While continuing to serve as the backbone of NATO's nuclear posture, American forces branched out to perform a broad set of conventional roles and missions. U.S. units in Europe handled many of NATO's most important command, control, communications, and intelligence functions. The U.S. Army's V and VII Corps stood guard over the critical Fulda and Meinengen Gap regions along the inter-German border. U.S. Air Force (USAF) forces conducted many of NATO's tactical air missions, and Army units provided a substantial portion of NATO's ground-based air defenses in Central Europe. Meanwhile the U.S. Sixth Fleet, operating out of bases in the Mediterranean, helped protect NATO's southern flank.

Despite American pressure, the West European allies proved unwilling to expand their conventional forces to the degree required by the new strategy. As a result, during the 1970s, the United States increasingly emphasized its traditional role of providing outside reinforcements to NATO in a crisis. The Department of Defense developed an ambitious plan for deploying a total of 10 divisions and 60 tactical fighter squadrons to Europe in only ten days: more than a twofold increase over peacetime levels. To help achieve this goal, the DoD prepositioned Army and Air Force equipment stocks in Europe (POMCUS), sought allied host nation support, and established U.S. units capable of processing a large infusion of incoming troops. Backing up these initial reinforcements were additional Army forces from the United States, many of them transported by sealift across the Atlantic. The need to secure the sea lines of communication (and to defend Norway), in turn, called attention to the important task of containing the Soviet naval threat in the northern waters. Maritime operations thereby came to play an increasingly important role in NATO's strategy, and only the U.S. Navy was equipped to perform these operations. The contributions provided by these naval forces, and by large ground and air reinforcements from the United States, further underscored American influence in NATO planning circles.

These conventional defense-oriented changes in NATO strategy and force requirements underscored the need for a large, unchanging U.S. military presence in Europe. During the 1970s and the 1980s, the U.S. presence was periodically challenged on the grounds that its deterrent mission could be accomplished, in political terms, with fewer forces. But military realities always barred the door to any major drawdown. Fear that a large U.S. withdrawal might unravel NATO's military strategy, especially against a short-warning attack, was one inhibiting factor. Reinforcing this concern was apprehension that withdrawal might influence the West European allies to slacken their own defense efforts and even to lose faith in NATO itself. As a result, when the Cold War came to a climactic end in the late 1980s, American forces in Europe were still at their traditional levels.

COMPOSITION OF U.S. FORCES IN EUROPE

The Cold War's demise left in its wake an American military presence that strongly reflects these four decades of coalition planning. The primary political-military missions that have shaped this posture include:

- Preservation of U.S. influence within NATO and Europe, including an American SACEUR, affecting NATO's strategy, force goals, military programs, and crisis-management procedures.
- Achievement of nuclear coupling and extended deterrence in ways that link the U.S. strategic posture to Western Europe's security.
- Maintenance of a peacetime military infrastructure to include adequate U.S./NATO command staffs, intelligence and communications assets, and associated bases and facilities.
- Deployment of adequate in-place ground, air, and naval combat forces to perform conventional missions stemming from NATO's military strategy and coalition plans in peace, crisis, and war.
- Deployment of adequate combat support and combat service support (CS/CSS) forces to meet support requirements for these combat forces during peacetime and the initial stages of a crisis.
- Maintenance of a support establishment capable of efficiently absorbing outside reinforcements, including care of POMCUS sites, Collocated Operating Base (COB)/Main Operating Base (MOB) bases, war reserve stockpiles, and reception facilities.

These missions have produced the mid-1990 U.S. force presence that is displayed in Figure 3.1 below (before Desert Shield and subsequent drawdowns in 1991). This posture of 303,400 DoD military personnel excludes some 18,000 naval personnel deployed aboard ships at sea, mostly in the Mediterranean. Inclusion of these personnel would increase the total posture to 321,400 soldiers. The manpower options examined in this study include only ashore personnel and do not count afloat naval forces. Drawdown plans studied here thus start from a base posture of 303,400.

As Figure 3.1 indicates, the U.S. posture was dominated by U.S. Army units assigned to Germany. Nonetheless, these units accounted for only about two-thirds of the total. The Air Force fully deployed 82,600 airmen, less than one-half of which were based in Germany. Of the remainder, some 22,900 were based in the United Kingdom; the other 20,600 were scattered across Western Europe, with nearly 15,000 deployed on the southern flank. The Navy deployed 15,200 seamen, distributed among a variety of bases in the Mediterranean and elsewhere. By any standard, this was a complicated and geographically widespread posture. Any attempt to create a theory of post-Cold War manpower requirements will need to account for far more units and functions than just U.S. Army forces based in Germany.

We can gain some useful insights on how this manpower was distributed in relation to key U.S. military missions by examining Figure 3.2. This chart groups U.S. forces into service categories, then divides each service into "combat" and "support" units. This support category includes only units assigned to Army echelons above corps and, for the Air Force, those assigned to echelons above wing-level and associated combat units. Support manpower as-

	<u>Army</u>	<u>Air Force</u>	<u>Navy</u>	<u>Total</u>
FRG	196.0	39.1	.5	235.6
Belgium/Netherlands	2.1	2.6	.2	4.9
United Kingdom	.2	22.9	2.8	25.9
Greece	.2	1.5	.2	1.9
Italy	4.1	5.3	5.6	15.0
Spain/Portugal	.1	6.0	3.8	9.9
Turkey	1.2	3.4	.1	4.7
Other and transient	1.7	1.8	2.0	5.5
Total	205.6	82.6	15.2	303.4

**Figure 3.1—U.S. Manpower Levels in Europe Mid-1990
(000s)**

signed to the Army's V and VII Corps (or related combat formations) and to Air Force combat units are counted in the "combat" category. By this definition, some 236,000 U.S. military personnel were assigned to combat units for all three services, and another 86,000 were assigned to higher-echelon support units. If naval combat afloat forces are discounted, about 72 percent of U.S. service personnel were assigned to combat units, and the remaining 28 percent to support.

As Figure 3.2 suggests, the calculus about future manpower needs will be dominated by an assessment of combat force requirements. As of early 1990, the U.S. Army deployed two corps headquarters. Major combat formations included four divisions, five separate maneuver brigades and armored cavalry regiments, two aviation brigades, five artillery brigades, a battalion in Italy assigned to the ACE Mobile Force, a large air defense command based in Germany, and some special operations units. The Air Force deployed ten wing headquarters, with about 570 combat aircraft (roughly eight wing-equivalents). Supporting these forces were specialized reconnaissance, defense suppression, and electronic warfare units totaling 66 aircraft, along with units totaling 122 transport, utility, and other types of aircraft. These combat, specialized, and support aircraft were deployed at 12 air bases: seven in Germany, five in the United Kingdom, and one in Spain. U.S. military manpower requirements for the post-Cold War era will be heavily determined by how many of these ground and air combat forces are slated to be left behind.

Nevertheless, higher-echelon support forces above corps and wing, and at naval bases, are far from trivial considerations. If all U.S. combat forces were entirely removed but the existing support structure were left behind, the U.S. presence would still total 86,000 troops. This itself would be a fairly sizable presence—as large as some observers believe is appropriate for

<u>Army</u>	<u>Air Force</u>	<u>Navy</u>
<u>Combat (160 K)</u> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • V and VII Corps • BDE of 2nd AD (III Corps) • SETAF BN • Berlin BDE • 32nd AADCOM • SOSC 	<u>Combat (60 K)</u> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 4 TFW in FRG • 5 TFW in UK • 1 TFW in Spain/Italy • Recce, EW, air control, transport, SOS, and SAR units 	<u>Combat Afloat (18 K)</u> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 6th Fleet in Mediterranean; typically 1 CVBG, 7 SCs, 4 SSNs, 1 URG, 1 ARG, 1 MPS, 4 depot ships
<u>Support at EAC (45 K)</u> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 7th Army: TAACOM, ordnance brigade, training cmd., medical cmd. • Non-USAREUR: Intel & comm. units; SHAPE Hqs., 19 other units 	<u>Support Units (24 K)</u> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Intel & comm. units • MAC units • 20 other units 	<u>Support Ashore (15 K)</u> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Major bases at Holy Loch, Naples, Rota, Suda Bay • Numerous other minor facilities in Mediterranean

Figure 3.2—U.S. Combat and Support Forces in Europe Mid-1990 (000s)

the whole U.S. posture. In reality, of course, many support personnel can be taken out when combat units are withdrawn because they directly service those units. But how many? The answer is unclear. The reason for this is that some support forces perform functions that are partly or wholly independent of any combat units. Good examples are the U.S. space-tracking and seismic-monitoring facilities in Turkey. Support units like these would be candidates for withdrawal only if a decision is made to terminate their functions.

Further clouding the picture is the sheer diversity of this support establishment. Assigned to U.S. Army Europe (USAREUR) has been the 7th Army, which numbered some 27,000 personnel. This included a large theater headquarters staff (TAACOM) of 10,000 personnel, an ordnance brigade, a training command, a medical command, and other units. Additionally, the U.S. Army also deployed about 16,000 personnel in support units not assigned to USAREUR. These units included U.S./NATO command staffs, an intelligence command, a communications systems command, and some 19 other units, many of them quite small. The Air Force's support establishment was similarly complicated. Its 24,000 airmen were distributed among over 20 separate units. Dominating this support establishment were USAFE command staffs, a communications command, an intelligence command, Military Airlift Command (MAC) units, and airmen assigned to NATO staffs.

A support structure this large and complex defies simple characterization, much less an easy approach to altering its size. What can be said is that any theory of post-Cold War U.S. manpower requirements in Europe will have to come to grips with the support structure. Combat

forces perform most of the highly visible military missions in Europe, but these support units, operating out of eyesight, conduct a variety of essential missions of their own. In particular, they operate most of the peacetime U.S. military infrastructure in Europe, including U.S./NATO command staffs, intelligence assets, and communications networks. They also maintain the air bases, naval ports, and other essential facilities that permit U.S. aircraft and ships to deploy to Europe, refuel and get repairs, and either operate there or transit through. Additionally, they provide the wherewithal for quickly absorbing large numbers of outside reinforcements. Without them, the United States would be hard-pressed to stay in the military business in Europe and could even find itself temporarily crippled in an emergency. For this reason, the future U.S. military presence in Europe will need to strike an appropriate balance between combat and support forces by preserving that which is critical in both areas.

DRAWDOWN GOALS AND SCHEDULES

How many combat and support forces should be withdrawn, and how many left behind? Figure 3.3 illustrates this question in quantitative terms. As it suggests, during the late 1980s, the United States contemplated a phased reduction to about 225,000 by 1995, or to about 75 percent of the original 300,000 level. This plan first surfaced publicly after the Bush-Gorbachev summit in mid-1989 and served as a point of reference for several months. The plan, however, was linked to the assumption that while large Soviet forces would be withdrawn from Eastern Europe, the basic bipolar security order would remain in place.




Figure 3.3—Alternative Future U.S. Manpower Levels in Europe

The dramatic events of 1990 overturned this calculus. That year brought the collapse of Communist rule in Eastern Europe, Germany's unification in NATO, the death of the Warsaw Pact, and the USSR's agreement to remove all Soviet troops by 1994. This new state of affairs led the United States to adjust its end-strength target further downward. Based on the assumption that a roughly 50 percent reduction by 1995 is now being contemplated, Figure 3.3 projects a steady drawdown to about 150,000 soldiers. Actual drawdowns might proceed faster, but the sheer logistical complexity of moving large amounts of hardware and other material will have a constraining effect. The manpower issue at hand is whether the United States should remain at this level in the years after 1995 or, alternatively, should reduce further.

TOWARD A POSTURE OF FORWARD PRESENCE

The amount of military manpower needed in Europe will depend upon the kind the defense posture—in units and capabilities—that the United States and NATO decide is required for the post-1995 period. Taking a cue from official DoD and NATO statements, this study will assume that the United States presently plans to leave behind an Army corps of two divisions and associated units, a USAF presence of about 3.5 tactical fighter wing-equivalents, and the current system of naval bases in the Atlantic and Mediterranean. This study also assumes that these combat forces will be supplemented by appropriate higher-echelon support forces, including units capable of maintaining an adequate peacetime infrastructure and crisis reinforcement capability.

The strategic concept behind this plan can be labeled one of "forward presence." This concept is attractive to many U.S. military authorities because it would retain in Europe a sizable, operationally coherent posture capable of weighty, nationally independent combat operations. Politically, the idea here is that the United States would leave sufficient forces to unequivocally signal its commitment to NATO's continued existence and to Western Europe's security. A U.S. military presence of this magnitude would help underwrite nuclear coupling and extended deterrence provided not all theater nuclear weapons are removed from Western Europe's soil. It also would reinforce the continuing U.S. commitment to maintaining strong NATO conventional options in Central Europe and other regions. Not coincidentally, these U.S. forces would provide, percentage-wise, about the same contribution to NATO's defense posture compared to the West European allies as was made during the Cold War. This would occur because the active forces of most West European nations are themselves slated to undergo 25 to 50 percent cutbacks.

As a result, the United States would remain entitled to an unchanging strong role in NATO's integrated military command. In addition to occupying the SACEUR position, senior U.S. officers currently hold a host of other important NATO command billets. These include command of SACLANT, AFCENT, AAFCE, and AFSOUTH, and several less visible but important positions in NATO's civilian headquarters at Brussels and SHAPE headquarters at Mons, Belgium. Particularly because NATO tends to operate on the principle that influence is distributed in accordance with responsibility and contribution, this weighty role is a direct byproduct of the large presence the United States has maintained in Europe. In the future, NATO's command structure will be consolidated somewhat, as will the U.S. command structure in Europe. Nonetheless, the importance of having American officers in influential NATO positions will remain. A significantly smaller U.S. military presence in Europe could tilt the

all-important balance of national contributions, thereby undercutting the current U.S. entitlement and the influence that goes with it.

The centerpiece of this operationally coherent posture would be the U.S. Army corps, which would continue to be based in Germany at present U.S.-occupied installations. This corps would play an integral role in NATO's emerging strategy for defending Western Europe with responsive and highly mobile forces. It would be capable of conducting regular training exercises with allied forces and thereby participating in the creation of NATO's future military doctrine. Some of the corps' units could be cross-attached to neighboring multinational NATO corps (e.g., a German corps, a Belgian corps, or NATO's Rapid Reaction Corps), and its command structure would be capable of absorbing allied forces in return. In these ways, it would also fit into NATO's unfolding plans for creating multinational formations. Remaining in Italy would be an Army battalion that contributes to multinationality by serving as part of the ACE Mobile Force.

This corps would be a "heavy" formation. It would be structured with units capable of independent maneuver operations on Central Europe's relatively open and rolling terrain: armored and mechanized brigades, armored cavalry, attack helicopters, and self-propelled artillery. Attached to it would be a corps support structure (Corps Support Command [COSCOM] and related units) allowing it to move rapidly at long distances and to support itself in pitched combat. Indeed, this corps would be sufficiently self-contained to allow it to be picked up and moved outside Central Europe—for example, to Turkey or even the Persian Gulf. It thereby would defend Central Europe but would not be tied to that region alone. It would be a corps capable of responding to a wide range of contingencies calling for powerful ground forces.

The tactical air forces to be maintained in Europe would also be a visible part of this continuing U.S. presence, and equally important. In all likelihood, USAF would deploy about two wings in Germany, another wing in the United Kingdom, and some aircraft in the Southern Region. This basing pattern would provide broad geographic coverage of both Central Europe and the Southern Region. The posture would include about 250 combat aircraft supported by about 40 transport aircraft. Some USAF aircraft would be configured for nuclear strike missions, thereby providing a continuing American nuclear presence. Other aircraft would conduct air intercept missions, an area where the United States enjoys a comparative advantage because of its technological leadership in all-weather, day-night capabilities. Still other aircraft would perform interdiction and close air support missions—areas that, as Desert Storm showed, can be crucial to modern military strategy. This USAF posture thus would cover the full spectrum of NATO air missions and would be capable of working with allied forces in developing combined doctrine and procedures.

The preservation of a largely unchanged pattern of naval bases in the Mediterranean would permit the continued deployment of the Sixth Fleet there. Over the years, the U.S. Navy's strong presence in the Mediterranean has been an important part of American security policy and NATO's military strategy. During peacetime, it has conveyed a reassuring signal of U.S. intent to friends and allies in the Southern Region. During the crises that have occurred there regularly, it has provided an array of military options that U.S. and NATO authorities drew upon in pursuing their objectives. Especially because the Mediterranean remains a "hot spot," U.S. and NATO policy continue to value this presence and evidently prefer to see it remain undiminished.

At present, the U.S. Navy maintains large naval bases in Italy (Sigonella and Naples/Gaeta) and Spain (Rota), with a host of subsidiary installations scattered between Gibraltar and Turkey. This Mediterranean-basing network consumes about 10,000 of the total 15,000 naval forces and Marines deployed in Europe. The remaining personnel are primarily based in the United Kingdom, where the Navy maintains its SSBN (Ballistic Missile Submarine, Nuclear) base at Holy Loch. A small number of naval personnel are also based in Iceland and in other West European locations.

In recent years, Sixth Fleet deployments in the Mediterranean typically have included a carrier battle group, with a single carrier, some six to eight surface combatants, and four SSN (Ship, Submersible, Nuclear) attack submarines. This force normally is serviced by two fast support ships, and an underway replenishment group (URG) composed of four to six support ships and two to three escorts. Also deployed have been a Marine Amphibious Ready Group (ARG), with a Marine battalion embarked aboard amphibious ships, and about four depot ships. In the years ahead, declining Navy force levels might compel some scale-backs in this daily presence and possibly some base consolidations as well. Maintaining a full carrier battle group continuously on station is an important U.S. goal, but whether the Navy will be able to do so remains to be seen. Nonetheless, a still-adequate base structure will allow the U.S. Navy to deploy forces of this size, or even larger forces, at times of the nation's choosing.

Finally, the small U.S. presence in NATO's Northern Region is worth noting. At present, the United States prepositions a brigade's worth of Marine Corps equipment in Norway. It also maintains small but important naval installations along the arc stretching from northern Norway through Iceland and Greenland. This presence plays an important role in reassuring Norway. It also provides critical assets for executing U.S. and NATO maritime strategies in peace, crisis, and war. As matters now stand, this northern presence will remain largely unchanged even as U.S. forces elsewhere in Europe are reduced substantially.

Backing up this forward presence of Army, Air Force, and Navy combat units will be a capability to deploy large numbers of reinforcements from the continental United States in a major crisis. As in past years, the cutting edge of this reinforcing posture would be USAF forces, including several combat wings (e.g., 15 tactical fighter wings [TFWs]), along with reconnaissance, defense suppression, electronic warfare, command and control, and support units. Following shortly after would be several active Army divisions and brigades, most likely five to six division equivalents. Still later would come several more Army Reserve Component (RC) divisions. U.S. naval units in the Mediterranean and North Atlantic also would be reinforced.

To help facilitate this reinforcement capability, the United States presumably will maintain in Europe sufficient support units to process arriving forces. Also maintained will be two to three Army division-sized POMCUS sets of prepositioned equipment, stockpiles of munitions and equipment (WRM/WRS), a combination of "hot" (ready for combat operations) and "cold" air bases, and appropriate ground installations. This support infrastructure will be nearly invisible to the public eye. But its adequacy will largely determine how fast and efficiently the United States can add to its peacetime presence in Europe.

A good example of how support infrastructure matters is the case of POMCUS sets and WRM/WRS stocks. A single Army armored or mechanized division's major equipment items weigh about 100,000 tons, and its WRM/WRS stocks for a month of combat weigh another

50,000 tons. The task of quickly transporting even one fully supported division to Europe would consume nearly all U.S. airlift assets for about a week. The act of deploying six divisions (minus a sealift effort, which itself takes about a month to establish) would take a full six weeks. This lengthy period can be reduced dramatically by prepositioning POMCUS sets and WRM/WRS stocks in Europe. Illustratively, a program composed of two to three POMCUS sets and enough WRM/WRS to support six reinforcing divisions could cut this time about in half.

Whether U.S. Army inventories will permit an allocation of equipment and munitions this large is uncertain. During the Cold War, the United States strove to deploy six POMCUS sets and large WRM/WRS stockpiles to handle a full ten-division force. Although two to three POMCUS sets will be maintained, the budgetary cutbacks ahead probably will compel the Army to scale back its other Europe-deployed stocks in order to meet requirements in the United States and elsewhere. WRM/WRS stocks thus might fall short of requirements for fully supporting the active-duty Army combat forces that would deploy early in a crisis. Adequate stockpiles would help preserve rapid reinforcement as a viable option for the post-Cold War era.

MANPOWER REQUIREMENTS AND TRADE-OFFS

How many U.S. ground, air, and naval personnel will be required to maintain this posture? This question is an exceedingly complicated one, but it is not beyond informed analysis. The central conclusion developed in the following paragraphs is that a manpower level of about 165,000 troops would best meet the requirements posed by a forward presence posture. The currently planned level of 150,000 troops therefore will compel some belt tightening, especially in higher-echelon Army support units. Nevertheless, a posture of 150,000 troops will be broadly adequate.

The analytical path that must be followed to reach this conclusion is tortuous and yields widely inconsistent estimates along the way before the end is reached. Depending upon the method employed, a case can be made for U.S. manpower levels ranging anywhere between 145,000 and 181,000 troops. Despite the difficulty, however, this path needs to be followed if the complex relationship between force posture and manpower levels is to be understood. This applies in analyzing not only DoD's current plan but also the alternative policies being advocated by others.

The simplest approach to calculating future manpower needs is the rule-of-thumb standard of "linear proportionality." In this approach, total manpower levels would be determined largely on the proportion of Army and Air Force combat units to remain in Europe, with shares subdivided proportionately between the two services. This approach avoids the complex task of addressing many different units on a case-by-case basis. Also, it treats both services fairly; neither is called upon to tighten its belt more than the other. Under this rule, if exactly 50 percent of present Army brigades and Air Force wings were to be left behind, then the Army would be allocated 102,500 slots and the Air Force 42,000. Combined Army and Air Force manpower levels would be set at 144,500. An unchanged U.S. naval presence would bring the total to 159,500—somewhat above the currently planned level of 150,000.

The present DoD plan, however, appears to reduce both Army and Air Force combat units somewhat below the 50 percent benchmark. A future Army "Capable Corps" of two divisions,

an armored cavalry regiment, an aviation brigade, two artillery brigades, an air defense brigade, and other units would amount to about 45 percent of the Army's present combat strength in Europe. An air presence of 3.5 wing-equivalents and associated aircraft would represent about 42 percent of USAF's current strength. Under the proportionality rule, these combat forces would require 93,300 Army troops and 36,700 USAF airmen. This yields a combined total of 130,000 troops. With Navy manpower included, the total posture would rise to about 145,000 military personnel under the proportionality rule: 5,000 less than 150,000.

Proportionality, however, is a crude yardstick. Perfectly linear relationships seldom apply in defense planning or elsewhere. The reason is that, in complex organizations, the resource needs of various subcomponents tend to fluctuate in relation to each other as a function of total level of effort. This phenomenon is well known in the costing analysis of defense weapon systems, where relationships are often distinctly nonlinear. There, incremental costs normally drop as more weapons are produced but rise as fewer systems are procured. What applies to weapons systems does not necessarily apply to the relationship between manpower and force levels. Nevertheless, this experience does suggest that the proportionality rule should be supplemented by a more sophisticated calculus that is sensitive to the possibility of nonlinear requirements.

In the case of ground and air combat forces, manpower requirements do appear broadly susceptible to proportionality calculations. Figure 3.4 displays how manpower levels for a Europe-deployed Capable Corps of two divisions and associated units would derive from an Army table of organization for a standard three-division corps. This table suggests that a Capable Corps would require about 72,000 soldiers if 100 percent manning is maintained. Including a second attack helicopter brigade would increase the total to about 77,000 men. For USAF, about 6,800 airmen typically have been required in Europe to fill out a tactical fighter wing and associated flying units (i.e., transport aircraft). Employing this standard, a

Standard Corps		Capable Corps	
Divisions (3)	49.5	(2)	33.2
ACR	4.5		4.5
Separate BDE	5.3		—
Corps Arty	9.2		6.0
Avn. BDE	3.0		3.0
CS BDES	17.6		11.5
CSS/COSCOM	20.5		13.4
Total	109.6		71.6

Figure 3.4—Composition of a Future U.S. Army Corps in Europe
(000s)

USAF force of 3.5 TFWs would require about 24,000 military personnel. The total for Army and USAF combat forces together thus would be about 96,000 personnel.

What about support forces, where nonlinearity is most likely to manifest itself? If a total Army/Air Force manpower ceiling of 130,000 were to be met, this requirement for combat forces would leave a total of about 34,000 slots to be allocated among higher-echelon support units. Of these slots, about 21,000 would be available to the Army and about 13,000 to the Air Force—just under 50 percent of 1990 levels. At issue is whether the proportionality rule can legitimately be applied to higher-echelon support requirements to the degree needed to make this authorization adequate.

To the extent that the proportionality rule underestimates support needs deriving from non-linear considerations, overall manpower requirements would rise. Take, for example, the extreme case in which higher-echelon support requirements do not fall at all. In other words, the United States would need to maintain exactly the same higher-echelon support structure even though its corps and wing combat forces had been reduced by one-half. In this event, the required manpower level for Army and USAF forces would rise to 166,000 men. With naval forces included, the total count would rise to 181,000 troops—fully 31,000 above the current plan.

The truth can be ascertained only through a detailed review of each support function, a task that is beyond the scope of this study. Some general observations, however, can be offered here. To some degree, support requirements are clearly flexible. The drawdown of combat forces will reduce these requirements somewhat, and opportunities for consolidation will create added flexibility. Also, innovative ways often can be found to compensate for support shortfalls below ideal standards. One method is to rely more heavily on civilian contractors and host-nation support (HNS). Another method is to alter support practices. For example, engineer units can be trained to perform a broader range of duties and provided extra equipment that permits surge operations. The same applies to maintenance and other support functions. These methods have costs of their own, and they typically work better in peacetime than in war. But they do provide options for helping to manage a large support requirement with fewer-than-ideal assets.

Particularly since these methods will be available, some support reductions do appear feasible as a result of the planned withdrawal of U.S. combat forces. For the Army, many 7th Army and associated units currently provide direct support to V and VII Corps and therefore should be able to absorb manpower cuts with the removal of one corps. Included are the 56th Ordnance Brigade, the 7th Army's TAACOM, training command, and medical command. Also, the Army's intelligence and communications units can be reduced somewhat. For the Air Force, partial cutbacks appear feasible in the communications, intelligence, and MAC commands, as well as a number of other small units. Also, both Army and Air Force staff personnel can be reduced somewhat. As a best estimate, the net effect is to bring Army and Air Force manpower requirements down by about 16,000 spaces, or by about 25 percent of the late 1980s posture.

The implications for U.S. manpower requirements—combat and support—are displayed in Table 3.2. The "best estimate" developed here, with a total manpower requirement of 165,000 personnel, lies between the poles of proportionality and unchanging support needs. This pos-

Table 3.2
Alternative Manpower Requirements for a Forward Presence
(000s)

	Proportional Reductions	Best Estimates	Unchanging Support Needs
Army	93	107	117
Combat	(72)	(72)	(72)
Support	(21)	(35)	(45)
Air Force	37	43	49
Combat	(24)	(24)	(24)
Support	(13)	(19)	(25)
Ashore Navy	15	15	15
Total	145	165	181

ture would provide about 107,000 Army soldiers, 43,000 USAF airmen, and 15,000 Navy/Marine personnel. Of these, 54,000 troops would be allocated to Army and USAF higher-echelon support units. As best as can be determined here, this posture would provide a forward presence that is adequately balanced among the three services and among the requirements for combat power, peacetime infrastructure, and reinforcing capability.

If a manpower level of 165,000 in fact is appropriate for this posture's goals, then the currently planned level of 150,000 men will compel DoD to make sacrifices in either combat forces or support assets. The trade-off here is between the highly visible presence that comes from combat units and the less visible support assets that provide a militarily important peacetime infrastructure and crisis reinforcement capability. While this trade-off is not an easy one, a proper programming strategy would allocate manpower assets in a fashion that tries to ensure that neither combat nor support units are left seriously short.

As matters currently stand, the DoD plan places highest priority on fully manning combat units and evidently is willing to accept shortfalls in the support structure. Given this, the manpower issue becomes one of deciding how to allocate the extra 5,000 spaces (the difference between 145,000 and the plan's 150,000 troops). On balance, these assets probably could best be allocated to Air Force support units. Included would be intelligence, communications, maintenance of air bases for absorbing reinforcements, and supply units. The reason is that, in the early stages of a fast-breaking crisis, the premium would be on having a well-developed air infrastructure that can absorb a rapid USAF reinforcement effort. Army support units would be needed sometime later. Assuming this will be the case, manpower for the U.S. posture would be distributed as shown in Table 3.3.

Table 3.3
Allocation of U.S. Military Manpower at 150,000 Total Troops
(1995)

	Combat	Support	Total
Army	72,000	21,000	93,000
Air Force	24,000	18,000	42,000
Navy	—	15,000	15,000
Total	95,000	55,000	150,000

This distribution would leave the U.S. posture with fully manned Army and USAF combat forces and nearly adequate USAF support units, but 14,000 soldiers short in Army support. Therefore, Army support forces would meet only 60 percent of their requirements as estimated here; the remainder would have to be based in the United States and could be deployed only in a crisis. This deficiency would be manifested during peacetime operations in U.S./NATO command staffs, intelligence and communications, engineers, training facilities, and maintenance of supplies and prepositioned stocks. During a major crisis, it could result in a delayed Army reinforcement effort because critical support assets might claim priority over combat forces. For this reason, the Army's total posture could be fairly characterized as "tooth heavy" and somewhat "tail light."

Barring a willingness to scale back the Capable Corps in order to deploy more support assets, a step that would entail difficult sacrifices of its own, the issue for the future will be whether a posture of 150,000 troops is adequate. The problem could be eliminated entirely by adding 15,000 troops (14,000 Army and 1,000 USAF), a difference of only 10 percent. But now that the United States and NATO seem to have publicly embraced a level of 150,000 troops, political considerations might stand in the way of even marginal increases.

Whatever the case, this analysis concludes that a U.S. posture as envisioned here could not readily be reduced below 150,000 without sacrificing important capabilities. Additional cutbacks would either pare back some combat forces that are a key element of the DoD plan or further reduce a support posture that (with Army and USAF assets considered together) already is about 25 percent short. In all likelihood, the Army's Capable Corps and USAF reinforcement capabilities would be the first to suffer. In important ways, further cutbacks—especially of a sizable nature—would change the essence of DoD's plan, the commitments it is designed to meet, and the political-military strategy that underlies it.

AVAILABILITY OF DoD RESOURCES

Will adequate U.S. defense resources be available to support an enduring presence of about 150,000 soldiers? As matters now stand, the answer appears to be a qualified "yes." This judgment rests on the assumption that DoD resources will not be cut far below presently planned levels. Even at these levels, however, an ever-watchful eye will need to be kept on the relationship between European troop strengths and total military assets.

One potential impediment to supporting the presence is that the U.S. defense budget is coming down. Between 1985 and 1992, the DoD budget has been reduced by fully 24 percent in real terms. As of 1991, the six-year budget was programmed to remain constant in current dollars at about \$280 billion. But when inflation is considered, this amounts to a real decline of about 3 percent annually. The FY93 budget announced in early 1992 calls for an additional \$50 billion in cuts over a six-year period, but mostly in modernization, not force structure. This equates to annual spending cuts of 4 percent in real terms, but current plans call for no reductions in the size of the Base Force. Fewer defense dollars will translate into less flexibility overseas. Nevertheless, DoD was able to maintain a European presence of 300,000 soldiers during the fiscally austere 1970s. Because the incremental costs of deploying troops at already-existing facilities will not be high, DoD's budget currently is planned to remain large enough to permit a presence of 150,000 troops.

Another impediment is that DoD manpower levels are also shrinking. From a peak of 2.174 million soldiers in 1987, DoD active-duty manpower will decline to 1.886 million in 1992, and then to 1.653 million by 1995. Although this 25 percent total reduction will provide a smaller manpower pool for managing large overseas deployments, the planned 50 percent cutback in Europe will ease the situation by reducing the proportion of end-strength deployed there. In 1987, nearly 15 percent of DoD's end-strength was based in Europe; in 1996, only 9 percent will be deployed there. Nevertheless, the need to maintain an adequate military infrastructure in the United States imposes large, rather constant demands for manpower. This exacerbates the problems encountered at low manpower levels in establishing rotational policies and maintaining a proper balance between overseas deployments and CONUS strength. A future presence of about 150,000 seems to be an achievable goal, but not without nagging problems in this area.

A final impediment to maintaining the U.S. presence is the important matter of international responsibilities elsewhere. In addition to Europe, the United States will need to maintain sizable forces in the Western Pacific/Northeast Asia areas, and at least some forces in the Persian Gulf. Additionally, it always will need to have sufficient reinforcements for meeting crises and wartime contingencies in these and other areas. It will need to meet these enduring requirements with far smaller forces than during the Cold War. As Table 3.4 illustrates, U.S. active and Reserve Component (RC) forces will be reduced by 25 percent compared to previous levels.

U.S. force levels in the Pacific are scheduled to be reduced and nearly all Desert Shield/Storm forces will be withdrawn from the Gulf region. This will ease the task of meeting future peacetime overseas deployment requirements in these regions even if 150,000 troops are kept in Europe. A more troublesome problem could arise in meeting crisis and wartime contingencies. If European-deployed forces are discounted, the United States will have available an active posture of only 13 Army/Marine divisions and 14.5 USAF/Marine air wings. As Table 3.5 shows, this is less than in 1990, and even then, U.S. VII Corps and air units had to be withdrawn from Europe to execute Desert Shield/Storm.

DoD's base posture will provide plenty of forces to meet small contingencies. But a different matter is a large crisis involving the kind of forces that had to be deployed to Korea, Vietnam, and the Persian Gulf: about ten divisions and several hundred aircraft. In principle, enough active forces will still be available, supplemented by a pool of RC forces that could be activated. In reality, however, constraints could bar the use of all these forces. Typically, some units will be tied down elsewhere (e.g., Korea). Others might not be properly configured; for example, "light" forces might not be suitable for desert warfare, "heavy" forces

Table 3.4
Future U.S. Conventional Force Levels
(base force)

	1990	1996
Army/Marine divisions	32 (21 active)	21 (15 active)
USAF/Marine fighter wings	40 (27 active)	30 (18 active)
Available aircraft carriers	13	12
Carrier air wings	15 (13 active)	13 (11 active)
Battle force ships	545	451

Table 3.5
Residual Active Forces After Europe-
Deployed Units Are Discounted

	1990	1996
Army/Marine divisions	17	13
USAF/Marine wings	16	14.5

for mountains and jungles. And experience suggests that Army RC combat forces are not easily activated for overseas combat on short notice. These constraints do not bar the way to the deployment of a corps and 3 to 4 wings in Europe. But especially in light of the recent Persian Gulf experience, they do suggest that U.S. forces in Europe should be regarded as flexible assets that can be used elsewhere if the need arises.

SMALLER FORCE POSTURES: TOWARD A SPECTRUM OF POLICY CHOICES

Although DoD has revealed its plan in enough detail to permit analysis of how force composition and manpower requirements relate to each other, the same cannot be said for other proposals. Thus far, advocates of a smaller U.S. presence chiefly have presented their alternatives in terms of manpower levels that are, in turn, justified on broad political grounds. In each case, little has been said about such specific matters as force structure and associated military rationale. For all these alternatives, their lack of greater specificity inhibits any effort to define their essence, much less assess their implications.

For example, the argument for keeping 100,000 troops (or less) in Europe typically states that, almost irrespective of force composition, this many troops seems politically sufficient. While this might or might not be the case, the truth at least partly lies buried in the military details. Not only does the absolute size of the U.S. manpower commitment matter but also its exact force composition in relation to NATO's military needs. In theory, a posture of 100,000 might be just right, too large, or too small. In the absence of a more definitive portrayal of what this posture provides militarily, it is impossible to tell.

For this reason, the approach adopted here is not to analyze directly any of the alternatives currently being put forth by DoD's critics. Instead, this section analytically develops a spectrum of alternatives at ever-decreasing levels. In each case, it identifies both manpower levels and specific force composition assuming roughly the current mix of Army, Air Force, and Navy personnel is maintained. Its goal is to bound the range of current policy debate without ascribing any of these alternatives to specific participants in the process.

This section endeavors to be selective. Between a 50 percent withdrawal and total departure lies a very large number of different postures. Rather than address all of them, this study analyzes only three: 100,000, 70,000, and 40,000 troops. These postures are chosen because they differ in more than marginal terms. They offer distinct policy and strategy choices. Each identifies a quite different U.S. force presence that is designed to serve a unique strategy calculus and assessment of political-military requirements. Together they provide a range of progressively diminishing ambitions and a growing willingness to accept risks and shortfalls. They do not exhaust all the permutations and combinations, but they do help illuminate the broad policy and strategy choices ahead.

The number of combat forces that the United States could deploy would depend heavily on how military personnel are allocated at each manpower level between combat and support. Especially because combat forces are politically visible, a key U.S. goal would be to provide as many Army maneuver units and Air Force wings as possible. An Army brigade normally can be deployed with about 11,000 soldiers, counting the brigade itself and its immediate support units. A USAF wing can be deployed with about 6,800 airmen, counting 5,500 to service the combat aircraft and an additional 1,300 to provide various types of immediate support. If these requirements were the only consideration, the task of calculating total combat forces at all manpower levels would be straightforward.

The thorny matter of higher-echelon support requirements, however, again enters the manpower equation in ways that reduce feasible combat force levels. If the United States aspires to maintain in Europe its vital C³I network and an infrastructure capable of absorbing outside reinforcements, it will need to allocate a significant portion of its reduced manpower assets to these functions. These support requirements are not rigid, but neither are they highly flexible. Absent a policy decision to sacrifice support assets in some wholesale way, they promise to bite heavily into the amount of manpower assets that can be allocated to combat formations.

As an illustrative estimate, this analysis will postulate that a "bare bones," minimally adequate C³I network and military infrastructure in Europe will require at least 30,000 troops. This estimate includes 22,000 Army and USAF personnel and 8,000 ashore seamen. If this is the case, an analysis of feasible combat force levels would need to begin with this irreducible requirement firmly in mind. The implications are displayed in Table 3.6, which displays how U.S. military manpower might be allocated among these three force postures. It uses the posture of 150,000 troops as the "base case," which provides the Army with a lean support structure, and Air Force support needs are adequately met. It reduces from there, with one eye on proportionality and another eye on minimum higher-echelon support needs.

A noteworthy feature here is that Table 3.6 progressively reduces naval ashore assets, ultimately by 7,000 seamen. Because the drawdown to a posture of 100,000 would cut naval ashore assets by 20 percent, the cut could be absorbed without closing major facilities in the Mediterranean and the Atlantic. But at lower levels, significant closures inevitably would

Table 3.6
U.S. Combat Forces in Europe at Lower
Manpower Levels
(000s)

	100,000	70,000	40,000
Army	62	43	23
Combat	(40)	(24)	(5)
Support	(22)	(19)	(18)
Air Force	26	17	9
Combat	(16)	(10)	(4)
Support	(10)	(7)	(5)
Navy	12	10	8
Total combat forces			
Army maneuver brigades	4.1	2.4	.54
USAF wings	2.3	1.5	.60

occur. Major naval base closures, of course, could degrade the Navy's operating tempo in peace, crisis, and war. The alternative, however, is even fewer Army and Air Force combat forces than contemplated here.

Table 3.6 is illustrative; a more detailed appraisal by U.S. military staffs would be necessary to determine actual force levels. Even allowing for uncertainty in its estimates, however, Table 3.6 shows starkly that the U.S. military's combat role in Europe would become smaller and smaller as manpower levels plummet downward. A posture of 100,000 troops would permit only about 4 brigades and 2.4 air wings. At 70,000, only 2.4 brigades and 1.5 wings could be deployed. At 40,000 troops, less than 1 brigade and 1 wing would be possible. This table places priority on preserving a minimum support infrastructure, and therefore removes a higher percentage of Army combat troops in each case. A proportional drawdown plan would result in .5 to 1.0 more brigades in each case, but at the cost of serious cutbacks in higher-echelon support. Even so, the Army would not have many combat forces in Europe. Nor would the Air Force.

These manpower dynamics play a large role in shaping the European options open to the United States at significantly lower manpower levels than 150,000 troops. These options can be characterized in the following terms: dual-based forward presence, limited presence, and symbolic presence.

Dual-Based Forward Presence (100,000)

At a manpower level of 100,000 troops, the U.S. Army would be able to maintain a corps headquarters with enough maneuver units to form the lead echelons of two divisions and a proportional amount of corps-assigned combat support units (e.g., artillery). The Air Force would be left with only 2.3 wings but could still maintain a presence in Germany (1.3), the United Kingdom (.5), and Italy (.5). Backing up these combat forces would be some 24,000 higher-echelon support personnel that could staff C³I and other units at about 70 percent of presently planned levels. Presumably, this manpower would enable the Army and the Air Force to keep operating most of the key support units in the current plan.

On paper, this posture would enable the U.S. Army to continue commanding a NATO multinational corps and USAF forces to play an important role in NATO's air plans and command arrangements. U.S. support units could continue performing many important NATO C³I functions while providing important national assets. Additionally, a support infrastructure would be preserved for facilitating a U.S. reinforcement effort in a crisis.

In reality, however, this posture would be "hollow" in important ways. Its deficiencies could be partly solved only by "dual-basing" the additional combat forces and support manpower needed to bring the currently planned U.S. military commitment fully to life. Dual-basing means the permanent stationing of these forces and troops in the United States, coupled with their formal assignment to NATO in a way that would permit their quick return in a crisis. Their equipment (i.e., an extra set of it) would be prepositioned in Europe, and they could be recalled by SACEUR in an emergency without obtaining a formal NATO-wide political decision.

A good example of how dual-basing works is the Army 1st Mechanized Division, which has long deployed one brigade in Central Europe and two brigades in the United States.

Equipment for these brigades has been stored in POMCUS sets in Europe, and the entire division has been assigned an important reserve role as part of U.S. VII Corps. Over the years, these two U.S.-based brigades regularly were deployed to Central Europe and trained there as part of the annual REFORGER exercises. The entire 1st Mechanized Division deployed to the Persian Gulf with VII Corps during Desert Shield. In recent years, the Army also has deployed a single brigade of the 2nd Army Division, with equipment prepositioned for two brigades. These other two brigades have been based in Texas, earmarked for early deployment as an Allied Forces Central Europe (AFCENT) reserve. Similarly, the Air Force has long dual-based several tactical air squadrons. Dual-basing thus has historical precedent.

Dual-basing, however, has important drawbacks. It separates a division's or a wing's sub-components from each other, thereby potentially degrading training, readiness, and efficient command arrangements. It also is an expensive option because it requires the purchase of extra equipment and deployment in costly POMCUS sites. Finally, it requires periodic deployments of the U.S.-based units to Europe, where they can train with their counterparts. This practice too is both disruptive and costly. Nevertheless dual-basing has proven over the years to be a politically acceptable alternative. The key difference is that, whereas in the past only about 15 percent of U.S. combat forces formally committed to Europe were dual-based, now a much larger portion would fall into this category.

Of the 135,000 Army and USAF personnel currently planned for deployment in Europe, about two-thirds would remain there. The other one-third would be dual-based in the United States. For the Army, 62,000 soldiers would deploy in Europe and 31,000 in the United States. Of the 72,000 soldiers required to man the Capable Corps, about 48,000 would be based in Europe and 24,000 at home. While many different configurations are possible, the Army might, for example, elect to outfit its corps in Europe with the following units:

- Two maneuver brigades from one division, and a single brigade from the other division;
- An armored cavalry regiment;
- An aviation brigade with two battalions;
- Two artillery brigades with two battalions apiece;
- Other combat support brigades with two battalions apiece;
- A COSCOM of about 12,000 troops.

This configuration would require U.S.-basing of three maneuver brigades, an aviation battalion, two artillery battalions, a variety of other combat support battalions, and about 7,000 COSCOM personnel. In addition, another 7,000 soldiers normally assigned to Army echelons above corps would be based in the United States. For the Air Force, some 26,000 airmen would be based in Europe and 11,000 in the United States. The number of USAF squadrons dual-based would amount to 33 percent of the currently committed force, totaling 80 to 85 combat aircraft.

Because one-third of Army- and USAF-committed forces would return to the United States, this option is labeled "dual-based forward presence." Between manpower levels of 150,000 and 100,000 are a wide range of postures, each with a different mix of forward-stationed and dual-based units. Postures only marginally different from the current plan might not appre-

ciably alter the character of the U.S. presence in either political or military terms. But deeper cutbacks would increasingly do so. A posture of 100,000 troops would still provide the six-figure deployment that is regarded as especially significant in some quarters. Nonetheless, it would drop the U.S. military presence onto a different lower policy and strategy plateau.

If 150,000 troops is deemed too many and 100,000 too few, a potential option is a dual-based posture of 125,000. This level would provide about 80 percent of the manpower needed to achieve the operational coherence of the currently planned force and therefore would be far less dependent upon prompt outside reinforcement than a posture of 100,000 troops. In principle, this manpower level could permit a deployed combat force of 5.6 brigades and 2.8 fighter wings, along with associated support troops. In practice, U.S. military planners might want to maintain a larger mix of support troops, which often are harder to keep ready and transport quickly if based in the United States. The exact mix of combat and support forces would have to be determined through detailed analysis of the political-military trade-offs.

Limited Presence (70,000)

A manpower level of 70,000 troops would drop the United States down one plateau further. One reason is that the U.S. contribution to NATO's peacetime defenses in Europe would shrink in politically important terms. Traditionally, the United States has provided about 18 percent of NATO's active duty manpower in Central Europe. Because allied active military manpower currently is planned to diminish by 25 to 50 percent, a U.S. posture of 150,000 troops would maintain this contribution at about 14 percent. A posture of only 70,000 troops would drop the U.S. contribution to only 7 percent—a change that could alter traditional burden-sharing arrangements and possibly the command relationships that flow from them.

In addition, the military character of the U.S. presence would also change significantly under these conditions. This would be the case even if sufficient Army and Air Force units were dual-based in the United States to provide a posture readily capable of reaching 150,000 troops. At best, the Army could deploy only two to four maneuver brigades in Europe and about 40 percent of the Capable Corps' required manpower. Even with dual-basing, the United States would be hard-pressed to maintain the stance that it was providing a true Army corps. The framework of a corps—a headquarters, a staff, and associated units—could be maintained, but in absence of more combat forces, the corps might be perceived as a hollow shell. Conceivably, Army combat forces might be configured as a single division. In any event, having only one division would undercut the present goal of having the United States command a NATO multinational corps while also making a meaningful contribution to a second corps commanded by an allied officer.

With only 1.5 wings, USAF forces would be less able to contribute meaningfully to the full range of NATO's peacetime air missions, including nuclear deterrence and air defense. In all likelihood, it would have to specialize: e.g., by concentrating in nuclear and deep interdiction missions. The presence of only about 110 combat aircraft would not provide much geographic spread. USAF probably would still deploy a full wing to Germany, but its presence in the United Kingdom and Italy would be likely to drop to about a squadron apiece. This would scarcely be enough aircraft to conduct meaningful training exercises with British and Italian air forces.

It is difficult to specify exactly where, along the spectrum of reductions, the U.S. posture would shift from one kind of presence to another. Nevertheless, a posture of 70,000 does appear to place the United States on a significantly lower policy and strategy plain than the higher options examined here. Especially critical factors are the diminished U.S. contribution relative to the allies, and the loss of a credible corps and an equivalent USAF presence. U.S. combat forces would remain present in more than symbolic strength, but they would be far less able to operate independently, and to have a weighty political-military impact. They thereby would lose some of their military strength, and the political influence that goes along with it.

Symbolic Presence (40,000)

This manpower level would be similar to what is deployed in Korea, but with fewer combat forces because support allocations would be higher. Included would be less than one Army brigade that could form a division only by dual-basing with other brigades in the United States. Also remaining would be less than a single air wing (43 combat aircraft), about 23,000 Army and Air Force support personnel, and 8,000 ashore seamen at the naval bases. Compared to the current DoD plan, only about 25 percent of U.S. military manpower would remain in Europe.

A similar manpower level has preserved a highly visible role for the United States in Korea. But Europe is a different place: much larger, with more people, larger and better-armed military forces, and far greater political complexity. In Northeast Asia, the principal adversary is North Korea, a small nation that, notwithstanding its conventional military strength, does not possess nuclear weapons. In Europe, the former Soviet Union remains a military superpower, with nuclear weapons and a still-large army. Europe's larger geographic expanse alone has important military implications. In Korea, the U.S. military is able to focus on defense of a narrow peninsula. In Europe, it is required to address defense needs not only in Central Europe but also the Northern and Southern regions. This physical reality requires preservation of a larger communications network, more intelligence units, a far-flung system of air bases, and more Army reception facilities. The effect is to drive up manpower requirements for maintaining a similarly capable military infrastructure.

This posture would leave the United States with only about 4 percent of NATO's forces in Central Europe and with a reduced capacity to perform NATO and national missions across the entire continent. NATO's peacetime defense missions and immediate crisis-response capabilities would fall largely into the hands of the West European allies. In order to act either within NATO or individually, the United States would have to deploy sizable forces from across the Atlantic. For these political and military reasons, this posture would be meaningful primarily in symbolic terms. It would symbolize the U.S. military commitment to NATO rather than manifest it directly. Fulfillment of the U.S. military commitment to NATO would rest primarily on the combat forces that could be sent from the United States as reinforcements.

Budgetary Costs

The strategic benefits and costs of these four options will be discussed later, but their budgetary implications deserve brief mention here. Surface appearances suggest that smaller force postures in Europe would cost less than larger postures, but appearances here can be deceiving. Much depends upon a host of considerations that, at progressively lower force levels, can drive budgetary costs either down or up. Table 3.7 displays the budgetary impact of the three smaller postures compared to a 150,000 posture under three quite different assumptions: the withdrawn forces are disbanded; they are retained in the active posture in the United States; and they are both retained and dual-based. These cost figures are illustrative. For example, reductions well below 150,000 troops could permit base consolidations that yield marginal savings but also create costs brought about by the need to refurbish existing facilities. The exact budgetary trade-offs would need to be studied closely before a definitive conclusion can be reached.

Table 3.7 suggests savings of \$31 to \$67 billion would result at European levels below the present plan if the extra withdrawn forces are disbanded entirely. If the withdrawn forces are placed in Reserve Component status, the savings would be about one-half this large. These savings would be considerably reduced, however, if the withdrawn forces instead were retained in the active posture. Over the first three years, there would be little or no savings because relocation costs would offset the incremental costs of deploying these forces to Europe. Over the following seven years, small savings of \$1–2 billion would accrue annually, resulting in total savings for the ten-year period of \$6–13 billion. If the withdrawn forces were retained on active duty and dual-based, there would be no savings at all. Indeed, costs would rise by \$4–10 billion because of the expense of prepositioning equipment stocks and periodically deploying these forces to Europe for exercises.

These cost figures suggest that, unless withdrawn forces are disbanded, budgetary considerations do not play a major role in the analysis of future U.S. force levels in Europe. In this calculation, the base-case cost of the planned 150,000 presence would be about \$100 to \$125 billion for investment and operations over 10 to 15 years. Assuming disbandment is not pursued, budgetary costs for all three alternative postures vary only by 5 to 10 percent around this base case. In other words, all four postures would cost about the same. Particularly since the savings/costs here amount to a trivial portion of the total U.S. defense budget for this period, the larger policy and strategy factors at work dominate the relatively minor cost differences that do exist.

Table 3.7
Budgetary Implications of Alternative U.S. Force Postures^a
(10 years, \$billions, FY92 constant)

Postures	Status of Withdrawn Forces		
	Disbanded	Retained Active Duty	Retained and Dual-Based
150,000	0	0	0
100,000	+31	+6	-4
70,000	+49	+9	-7
40,000	+67	+13	-10

^a(+) = savings; (-) = extra costs.

Political Acceptability

Another issue that deserves mention is the political acceptability of these postures among West European nations. Currently, the governments of NATO's West European members officially support the idea of a U.S. presence of 150,000 troops. Whether their stance will maintain public support in these nations in the years ahead is an open issue. Concern that West European public opinion will grow dissatisfied with a still-large U.S. force presence is one important reason why some DoD critics favor a much smaller posture than 150,000 troops. Table 3.8 helps illuminate the implications by illustrating how U.S. military manpower might be deployed across Europe for all four postures.

Table 3.8 suggests that Germany's stance will be a decisive issue. Although the current DoD plan trims back U.S. military manpower by a full 50 percent, slightly over 100,000 soldiers and airmen will remain in Germany. The U.S. Army's corps and about two USAF wings will remain based there. Even at a lower posture of 100,000 troops, about 70,000 would still be based in Germany. The number there drops to a relatively small level only when the total posture shrinks to 40,000. Will Germany remain favorably inclined to hosting a still-large and highly visible American presence in the years after the Soviet Army has completely left Eastern Europe? This question is an imponderable. We can say that if Germany stays supportive, the current DoD plan will be in solid shape. But if Germany changes its mind in some major way, the idea of preserving a strong U.S. military presence in Europe would find itself on shaky ground.

A less dominant but still important imponderable is Italy's attitude. Although the U.S. presence in Italy has amounted to only about 15,000 personnel from all three branches, it has been a source of some controversy in Italian politics. The problem with the current U.S. plan is that while American forces will be cut by one-half across the rest of Europe, they will not be reduced appreciably in Italy. This pattern occurs because naval bases there are not slated for drawdowns, plans are under way to base a USAF wing at Crotone, and a U.S. Army combat team will remain at Vicenz as part of the ACE Mobile Force. The Italian government thus far has welcomed the USAF base at Crotone, but uncertainty exists about whether it will remain content with an unchanging total U.S. presence in the future. Much probably will depend upon the degree to which mechanisms can be found to increase training and other forms of integration between U.S. and Italian forces.

If German support wanes, other homes could be found for at least some U.S. troops. In particular, the United Kingdom has been a longtime supporter of a strong U.S. presence in

Table 3.8
Distribution of U.S. Manpower in Europe
(illustrative, 000s)

	Alternative Postures				
	300	150	100	70	40
Germany & Lowlands	241	109	72	51	29
United Kingdom	26	14	9	6	4
Italy	15	14	10	7	4
Other Southern Region	15	9	6	4	2
Miscellaneous	6	4	3	2	1

Europe. It might welcome not only a larger USAF presence beyond the single wing now slated to be retained there but also some U.S. Army combat forces. Elsewhere, the U.S. drawdown plan will leave only about 9,000 U.S. forces, mostly naval, deployed on the Southern Region (apart from those based in Italy). This drawdown will come at a time when the Southern Region's importance in NATO security policy is likely to increase because of mounting political tensions in both the Balkans and North Africa. Whether Spain, Portugal, Greece, and Turkey would be willing to host a larger U.S. presence than now planned is uncertain. But especially if German support does flag, this interesting possibility is worth keeping in mind.

4. U.S. SECURITY GOALS IN EUROPE

The task of deciding upon the future U.S. military presence in Europe requires more than a portrayal of the available options. It also requires an assessment of their political-military consequences. To form this kind of assessment, the United States will require a strategic planning framework that accurately identifies its security needs in Europe in the years ahead. An analytical structure of this sort would provide a theory of requirements that could be used to judge how alternative force levels perform. It would help bring the relationship of ends and means into focus, thereby providing a basis for gauging how much is enough.

During the Cold War, the United States had the luxury of possessing a highly elaborate planning framework. This framework provided not only a coherent analysis of European security affairs but also a quantitative basis for gauging specific military requirements. The end of the Cold War has overthrown this framework, thereby confronting the United States and NATO with the task of building a replacement. Because this task requires fresh thinking and political-consensus formation on both sides of the Atlantic, it promises to be anything but easy. Yet it must be accomplished. To do otherwise is to guarantee the kind of intellectual vacuum that, in the past, so often has produced bad decisions.

The purpose of Sections 4 through 8 is to put some of the required building blocks into place. These sections rely heavily on the progress that NATO's ongoing strategy and policy review already has made, but because this review is still far from complete, in some places these sections push the state of the art beyond officially approved NATO thinking. These sections refrain, however, from endorsing any single strategic planning framework. Instead, they endeavor to show how NATO's thinking plausibly could go in several different directions depending upon how the United States and its allies assess the situation ahead. In doing so, they illuminate both the strategic judgments that give rise to a requirement for a large U.S. military presence and the judgments that could lead to quite different conclusions.

Together, these sections conduct an exercise in classical military planning. They begin with an appraisal of U.S. security goals in Europe. They then proceed deductively through an appraisal of the future European security environment and NATO's military strategy for dealing with it. Finally, they address U.S. roles and missions in Europe and specific U.S. military requirements that flow from these missions. These steps are displayed in Figure 4.1, which displays the methodological approach outlined in the introduction.

This methodology offers a highly stylized and formal way of thinking that seldom is followed, in any pure form, in actual policymaking. But it has the advantage of being intellectually rigorous. It identifies the major steps in the planning process and shows how they relate to each other. By compelling orderly thinking at each step, it calls attention to the implications of assumptions and calculations made along the way. It also identifies key branch points that spread out in different directions, and it produces conclusions in each case that stem logically from a consistent set of premises. As a result, it brings analytical coherence to a process whose sheer complexity alone can produce unclear reasoning and erroneous judgments.




Figure 4.1—Methodology for Strategic Planning

This methodology highlights the difficulty of trying to reach any firm conclusions about future U.S. military needs in Europe. Evaluating force requirements necessitates a string of assessments, each made in the face of uncertainty and thus subject to alternative interpretations. Unchallengeable assertions therefore are hard to come by. Regardless of what theory of requirements is adopted to shape U.S. policy, it will be more subject to challenge than was the case during the Cold War.

Moreover, even with fixed assessments, the ambiguity of the post-Cold War era reaffirms the old maxim that it is difficult to specify any single-point estimate above which success is assured and below which failure is inevitable. More forces will continue to be better, and less, worse. The troublesome question is: How much? Degree matters, of course, and the purely military parts of the planning equation can be gauged with some precision. But hard-to-measure political factors will play an even greater role in U.S. policy than during the Cold War. Especially for this reason, the word “requirement” should be used with some care. It carries with it an implicit stance toward buying political influence and military insurance that should be spelled out explicitly. Perhaps this word can best be defined in terms of a reasonable assurance of attaining policy goals rather than an irreducible minimum.

Nevertheless, this methodology does provide useful insights into the future role of U.S. forces in Europe. A central theme of the following sections is that a presence of 150,000 troops is consistent with the security policies currently being pursued by the U.S. government and with the military directions NATO is taking. It is a logical outgrowth of a particular set of official assessments about U.S. policy goals, Europe’s stability, NATO’s defense strategy, operationally coherent forces, and the military situation in both Europe and the Middle East/Persian Gulf. Individually, these assessments pull in the direction of large U.S. force needs. Collectively, they make this argument all the stronger.

IMPACT OF AN ACTIVIST AGENDA AND MULTIPLE OBJECTIVES

First and foremost, the task of assessing future American military requirements in Europe involves an appraisal of the broad security policy goals that the United States will pursue there in the era ahead. All of the myriad political-military calculations about force levels follow in the wake of this appraisal. What then can be said about future U.S. goals?

Most important, the official documents released publicly in recent months clearly suggest that the U.S. government intends to continue pursuing an activist policy agenda in Europe. That is, it does not intend to become a passive witness to Europe's evolution. It plans to try to influence events there, to drive them in directions favorable to its own interests and that of its allies. It thus intends to remain a major player in Europe's security affairs.

This approach has fundamental implications for the assessment of future U.S. military needs. A passive and diffuse U.S. policy agenda would carry with it a methodology for force-sizing that first assesses where Europe is headed on its own and then designs an appropriate force presence in response. It might well translate into an indifferent stance regarding the exact nature of the U.S. posture or even into a call for quite small forces. By contrast, an activist agenda creates a need to pay careful attention to the U.S. force posture, which will serve as an important instrument of this policy's efforts to affect Europe's evolution. In itself, an activist policy agenda says little about the military details of the required U.S. military posture. But *ceteris paribus*, it does open the door to a much larger force requirement than would be needed under a more passive policy.

Along with an activist agenda will come an effort to pursue *multiple* security goals in Europe. During the Cold War, the United States pursued a quite demanding set of goals, and these goals largely caused the constantly large American force presence in Europe. In the years ahead, U.S. policy goals are likely to mutate. The objectives of containment and deterrence will give way to a set of goals more conducive to the less threatening dynamics of the post-Cold War era and more oriented to achieving overall stability. But like the past, these new objectives will be several in number. They also will be diverse in nature, and demanding both individually and collectively. Their net effect will be to elevate U.S. force requirements beyond what might be the case if fewer goals were included on the national agenda.

MAINTAINING INFLUENCE

As Figure 4.2 suggests, a high-priority U.S. goal will be to maintain American influence in NATO and Europe. To be sure, influence in Europe, seen in isolation, is not an end in itself for a nation that lies across the Atlantic Ocean and is largely self-sufficient. But seen in the context of other objectives that do matter, it is a means so important that it achieves the *de facto* status of a first-order end. The reason is that, without influence, these other goals cannot be accomplished. Thus, influence measured in terms of impact and overall effectiveness is a necessary condition for even considering how the United States can advance its political, military, and economic interests in Europe. In order to pursue an activist agenda, it is *sine qua non*.

The United States will be aspiring to achieve a particular level of influence in Europe, one that matches its responsibilities and commitments there. An especially important considera-

- Maintain U.S. influence in NATO and Europe:
 - to a degree that matches U.S. interests, responsibilities, and commitments.
- Preserve NATO as a *unified* and *collective* alliance.
- Build a stable and peaceful security order in Europe, anchored on a military balance of power vis-à-vis the USSR.
- Maintain an adequate military posture and strategy as a safeguard against a downturn of events.
- Contribute to stability in the Middle East and Africa (EUCOM AOR) and in the Persian Gulf:
 - acting nationally or through NATO.

Figure 4.2—Future U.S. Security Goals in Europe

tion is that, even during the more relaxed post-Cold War era, the United States will still be obligated to provide extended nuclear deterrence coverage for many of its Western Europe allies. This obligation, coupled with other enduring military commitments to NATO, directly exposes the United States to nuclear attack in any crisis with the nuclear-armed states that escalates out of control. It is what makes NATO, for the United States, a genuinely entangling alliance.

As a matter of vital national interest, entanglement of this sort cannot be accepted in absence of commensurate influence. The still-existing specter of nuclear destruction will continue to draw the United States into the heart of Europe's security affairs. It imposes on the U.S. government a need to maintain the kind of influence and presence that allows it to help manage potential crises before they spiral beyond recall. Many changes doubtless lie ahead in NATO's integrated command structure, defense strategy, and force posture. But what the United States cannot safely accept is a situation in which its nuclear commitments remain unchanged and yet it has little control over the events that might require these commitments to be acted upon. For this profound reason, major influence in Europe will remain a key U.S. goal. Indeed, it will remain a condition for continued active U.S. membership in NATO.

Political influence is notoriously hard to measure, and its exact dynamics are difficult to assess. But while the existence of influence is often registered only subtly, its absence is normally transparent. Military forces, to be sure, are not the only vehicle by which the United States gains influence. Nevertheless, U.S. military forces, when continually deployed in Europe, do buy a particular kind of influence there. Whereas diplomacy and economic instruments have realms of their own, military forces buy leverage in the unique, hard-to-crack realm of European defense relationships and security affairs. This was the case during the Cold War, and it is likely to remain true in the coming era.

Military forces in Europe, backed up by larger forces in the United States, gain this kind of influence because they unmistakably signal national intent to friends and potential foes.

Also, they help elevate the U.S. role in NATO's councils, and they help channel NATO's military strategy and crisis management policies in directions responsive to U.S. aims. Beyond this, they help preserve for the United States a "seat at the table" in Europe's various security forums. With military forces, the United States remains a viable power in Europe. In no small way, it becomes a European nation. Without them, the United States becomes a potential power an ocean away: "potential" not only because its commitment fails to be manifested, but also because its intent is uncertain.

An old maxim holds: The larger the U.S. force presence in Europe, the greater the influence; the smaller the posture, the less the influence. This elementary but important calculus is clearly still being taken seriously today in official quarters. Taking into account allied draw-downs, the current U.S. policy, calling for an enduring military presence of 150,000 troops, reflects this desire for a comparatively undiminished American military profile in Europe. An alternative assessment calling for a noticeably smaller posture presumably would carry with it fewer demands for influence, or a more relaxed attitude on how influence is maintained. The trade-off here is a straightforward one, but no less important for all its simplicity.

PRESERVING NATO'S UNITY

The second U.S. goal will be to preserve NATO as a unified, collective-defense alliance. Because NATO was born and raised during the Cold War, early 1990 witnessed public speculation that the alliance could be disestablished once the threat of Soviet attack had faded. At a minimum, some contended, NATO's integrated military command could be disbanded, and the alliance could revert to a looser structure involving policy coordination but not automatic defense commitments and coalition planning. The London Summit of 1990, however, seems to have laid this idea to rest. There, both the United States and its West European allies officially declared their intention to keep NATO and its integrated command structure alive even as they refashion the alliance's specific features. The troubling events of the following 12 months, including the Persian Gulf War and turbulence in the former Soviet Union, have underscored this stance, thereby breathing further life into NATO. The Rome Summit of 1991 reaffirmed the decision taken a year earlier.

In one sense, NATO itself is a means to the end of stability and security, but as a practical matter, maintaining NATO has become an important U.S. policy goal. The reasons why the United States wants to preserve NATO are both varied and readily understandable. Perhaps most important, the United States has never viewed NATO purely as a creature of the Cold War or solely as an instrument of containment. It has long regarded NATO as an embodiment of the Western community. In the United States' view, NATO has a proven track record for promoting common democratic values along with a transatlantic partnership that extends well beyond military collaboration.

Prior to NATO's creation, the West European powers normally competed against each other, often falling into war, and the United States lurched wildly between isolationism and frenetic involvement. In dramatic ways, NATO cured both of these chronic problems, bringing in its wake a stability in Europe unknown during the first half of the 20th century. U.S. reluctance to part with NATO reflects continuing regard for this achievement and concern that the alliance might prove fragile if NATO were to disband.

By agreement at the London and Rome summits, NATO is becoming a less military and more political alliance. It is being embedded in a set of other institutions for managing European affairs, including the CSCE, the EC, and the WEU. Also, a North Atlantic Cooperation Council is being created as a mechanism for formal dialogue between NATO ministers and their counterparts in former Warsaw Pact nations, including Russia and the Commonwealth. Nonetheless, NATO is to remain a collective defense alliance with an integrated military command and close coalition planning.

NATO today remains a working institution in which the United States and Western Europe are unequivocally joined on behalf of a common cause. It offers the only existing vehicle through which the United States can express its security preferences with confidence that they will be heeded. It also provides a forum that enables all NATO's other members to harmonize their security policies with the confidence that the outcome will promote their own interests. NATO's integrated military command creates the mechanism for this advanced form of joint planning, coordination, and outright negotiation to take place. A less integrated alliance would impinge less heavily on national sovereignty, but it also might produce far less by way of similar visions and cooperative behavior.

History suggests that coalitions like this are not easily created and should not be abandoned casually. If NATO were to dissolve, many U.S. officials fear, more would be lost than joint military planning. A particular concern is that economic competition and differing strategic priorities might drive the United States and Western Europe apart. The eventual outcome might be the emergence of open rivalry between them. Additionally, the drive toward West European integration might itself stall. This could be the case especially if the European Community failed to create a full-fledged security alliance to replace NATO. In this event, old patterns of maneuvering, suspicion, and animosity might reappear in Western Europe, thereby reproducing the kind of rivalries that characterized the stressful last half of the 19th century.

A special concern here is Germany's status. Because of NATO's existence, Germany has tempered its military preparedness and pursued a policy of close cooperation with its Western neighbors. The U.S. nuclear umbrella has played a key role in Germany's stance, but so also have the military commitments made by other NATO partners, especially France and the United Kingdom. As a result, Germany does not possess nuclear weapons and its conventional forces are well short of what would be needed to defend their country against a major attack.

To an important degree, NATO's future revolves around the issue of how Germany can best be reassured, thereby providing Germany compelling reasons to continue behaving moderately to ensure that its security is guaranteed. A principal, if not openly acknowledged, fear is that any wholesale dismantling of NATO might remove these reassurances. As a result, Germany might then be propelled in directions that could cause frictions not only with Russia and East European nations but with its West European neighbors as well. History suggests that European security systems with Germany left both insecure and free to pursue its own course were not stable. Would a similarly constructed future security system be any less troubled?

Germany today is a tranquil and democratic nation, and Western Europe itself is far less nationalistic and better integrated than a century ago. For these reasons, none of these down-

turns would emerge overnight. But over a longer period, many fear that they might. A key consideration here is that security systems normally last anywhere from 25 to 50 years, and negative trends often take a long time to make themselves felt. By contrast, those who read the trends differently are less worried. They believe that the roots of transatlantic community and West European integration have been planted deeply enough to continue growing even in the absence of NATO and its integrated command. For this reason, they are less concerned about how deeper U.S. force cuts than those now planned would play out in Western Europe.

Where the truth lies between these arguments is hard to ascertain and can be known only through actual experience. The problem is that policy decisions have to be made long before the data are available and, therefore, in the face of major uncertainty. With the Cold War ended and the EC integrating, NATO's future is undeniably uncertain. One thing does seem clear, however: NATO would not survive in the absence of the United States. Throughout NATO's history, the United States has led the alliance. Recognizing that they would be hard pressed to achieve close cooperation without a dominant power, the West European nations have willingly accepted this situation as an important part of the transatlantic bargain. In exchange for the security and partnership that NATO has offered, they have acquiesced in some loss of sovereignty and the demands of coalition planning under U.S. leadership.

This situation continues to exist today. Many allied nations are expressing interest in altering NATO to provide greater scope for West European influence. Several are participating in the EC's efforts to achieve a common security identity and some form of joint planning. But thus far their plans for the EC are limited in scope, designed more to supplement NATO than replace it entirely. Acknowledging this, currently all these nations are calling for the United States to remain militarily present in Europe and actively involved in NATO.

Their stance reflects enduring but easily overlooked realities in Europe. To stay healthy, NATO must be led by the United States. For political reasons on both sides of the Atlantic, the United States can lead NATO only if sizable U.S. forces are present in Europe. Virtually all of the West European nations are in the midst of internal defense reviews, and their decisions will depend heavily upon their reading of U.S. intentions. A larger U.S. military draw-down than now planned almost inevitably would produce a further diminution of their coalition efforts. Any withdrawal suggesting a declining U.S. political commitment to Europe's security might lead to NATO's unraveling.

The issue of the U.S. troop presence in Europe thus is heavily entangled with the task of charting NATO's own future. Should NATO remain in existence with an integrated military command under U.S. leadership? If so, then one kind of U.S. military presence is required. If not, then another, presumably far smaller, U.S. presence is possible. Precisely how many U.S. forces are needed to preserve a workable pattern of NATO military relationships is a debatable matter. But the issue does need to be addressed in this larger context.

BUILDING A COOPERATIVE SECURITY STRUCTURE ANCHORED ON A STABLE BALANCE OF POWER

The London Summit Declaration and the Charter of Paris have committed NATO's nations to the goal of building a genuinely stable and cooperative security structure across all of Europe. This sweeping vision includes the former Soviet Union, which is no longer officially

regarded as an adversary of the West. The idea here is to replace the bipolar Cold War standoff with a set of mutual commitments, interlocking treaty restraints, economic partnerships, common visions, and collective institutions. Progress in these areas, it is hoped, will bring an enduring era of harmony to a continent that has experienced constant strife for the past century.

Many issues surround not only the feasibility of this idea but also the important matter of how it can best be pursued. Especially troublesome is the issue of how the West can square continued defense preparations with its efforts to build a cooperative partnership with its former Soviet adversary. In essence, the West finds itself on the horns of a dilemma: Should it prudently maintain its defense shield even as it extends a diplomatic hand to Russia and the Commonwealth, thereby running the risk of sending ambiguous signals that might contribute to miscommunication. Or should it lower its shield in order to help facilitate diplomacy, thereby risking a military disaster if its actions prove premature?

As of early 1990, the answer to these perplexing questions was not apparent, even in some official NATO circles. At that juncture, two arguments were commonly heard in favor of drawing down the West's defenses far beyond what current plans envision. The first argument was that NATO is a genuine barrier to political rapprochement, and that it can be replaced by the CSCE. The second argument was that the Soviet Union not only is irreversibly traveling down the path of internal reform, but is also finished as a military superpower. Together, these two arguments pointed the West in the direction of disbanding NATO, disarming in some wholesale way, and trusting the management of European security affairs to an institutionalized CSCE.

During 1991, these arguments seemed to have largely passed from the scene in official NATO circles. Four reasons account for this trend. First, CSCE's luster faded as the potential weaknesses of relying on a collective organization of 35 nations became evident. Second, NATO's attractiveness rose in the eyes of its members as they gained greater appreciation of its potential utility in the post-Cold War era. Third, the external barriers to NATO's continued existence were lowered when some East European nations began voicing interest in joining the alliance and the USSR reconciled itself to Germany's reunification within NATO. Fourth, reform within the Soviet Union slowed down. With that nation poised on the brink of economic collapse and internal chaos, doubts began to emerge about its reliability. Moreover, evidence appeared that its disarmament efforts would stop well short of leaving the USSR unable to threaten the West. The prospect of a militarily strong but politically turbulent Soviet Union gave serious pause to many in the West, including NATO's defense planners.

Then in late 1991, the failed coup, the collapse of communism, and the dissolution of the Soviet state intervened to reawaken the debate. Any thought that Russia and the new Commonwealth could mount a major conventional military threat to NATO anytime soon passed by the boards. The shudder that the coup sent down Western spines was a grim reminder, however, that democracy is not yet institutionalized in Russia and associated republics. Growing social chaos and rapid economic decline lend further reasons for caution. Beyond this, Russia went through periods of internal preoccupation and weakness before, only to emerge several years later as a militarily strong nation with an assertive foreign policy.

In response, the NATO summit in Rome in late 1991 dropped all reference to the Soviet Union as an active military adversary but did lay down cautionary guidelines about the need to retain viable alliance defenses. The summit communiqué declared that "Prudence requires us to maintain an overall strategic balance and to remain ready to meet any potential risks to our security which may arise from instability or tension."¹

The new strategic concept adopted at Rome said:

In the particular case of the Soviet Union, the risks and uncertainties that accompany the process of change cannot be seen in isolation from the fact that its conventional forces are significantly larger than those of any other European state and its large nuclear arsenal comparable only with that of the United States. These capabilities have to be taken into account if stability and security are to be preserved.²

As a result, NATO's nations seemingly have settled on a policy that continues to maintain a militarily vigilant alliance even as they pursue stable relations with Russia and the Commonwealth. Recognizing that the Soviet military threat is genuinely receding in its immediacy, NATO's nations have endorsed the idea of a parallel drawdown of their forces. They have stopped well short, however, of anything approaching disarmament. As matters currently stand, there is uncertainty about the degree to which NATO's military plans should focus on specific contingencies involving the former Soviet Union. But a broad consensus does seem to be emerging that NATO should maintain at least a peacetime military "balance of power" in Europe that takes into account the military strength of Russia and the Commonwealth.

The idea here is that, even if war with the former Soviet Union is a very unlikely event, a stable balance of power is still a desirable part of a prudent Western security policy. This balance would operate much in the way that military equilibrium helped underwrite stability during the Concert of Europe in the mid-19th century. By discouraging any form of aggression, it would provide powerful incentives for moderate behavior. In this way, it would reinforce, rather than contradict, a policy aimed at building a politically stable European security architecture in the post-Cold War era.

The situation has changed a great deal in recent years, but the future is far from clear. Now that the Soviet Union has fragmented, NATO will need to observe, influence, and respond to the military structures that the independent former Soviet republics decide to maintain. What are NATO's military requirements for a stable balance of power in Europe? While this question is not easily answered, it does seem evident that, at a minimum, a stable balance of power requires a NATO nuclear counterweight to the former Soviet Union, which can be provided only by the United States. Because offshore U.S. nuclear forces can help meet NATO's needs, this requirement does not mandate the continued presence of the massive nuclear posture that the United States deployed during the Cold War. But it does mandate that at least some U.S. nuclear forces remain in Europe, primarily in the form of air-delivered weapons.

¹"Rome Declaration on Peace and Cooperation" issued by heads of state and government participating at the North Atlantic Council in Rome on November 7-8, 1991.

²"The Alliance's New Strategic Concept," agreed on by the heads of state and government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Rome on November 7-8, 1991.

Beyond this, a balance of power philosophy also requires that U.S. conventional military power be present on the European continent. Figure 4.3 displays the daunting realities in terms of total mobilizable ground forces (in DEFs, division-equivalents in firepower) for Europe's nations. This figure counts active and reserve formations; no U.S. forces are displayed here. The figure shows the extent to which the former Soviet Union's military shadow will continue to hang over Europe. Even after the Soviet Army has entirely withdrawn, the CFE treaty will permit about 60 divisions on former USSR soil in the Atlantic to the Urals (ATTU) region. The breakup of the USSR into separate republics and major defense spending cuts may reduce this posture appreciably. Nonetheless, Russia and its Commonwealth partners—including Belarus, which adjoins Poland—probably will retain numerous mobilizable divisions including the regions outside the ATTU. Russian/Commonwealth military power therefore will remain an important factor in Europe.

NATO's nations together will field about 30 mobilizable divisions. But this is only enough to bring the peacetime military force ratio vis-à-vis the former USSR down to 2:1. Is this enough to constitute a satisfactory "balance of power"? Since perceptions count heavily, some analysts might argue that the idea of balance should not be interpreted in mechanistic terms. In this view, a 2:1 relationship might be acceptable. But to the extent it is deemed unsatisfactory, this situation mandates the presence of American military forces for both political and military reasons.

- No U.S. forces displayed.
- Russia/Commonwealth still preponderant military power in Europe.




Figure 4.3—Post-Cold War Balance in Central Europe in Ground Division-Equivalents

How many U.S. forces are needed to establish a politically acceptable conventional balance? Even a presence of 150,000 U.S. troops would make only a small dent in the peacetime balance. A somewhat different conclusion is suggested, however, if only active formations are counted. Most likely is that the former USSR will maintain only about one-third of its forces in fully active status (20 divisions), and NATO's nations in Central Europe will have about 10 to 15 active divisions. For this category of forces, a U.S. contribution of 150,000 troops would have a more meaningful impact than a much smaller posture.

In any event, the key issue here is political. What matters is not the numerical contribution of U.S. forces in Europe, but whether they project the entire shadow of American military power and resolve onto the Continent. The goal of a balance of power philosophy would be to offset Russian military strength with the perception that a Western superpower is present in spirit if not in actual form. The military potential of the United States, most of it based across the Atlantic, must be made to count in the eyes of all Europeans. In all likelihood, the kind of posture required to bring this perception to life would have to be more than symbolic. In demonstrable and visible ways, it would have to provide real military strength.

MAINTAINING AN ADEQUATE DEFENSE POSTURE

During the Cold War, NATO attached such predominant importance to this goal that it came to dominate the alliance's defense calculus. For the most part, NATO's planning focused on major wartime contingencies involving a massive, theaterwide attack by the Soviet Union. This threat has now passed into history. In the years ahead, NATO's planning will be broadened to focus on smaller contingencies and the complex dynamics of managing crises in their early stages. In addition to guarding against overall political dangers to security and stability during the turbulent period ahead, NATO's nations are likely to view their wartime defenses as an insurance policy or a "safety net" against the unexpected. Although other contingencies are far more likely, Russian scenarios will remain a factor of contingent importance in NATO's defense planning. Because these scenarios will continue to place high stress on NATO's defense preparedness, the debate over the U.S. military presence in Europe might come to focus partly on their impact on planning.

The requirements for NATO's defense posture, and the U.S. role in meeting these and other more immediately relevant contingencies, will be addressed below. What can be said here is that, for all contingencies, much will depend on such hardy perennials as the size of the adversary force, relative buildup rates, NATO's strategy and operational doctrine, and the role of West European forces. To some, the presence of these issues in the post-Cold War era will create an unwelcome sense of déjà vu and perhaps will seem anachronistic or even entirely unrealistic. Nevertheless, they are the lifeblood of defense planning, and they seem likely to remain with NATO as long as major war in Europe, or the threat of it, is real enough to be taken seriously.

The need to conduct coherent defense planning applies to the Northern and Southern regions as well. Indeed, the Southern Region's importance in NATO defense planning seems destined to rise now that the Cold War is over. In Central Europe, the Soviet military threat is weakening: The prospect of a short-warning attack has given way to a focus on longer warning times and contingencies involving smaller forces separated by long distances. In the Southern Region, Turkey finds itself adjoining three potentially turbulent regions: the former

Soviet Union, the Balkans, and the volatile Middle East. Along the Mediterranean littoral, NATO's nations are beginning to worry about military threats emanating from North Africa. These concerns promise to introduce a new element into NATO and U.S. defense planning.

The analysis presented below will suggest that the task of calculating U.S. requirements to help NATO achieve its defense goals is laden with many uncertainties and sensitivities. Nonetheless, a sizable U.S. military contribution will be needed to give NATO a viable conventional defense capability against the full range of challenges ahead. Most of the required forces can be provided by reinforcements sent from the continental United States, but not all of them. To a significant degree, a sizable U.S. military presence in Europe will be needed to provide the early response options that could prove necessary. To the extent that early military options are needed to better enable NATO to manage the crises that lie ahead, a meaningful U.S. presence in Europe appears more attractive than a symbolic posture.

CONTRIBUTING TO STABILITY IN THE MIDDLE EAST, THE PERSIAN GULF, AND AFRICA

Only a few years ago, this goal figured only peripherally in NATO's planning, and although the United States was concerned about these areas, this concern did not have major implications for U.S. forces in Europe. The U.S. Central Command was charged with defending the Persian Gulf, where a major crisis seemed most likely to occur. Meanwhile the U.S. European Command (EUCOM) was responsible for the Middle East and Africa. While these regions gave rise to a number of small-scale military operations that EUCOM carried out over the years, EUCOM's primary focus remained on Europe.

The Persian Gulf War seems likely to produce a permanent change in how NATO views the regions to the south. In the years ahead, Europe's security is likely to be increasingly seen as inseparable from events in this area. This altered calculus will apply especially to NATO's Southern Region, but it is likely to affect Central Europe as well. Whether NATO will engage in formal coalition planning for military operations in these regions is an unsettled issue. Most likely, it will continue to rely on ad hoc mechanisms to meet future situations there. But NATO's nations undoubtedly will pursue an active policy agenda in these regions aimed at protecting their interests and fostering stability, and they will design their forces with future contingencies for this area in mind.

What applies to NATO also holds true for the United States. It will require the capacity to conduct military operations in these regions both alone and with its NATO allies. Just as it used its military forces in Europe to help carry out Desert Shield/Storm, it will need to shape its future presence in this area with similar operations well beyond NATO's borders. Specific force requirements will be addressed below. Suffice it here to say that a military infrastructure in Europe is essential, and while the presence of sizable combat forces there is not absolutely vital, it does provide a host of valuable capabilities.

STRATEGIC VISIONS AND MILITARY FORCES

The United States thus will be pursuing an active and ambitious policy agenda in Europe. While this agenda says little about U.S. military requirements there in any numerical sense, it says a great deal conceptually. It provides a demanding frame of reference for evaluating

specific requirements and assessing the trade-offs among the military options open to the United States. The current DoD plan is designed with this agenda in mind, and it is broadly responsive to the force requirements the agenda imposes. Whether a smaller force posture would suffice is an issue that can be addressed only by assessing the implications for all five of these goals combined. These objectives are parts of a cohesive whole, and they need to be seen in relation to each other. Together, they reflect the U.S. government's preferred vision for the future of Europe's security affairs.

In essence, the United States envisions a Europe in which: (a) Washington still has considerable influence; (b) the Atlantic Alliance continues to flourish; (c) the Continent remains stable partly because a military balance of power is preserved; and (d) the Western allies retain sufficient defense capability to handle challenges either in Europe or the Middle East/Persian Gulf. The presumed consequence is a tranquil continent that safeguards the vital interests of the United States and its allies, while propelling the cause of democracy and cooperative community forward. The logical outgrowth of this vision is a predisposition in favor of a still-sizable U.S. military presence in Europe for a considerable period. How long? Long enough, in principle, to confidently ensure that this kind of European security system can stand on its own, without being propped up by American military power.

To question DoD's military plans in Europe is partly to question this policy vision and the assumptions about Europe's dynamics that underlie it. Obviously, if the U.S. government were to embrace a less ambitious vision, then the need for a sizable U.S. force posture in Europe would be less compelling. Each of these U.S. goals alone, however, carries with it a rationale for a large military presence, and the case is all the stronger when the combined effects of these goals are taken into account. For this reason, the strategic need for a large posture in Europe would diminish only if all five goals were either abandoned or declared satisfactorily achievable without the continual presence of sizable U.S. forces there. Barring an official reappraisal of this sort, the DoD plan thus is robust in policy terms. That is, its strategic rationale stands up well when U.S. goals are considered, and it does not break down easily if a few goals are downplayed.

Exactly how crucial is the full realization of this U.S. vision? Here, degree matters. The Western alliance won the Cold War because it stubbornly clung to its vision and was willing to commit the military, economic, and political resources to pursue this vision over four troubled decades. The same held true, in a far shorter period, in the recently concluded Persian Gulf War. Nevertheless, individual nations and multinational coalitions most often do not fulfill their visions completely, and they still are able to live with the results. What matters is whether the negative consequences are minor or major. The United States presumably could live with a partially frustrated policy vision in Europe. It could tolerate some loss of influence, some weakening of NATO, and some question marks about the balance of power and NATO's defense posture. But what it will want to avoid is running a serious risk that Europe might tumble into an abyss of instability because the United States and NATO had failed to maintain their military vigilance in some fatal way.

What are the chances that this sort of downfall might occur, and what might bring it about? Experts today differ in their opinions, and in any fair-minded assessment, the answer depends heavily upon whether emphasis is placed on the positive trends at work in Europe today or on Europe's troubled history. Experience suggests that a cautious policy is a wise policy, and that if catastrophe is to be avoided, it should be guarded against. Perhaps the

best assessment is that Europe today stands at a crossroads, and even experts are genuinely uncertain about where it is headed and how it can best be steered in the right direction. It may continuously travel in a safe direction, and it may make a wrong turn, somewhere along the way, in a direction that does lead to an abyss. The steering mechanism enters the equation here in a powerful way. A policy of continued military vigilance would be intended to help the United States and NATO keep Europe on a safe path, avoiding the dangerous detours. A weak steering wheel would not guarantee a disastrous turn, but neither would it make the journey any easier.

Of the dangers ahead in Europe, the most worrisome is not that major war will occur as an act of naked and premeditated aggression. Rather, the danger is that a number of negative trends might take hold unintentionally and feed off each other to produce the kind of chronic instability that eventually could culminate in a disaster. Because political forecasting is so hard, these trends and their interacting nature might go unnoticed at first and then go misunderstood well past the point of correcting them. Something like this happened early this century. At that time, European political leaders, confident of their continent's steady march to progress, failed to grasp how the subtle forces of economic dislocation, social stress, nationalism, military competition, and interlocking treaties were driving Europe toward a catastrophe. The result was a full-scale war that exploded suddenly in 1914, without premeditation, and consumed all of Europe. If World War II was a classic case of blatant aggression, World War I's origins provide a textbook case of how the unforeseen can bring disasters of its own.

Whether Europe today is prone to this kind of instability is unknowable. What can be said is that if the United States falls well short of achieving its vision, Europe will be left more vulnerable to such instability. An influential U.S. role, a unified NATO, a balance of power, and an adequate NATO defense posture would all help stabilize Europe's security affairs. The absence of these characteristics would not guarantee a cataclysm. But if Europe were to experience a simultaneous upsurge in political tensions and economic strife, the chances of disaster occurring would be all the greater. In this situation, a weak security architecture and underlying political instability could feed off each other, thereby further magnifying the danger.

Serious shortfalls in these U.S. goals could magnify each other to help bring about this kind of weak security architecture. The lack of an influential American role, for example, could erode alliance solidarity, thereby producing a deficient NATO defense posture and military strategy. The result could be an imbalance of military power in Europe coupled with diluted security guarantees that might eventually lead Germany to pursue an independent and unhealthy course. This change, in turn, could produce the kind of tension between Germany and the Soviet Union, especially over influence in Eastern Europe, that caused trouble a century ago. Other bleak spirals could be cited, including stressful interactions between Europe and the Middle East. None of them individually might seem likely, but together their combined probabilities can add up to worrisome levels.

If the present DoD plan is aimed at enabling the United States to transform its policy vision into reality, to what degree would a significantly smaller presence impair this effort? While the answer to this important question must await the more detailed military appraisal conducted below, some observations can be offered here. Because the DoD plan provides a force posture that is both politically impressive in its size and militarily capable as well, it serves

all of these U.S. security goals. A smaller posture, due to its lower visibility and truncated capabilities, would perform less well on all of these fronts. The exact reduction in policy performance would depend upon the specific posture deployed.

A posture of 100,000 troops would stack up less well than the DoD plan, but at least it would maintain a six-figure presence while also providing most of an Army corps and several air wings. As a result of these features, its overall performance can probably best be labeled as uncertain and open to interpretation. Barring the unforeseen, it might not cause fatal damage to U.S. goals for the European political milieu that seems most likely to be present five to ten years from now. Nevertheless, this posture would not solidly support all five U.S. goals, and it could leave the United States militarily deficient in a quick-breaking crisis.

Significantly smaller postures merit a more negative appraisal. Their small size and limited combat capabilities could eat away at U.S. influence, NATO's cohesion, the balance of power in Europe, and—for anything other than slowly evolving crises—the U.S./NATO defense posture there as well. Here again, degree matters. The presence of at least a single U.S. division, for example, would buy far greater strategic leverage than a purely reinforcing posture that provides no combat forces in Europe at all. And, if European political dynamics allow for nothing more, a symbolic presence is better than complete withdrawal. Even so, postures in the range of 40,000 to 70,000 seem appropriate only if Europe evolves considerably further down the path to stability than is forecasted here. Short of that, these postures fail to pass the important test of prudence.

5. THREATS AND CONTINGENCIES

Although U.S. policy goals provide the all-important foundations for planning, they often lack the sufficiently detailed information needed to reach firm conclusions about specific U.S. military requirements in any region, including Europe. The next step in the planning process moves the analysis one step further toward this end. It determines the military threats and contingencies that the United States and NATO are likely to confront in Europe and nearby regions over the coming years. Typically, the delineation of threats and contingencies to be included in the planning process plays a contributing role in shaping programmatic choices and associated budgetary pursuits.

During the Cold War, the United States and NATO planned their forces for Europe on the basis of a single dominant contingency: a short-warning and theaterwide Warsaw Pact attack aimed at overrunning not only Central Europe but NATO's flanks as well. While this contingency posed a grave threat to NATO's security, it made the U.S. planning process comfortably simple. It was sufficiently credible to command political consensus, and it enabled planners to concentrate their efforts on a single event. It thus made requirements analysis a fairly straightforward exercise.

Force planning in the years ahead will have no such luxury. The Warsaw Pact already has been terminated, and by 1995 the Soviet Army will have both withdrawn from Eastern Europe and been scaled back sharply in response to budget cuts and the Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty. Moreover, the USSR itself has dissolved and has been replaced by a fragmented nation with no malevolent intent to its neighbors and a steadily weakening military structure. Plausibly, events in the mid to late 1990s could lead Russia and its Commonwealth partners to use force beyond its borders in pursuit of limited aims. But Russia no longer will possess the messianic ideology, internal totalitarian institutions, and raw strategic ambitions that might lead it to attack all of Western Europe at once. As a result, the old contingency has gone the way of the Cold War.

In its wake, a quite different challenge is coming. In the future, the United States and NATO will face a much broader spectrum of contingencies, with Russia playing a limited role at best. While these contingencies will pose a less severe threat than did the old scenario, they will present challenges of their own, some of them quite unique to NATO's experience. At least at the moment, many will not seem credible in the public eye, but they are likely to be deemed sufficiently plausible to attract the attention of force planners. Together they will compel the requirements process to cast a much wider analytical net than before.

Although many of these threats and contingencies seem extreme or farfetched, it is useful to describe and assess them explicitly in order to provide a sense of their likelihood, of their importance in terms of U.S. and NATO security interests, and of the force requirements they might entail. In the months and years ahead, decisions will have to be made regarding which of these contingencies should be prepared for, and used as the basis of force planning. No presumption is made here that *all* of the contingencies should be incorporated into U.S. and NATO defense planning. Recognizing that discriminating choices will have to be made, the goal here is to be as comprehensive as possible, even at the risk of occasionally bordering on implausibility. Nonetheless, a number of these contingencies probably will be regarded as

sufficiently significant to warrant reasonable and appropriate measures to deter them or to respond to them should they occur.

Above all, we do not presume that NATO should plan for war against Russia and the Commonwealth, which NATO no longer regards as an adversary. The goal of this analysis is merely to flag this issue as a matter for policy decision within the framework of diplomacy and military planning. The critical question is this: Because all other conflicts in Europe are likely to be small, can a “balance of power” and the stability flowing from it be maintained if NATO forces cannot pass reasonable tests of sufficiency in contingencies involving actual fighting with Russia and the Commonwealth? Regardless of how this question is ultimately answered, the requirements for sufficiency cannot be known unless concrete contingencies are examined.

Finally, we must remember that defense planning aims to deter these contingencies from occurring at all, thereby contributing to the larger cause of political stability. Acting as a bastion of political cohesion and military strength, NATO can help bring added stability to Eastern Europe and other turbulent regions by deterring the kinds of contingencies described herein. *Ceteris paribus*, the greater the strength and credibility of U.S. and allied forces, the greater will be NATO’s deterrent power.

CONTINGENCIES AHEAD

Figure 5.1 provides an illustrative list of contingencies that are plausible candidates for force planning and assessing U.S. requirements in Europe. It presents six separate categories that total 22 different contingencies; counting the different ways some of these contingencies could occur, the number rises to 27. While these contingencies range from large to small in importance, they all would pose important challenges to U.S. and NATO military forces in Europe.

In particular, nearly all involve “limited wars”: conflicts of a classical type that fall well short of all-out encounters with totalistic aims and unrestrained use of force. A limited war might involve large forces, but it would likely grow out of a political confrontation that could be subjected to crisis-management policies. Additionally, it would be conducted with limited goals in mind and would be subjected to restraints aimed at controlling escalation. A good example is the recent Persian Gulf War, a conflict waged with large forces but limited political aims. A central theme of this contingency analysis is that whereas preparations for all-out conflicts characterized the Cold War, the coming era will see a return of planning for limited wars of 19th century vintage.

Although some of these contingencies focus on Central Europe, another theme is that NATO will need to pay greater attention to its turbulent southern flank, as well as to the Middle East and the Persian Gulf. In addition, NATO will need to consider security affairs in Eastern Europe and the Balkans. These contingencies thus will compel U.S. planners to broaden their coverage in both geographic terms and in the kinds of forces that would be used to deal with them. In particular, these changes will create a need for greater mobility and regionwide responsiveness by NATO’s forces, including those of the United States.

Category I: NATO-Russian peacetime competition

1. Russian nuclear intimidation of Germany and Western Europe.
2. Russian military reconstitution in peacetime.

Category II: NATO-Russian war

3. Air and missile strikes on Germany.
4. Warfare at sea.
5. Military invasion across Poland and against Germany.
6. Military invasion of Turkey.

Category III: Russian reentry into Eastern Europe

7. Intervention in the Baltic republics that spills over into the Baltic Sea and nearby regions.
8. Major civil war that spills across the Commonwealth's borders.
9. Invasion of eastern Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, or Romania.

Category IV: Local East European/Balkan Crisis

10. Bulgarian-Turkish border war.
11. Hungarian-Romanian border war.
12. Civil war in Yugoslavia and/or Romania.

Category V: Crises involving radical Arab powers

13. Minor incidents in Middle East and North Africa.
14. Radical Arab air and missile attacks on Italy or southern France.
15. Radical Arab attack on Turkey.
16. Arab-Israeli war requiring U.S. security assistance.
17. Major war in the Persian Gulf requiring Western intervention.

Category VI: Other contingencies

18. Hostage-rescue incidents.
19. Counterterrorist and counterdrug incidents.
20. Incidents requiring international peacekeeping operations.
21. Incidents requiring disaster-relief operations.
22. Incidents in Sub-Saharan Africa.

Figure 5.1—Future Contingencies in Europe

Space does not permit a full elaboration of each contingency, but remarks about their chief characteristics and implications for U.S. planning are appropriate. Category I calls attention to the possibility of renewed political tensions in peacetime between the Russian/Commonwealth nations and NATO. It contemplates a downturn in relations between Russia and the West European nations that could lead to efforts by Russia to gain diplomatic leverage from either its nuclear strength or an arms buildup, or both. Postulated here, of course, is the failure of reform in the former Soviet Union and the rise of some form of authoritarian rule with a threatening external agenda. These contingencies would require the United States and NATO to preserve a strong nuclear deterrent as well as the assets needed to maintain capable air defenses in Europe.

Prevailing sentiment holds that nuclear weapons cannot readily be converted into political and diplomatic leverage. This judgment, however, rests on the assumption that a situation of mutual deterrence will prevail: that both sides will possess sufficient nuclear power to counterbalance the other. Minus a credible Western deterrent, Russia's nuclear posture, even after the START Treaty, will provide that nation a viable instrument for intimidating Western Europe. The least likely scenario is an actual nuclear attack. A more worrisome concern is that nuclear power might cast a continuing dark shadow over Europe in peacetime as well as in any crises that might occur. Manifesting itself subtly on normal occasions and more openly on others, this concern could have a profound effect on future European diplomacy, economic ties, and political relations. It would form a pathological foundation for the future European security architecture.

For this reason, NATO will need to maintain a strong, credible, and survivable deterrent shield over Western Europe. Since Germany and other West European nations have no nuclear forces, they are especially vulnerable. The United Kingdom and France have nuclear postures, but their forces are relatively small and are intended primarily for national defense. Only U.K. forces are integrated within NATO; France's remain outside. Whether these forces alone could provide an adequate deterrent shield, even if they were fully integrated in NATO or through the WEU, is uncertain. Consequently, this contingency highlights the need for continued U.S. extended nuclear deterrence coverage, and this coverage can be made credible only if sizable U.S. forces are present in Europe.

The prospect of renewed military competition between Russia and NATO seems remote in light of the Commonwealth's political changes and economic plight. Yet the Cold War saw several cycles of relaxed diplomatic relations followed by increased tensions that brought an intensification of the arms race. To guard against a new cycle of nuclear tensions if political relations deteriorate, NATO will need to retain sufficient political strength, economic resources, and industrial capacity to discourage this form of threatening behavior and to respond if it does occur. Except as a deterrent, this requirement does not directly mandate the stationing of large U.S. forces in Europe. But it does call attention to NATO's solidarity, which will be preserved only if the United States continues to perform a significant military role in Europe.

Category II presents a spectrum of wartime conflicts with Russia and the Commonwealth. Even though they are low-probability events, they may play a role in NATO's future defense planning because they focus on the need to continue defending NATO's borders against a large threat. All four contingencies would trigger Articles 5 and 6 of the North Atlantic Treaty and therefore would call for a collective defense response. Because they involve

Russian military power, they would stress NATO's defenses in ways that go beyond most of the other contingencies discussed here. Thus, they would levy a large requirement for U.S. forces. Given current trends in Russia and the Commonwealth, at issue is whether these contingencies should be incorporated into NATO's defense plans. A key advantage of employing them is that they provide a basis for determining exactly how a European balance of power is to be maintained.

Contingencies 3 and 4 would stress NATO's air defenses in Central Europe and maritime defenses in the northern waters: areas where the United States traditionally has performed many of NATO's missions. A Russian long-range air and missile attack on Germany could grow out of mounting tensions between these two nations. Contemplated here is a politically motivated Russian effort to take advantage of modern long-range air power to exert military pressure on the German government (or other NATO nations) to make diplomatic or economic concessions. The Persian Gulf War showed that, even with conventional weapons, modern air forces equipped with smart munitions can quickly inflict enormous damage on a nation's industrial fabric. What happened in Desert Storm potentially can be repeated elsewhere, and Russia already possesses a large stable of long-range bombers and other aircraft. In the years ahead, Russia probably will preserve and acquire the command and control systems, modern munitions, and other technology to bring this capability to life.

As air-theorists Douhet and Mitchell predicted years ago, this form of strategic air warfare might become the wave of the future. In absence of an integrated NATO air defense system, capable of defeating aircraft and cruise missiles, Germany and some other NATO nations would be highly vulnerable to this type of air bombardment. In theory, the West Europeans alone could provide for their air defenses. But as a practical matter, the United States is NATO's leader in developing the required technologies, including Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS) aircraft, other sophisticated reconnaissance platforms, interceptor aircraft, ground-based systems (e.g., Patriot), and effective missiles. For this reason, the United States will need to remain involved in NATO's peacetime air defenses in both Central Europe and the adjoining regions.

A clash at sea could grow out of a larger military crisis, but it also could take place as a separate and limited encounter waged for specific political purposes. The Russian Navy, already one of the world's largest, may remain sufficiently large and capable to conduct offensive operations in the North Sea and adjoining Atlantic waters, the Baltic Sea, the Mediterranean, and other waters. This contingency contemplates attacks—ranging from small to large—by still-potent Russian naval forces on Western maritime commerce, Norway's maritime areas, or possibly U.S./NATO naval units. The purpose would be to exert diplomatic leverage over West European nations, especially those not capable of defending themselves alone.

In order to forestall this risk, NATO will need to retain effective maritime defenses. Here again, the West Europeans in theory could pool their naval forces to perform the task. But as a practical matter, only the U.S. Navy retains the carriers, aircraft, surface combatants, submarines, and other power-projection capabilities to meet this requirement for the foreseeable future. The need for a continued U.S. Navy role in NATO's maritime defenses does not mandate the stationing of large U.S. forces on the Continent, but it does require the preservation of a network of naval bases and associated installations in the Mediterranean and North Atlantic.

Contingencies 5 and 6 in Category II involve major Russian invasions of Germany or Turkey. These contingencies had greater plausibility before the dissolution of Communist rule and the Soviet state, and are now matters of rapidly diminishing plausibility. They remain primarily of theoretical interest now because they involve the defense of NATO's borders. Contemplated here is not a simultaneous Soviet assault against both nations but rather a "single axis" attack on *either* Germany or Turkey. An attack across Poland against Germany would take the form of the 1870 Franco-Prussian War, in which Prussia advanced against a single nation and temporarily occupied it in an effort to gain political, economic, and territorial concessions. This contingency would involve large ground forces with tactical air and naval support, launched after several weeks and months of full-scale mobilization. An invasion of Turkey would be conducted with similarly limited aims in mind and would be launched with large ground, air, and naval forces. Because these contingencies would involve aggression across NATO's borders, both would require NATO to mount a major coalitional, combined-arms defense that would involve sizable U.S. forces. Since these contingencies are likely to play a lingering role in NATO force planning and in gauging U.S. wartime requirements in Europe, they will be analyzed in more detail below.

Category III involves the greater likelihood of Russian military operations against East European countries. Contingencies 7 and 8 envision internal strife within the Commonwealth that spills over across its borders. One possibility is a Russian crackdown against the Baltic states; Georgia and Armenia are other candidates. The second possibility is a full-scale civil war, whose complicated ethnic politics and refugee patterns might cause fighting to migrate outside the Commonwealth. Contingency 9 involves a Russian military campaign against one or more East European nations. Although the purpose might be to reimpose permanent control over the nation(s), a more likely event is a limited aggression aimed at temporarily seizing foreign territory for political or economic purposes.

This category calls attention to the troublesome prospect that, even if Russia turns out not to be a military adversary of NATO directly, it still might pose a serious threat to Eastern Europe that could affect NATO's larger security interests. All of the East European nations lack the military power to defend themselves against Russia, and barring CSCE's flowering into a full-fledged collective security institution, they also will lack outside guarantees. They thus will be highly vulnerable to predatory behavior. Indeed, Eastern Europe might well come to present the kind of power vacuum that has attracted wars many times in the past.

During the Cold War, the United States and NATO largely defined Eastern Europe—then under Communist rule and part of the Warsaw Pact—as beyond its security planning. Consequently, they did not intervene when the Soviet Union used force to suppress rebellions in East Germany, Hungary, and Czechoslovakia. The years ahead, however, seem destined to bring Eastern Europe closer to the West. Even shy of these nations joining NATO or the EC, the growth of democratic institutions there and expanding economic ties with the West will introduce new elements into the strategic equation. Beyond this, any Russian military move into Eastern Europe, even if publicly characterized as temporary, would carry with it the potential of posing a threat to NATO's borders. For example, a Russian advance into Poland could serve as a springboard for a later attack on Germany. For this reason alone, NATO could not afford to turn its head.

Quite apart from the daunting military considerations, these contingencies would pose a legal challenge to NATO. Because NATO's borders would not be immediately threatened, none

of these contingencies would trigger Articles 5 and 6 of the North Atlantic Treaty, the collective defense clauses. But all of them would threaten NATO's security sufficiently to activate Article 4. This article allows NATO to engage in political consultations and to act either as an alliance or in an ad hoc way with only a few nations participating. For all of these contingencies, NATO's nations could be expected to impose stiff political and economic sanctions on Russia. Whether NATO's nations would intervene militarily cannot be known in advance, but if they chose to do so, they would most likely rely heavily on security assistance and tactical air forces. Ground forces, however, might also be used. Almost inevitably, U.S. military forces would become involved.

Category IV involves conflicts in Eastern Europe or the Balkans in which U.S. and NATO forces, if they intervened, would not engage in combat with Russia and Commonwealth republics. One of these contingencies envisions interstate wars between East European nations; another involves a NATO nation (Turkey) in a limited conflict with a Balkan neighbor. Contingency 12 involves intrastate civil wars in either Yugoslavia or Romania. In all cases, NATO military forces probably would become involved in only limited ways: e.g., security assistance, logistic support, intelligence, and communications. Possibly, however, NATO's nations, acting under the CSCE's auspices, might launch combat operations with air and ground forces. All of these interventions might require commitment of U.S. military forces.

Category V calls attention to NATO's Southern Region. It involves contingencies growing out of the turbulent Middle East, North Africa, and the Persian Gulf. Envisioned here is a spectrum of conflicts with radical Arab powers, all of which could threaten the security interests of NATO's nations, including the United States. Contingency 13 calls attention to the minor incidents that have occurred in the past and might well happen again. Examples are the U.S. El Dorado Canyon operation against Libya in 1986, which involved air attacks, the deployment of U.S. forces to Lebanon in the early 1980s, and the naval escort operations in the Persian Gulf in 1987-88. All of these experiences involved U.S. military forces operating outside NATO's command mechanisms; the first two were conducted by the U.S. European Command. The prospect that similar incidents will occur creates an obvious need for U.S. military strength in Europe.

Contingency 14 envisions air and missile attacks, and other operations, growing out of North Africa and launched against NATO's nations on the Mediterranean littoral. Because modern military technology is spreading, potential targets Italy and France already are worried about this prospect. This contingency calls attention to NATO's need for a modern air defense system along its southern flank, and for naval forces as well. West European forces are most directly affected, but since the United States plays an important role in providing NATO's southern flank defenses, it would be affected as well.

Contingency 15 involves a major attack launched by a combination of Syrian and Iraqi forces (possibly with Iran's cooperation) against Turkey. The purpose would not be to overrun Turkey, but rather to seize critical targets of value. Examples would be the Iskenderun area on the Mediterranean shore and the Tigris-Euphrates region, extending to the Attaturk Dam, which controls the flow of water to Iraq and Syria. This attack would trigger Article 5 and would mandate a NATO coalition response. The Turks would likely require major outside air and ground support, as well as assistance in logistic support, special weapons, and C³I. The United States, which is NATO's leader in power projection capabilities for this kind of operation, almost certainly would become involved.

Contingency 16 involves U.S. security assistance to Israel to help it fend off outside attack, and contingency 17 envisions a major U.S. and allied military operation in the Persian Gulf region. Because both contingencies have ample historical precedent, they will not be discussed at length here. Suffice to say that, in the past, the U.S. military infrastructure in Europe played a key role in the success that the United States was able to achieve. In the Persian Gulf War, for example, the vast majority of U.S. cargo-carrying air transports were staged through U.S. air bases in Europe, and the massive U.S. sealift operation transitted through the Mediterranean. The need to be prepared for similar operations in the future underscores the need to maintain an adequate infrastructure in Europe.

Category VI involves contingencies that often escape public notice but are important nonetheless. Contingencies 17, 18, and 19 involve hostage rescue, counterterrorist, and counterdrug operations that require that specialized U.S. forces be kept in Europe constantly. The next two contingencies involve international peacekeeping and disaster relief operations that, while not necessarily mandating specific force deployments in Europe itself, do require a U.S. command staff there. The final contingency calls attention to EUCOM's often overlooked mission to handle military operations in sub-Saharan Africa. Examples are rescue missions, security assistance, and disaster relief. As long as this mission is retained under EUCOM's purview, it will affect at least U.S. needs for military bases in Europe.

Together, these six categories lay out a broad spectrum of contingencies that should be thought about not only separately but also in terms of how they, and the political tensions they represent, might interact. Together, they imply that Europe may present a three-tiered conflict system in the future. At the top will be a low-probability but still-worrisome risk of renewed peacetime competition between NATO and Russia, along with an improbable threat of outright war between them over the sovereignty of one or more NATO nations. Another possibility is a forceable Russian reentry into Eastern Europe that does not immediately threaten NATO's borders but does impinge upon Western security interests. In the middle will be a variety of interstate conflicts between lesser European powers (e.g., Hungary and Romania) that could require NATO intervention. At the bottom will be a bewildering array of intrastate crises, hot spots, civil wars, and revolutions. During the Cold War, communism in Eastern Europe suppressed that region's nationalism and its history. The receding of the Soviet empire has unleashed long-pent-up emotions from Eastern Europe to the Urals and from the Baltic to the Black Sea.

Together, these three tiers form a pillar of future European conflicts. Standing beside this European pillar will be a similarly structured pillar of potential Middle East/Persian Gulf conflicts. At the top will be major war similar to Desert Shield/Storm, requiring a large U.S. and allied deployment to the Gulf. In the middle will come a set of potential medium-range conflicts requiring smaller but still substantial U.S. intervention (e.g., an attack on Turkey or Israel). At the bottom will be the sort of minor contingencies that regularly grow out of the Middle East's tangled politics (e.g., El Dorado Canyon). Figure 5.2 displays these two pillars side-by-side.

Because events influence each other, these pillars will interact both vertically and horizontally. Vertically, the different types of potential conflict in Europe will affect each other's likelihood, the conditions under which they are waged, and their larger implications for Europe's stability. Horizontally, the potential for conflict in Europe will influence security affairs in




Figure 5.2—Pillars of Future Conflict in Europe and the Middle East/Persian Gulf

the Middle East/Persian Gulf, and vice versa. These interactions will need to be managed carefully. Because they can feed off each other in the right circumstances, they may bring with them a serious potential for chronic instability in peacetime and rapid escalation in a crisis.

The West's relations with Russia will go far toward determining whether control is possible. To the extent that NATO's nations and Russia can find common ground, they will be able to collaborate to help dampen political tensions in both regions and to keep military conflicts within bounds when they do occur. In this event, something resembling the old Concert of Europe might evolve to preserve order, maintain equilibrium, and guide change.

However, if the Atlantic Alliance and Russia find themselves still at odds, even low- and medium-level conflicts will be conducted in an atmosphere that could draw the larger powers into confrontation. As a result, the possibility of a chain reaction spiraling outward and upward would always be present, threatening to transform a local affair into a much larger contest. The best analogy is 1914, when a local assassination set into motion a series of events that quickly produced a full-scale catastrophe. A Europe laden with the potential for large and small conflicts, flanked by an equally turbulent Middle East/Persian Gulf, might produce a similar propensity for disaster. In this event, the emerging depolarized European security system might well be less stable and more dangerous than the Cold War's bipolar order. For all its ideological conflict and military competition, the old system at least had the advantage of being structurally simple and therefore manageable.

IMPLICATIONS OF PLANNING FOR CONTINGENCIES

Although Europe recently has witnessed minor fighting in several areas, a major regional war anytime soon is hard to imagine. The Persian Gulf is a more probable location, but the destruction of Iraq's military machine lowers the chances of near-term aggression there as well. As a result, contingency planning for the coming era appears to violate the outer limits of political realism. Nonetheless, war almost always seems like a low-probability event in advance, and defense planning should be both prudent and specific. For all its drawbacks, contingency planning provides both prudence and specificity.

The act of using contingencies to gauge force requirements is always a hazardous exercise, and it is doubly so for Europe in the coming years. Contingencies are heuristic exercises for force planning, not predictions of specific events. Yet they are judged for realism, and properly so. The problem is that while wars normally are easy to explain in retrospect, they are very hard to forecast. Part of the reason for this is that their underlying causes are often blurred by conflicting trends. Equally important, war seldom seems like a rational choice to the outside observer, for whom it appears too risky and costly. The potential belligerents might view their priorities quite differently, but their intentions can be difficult to read, especially when they are concealed or change daily. Consequently, even when war is lurking around the corner, it still can look like a low-probability event. And when the risk of war lies uncertainly several years in the future, it typically seems too improbable to be taken seriously. As a result, contingencies often lack credibility.

Contingencies can lack credibility for another reason. Typically, they call the shots wrong. The war that is expected to start doesn't. But another and quite different one does take place. The result is a mad scramble to alter carefully laid plans and policies overnight. In retrospect, the original contingency can look foolish and even harmfully misleading if it diverted attention away from the real problem. A good example is 1950, when the U.S. government was preoccupied with Europe and got caught by surprise when the Korean War broke out. To a lesser degree, the Persian Gulf War falls into the same category. For years, the U.S. government studied the problem of defending Iran against the Soviets, only to find itself protecting Saudi Arabia and Kuwait against the Iraqis. Experiences like these lead many to view contingencies with a jaundiced eye.

Even so, contingency analysis is an important stage of the planning process. Its premise is that conflict is ever-possible, and this perspective alone is a valuable one. Moreover, if it is done right, it can have a positive impact even if its forecasts fall short of perfect accuracy. Contingencies should not be judged by the standard of clairvoyance. What matters is whether they correctly call attention to broad classes of problems and help push plans and policies in generally sound directions. Properly interpreted, the Persian Gulf analyses prepared by the Defense Department in the early 1980s fall into this category. They did not forecast Iraq's march on Kuwait, but they did call attention to the need to prepare for a major war in the Gulf. As a result, the United States was reasonably well prepared when war, of a quite different nature, actually did come.

If contingencies serve this purpose, they also are vital when the time comes to get specific about force requirements. A key risk in force planning is that decisions will be made, incorrectly, on the basis of impressions. Contingencies help avert this risk by focusing on concrete situations, thereby shedding light on military forces that will be needed for actual conflicts.

To the extent that their results can be generalized, they help point out in well-defined and even numerical terms the types of forces that will be needed for a whole class of problems. While they are no guarantee of good planning, they consequently help safeguard against bad planning.

Because the new European security system has not yet taken shape, its cracks and fissures are especially hard to foresee. As a result, any effort to speculate about future contingencies there is conducted in the kind of fog that can lead to oversights. Yet, what stands out from the list presented here is the sheer number of potential conflicts that might occur in the years ahead. What also stands out is their diversity: in size, geographic location, and political-military nature. Together, they provide a witches' brew of potential troubles. Judged individually, few of them seem very probable, but collectively, their probabilities add up. They suggest that in the years ahead, Europe will not be so tranquil that the issue of U.S. and NATO defense preparedness can be ignored.

These contingencies have clear implications for U.S. force requirements in Europe. Most readily apparent is the need for U.S. military staffs in Europe that can develop coordinated plans with allied governments and NATO, as well as establish broader contacts across the Continent. Also clearly required, even by the small and medium conflicts that might lie ahead, is a military infrastructure across Europe, from north to south. Finally a combination of ground, air, and naval combat forces is required to provide the broad range of military options that could be needed to respond quickly and effectively to the contingencies identified here. The exact number of combat forces required would depend upon which of these contingencies are taken seriously enough to plan against and upon the specific circumstances in which they might occur.

SIZE OF THE ADVERSARY FORCE

Requirements for U.S. combat forces in Europe will depend partly on the size of the adversary force that could be encountered in the contingencies ahead. The spectrum of contingencies developed here stretches from major wars through medium-scale conflicts to minor incidents. Where along this spectrum should the United States conduct its planning? Should it prepare forces for the entire spectrum, or can it safely discount the higher end and focus exclusively on the less demanding situations that remain? Thus, what is the size of the threat? The answer to this question depends not only on a calculus of probabilities but also on an assessment of risks and costs. Also involved is the question of objectives. The purpose of contingency analysis is not only to be prepared to respond to these situations but also to create the forces that will deter them from occurring in the first place. To the extent that improbable but dangerous contingencies are ignored, the risk of failing to deter them is magnified.

Simply stated, there will be a contingency-driven need for 150,000 U.S. troops in Europe if situations are likely to emerge demanding the prompt commitment of at least a full U.S. Army corps and three to four air wings. Many of the contingencies envisioned here fall well short of this size. As a result, the requirement for the currently planned posture will hinge on the stance adopted on two issues: (a) warfare with Russia and (b) warfare with heavily armed adversaries in the Middle East or Persian Gulf.

The first issue is whether the United States and NATO should actively prepare to deter and defend against the contingencies in categories II and III, which involve major Russian ag-

gression beyond its borders. Two arguments are commonly advanced for not doing so: First, a major Russian assault on NATO is already so far beyond the pale that it should not be taken seriously, especially since actively preparing to fight the Russians might cause bad blood with them. Second, the force requirements for these contingencies will be high and therefore too expensive. In other words, this argument concludes that this step would be both politically unwise and fiscally imprudent. The arguments in favor of this step are threefold: First, the West cannot afford to assume that the Russians will continue acting benignly simply because they currently are in a period of retrenchment, chaos, and halting reform. Second, Russia/Commonwealth is by far the strongest military power in Europe. If NATO plans only for lesser contingencies because they are cheaper and seem more likely to occur, it will find itself militarily deficient, perhaps with catastrophic consequences, if an unexpected war with Russia does occur. Third, Russian military forces are themselves declining, and therefore NATO can afford to defend against them. In other words, this argument claims that this step would be both fiscally affordable and strategically sensible.

The second issue to consider is whether the United States and NATO should be prepared to repeat the Desert Shield experience or something like it: a massive deployment of several divisions, several hundred aircraft, and large naval forces to the Middle East or Persian Gulf. The argument against this step is that with Iraq eliminated as a military threat, no other power is likely to take its place anytime soon. The argument in favor is that Iraq might rebuild faster than seems possible, or there are other powerful nations in the Middle East/Persian Gulf that might band together to take its place.

The manner in which these two issues are resolved will have a bearing on the assessment of future U.S. military requirements in Europe in the years ahead. Because the West Europeans probably will not have sufficient forces and cohesion to handle a large Russian invasion of Central Europe on their own, a sizable U.S. force contribution will be needed. A similar state of affairs applies with respect to a major war in the Middle East or Persian Gulf. In the Persian Gulf War, the United States deployed the vast majority of the forces sent by NATO's nations: about 80 percent. In the absence of a greater allied contribution, a future war might require the United States again to deploy as many as ten division-equivalents and other similarly large forces. In this case, the immediate requirements for waging a major war in the Gulf might not be dramatically different from fighting in Europe.

Although all of the other contingencies listed here would require some U.S. forces, none would pose requirements nearly as large as these two. To be sure, these are wartime requirements that do not automatically translate into a need for massive U.S. forces stationed in Europe in peacetime: Much depends on timing (discussed below). Nonetheless, any major war in either Europe or the Middle East/Persian Gulf would require a large-scale coalition effort. An effort of this magnitude could not be mounted in absence of prior coordination in the development of doctrine, training, weapons, support structures, and command relations. At a minimum, the need to accomplish just these tasks requires a sizable U.S. presence in Europe, with some combat forces, on a constant basis.

TIMING OF THE ADVERSARY BUILDUP AND ATTACK

U.S. force requirements in Europe will be influenced not only by the size of the adversary force but also by its timing. At issue is the speed at which an adversary, by mobilizing and

moving units forward, could generate forces on the battlefield. Also at issue is the amount of advanced warning time that the United States and its allies would get and the extent to which they would take advantage of this warning time to react by generating their own forces. A final issue is exactly when the United States would need to have its forces in place at the point of impending combat: at the time fighting starts, before, or after.

American forces already deployed in Europe will be located much closer to the battlefield than if they were based in the United States and therefore should be able to reach it quicker. But over a longer period, U.S.-based forces would be able to converge on the scene as well. Because the United States has impressive airlift and sealift assets, the extra time needed to deploy them often is relatively short: a matter of days and weeks, rather than months. Consequently, the advantage of European basing over U.S. basing is not necessarily obvious. Much depends on how quickly American forces would be needed at the scene and on how much time would be available to get them there.

During the Cold War, NATO feared a major Warsaw Pact attack in Central Europe in as little as 5 to 15 days after the Soviets and their allies had clearly begun mobilizing for war. It further calculated that NATO itself probably would not decide to mobilize until a few days after the Soviets had begun doing so. For this reason, the case for basing large U.S. forces in Central Europe was clear cut. Because they were already deployed there, many U.S. forces would have been available to begin fighting almost immediately, and all would have been at their battle posts within a few days at the latest. By comparison, the same forces, if based in the United States, would have taken several days and perhaps weeks longer—potentially arriving well after the enemy attack had begun.

The end of the Cold War has overturned this calculus and has confronted the United States with a far more complex situation. The task of studying this new situation in all its richness has only begun, and firm conclusions will be some time in coming. What can be said here is that at stake is far more than one canonical force-sizing scenario. The need to prepare for a wide spectrum of contingencies will make necessary a detailed review of competitive force-generation timelines in each case. The conclusions of this multiscenario analysis will have a bearing on this aspect of assessing U.S. force needs in Europe.

If war with Russia is deemed sufficiently worrisome to be taken seriously, the subject of Russian-NATO force generation rates in Central Europe is likely to play a contributing role in the analyses ahead. Clearly, the withdrawal of Soviet forces behind their borders means that an attack in Central Europe would take far longer to mount than during the Cold War. For example, rather than traveling only a few miles, the Russians would have to transit across Belarus and then enter Poland—a long distance. How much more time would this process take? Here, the answer seems to depend on a host of factors—political as well as military.

Because all of these factors currently are subject to major uncertainty, a number of different theses can be argued. At one extreme is the thesis that the entire process of mobilization could take a full year or two. This thesis starts the clock ticking quite early: when political relations start deteriorating to the point where Russian leaders begin to think about resorting to force. The thesis at the other extreme discounts not only the political process but also a whole set of time-consuming readiness improvements that the Russians probably would have to make in their forces. It starts the clock ticking at the point where the Russian

Army is massed on the Polish border. It therefore concludes that an invasion could be launched in as little as a few days or weeks.

The thesis in the middle claims that the entire process would take neither a few days nor a few years, but rather a few weeks and months. It starts the clock when the Russian government decides to begin a full-scale mobilization. Its calculus is driven by a technical assessment of overland transport capabilities in relation to tonnage requirements, potential resistance, and the time needed to establish forward bases before moving further into Eastern Europe. Using this calculus, an assessment of four to six months is plausible, but an estimate of about two to three months is more prudent.

These theses have very different implications for NATO's defense posture. A period of one to two years warning in theory could allow NATO to retire most of its forces into deep reserve status and, to the extent this contingency is the only worry, even to dismantle parts of its integrated command structure. By contrast, a period of only a few days' or weeks' warning would compel NATO to keep its military pump primed. NATO would need to keep not only a fully integrated command structure but also a large mass of highly ready forces. A period of two to three months or thereabouts would lead NATO to structure its posture on the basis of a mix of active forces and ready reserves, under the guidance of an integrated command similar to today's. Currently, alliance defense planning seems pointed toward this kind of mix, with U.S. forces in Europe providing a key portion of NATO's ready forces.

History's lessons are ambiguous on which of these theses seems most plausible. History does suggest that wars do not grow out of a political vacuum. For this reason, any future war with Russia could happen only as a product of a lengthy downturn in political relations. Downturns, however, can happen in different ways, some obvious, some not. In the 1930s, Europe's slide took a full six years to unfold. During this period, Nazi Germany progressively turned toward military rearmament and political revanchism in a way that was transparent for all who cared to look, but many chose not to watch. Twenty years earlier, by contrast, the dynamics were less easily seen. Europe found itself in a state of constant political tension that gave the misleading appearance of stable equilibrium because its frictions were chronic, not acute. Consequently, Europe's major powers all maintained large forces that always were ready to go to war quickly, even though few expected them to be used. When the fatal crisis came in July 1914, it unfolded with a suddenness that gave these nations little time for political reflection but compelled them to react militarily almost immediately. Within only six weeks, war exploded on them, seemingly out of nowhere.

Historical diversity of this sort confounds the task of assessing how long, politically, it would take a future crisis in Europe to become critical. In all likelihood, time lines will be affected by the degree to which the Russian/Commonwealth government decides to keep its army at a ready state. During the Cold War, NATO's planners viewed the Soviet army as an institution ready to wage war. The former USSR's recent slide into political chaos has given rise to a quite different picture of an army decaying from within, inflicted with poor morale and declining funds. If this continues to be the case, then the Russian/Commonwealth Army will pose little immediate threat to anyone.

Whether the present chaos will continue, however, is uncertain. Politically, nations have a way of rebounding, as the Soviet Union itself showed. In the past, the Russian Army has gone through bad periods and eventually emerged as a serious force. So also has the U.S.

Army, which experienced serious troubles in the late 1970s only to fight well a short decade later. Other examples can be cited. In the early 1930s, the German Army, for all practical purposes, did not exist. Six years later, it went on the march and showed that it was the world's best. More graphically, in the late 1940s, the Chinese Army was embroiled in a murderous civil war. Only one year later, it emerged with sufficient unity to attack American forces in Korea and temporarily inflict an embarrassing route on them. All these experiences suggest that what exists today, politically and militarily, might not be the case tomorrow.

Equally important, some of the 20th century's hardest fighting has been done by quickly mobilized reserve forces that, on paper, seemed to lack regular training to a degree constraining any early resort to war. Israel, whose military reputation comes partly from the superb record of its reserves, is an obvious case. Another example is World War I. The German army that raced through Belgium and then put the French Army on the ropes was heavily reservist. Many of the French forces that counterattacked successfully at the Marne were also reserves. Because the political crisis that caused World War I was so short, these reserve units had virtually no time to train. Yet, under the command of professional officers, they fought well on both defense and offense. If history is any judge, the likelihood that Europe's armies will be heavily made up of reserves is no guarantee that future wars cannot occur quickly and be fought aggressively.

Any future Russian invasion outside Commonwealth borders could be launched only after a major national mobilization whose time lines currently are unknowable. Because the CFE Treaty will impose strict limits on equipment that can be maintained east of the Ural Mountains, the Commonwealth will be capable of fielding only limited forces near its borders with Europe. Not all of these forces would be available for aggression due to defensive missions elsewhere and internal control functions. Therefore the Russian government would have to draw on at least some forces from its eastern military districts and move them west. The entire effort could consume several weeks, and the need to give refresher training to reserve units could easily drag out the mobilization process further.

Nonetheless, these constraints are no guarantee that an attack would proceed at a snail's pace. The process could be shortened if the Russians were to organize their road and rail assets efficiently. It could be shortened further if critical reserve units are maintained at higher readiness than in the past. Moreover, an offensive military drive could be hastened by strengthening support assets in ways that produce greater cross-country mobility. For these reasons, force-generation rates will lie partly in the hands of the Russian/Commonwealth government itself. If it is content with a defensive military strategy whose forces can swing over to the offense only slowly, then it will not be able to aggress quickly. But if it wants to preserve a capacity to march beyond its borders with dispatch, it will have the means to do so at its disposal. Only time will tell which path is taken.

Especially because arms control accords will provide early alarm bells, even a period of two to three months would give the United States and NATO much longer warning time than they had during the Cold War. But the presence of advanced warning is no guarantee of a swift reaction. History shows many cases in which nations, confronted with evidence of potential attack, failed to react. The initial stage of World War II is one long story of this error on both sides of the Atlantic. NATO might succumb to a similar failure. The sheer ambiguity of the situation, diplomatic calculations, and NATO's own cumbersome decision processes all could

lead it to react sluggishly, thereby losing some of its warning time. What applies to NATO could also apply to the United States.

While it is possible to imagine NATO dawdling up until the last moment, a reasonable estimate for planning is that NATO would likely decide to mobilize about one to three weeks after receiving clear warning. This would be about the time that Russian forces were gathering on Commonwealth borders and showing signs of advancing beyond. At about this time, diplomacy would also have likely run its course, thereby leading NATO's nations to cast prudence aside by mobilizing. A delay of one to three weeks would still leave NATO with several weeks to prepare. This period, however, would be less ample than initial appearances must suggest. During the Cold War, NATO's forces were capable of fighting in only a few days, but this was because they were deployed close to the inter-German border and maintained in high-readiness status. Now NATO's own forces will be far less ready, and they would have to advance some 200 kilometers into eastern Germany and possibly beyond. As a result, the entire process of mobilizing and moving forward could take longer than before.

What are the implications for U.S. force needs? During this interval, U.S. forces in Europe would need to move forward, and reinforcements would need to be sent from across the Atlantic. It is here that complexities arise in calculating U.S. time-phased force requirements in Europe. In theory, a U.S. Army corps and 3.5 USAF air wings could all deploy to Central Europe within a month. This would obviate the need to have them based there from the onset, thereby allowing for a withdrawal well below 150,000 troops.

However a variety of considerations could alter this calculus. For example, the immediately available presence of sizable U.S. forces might be needed to help bolster NATO's willpower. Also, the political situation might make an early U.S. reinforcement effort unwise. For example, NATO might balk at authorizing outside reinforcements if its diplomats felt that this provocative step would inflame an already delicate situation. Politics aside, U.S. forces might be required to begin performing important military missions well before combat begins, including reconnaissance and establishing defense positions. Finally, NATO probably would require more than a single U.S. corps and a few air wings at the time fighting does break out. Additional reinforcements coming from the United States might be delayed too long if their place in the transportation queue line is taken by units that otherwise would already have been deployed in Europe.

For all these reasons, a careful assessment of this situation might conclude that, for this contingency, a legitimate need exists for the peacetime presence of large U.S. combat forces in Europe. This conclusion, however, rests on a long list of calculations and thus is highly sensitive to assumptions made about many events. This entire calculus will probably be studied extensively in the period ahead, and its complexities are unlikely to be fully resolved anytime soon.

If the uncertainty about how timing affects U.S. force requirements for this scenario is large, it pales by comparison when the full set of other contingencies is taken into account. Some situations seem likely to provide the United States ample time to deploy forces to Europe from the United States. Examples are contingencies requiring disaster relief and international peacekeeping missions. At the other extreme, some contingencies could require a strong military response within a few hours or even immediately. Examples include a surprise air attack on NATO territory, hostage rescue operations, and counterterrorist missions.

In between are a whole set of contingencies whose time dimensions are difficult to know in advance. How much time, for example, would be available to respond to an attack on Turkey or a crisis in Eastern Europe or an event in the Middle East?

To the extent that time lines are compressed in these contingencies, the need for U.S. forces in Europe will rise. To the extent that time lines expand, the requirement will diminish. Whatever the case for individual situations, the timing issue can be addressed satisfactorily only by considering the full set of contingencies that might be encountered. For all of them, a forward presence of 150,000 troops would provide the capacity to respond in strength quite quickly. Smaller postures would provide a diminished capacity early and could leave the United States in the position of having to wait several days or weeks to mount a full response. The choice here comes down to a matter of priorities.

SIMULTANEITY OF THE ADVERSARY THREAT

Finally, U.S. military requirements in Europe will be affected by whether only one contingency is likely to be encountered at a time or whether two or more might arise simultaneously. During the Cold War, a central principle of U.S. defense planning was to be prepared for more than one contingency at a time. The rationale was that a potential adversary in one region, seeing U.S. forces rushing to another region, might see a golden opportunity to strike. As a result, the Defense Department typically sized its forces with a planning framework that began with a stressful challenge in the Persian Gulf followed shortly thereafter by a major war in Europe. These near-simultaneous contingencies produced higher force needs in both Europe and the United States than would have a single contingency.

Will the United States need to prepare for simultaneous contingencies of this size in Europe and surrounding regions during the post-Cold War era? The answer will depend upon whether the United States will be facing more than one strategic adversary at a time and on whether these adversaries will have the wherewithal to coordinate their positions. A key factor here is relations with Russia. During the Cold War, the United States constantly feared that the Soviets would take advantage of its involvements elsewhere around the globe to pounce on Western Europe. At the moment, that fear clearly has faded. Indeed the Persian Gulf War was waged in the confidence that the Soviets not only would remain quiescent in Europe but that they broadly supported the coalition's campaign in the Gulf.

This situation could clearly change if relations with Russia were to deteriorate. In this case, the old strategic problem would reemerge: the fear that Europe might start going down the tubes at the same time the Middle East flares up. The current DoD defense program suggests that while U.S. military planners are still concerned about regional wars, they are now more relaxed about the threat of strategic simultaneity arising from Europe. But as long as relations with Russia are question marks, Russia will still be lurking in the shadows.


Even if this strategic threat does not reappear, the sheer number of lesser contingencies ahead in Europe makes it possible that more than one contingency could arise at a time. For example, a fracas between Turkey and its Arab neighbors could occur at the same time that a civil war is under way in Yugoslavia. Or, a border war between Hungary and Romania could break out at the same time that Israel is under siege. Concurrent situations of this sort would place greater stress on the U.S. posture in Europe than would a single contingency on which U.S. planners could focus their complete efforts. Politics and time permitting, outside

reinforcements could be flown in from the United States. But even so, a posture of 150,000 troops would put the United States in a better position to respond to multiple time-urgent problems than would a far smaller posture. Once again, the choice comes down to a matter of priorities.

A CONTINGENCY-ORIENTED FRAMEWORK FOR REQUIREMENTS ANALYSIS

Contingencies are far from the only consideration in gauging force requirements, but they are important nonetheless. In the years ahead, U.S. force needs in Europe will be affected not only by the spectrum of possible contingencies but also by the size of those that are to be taken seriously, by their timing, and by their simultaneity. Figure 5.3 displays how these separate factors interact together to shape total requirements in Europe. As it suggests, force requirements rise as circumstances of potential crises become more stressful, and decline as conditions mellow.

To an important degree, the assessment of future defense needs will depend where on this matrix U.S. defense planning for Europe is to fall. Currently, U.S. planning seems focused on the middle shaded area. This focus is consistent with the plan to keep 150,000 troops in Europe. A switch to the more demanding part of the matrix would give rise to larger requirements. By contrast, a reorientation of planning to the less demanding segment would give rise to fewer requirements. Figure 5.3 thus helps suggest how the question of priorities comes to bear.



NOTES: S means simultaneous; NS means not simultaneous.

Figure 5.3—Impact of Contingencies on Future U.S. Force Requirements in Europe

6. NATO'S MILITARY STRATEGY AND CONVENTIONAL FORCE LEVELS

The next stage in the methodology of strategic planning is an analysis of how NATO's military strategy will affect U.S. force needs in Europe. U.S. security goals shape the broad policy criteria by which force needs are judged, and contingencies determine how specific threats to these goals are likely to be manifested. Strategy, in turn, provides guidelines on how a military response is to be mounted for these contingencies, thereby bringing planning an additional step closer to completion.

To the uninitiated, the phrase "military strategy" is associated with wartime operations: It often comes across as a set of clever maneuvers for outwitting the enemy on the battlefield. While it can be part that, it is also a good deal more. Properly defined, as B. H. Liddell Hart once wrote, military strategy is the art and science of determining how military force is to be used to attain political goals.¹ It thus focuses on the relationship between means and ends. Its purposes, moreover, are broader than merely defining how existing means are to be employed in any given wartime situation. Military strategy also plays a critical role in deciding what means should be acquired in the first place to pursue those ends. It thus has important programmatic consequences. In a direct way, it helps shape force levels, weapons, readiness levels, and the other determinants of combat capability.

Within NATO, military strategy also has consequences for alliance politics and coalition planning. It provides a vehicle by which conflicting intra-alliance perspectives are harmonized and consensus is preserved. In particular, it establishes an appropriate balance between nuclear weapons and conventional defenses, thereby bridging potential transatlantic differences on this sensitive issue. Furthermore, it provides a basis for NATO's members to coordinate their defense contributions, thereby achieving acceptable burden-sharing arrangements by allocating military responsibilities appropriately. In this way, it helps embed the analysis of U.S. force requirements in a larger context.

WHITHER MC 14/4?

From 1967 to 1991, NATO's military strategy, named MC 14/3 after the title of the document that bears its contents, was one of "flexible response." Briefly stated, this strategy moved NATO away from its nuclear-oriented predecessor (MC 14/2). It focused primarily on a full-scale NATO-Warsaw Pact war, and it called for a combination of nuclear deterrence and conventional defense, with sufficient conventional forces to withstand a full-scale enemy attack at least initially. To this end, it laid down three interlinked operational concepts to guide NATO's planning: direct defense, deliberate escalation, and general nuclear response.

With these concepts, MC 14/3's central message was that NATO should aspire to defend conventionally against nonnuclear aggression but that it should be prepared to cross the nuclear threshold in the event its forces buckled. In this event, NATO was to escalate gradually at first, in a political effort to convince the enemy to halt his aggression. Only if this effort also

¹B. H. Liddell Hart, *Strategy*, Signet, New York, 1967. Chapter 19, pp. 319-334.

failed was NATO to mount a massive nuclear attack against the enemy's forces, economic infrastructure, political command centers, and industrial capacity. This approach to military operations led, in turn, to MC 14/3's call for a triad force posture of strong conventional defenses, theater nuclear weapons, and strategic nuclear forces capable of striking the Soviet homeland. Out of this triad philosophy came the need for a large and diverse U.S. force presence in Europe, backed up by a sizable capability for rapid reinforcement.

Recognizing that MC 14/3 was a creature of the Cold War, NATO's leaders decided to embark on the task of crafting an entirely new strategy when they met at the London Summit in 1990. In the intervening months, NATO planners made considerable progress toward fulfilling this charter. A new strategic concept was agreed upon at the Rome Summit. But NATO is still a considerable distance from articulating the fully elaborated MC 14/4 that is needed to assess future force needs.

Pending completion of this important task, the analysis of U.S. force requirements in Europe will have to be conducted partly in a strategy vacuum. This state of affairs alone is grounds for exercising caution about making hasty final decisions. One type of NATO military strategy could push U.S. requirements in one direction, another strategy, a quite different way. Especially because NATO took a full five years to create MC 14/3, the new strategy, in its full dimensions, might take time to define. In the interim, planning on a U.S. force presence of 150,000 troops would keep options open, thereby providing flexibility.

Fortunately, the London and Rome Summit declarations laid down some useful guidelines that, because they will be reflected in NATO's emerging strategic concept, help provide insights on how MC 14/4 is likely to take shape. These guidelines include the following:

- Recognizing the Cold War is over, NATO's nations acknowledge that they must profoundly alter the way they think about defense.
- NATO's nations will refashion their military strategy to bring it into alignment with the goal of enhancing the political component of NATO and contributing to the pursuit of a stable security architecture in Europe.
- NATO will remain a defensive alliance and will continue to defend all the territory of its members; it has no aggressive intentions and it will never, in any circumstances, be the first to use force.
- The significant presence of North American conventional and nuclear forces in Europe demonstrates the underlying political compact that binds North America's fate to Europe's democracies.
- To reduce NATO's military requirements, arms control agreements are essential, but they must be sound.
- NATO will field smaller and restructured active forces. These forces will be highly mobile and versatile so that NATO's leaders will have maximum flexibility in deciding how to respond in a crisis.
- NATO will increasingly rely on multinational formations made up of national units. It will scale back the readiness of its active units, reducing training requirements and exercises. Also, it will rely more heavily on the ability to build up larger forces if and when they are needed.

- NATO must maintain for the foreseeable future an appropriate mix of nuclear and conventional forces based in Europe. Its nuclear weapons will be kept at the lowest and most stable level needed to prevent war. There will be a reduced need for substrategic nuclear weapons, permitting elimination of nuclear tube artillery shells in Europe.
- Nuclear weapons will continue to fulfill an essential role in NATO's strategy, and there are no circumstances in which nuclear retaliation to military action might be discounted. However, in the new NATO strategy, nuclear weapons will truly become weapons of last resort.
- NATO's strategy will move away from forward defense where appropriate, toward a reduced forward presence. Further, it will modify flexible response to reflect a reduced reliance on nuclear weapons. In that connection, NATO will prepare new force plans consistent with the revolutionary changes in Europe.

What do these guidelines imply for the future U.S. presence? Clearly, they state that NATO's overall posture is to be reduced significantly, thereby implying that some U.S. forces can be withdrawn. However, they also broadly endorse a continued and sizable U.S. military presence in Europe. They make no mention of specific levels, but in principle, they are not opposed to the idea of keeping 150,000 troops there, if that step contributes to stability.

Beyond this, these guidelines leave many questions unanswered that have a direct bearing on the future U.S. presence. They provide a combination of generalized policy statements and specific remarks on the internal structuring of NATO's forces. But they offer few insights on the analytical superstructure that is needed to determine exactly how large NATO's forces are to be, both U.S. and allied. In particular, they are silent on NATO's military objectives and operational concepts, both of which are vitally important to the task of determining future force levels. In areas where they do speak out, they are ambiguous. What does it mean, for example, to replace "forward defense" with "forward presence"? Equally important, exactly what does "last resort" mean? For these two questions alone, the answers can mean a world of difference for NATO's conventional defense plans and for U.S. requirements.

FUTURE MILITARY OBJECTIVES

In absence of more definitive information, the best that can be done is to offer an appraisal of where these unspecified components of strategy seem likely to be headed and what they imply for U.S. forces in Europe. This analysis will turn first to NATO's future military objectives. Here, MC 14/3 placed special emphasis on deterrence, defense, control of escalation, and alliance solidarity. Like NATO's broad security policy, the strategy of flexible response pursued multiple objectives. These objectives, in turn, tended to elevate and diversify NATO's force requirements and those of the United States. At issue is whether MC 14/4 will preserve or alter these objectives. From what can be determined, the answer is that MC 14/4 apparently will strive for a combination of continuity and change in these objectives. If this is true, the net effect will be to intensify and broaden MC 14/3's call for flexibility, thereby underscoring the importance of a continuing role for conventional defenses in NATO's strategy for the future.

Of all NATO's military objectives, deterrence is commonly thought to be the most important, and it will remain so in the years ahead. Deterrence was a logical by-product of NATO's pol-

icy of containment, and since this policy is mutating toward a broader conception of European security affairs, the definition of deterrence will evolve as well. In years past, deterrence was defined in terms of NATO's capacity to threaten the USSR with military resistance, including nuclear reprisals, sufficiently severe to make the costs and risks of aggression far outweigh any rational calculus of gains. In the years ahead, this core idea is likely to be carried forward, but it will be implemented in different ways.

Because NATO's nations will be seeking to embed Russia and the Commonwealth in a stable European security architecture, their approach to deterrence will rely increasingly on negative sanctions that go well beyond military punishment. Included will be economic reprisals, diplomatic isolation, and exclusion from the larger Euro-Atlantic community, membership in which will be crucial for the former USSR if it is to surmount its economic backwardness. Thus deterrence will be defined in terms of the more subtle concept of persuasion, or dissuasion. Backing it up will still be a military club for extreme situations, but added to it will be a host of inducements that threaten any adversary's vital interests in other powerful ways.

Beyond this, deterrence will change in other ways as well. In the past, deterrence was focused exclusively on the Soviet Union, the locus of NATO's security troubles in Europe. In the years ahead, NATO's strategy will need to address the problem of deterring a much wider spectrum of challenges beyond naked Russian aggression, many not involving Russia at all. In particular, deterrence's shadow will need to be cast over the Middle East and Persian Gulf. There, political passions have been so strong that the potential threat of Western military intervention often has carried insufficient weight. The Persian Gulf War has helped rectify this disrespect for Western interests and military power, but even so, deterrence will remain a goal to be constantly achieved. Additionally, efforts at deterrence will need to focus on Eastern Europe and the Balkans, areas where relatively small but potentially explosive conflicts will threaten to spiral upward, drawing in the major powers.

For all these situations, the threat of military force will continue to play an important role in the deterrence calculus. The new dimensions of deterrence, in turn, cannot help but highlight the importance of conventional forces in NATO's efforts to discourage these military conflicts from happening at all. MC 14/3 parted company with MC 14/2 partly because it acknowledged that the threat of immediate nuclear retaliation was no longer credible against nonnuclear aggression by the Soviet Union. If this was the case during the Cold War's last two decades, it will be doubly true in the era ahead. Nuclear retaliation will seem even less applicable to limited wars and largely irrelevant to the multiplicity of small conflicts that might occur. Because nuclear forces will remain a club that cannot be used except truly in extremis, conventional forces will acquire an even wider role in deterrence. By endorsing the concept of "last resort," the London Summit Declaration implicitly acknowledges this elementary fact.

NATO's "defense" objective also is mutating in ways that have similar implications for strategy and forces. In MC 14/3, this objective was defined differently than deterrence. Whereas deterrence focused on convincing an adversary not to attack in the first place, this objective spelled out NATO's military goals in the event aggression did occur. In essence, it called for sufficiently strong forces, nuclear and conventional, to physically deny the enemy his aims. In particular, it called on NATO to be able to protect its members' borders and to destroy enemy forces that crossed them. In the years ahead, NATO will remain concerned with protecting its borders, but because it might become embroiled in conflicts that are fought over values other than territory, it will need to interpret its defense objective more broadly. MC 14/4

therefore will need to cast this objective in terms of ever-shifting political-military war aims that could include protection of NATO's territory but will not be limited to it.

Nuclear weapons will figure importantly in defending NATO's borders; the London and Rome Summit declarations are clear on this point. But if nuclear weapons were inappropriate under MC 14/3 for defending NATO's borders in the initial stages of major aggression, they will be even less appropriate for flexibly pursuing broader political-military aims under MC 14/4. Unlike conventional forces, nuclear weapons cannot occupy terrain or hold key targets of value. Nor do they provide a diverse array of options that can be crafted to suit the situation and then adjusted flexibly as the crisis unfolds. What they can do is to rapidly destroy enemy forces. But they confer no net advantage on NATO when the enemy is similarly armed, and as Desert Storm showed, they normally are not politically acceptable instruments when the enemy does not possess them.

NATO's third military objective, control of escalation, is likely to evolve in a manner that will point strategy and forces in the same direction. Unlike its predecessor, which was adopted before the former USSR had become a nuclear superpower, MC 14/3 enshrined this objective as an important feature of modern strategy. MC 14/4 is likely to elevate it even higher yet. Future wars primarily will be fought over the kind of limited political aims that call for mutual restraint. Additionally, Europe's depolarized politics ahead mean that even limited wars will bring with them the potential to spiral out of control well beyond the immediate issues at stake.

Controlling escalation will become more feasible in one way, but more difficult in another. Participants will have a greater incentive to pursue it because they will share common goals to a larger degree than they did during the Cold War. But they might be less capable of achieving it because the surrounding situation will be more fluid and less dominated by two superpowers. Whatever the case, nuclear weapons will become even more antithetical to the control of escalation than before. They will remain an option for terminating fighting by dramatizing the rising stakes, especially if NATO's physical survival or vital interests are being threatened. But these situations aside, the use of nuclear weapons could only be expected to inflame an already dangerous situation. For this objective, conventional forces will remain the weapons of choice.

Conventional forces also will continue to figure importantly in the fourth objective of NATO's strategy, alliance solidarity. MC 14/3 recognized that while NATO's unity is affected by common transatlantic interests and security goals, it is also influenced heavily by military strategy. For this reason, MC 14/3 simultaneously endorsed extended nuclear deterrence, forward defense, flexible response, and robust nonnuclear options. Its net effect was to upgrade the interests of both the United States and the West Europeans, thereby giving them an incentive to continue cooperating together. MC 14/4 will need to be built with similar political considerations in mind: It will need to face outward but also inward.

As the London and Rome Summit declarations stated, nuclear weapons will continue being needed to bind NATO together, but so will strong conventional defenses. In particular, the United States, concerned about being embroiled in an intercontinental nuclear war that starts for hazy reasons in Europe, will insist on a NATO strategy anchored on conventional strength. Traditionally, the West European allies, reluctant to see Europe made safe for a devastating conventional war that leaves the superpowers unscathed, have looked with

greater favor on a nuclear strategy. But during the Cold War's last two decades, even they came to see value in strong conventional options provided NATO's nuclear deterrent shield was not dismantled. With the future offering the prospect of limited wars, potentially beyond their borders and vital interests, they are likely to remain at least similarly inclined and perhaps become more so. For these reasons, under MC 14/4 conventional strength will remain an equally important point for binding NATO's nations together.

Tempering this need for conventional strength will be a pair of secondary objectives that will have important influence of their own: arms race stability and cost control. Of the two, arms race stability seems least likely to impinge on NATO's posture and strategy. The reason is that pursuit of this objective has been institutionalized in negotiations aimed at creating a stable military balance in Europe. The CFE Treaty is bringing about a major drawdown in Soviet forces, but it does not obligate NATO to make major cuts in its current weapons inventories. Perhaps future arms control treaties will compel further cuts in NATO's conventional posture, including U.S. forces in Europe. But at the moment, prospects for this do not seem high. While major nuclear cuts are being discussed in other forums (e.g., START), follow-on CFE negotiations are more likely to address a more selective set of constraints. In any event, future treaties will be designed to preserve a military balance at lower force levels, thereby allowing NATO to design a properly flexible strategy.

Cost control, however, will play a major role in shaping NATO's future posture and alliance military strategy. Even during the Cold War, NATO's nations tried to maintain a lid on their defense budgets, and they clearly are determined to reduce military expenditures for the post-Cold War era. The U.S. defense budget and posture are pointed downward by about 30 percent, and the West European allies have similar plans in mind. At present, these transatlantic plans will leave NATO with sufficient conventional forces to embrace a strategy calling for a strong conventional defense. But budgetary cutbacks far beyond this, in absence of a further diminution in the external threat, could propel NATO's strategy downward onto a different plateau.

FUTURE OPERATIONAL CONCEPTS

If MC 14/4's principal military objectives will call for a conventional defense strength, MC 14/4's operational concepts will provide important guidelines for determining how this strength is to be manifested. In this area, unfortunately, the London and Rome Summit declarations left much unsaid. Both declarations call for a move away from forward defense to forward presence, and both endorse highly mobile and flexible forces. But these concepts lack the specificity for assessing exactly what they mean for NATO's military doctrine and conventional force levels.

SACEUR (General Galvin) has stated publicly that MC 14/3's operational concepts of direct defense, deliberate escalation, and general nuclear response will need to be recrafted. But what are to be the new concepts? Although the answer is unclear, one change can be predicted with confidence. Whereas MC 14/3's concepts were entirely preoccupied with actually fighting a war, MC 14/4 will need to be broadened to address both the prewar and postwar periods. In other words, it will have to provide a basis for enabling NATO to engage in crisis management.

The Persian Gulf War provides an illuminating case study on how the dynamics of crisis-management can unfold. The coalition engaged in a lengthy military buildup aimed at both deterring further Iraqi aggression and at signaling the Iraqis to withdraw from Kuwait. Desert Shield took place amidst steadily rising economic and diplomatic pressure from the coalition and other U.N. powers. Then came Desert Storm, an offensive campaign that itself was conducted in two separate phases: a month-long air assault that gave the Iraqis an opportunity to bow out, and then a climactic ground assault that directly ejected them from Kuwait. This ground assault, however, was restrained. It went no further than the Euphrates River, thereby sparing Iraq's heartland, and it was halted after only four days, thereby sparing part of Iraq's trapped army. Following this campaign, a cease-fire was negotiated, and the coalition began a prompt withdrawal.

If this experience is a useful guide, NATO will clearly need to sharpen its thinking on how military forces can be used to manage the crises of the future in a similarly skilled manner. This particularly applies to the prewar stage. During the Cold War, NATO's plans called for a massive and pell-mell mobilization and reinforcement effort on the premise that the time for diplomacy had passed and war was inevitable. Future crises are likely to be more politically complex and tentative, thereby calling for force generation efforts carefully attuned to the situation of the moment. In all likelihood, the United States and NATO will need a set of highly flexible plans that can be adjusted quickly, thereby providing not only different force packages but also the capacity to accelerate and decelerate. Plans of this sort would seem to provide an important key to managing the transition from peace to crisis to war.

With regard to actual war-fighting, it is hard to see how NATO could depart in some wholesale way from MC 14/3's script: conventional defense followed, when appropriate, by a measured and controlled nuclear escalation. Neither an abandonment of conventional options nor a strategy of "no first use" (whereby NATO would swear off nuclear weapons unless used against them) appear in the cards. Consequently, a strong measure of continuity appears probable in defining the fundamentals of NATO's operational concepts.

What is more likely to occur is an important shift in the internal balance that MC 14/4 will strike among these concepts. Because NATO's new strategic concept calls for reduced reliance on nuclear weapons, it seemingly implies that deliberate escalation and general nuclear response will be downgraded in importance. That is, these concepts will remain on the books, but they will play a less central role in shaping how NATO thinks about future operations. This particularly is the case for general nuclear response, which seems especially unsuited to anything short of an all-out war over unlimited political objectives. Deliberate escalation's fate seems more ambiguous. To the extent deliberate escalation survives, it probably will be interpreted not as a temporary way-station along the path to major nuclear retaliation but as a stage of intensified conflict itself aimed at war-termination. Moreover, deliberate escalation may well come to be defined in conventional, not nuclear, terms.

If direct defense and deliberate escalation are to be de-emphasized, then direct defense seems destined to rise in importance. But direct defense itself cannot help but undergo a profound face-lifting that, if not redefining its basic intent, does reinterpret how it is to be implemented. During the Cold War, NATO's plan for defending against an all-out Warsaw Pact assault called for simultaneous forward defenses in Central Europe, the northern region, and the Southern Region. If the future Russian military posture will be limited to single-axis attacks rather than theaterwide campaigns, then NATO presumably can cease worrying about

trying to defend all three areas at once. Instead, it can focus primarily on defending these three regions individually.

This change will ease NATO's defense burden, but it will also place a premium on highly flexible plans and forces that can swing quickly from one region to the next. Particularly important will be a capacity to concentrate NATO forces in Turkey rapidly, to help defend that nation against attacks from multiple directions. Also important will be northern Norway. Because U.S. forces are by far NATO's most mobile units, they presumably would have an important role to play in NATO's emerging need for interregional operations.

A major change also seems in store for NATO's operational concept for defending Germany. Because Germany is now unified, NATO will no longer be able to plan on defending at the old demarcation line. Once Soviet forces are fully withdrawn, NATO will need to plan on defending Germany's eastern borders. Moreover, NATO's forces almost certainly will not be defending in the linear way of old, with a layer-cake array. By the standards of the past, the future offers a very different kind of employment doctrine.

In addition to defending its borders, the United States and NATO will also need military plans enabling its forces to deal with contingencies that call for operations beyond them. The many different types of situations that might arise are too diverse to address in detail here. Suffice it to say that future NATO operations might well cover the gamut: from disaster relief, to small and medium-sized ventures, to major military campaigns. In situations calling for military power, it is possible to envision the United States and NATO providing only logistic support or contributing with air power or deploying ground combat forces that would conduct sweeping battlefield maneuvers. NATO's operational concepts will need to be broadened to take these possibilities into account, thereby setting in motion the activities required to promote proper training, force structures, and command relationships.

IMPLICATIONS FOR U.S. AND NATO CONVENTIONAL FORCE LEVELS

If MC 14/4 seems destined to evolve along these lines, what is implied for NATO's future conventional force needs and the contribution to be made by U.S. forces? This question can best be answered by first examining current U.S. allied force plans in Central Europe and then relating these plans to the wartime situations that might be encountered there or elsewhere. As Figure 6.1 illustrates, NATO currently plans to maintain three categories of ground forces: rapid reaction, main defense, and augmentation forces. Similar levels are planned for air and naval forces.

In Figure 6.1, U.S. forces deployed in Europe (the Capable Corps, the associated 3.5 fighter wings, and the Sixth Fleet) are classified as "rapid reaction forces" because they will be highly ready and capable of use anywhere in Europe or its surrounding regions. Backing up these deployed units will be "Atlantic forces" based in the United States that are planned for commitment in Europe in the event of a contingency requiring outside reinforcement. These forces include three to four active divisions, plus four to five wings and naval combatants. Also available are "augmentation forces" for use in a major regional contingency, including six Army reserve component divisions and seven to eight "contingency forces" that are commonly associated with Central Command (CENTCOM) missions in the Persian Gulf but could be made available in Europe, if necessary. This category includes five to six active divisions, six to seven fighter wings, and naval forces.

	<u>NATO allies</u>	<u>U.S.</u>	<u>Total*</u>
Active Rapid Reaction Forces	3-4	2	5-6
Active Main Defense Forces	7-8	3-4	11-12
Reserve Main Defense Forces	14-17	—	14-17
Augmentation Forces	—	6	6
Contingency Forces	—	5-6	5-6
Total	24-29	17-18	41-47

*For the United States, only the two "rapid reaction" divisions will be based in Europe; the remainder will be based in the United States.

**Figure 6.1—Future NATO Ground Forces for Central Europe
(Division-Equivalents)**

The idea behind this combined U.S./allied force posture is to provide a spectrum of capabilities. A small pool of highly ready forces is to be available to handle time-urgent emergencies. Backing up this pool will be the capacity to mobilize large forces over a period of weeks and months. In the extreme case, NATO is to be capable of mobilizing roughly 40 to 45 divisions and 2,800 tactical combat aircraft, enough to handle a major regional contingency in Europe. This mobilizable posture is less ready and smaller than NATO's posture was during the Cold War, but it presents a substantial capability nonetheless.

Will this posture, with its lower readiness and reduced force levels, be adequate to execute NATO's new strategy in the years ahead? The answer to this question must await a detailed appraisal of the contingencies and adversary forces that could be faced. Recognizing that much analysis remains to be done, some initial appraisals can be offered in Figure 6.2.

- During peacetime, NATO will retain enough active duty forces to provide public assurances that it remains well-armed and militarily vigilant. Especially because the Soviet-Warsaw Pact threat in Central Europe has collapsed, a NATO posture of 14 divisions and several hundred combat aircraft should be sufficient for this purpose. Similar force levels will be deployed in the Northern and Southern Regions, thereby providing peacetime reassurance there.
- In the event of a fast-breaking emergency, NATO will have available a pool of three to four allied divisions (Rapid Reaction Corps), two U.S. divisions, and associated tactical air and naval forces. If these forces are insufficient, NATO's larger pool of active main defense forces can be drawn upon. Provided these forces are properly trained and equipped and can be deployed promptly, they should be adequate to meet the broad range of time-urgent, small- to medium-sized crises that might lie ahead in Europe.

	Late 1980s	Future forces
Active and deployed in Central Europe	30	14
Mobilizable within one month	42	33-37
Fully mobilizable	55	40-45

Figure 6.2—Trends in NATO's Defense Posture
(Division-Equivalents)

- In the event of an emergency of Desert Shield/Storm dimensions in the Persian Gulf or elsewhere, NATO will be able to draw upon the Rapid Reaction Corps, U.S. forces deployed in Europe, and "Atlantic" and "contingency" forces based in the United States. In total, this force amounts to 13 to 16 ground divisions, about 1,100 tactical combat aircraft, 4 to 6 carrier battle groups, and other naval combatants. Once again, this posture's adequacy will depend upon political availability, training and readiness, and prompt deployability. In terms of size, however, it is sufficiently large to match the posture that was deployed to the Persian Gulf for Desert Shield/Storm, which proved to be adequate.
- In the event of a major regional contingency in Central Europe, NATO will be able to generate 12 to 14 divisions and 750 to 1,000 tactical combat aircraft within a few days (counting French forces). Within about a month, allied reserve mobilization and outside reinforcement from the United States could elevate this posture to 31 to 33 divisions and about 2,400 combat aircraft. Later reinforcement from U.S. augmentation forces could increase NATO's ground posture to 40 to 45 divisions and 2,800 aircraft. Again, readiness and mobilization rates matter, but on balance, this posture should be adequate to defend NATO's borders and meet other operational requirements. For example, dynamic simulations performed in 1990 (before the collapse of the Soviet Union) concluded that a NATO posture of 40 to 45 ground divisions and 2,800 combat aircraft could defend Germany's borders against a Soviet assault by 60 divisions and 3,000 aircraft. Even if Russia/Commonwealth continues to pose a potential military threat in Central Europe, its forces are likely to be smaller than 60 divisions, thereby providing NATO's posture an additional margin of insurance.

Although these conclusions paint a reassuring picture for NATO, the importance of the U.S. military contribution needs to be pointed out. U.S. military forces deployed in Europe will contribute only about 15 percent of the active-duty forces maintained in Central Europe, but this contribution will be politically important because it signals American constancy and alliance leadership. Beyond this, U.S. forces will provide a full 30 to 40 percent of NATO's rapid reaction forces for immediate use in crises outside Central Europe. Taking into account reinforcements from the United States, American forces will provide about 75 percent of the

forces that readily could be deployed to the Persian Gulf and about 33 percent of NATO's mobilizable posture for major war in Central Europe. Without these U.S. contributions, NATO's military posture would be appreciably reduced, its military strategy undercut, and its security weakened.

What are the major risks ahead? One risk is that budgetary constraints will erode NATO's posture to the point where proper readiness, modernization, sustainability, and force projection standards are not met. The result could be a "hollow" NATO posture whose actual capabilities fall far short of its surface characteristics. This damage could be manifested in a major war, but it could also appear in a host of small- to medium-size crises that demand a prompt and militarily effective response. A second risk is that NATO's political cohesion might weaken to the point that a coalition response cannot be counted upon, thereby leaving fewer and less integrated forces to meet NATO's military requirements. This loss could especially be manifested in crises that threaten NATO's larger interests but not its borders, thereby requiring strong ad hoc responses beyond combined defense plans crafted under Articles 5 and 6. A good example is the recent Persian Gulf crisis. Another potential example is a future crisis in Eastern Europe requiring a large NATO ad hoc military response.

A third risk is a slackening of NATO's defense efforts, brought about by a sense of declining threat and diminishing resolve, that leads to major reductions of forces far below the levels anticipated here. In this event, NATO could be rendered less able to deal with small- to medium-size crises, but also, its mobilizable conventional posture might be unable to meet the requirements of a major regional contingency in Central Europe in the face of a reduced capacity to influence crises and wartime conflicts.

A fourth risk is a major U.S. pullback of its forces and commitments to NATO and Europe. The result could be diminished alliance unity, a weakened NATO conventional defense capability, and steady drift to an incoherent alliance military strategy. The ultimate outcome could be a diminished U.S. capability to protect its vital interests in Europe, coupled with still-existing nuclear commitments in Europe in the face of a reduced capacity to influence crises and wartime conflicts.

In essence, the U.S. military contribution is an important causal agent in NATO's defense preparedness for reasons that go beyond the quantitative impact on force levels. U.S. behavior will continue to influence allied defense policies. If the United States continues to lead effectively, the NATO allies are more likely to respond constructively. However, if the United States scales back, especially in a major way, the allies are not likely to pick up the slack. In all likelihood, their own defense efforts will diminish. NATO therefore might be left with a less-than-adequate conventional posture even for normally manageable crises, along with a still-unhealthy dependence on nuclear weapons in the unanticipated event of a major war in Europe. Conversely, if the United States maintains its present plan, it will tend to pull the rest of the alliance along with it. By doing so, it can help place NATO on the policy and strategy plateau that the new strategic concept demands.

7. U.S. MISSIONS AND REQUIREMENTS FOR PEACETIME PRESENCE AND CRISIS MANAGEMENT

To an important degree, the exact size of future U.S. force requirements will be shaped by the specific military missions that will need to be performed in peace, crisis, and war. The following two sections turn to this subject—the final stage in the planning methodology—and assess the implications for U.S. military requirements. Section 7 sets the stage by first discussing future allied force commitments and prospects for role specialization in NATO. It then examines U.S. missions and requirements during peacetime and for crisis management. Section 8 discusses missions and requirements during wartime.

FUTURE ALLIED FORCE COMMITMENTS

During the Cold War, the total U.S. force contribution to Europe for peace and war reflected an estimate of what was needed to bridge the gap between allied capabilities and the requirements of NATO's strategy. At sea, the U.S. Navy provided the bulk of NATO's carrier and attack submarine forces and consequently spearheaded the alliance's maritime strategy by concentrating on power-projection missions. On the Continent itself, NATO's missions tended to be distributed more evenly. This philosophy reflected NATO's layer-cake array in Central Europe, which made each nation primarily responsible for providing the ground and air forces needed to defend its national corps sector(s).¹ As a result, both the United States and its allies tended to deploy combined force postures that performed a full array of ground and air missions.

In the years ahead, U.S. military requirements for NATO and Europe will continue to be affected by the total level of forces that the West European nations maintain and by the missions these forces are capable of performing. Figure 7.1 provides an estimate of how allied forces in Central Europe are likely to take shape in the mid-1990s. As it suggests, sizable allied ground forces will have been transferred into reserve status, and overall allied air and naval units will have been cut by about 25 percent.

Even though NATO's force needs are diminishing because the threat is shrinking, this reduction in allied forces will constrain how far U.S. requirements can be scaled back. For example, during the Cold War, NATO's ground posture in Central Europe was assessed as needing about 57 divisions to contain a 90-division attack. Because the allies were capable of providing about 35 mobilizable divisions, the U.S. requirement was 22 divisions. If NATO will now need 40 to 45 divisions for a high-confidence defense, absent any further allied drawdowns, the U.S. requirement would shrink to 10 to 15 divisions. In the plausible case of a 35 percent allied cut in mobilizable forces, the U.S. requirement would remain at 22 divisions—no different than now. In this event, the U.S. contribution could be scaled back only if a reduction in the strategy's requirements is accepted. What applies to ground forces, of course, also applies to the Air Force and Navy.

¹To a degree, some mixing of forces did occur that produced multinational corps formation (e.g., U.S. VII Corps, where a German division was assigned). But normally, NATO corps were manned and logistically supported on a national basis.

Allies will continue to rely on major U.S. combat forces in wartime					
	Division-equivalents			Combat aircraft	Major surface combatants
	Active	Reserve	Total		
Germany	2	11	13	500	12
France	4	3	7	430	32
United Kingdom	2	1	3	430	38
Netherlands	1	2	3	166	12
Belgium	.6	1	1.6	110	3
Denmark	.6	1	1.6	86	2
Total	9.2	19	29.2	1,722	99

NOTE: Allies also will need U.S. specialized capabilities: intelligence, electronic warfare, air defense, nuclear options, special operations, and war reserves.

**Figure 7.1—Allied Force Trends in Central Europe
(Mid-1990s)**

As Figure 7.2 suggests, a similar pattern will probably prevail in NATO's Southern Region. The forces of Italy, Greece, and Turkey are sized to perform NATO-assigned missions and can defend their countries against most threats. But none of these nations is capable of defending itself alone against a major outside aggression. With Soviet forces withdrawing and the Warsaw Pact dissolved, Italy and Greece, of course, are not geographically vulnerable to this kind of attack. But Turkey is a different story. It remains exposed to Russia and the Commonwealth and to potential adversaries from the south. Its army is large, but not modern, ready, well-equipped, or sustainable. Its air force is increasingly modern but still small,

	Italy	Greece	Turkey
Active manpower	377,000	215,000	635,000
Land forces (Div)	4 heavy 2 light	4 heavy 12 light	4 heavy 18 light
Air forces (Acf)	300	358	355
Naval forces (SC)	30	21	19

NOTE: Future force levels are uncertain, but lower than now.

Figure 7.2—NATO's Forces in the Southern Region

and its navy is paltry by modern standards. Consequently, it would need large outside reinforcements in a crisis, and perhaps quickly. Traditionally, NATO's defense plans have assigned this mission primarily to U.S. forces, which have the strategic lift and structural characteristics to deploy there rapidly.

PROSPECTS FOR FURTHER ROLE SPECIALIZATION IN NATO

Given the trends now under way, allied forces across Western Europe will continue to fit into NATO's integrated defense posture in ways that will perpetuate the military missions that the United States has traditionally performed in peace, crisis, and war. The United States will remain heavily responsible for performing its traditional offshore missions, but it also will be responsible for important missions on the Continent itself. These missions, of course, reflect purely national U.S. preferences, but they also represent important contributions to NATO's strategy that are officially reaffirmed each year when member-nation commitments are reviewed.

What are the prospects that NATO will move toward greater role specialization in the future, thereby alleviating some of the Continental missions that U.S. forces will otherwise still be called on to perform? In answering this question, it is noteworthy that NATO did not start out with its current approach to roles and missions. At NATO's inception in 1949, the United States was assigned the strategic roles of nuclear deterrence and maritime supremacy and was to play only a modest role on the Continent. The West European allies were to handle the bulk of the Continental defense missions, including ground and air defense. This approach was abandoned in the early 1950s when NATO decided to create an integrated command as well as a highly ready combined force posture for handling a short-warning attack. Large U.S. forces were needed partly to give the alliance a political shot in the arm but also for the practical reason that, because Germany had not yet rearmed, NATO simply did not have enough forces to defend itself. Moreover, the United States was unenthusiastic about making entangling nuclear commitments without having sizable forces and command staffs on the ground.

The constant pressures of the Cold War, including the unremitting fear of a surprise attack, contributed to the perpetuation of this approach for the next 40 years. The idea of a strategic "division of labor" faded into the background and was never again seriously considered. Examined more seriously was the idea of partial steps in this direction designed to enhance NATO's efficiency, promote better integration, and reduce redundancy. Between 1970 and 1990, NATO conducted three major defense reviews—AD-70, the LTDP, and the CDI—all of which considered changes in this area. Additionally, NATO's ongoing semiannual force planning process regularly looked into the matter as well, and calls for change periodically appeared on the NATO conference circuit.

These reviews did result in several specific programs to promote greater allied specialization, some of which relieved the United States of missions that it otherwise would have been called on to perform. A good example is NATO's AWACS program, which enabled the United States to reduce the military assets that it needed to contribute to the important airborne warning and control mission. Another example is the Host-Nation Support program, which called on the West European allies to provide about 100,000 combat support personnel for assisting the U.S. Army and Air Force in the event of a crisis mobilization. Other measures

to promote rationalization, standardization, and interoperability had the same effect on a smaller scale. In the 1980s, for example, the Germans agreed to pick up a number of local ground-based air defense missions, including protection of U.S. air bases. As a result, the United States was able to concentrate more exclusively on theaterwide air defense, where it was capable of making a uniquely important contribution.

These measures, however, stopped far short of a major alteration of how roles and missions are distributed between the United States and its allies. The reasons are complex but merit a brief review here because they bear on future possibilities for greater role specialization. The basic idea behind a division of labor approach is that nations would be encouraged to specialize in areas where they have a comparative advantage, thereby promoting a more effective use of resources. While this idea works fine in theory, powerful impediments have always stood in the way. For example, U.S. officials worried that some allies would take advantage of the opportunity to divest themselves of politically troublesome nuclear missions whose performance on a coalitionwide basis has been vital to NATO's solidarity. Meanwhile, West European governments worried that if the United States was excused from Continental missions in a major way, its commitment to NATO and Europe would weaken, taking extended nuclear deterrence along with it. In the final analysis, NATO's nations individually did not trust that NATO's coalition bonds were sufficiently strong to hold firm in the absence of entangling military commitments that gave all NATO's members no other choice.

Another barrier has been that NATO's nations, including the United States, were reluctant to part company with the goal of having force postures in Europe that could operate on a purely national basis, outside NATO if necessary. Sovereignty entered the equation here, but so also did recognition that because NATO might not perform as a coalition in some crises, each of these nations might have to act alone. A good example is the 1982 Falklands crisis, where the United Kingdom's insistence on maintaining a national capacity for joint operations paid off handsomely. Events like this give pause to nations, including the United States, that have commitments elsewhere than in Europe.

A third barrier has been that since 1966, France has not been a member of NATO's integrated command. France has always expressed its willingness to commit its forces to NATO in an emergency, thus adding importantly to NATO's wartime posture. But by not being a member of NATO's command in peacetime, France's absence has denied NATO not only territorial depth but also a host of opportunities for greater integration and specialization. In recent years, France has slowly moved closer to NATO (the Franco-German brigade is one example), and it is signaling a guarded willingness to draw closer yet in the years ahead. At the same time, its drive to invigorate the WEU and attach it to the EC pulls it in the other direction. Until France fully rejoins NATO, its absence will impose a major constraint on the degree to which military missions now being performed by the United States can confidently be handed over to the West European allies.

If NATO were to embrace the idea of creating an integrated multinational logistics system, it would launch itself down the path of reducing long-standing redundancies in combat service support forces. U.S. support requirements in peacetime therefore might decline. But NATO continues to shy away from this important step, which carries with it a host of unwanted implications for armaments cooperation and weapons standardization. Until NATO does embrace it, the United States will need to view its European-deployed support requirements primarily through a national lens.

Quite apart from logistics integration, additional opportunities would avail themselves if the West Europeans were to commit themselves to a greater share of the NATO burden and more specialization. If they were to increase their ground and air force levels, the United States could revert more to the role of an outside reinforcer, and the need for a presence of 150,000 troops would decline. If the West Europeans were to reduce their air forces and increase their ground power, the case for a U.S. Army corps would be less compelling. In this event, the U.S. presence could be dominated more heavily by less visible air forces.

Now that the European security system is undergoing a wholesale transformation, these options may gain in both attractiveness and feasibility, and there may be good cause for acting on some. At a minimum, the United States and its allies should study them seriously, not only because political barriers might rise against a continued large U.S. presence, but also because they may make military sense.

All of these options, however, have trade-offs: assets and liabilities that will demand a careful appraisal of the balance sheet. Arguably, the West Europeans should shoulder a greater portion of the post-Cold War military burden, but the large U.S. defense budget reductions now under way are lessening the sharp disparities in burden-sharing that emerged in the 1980s. The key issue in pursuing a revised division of labor and greater role specialization is whether the West Europeans should be encouraged to develop a more independent and integrated capability with reduced reliance on the United States. This issue is only partly military, technical, and mission-oriented. It is also political and strategic. In the final analysis, the issue is whether a stronger West European pillar would be healthy for the United States and Europe itself.

In any event, as matters currently stand, this issue is not urgent amongst NATO's official agenda, and it will remain so until an EC/WEU pillar takes shape. NATO is trying to integrate, but it is pursuing this path in an evolutionary and incrementalist way, a course dictated by historical experience. For both U.S. and allied forces, the traditional pattern of missions, national responsibilities, and burden-sharing therefore seems likely to prevail as the basis for planning in the years immediately ahead. To the extent this remains the case, it will shape the terms of reference for evaluating future U.S. military missions in Europe and the force requirements that flow from them.

PEACETIME MISSIONS AND REQUIREMENTS

In the years ahead, U.S. forces will be required to perform a number of important peacetime missions in Europe. Of special significance are the missions of U.S. military command staffs, both within NATO and as a separate national entity. Command staffs exercise daily control over combat and support forces, but they also engage in the important task of developing military plans for future contingencies. In theory, these plans could be developed in the United States, but practical considerations make this approach inefficient at best and perhaps ineffective at worst. Apart from the inconvenience of distance if U.S. staffs were based across the Atlantic, their presence in Europe would give them invaluable daily contact with the environment in which U.S. forces would have to operate in a crisis. It also enables them to coordinate with the West European allies individually and to take part in NATO's coalition planning. In their absence, the quality of U.S., allied, and NATO planning would deteriorate

across the board, thereby producing a reduced capacity to react quickly and intelligently in a crisis.

As discussed earlier, U.S. forces in Europe will also continue to operate a sizable communications and intelligence network. This communications network gives U.S. and allied forces the capacity to remain in close contact across the entire theater at all times. If it were to be removed, it could not be recreated quickly in a crisis, and the capacity of the U.S. and NATO forces to react promptly would suffer. Intelligence units, in turn, provide invaluable daily information on events in Eastern Europe, the former Soviet Union, and North Africa. Even with the consolidation efforts now under way, remaining U.S. units will probably not be able to perform their missions as effectively as in the past. Detailed data on the readiness of military forces might not be as essential as during the Cold War, but some level of information will still be necessary. Beyond this, the United States and NATO will require daily information on terrorist activities, espionage, drug smuggling, and other threats. At issue is whether these diverse types of information, and the sophisticated analyses that must accompany them, could be provided if U.S. intelligence assets were reduced well below current plans.

U.S. combat forces in Europe perform the vitally important mission of training with allied forces, including exercises that test NATO's mobilization, reinforcement, and wartime military plans. Under the current DoD plan, the Army's corps in Europe will conduct regular training with German and other allied forces. Continued training is made even more necessary because NATO is creating multinational formations at the same time that it will be both developing a maneuver-oriented military doctrine and contemplating moves across longer distances to fight on entirely new terrain. Because all these changes are taking place, an inadequate training regimen could leave both the United States and NATO lacking the military expertise to fight effectively on the ground not only in big wars but in small conflicts as well.

Training is also necessary for air forces, which rely heavily on coordinated procedures and common doctrine. With its planned force in Europe, U.S. Air Force Europe (USAFE) will be able to conduct a full training regimen with Central European forces, the British, and the Italians. Additionally, USAFE units will be able to deploy periodically to other countries and train with their air forces. Turkey is an excellent example, as is Norway. The same applies to U.S. Navy forces, which conduct regular training not only by themselves but also with allied navies, often under NATO's flag.

Additionally, training will be needed to maintain NATO's integrated air defense system, with its plethora of nationally operated ground-based missile batteries. The current large U.S. contribution to this mission seems destined to shrink appreciably if the 32d Air Defense Command is disbanded and a smaller force takes its place. Nonetheless, this force will probably be assigned missions to NATO's integrated command in the future, and it will need not only to train with this command but also to perform active missions daily. It could hardly perform this training, much less remain continuously operational, if parts or all of it were to be withdrawn. In this event, the West Europeans would have to assume responsibility for NATO's peacetime air defense mission, a step that would leave U.S. forces in Europe entirely dependent on allied support in this area.

Also on the horizon is an increased need for U.S. training missions in conducting strategic lift operations and associated exercises to NATO's peripheral areas. Although in past years

NATO did not focus heavily on this mission, Desert Shield graphically demonstrated the need to be able to respond quickly and in strength. The next time a major military crisis occurs outside Central Europe, it might not allow weeks and months to deploy. In addition, even small crises could strain U.S. and NATO assets if the required forces, plans, and procedures are not in place.

If the current DoD plan adequately meets training requirements, at issue is whether a smaller posture could also perform this important mission. While the answer will require a detailed appraisal, it is clear that the alternative postures contemplated here would result in scalebacks. Reduced training would not leave the United States militarily impotent in Europe. But it would certainly soften the sharp edge of American military power there, especially for situations calling for a quick and effective response.

An especially important consideration here is that, at low U.S. force levels, the drop-off might be more than linear. For example, the U.S. Army would be unable to train with more than one NATO multinational corps. USAFE would be unable to train with nearly as many allied nations, and in as many geographical areas, including the Southern Region. And Navy training operations would be sacrificed as well, possibly resulting in a diminution of cooperative NATO activities in the Mediterranean and elsewhere. In the event all U.S. combat forces were removed, training activities would cease entirely, except for periodic cases in which U.S. forces deployed to Europe for brief exercises. Consequently, U.S. forces would lose the capacity to operate in Europe, and in NATO, with anything like the effectiveness of today.

Finally, we should mention a host of often-overlooked peacetime missions that will have a bearing on future force needs in Europe and especially on the specific capabilities that are kept there. The first mission is that of humanitarian aid and disaster relief. Shortly after the Gulf War had ended, U.S. forces under EUCCOM found themselves in Turkey and Northern Iraq providing aid and safety to the beleaguered Kurds. Operation Provide Comfort may well prove to be a model for the future that will be reflected in a host of missions in Eastern Europe, the Balkans, Africa, and even the former USSR. This mission does not demand that large U.S. forces be kept in Europe daily, but it does mandate a readily available capability in the United States, appropriate staging facilities in Europe, and a command staff there.

Second, U.S. forces in Europe are likely to play a growing role in security assistance and military cooperation missions in the years ahead. Thus far, Turkey, Greece, Israel, and Egypt have been the primary beneficiaries, but over the years, assistance has been provided to many other nations. In the years ahead, security assistance will begin flowing to Eastern Europe in various forms. Also, it is likely that modest forms of military training will be undertaken not only with East European nations but with Russian/Commonwealth forces as well. If so, this mission will impose entirely new requirements on U.S. forces in Europe.

Third, U.S. forces in Europe will continue to conduct special operations—for example, against terrorist activities, airplane hijackings, or to free American hostages. Problems of this sort have been a constant preoccupation in recent years; at one juncture, Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Army, Europe (CINCUSAREUR) was the subject of an assassination attempt that almost succeeded. To the extent that instability spreads across Eastern Europe and the Middle East/North Africa, the need for these missions might well grow in the years ahead. Finally, there remains, barring a change in command relationships, the mission of handling operations in sub-Saharan Africa. This mission can, and has, taken many forms: from disaster re-

lief, to security assistance, to rescue of American diplomats and citizens. It too mandates that U.S. forces in Europe retain specialized capabilities, not the least of which is the capacity to conduct airlift operations in distant areas.

THE NATURE OF CRISIS MANAGEMENT

What kind of military missions might American forces have to play as part of U.S. and NATO efforts to manage the crises ahead, and what do these missions imply for U.S. force requirements in Europe? To answer these questions, we need to first define "crisis management." A "crisis," in its purest form, is a conflict of rapidly rising tensions in which the outbreak of hostilities is possible, but, while some shots might have been exchanged in anger, full-scale war has normally not yet begun. By "management" is meant an effort to shape the outcome in some satisfactory way short of major combat.

"Crisis management" thus means something different from actually fighting a war. Between a budding crisis and a full-scale war lies a spectrum of possibilities involving a combination of politics and fighting. While the distinction between crisis management and war management blurs as politics and war are increasingly intermingled, at some point the former gives way to the latter.

Good examples of crisis management are the 1949 and 1961 Berlin crises, where the United States and NATO found themselves in tense and prolonged political confrontations with the Soviet Union over the status of that divided city. In both cases, the threat of military force remained constantly in the background, but war never actually broke out. Desert Shield is less clear-cut but also qualifies as an exercise in crisis management. Because the crisis was triggered when Iraq invaded Kuwait in early August 1990, a war occurred before the United States even entered the picture. But Iraq stopped short of invading Saudi Arabia, and for the next five months a tense peace prevailed as the United States both engaged in a large military buildup and tried to induce the Iraqis to withdraw from Kuwait.

The crisis then gave way to a full-scale war in January 1991; notwithstanding the important role that diplomacy played, Desert Storm consequently is best characterized as an exercise in war management. The entire Korean War falls into the same category. It involved plenty of diplomacy, but war began when North Korea crossed the demarcation line in June 1950, and the fighting never stopped until an armistice was signed over three years later. Despite its periodic bombing halts and cease-fires, Vietnam also was a war, not a crisis.

THE ROLE OF MILITARY FORCE

In order to manage a crisis, the participant needs to actively employ the policy instruments at his disposal, not all of which are military. Both Berlin crises, for example, were characterized by major diplomatic activity as well as by military movements. So was Desert Shield, which involved diplomacy and economic sanctions. The same pattern is likely to prevail in the crises ahead during the post-Cold War era. Indeed, future crises may well be dominated by diplomacy, politics, and economics in ways that will relegate military moves to the backwaters, if not out of the picture entirely. Yet it also is possible to envision crises in which military forces will play an important role. For this reason, the United States and NATO will

need to develop their crisis-management policies with at least one eye on how they might make use of their forces.

Exactly why are military forces introduced into a crisis? In situations where fighting has already begun and threatens to go further, the purpose can be to begin combat operations immediately. Short of this, the act of inserting military forces in harm's way is normally a demonstrative step designed to convey serious intent, raise the stakes, and politically influence the outcome. Often it is taken fairly late in the game, or at least after other methods have been considered and found lacking. Consequently, its purpose is normally threefold. First, it is taken to warn the other side and convince it to settle the affair reasonably. Second, it is taken to deter the other side by signaling clearly that any full-scale resort to force, or further violence, will lead to its undoing or at least cost it dearly. Third, it often is taken to place the United States and NATO in a position whereby they are physically capable of carrying out their threats on short notice, if events go that far.

How are military forces introduced? Depending upon which of these purposes is being emphasized, forces can either be introduced in a small and symbolic way, in a big and imposing way, or somewhere in between. Normally, forces are committed in the realization that, even if fighting has not yet started, they might have to be used. Consequently, the premium often is on having enough strength to prevail. Regardless, the process typically unfolds in a five-step sequence. First, warnings are issued and initial preparatory steps are taken. Second, the forces deploy to the location of the crisis. Third, they engage in demonstrative maneuvers designed to signal intent and influence events, thereby underwriting parallel diplomatic and economic efforts. Fourth, combat operations may be undertaken. Fifth, the forces are removed as the crisis is ending, in a way that responds to the situation's dynamics. In other words, crises managed with military forces normally have a particularly distinct beginning, middle, and end.

TIME-URGENCY AND ITS IMPACT ON BASING REQUIREMENTS

What does this framework suggest about U.S. missions and force requirements in Europe? In theory, forces can be sent from the United States to manage crises in Europe. In both Berlin crises, the United States sent forces from across the Atlantic, and they were able to influence the result. Desert Shield, which began with almost no U.S. forces in the Persian Gulf, suggests the same conclusion. Yet Desert Shield also shows the advantage of having forces already present in the theater. Had U.S. forces been present, the crisis might not have occurred at all because Saddam Hussein might have been deterred from invading Kuwait and then making threatening gestures at Saudi Arabia. And if the crisis did occur anyway, the United States would have been in a far better position to manage it smoothly.

Even if Iraq had attacked Kuwait, the United States would not have undergone several weeks of nervous anticipation as its forces rushed to the scene, with its Arab and NATO allies initially left wondering exactly how Washington would respond. Some of the means to defend Saudi Arabia already would have been at the disposal of the United States and its allies. Nor would the coalition have been compelled to wait over five months to begin offensive actions, with its diplomatic hands partly tied in the interim. Building on top of an already-deployed defensive posture, an offensive force would have been available that much quicker, thereby

allowing the Iraqis less time to consolidate their position and maneuver to divide the coalition.

The more time-urgent the situation, the greater the premium on having forces already deployed in the theater. The historical record suggests that sometimes crises are "made to order" in ways that allow for a leisurely and carefully calibrated military buildup. The first Berlin crisis unfolded over a period of months in which the United States had ample time to mount an airlift. The second Berlin crisis built steadily over a three-month period, and the United States again had ample time to study the situation and move forces to Europe. As Desert Shield suggests, however, crises sometimes are not made to order and do not provide ample warning that they are coming. Because the premium so often is on stealth and surprise, they can explode suddenly and unexpectedly and then race to a swift conclusion. In these cases, the time windows can be quite short, measured in hours and days, not weeks and months.

Big invasions normally take a while to mount, but even here the record is ambiguous. Saddam Hussein, whose forces were fairly ready, still took several days or longer to move them into position at Kuwait's border. Although his actions were seen by Western intelligence, few decisionmakers took them seriously: The prevailing assessment was that he was merely posturing in order to put political pressure on the Kuwaitis. As a result, the United States was caught by surprise when he did invade, just as it was surprised by North Korea in 1950 and by Egypt in 1973. The historical record thus suggests that the United States sometimes will not react to warning, even if it gets it, and in these cases will not have ample time to deploy at its leisure.

A classic case of surprise was the Korean War, when to its dismay, the United States discovered that North Korea had attacked and that South Korea's defenses had broken down almost immediately. The result was a threat of North Korea holding the entire peninsula. Fortunately, the United States had some ground and air forces located nearby in Japan, and they were able to rush to the scene. These forces initially did not perform well, but they eventually did stem the tide, leaving the United States still holding the southern tip of the peninsula. Using this enclave, the United States was able to bring in more reinforcements and eventually swung over to a counterattack, led by MacArthur's amphibious landing at Inchon, that drove the North Korean forces out. Had the United States not been militarily present in Japan from the onset, it would have lost all of Korea and a counterattack would have been all the harder.

In a similar vein, the United States was truly fortunate that Saddam Hussein did not advance into Saudi Arabia immediately after he had swept through Kuwait. With no U.S. forces present and Saudi forces themselves small and mostly unprepared, the entire country, with its precious oil fields, would have been his for the taking. In this event, the United States would not have been given the opportunity to practice crisis management. It would have been faced with the prospect of either accommodating itself to a disastrous fait accompli or trying to launch an amphibious invasion in a region far from home where it had no preestablished infrastructure. At a minimum, the process would have been far more time-consuming and costly than proved to be the case in Desert Storm. For this reason, the Persian Gulf War hardly qualifies as an endorsement of the idea of withdrawing U.S. forces from their overseas locations.

The need to take time-urgent crises into account suggests that six problems can arise from relying on forces based in the United States. First, this basing posture can be misinterpreted as a signal of political disinterest, thereby leading potential adversaries to underestimate U.S. intent in ways that can encourage malevolent behavior. Second, it can confuse allies, and lead them to show weak resolve during the period before U.S. forces arrive. Third, it can leave the United States initially impotent and vulnerable to defeat before it can bring its resources to bear. Fourth, basing in the United States can inflame the crisis when massive forces are suddenly introduced entirely from outside the theater. Fifth, it can drag the crisis out too long and possibly cause costly reversals and losses because valuable time is lost moving enough forces to the locale. Sixth, it can cause troubles in winding down the crisis: Forces would have to redeploy all the way back to the United States, from where they could not return quickly if needed. Degree matters, of course, and a U.S. posture providing some forces in Europe would be better than none at all. But the larger the posture already deployed, the easier are crises to manage.

Especially in time-urgent situations, there are several advantages that a sizable U.S. presence can provide for crisis managers. First, a large presence provides influence and control over NATO's political-military decisionmaking from the first moment on. Second, it can reassure allies and warn adversaries, thereby encouraging restraint on all sides. Third, it can provide command, intelligence, and communication assets for assessing the situation from the start. Fourth, it can provide a wide range of readily available national military options, often contributing to NATO's portfolio in specialized ways, without having to engage in a provocative outside reinforcement. Fifth, it can provide the military bases and associated infrastructure to speed up reinforcement if that step is necessary and modulate the withdrawal when the time comes. Clearly, tools like these make the job easier.

FORCE NEEDS

What kinds of U.S. forces are required for crisis management, and how many? As with peacetime needs, a C³I structure and an infrastructure of bases stand out as being especially important. But combat forces are normally the instrument by which military power is inserted into a situation, and therefore they are needed, too. The exact number and composition of forces required depends upon the situation and the time lines involved. Often, getting to the crisis situation with some forces quickly can be more important than deploying large forces later. From their bases in Germany, the United Kingdom, and Italy, tactical air forces can reach any location in Europe within a few hours and therefore are normally valuable instruments. But ground forces and naval forces, which move more slowly, can also be valuable, and these forces can take a long time to deploy from the United States.

Are the military requirements for crisis management less than for actually prosecuting a war? In some cases, this is clearly so. Experience suggests that the vast majority of crises are minor affairs so dominated by politics and diplomacy that they require only a symbolic show of forces. When fighting does occur, it typically is brief and small scale. In these cases, a small package of forces deployed in a timely fashion can be enough: a contingent of special operations forces, a few aircraft, a battalion or a brigade, or a few combat vessels. A good example is El Dorado Canyon, which was accomplished with a small number of aircraft. The ill-fated Lebanon peacekeeping mission of the early 1980s also required few forces. The more successful operations in Lebanon in 1956 and Grenada in the early 1980s consumed larger

forces, and the 1990 intervention in Panama required about 30,000 troops—still a relatively small number.

Not all crises are minor, however. At the other end of the spectrum are bigger and more dangerous affairs that could involve a severe threat to NATO's nations or their vital security interests. Crises of this magnitude occur far less frequently than their smaller cousins, but the stakes that they raise and the requirements they pose can be far larger. Indeed, they can require forces whose size and characteristics are no different from a posture sized straightforwardly for war-fighting in a major way.

In these cases, force requirements are normally dictated by the classic military objectives of deterrence, defense, and the potential wartime pursuit of political-military objectives. Exact requirements will be driven by the threat in each case, and by whatever combination of these three goals is being pursued at the time. Deterrence is commonly thought to require the fewest forces if it can be accomplished by simply signaling serious intent or by bluffing the opponent. But against a determined adversary willing to take risks, deterrence's force requirements are normally defined in terms of what is needed to actually defend with high confidence. Requirements can be elevated further if the goal goes beyond defense and becomes one of using forces offensively to destroy an opponent or to compel him to withdraw or surrender.

Desert Shield is an illuminating case of how force requirements can quickly inflate in a major crisis. When the United States faced a heavily armed Iraqi force poised on Saudi Arabia's border with Kuwait, it could have responded by sending only a small force (e.g., a brigade and an air wing) to symbolize its intent. A small force, however, would not have been able to defend successfully, and, precisely because of its limited size, might have been seen as a weak bluff. Desiring to send a stronger signal, to reassure friendly Arab governments nearby, and to be prepared for the worst, the United States instead chose to deploy a much larger force. Consequently, the force that was sent in Phase I of Desert Storm—several divisions and wings, backed up by naval forces—was sized, along with allied contributions, to fully defend Saudi Arabia against an all-out Iraqi invasion.

Three months later came Phase II. At that juncture, the United States and its allies decided to prepare for a counteroffensive designed to militarily eject Iraq from Kuwait. As a result, large additional U.S. forces were sent: an Army corps, several air wings, and more naval forces. Phase I and II consequently resulted in an entire U.S. field army being deployed. By the time Desert Storm got under way, the United States had a full 430,000 military personnel in the Kuwaiti theater of operations—hardly a small force commitment.

Will the crises of the future in Europe and around its periphery be similarly large? While the answer is uncertain, clearly a repeat crisis in the Persian Gulf could require the prompt commitment of at least a U.S. Army corps, three to four air wings, and one to two carriers—and perhaps a good deal more. Similarly, a major threat to Turkey could require a force commitment of this size and more. A variety of other stressful situations in the Middle East and North Africa also could plausibly arise in ways requiring large U.S. forces.

Purely local crises in Central Europe and the Balkans might require a U.S. corps and associated air wings, but mostly likely would consume smaller forces. A major diplomatic confrontation in Central Europe involving Russia, however, could be a horse of a different color. A historical example helps illuminate why. In the early 1980s, when they were confronted

with the prospect that Soviet forces might move into Poland, some NATO officials privately gave thought to deploying alliance forces directly on the inter-German border as a precautionary measure. The idea would have been to take out an insurance policy in case the crisis spilled over into Germany and to convey a warning to the Soviets. Had this idea been pursued and carried out to its logical conclusion, it likely would have led to the deployment of NATO's full layer-cake array, including two U.S. corps.

Opting instead for prudence, NATO thought better of the idea, but a future crisis situation might conceivably arise that could lead NATO to quickly dispatch large multinational forces to Germany's new borders. This could occur if Russia seemed on the brink of invading Poland and possibly going beyond. Once again, the goal would be precautionary: to buy military insurance and to convey a strong warning, one aimed at deterring provocative behavior. Even so, however, NATO would be unlikely to execute this crisis management maneuver in a small way. Moving a small force forward would achieve little by way of either preparing NATO's defenses or conveying a signal that could be interpreted as more than a hollow bluff. For this reason, NATO probably would choose to deploy a larger force, one sized to provide at least a convincing defense of Germany's borders. For a host of political and military reasons, U.S. forces probably would take part in this maneuver, and a corps-sized contribution could easily be required.

BUILDUP RATES

In principle, an advantage of having U.S. forces based in Europe is that they are already located fairly close to any crisis there and therefore should be able to reach it faster than comparably equipped forces based in the United States. The difference is greatest for any crisis in Central Europe: Most U.S. forces will be based in Germany and thus will be close by. For crises along NATO's increasingly threatened southern periphery, the difference is less stark than distances alone suggest and therefore merits careful analysis. For example, U.S. bases in Germany will be about 1,000 miles away from Turkey, whereas bases on the U.S. East Coast will be about 5,000 miles away. Because many factors other than geographic distance are involved, however, the time differences in reaching Turkey from these two locations is far less than a factor of five. Nonetheless, this analysis concludes that when all the determining factors are considered, basing in Europe does offer important advantages when a timely response is required.

The issue of comparative buildup rates particularly arises with respect to deploying ground forces. Fighter wings can fly long distances in only a few hours, and their initial support units require a relatively modest airlift effort. Ground combat forces, however, are far heavier and more difficult to move. An infantry division weighs about 50,000 tons, and a heavier armored or mechanized division weighs about 100,000 tons, with bulky equipment and another 50,000 tons of initial supplies. Airlifting a heavy division can require 3,000 transport sorties, and transporting it by sealift can require nine or more large cargo ships. Because of the need for additional support units, deployment of a two-division corps would require an airlift or sealift effort more than double this size. As a result, ground forces tend to deploy rather slowly; days and weeks can pass before they have fully arrived. Nonetheless, a few days can matter in a hot crisis, and therefore even small differences can have policy significance.

The analysis can best begin by discussing the determinants of deployment rates to Europe's southern periphery. One determinant is the political setting. An advantage of basing forces in CONUS (Continental United States) is that they require only a decision by the U.S. government to initiate deployment, whereas in Europe, permission by the host government can be a *de facto* requirement as well. Moreover, forces deploying from Central Europe can encounter denial of overflight rights and neutral country prohibitions. Forces deploying from the United States are not completely free from these constraints, but because fewer countries must normally be dealt with, the barriers often are less imposing. For this reason, basing in Europe will be advantageous only to the extent that the NATO allies support the idea that U.S. forces there are available for use elsewhere.

A second determinant is the logistical dynamics of deployment. For an airlift, far more is involved than flying time. A transport airlift must first be loaded, and after it arrives, unloaded. At both ends, air base capacity—measured by support crews, equipment, ramp space, maintenance facilities, and landing/takeoff rates—can have a major bearing on deployment rate and can overpower flying time. For a sealift, the speed of cargo transports can make a major difference: a ship moving at 15 knots will take about 14 days to travel 5,000 miles, whereas a ship traveling at 30 knots can travel this distance in 7 days. Logistical factors can play an important role as well. Ground forces must first be transported by road and rail to ports that often are relatively far away. There, cargo ships must be loaded and, once they reach their destination, unloaded. Typically, a modern port can require two days to load or unload a cargo ship and often can handle no more than three ships at a time. The ground force must then be transported cross-country to the location of the crisis. The entire process can be time consuming. For example, in a case where a combat division takes a full month to deploy to an overseas crisis, one-half of this time would be taken up by the logistics of moving and loading/unloading.

These considerations suggest that, if basing in Europe is to be advantageous over CONUS basing, then air base, port, and ground transport facilities there will need to be broadly comparable to CONUS facilities. The infrastructure facilities in Europe are well developed, but planning is required to make them available in a crisis. Regardless of where U.S. forces are originally based, their prompt deployment to the Southern Region also requires adequate reception facilities there. Conditions in the Middle East/Persian Gulf differ from country to country. Turkey, for example, has relatively good airfields, but poor harbor facilities, thereby creating a premium on using airlift as much as possible. In any given locale, poor airfields and port facilities can negate the advantage of having U.S. forces originally located nearby. Conversely, prepared facilities can help maximize the advantage of nearby basing.

With these determinants in mind, the following two figures compare ground force buildup rates to the Southern Region using airlift. The figures assume that political support is forthcoming and that adequate facilities are available at both ends. They thus display relatively fast buildup times that might somewhat exaggerate the advantages of basing in Europe. What they show is the consequences of coherent planning and programming for forces based in both CONUS and Europe. Figure 7.3 displays the days required to airlift the tonnage for a heavy U.S. brigade or division, with initial support assets for the brigade and commensurate tactical air forces (one and three wings). Figure 7.4 shows the days required to airlift a two-division heavy corps, along with ground support and air support for six wings.

Destinations	Basing in Europe		Basing in United States	
	Brigade	Division	Brigade	Division
Balkans	3.3	9.9	6.4	18.3
Turkey	3.6	10.8	6.7	19.2
Middle East	3.9	11.6	7.0	20.1
Persian Gulf	4.1	12.4	7.4	21.4

Figure 7.3—Airlift Deployment Times for Small Force Commitments (Days)

Destination	Basing in Europe	Dual-basing	Basing in United States
Balkans	23	33	43
Turkey	25	35	45
Middle East	27	37	47
Persian Gulf	29	40	50

NOTE: Assumes sizable commitment of U.S. strategic airlift assets; smaller commitments would extend time lines in each case but would not change proportional relationships.

Figure 7.4—Airlift Deployment Times for Corps-Sized Force Commitment (Days)

Figure 7.3 shows that a brigade based in Central Europe can fully deploy to the Balkans, Turkey, and the Middle East about three days faster than a CONUS-based brigade. A division from Central Europe can reach these locations about one week faster than a CONUS-based division. Figure 7.4 suggests that a two-division heavy corps based in Europe can fully deploy to these locations about ten days faster than a dual-based corps and about three weeks faster than a comparable corps based in the United States. These figures, it must be emphasized, provide a comparative perspective and should not be used to make forecasts

about actual deployment time in any specific situation. Use of lighter infantry forces from either location, for example, could result in faster closure rates. Conversely, commitment of fewer airlift assets than assumed here, or inadequate facilities and political difficulties, could elongate the time lines considerably.

Figure 7.5 displays comparative buildup rates to Turkey or any nearby location using sealift, assuming adequate ground transport and onloading/offloading facilities at both ends. The figure suggests that, under these conditions, the manner in which sealift forces are organized makes a large difference. If U.S. cargo ships must first cross the Atlantic to pick up the two-division heavy corps there, basing in Europe offers no advantages over CONUS. Indeed, more time could be required because the total miles covered would be increased by 20 percent. If an adequate sealift force is already available in Europe, however, deployment time could be lessened appreciably by virtue of reducing total sailing distance by a full 50 percent. This reduction could be achieved, for example, by creating a NATO ready reserve cargo fleet composed of allied ships that would be available on short notice.

The process of projecting U.S. forces to the peripheral areas could be speeded up significantly if an equipment set for the Army corps were predeployed in the Mediterranean aboard afloat prepositioned ships (APS). With APS in Italian waters, a full corps could be deployed to Turkey in about 10 days—far faster than the other methods, which take 20 to 35 days. The same APS could deploy to the Persian Gulf in about a month or about the same time required for U.S.-based fast sealift ships to deploy there. Figure 7.6 displays sealift deployment times to the Persian Gulf for a variety of mobility programs. It suggests that an APS program is

	Basing in Europe		Basing in United States	
	Fast Sealift	Slow Sealift	Fast Sealift	Slow Sealift
No NATO-organized shipping in Europe	20	35	23	32
With organized shipping in Europe	20	25	—	—

NOTES: This and other sealift figures displayed here assume an efficient sealift effort in which ships are promptly available and are loaded/offloaded without encountering serious problems. Also, these figures (and airlift counterparts) display deployment times only for the initial support echelon of the combat forces and do not take into account follow-on echelons or full WRM/WRS stockage requirements. Inclusion of unplanned delays and these extra requirements would elongate buildup times in all cases but would not change the comparative evaluation.

Figure 7.5—Sealift Deployment Times for Moving a Two-Division Corps to Europe's Periphery (Days to Turkey)

Europe-based corps moved by:	
Slow sealift from United States	45
Fast sealift from United States	30
Organized European sealift	36
APS ships	28
United States-based corps moved by:	
Fast sealift	28
Slow sealift	41

**Figure 7.6—Deployment Times to Persian Gulf
(Days)**

the best vehicle for making a Europe-deployed Army corps competitive with a U.S.-based counterpart that benefits from fast sealift.

Figure 7.7 takes the analysis a step further by combining airlift and sealift assets for moving a two-division heavy corps and associated air forces to the Turkey region. It displays time-phase buildup rates as a function of basing mode and mobility programs. The chart suggests that, depending upon the exact nature of the mobility programs, basing in Europe can result in either slower or faster deployment rates as compared to CONUS basing. Reliance on a

	Days after C-Day							
	<u>0</u>	<u>5</u>	<u>10</u>	<u>15</u>	<u>20</u>	<u>25</u>	<u>30</u>	<u>35</u>
Europe-basing								
Sealift from U.S.	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	100
Organized NATO sealift	0	0	0	0	0	100	—	—
Airlift and organized sealift	0	20	40	60	80	100	—	—
APS and sealift	0	20	100	—	—	—	—	—
Dual-basing	0	20	40	50	50	100	—	—
U.S.-basing	0	10	20	30	40	100	—	—

NOTE: For dual-basing and U.S. basing, figure assumes a combination of airlift and fast sealift.

**Figure 7.7—Time-Phased U.S. Buildup Rates in NATO's Southern Region
(% Heavy Corps Deployed)**

sealift alone, which could result from denial of overflight rights, would result in a far slower buildup. Availability of overflight rights and use of an organized sealift could produce a faster buildup. The combination of afloat prepositioned ships, an organized sealift, and airlift forces could produce a quite rapid buildup.

This analysis has barely scratched the surface of an issue that will require far more study in the months ahead, and the conclusions here should be treated as tentative. Regardless of how the United States decides to meet its emerging military requirements for crisis management in the Southern Region, more will be involved than simply assembling a workable mobility program. For years, the Southern Region has been NATO's neglected stepchild. As a result, NATO's military infrastructure, air defenses, communications and intelligence, command relationships, and other preparations are not as far advanced there as in Central Europe. Improvements in these important areas will also be needed if the United States and NATO are to develop an improved capacity to employ large ground and air forces there.

SUMMARY

In summary, the challenges ahead suggest that the United States will need to pay attention to crisis management and to the military missions and requirements that are needed to perform it. This analysis suggests that it is possible to envision a spectrum of crises, ranging from small to large, and from fast-paced to slow, that impose a range of time-urgent requirements for U.S. forces. At issue is where, along this continuum, the United States wants to be fully capable of responding. A posture providing no combat forces in Europe would leave the United States entirely dependent on a relatively slow-moving outside reinforcement. A posture of one division and one to two wings in Europe would yield greater capability, and a dual-based posture would allow more capability yet. But neither of these postures would cover all the potential crisis contingencies ahead. By contrast, a forward presence of an Army corps and three to four wings, if its mobility programs are planned intelligently and other measures are undertaken, would provide coverage along virtually the entire spectrum as well as unequivocally signal national intent. The choice boils down to a matter of assessing the perceptions, the probabilities, the risks, and the stakes.

8. U.S. WARTIME MISSIONS AND REQUIREMENTS IN EUROPE

U.S. wartime missions and requirements would affect not only the forces based in Europe in peacetime but also the number of reinforcements that are to be deployed and the rate at which they are to arrive. It is possible to imagine, in the years ahead, the United States becoming embroiled in a number of military conflicts in Europe and around its periphery, many of them small and not especially threatening to the alliance's vital interests. Conversely, the least likely but most dangerous conflict is a major war with Russia and the Commonwealth involving aggression in Central Europe.

This contingency might seem wholly implausible to some. NATO's defense planning, however, could completely ignore it only at the cost of forgoing an adequate force posture and strategy in the event that the former Soviet Union unexpectedly returns to an adversarial course. As long as the alliance remains unwilling to take this risk, NATO's defense plans are likely to address this contingency, even if it is deemed unrealistic politically. Because of this contingency's demanding nature, it is likely to loom as one determinant of NATO's future conventional force needs in Europe and those of the United States as well. Consequently, this contingency is a fitting place to begin an appraisal of U.S. wartime missions and requirements.

RUSSIAN/COMMONWEALTH AGGRESSION AGAINST CENTRAL EUROPE

The military analysis for this contingency was conducted in early 1991, well before the cataclysmic events in Moscow that brought down Communist rule and the Soviet Union along with it. At that time, a Communist-ruled Soviet state seemed likely to continue existing and to be armed with a powerful army capable of reentering Eastern Europe. In order to identify the NATO forces needed to protect the borders of a now-unified Germany, this contingency postulated a major Soviet invasion aimed at subjugating Poland and then advancing on Germany. The analysis employed comparative force generation rates and dynamic computer war-gaming systems. It concluded that, with an appropriate operational doctrine, NATO's currently planned posture of 40 to 45 mobilizable divisions and 2,800 tactical combat aircraft would be broadly adequate for the task.

The events of late 1991 clearly have relegated this contingency even farther to the outer reaches of plausibility. For this contingency to occur, Russia would have to undergo a retransformation to authoritarian rule and hostility to the West. It also would have to achieve greater political control than now over other Commonwealth republics, and especially over Belarus, which stands between Russia and Poland. Finally, it would have to reach a sufficiently high degree of military preparedness to project a large and capable force sizable distances beyond its borders. At the time of this writing, these developments appear highly unlikely. Indeed, Russia and the Commonwealth have pointed themselves toward democracy and partnerships with the West, even as they slide further into economic decline, internal chaos, and demilitarization. Precisely where these developments are headed is very uncertain, but they do not add up to aggression against Germany.

Therefore, this analysis is presented here not in response to a perceived threat to NATO's borders in Central Europe but because it provides a methodological excursion into NATO's appraisal of the rates at which U.S. forces could be increased as a function of peacetime deployment levels. Although Germany is unlikely to be threatened anytime soon, the turbulent times ahead make it necessary for military planners to investigate the properties of a major contingency somewhere in middle Europe. Recognizing that each situation must be addressed on its individual merits, this contingency provides a useful point of departure for thinking about NATO force levels and the U.S. contribution to them.

The idea behind this contingency is that an intense political crisis might emerge that could lead Russia to attack Poland and Germany with "forces-in-being." That is, Russia would not engage in a multiyear expansion of its posture but rather would mobilize and attack with forces already in existence as either active or reserve formations. The total time required for the politics of this crisis to unfold might be quite lengthy (e.g., years), but its military dynamics would be compressed into a much shorter period. The decision to attack without a major buildup would necessitate forgoing the massive posture that was fielded during the Cold War, but it also would deny NATO time to expand its own forces. Whereas NATO could expect only a few days of "reaction time" during the Cold War, now it would have a few weeks in which to mobilize and reinforce, but it would also be compelled to fight with its own forces-in-being.

This contingency would produce a competition in force generation wholly unlike that during the Cold War in both spatial relationships and time-sequencing. As Figure 8.1 suggests, the two sides would mobilize and deploy forces across a much longer distance than during the Cold War. Combat presumably would begin as adversary forces approach Germany's eastern border with no sign of stopping there, thus showing clear hostile intent. This assumption will probably be a basis for NATO's military planning because it is consistent with Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty. If so, an Oder-Neisse defense concept will become a determinant of NATO's military requirements and employment doctrine.

NATO's force requirements for implementing this concept would be heavily influenced by assumptions made about the size and timing of the adversary military threat. The assumption of the original (1990) analysis was that a posture of about 60 divisions and 3,000 combat aircraft could be generated, given CFE entitlements and other factors. As for timing, a period of two to three months was assumed for adversary forces to mobilize, sweep through Poland, and deploy near the German border in attack formation. The conclusions, of course, are sensitive to these assumptions about the threat and will need to be subjected to continual evaluation as more information becomes available. Because of the restructuring now taking place and political fragmentation in the Commonwealth, any future Russian force for offensive operations will probably be less than 60 divisions. In any event, the answer lies in the future.

In the situation portrayed here, NATO's political leaders would have accurate intelligence of the Russian mobilization almost immediately, but they could be expected to delay full mobilization until ambiguity about Russian intentions had been resolved more fully. For example, they might confine their actions to endorsing a state of military vigilance, which would allow SACEUR to undertake only initial, relatively modest preparations. This analysis postulates that NATO's leaders will decide to fully mobilize about 35 to 50 days before Russian forces




Figure 8.1—The New Dynamics of Force Generation in Central Europe

are fully prepared to attack. At this juncture, SACEUR would be able to call a full alert, thereby triggering a massive NATO mobilization and deployment, including activation of a full U.S. reinforcement effort.

In making the transition from crisis to war, the employment concept that NATO implements for taking up defense positions would have a large bearing on the missions that U.S. and allied ground forces would be called upon to perform. NATO is unlikely to form the kind of linear array and layer-cake defense that characterized its Cold War planning. Instead, it is likely to deploy in a flexible echeloned array, with a strong frontal wall guarding the Oder-Neisse border but a thinly spread force protecting the less threatened border with Czechoslovakia. Additional forces would take up positions further toward the rear, where they would function as mobile reserves. The idea here would be to conduct a robust defense effort, relying on deep fires and mobile tactics, to prevent an attack from penetrating deeply.

The requirements for this concept's frontal wall would be far lower than NATO's previous layer-cake array, which required a full 30 divisions to cover the old border in sufficient density. But these requirements would not be trivial. Because the Oder-Neisse border is about 300 kilometers long, NATO's commanders probably would want to deploy about ten division-equivalents there, or about three full corps. Another three to five divisions would likely be needed to form a tactical reserve immediately behind the frontally committed forces, supplemented by another five divisions to screen the 500-kilometer Czech border. This posture would provide the framework for NATO's echeloned array. As additional reinforcements became available, they would presumably be assigned missions in the rear areas, where they would function as operational reserves.

In all, NATO would need some 20 divisions to implement the forward portion of its employment doctrine, and these forces would need to man their positions quite early. This especially applies to the 10 divisions slated to deploy along the Oder-Neisse border, which would both protect Berlin and seal off the rear areas in order to allow NATO's buildup to take place. Although a full assault would not be expected for another several weeks, smaller adversary forces could possibly arrive much sooner, especially if there were an opportunity to divide and disrupt NATO. For this reason, NATO's commanders would want to have these units occupying their forward positions within about ten days of full mobilization. The remaining divisions probably would be needed by about M+20.

If these are the time lines that might be faced, the first ten divisions would all have to be active formations or at least reserve units maintained at high readiness with a large active cadre. Under NATO's current plan, most of these divisions originally will be deployed far back in western Germany, at their present bases. Although these bases were very close to the old border, the new border will be about 200 kilometers away, thereby requiring an eastward march that could consume several days. As a result, these units would need to be sufficiently ready to leave their casernes within only three to five days: the readiness standard by which active formations are normally judged.

Which nations would contribute units to this ten-division force, and would the United States need to be involved? In theory, the German Army will have enough divisions to meet this requirement, but at least one-half of its units will not be sufficiently ready. Moreover, alliance politics will mandate a coalition response, and NATO's structure of multinational formations will make this unavoidable in any event. Because the other West European nations (minus France) are planning to keep only three to four active divisions in the vicinity, only about eight allied divisions will be at NATO's immediate beck and call. For this reason, it is hard to escape the conclusion that, especially since they will be part of corps formations that contain German units, both U.S. Army divisions now planned for Europe would be called on to contribute.

The requirement for this mission cannot readily be met by anything less than the current DoD plan to station a full Army corps in Europe. Even with prepositioned equipment and a rapid airlift-reinforcement effort, a dual-based U.S. corps could provide all the necessary forces fully three to four days later than required. Even with POMCUS, a corps entirely based in the United States would take at least 10 to 12 days to reach Europe and be ready to move into eastern Germany, and it would reach its forward positions about one week late. The delays could be longer if the need to deploy air reinforcements, and to fill-out critical elements of the U.S. support infrastructure, were to claim priority in the U.S. airlift schedule. If so, both alternative postures would fall even further short of meeting requirements in an area central to NATO's war plans.

In practical terms, exactly how serious would this shortfall be? The argument can be made that, because of the highly uncertain time lines associated with this contingency, some slack in NATO's preferred capability is acceptable. This is perhaps so, but in areas like this, NATO's planning standards generally have been rigorous. Because NATO's official plans are only beginning to take shape, only time will tell. What can be said now is that this potential requirement is one matter to be considered in determining how many Army forces are to be left behind in Europe.

During this stage of the mobilization and reinforcement process, NATO would also need to establish a strong air defense capability that protects NATO's airspace and denies adversary medium bombers and other long-range aircraft an opportunity to attack targets in NATO's rear areas. NATO's ground-based air defenses would play a key role in performing this mission, but interceptor aircraft would be called upon to contribute heavily as well. Under the Cold War's regime, NATO planned to allocate about 800 to 1,000 fighters for this purpose in Central Europe, counting the United Kingdom and French aircraft that would defend France's airspace. Especially since NATO's geography will expand to the east, its future requirements are unlikely to be anything less. With allied force levels declining, the planned presence of several wings of USAF interceptors would add importantly to NATO's total. If they were based in the United States, these forces could fly to Europe quickly, but they could not be fully operational until a few days after the mobilization order had been given. The withdrawal of some, or all, of the 3.5 wings now planned for peacetime deployment in Europe thus could temporarily debilitate USAF's capacity to perform its early missions in this contingency.

Total U.S. ground and air requirements, of course, would be affected not only by force needs very early in the mobilization process, but also by the additional reinforcements that are needed to fill out NATO's defense posture. For the Army, total time-phased reinforcement requirements would be driven by the adversary force, by allied capabilities, and by NATO's military strategy and employment doctrine. Figure 8.2 illustrates how these variables might interact.

As Figure 8.2 suggests, some adversary forces could begin arriving near the German border within a few days after NATO mobilizes, thereby underscoring the need for a prompt NATO forward deployment of initially needed combat units. As long as NATO responds, however, the Russians, even with a rapid sweep across Poland, would not be able to launch a powerful attack until about three weeks after NATO mobilizes. This is the earliest time at which a "two front" attack of 40 divisions and associated aircraft would be possible. A more likely D-Day is around NATO M+50, when all 60 divisions would be ready, thereby permitting a fully coordinated "three front" assault that could stress NATO's entire posture.

Figure 8.2 provides a time-phased estimate of NATO's needs for ground forces to defend against this threat. It also suggests that allied capabilities will build to near 30 division-equivalents within about three weeks of NATO's mobilization. This is a slower rate than during the Cold War, and it reflects the larger presence of allied reserve formations and the need to move eastward. If anything, this estimate might be on the optimistic side: Much will depend on how the West European nations maintain their reserve component forces.

The gap between NATO's requirements and allied capabilities measures the time-phased need for U.S. forces, which is displayed in Figure 8.3. It suggests that the United States will need to provide in-place forces of 2 to 3 division-equivalents. Required thereafter would be a quick buildup to about 8 divisions, followed by a slower buildup to 10 to 15 divisions at around D-Day or shortly afterwards. This posture would probably translate into four separate corps formations: the corps normally deployed in Europe, a heavy corps that will be oriented to operations there, a "light" corps (currently 18th Airborne Corps), and a fourth strategic reserve corps.




Figure 8.2—NATO Ground Requirements and Buildup Rates for War in Central Europe




Figure 8.3—U.S. Ground Requirements for War in Central Europe

As for missions, the Europe-based corps would participate in the forward battle as part of NATO's multinational formations. The reinforcing corps presumably would function as mobile operational reserves that could be committed almost anywhere on the battlefield. For all these units, required capabilities would include tanks, infantry fighting vehicles, attack helicopters, self-propelled artillery, and other weapons normally associated with combined arms operations. Additionally, weapons for long range fires would be important. Operational fires with these systems could have a positive impact by supporting not only U.S. forces but allied units as well.

This estimate of U.S. Army force requirements is influenced heavily by the analysis of how many NATO forces are needed to execute a stalwart defense. Although the sensitivities will need to be studied carefully, there are reasons for concluding that Figure 8.2's estimate of a NATO posture of 40 to 45 divisions would be broadly adequate. The chief drawback of this estimate is that it would call on NATO's forces to fight outnumbered by a margin of 1.3 to 1.5:1. This is less than the 2:1 disparity that NATO faced during the Cold War but still a sizable margin. However, military planners, operating on the assumption that a prepared defender can tolerate some numerical inferiorities, have traditionally expressed comfort with an imbalance of these dimensions.

The judgment that an adverse force ratio of some magnitude can be accepted is based on the important assumption that the defender has a cohesive posture and sound employment doctrine, and that his forces can fight effectively. This assumption is not always valid, and if it were not valid in this case, NATO would probably require forces as large as the enemy. However, Desert Storm provides a strong measure of confidence in the effectiveness of Western forces, doctrine, and weapons. Also, it offers grounds for concluding that the current Soviet model for designing forces and weapons is less impressive than it once was considered to be.

Indeed, if the Desert Storm experience were to be transposed literally to Europe, NATO's margin of confidence would be so high that it could field a smaller posture than that contemplated here. The Gulf War, however, had many unique features that argue against carrying its lessons too far. The coalition forces enjoyed a huge advantage in air power, fought on terrain and in weather ideally suited to them, were able to seize and hold the initiative, and had critical technological edges in several areas that mattered. Also, the coalition was fighting an enemy that was not well prepared, did not understand the operational art, and made an unending stream of errors in strategy and tactics.

The prudent approach is to presume that the adversary will fight effectively. Given this, the task at hand is to design a NATO posture that can rebuff a well-executed attack, not one tailored to defeat a weak enemy but one vulnerable to a strong foe. A posture of 40 to 45 divisions would meet this standard. It would provide NATO not only with a strong frontal wall in critical areas but also with sizable rearward-based reserves. The presence of both a strong front line and powerful reserves is a traditionally accepted hallmark of a posture that would be a tough nut to crack, even if the adversary has somewhat larger forces at his disposal. Above all, it would prevent easy enemy breakthroughs, thereby compelling the enemy to fight a lengthy and grueling pitched battle. In this kind of battle, a well-armed defender—employing prepared positions, coordinated maneuvers, lethal fires, and ground attack-oriented air power—should be able to do well.

Additionally, the dynamic war-gaming analyses that were discussed earlier provide further reason for tentatively concluding that a posture of 40 to 45 divisions will suffice. These simulations, however, also call attention to the risks of fielding smaller forces. In these simulations, NATO suffered serious reversals at significantly lower force levels not only because it was outnumbered but also because it lacked sufficient units to fight cohesively. In particular, NATO's lack of operational reserves stood out. Attacking forces were able to exert significant pressure at several points, and NATO's posture lacked the combination of frontal strength, defensible river lines, and mobile reserves to contain them. The result was that, at a minimum, NATO's forces were pushed back, thereby losing Berlin and other German territory. In the worst case, NATO's forces suffered crippling breakthroughs that led to their quick operational defeat.

For this reason, the conclusion put forward here is that a future Central European war is one that NATO could either win or lose. Much would depend not only on the size and timing of the threat but also on the size and quality of NATO's posture. U.S. force contributions would help turn the key one way or the other. A prompt U.S. Army buildup to 10 to 15 divisions would enable NATO to defend with confidence. A significantly smaller U.S. contribution would weaken NATO's capacity to deter this crisis, manage it, and defend successfully if war was the outcome.

To what extent will future U.S. Army forces be capable of meeting this time-phased buildup requirement? Figure 8.4 displays the Army's buildup rate if a full corps and three POMUS sets are deployed in Europe. It suggests that the buildup rate will be broadly satisfactory (albeit marginally in the early stages) provided an adequate infrastructure is kept in Europe—i.e., reception facilities, support troops, and adequate WRM/WRS stocks. In the event that an inadequate infrastructure is retained, the buildup rate would slow down during the first two months, thereby dropping below the requirements level. The reason is that airlift and sealift forces would need to be devoted to sending the necessary infrastructure assets to Europe, thereby bringing about a slower buildup of combat forces. As an estimate, the DoD plan for a posture of 150,000 troops would fall roughly midway between these two rates.

As Figure 8.5 illustrates, a decision to deploy a smaller force presence in Europe would reduce the Army's buildup below planned levels during the first 50 days of reinforcement. The effect is greatest during the first three weeks—i.e., in the period before war is expected to begin, but when NATO is laboring to assemble a viable defense posture. This figure provides one reason why the DoD plan makes military sense and why the other options would have a negative impact on NATO's military preparedness.

NATO's ground posture would need to be supplemented by air forces, and the United States would be called on to provide large reinforcements there as well. A total NATO posture of 2,700 to 3,000 combat aircraft is postulated here and was employed in the dynamic analyses cited above. Because the allies are projected to contribute about 1,700 aircraft, USAF would need to provide 1,000 to 1,300 aircraft or 14 to 18 wings for Central Europe. Additionally, some aircraft would be needed to reinforce Norway and to safeguard the Southern Region, thereby bringing the total up to a potential 20 wings. Ideally, the entire USAF reinforcement would be completed by M+10 but no later than M+20. Figure 8.6 displays an estimate of USAF's time-phased buildup requirements in Central Europe.




Figure 8.4—U.S. Buildup Rate in Central Europe

With this force in Central Europe, USAF units would be called upon to fly the full spectrum of air missions. In addition to performing intercept and air base attack missions, they would play a key role in NATO's ground attack campaign. Included would be missions for deep interdiction, battlefield interdiction, and close air support of both U.S. and allied ground formations. Also, USAF forces would conduct defense suppression, electronic warfare, command and control, and reconnaissance missions. Required therefore would be the full gamut of modern multipurpose combat and support aircraft, along with modern munitions of the sort employed in Desert Storm.

In postulating a total NATO requirement of 40 to 45 divisions and 2,700 to 3,000 aircraft, this analysis envisions no changes in NATO's traditional air-ground mix. Is this assumption valid? At first glance, Desert Storm suggests that if U.S. and NATO air forces were turned loose to bombard adversary units early in the journey across Poland, they alone might inflict enormous damage. Conceivably, it can be argued, this damage might be enough to make an assault across the Oder-Neisse either infeasible or so badly weakened that it could be contained with far smaller ground forces. Fear of exactly that kind of damage is likely to be a powerful constraint on Russia's eagerness to fight this war. Here again, however, Desert Storm's unique features need to be kept in perspective. Before a judgment can be made about air power's role in the future military balance in Central Europe, the conditions that actually would prevail there need to be carefully studied.




Figure 8.5—Days After U.S. Reinforcement Begins

Because the Iraqis were a dismal failure at air defense, coalition air forces quickly gained air supremacy and were able to focus completely on ground targets in an unimpeded way, while suffering almost no losses. In all likelihood, Russian air defenses would perform better, thereby diverting NATO aircraft away from ground attack missions and inflicting steady losses on them. This opposition could blunt, at least partially, the effects of a NATO air campaign over Poland. Most probable is that the Russian Army would arrive at the Oder-Neisse both later than desired and battered but still with enough strength to make an assault on Germany. Because NATO's air forces themselves would be weakened, the subsequent ground battle would be fought without the full advantage in air power that helps make an adverse 1.3 to 1.5:1 ratio acceptable. Even with this trade-off, an early commitment of NATO air power probably would ease NATO's defense task, but whether the difference would be enough to justify a far lower assessment for NATO's ground needs is unclear.

Political factors also need to be taken into account in evaluating the idea of a preemptive air campaign. Regardless of whether this idea makes sense militarily, NATO could hardly afford the negative political consequences of officially embracing it as a centerpiece of alliance military strategy. Moreover, diplomatic constraints might prohibit this idea from being implemented. For both reasons, NATO's defense planning will most likely remain anchored on the concept of an air campaign that begins only when adversary forces actually approach NATO's borders.




Figure 8.6—U.S. Air Requirements for War in Central Europe

Even so, air power clearly will remain an important arm of NATO's military strategy and perhaps a true "ace in the hole." A NATO air campaign that was launched at the time a ground war got under way might inflict more damage than past Western assessments commonly held. Desert Storm does show that air power is becoming more lethal and, if not blunted by effective air defenses, better able to influence the ground battle. However, NATO's ground forces would enter the equation here in ways that complicate the assessment. By halting an assault, NATO's ground forces would provide the air forces more time and better conditions in which to operate. But if the ground defenses were to buckle early, air power might not be given the opportunity to make itself fully felt. Precisely because air effectiveness and ground strength interact, the judgment offered here is that NATO will probably continue to strive for a joint posture along current lines.

Nonetheless, NATO's air-ground mix is an issue that merits careful study in the years ahead. Because the guiding criterion is a properly balanced posture that is not readily vulnerable to quick operational defeat, NATO will require sizable ground combat forces to provide a frontal wall and mobile reserves needed to prevent breakthroughs. This requirement exerts a powerful constraint on the idea of trading ground forces for airpower. A posture of 40 to 45 divisions, nonetheless, would seem to meet this criterion sufficiently well to allow, at the

margins, a partial shift toward greater reliance on air power if that step proves militarily attractive.

The United States and its allies probably would be reluctant to sacrifice any of the roughly 20 active divisions that would be available in a combined posture of 40 to 45 divisions, but reserve component forces might be another matter. The calculus here is influenced by an important consideration: Reserve component air forces have a reputation for performing well on short notice. In contrast, ground combat forces take longer to mobilize and then can require time-consuming refresher training. This has particularly been the U.S. experience, but it probably applies to allied forces as well.

While the cost dimensions are complex, roughly 2.5 air wings can probably be procured and maintained for the cost of a single heavy ground division (assuming reserve component status in all cases). If so, disbandment of four U.S. and allied ground divisions could allow for the deployment of fully ten air wings. Instead of fielding 45 divisions and 3,000 combat aircraft, NATO would deploy 41 divisions and 3,750 aircraft. Arguably, this posture might provide better overall combat capability not only for peripheral areas but in Central Europe as well. At a minimum, this concept merits thought.

In addition to needing strong ground and air forces, NATO also would require naval forces, and the U.S. Navy would be called upon to provide a large portion of them. Because the reinforcement time lines would be longer than during the Cold War, Russia might be even more prone to launching bomber, submarine, and surface combatant strikes against supply laden NATO convoys plying the North Atlantic. Accompanying this effort could also come an attack on Norway aimed at knocking that country out of the war and denying NATO an opportunity to use its valuable facilities. To deter and defend against both threats, sizable U.S. and NATO naval forces would be needed for both convoy defense and power projection. Also, some ground and air forces would need to be sent to reinforce Norway, including a U.S. Marine brigade and USAF units. For the U.S. Navy, its principal requirement would be a powerful carrier task force capable of operating in the northern waters. This task force would presumably include three to four carriers, plus combat escorts and support ships. It would need to be on-station quickly, preferably within three weeks of being ordered to deploy. Additionally, attack submarines and Antisubmarine Warfare (ASW) patrol squadrons would be needed. To the south, meanwhile, NATO might well want to reinforce, on a less urgent basis, its Mediterranean posture as a hedge against an unexpected attack there. Deployment of a second carrier task force, along with some USAF and Marine units, could help meet this requirement. Figure 8.7 summarizes the implications for U.S. naval requirements.

While this estimate of naval requirements will suffice for the moment, the dynamics of naval operations in this contingency need to be closely studied. The Cold War's planning regime envisioned one kind of maritime battle, but this new contingency might produce quite another. The longer time between mobilization and the outbreak of fighting would give NATO greater opportunity to resupply its European forces by sea, but it would also give enemy naval forces far longer to maneuver into place. The result could plausibly be a shift in adversary naval strategy away from a defensive bastion that hugs the Barents Sea to a greater emphasis on forward deployments in the North Sea and offensive operations south of the Greenland-Iceland-United Kingdom (GIUK) gap.




Figure 8.7—U.S. Naval Requirements for a Central European War

If so, the effect could be to complicate U.S. Navy efforts to project power northward and to increase the premium on operations to protect the North Atlantic. In any event, U.S. and NATO naval deployments would need to begin early in the crisis, perhaps even before reinforcement of the continent is begun. The early deployment of naval forces on both sides, in turn, could enhance the prospect that fighting might break out at sea before it begins on the Continent, thereby complicating efforts to resolve the crisis diplomatically. These complexities will need to be addressed as naval plans are formed.

Additionally, the likelihood that any Russian assault in Central Europe would be conducted on a single axis, rather than theaterwide, gives the United States and NATO a greater opportunity to concentrate their naval assets and use them in creative ways. The new demands placed on maritime operations in the Atlantic and North Sea might require the commitment there of any resources not needed in the Mediterranean. If not, the opportunity might avail itself to employ U.S. naval forces to influence the Center Region battle directly. This could include the commitment of one to two Marine divisions and associated air wings to NATO's posture there, as well as the use of carrier air wings to enhance NATO's air power. Imaginative use of U.S. naval assets in these ways could help strengthen NATO's defense prospects on land and at sea.

In summary, this analysis has presented a time-phased estimate of U.S. ground, air, and naval requirements for this demanding contingency. The goal has been to identify what is

needed, both early and later, to help underwrite NATO's military posture, doctrine, and strategy for actually fighting a war. The purpose of meeting these requirements, however, would be to deter this crisis from occurring and, if it does take place, to strengthen NATO's ability to resolve it short of an actual war. Any attack on Poland and Germany would probably carry with it complex political motives that might be subject to diplomatic settlement. A posture of military strength would place NATO in a better position to achieve a favorable settlement before the forces on both sides clash. The importance of fulfilling these military requirements can best be judged with these broader purposes in mind.

The larger question is whether this contingency will continue to play a role in NATO's defense planning at all. As a practical matter, the need to ensure that Germany's borders can be defended through a coalition response will compel NATO planners—for the near future at least—to keep an eye on this contingency even if it seems implausible. For the long term, much will depend upon the evolution of Russia and the Commonwealth. Successful completion of democratic reforms and enduring proof of a benign foreign policy would all but end any need to plan for war—even on a purely theoretical basis—with Russia. Indeed, Boris Yeltsin recently proclaimed Russia to be an ally of the West and suggested eventual membership in NATO. This development could call into question the need for a military balance of power in Europe, much less organized NATO defenses against Russia.

An entirely different situation could prevail if reform fails and Russia reverts to authoritarianism and a hostile stance toward the West. In this case, the need for organized NATO defense planning in Central Europe will continue. Indeed, it is possible that the dynamics of political and economic change would cause NATO military planning to focus increasingly on major military operations east of Germany's borders.

At the moment, the outcome is impossible to determine. The core issue for the United States is whether it should continue to develop operational plans (OPLANS) envisioning a military requirement in Central Europe for:

- peacetime deployment of two divisions and three wings in Europe,
- backed up by a capacity to reinforce promptly with about six divisions and seven wings,
- followed later by deployment of large additional ground and air forces.

The conclusion of this study is that because uncertainty and the stakes are both high, prudence argues in favor of this approach. If relations with Russia and the Commonwealth continue stabilizing, then these plans can eventually be discarded or at least relegated to the far back burner. If not, then OPLANS of this nature will be needed to continue contributing to stability and a credible balance of power.

MILITARY INTERVENTION IN EASTERN EUROPE AND THE BALKANS

Wartime U.S. missions and requirements for this class of contingencies would depend upon the nature of the conflict and U.S. goals in it. At the low end of the scale, U.S. forces might be dispatched to help NATO, the CSCE, or the United Nations stabilize a civil war. A prime example would be a contingency involving major civil war among the Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes in Yugoslavia. Other countries could also become involved, including Russia itself. U.S. military missions might begin with a major airlift operation to deploy forces there, fol-

lowed by logistic resupply to U.S., allied, and host nation forces; if the nation could be reached by sea, a cargo sealift effort could be undertaken also. As for combat forces, the primary mission would presumably be to help restore order and counteract violence. This could result in U.S. forces being used in a purely support capacity, or in helping control key urban areas and facilities, or even in participating in field operations. The U.S. contribution probably would be part of a multinational effort and therefore would be rather small. Commitment of military police officers, C³I, and logistics assets is one possibility. At the outside, deployment of one to two U.S. Army divisions backed up by some tactical air forces and specialized air support (e.g., helicopters and reconnaissance aircraft) might be required.

In the middle of the spectrum is a major peacekeeping operation designed to stabilize a military conflict between two East European or Balkan nations. Once again, the United States would probably participate along with forces from other nations, under the auspices of the CSCE or United Nations. These forces would enter into the conflict on the side of the nation whose cause is judged legitimate and requires outside help. U.S. forces might perform logistic support and C³I missions, but combat missions also might be needed from U.S. ground and air forces (in some cases, naval operations might also be required). These combat missions would probably be on a larger scale than when intervening in a civil war, but because most East European and Balkan nations are not heavily armed, they would be far smaller than what occurred in Desert Storm. The upper limit would probably be commitment of a U.S. Army corps and three tactical air wings, possibly supported by a carrier battle group.

At the high end of the spectrum is intervention designed to block Russian aggression somewhere in Eastern Europe or the Balkans against a nation not belonging to NATO. Once again, the United States probably would not intervene alone, but NATO itself would be unlikely to sponsor the effort because it would not fall under Article 5's provisions. Regardless of sponsorship, force requirements could easily be very high, especially if Russia were to bring its military power fully to bear. The primary reason is that all of these East European and Balkan nations lack sizable military forces, and they would be unlikely to band together if one is attacked. The daunting task therefore would be to aid an isolated nation that is far short of the military capacity to defend itself.

Requirements would be influenced by the size of the adversary threat, the invaded nation's forces, allied contributions, and U.S./allied goals. If the goal were to execute a purely deterrent maneuver, a U.S. contribution of a corps and three tactical air wings, along with equivalent allied forces, probably would be required. If the goal were actually to block an attack by the kind of forces that were used to invade Czechoslovakia in 1968 (about 30 divisions), then a far larger U.S./allied air contribution would be needed. This would easily amount to a repeat of Desert Storm (or larger), but conducted in Eastern Europe. If the goal were to defend against a larger attack, the requirement could easily approach what would be needed to defend Germany in a major war.

Quite apart from the political question of whether Western interests would be sufficiently threatened to justify a large intervention, the military feasibility of the intervention would be subject to question. By virtue of proximity, conceivably, NATO's members could project sizable forces into Poland or Czechoslovakia. But supporting them in pitched combat, against an adversary that would be operating with far shorter supply lines, might be another matter. For nations farther to the south or east, NATO might well not enjoy direct access to them and, regardless, would lack nearby bases, reception facilities, and other infrastructure. As a

result, NATO might not be physically able to send any appreciable number of combat forces in an acceptable period of time. Short of these nations joining NATO and taking active part in its military preparations, these daunting constraints might make this kind of intervention a practical impossibility.

MILITARY OPERATIONS IN THE MIDDLE EAST/NORTH AFRICA

Most of the wartime contingencies in this category would call for limited military missions that would impose relatively small requirements for U.S. forces. Most probable is that U.S. air forces and naval forces would be involved. A good example is El Dorado Canyon, which was carried out by a limited number of USAF/USN (U.S. Navy) combat and support aircraft. It is possible, however, to imagine the conditions under which larger combat interventions, with ground forces, could be needed. For example, sizable U.S. combat forces might be called upon to intervene in Lebanon again, to come to Israel's assistance, or even to intervene in North Africa. In these cases, commitment of a U.S. Army division or even a corps, backed by commensurate air and naval forces, could be required. In any event, the range and diversity of plausible wartime contingencies in the Middle East and North Africa (or even sub-Saharan Africa) call attention to the need to maintain a basing infrastructure and command staffs in the Mediterranean. Furthermore, the possibility that combat missions might have to be performed on a time-urgent basis creates an argument for keeping U.S. forces in Europe.

DEFENSE OF TURKEY

This wartime contingency seems likely to become more important in U.S. and NATO planning in the years ahead. Two different possibilities present themselves: a radical Arab assault from the south and, less likely, a Russian attack from the north and east. In both cases, Turkey would require logistic support and reinforcement with sizable combat forces. In all likelihood, the United States would be called upon to provide some of the forces. The U.S. contribution would take the form of air and naval forces at first, but ground combat forces could be required as well. Because heavy forces capable of performing mobile missions would be needed, the Army corps based in Germany would be an obvious candidate to fulfill this role.

A radical Arab attack in the Tigris-Euphrates and Iskenderun areas might, for example, be launched with 15 to 20 divisions and several hundred aircraft. Currently, Turkey does not deploy large military formations in this area, but it would be able to move a sizable portion of its ground and air forces there. Even so, local Turkish forces could find themselves outnumbered by a margin of 2:1 or more. In all likelihood, they would be compelled to give ground, especially in the Tigris-Euphrates area, thereby resulting in a political reversal. Figure 8.8 illustrates this risk by displaying the results of a simulation analysis of this contingency, assuming no outside help to Turkey. As it shows, enemy forces successfully advanced deep into Turkey, eventually seizing both Iskenderun and the Tigris-Euphrates area.

U.S. and allied military assistance would be needed to help stem the tide and then counterattack to reject enemy forces. Logistic resupply would be important to bolster the combat power and sustainability of Turkish forces; C³I support would also be needed. In addition, deploy-




Figure 8.8—Radical Arab Attack Against Turkish Forces Alone

ment of 750 or more U.S. and allied combat aircraft, with support forces, would be required. Figure 8.9 provides simulation results in which air power of this magnitude was quickly committed. As it suggests, a prompt infusion of air power could have a significant impact in destroying enemy forces and stopping their advance well short of their goals. A ground counterattack would probably be necessary, however, to restore Turkey's borders. Most probable is that Turkish forces would need the assistance of about two heavy NATO corps.

Because this contingency would fall under Article 5, NATO would be called upon to mount a coalition response. In this case, the required U.S. contribution would be a function of the




Figure 8.9—Radical Arab Attack Against Turkish Forces with Outside Assistance

forces committed by European allies. For example, NATO's Rapid Reaction Corps might be committed, along with combat aircraft. U.S. airlift and sealift forces would need to be used to deploy them there. Additionally, the United States would need to provide combat aircraft and a heavy Army corps. U.S. naval forces also would be committed, including one or two carriers, escort combatants, support ships, and fleet marine forces.

Figure 8.10 portrays U.S. time-phased deployments to Turkey, assuming ten tactical fighter wings are dispatched first, followed by an Army corps. A combination of airlift and sealift is used. As the figure suggests, the entire force could be deployed within two weeks if equipment is prepositioned. Absent prepositioning, the buildup process would take three to four weeks and perhaps longer if the assumptions used here prove too optimistic.

U.S. military missions would cover the gamut of typical combat operations. Logistic support and C³I units would perform their tasks over quite long distances that would tend to elevate total requirements in these areas. U.S. air forces (USAF and USN/U.S. Marine Corps [USMC]) would conduct a panoply of air defense, close air support, interdiction, and strategic bombing missions, much as occurred in Desert Storm. U.S. Army and Marine forces would




Figure 8.10—Air/Ground Deployment Rates to Turkey

engage in a mixture of highly mobile defensive and offensive operations. U.S. naval forces would be called on to secure the sea lines of communication and Turkish ports and to support the air/land battle. In these ways, combined U.S. forces could work with Turkish and other allied units to achieve a favorable outcome.

Even if politically feasible, a Russian/Commonwealth attack on Turkey would encounter imposing constraints. The most prized target would be Turkish Thrace, which stands astride the Dardanelles and controls access to the Mediterranean. To attack Turkish Thrace, however, Russian forces would have to pass through Romania and Bulgaria, whose withdrawal from the Warsaw Pact makes their cooperation uncertain at best. To attack Turkey's northern borders, Russia would have to launch a major amphibious operation across the Black Sea—a difficult type of warfare. An attack against Turkey's eastern borders in Anatolia would be far more feasible because this area directly abuts Commonwealth territory, but could be politically infeasible. The terrain there, moreover, is highly mountainous, thus promising to slow an advance at first. Even if attacking forces did make progress, they still would be about 200 miles from strategically vital targets and 400 miles from Ankara, Turkey's capital.

For all these reasons, an attack on Turkey might take the form of an air campaign aimed at intimidating the Turkish government. Turkey's relatively small air force would have trouble countering this threat and therefore would require outside U.S. and allied air reinforcement. A package of about 300 to 500 air defense fighters, AWACS aircraft, other C³I assets, and logistic support would be needed, much of it coming from the United States.

A full-scale ground invasion would probably be launched by about 30 to 40 divisions, supported by some 2,000 combat aircraft. The lightly equipped and poorly supported Turkish Army could find itself overpowered if the attack came in Thrace, and it would be hard-pressed to contain this attack even in mountainous Anatolia. In either case, prompt intervention of U.S. and allied air power would be minimally required. A force of 750 to 1,000 combat aircraft (or more) would probably be needed, and they would be called upon to conduct both air defense and major ground attack operations. Also, strong ground combat forces would be needed. At least two corps could be required and possibly a full 10 to 12 division field army of Desert Storm dimensions. As with other Turkish scenarios, West European combat forces could lend help, but the bulk of the reinforcement requirements would fall on the United States.

These Turkish scenarios provide very different wars, but common themes stand out, especially for the more realistic case of a radical Arab assault from the south. In all cases, Turkey would need military help. It would particularly need logistic support and other security assistance, but a major infusion of tactical air power would be required as well. In the most demanding cases, sizable ground combat forces would also be needed. Another theme is that for all cases, as a practical matter, the United States would need to provide the bulk of these forces. These scenarios thus highlight the role of Turkey in NATO's future military strategy, and the need for the United States to develop and maintain a capacity to project large combat forces there.

MAJOR WAR IN THE PERSIAN GULF

This contingency would involve a literal repeat of Desert Shield/Storm but possibly with force deployments conducted more urgently and combat operations waged less one-sidedly. Total force requirements would match Desert Storm: over ten divisions, several hundred aircraft, large naval and marine forces, and massive logistic and C³I support. The West European and Arab allies might well contribute more heavily than they did during Desert Storm, but the United States would probably still carry the lion's share of the military burden.

This operation would not be primarily commanded by U.S. staffs in Europe, but as in Desert Shield/Storm, an American military presence there would be required to play an important role. Perhaps most important, U.S. bases, C³I assets, and infrastructure would be needed to expedite an even more rapid reinforcement effort than the one that took place in Desert Shield. Additionally, combat air sorties and other special operations would be launched from bases in Turkey, naval forces in the Mediterranean, and installations elsewhere in Europe. Also, the U.S. Army corps based in Europe, by virtue of its combat power and training with allied forces, would deploy to the Gulf. For these reasons, the loss of Europe as a military platform could severely impede, and possibly cripple, any future major Western intervention in the Gulf.

COMPOSITE REQUIREMENTS FOR PEACE, CRISIS, AND WAR

Based on this analysis of these contingencies and the missions they would generate, Figure 8.11 presents a composite estimate of future U.S. military requirements for Europe.




Figure 8.11—Composite U.S. Force Requirements in Europe

These requirements reflect needs for peace, crisis, and war. The peacetime deployment envisioned here, backed up with the potential to reinforce, would enable the United States to pursue its demanding security goals in Europe. If peace gives way to crisis and war, forces designed to meet these requirements would enable the United States to deal effectively with the most demanding contingency facing it: a major regional contingency. But they also would allow for a powerful response to the broad spectrum of lesser but still demanding and more probable crises and wars that might lie ahead, including those in peripheral areas.

Table 8.1 is an amalgam of a wide variety of potential contingencies in Europe and its surrounding regions. The table displays force needs for a number of specific contingencies, ranging from large to small and stretching from Europe to the Persian Gulf to sub-Saharan Africa.

The table helps illuminate the wide variety of circumstances in which U.S. forces could be called upon to perform military operations. The virtue of a forward presence of 150,000 troops is that sufficient capabilities would be available to handle initial requirements for all of these contingencies. Smaller force postures would provide a commensurately reduced capacity to respond in a prompt and effective manner.

Table 8.1
U.S. Military Requirements for Contingencies Affecting USEUCOM
(Illustrative)

	Divisions/Other Units	Fighter Wings/Other	CVBGs/Other	C ³ I	Logistics Support
Major Regional Contingencies (MRC)					
MRC in Central Europe	10–15 div.	17–20	6–8	Yes	Yes
MRC in Turkey	3–6 div.	8–0	3–4	Yes	Yes
MRC in Persian Gulf	8–10	10–13	4–6	Yes	Yes
Lesser contingencies					
Air attack on Germany	Air defense	3–5	na	Yes	Yes
Humanitarian and peacekeeping aid to Russia	Specialized units	Airlift	na	Yes	Yes
Combat at sea	na	3–6	3–4	Yes	Yes
Major peacekeeping operations	1–3 div./specialized units	2–3 AWACS	1–2	Yes	Yes
Minor incidents in Middle East and North Africa	1–2 brigades/specialized units	1–2 AWACS	1–2	Yes	Yes
Major crisis in Middle East and North Africa	1–3 div.	3–6	3–4	Yes	Yes
Air/missile attacks on Europe from North Africa	na	3–6	3–4	Yes	Yes
Arab-Israeli war	Air defense units	Airlift	na	Yes	Yes
Hostage rescue	Special forces	1	1	Yes	Yes
Counterterrorist	Special forces	.3	na	Yes	na
Minor peacekeeping operations	1 brigade/specialized units	.3	1	Yes	Yes
Disaster relief	Specialized units	Airlift	Sealift	Yes	Yes

9. ASSESSMENT OF THE MILITARY OPTIONS IN RELATION TO FUTURE REQUIREMENTS

This section weighs the options in relation to their ability to meet—individually and collectively—all the requirements that flow from the different parts of the planning process. It conducts an appraisal that is inclusive, systematic, and across the board. Recognizing that the options must be evaluated in terms of their overall capacity to perform several different political and military tasks, it aims at providing the kind of synthesis that can help facilitate policy choice.

With this goal of synthesis in mind, Section 9 addresses the following important questions: All things considered, will a posture of 150,000 troops be needed to adequately satisfy the demands of the post-1995 period, or will a smaller presence suffice? If it will not be needed, what are the strategic consequences of deploying a less-than-ideal posture? How can the choices, opportunities, trade-offs, and risks ahead be best assessed?

A COMPOSITE APPRAISAL OF THE OPTIONS

Figure 9.1 presents, in matrix form, this section's central thesis of how the options are likely to perform in relation to the diverse requirements ahead. The figure presents eight key security goals that the United States will be pursuing in 1995 and beyond. The four postures considered here range from a forward presence of 150,000 troops to a symbolic presence of 40,000 soldiers. Reading from the top down, the matrix is filled-in in a way that presents an appraisal of how all four postures perform in terms of meeting the military requirements that flow from all eight goals.

Recognizing the mathematical rule that precision should be claimed only to the extent that the data allow, Figure 9.1 stops short of offering a quantitative appraisal of the sort that could produce a fully integrated multiattribute utility function. Instead, it employs a three-fold technique for qualitatively grading these postures. A check mark means that requirements in this area are adequately met and that, insofar as military forces affect final results, the United States will enjoy a good position for pursuing the goal under review. A question mark means that the outcome—in terms of meeting requirements and therefore actually attaining the goal in question—is uncertain. A negative mark means that requirements are unfulfilled to such a degree that the United States might be hard-pressed to achieve its goal in that area. This scoring system thus provides a consistent and transparent, if qualitative, grading technique for assessing the performance of each posture across the board.

Figure 9.1's assessments, it is important to emphasize, are based on the appraisal of future European security conditions that was articulated earlier: that both Europe and the Middle East/Persian Gulf will continue to be characterized by worrisome stresses, tensions, and potential instabilities. A different appraisal could produce dissimilar assessments. For example, a more optimistic appraisal of what the future holds could result in a more positive assessment of how force posture options below the current DoD plan would perform. Conversely, a more pessimistic appraisal might yield a more negative assessment of how

Security goals in Europe and peripheral areas	Postures			
	1. Forward presence (150K)	2. Dual-based presence (100K)	3. Limited presence (70K)	4. Symbolic presence (40K)
U.S. influence	√	?	—	—
NATO unity	√	√	?	—
Balance of power	√	√	?	—
Adequate NATO strategy	√	?	—	—
Adequate U.S./NATO defense posture				
Peace	√	√	?	—
Crisis	√	?	—	—
War	√	?	—	—
Options for Middle East/Persian Gulf contingencies	√	?	—	—

NOTE: Evaluations assume Europe and Middle East/Persian Gulf remain potentially unstable.

Figure 9.1—Impact of Alternative Postures on U.S. Security Goals and Associated Requirements

even a posture of 150,000 troops will serve U.S. national interests. In any event, the methodology can be employed to help provide a summary assessment for a broad range of evaluations, ranging from optimistic to pessimistic.

To the extent its assessment is correct, Figure 9.1 suggests that these options stack up very differently when the balance sheet is totaled. Under the security conditions assumed here, a posture of forward presence works satisfactorily in all eight areas of evaluation. As will be discussed below, even this posture has some drawbacks and deficiencies that could mar its performance, but overall, it gets high grades. By comparison, a dual-based posture of 100,000 troops would perform satisfactorily in only three areas and would offer questionable performance in the remaining five. Overall, its performance can be characterized as open to interpretation at best and genuinely uncertain at worst. Moreover, if Europe and its peripheral areas were to achieve less stability than is postulated here, this option's prospects would worsen.

The final two postures get mostly failing grades even under the security conditions assumed here. A posture of limited presence (70,000 troops) looks questionable in three areas and poor in five. A posture of symbolic presence (40,000 troops) merits a poor performance scorecard across the board. For both postures, their failing grades could be remedied only if Europe and peripheral areas achieve a greater degree of stability than is projected here, or if NATO itself changes in a way that permits a far larger U.S. drawdown than now seems wise.

FORWARD PRESENCE (150,000 TROOPS)

As discussed earlier, the Defense Department's approach to defining future force requirements in Europe is anchored on an ambitious set of policy goals and a cautious view of what the future holds in Europe and the Middle East/Persian Gulf. Its plan to continue deploying a forward presence of 150,000 troops, led by an Army corps and three to four tactical air wings, is a coherent and logical response. As a result, this option would do a better job of supporting U.S. interests in Europe than the other three less amply endowed postures studied here. This will especially be the case if, as expected, both Europe and the Middle East/Persian Gulf remain sufficiently unstable to compel the United States and NATO to stay militarily vigilant there.

The key strength of the DoD plan is that it provides for continued security and stability in the vitally important region of Central Europe. It does so partly because it provides sufficient U.S. forces to help perform these important political tasks:

- Keeping NATO unified under U.S. leadership and pointed toward greater multinational integration.
- Fostering a sound NATO military strategy.
- Reassuring Germany that its borders and physical safety will remain protected.
- Underwriting extended U.S. nuclear deterrence coverage for the other allied nations there.
- Sending a credible deterrent signal without being provocative.
- Providing a credible, operationally coherent force capable of major combat operations.

Additionally, a forward presence of 150,000 troops would provide the United States, acting individually or under NATO's flag, a readily available spectrum of military capabilities and options during peace, crisis, and war. As Sections 6 and 7 concluded, this option passes most tests of sufficiency where the specific details of military missions and requirements are concerned. This especially is the case for contingencies involving threats to NATO's interests in Central Europe.

Under what circumstances could this option prove insufficient to meet future U.S. political and military requirements? A major return of the Cold War, especially if accompanied by a Russian/Commonwealth military buildup that violated the arms control agreements that will be in effect by 1995, could bring this state of affairs about. In this case, the United States might have to bolster its presence above 150,000 by returning some of the forces that will have been withdrawn by then. Another possibility is stability in both Europe and the Middle East/Persian Gulf that raises the prospect of multiple simultaneous scenarios, thereby stretching U.S. forces beyond their limits. Short of these downturns, however, the current DoD plan appears sufficiently endowed to handle the threats and problems that lie ahead.

Despite these strengths, nevertheless, some question marks surround the DoD plan. This plan will undeniably require a large amount of political support in the United States and Western Europe at a time when concern about Europe's security affairs is fading. If present trends continue, and especially if Russia takes further major steps down the path of political reform, a U.S. posture of this size might come across as excessively large. This could especially be the case if Europe's remaining security problems seem vague and diffuse. In this circumstance, political consensus might diminish to the point of leaving no option other than

further U.S. withdrawals, possibly at a time when the Defense Department believes this step to be imprudent. At a minimum, the current DoD plan must be assessed as vulnerable on this score.

Militarily speaking, some programmatic aspects of the DoD plan are likely to become matters of study and debate in the years ahead. One issue is the potential shortfall of Army support troops brought about by the decision to retain a full combat corps within a manpower ceiling of 93,000 soldiers. A second issue is whether the Army and Air Force will retain enough WRM/WRS stocks in Europe. A third issue is whether the Air Force will have enough combat support aircraft: reconnaissance, defense suppression, and electronic warfare. All three of these issues will require further evaluation and could lead to some marginal changes in the current DoD plan.

Another issue is whether the U.S. force posture in Europe should be tailored to specialize more explicitly in military missions that complement NATO's emerging defense plans. The U.S. Army corps, by subdividing its two divisions, will evidently participate in two NATO multinational corps formations. Also, some specialized U.S. contributions will evidently be made to NATO's Rapid Reaction Corps. Nevertheless, the current DoD plan is primarily focused on maintaining the U.S. posture as an independent and nationally visible force that performs a traditional set of military missions.

If desired, the U.S. Army corps could be pushed toward greater role specialization by configuring it with an "operational fires" brigade (MLRS/ATACMS) and an additional attack helicopter brigade. These units could be available for swift allocation to other NATO multinational corps in a wartime situation, and they could train in this capacity in peacetime. Similarly, USAF forces could specialize by providing capabilities that allied air forces lack: strategic airlift, defense suppression, electronic warfare, and reconnaissance. Changes of this sort would dilute the national identity of U.S. forces but would enhance their unique contributions to NATO's posture, thereby creating a powerful incentive to keep them in Europe.

The DoD plan also seems likely to come under criticism on grounds that because it is focused on Central Europe, it does not adequately answer questions about Eastern Europe and the Southern Region, where major troubles are most likely to occur. To be sure, U.S. ground and air forces based in Germany will be physically capable of deploying to regions outside Central Europe. Nonetheless, they could become entangled in NATO's defense plans there in ways that might impede easy movement elsewhere, and, in any event, a heavy U.S. Army corps is hardly light-footed.

To an important degree, this problem of remaining too focused on Central Europe at the expense of other important areas is not limited to U.S. forces alone. On a broader scale, it seems destined to apply to NATO's coalition plans in general. To the extent that changes in U.S. force dispositions will prove desirable, they will probably grow out of larger changes in NATO's traditional ways of doing business, all aimed at configuring the alliance to look beyond Central Europe.

Conceivably, the need to configure Army forces for missions outside Central Europe could lead to pressures to convert some of the Capable Corps' heavy combat formations into light infantry and other specialized units. Any wholesale change in this direction would radically alter the current DoD plan, but if the required changes are marginal, they could probably be

accomplished without abandoning the Corps' current missions and force structure. For example, one brigade might be converted to airborne or airmobile status. Another brigade could be transformed into a combination of engineers, military policemen, and other specialized forces aimed at providing a peacekeeping/disaster relief force for East European and Balkan missions. These changes would leave the Army corps with one light and six heavy combat brigades: still a potent force, but with greater diversity than under the current plan.

A larger issue is whether additional U.S. Army and Air Force personnel might need to be moved outside Germany. Political pressures within Germany itself could make this step unavoidable. This aside, the need to achieve greater responsiveness in the Southern Region could itself create a rationale for basing more air and ground units, along with war reserve stocks and other facilities, in Italy and perhaps Turkey as well. Basing in the United Kingdom, which would allow quick movement of forces to Central Europe or either flank, is another possibility. The current DoD plan calls for about 100,000 troops to remain in Germany while the remaining 50,000 are deployed in other countries, primarily the United Kingdom and Italy. In the extreme case, movement toward a different basing pattern might result in a posture with only about 50,000 troops in Germany and the remaining 100,000 based elsewhere in Europe. Changes of this sort would obviously have a large impact in reshaping the DoD plan and channeling it in different directions than those now envisioned.

The act of pointing out these myriad possibilities for change is not to endorse them. The additional missions cited here include better support forces, units for East European missions, greater role specialization within NATO, and enhanced responsiveness in the Southern Region. An effort to retaylor the U.S. posture to suit all these purposes would seriously dilute the present plan's emphasis on having strong combat forces in Central Europe under U.S. command, oriented toward traditional missions at a high level of capability. Although the DoD plan does come across as somewhat single-minded, it is intelligently anchored on a coherent logic that responds to geostrategic politics in Europe. An important trade-off is therefore involved here.

To what degree would a more diversified posture allow greater capacity for secondary missions at the expense of visibility, influence, and prompt action if a major war does occur? The answer is unclear, and while the DoD can be criticized, the alternatives have liabilities and drawbacks of their own. For the moment, perhaps the best conclusion is that the DoD plan is a good starting point, but an open mind should be kept about how the future U.S. presence in Europe can best manifest itself.

Regardless of where optimality lies, the issues raised here highlight a more fundamental point about the future U.S. presence in Europe. If there is a clash between the DoD plan and alternative ways to configure U.S. forces in Europe, it boils down to a struggle over how to get the most political-military mileage out of limited assets. Despite its size, a posture of 150,000 troops is seemingly not large enough to satisfy all priorities for flexibility and multi-mission capability at once. If this problem is prevalent with the DoD plan, it would be considerably more striking if the U.S. posture were to be reduced far lower. This is one argument against proposals for a smaller presence than DoD has in mind.

If the DoD plan is to represent national policy, it will need consistent funding support to carry it out. A European-based posture of a heavily armed corps and three to four fighter wings will require regular modernization with new weapons, robust training and other

readiness-enhancing measures, and sustainment programs. Backing up this presence will need to be a capability of reinforcing rapidly from the United States, and this will continue to require a combination of strategic airlift, sealift, and prepositioning programs. Indeed, spending on strategic mobility could rise in the years ahead, especially if efforts are made to enhance deployability to the Southern Region.

The following two figures display how a package of strategic mobility and readiness programs for Army Reserve Component (RC) forces could enhance U.S. force-generation rates in Central Europe. Figure 9.2's "base program" shows the rate at which U.S. ground forces would increase in Central Europe assuming that a two-division corps remains there but no POMCUS sets are left behind. As the figure suggests, the U.S. buildup rate would fall well short of requirements not only during the initial days but even during the period when war might break out. By leaving three division sets in POMCUS sites, however, the U.S. buildup rate could be brought significantly closer to adequacy. A sound POMCUS program therefore will remain key to future U.S. reinforcement plans.

Even with a POMCUS program, the U.S. buildup rate will fall at the lower end of adequacy through the first two months of mobilization and reinforcement. As Figure 9.3 suggests, the buildup rate during the first month could be accelerated through procurement of enough fast sealift ships to transport an additional three U.S. Army division-equivalents to Europe. The buildup rate during the second month could be sped up by programs to increase the readiness of four division-equivalents of Army RC forces. This increase might be achieved, for example, by establishing an active cadre of about 25 percent in each combat unit—thus creating the equivalent of cadred reserve divisions.




Figure 9.2—U.S. Buildup Rate in Central Europe




Figure 9.3—Impact of Improvement Measures on U.S. Buildup Rate

Although Army reserve support units performed well in Desert Storm, the decision to give reserve combat units lengthy refresher training bodes poorly for efforts to speed up their availability for European contingencies. If this step proves infeasible, the same effect could be achieved by increasing the allocation of active Army and Marine divisions from 8 (as postulated here) to 12. In this event, mobilized RC units would presumably acquire the mission of providing a backup strategic reserve for other global needs. Involved here is the issue of global military strategy and force allocation philosophy. With 12 Army and 3 Marine divisions, the Defense Department will have enough forces to commit a fully active 10 to 12 division “field army” to Europe, but only if RC forces are used to meet simultaneous missions in other regions. In absence of this decision, DoD will be left with no alternative but to employ its Army RC forces for the European mission, a step that would create a rationale for measures to increase their readiness.

Regardless of how DoD proceeds, the need to have a viable rapid reinforcement capability will continue to be an important requirement even if a posture of fully 150,000 troops is kept in Europe. This need would be all the greater, and commensurately more expensive, if a smaller force were to be deployed there. In this event, the United States would be compelled to bolster its reinforcement capability even further in order to compensate for a reduced peacetime presence. Programs to provide this capability would be expensive, thereby canceling out any savings that might otherwise come from a reduced peacetime presence.

Assuming 150,000 troops are kept in Europe, fiscal costs for keeping this force combat ready and backed up with reinforcements thus will have a demanding impact on defense spending. This will come at a time when the DoD budget will be subjected to competing pressures from other directions brought about by the decline in real spending levels in the years ahead. The

manner in which the inevitable competition over resources is played out will have a large bearing on the military quality of the U.S. presence in Europe, if not its actual size. The risk is that a steady stream of budgetary cutbacks, aimed at bolstering U.S. forces for other missions, will result in a progressive "hollowing-out" of the posture in Europe. In order to avoid this risk, constant attention will need to be given to the task of keeping the Europe-deployed posture at an appropriately high level in DoD's scheme of priorities.

DUAL-BASED PRESENCE (100,000 TROOPS)

From the vantage point of senior U.S. military authorities, the current DoD plan would leave an operationally coherent force in Europe, whereas a dual-based posture would sacrifice that coherence and leave it hostage to outside reinforcement in a crisis.

As discussed earlier, total force deployments for this option would include 4 Army brigades and 2.3 wings. This compares to 7 brigades and about 3.5 wings for the DoD plan. The remaining forces would be based in the United States in "dual-based" status, thereby allowing for their prompt return in a crisis. Compared to the DoD plan, this option is less desirable across the board but does retain the framework of having an Army corps and several air wings in Europe. It thus would endeavor to retain the character of the DoD plan but without that plan's full complement of military resources. In other words, it would try to buy equivalent security in Europe, but with a less visible presence.

As with any approach to defense planning that tries to pare back resources without adjusting goals downward, this option has predictably negative features. One problem with this plan would be if the future European security proves to have the fault lines that, from the vantage point of today, are contemplated by this study. In this event, this option might not cripple U.S. policy for dealing with the demanding European problems that may lie ahead, but it would render the United States less capable of dealing with them. Stated another way, this option would not necessarily compel the United States to abandon its present policy, but it would make the implementation of that policy more difficult and less effective.

This option could proportionately reduce U.S. forces in Europe more than allied forces are being pared back, thereby lowering the U.S. profile in a relative sense. Even so, with 100,000 troops in Europe, the United States might remain sufficiently present there to make its views felt and its visibility apparent. This option would therefore still allow the United States to endeavor to keep NATO unified, to preserve a viable military balance of power in Europe, and to participate actively in shaping the future security order there. Conversely, however, it could set in motion a chain of events within NATO that could alter the alliance—perhaps marginally, perhaps more so—in ways detrimental to U.S. interests and Europe's long-term stability.

In particular, this option might somewhat weaken U.S. influence and leadership capacity in NATO. This weakening, in turn, could produce undesirable trends in NATO's command structure, coalition plans, and military strategy. To an important degree, NATO probably would become more dominated by West European perspectives and priorities. Whether NATO would remain a vigorous alliance is uncertain, but in all likelihood, it would not emerge with the kind of defense preparedness and flexible strategy that the United States prefers and the situation requires. If so, damage of some magnitude would be done to

NATO's traditionally important objectives of deterrence, defense, and the control of escalation—all to the detriment of peace, security, and stability in Europe.

Militarily, the United States would still retain enough forces to perform many of the missions contemplated by the current DoD plan. These missions, however, could not be carried out with comparable vigor and flexibility. During peacetime, this option would create numerous problems in training and readiness that typically arise from dual-basing. To a degree, U.S. readiness would probably suffer, as would training with West European allies and NATO's multinational formations. In a crisis, the United States could not respond as quickly and effectively as under the DoD plan, and this problem would be manifested more strongly were a war to break out. This especially would be the case if a severe crisis were to explode suddenly with little actionable strategic warning, or if more than a single crisis were to occur at once.

These crisis-management problems would be manifested in Central Europe, where the United States could deploy fewer forces during the very early stages of a crisis. Similar problems could occur in the more volatile Southern Region. Even under the DoD plan, the United States will maintain few forces there in peacetime, and while it quickly could deploy tactical air forces, it would be far less able to project ground forces. With a smaller presence of 100,000 troops, this liability would be magnified further. To a degree, NATO's military security and U.S. interests would therefore be weakened in both Central Europe and the southern flank, a double loss that needs to be recognized in evaluating this option.

Compared to the DoD plan, this option would thus carry with it a smaller benefit stream, and a larger stream of political-military costs and risks. Exactly how serious would its negative consequences be? This question is hard to answer precisely. Also, it is clearly open to interpretation: Analysts could read the data marshaled here and come away with different conclusions. This is especially the case since a posture of 100,000 troops would still be a sizable presence, and the task of evaluating its performance is beset with many uncertainties and subtleties.

What can be said fairly is that with a dual-based posture, U.S. interests would be less well insured, and Europe would probably be a less safe place than if the DoD plan is carried out. Much would depend, of course, on how Europe's larger security affairs evolve. If Europe continues marching on the path toward greater stability, a posture of 100,000 troops might serve the U.S. interest about as well as the DoD plan. But if Europe and its peripheral areas were to spiral downward, then the differences between these two postures might become starker than that portrayed here. This is an important feature that needs to be considered in planning for the uncertain era ahead. Whereas the DoD plan provides a margin of safety if things do not go well in Europe, a dual-based posture is more dependent on the proposition that the future European security order will be a tranquil one.

On balance, the negative features of the dual-based option are sufficient to justify this study's conclusion that the DoD plan represents a safer and better strategic choice. This will remain the case as long as U.S. policy continues to pursue its multifaceted goals against the backdrop of a justifiably cautious view about Europe's future. The chief positive feature of the dual-based option is that it provides a potential fallback position if political circumstances make the full DoD plan infeasible. Also, it does provide a logical lower plateau if Europe and its peripheral areas achieve greater stability than U.S. policy currently expects

will be the case. Short of these developments, however, it comes in second place among the options surveyed here.

LIMITED PRESENCE (70,000 TROOPS)

This option would leave the United States with a posture of about one Army division (-), 1.5 USAF air wings, and a support infrastructure. Compared to the DoD plan and even to a dual-based posture of 100,000 troops, it would alter the *character* of the U.S. military presence in Europe. That is, the U.S. posture would not only be smaller in numbers, but it would also be on a qualitatively different, lower political and military plain.

Under this option, the United States would still retain some ground and air combat forces in Europe, which are needed not only to provide conventional capabilities but also to underscore extended nuclear deterrence. In addition, the United States would also contribute to NATO in other militarily important ways. Its strategic nuclear forces, naval forces, and CONUS-based ground and air forces would all retain important missions in NATO's defense strategy and would be called on to play critical roles if NATO were to become involved in a full-scale war. These offshore forces would help enable the United States to still cast a military shadow over Europe's security affairs.

The United States would do so, however, in ways quite different from those of the past. U.S. forces deployed in Europe during peacetime would lack the operational coherence and national independence that is a distinguishing feature of the DoD plan. As a result, they would have less political standing in the alliance. In NATO circles today, the presence of an army corps is the hallmark of a serious military commitment justifying a major role in NATO's command structure and defense plans. With a limited presence, the U.S. posture would fall short of this important test of sufficiency and credibility.

Consequently, the U.S. military presence could diminish from its present weighty role in NATO's defense plans to becoming primarily a cog in a NATO machine dominated by German forces. As an illustration, the U.S. contribution to NATO's Continental defenses would shrink to the point where it approximately matches that of Denmark and Belgium. With a posture of these dimensions, the United States would be hard-pressed to lay claim to a premier leadership role in NATO. A principal risk is that the SACEUR position would be transferred to a European officer. Even short of this, the United States might lose many important command positions in NATO's integrated structure, including senior slots in NATO Headquarters, Supreme Headquarters, Allied Powers of Europe (SHAPE), and subsidiary staffs. As for U.S. combat forces, they would probably come under the direct command of European officers, rather than U.S. officers today.

All of these changes almost inevitably would translate into a sharp loss of U.S. influence in NATO, well beyond what would be experienced with a posture of 150,000 troops or even 100,000. The exact consequences are difficult to foretell, but a NATO alliance dominated by West European officials would probably come to embrace a different defense strategy and standard of military preparedness than that of today. Indeed, with U.S. leadership on the decline, coalition planning itself might slacken appreciably. In the years past, NATO has owed its successes mostly to U.S. leadership, a fact that West European governments openly acknowledge. In theory, NATO could continue to function if the United States were to assume a less dominant role, but in practice the outcome could be quite different. Put simply,

Europe's complex political dynamics make it hard for a large number of small and medium-sized nations to achieve the required cooperation in absence of a powerful leader.

Even if NATO were to continue functioning, diminishing West European enthusiasm for military affairs could produce a steady decline in NATO's defense preparedness. This tendency would be reinforced by the perception that the United States itself was discounting the security risks in Europe. The eventual outcome might be a de facto NATO military strategy more dependent on nuclear deterrence and escalation than that called for by the London Summit and a conventional posture suited only to handling minor contingencies. This development would hardly bode well for NATO's unity or for NATO's efforts to maintain a European balance of power through preservation of an adequate defense posture. In important ways, negative reverberations might be felt across the entire Continent, thereby weakening long-range prospects for peace and stability.

Whatever the political consequences, militarily U.S. forces would be far less capable of operating on their own and more heavily reliant on outside reinforcement than they are under the DoD plan. This would result in a proportionately diminished capacity to respond quickly and decisively to crises in either Central Europe or the Southern Region. During the early stages of a crisis, NATO's defense plans would therefore come to hinge primarily on what allied forces, acting together or alone, could provide. The United States would not be consigned to the role of an outside observer but, at least until reinforcement got under way, neither would it enjoy the latitude of being in a controlling position.

The bottom line here is that, compared to the previous two options, this posture comes in a distant third when its negative consequences are added up. Because it would alter the character of the U.S. presence in Europe, its primary effect would be political, but it would have a deleterious impact in the military sphere as well. Eventually it would compel a marked change in U.S. policy and strategy, even if that was not intended at the onset. For these reasons, it is an appropriate policy choice only if the United States were to decide that it prefers a sharply diminished role in NATO's affairs or if Europe's stability improves dramatically.

SYMBOLIC PRESENCE (40,000)

This option would leave the United States with a peacetime military infrastructure in Europe, but with almost no combat forces: less than one division and one air wing. In essence, it would have a combat presence in Europe of only symbolic dimensions. It would be left entirely dependent upon outside reinforcement to respond to all but the most minor of contingencies.

The negative political consequences of this option would be similar to those of a limited presence, only magnified significantly. For all practical purposes, the United States would revert to the offshore role originally intended for it in 1949, when NATO was formed and before an integrated military command took shape. Defense planning on the Continent would fall almost entirely under control of the allies, bringing with it a stream of West European-oriented decisions on military strategy, doctrine, force levels, security policies, and crisis-management procedures. Meanwhile, the United States would not have sufficient combat forces present in Europe to make credible its nuclear commitments, much less to fight a conventional war.

The situation would be very different from that of 1949, when the Soviet Union did not yet possess a serious nuclear arsenal. The United States presumably would remain obligated to continue providing extended nuclear deterrence coverage over Western Europe while coming to the rescue with reinforcements if a war were to occur. Thus it would still bear heavy and potentially dangerous responsibilities for Europe's security, but without the political influence to shape events in ways that protect its own vital interests. In essence, the United States would become a captive hostage to its allies and to Europe's larger dynamics. The desire to avoid precisely this untenable situation is one of the primary reasons why the United States decided in 1950 to permanently station large forces in Europe and why it kept them there through 40 years of Cold War.

Whether Europe's future dynamics would pull the Continent toward greater stability or away from it is an uncertainty, but there are ample historical precedents for fearing the worst. This especially would be the case if, as is possible, the West European allies failed to pick up the slack left by the U.S. departure. In this event, the European force balance would become increasingly dominated by Russian military power at a time when that nation probably will be undergoing a severe internal trauma and Eastern Europe will be facing dislocations of its own. These trends, if they came to pass, do not add up to high confidence in Europe's future stability.

Militarily, the United States would no longer have a significant capacity to continue training with allied forces in ways that help produce common doctrine, tactics, weapon systems, and procedures. For this reason alone, NATO's defense posture would come to resemble the kind of loose coalitions reminiscent of earlier times, when allies were united by parallel diplomacies but not by closely cooperating military forces. Additionally, U.S. forces in Europe would have little capacity, sans reinforcement, to operate independently as an extension of purely American policy. Quite apart from their inability to respond quickly to major contingencies, they could be hard-pressed to handle even minor but still important problems, including counterterrorist operations, hostage rescue missions, and security assistance.

In the event of a severe crisis, the United States would be capable of deploying large forces to Europe within a month or two. Whether this would be fast enough would depend upon the situation, but the United States could initially find itself unable to exert much crisis-management control over events. The risk, of course, is that by the time U.S. forces had arrived in strength, the crisis would have already spun out of control, thereby making a military conflagration unavoidable. The result is that the United States might find itself committed to entanglement but unable to either prevent military conflict from occurring or to bring it to a swift end. This, of course, is a worst-case appraisal, but one of the purposes of a sizable U.S. military presence in Europe is to prevent worst cases from becoming high probability events.

The ability of the United States and its NATO allies to intervene effectively in the Persian Gulf, if that requirement were to arise again, might also become a question mark. Under this option, the United States would retain a sufficient military infrastructure and system of bases to permit the transiting of forces through Europe on the way to the Gulf. Because U.S. combat forces would be largely absent from Europe in peacetime, however, there would be little opportunity to preserve the coalition capabilities that permitted highly successful combined operations in Desert Storm. In this event, the United States and its allies would be compelled to deploy to the Gulf as a hastily crafted coalition of partners with a diminished capacity to work together from the onset. Indeed, the risks inherent in this situation might

be sufficient to motivate the West European allies not to participate at all, thereby leaving the ball entirely in the U.S. court.

For all these reasons, this option is assigned failing grades across the board as long as Europe and peripheral areas remain sufficiently unstable to make explosive crises and wars plausible concerns. In appraising this option, an especially important issue is whether the United States is willing to entrust management of Europe's security affairs to the European Community and the WEU. These institutions would probably replace NATO as the focal point of Western defense and security planning there. A premeditated U.S. effort to devolve responsibility onto these organizations would square with a decision to almost entirely remove American combat forces from Europe's soil, but it also would imply a need to make major adjustments in U.S. nuclear commitments there. Short of a decision to encourage the emergence of a fully independent West European pillar, and to accept the risk that the effort would die aborning, this option seems to have few redeeming features.

RISKS OF CUTTING U.S. FORCES TOO DEEPLY

The task of comparing the DoD plan with options for a smaller U.S. force presence is made difficult by the troublesome problem of trying to forecast the specific political-military costs and risks of these options. Uncertainty about the negative consequences, however, does not make them any less real or justify discounting them from the calculus. Recognizing the need to make judgments in the face of unclear data, this analysis concludes that the act of reducing U.S. forces well below the DoD plan would send the United States sliding down a slope in Europe. As the U.S. posture becomes smaller, the angle of this slope would increase and the rate of slide would accelerate. At some undetermined point, in all likelihood, the United States would fall off a strategic cliff, with no guarantee of a soft landing.

While pinpointing the location of this cliff is difficult, the worst consequences of falling off it can be delineated. The immediate risk of cutting U.S. forces too deeply is that the United States might lose influence in NATO and Europe and might lose NATO entirely. This could occur not only because the West European nations might go their own way but also because the United States, historically an isolationist nation, might shortsightedly lose interest in Europe.

Even if NATO were to remain largely intact in a political sense, its defense policy might well drift toward diminished conventional strength and an early reliance on U.S. strategic nuclear forces. This unhealthy development would occur at a time when the prospect of all-out conflict in Europe is giving way to the reappearance of limited wars, possibly fought beyond NATO's borders. In this event, NATO would find itself unprepared to meet the security challenges of the post-Cold War era. The interests of both the United States and its West European allies would suffer.

In particular, the United States and NATO might not possess the kind of military forces needed to effectively manage crises in Europe and the Middle East/Persian Gulf. If a major war were to occur, the United States might not be able to reinforce rapidly enough, thereby leaving its own forces and NATO's inadequate. The stage would thus be set for either a policy of impotence or a hasty and militarily ineffective reaction that could cause a crisis to explode into war and then produce a defeat on the battlefield.

Even short of an actual battlefield reversal, concern about NATO unraveling and the United States losing its military punch in Europe could itself have negative political consequences. This development alone might help push Europe's evolution down the path of instability, a process that would be aided if the Continent's eastern half does experience the political and economic turmoil that might lie ahead. Perhaps the most foreboding strategic risk is that, with an imbalance of military power in Europe, and reform having failed in Russia, Germany might find itself unprotected and therefore compelled to pursue an independent course in diplomacy and military policy. This development could easily lead to the kind of resurrected tensions in German-Russian relations that would make a depolarized European security system all the more chronically unsettled.

In summary, the worrisome risk is that the negative consequences of a too-small U.S. posture might feed off each other, thereby producing a cascading slide toward instability. This dark scenario, of course, is a worst-case event whose probability might be as low as its disastrous consequences would be high. However, the prospect that Europe would move toward stability in absence of a security architecture shored up by U.S. and NATO military power might itself be a low-probability event. Because the purpose of defense planning is to help tilt the probability scales in the right direction, the issue ultimately comes down to one of managing uncertainty. If the United States aspires to a strong military position that would help channel Europe's evolution in safe directions, then the DoD plan makes strategic sense.

CONDITIONS PERMITTING A LARGER U.S. DRAWDOWN

Under what conditions could the United States afford to go beyond the DoD plan? The fact that the U.S. force presence is designed to serve multiple objectives, contingencies, and missions makes it improbable that future requirements will diminish appreciably because of any single change. Most likely, favorable changes in several different areas—political and military together—would be needed. Especially because Europe has moved so far in the direction of greater stability since 1989, however, further changes of this sort are possible. The subject is therefore worth speculating about.

Deeper U.S. force cuts might be possible, for example, if NATO were to alter its traditional approach to coalition arrangements and burden-sharing practices. In particular, an alliance decision to entrust Continental missions to the West European allies while the United States focuses on off-shore missions could permit a smaller U.S. presence in Europe. The degree to which NATO embraces this philosophy would determine the extent to which U.S. forces could be withdrawn. A minor shift in this direction would allow only some thinning of U.S. forces, but a major shift could permit a more sizable withdrawal.

Short of NATO embracing the idea of role specialization, future U.S. force requirements in Europe will rest heavily on how the United States appraises the status of its key security goals there. Obviously, deeper force cuts would be possible if the United States were to downgrade these goals and the underlying interests that drive them. A more likely development is that the United States might conclude that the bulk of its goals have been satisfactorily achieved to the point where a forward presence seems less necessary on political grounds. For example, the United States might grow confident that its own influence and NATO's unity are adequately ensured and that the European security architecture no longer needs a strong Western military prop to support it. Changed assessments of this sort could

remove the political rationale for the DoD plan, thereby leaving it primarily dependent on NATO's assessment of future military requirements.

With regard to these requirements, it is apparent that the prospect of a major war in Europe remains a factor in NATO defense planning and plays a contributing role in the rationale for the DoD plan. If this risk could be discounted entirely, U.S. forces would not be needed for this contingency at all. Alternatively, if NATO could be confident of getting extended strategic warning of the sort that can be acted upon, then its military readiness standards could be dropped lower than those now planned. This development might enable the allies to transfer more of their forces to reserve status. It also might allow the United States to place greater reliance on outside reinforcement, thereby permitting a smaller peacetime presence in Europe. In this event, a dual-based U.S. posture, or even a limited presence, might become a more viable proposition.

Even so, however, the prospect of war in the Middle East and Persian Gulf would exert a powerful break on how far drawdowns could go. If the risk of a fast-breaking war there remains compelling, it might itself create a powerful stand-alone argument for keeping a U.S. posture of forward presence dimensions in Europe. Less urgent time lines might permit a smaller posture, but as long as U.S. forces need to train with their NATO counterparts for a major Gulf war, it is hard to see how anything less than a dual-based corps, or possibly a limited presence of a single Army division and one to two air wings, would suffice.

The disappearance of any plausible risk of major war in either Europe or the Middle East and Persian Gulf could create the conditions allowing for the removal of most U.S. combat forces from Europe. In this event, U.S. military requirements would focus on maintaining constructive relations with the West European allies and other European nations, whose own forces presumably would become very small. Additionally, the United States would probably want to have some forces there to handle purely minor contingencies (e.g., hostage-rescue operations). Also, a military infrastructure there would still be needed to allow for prompt reinforcement, if that step should unexpectedly become necessary. These requirements would seemingly argue for maintaining a symbolic presence, rather than leaving entirely.

The act of speculating about the conditions under which the DoD plan could be altered thus illustrates that the idea of keeping a forward presence in Europe is a robust one. For smaller postures to become attractive, the political need for U.S. forces would have to abate appreciably, and the military requirement to be capable of responding quickly and strongly would also have to diminish. Either of these changes might occur over the coming years, but whether both will occur in tandem seems less probable. In the event that both do take place, however, the three alternatives examined here provide a logical path that can be followed with confidence that enough U.S. forces are being left behind to meet still-existing requirements in Europe.

10. CONCLUSIONS

Now that the Cold War has ended, the U.S. military presence in Europe has reappeared on the national agenda with a vengeance. As part of the diplomatic settlements taking shape in Europe and NATO's shrinking defense needs, the United States already has agreed to withdraw about 50 percent of its forces by 1995, and many observers are calling for more. If history is any guide, however, the passing of the Cold War does not mean that security affairs in Europe have come to a permanent end. The outlines of the new security order are only dimly visible, but for good or ill, military forces will evidently continue to play an important role. Since the United States will remain involved in Europe, and committed to both its own interests and its allies' security, it will need to leave a sizable contingent behind. The troublesome question is: How many troops and with what capabilities?

Because the fluid and uncertain situation in Europe is making the task of analysis far more complex than it was during the previous era, the choices ahead are anything but easy and automatic. Too many considerations are involved to permit decisionmaking by snap judgments and instant impressions. What is to be avoided, above all, is the tendency to arbitrarily set U.S. military manpower levels in Europe on the basis of political temperature-reading there. Political passions are undeniably cooling in Europe, and the risk of all-out war is receding dramatically. But this favorable trend itself is no reliable guide to determining how many forces should remain.

The central conclusion of this study is that the future U.S. military presence in Europe should be determined only on the basis of careful study and measured deliberation. The proper approach is to assess future force requirements as a function of U.S. goals, the evolving situation in Europe, NATO's defense strategy, and appropriate military missions in peace, crisis, and war. From this theory of requirements, judgments can then be made about proper force levels, which in turn can permit decisions on manpower levels. This approach is admittedly ponderous, but it provides the best vehicle for guaranteeing that the decisions ahead will be taken properly. For the methodology of strategic planning, analytical virtue is not its only reward: Sound policy comes in its wake.

A second conclusion is that the core issue facing the United States is one of deciding how it intends to manage uncertainty and change in Europe. Should it be a passive witness to Europe's evolution, or should it actively try to help guide Europe down the path to stability? If it does opt for an activist stance, then its own demanding agenda and the challenges ahead will seemingly create compelling reasons to keep large forces in Europe for the foreseeable future. This situation will change only if the United States successfully transforms its visions for Europe's peaceful future into concrete reality. Among other things, Russia and the Commonwealth would need to become a truly benign partner of the West (or collapse into impotent chaos), and the Middle East/Persian Gulf would have to stabilize to the point where major war there becomes equally unlikely. In addition, there would have to be solid grounds for confidence that the transatlantic relationship will remain healthy if U.S. troops depart.

A third conclusion is that the DoD plan for a forward presence of 150,000 troops in Europe is based on a design concept that, while not immune to second-guessing, is nevertheless militarily coherent and supportive of U.S. policy goals there. The presence of an Army corps and

several air wings, primarily based in Germany, will help underwrite security in Europe's still important Central Region, while providing a ready capability to move elsewhere if required. Among its other attractions, this sizable posture provides considerable flexibility not only militarily but politically as well. With it, the United States will be able to watch Europe evolve in the confidence that it can remain there in strength if needed or later withdraw further if not. A dominant consideration here is that the U.S. troop presence can always go down at any time during the post-1995 period, but it cannot easily go back up.

A final conclusion is that the other three alternatives examined here, envisioning larger drawdowns and a smaller residual presence, are not as strategically attractive as the DoD plan. To varying degrees, they would fail to serve U.S. policy goals and military requirements in Europe. They do deserve, however, to be kept in mind. If the DoD plan falls victim to political opposition, as is possible, they provide potential fallback positions that would leave at least some U.S. forces in Europe. Additionally, they provide a path to further reductions if Europe and its peripheral areas achieve the kind of enduring stability that no longer mandates a U.S. military presence of the DoD plan's dimensions.

Appendix A
**PERFORMANCE DURING PEACE-TO-CRISIS-TO-WAR
TRANSITIONS: THE KEY TEST FOR FORCE STRUCTURE,
COMMAND ARRANGEMENTS, AND DECISION SUPPORT
SYSTEMS IN USEUCOM**

INTRODUCTION

An absence of crisis equates to success.

— Sir Michael Alexander

This Report takes Sir Michael's terse summary a step further and examines what is needed to restore conditions that may lead to success. The subject is peace-to-crisis-to-war transitions. The focus is on those capabilities that SACEUR and United States Commander-in-Chief, Europe (USCINCEUR) might most value during crisis management transitions.¹ Military capabilities are of particular interest. The objective is to provide a list of those capabilities associated with a representative set of scenarios and to suggest their implications for USCINCEUR and SACEUR. The scenarios are intended to be representative of a much larger set. The larger set would portray future worlds in all their variety. *But the task in this Report is not to specify all or most conceivable scenarios. It is to specify a set that will help senior commanders identify most of the capabilities needed to respond in crisis and war.*

This sketch of objectives and focus suggests four parts to the task at hand:

- Outlining the backdrop common to all scenarios and a typology for defining scenarios;
- Defining an illustrative set of scenarios and possible U.S. and NATO responses;
- Suggesting sets of needed crisis management capabilities;
- Examining scenario-capability pairs to flag the most stressing scenarios and the most used capabilities in crisis management.

These points correspond to the outline of the Report before the reader. The task stops short of comparing the capabilities of the current NATO and U.S. force, command, and crisis management structures ("supply") to the needed capabilities ("demand"). This lack of completeness is accepted because research time and resources are not adequate to do more, and because the responsible military staffs can conduct a better comparative analysis than the author can. The approach is sufficiently flexible to permit adaptation by the user community: Scenarios can be added or modified, possible U.S. and NATO responses changed, additional required capabilities identified and prioritized, and side-by-side comparisons with current capabilities made.

¹While crisis *avoidance* is usually preferred over crisis *management*, the emphasis in this paper is on the latter. My reasoning is that a military system that functions well in crisis management will also function well in crisis avoidance. The reverse is more problematic.

Many analysts have studied the transition problem. Regrettably, given the perishability of such analysis and the headlong rush of events since mid-1989, much of this analysis is not relevant to the conditions now emerging in Europe.² In the old NATO context, much alliance planning focused on crisis detection (e.g., warning) and crisis avoidance (e.g., signaling and negotiations) rather than crisis management (e.g., realistic political-military exercises) to respond to a Soviet threat. While that reasonably understood, and in some respects comfortable, threat has not disappeared, it has been largely replaced by what might be best called a set of uncertainties that could be inimical to NATO or U.S. interests.

This uncertainty is palpable in the London Declaration of June 1990 and in the subsequent NATO Council (Brussels) communiqué of December 1991. Those documents lead one to believe the Cold War is over, but at the same time they argue that it is too soon to take our eyes off Russia's potential for future mischief.³ With the transformation, if not disappearance, of the Soviet threat, the alliance is faced with a hodgepodge of actual and potential problems in Eastern Europe, the Middle East, and North Africa. The continued utility of the old concepts, systems, and other tools of crisis management tailored to the Soviet threat is problematic.

For example, the old crisis transition toolbox was fashioned to respond to the threat (or fact) of a Soviet theater strategic operation (TSO) under a wide range of warning times, optimistic political decision times, and somewhat questionable assumptions about timely and effective NATO response. Crisis management was given less attention in planning than was crisis avoidance. Crisis management plans and exercises raised all sorts of unpleasant questions that held the potential for dividing the alliance. De-escalation was not addressed at all because the escalation process itself was not taken very seriously except in the (now defunct) biennial NATO exercise on crisis management.

In today's circumstances, the Russians are just one of several potential threats to NATO security and to many a not very plausible one at that. To the degree that the Russian threat is taken seriously (and prudent military leaders must do so) this threat is based on extended warning times that permit timely mobilization or reconstitution of forces. The other threats or uncertainties are usually described in ominous (but not very specific) terms such as "unrest in Eastern Europe," "out of area contingencies," and "the increased importance of the Mediterranean to NATO planning." Because these "other" contingencies have been so poorly defined, to say nothing of understood, we will spend much of this Report describing what we think is a not implausible set of scenarios as a basis for planning.

DEFINING AND SCREENING THE SCENARIOS

The essence of a national security strategy is to prepare for a wide range of plausible contingencies, not just the immediate crises of today.

—Fred Ikle and Turumasa Nakamishi⁴

²RAND has done extensive work on the analysis of crisis management. But, there are many others who have studied the subject. Among the better known are Herman Kahn, Richard Betts, Bruce Blair, Paul Bracken, Alexander George, and Scott Sagan.

³This tension is also apparent in the difficulties being experienced at three NATO echelons in crafting a replacement for the current NATO strategies reflected in MC 14/3.

⁴"Japan's Grand Strategy," *Foreign Affairs*, Summer 1990, p. 86.

The question of plausibility always raises problems. We tend to be most comfortable with contingencies that are a clear projection of current concerns (e.g., the breakup of Yugoslavia) or a repetition of contingencies past (e.g., El Dorado Canyon, Desert Storm) rather than with contingencies that appear unlikely or otherwise challenge the current conventional wisdom. In this subsection, some contingencies in each category are defined. The purpose is not to be predictive, but rather to provide a multifaceted frame of reference for use in defining associated needed crisis management capabilities. The reader is invited to substitute his or her own scenario where those described seem unsatisfactory. In addition the reader is asked to extend the framework used to encompass classes of scenarios that have been overlooked.

Gerd Krell has suggested that all European scenarios could be put in one of two categories: those in which the USSR is involved and those in which it is not.⁵ While a useful focusing device—particularly during the Cold War—this categorization doesn't carry us very far today. Johan Holst has provided an expanded scenario typology that encourages examination of the more detailed set of possibilities set out in Table A.1.⁶

In assessing his categorization, Holst observes:

We are not in a position to assign probabilities to the clusters, nor do we claim that they are equally probable. We shall not attempt to identify any class of contingency as the design case. *The alliance will have to develop force postures and crisis management procedures for dealing with a broad spectrum of contingencies, designing around the uncertainties rather than attempting to reduce them.*⁷

Fair enough, but that is not adequate for the purposes of this paper. Moreover, Holst omits some classes of scenarios that are likely to be important in the future. Accordingly, his typology has been expanded by adding several categories in the outline that follows. That outline contains an exemplar scenario for each type. With each exemplar, a possible initial U.S. and NATO response is offered.

A Scenario Typology with Exemplars

A. Intimidation Scenarios

1. Soviet show of force against a NATO country. Soviet naval show of force off the Bosphorus as the result of: Turkish refusal to honor a warship transit declaration under the Montreaux Convention; or Turkish supply of arms to Georgian dissidents; or a revolutionary Turkish government's levy of tolls on ships transiting the Straits.
 - *NATO response to Soviet show of force off Bosphorus: Deploy Allied Commander, Europe (ACE) Mobile Force to Turkey, concentrate NATO naval forces in Aegean Sea.*

⁵Krell was commenting on alternative NATO scenario typologies presented during the conference on "NATO Crisis Management in a Changing Europe," held in Brussels on April 2-3, 1990, as part of a larger project conducted jointly by RAND and the RAND/UCLA Center for Soviet Studies.

⁶Johan Jorgen Holst, *Exploring Europe's Future: Trends and Prospects Relating to Security*, RAND, N-3185-CC, September 1990, pp. 48-50. Holst is currently Norway's Minister of Defense.

⁷Holst, emphasis added.

Table A.1
A Typology of Potential Contingencies

A. Intimidation scenarios	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Soviet show of force against NATO countries. 2. Soviet show of force against non-NATO countries in Europe.
B. Fait accompli scenarios	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Rapid Soviet limited military action against NATO countries. 2. Rapid Soviet limited military action against non-NATO countries.
C. Intervention scenarios	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Soviet military intervention in (former) Warsaw Pact countries. 2. Soviet military intervention in neutral countries.
D. Reconstitution scenarios	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Rapid overt Soviet remobilization. 2. Slow covert Soviet remobilization.
E. Soviet turmoil scenarios	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Military suppression of secession attempts. 2. Wars between Soviet nations or union republics.
F. Soviet breakdown scenarios	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Military takeover (Bonapartist solution). 2. Anarchy (warlord system).
G. Internecine warfare scenarios	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Civil wars rooted in ethnic conflicts in Europe. 2. Interstate wars triggered by ethnic conflicts in Europe.
H. Out-of-area scenarios	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Conflicts threatening to spread to Europe (Mideast, the Mahgreb). 2. Conflicts threatening vital Western interests.

- *U.S. response: Deploy Sixth Fleet to eastern Mediterranean and Aegean seas, one USAF tactical fighter squadron to Turkey, speed up foreign military assistance equipment transfers.*
- 2. Soviet show of force against non-NATO country in Europe. Soviet naval show of force and stopping of Swedish merchant vessels in the Baltic as a result of Swedish naval forces sinking Soviet submarine in Swedish territorial waters.
 - *NATO response: Protest by NATO Council of violation of spirit of CSCE, State of Military Vigilance for BALTAP forces.*
 - *U.S. response: Diplomatic protest, reaffirmation of freedom of seas, consultation between defense officials of Sweden and United States over sales of military equipment and the holding of bilateral exercise by U.S. and Swedish Air Forces.*

B. Fait Accompli Scenarios in Europe

1. Rapid Soviet limited military action against NATO country. Soviet seizure of Svalbard (Spitsbergen) to provide improved protection of SSBN bastions after accidental collision between Soviet SSBN and trailing U.S. SSN in Soviet territorial waters; territorial jurisdiction incident on Svalbard itself; or Soviet bombing of Turkish military forces on mutual border on some pretext.

- *NATO response to seizure of Svalbard: Stage of simple alert in AFNORTH, dispatch of forces to Svalbard, DPC discussion of military response to include removing Soviet invading forces and reinforcing Norway.*
 - *U.S. response to seizure of Svalbard: reinforcement of Norway (MEB) and dispatch of forces to Norwegian waters pending Defense Planning Committee (DPC) decision on other actions.*
2. Rapid Soviet limited military action against non-NATO country. Soviet seizure of previously occupied Finnish territory in Gulf of Finland as warning to a new anti-Soviet Finnish government; or mining of Gulf of Finland to prevent escape of flotilla of Soviet warships (manned by dissidents) to the West.
- *NATO response to seizure of Finnish territory: Strong North Atlantic Council (NAC) protest of violation of CSCE, call for convening new CSCE, invocation of selected NATO preventive measures.*
 - *U.S. response to seizure of Finnish territory: Strong diplomatic protest, cancellation of impending summit, offer of military equipment to Finnish government.*

C. Intervention Scenarios

1. Soviet military intervention in former Warsaw Pact states. Soviet armed intervention in Romania to stop the flow of arms to insurgency in Moldavia; or intervention in Slovakia to assist local authorities resisting Czech laws deemed anti-Slovak.⁸
- *NATO response to intervention in Romania: Strong NAC protest about resurrection of Brezhnev Doctrine, stoppage of EC-sponsored economic aid to USSR.*
 - *U.S. response to intervention in Romania: Strong diplomatic protest, stoppage of economic credits to USSR, top-level diplomatic consultation between United States and Romania and Hungary to include consideration of some form of military assistance (equipment and training).*
2. Soviet military intervention in neutral countries. Soviet supply of arms and “volunteer” air squadrons are sent to assist Serbia in exerting control over parts of Croatia and Bosnia and to assist the Yugoslav (i.e., Serb) Navy blockade of ports held by Slovenia (e.g., Rjecka).⁹
- *NATO response: Strong NAC protest, State of Military Vigilance in Allied Forces Southern Europe (AFSOUTH), NATO AWACS deployed to Italy, consideration of economic sanctions against USSR and military assistance to Croatia and Slovenia.*
 - *U.S. response: Strong diplomatic protest, major portion of Sixth Fleet to Adriatic and Ionian seas, USAF squadron at Crotona redeployed to Aviano, advance elements of ready brigade of 82nd Airborne deployed to Vicenza and Livorno.*

⁸A thumbnail sketch of current differences between the Czech government and nationalists in Slovakia is set out in the *Economist*, March 16, 1991, pp. 44–45.

⁹One version of this scenario is described at some length in James Winnefeld and David Shlapak, *The Challenge of Future Nonstandard Contingencies: Implications for Strategy, Planning, Crisis Management, and Forces*, Vol. II, RAND, N-3098/2-DAG, October 1990 (hereinafter Winnefeld and Shlapak), pp. 120–144. See also James Winnefeld *Crisis De-escalation: A Relevant Concern in the “New Europe”?* RAND, N-3153-CC, July 1990, pp. 12–14.

D. Reconstitution Scenarios¹⁰

1. Rapid, overt Soviet remobilization. FRG government provides arms to Baltic nationalists and gives signs of developing its own nuclear weapons to back up a more militarily oriented ostpolitik—perhaps against a backdrop of major internal Soviet unrest.
 - *NATO response: NAC protest at violation of CSCE and Conference on Disarmament in Europe (CDE) accords, DPC declares state of military vigilance and selected measures of simple alert for AFCENT. FRG starts mobilizing and requests return of U.S. Corps and three tactical fighter wings. SACEUR's OPLAN 10002 is updated.*
 - *U.S. response: Post-Cold War version of Reforger/Crested Cap executed. Remainder of USEUCOM 4102 updated. Wartime Host Nation Support (WHNS) agreements activated in AFCENT. U.S. mobilizes 150,000 selected reservists.*
2. Slow covert Soviet remobilization. A reactionary Soviet government dominated by a charismatic new leader determines to “right past wrongs.” It plans to incrementally reestablish its direct control over Eastern Europe by taking advantage of the much reduced U.S. position in Western Europe and the West’s increasing reliance on reserves and reconstitution. Observable CFE and CDE treaty “breakout” delayed as long as possible.
 - *NATO response: Slow response first with selected measures of military vigilance and followed by selected measures of simple alert in AFCENT. NATO dithers as it tries diplomatic means to roll back what appears as incipient Soviet mobilization.*
 - *U.S. response: At FRG request U.S. returns one division and two tactical fighter wings to Germany. Remainder of reinforcing corps in CONUS put on alert. Many bilateral U.S. actions with individual Western allies because of halting NATO response.*

E. Soviet Turmoil Scenarios

1. Military suppression of secession attempts. A bloody put-down of revolutions in the Baltics and Moldavia, together with blockades of the coastlines to prevent Western relief supplies (and perhaps arms) from entering the rebel-held regions.
 - *NATO response: NATO condemnation but little action except in the economic and political spheres. Some measures of increased surveillance and readiness undertaken, but NATO unwilling to take any tangible force deployments or alerting actions.*
 - *U.S. response: Same as NATO.*
2. Wars between Soviet nations or union republics. A rekindled war between Azerbaijani and Armenian republics, with the Soviets providing little more than lip service in keeping order. Some attempts at outside intervention and resupply (Iran and Turkey helping Azerbaijanis, expatriate Armenians funneling aid to Armenia).

¹⁰See Winnefeld for a discussion of this important class of scenarios, pp. 6–12.

- *NATO response: Political condemnation. Token force deployments to Turkey.*
- *U.S. response: Same as NATO plus major land-air-sea exercises with Turkey, including a battalion of the 82nd Airborne and a Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU).*

F. Soviet Breakdown Scenarios

1. **Military takeover.** Charismatic military leader seizes control of Soviet government (on Bonapartist model), bloodily puts down domestic opposition, and gives every indication of getting ready for a foreign adventure in Poland.
 - *NATO response: DPC warning against moving into Poland, some preparatory measures short of State of Military Vigilance, hastily scheduled AFCENT alerting and mobilization exercise, but no major force movements.*
 - *U.S. response: U.S. participates in AFCENT exercise using in-place forces, but updates plans for Reforger/Crested Cap.*
2. **Anarchy.** A secession of the Russian and Byelorussian republics after major labor unrest, bloodily contested elections, and KGB repression by the central government. A multiparty civil war ensues between the related constabularies and sympathizers on many sides. The Red Army is too divided to intervene effectively (often the troops go over to rebellious elements). Local war lords seize power in some areas.
 - *NATO response: Expresses concern to all Soviet factions about custody of nuclear weapons, but otherwise takes neutral stance toward conflict.*
 - *U.S. response: Same as NATO except U.S. increases surveillance of Soviet nuclear weapons sites and forces and brings up readiness of own nuclear forces a notch.*

G. Internecine Warfare Scenarios¹¹

1. **Civil wars rooted in ethnic conflicts in Europe.** A Yugoslav civil war that pits Croatia and Slovenia against Serbia and Macedonia, with outside states attempting to supply their client factions.¹²
 - *NATO response: Attempts to arrange cease-fire and UN mediation, warns against outside intervention, NATO AWACS to Italy, selected measures of State of Military Vigilance in AFSOUTH.*
 - *U.S. response: Same as NATO except some units of Sixth Fleet moved into Adriatic and Ionian Seas. Considers sending arms to Croatian and Slovenian factions.*
2. **Interstate wars triggered by ethnic conflicts in Europe.**¹³ A Turkish invasion of Bulgaria's ethnic Turkish districts; or a Yugoslav (principally Serb) invasion of

¹¹The best recent catalog of ethnic and cross national problems in Eastern Europe that could lead to conflict scenarios is in Daniel N. Nelson's "Europe's Unstable East," in *Foreign Policy*, No. 88, Spring 1991, pp. 137-158. Some of the tensions that Nelson cites are seldom discussed in the Western press.

¹²A very senior retired officer who often participates in War College and "Think Tank" war games remarked to the author that he had never seen any of the many games involving a civil war in Yugoslavia result in NATO or U.S. intervention, even in cases where there was substantial Soviet involvement.

¹³See Winnefeld, p. 14.

Albania to cut off arms and supplies to ethnic Albanians living in Kosovo; or border skirmishes between Hungarian and Romanian security forces in Transylvania.

- *NATO response to Turkish invasion of Bulgaria: NATO disavowal of Turk action as "lying outside the Charter." Offers of mediation and "good offices" but no military actions.*
- *U.S. response: Same as NATO plus threat to cut off military aid to Turkey. Attempt to coordinate U.S. and Soviet diplomatic actions to reduce threat of intervention by either. No U.S. force movements. Some examination of U.S. peacekeeping options.*

H. Out-of-area Scenarios¹⁴

1. **Conflicts threatening to spread to Europe. A new Israeli-Syrian war (with chemical weapons) with U.S. and Soviet involvement¹⁵**
 - *NATO response: Generally hands off while condemning both sides. Some consideration of responding to Turkish requests for deployment of ACE Mobile Force to Turkey to protect Turkish neutrality. Few bases and facilities made available to U.S. forces involved.*
 - *U.S. response: Shipment of weapons and supplies to Israel, movement of Sixth Fleet to eastern Mediterranean to protect lines of communication to Israel; readiness increased to deploy ground and air forces to Israel if level of Soviet involvement warrants.*
2. **Conflicts threatening vital Western interests. Attempted overthrow of Saudi monarchy by Muslim fundamentalists supported by Iran; or, same for Egypt.¹⁶**
 - *NATO response to Saudi coup attempt: Wait and see.*
 - *U.S. response to Saudi coup attempt: Rapid response to Saudi government's request for assistance, including introduction of airborne and Marine units to protect oil fields and terminals from destruction and to deter intervention by outsiders. U.S. efforts assisted by other Persian Gulf allies. USEUCOM provides some ground and air units.*

I. Peacekeeping Scenarios

1. **Conflict among NATO members. Limited Greek-Turkish hostilities over Cyprus or air space violations in the Aegean; or riots in Algeciras that spill over into Gibraltar and lead to Spanish threats to restore peace to the area by temporarily occupying Gibraltar.**
 - *NATO response to Greek-Turkish hostilities: NATO provides peacekeeping forces and sponsors mediation. Peacekeeping forces man air control centers in Aegean Sea, and NATO standing naval force squadron patrols waters between adversaries.*

¹⁴See Winnefeld, pp. 14–16.

¹⁵See Winnefeld and Shlapak for an extended description of the Syrian scenario, pp. 145–168.

¹⁶See Winnefeld and Shlapak, pp. 4–39.

- *U.S. response to Greek-Turkish hostilities: Participates in NATO effort and threatens weapons and other aid cutoff to both parties if mediation or peacekeeping fails. USEUCOM provides special communications, air, and logistic support to peacekeeping forces.*
2. Other peacekeeping in which NATO might be involved. Slovenia and Croatia invite NATO to send peacekeeping force to Yugoslavia; Serbia prefers UN or nonaligned force.
 - *NATO response: Provide peacekeeping force to match UN force with both forces patrolling conflict areas together. UN and NATO Secretaries General coordinate actions of both forces.*
 - *U.S. response is to support NATO peacekeeping effort and provide specialized communications, air, and logistics support.*

J. NATO Member Involved in Major Out of Area Contingency

1. U.S. involvement. Desert Shield/Desert Storm.¹⁷
 - *NATO and U.S. responses: As in 1990–1991.*
2. Other NATO member in major out of area involvement. Spain defends its coastal enclaves on Mediterranean against Muslim fundamentalist volunteers originating in Morocco and Algeria; or France in Chad; or Britain in Falklands; or U.S. in Panama.
 - *NATO response to attack on Spanish Morocco: Cannot agree. No concerted NATO, EC, or WEU action.*
 - *U.S. response to attack on Spanish Morocco: Pleas for both sides to end hostilities, some movement of U.S. naval and air forces to remove U.S. nationals.*

K. NATO Member Involved in Responding to Major Terrorist Threat

1. U.S. involvement.
 - (a) Libyan-based terrorists use poison gas against U.S. military installation in Germany. Hundreds killed or injured including some FRG nationals.¹⁸
 - *NATO and U.S. response: Concerted NATO military action after positively identifying nature of attack. Tripoli seized by combination of ACE Rapid Reaction Corps and the U.S. Sixth Fleet. Democratic government installed and Libya largely disarmed.*
 - (b) Arab group based in Tunisia claims (with some corroboration) to have nuclear weapon located in United States and attempts blackmail of U.S. government, warns NATO to not permit U.S. to use bases on NATO territory.
 - *NATO response: NATO cannot agree on a concerted response.*

¹⁷For a pre-August 1990 version of the Desert Shield scenario based on civil war in Saudi Arabia, see Winnefeld and Shlapak, pp. 4–39.

¹⁸For an alternative version of this scenario, see Winnefeld and Shlapak, pp. 100–119.

- *U.S. response: Special Operations Forces (SOF) attacks (based on Israeli and Egyptian intelligence) against terrorist leadership in Tunisia, Libya, and Lebanon.*
2. Other NATO member involvement. Member of UK royal family assassinated by IRA with clear evidence of involvement by a senior member in the Government of the Republic of Ireland.
 - *NATO response: None, as UK threatens blockade of the Republic of Ireland unless perpetrators handed over. Many NATO members agree with UK response, but others are strongly opposed.*
 - *U.S. response: Reluctantly supports UK action diplomatically, while attempting to act as mediator. No military actions undertaken.*

L. Major Natural, Population, or Industrial Disaster

1. U.S. involvement. Reactor meltdown on U.S. submarine in Italian port; or providing relief to the Kurds.
 - *NATO response to meltdown: Massive relief and damage-limiting response with Italian government coordinating relief efforts.*
 - *U.S. response to meltdown: Major role in both relief and damage-limiting efforts. Specialized U.S. industrial and military nuclear material handling capabilities employed. USCINCEUR and the U.S. Atomic Energy Agency jointly manage containment efforts and provide point of contact with Italian government.*
2. Other NATO member involvement. Earthquake in Central Turkey with hundreds of thousands of deaths and inability of central government to provide necessary assistance; exploitation of disorder by ethnic Kurds who set up Kurdish republic in Southeast Turkey.
 - *NATO response: Major EC relief effort, protected by elements of ACE Rapid Reaction Corps against Kurdish insurgents.*
 - *U.S. response: contribute to NATO effort and provide specialized disaster relief capabilities in communications, air, and logistics support. Engineers from all services create a new port in Southern Turkey and a Ground Line of Communication (GLOC) to the hardest hit regions.*

Some Observations on the Scenarios

Table A.2 suggests that perhaps the most remarkable feature of these scenarios in the aggregate is that only a third require either NATO or U.S. military actions beyond some alerting and minor precautionary force movement. While this may be an accident of scenario selection, it probably also says something about the probability of major force deployments and application in the post-Cold War environment.

As Table A.3 indicates, another noteworthy feature of the selected scenarios is their rapid development from peace to crisis and the need for fast deployment and occasional employment of flexible forces. Finally, it should be noted that there is still substantial scope for

Table A.2
Military Response by Scenario
(Number of Scenarios)

	No Significant Response	Alerting, Preps (No Deploy)	Small Force Deployments	Major Force Deployments
NATO response	8	5	6	5
U.S. response (same as NATO)	3	2	4	5
U.S. unilateral response (minimal NATO)	—	1	3	6
Total	11	8	13	16

Table A.3
Rapidity of Scenario Development from Peace to Crisis
(Number of Scenarios)

	Hours	Days	Weeks	Months
Soviet involvement	—	3(1)	7(4)	2(1)
No Soviet involvement	4(3)	6(5)	2(1)	—

unilateral U.S. action in the USEUCOM and adjacent AORs even with a greatly changed Soviet threat.

NEEDED CRISIS MANAGEMENT CAPABILITIES

These capabilities could be categorized in several different ways: by phase of a crisis, by priority, by command function, by command organization, or by whether or not the focus is process (e.g., indications and warning) or output (e.g., moving the Fifth Corps into the Eastern FRG).¹⁹ This Report documents an approach that focuses on command and control processes and on outputs. The reader will note some redundancy and overlap of required capabilities. Some of this was unavoidable and reflects the complexity of the problem addressed as much as a lack of time to conduct an analysis in detail. There is good reason to believe the list of needed capabilities is incomplete as well. The reader is invited to extend the list to cover important omissions.

While the focus in developing this list has been on USEUCOM (U.S. European Command) needs in meeting national requirements, it is apparent that many entries apply to NATO crisis management as well. Further development of the NATO dimension is left to future analysis.

¹⁹In its early work on this subject, the staff at USEUCOM Headquarters used a combination of phase (e.g., stabilization) and function (e.g., operational concept development) to define needed capabilities. The Report before the reader uses a scenario-based architecture that examines both process and output. Both approaches have merit. The approach documented here is intended to complement the Headquarters' analysis.

Processes That Define Needed Capabilities

A. Political-Military (pol-mil) Consultation

1. The ability to rapidly compute and project force deployment times and likely combat outcomes in a manner that reflects all important decision and performance variables, and that is understandable to political authorities.
2. The ability to assess political courses of action (including cease-fires and withdrawal/stand-down of forces) for military implications and test for feasibility.
3. The ability to suggest military courses of actions that are feasible and define the enabling political decisions that are necessary for execution.²⁰
4. The ability to assess warning indicator flags and portray downside risk of failure to act for political authorities.
5. The ability to keep political authorities abreast of unfolding military developments and provide military assessments of their implications.²¹
6. The ability to understand the interface between political and military responsibilities and authorities and devise modalities that meet the minimum requirements of each.
7. The precrisis establishment and maintenance of communication, liaison, and informal channels that facilitate the exchange of information and advice between political and military authorities.²²
8. The ability to assess proposals tabled during negotiations with allies, neutrals, and adversaries.
9. The ability to inform political authorities about acceptable confidence-building measures and those that hazard U.S. interests or the safety of U.S. forces.
10. The ability to assess the military cost or benefit of NATO "preventive measures" (a set of options compiled by NATO's Political Committee for signaling or other responses in crisis).

B. Intelligence

1. The ability to rapidly and effectively deploy and focus theater intelligence assets on a crisis area and to develop requests for support from national assets.
2. The ability to obtain allied intelligence support in areas or functions in which U.S. regional and national assets are deficient.
3. In-depth knowledge of the military and paramilitary command structures, forces, and leading figures for all states in USEUCOM AOR (Area of Responsibility).
4. A formal warning system that goes beyond the current Soviet threat oriented systems.²³

²⁰The best layman's description of this system is in *The Joint Staff Officer's Guide*, AFSC Pub. 1.

²¹Niblack, pp. 57-58.

²²Ibid., pp. 175-178

²³Winnefeld, pp. 12-13, 15-18.

C. Planning

1. A catalog of contingency scenarios oriented to short, mid, and long terms.
2. The ability to rapidly develop concept plans (CONPLANS) for a range of scenarios.
3. The ability to display all enabling political and military decisions (their priority and the preferred order of occurrence) necessary to execute or adjust an operation order.
4. The ability to project forces rapidly to meet NATO war plans when a national operations order is executed and vice versa.
5. The ability to rapidly craft a set of responses applicable to a given set of circumstances and test them against the political guidance provided and the need to protect our own forces.²⁴
6. The ability to preserve U.S. flexibility for unilateral action using forces based on territory of NATO allies.
7. The ability to provide backup or fillers (from CONUS) when U.S. must pull forces out of multinational formations to perform national tasks.
8. The ability to plan for ground-air operations in Eastern Europe.
9. The development of a catalog of military response options (the U.S. equivalent of MC 294), expanded to include non-Soviet threats.
10. The ability to rapidly retrieve all relevant documented analysis associated with specified contingencies (e.g., Soviet reentry into Poland, Soviet mobilization).

D. Command and Control (Direction of Operations)

1. The ability to perform all functions inherent in the Joint Chiefs of Staff's (JCS) Crisis Action Procedures (CAP) [includes staff, organization, planning tools, information support, and communications].
2. The ability to portray force status of enemy, own, and allied forces in an integrated form.²⁵
3. The ability to conduct combined operations with the forces of non-NATO states in the USEUCOM AOR.
4. The ability to adjust plans rapidly during execution, insuring that all relevant information is developed for the commander and for forwarding to political authorities.
5. The ability to monitor decisions and actions during ongoing crisis action planning and operations.
6. A continuing appraisal of the escalation potential of unfolding military operations.

²⁴Niblack, pp. 167-169. See also W. Hays Parks, "Righting the Rules of Engagement," *U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings*, Vol. 115/5, May 1989, pp. 83-93.

²⁵Integrated display of order-of-battle (OOB) information plagues many DoD exercises and combat operations. Part of the problem lies in the fact that J-2 compiles adversary OOB information and J-3 maintains own force displays. During the early phase of Desert Shield, the J-3 on the Joint Staff (Washington, D.C.) had difficulty getting the OOB for allied forces in the field because the responsibility for collecting that information was not clearly defined.

7. The ability to deploy NATO-committed forces for U.S. national missions in USEUCOM, or to support another CINC.
8. The ability to establish rapidly the necessary command structure for special force packages, command structures that provide for clear military command chains while remaining responsive to detailed political direction in crisis.²⁶
9. The ability to rapidly and smoothly expand the USEUCOM command structure to accommodate a major reinforcement from CONUS, with minimal disruption of NATO interfaces and existing chains of command.
10. The ability to rapidly marshal the relevant crisis information needed for the commander's decision in crisis—identifying the important decisions, the information needed to make them, where the information resides, how to get it, how to present it to best facilitate assessment and decision. This information must go far beyond the militarily relevant and provide the political, economic, and diplomatic context that frame the decision.

E. Communications

1. The ability to interface with communications of forces of East European and other non-NATO states (including the former USSR).
2. The ability to deploy major communications nodes to support peacekeeping or relief operations.
3. The ability to communicate directly with U.S. embassies, consulates, and important delegations interacting with allies and adversaries.
4. The ability to communicate directly with national and international relief agencies in the field.
5. The ability to adjust communications load in crises and to access backup systems to reduce overloads.
6. The ability to communicate directly ("hotlines") with military commanders of potential enemies during ambiguous crisis situations (an extension of Dangerous Military Activities agreement to CINC headquarters). [Note: Although this is a communications capability, the decision to set up such a system and use it would probably be more related to operations direction and pol-mil consultation functions than communications.]

F. Public Affairs

1. The ability to understand the interface between dissemination of information to the public and the media and shaping the responses of an adversary in crisis. Public affairs conduits are a means to communicate with the enemy during a crisis.
2. The ability to exploit media sources to extend the reach of intelligence sources during a crisis.

²⁶Some will quarrel with the need to be responsive to "detailed" political direction in crisis. Suffice it to say, detailed direction has been given in many past crises and probably will be given in the future as well. It is prudent to plan accordingly.

3. The ability to assess the public affairs impact of military decisions during ongoing military operations.

Outputs That Define Needed Capabilities

G. Force Deployments

[Note: all deployment times are illustrative]

1. The ability to deploy a heavy corps and support from CONUS to Germany in 30 days.
2. The ability to deploy a second heavy corps and support from CONUS to Germany in 60 days.
3. The ability to deploy the heavy corps and support from Germany to the Middle East or North Africa in 30 days.
4. The ability to deploy a brigade to Turkey, Norway, or Eastern Europe in five days.
5. The ability to deploy a heavy division and its support to Turkey in 15 days.
6. The ability to deploy a tactical fighter wing or composite wing and support to Turkey or the Middle East in five days.
7. The ability to deploy a brigade-sized peacekeeping force to central or southern Europe in 15 days. The brigade would have the necessary language skills and specialized communications support.
8. The ability to redeploy a brigade from in-theater to any part of USEUCOM AOR in five days.
9. The ability to move the FRG-based heavy corps from casernes in western FRG to Oder-Neisse in ten days.
10. The ability to stage U.S. air forces in CONUS and western FRG into air fields in eastern FRG in three days.

H. Logistics and Support

1. The ability to receive and provide support in Germany for two reinforcing corps from CONUS.
2. Prepositioned equipment for at least two heavy corps in Europe.
3. Prepositioned equipment for one heavy division in southern Europe (could also be used in Middle East or Southwest Asia).
4. The ability to rapidly deliver and turnover military equipment and supplies to allies or relief organizations.

A CROSSWALK BETWEEN SCENARIOS AND NEEDED CAPABILITIES

From the admittedly incomplete list of scenarios set out above and the similarly incomplete list of required crisis management capabilities developed, it is possible to gain some appreciation of the most system-stressing (not the most likely, or necessarily the most important)

scenarios and those crisis management capabilities that are most often needed. The matrices shown in Tables A.4 and A.5 offer one set of judgments about where capabilities and scenarios intersect. As indicated earlier, both axes of the matrices are expandable and the various entries along each axis can be changed to suit the user. Moreover, instead of the simple "x" in each cell, a more thorough analysis might insert measures of importance and other descriptive data. In effect, each cell is an entry point for further analysis. The trick is to determine which cells are most important in terms of scenario likelihood or importance and in terms of *current* capabilities.

Obviously, some method is needed to "prune" the matrix to a workable size to fit the staff resources available. The distribution of x's in Table A.4 offers one starting point for this effort. Based on a simple totaling along the columns and rows of the table, one might conclude that the ten most stressing scenarios from a process standpoint are:

- A1 Russian show of force against Turkey.
- A2 Russian show of force against Sweden.
- B1 Russian action against Norway (Svalbard).
- C2 Russian intervention in a Yugoslavian civil war.
- D1 Fast, overt Russian mobilization.
- D2 Slow, covert Russian mobilization.
- F1 Russian military coup by junta with adventurist tendencies.
- G1 A civil war in Yugoslavia (no major outside intervention).
- H1 An Israeli-Syria war with Russian and U.S. involvement.
- H2 Seizure of the Saudi oilfields by an unfriendly power or domestic group in Saudi Arabia.

When describing these as "stressing scenarios," I mean that they bring into play the greatest *range* of crisis management capabilities. Other scenarios may be as stressful in the sense that they require a more *intense* use of a smaller set of capabilities. A chemical or nuclear terrorism scenario comes to mind (scenario K1).

Looking at the table vertically, one sees some confirmation of the obvious. The top 20 needed process capabilities include some that are not only fundamental to crisis management but are part and parcel of the USEUCOM staff's daily business.²⁷

- A2 Assessing political courses of action for military implications.
- A3 Developing feasible military courses of action and defining associated enabling political decisions.
- A4 Making a warning assessment, portraying for civilian authorities the downside risk of failure to act.
- A5 Informing political authorities about military developments and their implications.

²⁷These capabilities are not shown in order of importance. Merely adding up the "hits" in the columns is only one way to measure criticality or robustness. Many needed capabilities not on the list, having just barely missed the arbitrary top 20 cutoff.

- A6 Understanding the interface between political and military responsibilities and authorities and devising modalities that meet requirements of each.
- A7 Maintenance of channels to exchange information with political and diplomatic authorities (formal and informal).
- A8 Ability to rapidly assess proposals for military implications during negotiations.
- B1 Deploying and focusing intelligence assets on crisis area and requesting support from national assets.
- B2 Obtaining allied intelligence support.
- B3 Information on military forces, capabilities, command structures, and key personnel for states in USEUCOM AOR.
- B4 Developing a formal warning system that goes beyond current threat-oriented systems.
- C1 A catalog of contingency scenarios oriented to short, mid-, and long term, and a first-order understanding of their implications for military planning.
- C2 Capability of rapidly developing CONPLANS for a wide range of scenarios.
- C5 Ability to rapidly craft ROE that meet political and military criteria.
- D1 The ability to perform all functions inherent in JCS's CAP (to degree not covered elsewhere in this listing).
- D6 Assessing escalation potential of contemplated or unfolding military operations.
- E5 The ability to adjust communications load in a crisis and to access backup systems to reduce overloads.
- F1 Understanding interface between dissemination of information (public affairs) during a crisis and shaping adversary responses.
- F2 Exploiting media information and sources to extend intelligence reach during crises.
- F3 Ability to assess the public affairs impact of military decisions during planning and operations phases.

RECOMMENDATIONS

This Report has demonstrated one way to a better understanding of the capabilities that are needed to help manage the transitions from peace to crisis to war—and back. The scenarios and the needed capabilities are illustrative, neither necessarily accurate nor complete. Even if they were accurate and complete, there remains important work to be done in the matrix shown in Table A.4. The important cells need to be identified and then expanded to develop more detailed knowledge on the specific nature of scenario-oriented requirements. The next step is to compare these requirements with capabilities as demonstrated in actual analogous operations, exercises, or in desktop analysis. The final step is to develop a plan for remedial action (including work-arounds). This paper has attempted to present an entry point for understanding, planning, and undertaking this work.

Staff actions include:

1. Validate scenarios. Canvas staff and components for important scenarios that have been omitted. Adjust existing scenarios to fit staff perspectives of plausibility. Ensure all existing CONPLAN contingencies are represented or otherwise covered.
2. Prune and prioritize scenarios. Select a subset of scenarios as the focus of crisis management planning (much as the staff has already done in its early analysis of this topic). The subset should be a mixture of the most likely, the most stressing, and the most immediate. Pick scenarios that can “stand in” for others in terms of needed capabilities.
3. Flesh out scenarios (optional). Structure a description of the selected scenarios around transition points such as day-to-day readiness for the onset of crisis, the onset of crisis and the preparation of the commander’s estimate, etc. See Winnefeld and Shlapak for one method of doing this. The only purpose of fleshing out is to assist in identifying the most needed process and output capabilities.
4. Review and list needed capabilities. As presented in this Report, the needed capabilities are placeholders until a more detailed set can be developed by the staff. The output capabilities need particular attention to see if they are consistent with current plans and realistic projections of future requirements (e.g., forces needed, time to close).
5. Adjust scenario/capabilities matrices. This step is an updating of the dimensionality of Tables A.4 and A.5 and marking the important cells.
6. Flesh out a subset of needed capabilities. Select a subset of capabilities using any convenient and appropriate criterion (e.g., number of times appearing in the most important scenarios) and describe the capabilities needed in some detail.
7. Compare needed capabilities with current capabilities. Using the subset identified in step #6, undertake a comparative analysis. This analysis might be structured around the following *process* capabilities:
 - a. Information needed and available.
 - b. Staff expertise needed and available.
 - c. Coordinating interfaces needed and available (e.g., staff interface with U.S. diplomatic missions, foreign intelligence organizations).
 - d. Plans needed and available.
 - e. Projection models needed and available.
 - f. Authorities needed and available (and how to get them).
8. Develop plan for remedial action. This plan should be developed around these organizing principles:
 - a. Actions that can be accomplished within existing command authorities and command resources and those that cannot.
 - b. Actions that require extensive coordination with other echelons and those that do not.

- c. Actions that can be taken now (or soon) and those that require significant additional preparation and planning.
- d. Actions that depend on NATO actions and those that do not.

Appendix B

USEUCOM COMMAND ARRANGEMENTS DURING TRANSITIONS FROM PEACE TO CRISIS TO WAR

INTRODUCTION

The purpose of this Report is to improve our understanding of how one set of U.S. and NATO command structures might function during transitions from peace to crisis to war. A common failing of command structure analysis is inadequate attention to the effects of scenario dynamics. A focus on functions, "wiring diagrams," and organizational theory tends to emphasize static models of structural adequacy at the expense of understanding the effects of changing contexts that lie at the heart of international relations and military operations. While scenario-based analysis does not provide a complete answer to this problem, it does raise many of the relevant questions that can lead to important answers.

Force Structure Assumptions

We assume the United States has transitioned to the Future Year Defense Plan (FYDP) base force by 1995. There is a U.S. corps headquarters in Germany, together with two divisions and associated combat and combat service support. There are three USAF tactical fighter wings distributed between Germany and the United Kingdom. A fourth is in Italy. In the Mediterranean, there is a single carrier battle group and associated support ships, an afloat Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU) and associated amphibious shipping, three submarines, and one maritime air squadron.

These forces are backed up by earmarked reinforcements that include:

- Five active, five reserve, and two reconstitutable Army divisions.
- Eight active and seven reserve USAF tactical fighter or composite wings.
- Four carrier battle groups.

These forces are supported by two POMCUS division sets in Germany and two afloat brigade sets in prepositioning squadrons (APS) usually moored in Turkish waters. There is one Marine brigade set prepositioned in Norway.

U.S. Command Structure Assumptions

We assume that USCINCEUR remains a unified (not subunified) command reporting directly to the National Command Authority (NCA) through the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS). USCINCEUR Headquarters (under the Deputy Commander-in-Chief [DCINC]) is still in Stuttgart. The component commands have been streamlined as follows:

- There is only one numbered Air Force in Europe, and it is collocated with CINCUSAFE at Ramstein.

- The 7th Army staff and functions have been consolidated with USAREUR and the in-place corps command. The U.S. corps commander in theater commands a multinational corps. One U.S. division is attached to a multinational corps commanded by a Bundeswehr officer. One of the U.S. brigades in the Bundeswehr-commanded corps is earmarked for NATO's Rapid Reaction Corps. Considerable streamlining of the Army support structure has taken place—resulting in even greater reliance on the reserve structure for vital combat service support.
- For the Navy, subordinate headquarters have been eliminated and the functions have been taken on by the Commander-in-Chief U.S. Navy, Europe (CINCUSNAVEUR). The headquarters in London has been closed as an economy measure and the staff moved to Naples. COMFAIRMED (double-hatted CO, NAS Sigonella) reports to the commander of the Sixth Fleet.

We assume that all U.S. headquarters staffs remaining in Europe, including USEUCOM Headquarters, have been reduced to 50 percent of their 1990 strength. These reductions include U.S. civilian staff members and foreign-hire personnel assigned to staff support duties. Staff augmentees are all in the reserve structure. However, shortages of funds and the limited availability of reserve staff have precluded any significant or extended exercising on site in Europe.

NATO Command Structure Assumptions

We assume that Central Army Group (CENTAG) and Northern Army Group (NORTHAG) have been eliminated and that AFCENT is reorganized to have a "Main Defensive Forces" commander (a U.S. officer), a "Rapid Reaction Forces" commander (UK officer), and an "Augmentation Forces" commander (a Bundeswehr officer).¹ The forces assigned to these three commanders in unalerted peacetime conditions include five multinational army corps: two FRG, one U.S., one Belgian, one Rapid Reaction (UK).² Except for the Rapid Reaction Corps, all of these forces depend heavily on reserves and mobilization. French forces remain outside the NATO command structure, though there are some unwritten agreements with NATO commanders as to the future role of those forces in the defense of Western Europe.

The Rapid Reaction Corps is comprised of four divisions: two UK and two multinational. As indicated earlier, an American brigade is attached to one of the multinational divisions. The Corps is supported by two UK, two Luftwaffe, and two USAF tactical fighter wings and supporting elements.

Two and four ATAF have been eliminated and the functions assumed by the Commander, Allied Air Forces, Central Europe (COMAAFCE).³ Under COMAAFCE, air defense, strike,

¹This nomenclature is that used by the chairman of the Military Committee in categorizing NATO's ground forces in AFCENT. Although unmentioned here, there would also be a border or screening force commander in eastern Germany along the Oder-Neisse (probably the double-hatted commander of the Bundeswehr Eastern Command).

²This designation of the corps refers to the nationality of the corps commander and the bulk of the headquarters staff. There are several different multinational corps organizational concepts under consideration. The details are not addressed in this paper.

³There are a number of other possible variations. COMAAFCE could be eliminated or folded into the AFCENT headquarters, while retaining a single ATAF organization. Alternatively COMAAFCE could be strengthened by making him a major subordinate commander answerable to SACEUR for all NATO land-based air forces. My point

and support commands have been established. Moreover, he has been given the mission to provide major allied air force support to CINCNORTH and CINCSOUTH when directed. AAFCE has become in effect a swing force that can redeploy forces to support CINCNORTH or CINCSOUTH when needed.

In AFSOUTH and AFNORTH command arrangements remain about as they are now. LANDJUT (Allied Land Forces Schleswig-Holstein and Jutland) is abolished. Danish land forces are placed under the Augmentation Force Commander.

Scenario Cases

We examine four scenarios:

1. Regeneration of Soviet threat to Central Europe.
2. Redeployment of USEUCOM forces to support the U.S. Commander-in-Chief Central (USCINCENT).
3. U.S. forces from CONUS deployed within a redefined USEUCOM AOR.
4. Deployment of NATO forces to reinforce Turkey.

In each scenario, we sketch the important events to act as a backdrop to describe and assess activation and modification of command arrangements in ACE and in USEUCOM. In effect we are *testing* the force and command structures of ACE and USEUCOM during the transitions to probe for weaknesses and develop recommendations for planning and command structures.

REGENERATION OF SOVIET THREAT TO CENTRAL EUROPE

The political backdrop for this scenario is left for others to devise. Suffice it to say, the Soviet leadership has decided to reenter Western Europe. Its plan is to invade Poland and Czechoslovakia to "defend those East European states from German aggression." Depending on the NATO reaction, the Soviets are prepared to go further west into the former German Democratic Republic (GDR).

- | | |
|--------|--|
| Day 0 | Secret Soviet mobilization and force movement starts under cover of "exercise preparations" and mobilizing selected units to "deter domestic unrest" in the USSR. |
| Day 10 | U.S. and NATO see unambiguous signs of major Soviet mobilization and force movement. |
| Day 15 | At SACEUR's request, DPC orders State of Military Vigilance. Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) requests and the United States agrees to return of dual-based forces (B Corps and TFWs). ⁴ |

here is that it is unlikely that the current air organization in AFCENT will remain as it is today. There will be some consolidation and reorganization.

⁴We use letter designations for U.S. Army Corps to avoid confusion. Thus, the in place corps in Germany (probably the V Corps under current planning) would be "A Corps." The second corps to arrive in theater would be "B Corps," and so on.

- Day 17 First reinforcing USAF TFW arrives in FRG. The buildup rate for USAF forces is shown in Figure B.1.
- Day 18 DPC orders selected measures of Stage of Simple Alert.
- Day 20 Two USAF TFWs arrive in FRG from CONUS and are chopped to 17th Air Force.
One USAF TFW arrives in UK from CONUS.
3rd Air Force activated in UK (formed from active and reserve USAF units in CONUS).
A Corps chops to NATO's Commander Main Battle Forces commander. The buildup rate for U.S. Army forces is shown in Figure B.2.
One CVBG arrives in Mediterranean and chops to commander Sixth Fleet (two CVBGs now on station).
- Day 25 Two USAF TFWs arrive in UK and are chopped to 3rd Air Force.
B Corps personnel complete movement to FRG and chop to CINCUSAREUR (linking up with POMCUS).
Two CVBGs (under SACLANT opcon) arrive in North Sea ready to accept air tasking from AAFCE.
- Day 30 Two USAF TFWs arrive in FRG.
C Corps starts to arrive in Germany via fast sealift and airlift.
2nd MEF(-) arrives in Denmark via amphibious lift.
CG 17th Air Force becomes CINCUSAFE, while former CINCUSAFE becomes full-time AAFCE commander.
- Day 35 B Corps chops to NATO's Main Battle Forces commander.
DEPCINCUSAREUR becomes acting CINCUSAREUR as the CINC takes on full-time duties as NATO's Commander Main Defensive Forces.
C Corps completes sea/air movement, chops to USAREUR, starts linking up with its equipment.
Two USAF TFW arrive in Netherlands and another in France.
- Day 40 Two USAF TFW arrive in FRG from CONUS.
- Day 45 Soviets invade Poland and Czechoslovakia. Meet token resistance. Soviet sympathizers, assorted hardliners come out in open.
C Corps chops to NATO's Augmentation Forces commander while "gaining" a Bundeswehr reserve division.
Four NATO corps under command of Main Defense Forces Commander, and including two U.S. corps (A and B) move into eastern Germany and take up positions near the Polish border.
Two USAFE TFW move forward into bases in East Germany, and two TFW arriving from CONUS take their places at West German bases.
- Day 50 Reserve divisions start to arrive in NATO ports from the United States. Some priority units arrive by airlift.
NATO forces invited into Czechoslovakia to check Soviet advance.
- Day 55 Air combat operations commence between NATO and Soviet air forces.




Figure B.1—Illustrative Expansion of USAF Forces in Europe
(TFW Only)

In this scenario, arriving U.S. forces brought most of their command structure with them. It quickly became apparent that the greatly reduced (50 percent of current levels) USAFE staff was inadequate to support its commander in chief during the transition. Moreover, the commander in chief himself was overcommitted. Accordingly, the CINC assumed full-time duties as COMAAFCE and turned over his USAFE duties to commander 17th Air Force. An additional numbered Air Force was set up quickly in the UK. In this example, USAFE was well served by having a numbered air force in theater to oversee the details of reinforcement and readiness changes. Moreover, the 17th Air Force commander could logically fill in (at least temporarily) for the former CINCUSAFE now devoting full time to NATO duties.




Figure B.2—Illustrative Expansion of U.S. Army Forces in Europe (Major Combat Units Only)

CINCUSAREUR was faced with similar problems in trying to perform his national duties while at the same time having a major role to play as NATO's commander Main Defensive Forces. He solved his problem differently (for illustrative purposes in this analysis) by having his deputy act for him in discharging his national duties and becoming a full time NATO commander.

Implications for USEUCOM Command Arrangements

1. A component staff manned at 50 percent of current levels and faced with a fourfold expansion of forces is inadequate to the demands of the situation. Either experienced backup staff support need to be deployed in advance of the force deployment or backup in-place (perhaps cadred) staffs are needed. To be useful, this backup support *must be trained and exercised in Europe in peacetime.*

2. The common perception that forces, not staffs, are needed in crisis situations overlooks an essential point. Planning and phasing of staff formation and movement provides the essential command link that makes force movement and combat effectiveness possible. This is particularly the case when arriving units must fit into multinational structures.
3. The USEUCOM staff, though not mentioned in this scenario time line, performed the essential tasks of dealing both with the U.S. National Command Authority (NCA) and the host nation(s) in support of the components, freeing the component commanders for their combat and force reception duties. Combining a component with a unified command staff compounds rather than solves problems: unclear command lines, inability to expand quickly and rationally, and conflicts of interest.⁵
4. Since CINCUSNAVEUR is in Naples, he is not optimally situated to accept opcon of forces in the North Sea.⁶ If a war is to be fought in northern and central Europe and naval forces have a role, retaining a naval headquarters in that region makes sense, even if it is a cadre organization in peacetime.⁷
5. While there are deployment and logistic problems in redeploying U.S. and NATO forces from West to East Germany, there do not seem to be any command problems.
6. The practice of keeping forces under national command until they are combat ready and deployed is sound.
7. USEUCOM headquarters and component commands serve an absolutely vital function in receiving, moving, and supporting arriving forces during a large force expansion over a short period of time.⁸

Implications for NATO Command Arrangements

NATO command arrangements have been (in theory) optimized and exercised for this type of crisis. However, the response in this case suggests that while "double hatting" national and NATO commanders in peacetime is useful for planning, coordination, and national participation, in transitions to crisis and combat operations, it introduces changes in national military

⁵Experience with Commander-in-Chief, Far East (CINCFE) staff in Korea 1950–1953 and Commander, U.S. Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (COMUSMACV) staff in Vietnam 1965–1972 (both were consolidated unified and component command staffs) illustrates some of these problems. The Desert Shield/Storm experience was mixed. There was a separate Army component command, but the CINC served as his own ground component commander.

⁶Operation of CVBGs in the North Sea or in support of the Central Front has long been problematic. With the U.S. and NATO force reductions in prospect, it is likely that innovations will be required to meet urgent requirements—including some that would be rejected under what passes for normal circumstances.

⁷The reader will recall that the NAVEUR Headquarters in this scenario has removed to Naples. There is no major U.S. naval headquarters in the UK. However, if major naval forces are operating in the vicinity of the UK, a shore support headquarters would provide leverage. This headquarters would serve to unload afloat staffs of liaison and support functions (e.g., coordinating U.S. naval operations with those of other NATO navies in the region, arranging for shore-based logistic support (including refueling, rearming, ship repair, replenishment) and intelligence and communications support.

⁸In Desert Shield/Storm (DS/S) the entire USCENTCOM command structure (less CJTFME who was already deployed) had to be deployed to the theater with the deployment of forces. The fact that the massive deployment worked reasonably well overlooks several factors unique to DS/S: the long time line between the initial force deployment and the commencement of combat operations (almost five months), the years of planning preparation time for similar contingencies by a staff that had few other responsibilities, and the fact that CENTCOM deployed a staff element forward to the Gulf before the arrival of major forces. The identification of the lessons from DS/S that may *not* be applicable to future contingencies may be as important as learning those that are applicable.

command leadership at a time when it can be least afforded. There is probably no politically acceptable solution to the problems caused by double hatting. However, those problems suggest attention by national authorities to their plans for replacing commanders who lose their national "hats" to become full-time NATO commanders. Ideally, one would want a fully promotable deputy in place to take over from his commander.⁹

Naval forces operating in support of Commander-in-Chief, Central (CINCENT) would be subordinate to Supreme Allied Commander Atlantic (SACLANT). While both AFSOUTH and AFNORTH have had some experience in integrating carrier air into their regional air operations, AFCENT has had very little in recent years. (Are there U.S. Navy (USN) air operations officers at AAFCE Headquarters?)¹⁰

Enhancing the Ability of the Command Structure to Respond

Going back to the command structure assumed in this scenario, what additions would have improved its ability to transition effectively? I would offer the following:

- Maintain an advanced echelon of the corps and numbered Air Force scheduled for NATO deployment in place in Western Europe—much as is currently done in the case of the III Corps headquarters.¹¹ These skeleton staffs would be the in place interface with local authorities (for HNS), with the NATO commands that they would reinforce, and with the existing component commands. In the interest of economy, these staffs should be collocated with the component command staffs.
- Consider having the first U.S. reinforcing division become part of the existing U.S. commanded multinational corps to assist in the transition to the NATO environment and to exploit existing in-place corps support assets.
- The priority of resourcing in Europe to support or command reinforcing units might be as follows:
 1. POMCUS and war reserve stock caretaker units.
 2. Command staffs (e.g., Army corps headquarters).
 3. Reception and onward movement support.
 4. On site support (mainly combat service support) in Europe.
- If staff and support for reinforcing units is to remain in CONUS, field and command post exercising is a must. Without such exercising (approaching REFORGER/CRESTED CAP magnitude and intensity), the concept of rapid and effective reinforcement is a shell game. Support and command capabilities that are not in place *or* are not exercised realistically

⁹However, Deputy positions are not the assignment "plums" that line command positions are at the same rank. It is arguable whether or not all deputies up and down the chain of command are "promotable" to their principal's assignment. Although data on the matter are sketchy, it seems that bringing in an outsider or promoting a subordinate line commander is more in accord with current practice. The USEUCOM Deputy Commander-in-Chief (DCINC) position is an exception, since plans call for the DCINC to become USCINCEUR at about the time the NATO alliance enters a stage of simple alert and SACEUR/USCINCEUR split.

¹⁰During the height of the Cold War, there was a series of exercises (e.g., Magic Sword) wherein Navy carriers operating in the North Sea or the Bay of Biscay would provide set levels of sorties to AFCENT.

¹¹Under the assumptions used, there were already one corps and numbered Air Force headquarters in Europe at the start of the scenario. The discussion here is about the *initial additional* U.S. corps and numbered Air Force Headquarters scheduled to enter the theater.

frequently do not exist. The five months of preparation and movement time experienced during Desert Shield are not likely to pertain in Europe.

REDEPLOYMENT OF USEUCOM FORCES TO USCENTCOM

This scenario might be a 1995 reprise of Desert Shield/Storm. A key difference would be that the United States and USEUCOM would start from a lower force base. There are several conceivable force combinations in such a scenario:

1. Use of CONUS-based forces, exclusive of USEUCOM forces.
2. Same as #1 plus deployment of NATO/WEU Rapid Reaction Corps.
3. Use of combination of CONUS-based and USEUCOM forces.
4. Use of combination of CONUS-based, USEUCOM, and U.S. Pacific Command (USPACOM) forces.
5. Use of lower readiness CONUS-based forces to backfill in Europe for USEUCOM based forces deployed to the Gulf or Turkey.

To demonstrate an extreme case, in this scenario we assume combination #5 is employed. A corps headquarters, an armored division, and most of the COSCOM in Europe are deployed to the Gulf. A mechanized infantry division remains in Europe as part of an FRG-led multinational corps. After the first surge of forces to the Gulf subsides and it appears the Gulf commitment will be an enduring one, the United States, using CONUS based forces, backfills for the USEUCOM forces deployed to the Gulf.

The carrier battle group in the Mediterranean is redeployed to the Gulf. The Crotona-based USAF tactical fighter wing and non-U.S. NATO naval forces pick up the CVBG commitment. One tactical fighter wing in the FRG is redeployed to Turkey. The redeployed wing is supported by Army base and air defense units deployed from the CONUS.

USEUCOM Command Structure Implications

The U.S. command structure described above appears suitable for the tasks assigned USCINCEUR. A Joint Task Force (JTF) would be set up in Turkey (on the Desert Shield/Storm model) and report to USCINCEUR. The armored division would chop to Army Forces CENTCOM upon arrival in the Gulf. The incoming replacement units from CONUS would chop to USAREUR on arrival in the FRG.

It is possible that the Gulf conflict could spill over into the Mediterranean. In that eventuality and in the absence of a NATO response, it might be appropriate to establish a JTF in the Mediterranean under USCINCEUR. The JTF would direct the operations of the Crotona-based wing and residual U.S. Navy forces in the Mediterranean, as well as providing a single point of contact with non-U.S. NATO forces covering for redeployed U.S. Navy forces. The JTF commander could either be commander Sixth Fleet or the USAF commander at Crotona.¹²

¹²If the wing at Crotona is a composite wing, its commander might become the JTF commander.

I would observe that the component command organization in Europe is, for the most part, more oriented to force support in a NATO war than it is to directing U.S. national operations in a combat environment. Under conditions in which U.S. forces are required to act unilaterally, the JTF organization is probably better than using a component structure for most contingencies.¹³

NATO Command Structure Implications

In the scenario sketched out above the only NATO command structure perturbation is the deployment of the U.S. elements of a U.S.-led multinational corps to the Gulf, leaving the normally assigned FRG division to be reassigned to another corps. However, if the NATO Rapid Reaction Corps were transferred to the Gulf, steps would probably be taken to replace it with mobilized forces in Europe. The Rapid Reaction Corps in the Gulf would probably be placed under the coalition force commander. SACEUR's relationship with that coalition force commander is not clear.

If the Gulf conflict were to spill over into the Mediterranean, it is likely that NATO would become involved and CINCSOUTH would have member state forces chopped to him. A difficulty would arise if U.S. forces in the Mediterranean had a residual national mission different from that given to CINCSOUTH. For example, if Syria and/or Libya were taking offensive action against U.S. forces or harming U.S. nationals in the region, the United States might take military counteractions at the same time that NATO was content with taking some measures of a stage of simple alert in AFSOUTH. Under these circumstances, it is unlikely that U.S. forces would be chopped to CINCSOUTH.¹⁴

Enhancing the Ability of the Command Structure to Respond

Given the command structure assumed in this scenario, what additions would have improved its ability to transition effectively? I would offer the following:

- Establish and periodically exercise a U.S. JTF organization for the discharge of national missions in the Mediterranean. The current JTF in Turkey provides some of this experience, but its maritime responsibilities are not large. The configuration of the Mediterranean and the need for combined arms application in many plausible contingencies argues for more practice.
- Planning should be undertaken for using mobilized forces to backfill for U.S. forces redeployed from the NATO center to other portions of ACE or to support other CINCs. Part of

¹³Utilization of the JTF as a contingency force commander offers some significant advantages over employment of the component command organization. The JTF commander reports directly to the CINC, not the component. The 1984 Lebanon experience with a cumbersome operational chain of command running through the component led to the greater utilization of the JTF concept for planning and directing operations within a unified command. See Richard Halloran, "Pentagon Moves to Simplify Chain of Command in Beirut," *New York Times*, 23 February 1984. The JTF concept was used by USCINCEUR in the 1986 Libya operation (El Dorado Canyon) and more recently in support of Operations Desert Shield/Storm and Provide Comfort.

¹⁴The question would likely come to a head during consideration of ROE for NATO and U.S. forces. The United States has consistently refused to chop forces to NATO unless NATO ROE were authorized that were consistent with a U.S. commander's responsibility to protect his forces. This and other ROE issues were a consistent feature of successive NATO WINTEX/CIMEX exercises through 1987. Establishing ROE is a DPC, not an MNC or MSC, decision in NATO practice.

this planning is determining how much command structure should be left in place in Europe and how much the backfilling forces should bring with them.

- Plan for the rapid deployment of staff augmentees to Europe to help plan for and manage the redeployment of USEUCOM forces and to support USCINCEUR's ability to engage simultaneously in NATO and U.S. national operations.
- Examine alternative command structures to support NATO in dealing with a Mediterranean contingency, other than a direct threat to Turkey.

U.S. UNILATERAL ACTION IN USEUCOM AREA OF RESPONSIBILITY

In this contingency, we assume no NATO involvement. There is a contingency in the Mediterranean—we will assume U.S. assistance to an Israel under attack from Syria, Jordan, and some factions in Lebanon. The attack has prompted a desperate Israeli response, including an attempt to take Damascus. These actions, in turn have provoked sporadic attacks by Egyptian, Iraqi, and Saudi forces. The United States is responding to Israeli calls for arms, supplies, and line of communication (LOC) protection. The challenge to the United States is similar to that faced during the 1973 war: supporting an ally with few bases in theater.

The Italian government has refused the United States the use of its bases for operations, including air resupply, in support of Israel. Other governments in the Mediterranean have similar, though less stringently applied, policies. As a result, the United States has deployed a tactical fighter wing (from Crotona), supporting elements, and ATBM batteries to Israel to provide cover for the sea and air lines of communications including ports of debarkation. In addition, two CVBGs are deployed to the eastern Mediterranean.

USCINCEUR establishes a JTF headquarters in Israel to coordinate U.S. joint operations and act as a single point of contact with the Israeli government. Combined Task Force (CTF) 61 with two carrier battle groups and some maritime air (based at Royal Air Force (RAF) Akrotiri) is ordered to operate in support of the JTF.¹⁵

USEUCOM Command Structure Implications

Again, a USEUCOM JTF is employed with units provided by all component commanders in the theater, plus some dispatched directly from the United States. No change in U.S. command structure is needed.

If U.S. support of Israel were to expand into active combat operations against targets in nations attacking Israel, more U.S., including USEUCOM, forces would necessarily become involved. If such operations were to continue for long, it might be prudent to have different officers serve as USCINCEUR and SACEUR to more clearly separate NATO and national responsibilities.

¹⁵He could be made the naval component commander of the JTF in Israel, but that option was not exercised in this case. CTF 61 as the largest combat command of the Sixth Fleet has other theater responsibilities, including support of NATO operations. Moreover, the anti-Israeli threat extends the length of the Mediterranean, and it is not feasible to make the JTF commander responsible for LOC protection at great distances from Israel itself.

NATO Command Structure Implications

While the contingency as described is a U.S. national operation, NATO would become involved whether it liked it or not since the combat operations would: occur near ACE's boundaries, involve the use of forces committed to NATO, employ U.S. officers with key NATO responsibilities, and utilize some bases belonging to NATO states. NATO's first reaction is to attempt to stop combat operations, perhaps with an offer of mediation and the supply of peacekeeping forces. However, there is no reason to believe NATO would be any more effective in this role in 1995 than it was in 1973. If the nationals or commerce of NATO states were attacked by the belligerents, it is likely that there would be a NATO response—perhaps using the standing naval force, Mediterranean to escort shipping and NATO AWACs to control and defend air traffic through the region.

If NATO were to become involved militarily, it is likely that its operations would be led by CINCSOUTH. As in the Gulf contingency described earlier, it is unlikely that any significant U.S. forces would be chopped to CINCSOUTH—because of competing national uses for those forces.

Enhancing the Ability of the Command Structure to Respond

The NATO and U.S. military command structures in Europe have never been stressed by the conditions of U.S. engagement in a major conflict close to Europe, with spillover into the ACE AOR. Desert Shield/Storm was not fought in the Mediterranean, and it caused difficulty enough—though some of the difficulties were masked by the long planning horizon between 2 August 1990 and 17 January 1991.

In this and the other scenarios where U.S. forces and staffs have been cut in half, there is a gap between requirements and capabilities that is reflected in the command structure. JTF staffs can be established at the stroke of a pen, but that doesn't make them operational and functional. The NATO responsibilities of U.S. commanders in USEUCOM continue even as U.S. national contingencies unfold. This possibility is one persuasive argument for retaining military operational staffs in USEUCOM at something close to full strength in peacetime and for retaining the capability of conducting U.S. national operations in the theater without unduly disturbing the NATO connection.

NATO REINFORCES TURKEY

In this scenario, Turkey is threatened by either the former USSR or Iraq and NATO decides to deploy reinforcements to the region. The DPC directs SACEUR to deploy the Rapid Reaction Corps to Turkey along with such tactical air forces as the nations agree to send, up to a total of five wings. NATO naval forces are surged to the eastern Mediterranean.

The U.S. contribution to the Rapid Reaction Corps is a mechanized infantry brigade, using equipment stocks from APS moored in Turkish waters and a brigade of the 101st Air Assault Division. Personnel from both units are airlifted to Turkey. The mechanized infantry brigade personnel marry up with their equipment at Iskenderun under cover of an MEU and U.S. carrier aircraft. Izmir, Mersin, Antalya, and other Turkish ports are saturated with shipping transporting the other elements of the Rapid Reaction Corps.

The U.S. response is fully integrated with the NATO response. The Commander, Land Southeast (COMLANDSOUTHEAST), with a greatly augmented international staff, takes charge of the ground forces, six ATAF take charge of incoming air forces, and COMNAVSOUTH takes charge of providing naval support. Strike Forces South (STRIKEFORSOUTH) is directed to provide carrier and amphibious support to Naval South (NAVSOUTH). However, it quickly becomes apparent that COMNAVSOUTH does not have the command and control capabilities needed to support NATO forces in Turkey. Consequently, COMSTRIKEFORSOUTH is made the on-scene commander for COMNAVSOUTH. A similar shortcoming faces six ATAF whose capabilities are overwhelmed by the job of directing the operations of five tactical fighter wings and coordinating carrier air operations with STRIKEFORSOUTH. The problem is resolved by having the senior deployed USAF officer (a general officer on USAFE Headquarters staff?) and his pickup staff take on the responsibilities of preparing integrated air task orders and assisting six ATAF in directing air operations in Turkey.

Implications for U.S. Command Structure

The current U.S. support structure for land forces in AFSOUTH is almost totally oriented to a reinforcement of Italy. A new support structure was established and run through Iskenderun, paralleling the U.S. support provided in 1991 in Operation Provide Comfort. Since logistic support is a national responsibility, a division-size support command is established in southeast Turkey. The senior Army officer in Turkey is made a JTF commander with the mission of providing U.S. support to COMLANDSOUTHEAST and six ATAF.

This scenario and the one preceding it highlight the necessity for U.S. force operations planning to focus on contingencies in AFSOUTH that use forces from USEUCOM *and* incoming forces from CONUS. The JTF mechanism is adequate to solve most command and control problems, but this involves tricky new interfaces with existing NATO organizations that may not be capable of performing their newly important missions.

Enhancing the Ability of the Command Structure to Respond

The principal command structure problems faced in this scenario were:

- The shortcomings of the NATO structure (COMLANDSOUTHEAST and six ATAF) in providing the necessary command and control capabilities for large combat formations coming into Turkey. In this scenario, work-arounds were required to keep NATO commanders (who are not U.S. officers) nominally in charge while having direction of operations devolve to U.S. commands that are equipped to do the job.
- The problem of providing logistic support for U.S. forces provided by different sources (e.g., from CONUS, from the FRG). It is clear that the current U.S. skeleton logistic structure in Turkey is only marginally adequate. A structure that is reduced to fit new lower theater manpower ceilings will probably not meet the test.
- The absence of a U.S. joint operational organization (short of USEUCOM Headquarters) to undertake the necessary planning and perform on-site management functions. A standing joint task force, under USCINCEUR, would do much to overcome this deficiency.

AN ASSESSMENT OF THE COMMAND STRUCTURES IN THE BASELINE CASE

Both U.S. and NATO command structures performed adequately in all cases. The principal difficulties were those posed by a major force expansion (deployable staffs vs. cadre staffs in place), major force deployments in remote parts of ACE or outside ACE, and the double hating of national and NATO commanders. While all those difficulties might be faced in a contingency with today's threats, forces, and command structures, the difficulties become more pronounced when existing structures and capabilities are downsized as in the scenarios described in this paper. As forces and command structure are downsized, flexibility decreases correspondingly.¹⁶ The result is a shrinking force and command structure that is built around what is arguably the least likely threat. Ways must be found to protect flexibility as the structure declines in size.

When Is Less Better?

This situation calls for a rethinking of the relationship between tooth and tail at much reduced deployed force and manpower levels. Unfortunately, headquarters staffs and some support remote from combat units are popularly characterized as unnecessary (e.g., "bloated," rear echelon). What is lost in this representation is the fact that headquarters *in theater* are the brains and nervous system for the entire force posture. Support is the sustenance for that posture. A "brain dead" military posture, or one that is not nourished with the requisite support, is by definition ineffective.

While some would accept this analogy, they would insist that neither command staffs nor support need to be based forward: They can be deployed from the United States when needed. The fact that the United States did just that during DS/S is cited as evidence. What those simple arguments overlook is the time and multinational dimensions of command structure. It takes time to establish command structures overseas and get them functional in their environment. The plans that those staffs develop and the operations they oversee require contact with personnel on scene. An existing combined staff structure (e.g., NATO) needs to be interfaced on a daily basis if U.S. joint and service operations are to be adequately integrated.

It is clear that USCINCEUR has a marketing and public relations problem in convincing the administration and the Congress that as force structures decline, command structure should come down at a slower rate. This process will invite all the usual charges of preserving tail over tooth, preserving headquarters and general officer positions at the expense of combat personnel and so on. The counterargument has to be based on the changed configuration of USEUCOM, with its even greater reliance on reinforcement, the closer integration of its units in the NATO structure (while retaining national missions), and the major change in the threat (from the Soviets to all-azimuth uncertainty).

¹⁶Some argue otherwise: Large and numerous staffs generate work and get in the way of the operating forces as they go about their tasks. The outcome of this logic is that if less is always better, then zero is best of all. The critics of staff functions seldom declare themselves in specific terms (e.g., what functions can be cut, how much effort is required for specific needed functions) and are content with translating their views into percentage reductions.

The Problem of the Southern Region

Much of the commentary flowing from Casteau, Brussels, Stuttgart, and Washington points to the growing importance of the Southern Region—loosely the AFSOUTH AOR—and the need to shift (or divide) command attention and resources accordingly. There is a subtle difference between planning and war fighting focused on the NATO center and that focused on the Southern Region. The two largest USEUCOM components have major forces in the NATO center, and their commanders have key NATO responsibilities. USEUCOM Headquarters is located in the NATO center. A U.S. national military operation divorced from NATO is nearly inconceivable in the center.

The third USEUCOM component commander is headquartered in the Southern Region and has an important NATO “hat.” But there are two differences between the south and the center: There is a much greater likelihood of U.S.-only (or at least non-NATO) operations in the south (if history is any guide), and there is *no existing U.S. joint command in the region to plan for and direct those operations*.¹⁷ Two of our scenarios point up the utility of having a standing USEUCOM joint organization in the Southern Region—to plan for and direct regional contingency operations. Critics of this suggestion will point out that USEUCOM headquarters is fully capable of performing the necessary planning, and who the JTF commander is should be dependent on the nature of the contemplated operations. This criticism is appropriate to a point. But there are tangible benefits to having the planning and operational command functions combined in one commander and for having the planning updated continuously by those responsible for the details.

¹⁷There are and have been JTFs established to accomplish missions of relatively short duration. But there is no “standing” JTF (e.g., such as U.S. Commander-in-Chief, Atlantic’s (USCINCLANT’s) JTF 120) or subunified command.

