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The Governmentality of Meta-governance

Identifying Theoretical and Empirical Challenges
of Network Governance in the Political Field
of Security and Beyond

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Dissertation presented at Uppsala University to be publicly examined in Gustavianum, Uppsala, Friday, 25 September 2015 at 13:15 for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy. The examination will be conducted in Swedish. Faculty examiner: Biträdande professor Lars Niklasson (Linköpings universitet).

Abstract
Larsson, O. 2015. The Governmentality of Meta-governance. Identifying Theoretical and Empirical Challenges of Network Governance in the Political Field of Security and Beyond. *Skrifter utgivna av Statsvetenskapliga föreningen i Uppsala* 193. 204 pp. Uppsala: Acta Universitatis Upsaliensis. ISBN 978-91-554-9296-0.

Meta-governance recently emerged in the field of governance as a new approach which claims that its use enables modern states to overcome problems associated with network governance. This thesis shares the view that networks are an important feature of contemporary politics which must be taken seriously, but it also maintains that networks pose substantial analytical and political challenges. It proceeds to investigate the potential possibilities and problems associated with meta-governance on both theoretical and empirical levels.

The theoretical discussion examines meta-governance in relation to governmentality, and it puts forward the claim that meta-governance may be understood as a specific type of neo-liberal governmentality. The meta-governance perspective regards networks as a complementary structure to traditional administration that can be utilized in the implementation and realization of public policy, but which also preserves the self-regulating and flexible character of networks. This generates a contradiction between the goals of public management and the character of networks that requires further investigation.

The combination of the specific dynamics of the political field of security, the diminishing role of sovereign powers, the emergence of security networks, and the *meta-governance stance* adopted by the Swedish state constitutes a situation that should have been favorable for the successful employment of meta-governance. The empirical investigation of meta-governance is divided into two parts. The first part reviews the historical process involved and shows how the Swedish government and public authorities have adopted a meta-governance stance. The second analyzes the specific instruments and strategies that have been deployed in the governance of security communications and in the management of Sweden's new security communications system which is an important aspect of security networks. The historical study together with the analysis of the meta-governance tools deployed reveals that the meta-governors neither reached the goals specified, nor fulfilled the overall purpose of successful security communications.

I argue on the basis of the theoretical and empirical findings obtained in the present study that it is very difficult to successfully employ meta-governance in respect to security and crisis management, and that we have sound reasons to suspect that meta-governance will run into similar difficulties in other political fields as well. I conclude that meta-governance is a far more difficult practice than has been anticipated by existing theories and policy recommendations. Turning to meta-governance as a way to govern and control organizations may in fact lead to further fragmentation and distortion of public politics.

Keywords: meta-governance, meta-governance stance, governance, governmentality, sovereign power, political power, networks, security, communications systems, process-tracing, interpretive policy analysis, Sweden, KBM, MSB, RAKEL

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Acknowledgements

There is a life outside of academia that has helped me remain sane during the "final sprint". I wish to thank my three children, Esmeralda, Darian, and Elvira, for always asking for my full presence, which enabled (forced) me to stop thinking about the thesis when not in the office. Finally, I wish to thank Josefina for enriching my life in so many ways. You make me truly happy!

1 Introduction

In a globalized world, and within the framework of a neo-liberal discourse and practice, many of the basic functions of the state have been privatized. Interdependency between the state and private organizations has thereby emerged, and solutions to public problems now increasingly require the involvement of other actors than public organizations. Networks, which are a recurrent phenomenon in basically all policy fields, are characterized by extensive and often institutionalized collaboration between public and private organizations that address public problems. These collaborations are based on voluntary participation by involved stakeholders and are self-regulating. The institutionalized involvement of private organizations in network governance means that private organizations not only implement already defined policy goals, but also participate in the policy production and thereby shape public policy and influence its implementation. Networks have thus become an essential part of the general shift from *government* to *governance*, in which states have been forced to find new steering instruments in order to govern the society. This development creates new problems and challenges for politicians and public administrators as they try to implement public policy in non-hierarchical and informal governance structures. Governance by networks opens up for a range of important issues and questions. Should networks be seen as a threat or an improvement and compliment to traditional institutions of democracy? Are they more effective and can they contribute to better policies and quicker implementation since stakeholders and implementers are involved in formulating the policy goals?

Positive accounts of networks claim that there are potential benefits associated with network governance, and this form of collaboration is often proclaimed to be a desirable and innovative way to address complex problems. Networks can function as arenas for deliberation and problem-solving, and insofar as the participation of non-public actors permits additional voices to be heard, networks may be viewed as part of a new pluralistic order. The pluralist element is further strengthen by the notion that networks consist of horizontal relations between interdependent actors, which means that they would *collectively* steer the development of policy and its implementation (Klijn and Skelcher 2007, 588, Esmark 2007). Networks could therefore make it possible to expand the public sphere, empower communities, and cultivate both inclusive policy-making and an inclusive management of public issues (Bevir 2010a, 33). They could

connect public policymakers with citizens and stakeholders and thereby supposedly overcome the constraints and limitations of representative democracy and party politics. It is thus often argued that networks are better suited to find solutions to public problems than the traditional forms of hierarchical rule that characterize the relationship between government and bureaucratic administration. They may also obtain greater out-put legitimacy to the extent that they are better suited for getting things done (Mathur and Skelcher 2007, 232). Consequently, while network governance is an empirical phenomenon, it is also put forward as a normative and desirable solution to the dysfunctionality of modern states (Jessop 1998, Kooiman 2000, cf. Dean 2007, 48).

Networks are often presented as necessary and desirable given the complexity of contemporary public problems insofar as they offer new ways to incorporate private actors in public rule and thereby lead to a decentering of political power. Network governance has therefore not only come to be regarded as a flexible and efficient way of dealing with public problems, but is also often contrasted to government, which is viewed as rigid, inefficient, and clumsy (see Hooghe and Marks 2003, 239). Governance networks are regarded as capable of bringing together powerful stakeholders and allowing for a smother implementation of public policy since they are typically characterized by informality and the pre-empting of legislation (Héritier and Lehmkuhl 2010, 133), consensus-orientation and deliberation (Ansell and Gash 2008, 544), shared interests, and the pooling of resources (Kooiman 2000, Pierre and Peters 2000, 25).

But network governance is not without its own problems. For example, networks consist of public and private actors who jointly address public problems by means of informal procedures and within informal structures. In addition, as Hajer and Versteeg observe, "[g]overnance networks typically function in the absence of clearly defined constitutional rules" (Hajer and Versteeg 2005, 340). This means that networks and individual participants may have an unwarranted influence on public policy insofar as networks do not live up to the democratic ideals of representation, transparency, and accountability (Weale 2011, Follesdal 2011, Hazenberg 2013b). Instead of viewing networks as complements to traditional forms of public rule, they can in fact be regarded as undermining democratic institutions and the ability of public administration to implement democratic decisions and deliver public goods (Larsson 2013). Powerful actors can even halt or distort the implementation of public policies (Marsh 2011). In this respect, networks threaten to undermine the state and democratic institutions rather than function as a complement to them.

Another important issue is to what extent networks also might hinder or make it more difficult to implement public policies. Since networks have a "…significant autonomy from the state" (Rhodes 1997, 17) and are self-regulating, they are difficult to control and may suffer from substantial

coordination problems concerning the participating actors (Scharpf 1994) it is not always so that networks improve implementation of public policies. The problems associated with controlling and managing networks is the main theme of this thesis. The normative dimension regarding democratic aspects of network governance is closely related to issues of implementation and effectiveness is also touched upon. The positive image that follows upon the claim that horizontal relations between interdependent actors characterize networks has been shown to be more complex and diversified than initially seems to be the case insofar as the distribution of power within a network can either facilitate or hinder the political process. Important organizations may try to keep problems off the agenda, refuse support for key network strategies and decisions, and withhold necessary resources. This produces a negative social energy that is frequently overlooked in network research (McGuire and Agranoff 2011, 267). For instance, Davies discusses "network closure" as a major threat towards the realization of a new pluralism. Studies have revealed in this regard that voluntary and community actors are excluded if they lack the financial resources regarded as warranting a position in the partnership. Ironically, closure around the congruent interests of powerful actors may be a precondition for sustainable and continued networking. Furthermore, if consent cannot be achieved, one solution is for powerful interests to oust or otherwise exclude dissenting voices (Davies 2011, 62). Networks may thus give rise to governance failure in a way similar to how states and markets can fail and not provide satisfactory solutions to public problems. To the extent that networks partially or fully replace traditional public administration, the failure of network governance may have negative consequences for the citizens who are the end-recipients of the services and policies that the network ought to deliver which are equal to or even worse than those consequent to governmental failures.

The knowledge of fragile networks calls for a need to cater and manage not only the policy issue but also the new and informal structures that networks characterize:

> If actors do not succeed in achieving cooperation with regard to concrete problems, how then is it conceivable that they should succeed in building consensus on how they are going to organize that cooperation?... [I]n certain situations, given the attitude of actors concerned, the current game rules and the social capital available, actors might independently reach a consensus on collective action, whereas in other situations an outside impetus is needed (Kickert, Klijn, and Koppenjan 1997, 43).

A recent and important theoretical development regarding networks is therefore the emergence of the *meta-governance approach* (Sorensen and Torfing 2005, 2007, 2009, Sørensen 2006b, Torfing et al. 2012, Torfing and Triantafillou 2013, Jessop 2009, Kooiman and Jentoft 2009). Meta-

governance recognizes both the democratic deficit and the coordination problems associated with networks as substantial challenges that policy makers, elected politicians, and top managers within the administration must address. However, networks are at the same time viewed as a necessary and desirable feature of contemporary politics that can, if they are managed properly, lead to substantial improvements in public rule. The idea and promise of meta-governance is that politicians and public managers can regain control over public policy and networks by carefully calibrating various *meta-governance tools* (Sørensen 2006a, Sorensen and Torfing 2009, Torfing and Triantafillou 2013, 10, Torfing et al. 2012, 133). By becoming skilled at the art of meta-governance, public administrators and democratically elected leaders can, it is stated, control and direct networks to work for the public good. Networks that are properly anchored to democratic institutions can improve public policy and strengthen the legitimacy of both networks and traditional democratic institutions.

The meta-governance approach aims to resolve problems with networks, not by altering their nature, but rather by introducing new tools that meta-governors can use to control and harvest them. This approach regards networks as both necessary and desirable, but maintains they can be further improved by network management and by anchoring them in democratic institutions. It suggests that governments, politicians, and public authorities who have a democratic and professional foundation should adjust to networks and develop ways for managing them without resorting to traditional sovereign instruments of regulation and coercion. Meta-governance is concerned with managing and "harvesting" the positive aspects of networks (Jessop 2009, 55) as well as finding the proper way in which to steer them without destroying the dynamics of network governance itself. As such, "it requires a carefully calibrated combination of different meta-governance tools" (Sorensen and Torfing 2009, 252).

The meta-governance approach appears promising for strengthening the ability of elected politicians and chief administrators to promote, guide, and direct networks to provide public goods and important services to citizens in a democratic fashion. Networks are an important feature of contemporary politics and need to be taken seriously, and theories of meta-governance offer possible solutions to the challenges and pitfalls associated with them. This thesis shares the view that networks are an important feature in contemporary politics and must be taken serious. Meta-governance does in this respect offer an approach to networks that would allow us to overcome known problems and increase the democratic control of networks. Meta-governance is however not only an approach that aims to describe and analyze current attempts to patch together fragmented states and networked administrations. It is also a normative position that argues for the benefits of networks as well as the potential to further increase public and democratic control of these self-regulating networks. Meta-governance leaves

suggestions and recommendations for how politicians and top managers should manage public politics. The policy recommendation concerns both how politicians should value and view networks as well as providing a set of policy tools, suggestions for how politicians and top managers can meta-govern networks on conditions favorable to their nature and continuation:

> Those politicians and public managers who fail to grasp that meta-governance is a new and important assignment for government will find it increasingly difficult to achieve their policy goals…governing interactive governance arenas [networks] is a crucial task for governments, and it requires the development of a new way of governing that aims to build, shape, and enhance the self-governing capacities of decentered governance arrangements, while giving direction to the policy process and holding policy arenas to account (Torfing et al. 2012, 122f)

The meta-governance perspective bring together the normative position that it would be desirable if networks can be retied to democratic institutions and provides a set of tools for how politicians may control and govern networks. This gives that meta-governance is more than a scientific perspective. It is, or so I would argue become a specific *rationality* within the broader neo-liberal context. Michel Foucault developed the term *governmentality* at the Collége de France in the late 1970s (Foucault 2004, Foucault and Senellart 2008, Foucault 2007). Both governance and governmentality share an interest in the marriage between public and private actors and the practice of governance beyond the domain of the state and formal institutions (Lemke 2012, 35, Walters 2012, 65). Some authors suggest that governmentality should be seen as a specific policy instrument that meta-governors can use to steer at a distance (Sorensen and Torfing 2007, 178). Bevir suggests that *governance* and *governmentality* are surprisingly promising bedfellows. Bevir argues that both governance and governmentality draw attention to the diffusion of power and ruling throughout civil society and take the disaggregating of the state serious. Bevir is critical towards the Foucouldian perspective since it is has no clear normative commitment. This shortcoming can be remedied by a marriage with the governance perspective. In that sense, governmentality would be able to foster a more democratic and dialogical approach that may form part of a third wave of governance reform (Bevir 2011, 468, c.f Bevir 2010a, 269). I wish to take an alternative route in my combination of the meta-governance discourse and governmentality. Governmentality has grown into a paradigm of its own and should be used as an alternative approach to governance rather than viewed as a tool of performing governance. Thus, placing meta-governance under the lens of governmentality will allow me to dissect meta-governance and understand its rationality. This is important since meta-governance is more than an analytical approach. It is also a strong policy recommendation that combines

a normal outlook with specific recommendations for network management.

This gives that the approach of meta-governance has, to the extent that it is adopted by politicians and public managers, also has performative mechanisms. *Performativity* is created by the fact that social and political agents are reflexive, contemplative and perform purposeful intentional actions (Nelson 2010:336). Judith Butler's elaboration and specification of performativity has contributed much to understand how ideas and theories may produce the very reality they aim to describe. In her book, *Gender Trouble* – she uses a Foucaldian approach to specify how juridical forms of power produce the subjects that they subsequently come to represents and thereby renounces its productive role. Butler advocates theorizing gender and sexuality (or any other identity) as performative. The theory of the performativity of theories and discourses suggest that the subject is constituted through processes of repetition and re-signification. Butler argues that implicit and explicit assumptions of gender and sex tend to naturalize differences between the sexes. The sexed subject is the effect of discourses and power matrices. In this way, the process of doing gender (or sexuality) involves the repetition and the performance of gender present in dominant discourses (Butler 2002, 145). The core point of performativity is that ideas and discourses of gender and sex produce the very subject and identity that it aims to describe. Butler's theory of performativity concerns foremost gender and identity of individuals but is influential for many theorists who explore the relationship between the ideational and political reality. Stefano Guzzini who suggests that Samuel Huntington's notion of clashes of civilization have become so popular that it functions as an interpretive grid for politicians and commentators gives another example of performativity. The clashes of civilization thesis may initially be an attempt to describe and understand new potential conflicts in the post-Cold War era but as more and more political actors start to adopt this understanding the theory gains a performativity to the extent that it guides the thoughts and actions that these actors perform. The relationship between the social construction of knowledge and the construction of social reality is in this case reversed because the knowledge claim produces the social reality. This is not because the Huntington clash was inevitable or analytically correct when it first was formulated but rather because people have learned to interpret the world and act according to the matrix of "clashes". Thus, "[a]ssuming the claim to be true, our actions would tend to produce the very reality the claim was only supposed to describe" (Guzzini 2005, 499f). The performativity of "the clashes of civilizations" is not about the relationship between individuals but between "civilizations" and nations. I argue that the meta-governance perspective could also be considered as a perspective that is performative in the sense that it may produce the reality it initially aimed to describe by providing a

specific understanding of networks, their desiribility and the possibilies of governing thtough networks.

The problem of meta-governance is that it recommends that states should encourage and facilitate the emergence of networks that it will later be able to govern by means of specific and calibrated steering instruments. This may seem overly optimistic and to the extent that it does not work have detrimental implications for public politics where meta-governance is deployed. The recommendation of meta-governance scholars that governments, politicians and top public managers to encourage networks to flourish that they later will be able to control via meta-governance tools may potentially lead to ever more fragmented political systems with less ability for democratic control and influence over important public issues.

This begs for a more thorough analysis of the rationality behind the emergence of meta-governance as well as the various instruments that meta-governors are recommended to use when controlling and managing networks. This thesis attempts to do both as it scrutinizes the development in the political field of security in Sweden.

1.1 The Emergence of Security Networks in Sweden

Networks are perhaps more easily imagined in some policy fields than others. When it comes to schools, housing, hospitals, and manufacturing, there have always been private actors who have performed certain important functions. In addition, most welfare states in the neoliberal era have deregulated state functions and privatized welfare provisions. There is, however, a core function of the state that seems very unlikely at first glance to follow the current general trend from government to governance, and the emergence of networks and that is providing security to citizens. *The political field of security* has traditionally been regarded as the core purpose and competence of the state. The emergence of *security networks* (Robinson et al. 2013, 346, Ansell, Boin, and Keller 2010, 196) indicates a major shift and challenge to the state. Security companies are now hired for managing aspects of domestic security, with private companies also providing important security management tools in the form of technological devices, not least of all communications systems. These developments, however, are much more strongly controlled by governments and public agencies since private providers normally sign contracts with such public sector partners.

A more complex challenge is *the broader understanding of security* that has emerged (Aradua 2009, 2). The subsequent expansion of the security concept beyond military threats and threats to national security means that a wide range of issues and objects are now managed under the label of security. It is not possible to manage many of these new security issues simply through border control or the use of force. A range of knowledge,

expertise, and practices are instead called upon when dealing with the *securitized* issues of environment, poverty, social and political inclusion, terrorism, epidemics, floods, electrical power failure, and so forth (Buzan 1998, 24).

The strategic focus in the political field of security has gradually shifted from national state security and the management of military forces to a notion of societal security that includes "safeguarding the critical functions of society, protecting people and upholding fundamental values and structures of democratic governance" ('t Hart and Sundelius 2013, 445). Security now more loosely involves the well-being of individuals and the protection of important objects and values even though many issues still concern the immediate survival and protection of human beings. However, due to the ongoing neo-liberal trend of outsourcing and of various programs for privatizing core state functions and vital systems, the state has lost some of its immediate control over such functions. Private actors are now increasingly present in the political field of security, either as immediate security providers, or indirectly by managing a specific issue or object that has been securitized. The wider understanding of security that has become common today stimulates the emergence of security networks that comprise a new challenge that elected politicians, top managers, and the state must manage. For this reason, it is both important and fruitful to combine the crisis management perspective with theories of meta-governance (Nohrstedt et al. 2014).

Sweden is a particularly interesting case in this regard. The Swedish state adopted a wider understanding of security shortly after the end of the Cold War, with the idea of a *comprehensive view* on security being mentioned in public documents as early as 1995 (SOU 1995). This notion was further specified through three principles that are regarded as guiding development in this political field, namely, *the principle of responsibility*, *the principle of similarity*, and *the principle of subsidiary*, which were adopted in legal documents in 2001 (Prop. 2001/02:10, 2001/02:158, 22). The overall meaning of these principles is that crisis and security management should be handled on the lowest possible level, that continuity with and similarity to normal procedures and operations to be as great as possible, and actors who are normally responsible for specific functions under normal circumstances also be responsible during a crisis. This means that a range of public and private agents should be considered to be security providers and take part in security networks. Sweden securitized vital systems and critical infrastructure in the middle of the 1990s and stated in public documents that the state was no longer able to provide security without extensive collaboration with private actors:

> The Government wishes to emphasize that the activities of the public sector are not sufficient to ensure a safe and robust society. Problems must be

solved bottom-up and through close collaboration between the public and private spheres. The Government therefore believes that private and public actors must establish a structured collaboration, and that failure to do so will have a negative effect on our ability to prevent and manage crises. The Government therefore intends to initiate the creation of various collaboration forums between industry and the public within the proposed areas of collaboration (Prop. 2001/02:158, 11author's translation)

This position has resulted in the emergence of security networks but also in a multilevel networked security administration. Even though Sweden experienced a number of national crises at the beginning of the new millennium, collaboration between public and private actors and the guiding principles mentioned about were not brought into question. Security networks both continue to serve as an ideal and also are a reality, and they are encouraged by the government and leading public agents in the policy field. This leads to what I refer to in this thesis as a *meta-governance stance*, which is characterized by the acceptance and promotion of security networks and by adjustments to govern these networks with tools that ensure their continuation. Taken together, such changes elicit a new role for the state in the political field of security and alter the policy instruments that may be used when managing security. Although this political field has traditionally been a domain in which sovereign powers have played a prominent role, it has developed in Sweden in a way that follows the more general trend from government to governance. The combination of the specific dynamic and logic of the political field of security, the presence of sovereign powers, the emergence of security networks, and the meta-governance stance adopted by the Swedish state constitutes a very interesting case for investigating the conditions and possibility of meta-governance. Furthermore, given the history of state dominance in this political field, it would appear to be fairly easy for the state to be able to meta-govern this field and thus control the governing process. The logic is also that security is a common good and it is therefore unlikely that any stakeholder would oppose cooperation and effort for increasing security. In that regard it comprises a *most-likely case* (George and Bennett 2005, 122) concerning the possibility to meta-governing security networks. However, it is also possible to imagine that given the nature of this political field there is a path-dependency in how the state governs the political field and sovereign powers remain the preferred way of governing. The presence of self-regulating networks may thus appear as most unlikely. The case does however reveal that the state actively seeks and promotes networks and a multilevel networked administration. In order to explain this development it is necessary to trace this development backwards.

   This thesis therefore investigates the specific route that the emergence of security networks and rationality of meta-governance in the political field of security in Sweden. The conclusion is that it is very difficult to combine

meta-governance of core public actors with the voluntary participation of other public as well as private actors. In Chapter 6, I look more closely at the attempt to try to facilitate for security networks by the implementation of a new communication system called RAKEL. The implementation of RAKEL must be seen in the light of the meta-governance stance and is thereby a very interesting an example of meta-governance that has a specific policy goal already in place. Security communication in the sense that involved security actors can communicate and coordinate responses to threats and disturbances is very important and is much more than a matter of technology. This issue will be developed further in the next sub-section in this introduction.

1.2 Security Communications and Technology

While communications are a vital aspect of all security management, the ability to communicate effectively becomes necessary in loosely connected networks for purposes of coordination and joint response. Crises and security events can be regarded as episodes of serious threat and uncertainty that demand urgent action (Boin and Hart 2003, 544). Although both public and private actors from various policy fields and different sectors and levels of government (local, regional, and national) are often required to cooperate when dealing with security and crisis issues (Robinson et al. 2013, 346), the complexity of managing collaboration across policy fields, jurisdictions, and the public-private divide should not be underestimated. Jurisdictional disputes and financial responsibility for operations and long-term collaboration inevitably challenge the effectiveness of security networks as well as the willingness of actors to participate ('t Hart and Sundelius 2013, 453). Crisis managers must respond to and overcome *transboundary* events, and the key to solving such problems is the ability of participating organizations to adapt and cooperate to an unprecedented level under conditions in which this is very difficult to achieve. The capacity and authority to respond are distributed across multiple organizations and jurisdictions in crisis and security events, with crises themselves creating patterns of interdependence among the actors involved (Ansell, Boin, and Keller 2010, 204).

Security issues and crises activate a need for communication and information sharing, but coordination between collaborating partners becomes difficult in all such situations. Problems or constraints concerning communication are likely to further complicate the challenges associated with coordination if there is no established high-status organization capable of acting as a hub for information collection and dissemination (Ansell, Boin, and Keller 2010, 199). The very nature of emergencies requires that collaborating partners communicate effectively in order to make informed decisions under conditions of uncertainty. This is especially important within

security networks and in a networked administration since, although there is an element of self-organization, every new crisis creates new patterns of communication and collaboration (Hu and Kapucu 2014). The shifting nature of crises and security threats thus demands that networks be spontaneous and dynamic in their responses and incorporate new actors if and when necessary. As a result, one aspect of particular importance in the meta-governance of security networks is to facilitate and assist security communications.

Recent innovations in Information Communication Technology (ICT) have provided systems that have the potential to improve communications among security providers and, if used properly, they may help to prevent and mitigate the disturbing effects of threatening situations (Vogt, Hertweck, and Hales 2011, 1). ICT is thus an important aspect of managing security networks since it can to help organizations to share and process information, establish communication channels, reach and engage all necessary stakeholders, and, not least of all, undertake collaborative efforts among a large number of partners (Hu and Kapucu 2014, 2). TETRA (Terrestrial Trunked Radio), which was standardized in 1997 from ETSI (European Telecommunications Standards Institute) and has been available since then on the world-wide market, has become the leading ICT of choice for European States and been promoted as a solution to the "borderless Europe." The idea in this respect was that all public safety agents in all European countries could replace their national communication systems with a single "borderless mobile communication system" that would enable cross-border policing and ensure the safety and security of the population in Europe. TETRA is one of the multi-vendor communications standards that guaranteed interoperability with unmatched versatility, efficiency, robustness, longevity, and security (Mikulic and Modlic 2008, 207).

When the Swedish state decided in 2003 that it needed to invest in a new ICT for security communications, it was keen to find a technical solution and standard that both enabled and improved communications between all public safety agents and other newly identified security agents involved in public safety and security management (SOU 2003, 22-23). Sweden had at the time over 200 different analog systems that did not allow for communications between them. Analog radio is also problematic since it can be fairly easily intercepted and disrupted by external and un-authorized users. The public investigation concluded that the only system capable of meeting the many specifications was the TETRA standard. In addition to answering to the new organizational and institutional demands, the system chosen also introduced a range of technological improvements, such as making possible the transmission of types of information other than the oral radio communication supported by analog radio. For example, written messages, maps, patient journals, reports, fingerprints, and similar written or pictorial information can be exchanged among the connected users. These types of documents can

also be encrypted so that sensitive and confidential information can be transmitted between users without the risk of unauthorized interception from inside or outside the system.

The Swedish state now owns a very advanced and robust radio system that includes a range of technological innovations and improvements which makes possible more secure and precise communications between security actors. The new national radio system is thus a good investment, but only to the extent that it is in fact utilized by security actors since the system itself is merely a tool for effective communications in crisis situations. The main challenge for the Swedish state and the responsible public agencies was thus to persuade both traditional and newly identified security providers to acquire the necessary equipment, access the new radio system, and use it. However, it would be very challenging to convince all different kinds of security actors to get on board. It was initially assumed that the new system was such an improvement that many actors would ask to join the system on their own initiative. This was not the case, however, and the importance of the new system was questioned among its potential end-users. As a result, the responsible public agencies decided to use a range of meta-governance tools to promote acceptance and implementation of the system. The state hoped that it could encourage adoption of the new system as a way to facilitate and promote cooperation between security providers without necessarily commanding security agents to acquire the equipment, licenses, and knowledge needed to communicate using the TETRA system. Since the strategies and policy tools used by the Swedish state to govern crisis communications within security networks must then be understood in terms of meta-governance, this situation provides a particularly good case within this policy field to investigate different meta-governance tools.

1.3 Aim of the Thesis and Research Questions

As mentioned above, network governance has its own set of problems, including the fact that networks are self-regulating and difficult to control from the outside, involve power relations, have problems involving coordination, and possess democratic shortcomings. The theory of meta-governance suggests that these problems can be solved if politicians and public managers adopt and learn to master *the art of meta-governance* (Sørensen 2006b), which comprises "a way of enhancing coordinated governance in a fragmented political system based on a high degree of autonomy for a plurality of self-governing networks and institutions"(Sørensen 2006b, 100). By taking the theory of meta-governance seriously and investigating its claims and suggestions empirically, this thesis contributes to an important and ongoing debate about network governance, including the more recent notion of the meta-governance of networks.

The aim of this thesis is to investigate the theoretical and empirical problems of the meta-governance approach. I do this theoretically by discussing and placing the meta-governance perspective under the lens of governmentality in order to understand its rationality. Empirically I investigate the process that lead to the meta-governance stance taken by the Swedish government in the political field of security. Finally I also investigate the implementation of a new ICT in this field in order to find out the various meta-governance tools that the Swedish government and public agencies have used and to what extent they do in fact enable meta-governance of networks. The political field of security should be regarded as a most likely case concerning the possibility of meta-governance approach in the sense that elected politicians and top managers should be able to govern the networks that have emerged in this political field. The design with a most-likely case and the theoretical discussion about the rationality of meta-governance and its implications makes it possible to discuss the findings of the thesis in more general terms. In order to investigate theoretical and empirical problems of meta-governance I specify three research questions:

1. Has the Swedish state taken a meta-governance stance in the political field of security (if so)?
2. What meta-governance tools can be identified and what problems did the Swedish state experience in its attempt to meta-govern security networks?
3. What are the implications of the theoretical and empirical findings of this thesis?

The three questions are of different nature and contribute in different way to the overall design and purpose of the thesis. The next section specifies the research design and the overall structure of the thesis.

1.4 Research Design and Structure of the Thesis

In this introductory chapter, I have suggested that networks are an important feature of public politics and their presence invoke important normative and empirical problems. The recent theoretical perspective of meta-governance recognizes both the democratic deficit and the coordination problems associated with networks. The solution is not to work against networks but that legitimate policy makers, elected politicians, and top managers within the administration should learn to master the art of meta-governance. The core claim is that networks can be controlled from a distance with a specific set of meta-governance policy tools. To the extent that networks are properly managed this can lead to substantial improvements in the quality and democratic in public rule (Sørensen 2006a, Sorensen and Torfing 2009, Torfing and Triantafillou 2013, 10, Torfing et al. 2012, 133). Networks that

are properly anchored to democratic institutions can improve public policy and strengthen the legitimacy of both networks and traditional democratic institutions. However, there remains uncertainty whether meta-governance in fact is a fruitful solution to overcome problems associated with network governance. Indeed, if networks are understood in terms of self-regulation and significant autonomy from the state it seems farfetched that elected politicians and top managers should be able to control networks from a distance (Larsson 2013). Furthermore, meta-governance is more than a perspective to analyze politics. It brings forth normative positions on how to value networks and that networks should be encouraged. It provides a set of policy tools that meta-governors should be able to use to control and manage networks. This gives that meta-governance is in itself a discourse that has "performativity" (Lash 2015). Meta-governance set out to solve important problems with networks and network governance yet at the same time encourage the increase of networks in public politics. The danger with the meat-governance perspective is that self-regulating networks may not be so easy to control and the result is an increased fragmentation of the state and increased difficulties in providing public goods for its citizens. I therefore believe that meta-governance need to be scrutinized and discussed both theoretically and empirically.

In chapter 2, I discuss the general shift from *government* to *governance* that has taken place and some benefits and challenges of network governance. I then address the solutions and arguments provided by the meta-governance perspective. The basic tenants of meta-governance are that states must acknowledge the presence and importance of networks and promote and facilitate their continuity. By mastering the art of meta-governance, politicians and top public managers should be able to control and steer networks in such a way that they guard networks from policy failure while providing democratic anchoring. This sounds very promising but I argue that meta-governance needs to be understood as a specific kind of *neoliberal governmentality*. Chapter 2 therefore contains a theoretical discussion that aims to consider meta-governance as more than an analytical approach. Insights from this theoretical discussion are returned to in the final chapter when discussing the results from the empirical investigation.

It is also important to investigate the empirical claims of meta-governance that states that politicians and top managers will be able to control networks if they use specific tools. A good case for investigating the promise of meta-governance is the political field of security. Recent developments and a broader understanding of security has led to the emergence of security networks in which there is an extensive request for collaboration of private and public actors to address security challenges. Security is a political field where the state has had a prominent position and one of the core tasks of states is to provide security for its citizens. This ambition remains central to most states but the emergence of security networks is a real and important

challenge for states that now must act as meta-governors. The political field of security is therefore a particularly interesting case to investigate problems and possibilities of the meta-governance perspective. However, in order to understand the specific dynamics of the political field and the emergence of security networks it is necessary to under*stand the widening of the security* concept as well as the theory of *securitization*. This is the main purpose of chapter 3. The political field of security and crisis management is a political field in which meta-governance has become very important because of the high stakes associated with governance failure. A vital aspect if security networks will function is their ability to communicate during crisis management. Collaboration between different organizations that quickly must respond to an ongoing crisis requires that these organizations can communicate with each other. The Swedish state decided to build a new ICT for security communication in 2003. The particular aspect of security communication and its management provides an opportunity to identify and investigate the different meta-governance tools that Swedish officials have utilized in order to make security providers start using the new communication system. Chapter 3 therefore also discusses security networks and communication as well as the technological advances in this field. The theories and discussions in chapter 3 form important background knowledge when I approach the empirical study of the *Swedish meta-governance stance* and the implementation and management of a new security communication system that is based on the TETRA-standard.

Chapter 4 is a methodology chapter that specifies the approach and methods that I use in the empirical study. The methodology rests on overarching Interpretive Policy Analysis (IPA). Interpretive approaches to policy analysis focus on the various meanings that policies and policy instruments have for different policy actors. Interpretive research regards human beings as agents who actively and collaboratively construct and destruct meaning by critically assessing and changing their understandings, preferences, and actions. Reflexive human beings constitute and establish societies, cultures, institutions, organizations, practices, and physical artifacts, and these differing settings are populated by diverse discourses and concepts. Against this background, interpretive policy analysis searches for the motivations that animate social and political activities and help generate their meaning. And insofar as language is the nexus of meaning and action, interpretive research is particularly interested in language since the language characteristic of a given setting shapes and frames agents' worldviews (Schwartz-Shea and Yanow 2012, 47).

The empirical study is divided into two different parts and I use different methods to cover them. First, it is important to investigate if the Swedish state indeed has taken a meta-governance stance in the political field of security. In order to investigate this I conduct a *process tracing* that follows the development in this field from the middle of the 1990s until 2015. The

second part of the empirical study focus on the implementation and management of security communication. This part of the study is chronologically described but is more oriented towards describing the strategies and meta-governance tools that is used and to understand the resistance of security providers to implement and adopt the new ICT. In order to do this two-folded study I use both *qualitative text analysis* and *interviews*, which are discussed in chapter 4. This chapter also addresses the strengths and weaknesses of single case studies and the logic behind choosing a most-likely case for testing existing theories.

Chapters 5 and 6 report the results of the empirical investigation. In Chapter 5, I provide a contextual and historical background for the ideational shifts in the political field of security in Sweden. This chapter covers the period 1995-2015 and identifies core shifts and policy changes that have led to the emergence of security networks. In Chapter 6, I investigate one specific aspect of meta-governance that is especially important for managing security networks, namely, communications. While this new radio system, code-named RAKEL, presents a range of improvements in technology, communications abilities, and robustness, the most interesting issue concerns how the Swedish state and the responsible public agencies have managed its implementation and sought to encourage security actors to begin using it. Despite ambitious and costly attempts at meta-governance, it has proven difficult to increase adoption and use of the new system beyond the core users, such as the traditional agents working with public safety. This case reveals that even though meta-governors have utilized in this regard a range of steering instruments identified by theories of meta-governance, it has also been necessary to use sovereign powers and thereby sidetrack the very idea of meta-governance.

In Chapter 7, I conclude the empirical study and discuss the implications of the results obtained, including their wider implications for meta-governance as a theory and as a potential recommendation for policy makers. The results of the study and of the theoretical discussion in Chapter 7 lead me to suggest that meta-governance is a far more difficult practice than theories would admit, and that we should be cautious in believing in the possibility of meta-governing self-regulating networks.

2 Meta-governance of Networks

Governance theorists claim that we are witnessing a major change in the way contemporary societies are ruled, arguing that we are in the midst of a political and institutional change that comprises a general move from *government* to *governance* (Dunsire 1996, Rhodes 1996, 1997, Pierre and Peters 2000, Ansell 2000, Majone 1997, Kooiman and van Vliet 1993, Kickert, Klijn, and Koppenjan 1997, Bellamy and Palumbo 2010). The term government refers to the exercise of formal sovereign rule with specific policy instruments, such as executive, legislative, judicial, and coercive powers. A range of various challenges, reforms, and trends during the twentieth century have complicated and disrupted the modern image of political spheres and processes in sovereign states. Alternative governance models have sought to grasp the new complex governing processes in which a multitude of public and private actors collaborates in order to govern society. Network governance has emerged as an alternative model to sovereign rule. Governance by networks is still compared to an idealized image of sovereign rule and concerned with questions of legitimacy of network governance. I believe that the discourse of governance could be complemented with the discourse of governmentality. Governmentality provides an alternative theoretical understanding of political rule and power and focus more on finding the rationality behind a specific type of governance. In that regard, it breaks with concerns of legitimacy and sovereign power in ways that are more fundamental. It is therefore a fruitful entrance to analyze the perspective of meta-governance as a theory and a practice in terms of a specific neoliberal governmentality. Providing an understanding of the normative concerns and policy recommendation for politicians and top managers allow us to see the rationality of meta-governance. The governmentality perspective will also enable a different understanding of the practices that can be identified as meta-governance in the empirical analysis.

In this theoretical chapter, I intend to discuss the shift from government to governance. I concentrate on network governance and the emerging meta-governance perspective that hope to overcome problems of networks by retying them to democratic institutions. As I mentioned in the previous chapter, this is a perspective that combines normative, empirical and policy oriented positions that may be overly optimistic about the possibility to meta-govern self-organizing networks (Sorensen and Torfing 2009). I

therefore wish to provide an understanding of this type of governance by utilizing insights from the governmentality perspective. The governance perspective and the governmentality perspective both try to explain political order and rule in contrast to the image of a beast, the sovereign state. It is therefore necessary to specify some core characteristics of this creature before we turn to the alternatives.

2.1 The Sovereign State

Sovereignty is in many ways one of the most central concepts in political science, and it serves as an organizing concept in empirical, theoretical, and even disciplinary terms (Bartelson 1995, 2001, compare Walker 2010). Most attempts to address the concept of sovereignty in one way or another seem to begin with an outburst of frustration over its ambiguity. For instance, Stephen D. Krasner refers to it as *organized hypocrisy* (Krasner 1999), Raia Prokhovnik refers to it as a *metaphor* (Prokhovnik 2007), and Walker views it as a *myth* (Walker 2010). But regardless of the vagueness and elusiveness of the concept, it remains crucial for theories of the state (Biersteker and Weber 1996). Furthermore, the concept of sovereignty often distinguishes not only between domestic and international spheres, but also between public and private spheres within the state itself (Prokhovnik 2007, 14, Bartelson 1995, 16). These spatial divisions remain crucial for understanding the novelty of network governance. Therefore, I begin by discussing how the concept of sovereignty in respect to the modern state specifies a separation between individual states and the international sphere and then turn to the political geography within the state.

2.1.1 International Sovereignty

The Peace of Westphalia is often taken as an important historical starting point for the emergence of a system of sovereign states in which autonomy and non-interference are core principles (Krasner 1999, 20, c.f Walker 2010, 99). This treaty provided a model for the organization of political life that is based upon two core principles: territoriality and the exclusion of external actors from domestic authority structures. In this respect, external forces and contexts may obstruct sovereign states, but they remain free to choose the institutions and policies they regard as optimal (Krasner 1999). The concept of sovereignty also describes a number of functions, abilities, and responsibilities of sovereign states, including control over its territory, borders, and population, respect for other sovereign states, and the ability to uphold formal authority structures within the state (Biersteker and Weber 1996, 3). Chris Brown adds that sovereignty tends to be synonymous in international political theory with autonomy (Brown 2002, 4). While these

various meanings and functions of the international dimensions of sovereignty are related to each other, competing conceptualizations of sovereignty are seldom "presented in a mode that would eliminate their effects on one another" (Kurtulus 2005, 52). On the contrary, they often implicate one another. For instance, de facto control over a territory is necessary for de jure recognition (Kurtulus 2005, 52), while the notion of sovereignty is intimately connected to a spatial understanding of the state which specifies that the state must exercise formal control over a specified territory (Edkins and Pin-Fat 2004, 3f). Sovereignty and sovereign powers are also important when discussing political life inside the state. Domestic sovereignty concerns juridical and factual power, but it also describes a spatial division within the state between the state itself and civil society.

2.1.2 Domestic Sovereignty

The requirements of the sovereign state in respect to its international surroundings are easily translated into the understanding that formal state authorities should be the ultimate source of authority within the defined boundaries of the state (Bartelson 2001, 149). Sovereignty within the state is referred to as *domestic sovereignty* and, in order for the state to either possess or make claim to it, there must be a formal organization of political authority within the state and the public authorities must be able to exercise effective control within the borders of the polity (Krasner 1999, 4). Domestic sovereignty also includes normative concerns of legitimate rule of and by the state. Sovereignty is thus a crucial concept within the range of discourses that address political life inside the state (Pierson 2011, 12). When Jean Bodin and Thomas Hobbes outlined the modern notion of sovereignty, they were interested in the political rule and function of the sovereign body as the final authority within the state (Bartelson 1995, 28, Brown 2002). Bodin [1576] consequently maintains that the concept of sovereignty implies the understanding that there is an "absolute and perpetual power of a common-wealth" (quoted in Dean 2007, 139), while Thomas Hobbes summarizes the unparalleled power of the sovereign in the following manner: "So that it appeareth plainly, to my understanding, both from reason and Scripture, that the sovereign power (whether placed in one man, as in monarchy, or in one assembly of men, as in popular and aristocratical commonwealth) is as great as possibly men can imagine to make it" (Hobbes 1994, 135). The understanding of sovereignty as an absolute authority is a common understanding of sovereign power. Hinsley suggests that "the idea of sovereignty was the idea that there is a final and absolute political authority in the political community; and everything that needs to be added to complete the definition is added if this statement is continued in the following words: *and no final and absolute authority exists elsewhere*" (Hinsley 1986, 26). Furthermore, the presence and control of the state

apparatus is required in order to carry out the will of the sovereign, whether this be the Parliament, the Executive, the Supreme Court, or the People (Rees 1950). In addition, since the state is believed to be autonomous in relation to other states and other actors and have the final say within its own borders, it is both a subject capable of acting and an object and vehicle for political action by specific groups and actors (Bartelson 2001, 35). It is normally the state and its institutions that have domestic sovereignty, but domestic sovereignty also rests on both *legitimacy* and *capacity*. What happens when either the legitimacy or the capacity of the state is restricted in one way or another? The bold claim in the shift from government to governance suggests that the state is no longer able to provide public goods on its own, but has become interdependent with private actors. Although one defining characteristic of the modern state is the separation between public and private spheres, the theory of governance maintains that it is precisely this border that has become increasingly blurred today (Stoker 1998). That also means that one of the defining characteristics of state politics has been altered.

One of the most authoritative sources of how to describe the modern state is the work of the German political sociologist and economic historian Max Weber (1864-1920), who identified many of the defining characteristics of statehood that still remain valid today. He argued that the state should not be defined in terms of its goals and functions, but rather understood in terms of its specific means and powers:

> [t]he state cannot be defined in terms of its ends. There is scarcely any task that some political association has not taken in hand, and there is no task that one could say has always been exclusive and peculiar to those associations which are designated as political ones.… Ultimately, one can define the modern state only in terms of the specific means peculiar to it, as to every political association, namely the use of physical force (Weber 2009, 77-78)

Weber extends this definition elsewhere to include other means than strictly physical force:

> A compulsory political organization with continuous operations will be called a 'state' in so far as its administrative staff successfully upholds the claims to the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force in the enforcement of its order.… [It also] possesses an administrative and legal order subject to change by legislation, to which organized activities of the administrative staff, which are also controlled by regulations, are oriented. This system of orders claims binding authority, not only over members of the state, the citizens, most of whom have obtained membership by birth, but also to a very large extent over all action taking place in the area of its jurisdiction. It is thus a compulsory organization with a territorial basis. Furthermore, today, the use of force is regarded as legitimate only so far as it is permitted by the state or prescribed by it (Weber 1978, 54f)

The *government* of the state normally has the ability to make decisions and enforce them, including the maintenance of public order and the promotion of collective action (Stoker 1998, 17). This is secured by physical effectiveness, or the capacity to impose will through force. A vital aspect of the modern state is thus connected with its control over brute force and the *legitimate* right to use such instruments in order to secure certain goals and maintain order (Hindess 1996, 37f). Modern statehood is associated with coercive power and the ability to secure domestic order insofar as it has the acknowledged *right* to use law-upholding violence (Dean 2007, 136). Even if a claim to the monopoly control of legitimate force in a given territory is important, the use of physical force is neither the sole, nor even the most common method of administration for those political organizations known as the state (Weber 1978, 54). For example, when Christopher Pierson lists the most important, albeit contested, characteristics of the state, control of violence is only one of the nine he identifies (Pierson 2011, 6). Quentin Skinner also highlights aspects of the modern state other than simply controlling violence, arguing that the modern state is characterized by the fact that:

> [T]he power of the state, not the ruler, came to be envisaged as the basis of government. And this in turn enabled the State to be conceptualized in distinctly modern terms – as the sole source of law and legitimate force within its own territory, and as the sole appropriate object of its citizens' allegiances (Skinner 1978).

The modern state is thus characterized by the rule of law and constitutional arrangements, the latter comprising the basic "rules of the political game." In many states there is a single document or set of documents which comprise the fundamental law or constitution that specifies and justifies the basic political arrangements that obtain. The constitution thereby establishes the laws for making laws, and it can be understood as in fact creating or securing the existence of the state. Most constitutions also specify the powers, rights, and obligations of the different branches of the state, include a bill of rights, and specify electoral and referenda arrangements. Constitutions thereby help provide the stability needed to manage political struggles inside the state (Dahl 2000, 124). That is to say that "the state constitutes a distinct and rule-governed domain with powers which are (at least formally) distanced from society and the economy and are distinctly modern" (Pierson 2011, 5). Although social, economic, patriarchal, and political powers were undifferentiated in pre-modern versions of the state, the modern state provides an understanding of political rule which is distinct from earlier versions that connected political power to specific persons, such as the Machiavellian prince. The modern state instead rests upon the de-personification of political power (Dean 2007, 140). That means that those

who exercise state power must do so within the constraints of constitutionally defined procedures, and it is important to note that persons who occupy state offices are to be regarded as *officials* who should not act as persons, but rather as representatives of the state. The modern state thus contains a form of impersonal power that politicians and civil servants, as temporary occupiers of particular public posts who use the state as an apparatus for attaining certain ends, fill with content (Pierson 2011, 16). If the state is to be effective and capable of carrying out specific tasks, it needs an administration to do so since it must have the capacity to carry out its decisions (Dean 2007, 136, Hindess 1996, 35). Max Weber argued that the administration of modern states must be *bureaucratic* in nature. In addition, state bureaucracy should follow a legal rationality in which accountability and predictability in respect to existing laws are a requirement (Hill and Hupe 2009, 23).

Weber describes public administration as possessing the following four characteristics:

Bureaucratic administration is conducted according to fixed rules and procedures within a clearly established hierarchy in line with clearly demarcated official responsibilities.

Access to employment within the civil service is based upon special examinations. The effective operation of the civil service is dependent upon knowledge of its special administrative procedures, and a good deal of the power of the civil service rests upon its specialized knowledge and "expertise".

Bureaucratic management is based upon a knowledge of written documents (files), and it depends upon the impartial application of general rules to particular cases.

A civil servant acts not in a personal capacity, but rather as one who occupies a particular public office (Pierson 2011, 16-17).

By governing according to the rule of law, the public administration can both enjoy legitimacy and also possess a very considerable capacity to transform and intervene in society since it resides upon "legal rationality" (Hill and Hupe 2009, 23). However, a new role for the public administration follows upon the shift from government to governance insofar as it becomes embedded in public-private relations and networks. Network governance as an ideal and practice tends to conflict with the foundations of the modern state, especially conflation of public and private spheres.

2.1.3 Public and Private Spheres

Theories of the modern state also describe a spatial division within the state between the public and the private spheres. Pierson, for example, maintains that "the state constitutes a distinct and rule-governed domain with powers which are (at least formally) distanced from society and the economy is

distinctly modern"(Pierson 2011, 15). F.H Hinsley also emphasizes this point in respect to the sovereign state, stating that "a community and its government must be sufficiently distinct, as they are only when the government is in the form of the state" (Hinsley 1986, 21). Consequently, an important aspect of the modern state is that "[t]he distinction between the state and other political institutions is as decisive as is the distinction between a society and its political system (Hinsley 1986, 5). Political authority in modern states requires a differentiation of public and private spheres, with political power ultimately residing in the public sphere while the private sphere is often referred to as civil society (Krasner 1999, 4, Loughlin 2006, Hoffman and Graham 2009).

   Such descriptions of the modern state help to identify central characteristics of what is normally included in the concept of *government*. One of the defining characteristics of the modern state is the rule of law and constitutional arrangements, which provides legitimacy to public rule. However, the state also needs to have the capacity to implement public policies, and a public administration that is bureaucratic in nature and follows the law is essential in this regard. The state and public actors may thus enjoy legitimacy through legal rationality, and the public sphere may be viewed as a rule-governed domain with powers that are distinct from those of civil society and the economy. When scholars maintain that the general trend today represents a move from *government* to *governance*, these characteristics are called into question. Some authors argue that this claim is a purely empirical observation, and that the notion of governance provides a new model for describing and analyzing political rule in post-modern states (Rhodes 1997, 138f.) (Ansell 2000, Kooiman 2000, 139). Others herald this shift because it tends to respond to normative calls for wider participation, increased deliberation, and a de-centering of political power (Bevir 2010a, 29f).

2.2 Network Governance

R.A.W. Rhodes suggests that the Westminster model – what I broadly call the sovereign state no longer constitutes an adequate framework for analyzing public policy and political rule in modern societies. Chris Ansell summarizes current empirical trends in a similar vein and reaches the conclusion that we have encountered *the networked polity*. Ansell utilizes academic work in disparate fields of comparative politics, public administration, organization theory, and economic sociology to support the claim that states are strongly embedded in society and pursue their objectives by operating through networks of societal associations (Ansell 2000). Ansell concludes that the image of the sovereign state is obsolete, and that the new role of the state is that of a liaison or broker. Both Rhodes and Ansell argue

that the sovereign state has lost core functions – upwards to the European Union and other international bodies, downwards to local governments and special-purpose bodies and agencies, and outwards to contracted private actors or even non-profit NGOs who have taken on certain core public tasks. The notion of the *hollowed out state* (Rhodes 1997, 138f), with its three core characteristics of *fragmentation*, *interdependency*, and *complexity*, it may be regarded as portraying the model and perspective of the "differentiated" or "networked" polity.

Network governance is a specific form of governance that refers to self-regulating collaboration between public and private actors that together address some public issue. The increased practice of forming and institutionalizing such collaboration has spurred academic interest in this form of governance. The challenge posed by network governance, which is a response to the perceived complexities, interdependencies, and overall un-governability of and by the state, is that the nature of political rule has changed more dramatically than state-centric approach to governance is willing to admit. The underlying notion is that networks are a necessary response to the many problems that modern states face due to the changed social and political conditions of late modernity (Rhodes 1997, 19f, Kooiman 2000, 139, Hooghe and Marks 2003).

Networks are often part of the very definition of governance. Rhodes maintains, for example, that "governance refers to self-organizing, interorganizational networks characterized by interdependence, resource exchange, rules of the game and significant autonomy of the state" (Rhodes 1997, 15). This way of understanding governance is also supported by Stoker, who observes that "governance is about autonomous self-governing networks of actors" (Stoker 1998, 18). Jan Kooiman states that social-political governance consists of making "arrangements in which public as well as private actors aim at solving societal problems or create societal opportunities, and aim at the care for societal institutions within these governing activities take place" (Kooiman 2000, 139). Ansell and Gash highlight the new connections between public and private agents when they define collaborative governance, identifying the latter as a "governing arrangement where one or more public agencies directly engage non-state stakeholders in a collective decision-making process that is formal, consensus-oriented and deliberative and that aims to make or implement public policy or manage public programs or assets" (Ansell and Gash 2008, 544). Bevir argues that governance should be understood as a general move away from formal institutions and laws towards attention to complex processes and the blurred boundary between the public and private spheres. In this respect,

> Governance draws attention to the complex processes and interactions that
> constitute patterns of rule. It replaces a focus on the formal institutions of

states and governments with recognition of the diverse activities that often blur the boundary of state and society. Governance as theory, practice and dilemma highlights phenomena that are hybrid and multijurisdictional with plural stakeholders who come together in networks (Bevir 2010b, 2).

Rose and Miller point out that a liberal normative division between public and private spheres often hinders a more correct analysis of contemporary rule, arguing that it is important to move beyond the public-private divide in order to understand the varied ways in which social authorities seek to shape and fashion the conduct of persons. They write that "[w]e should not accept at face value the distinction that are so valued within political philosophy and everyday life between the public and the private, only to then ask why and to what extent the boundary has been inappropriately transgressed" (Rose and Miller 2013, 19). Within this context, the notion of network governance offers advantages as an analytical approach because it moves beyond the formal aspect and institutions of politics. Network governance is not only an analytical approach to new ways of governing insofar as the notion of steering can easily become part of a normative outlook which maintains that networks are better suited than centrist state structures for dealing with contemporary problems.

2.2.1 The Benefits of Networks

Much of the current literature on networks is dismissive of state government as an appropriate and accurate model of contemporary rule. It regards this form of hierarchy as a type of rule better suited for the institutional and legal order of the past that was characteristic of a highly standardized public service, a Fordist economy, domestically controlled markets, and strong states (Rhodes 1997, 15f, Pierre 2000, 15). The critique against the political rule of governments can be divided into two main categories, namely, empirical and normative arguments. The former claim that substantial empirical changes have taken place that alters the ways in which modern politics and the management of public issues are addressed. Networks and collaborations would thus have become a necessary feature of modern politics that replaces or complements public administration. Some scholars argue that networks offer more flexible and effective ways of delivering public goods, and governments should accept networks as a new and appropriate form of governance without which the state will lag behind in competition with other states. This is an argument from necessity that claims there is simply no alternative to adjusting to both exogenous and endogenous processes makes old ways of governing obsolete (Skelcher 2000, 5, Pierre 2000, 15, Rhodes 2000, 71, Kjaer 2004, 3f). Normative arguments imply that it is desirable to organize politics in such a way that governments and sovereign powers have a less prominent role. We should thereby promote

and facilitate the development of new structures that allow for cooperation and horizontality between a wider set of actors. The claim is put forward that the consequent flexible solutions are capable of resolving the authoritative allocations of values more efficiently and justly than traditional methods (Rhodes 1997, 19f, Kooiman 2000, 139, Hooghe and Marks 2003).

The promotion of networks as a normative solution to contemporary social problems is often in opposition to the hierarchical state with its bureaucracy and coercive instruments. Network governance is in fact often regarded as a non-political form of governance by virtue of its specific characteristics that are regarded as opposites of the specific traits of the state. Governance by networks is thus characterized by and promotes, *inter alia*, informality and the pre-empting of legislation (Héritier and Lehmkuhl 2010, 133) as well as consensus-orientation and deliberation (Ansell and Gash 2008, 544). Its proponents also argue for the existence of benefits associated with the practice of shared interest and the pooling of resources (Kooiman 2000, Pierre and Peters 2000, 25). The focus in the literature is often concerned with good outcomes, with networks being said to increase problem-solving capacity and the adoption of best practices. The depoliticized character of networks is also supposedly furthered by the notion that governance is solving and managing communal and public problems that otherwise would go unaddressed (Hewitt de Alcántara 1998). The rival of governance is therefore not other actors, but rather such "wicked problems" as corruption, disorder, distrust, political alienation, bad governance, and so forth (Walters 2004). Other political discourses may view politics as a game of antagonistic forces that contributes to political transformation by resolving conflicts of interests. In the discourse of network governance, however, actors and interests are regarded as potential partners in a game of collective self-management and modulated social adjustment. Difference and confrontation are thus viewed in terms of deliberation and regarded as functional for the advancement of society as we engage in a learning process that is often described in technical or managerial terms (Walters 2004, Kooiman and Jentoft 2009). As a result, networks are portrayed as more efficient than traditional state administrations when it comes to dealing with contemporary problems.

Networks are also viewed as a revitalization of democracy insofar as they include a broader range of actors and stakeholders. In the most optimistic accounts, network governance is deemed capable of fostering a new deliberative pluralism with the potential for a trust-based consensus concerning the means and ends of social life. Networks may then be viewed as making possible an expansion of the public sphere, the empowering of communities, a cultivation of inclusive policy making, and a broader management of public issues (Bevir 2010a, 116f). In this respect, they comprise arenas that provide new ways of connecting public policy-making to citizens and stakeholders, thus overcoming the constraints and limitations

associated with representative democracy and party politics. The pluralist notion of networks suggests that networks consist of horizontal interdependencies through which actors collectively steer the development of policy and its implementation (Klijn and Skelcher 2007, 588, Esmark 2007). The promise and legitimacy of networks comes from an understanding that they are better suited to deliver consensus-oriented solutions than top-down command and control, therefore often possessing out-put legitimacy (Mathur and Skelcher 2007, 232). As a result, it is claimed that networks are part of a *post-liberal democratic order*, and that they should not be compared with or evaluated by the standards that pertain to representative democracy (Sorensen and Torfing 2007, 236). Network governance is thereby an empirical phenomenon that is presented as a normative and desired solution to allegedly dysfunctional modern states (Jessop 1998, Kooiman 2000, cf. Dean 2007, 48).

Positive accounts of network governance understood in this manner regard it as a complementary political structure which engage with public purposes that have been conventionally associated with government (Donahue and Richard 2006, 508), thereby comprising an improvement upon traditional forms of public and democratic rule. Empirical and normative arguments often go hand in hand concerning the role of networks in contemporary politics. For example, governance by networks possesses an analytical perspective that recognizes new forms of public politics, but it also suggests that these new forms have positive normative values and qualities that are desirable. The conflation of these two aspects of network governance is a recognized problem in the literature, with theories of network governance often prescribing and pointing to the importance and benefits of new forms of governance (Marsh 2011, 33, 37). Networks have also been presented by a rather broad set of scholars as flexible, voluntary, and efficient ways of dealing with public problems, and they are often contrasted to government, with the latter taken as rigid, inefficient, and clumsy (see Hooghe and Marks 2003, 239). Governance networks, furthermore, bring together a range of affected actors, so-called stakeholders, in contingent interactions that over time may become institutionalized in the sense that a regulative, normative, cognitive, and imaginary framework for negotiation and joint decision-making takes shape (Sorensen and Torfing 2007, 26). Others argue that even though networks lack formal rules and procedures, they often develop norms, principles, and standards that are eventually acknowledged and adhered to (Kooiman and Jentoft 2009). A type of bottom-up perspective on network governance suggests that networks may develop their own rules and standards of accountability that may later be used as checkpoints for evaluation (Hajer 2003), but this does not take away from the defining characteristic of networks, which is that they are self-regulating. But although networks have a positive air about them and appear to be a solution for all seasons and for all kinds of

problems, there are nevertheless reasons to be cautious when it comes to network governance.

2.2.2 The Pathologies of Networks

Why would networks and close collaboration between public and private actors be regarded as a problem? One reason is that networks are difficult to control both from the outside and even by a single actor from within the network. Close collaboration between public and private actors is not a novel feature of political life, and several distinct variants have previously been identified and theorized. In Sweden, for example, there is a long history of corporatism, which can be understood as a form of state-society collaboration that sets the limits and rules of the game for public policies concerning issues of central importance (Öberg et al. 2011). In addition, iron triangles, more loosely constituted issue networks (see Heclo 1992), policy communities (Rhodes and Marsh 1992), advocacy coalitions (Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith 1993), and epistemic communities (Haas 1992) are varieties of collaboration between public and private actors. The novelty of network governance lies in the new and extreme form that *new* networks, which may be described as self-regulatory structures within their own policy sectors (Pierre and Peters 2000, 20), have recently taken. They are even defined by their characteristic of possessing "significant autonomy from the state" (Rhodes 1997, 17).

Kooiman and van Vliet argue that self-governance is an important mode of societal governance in modern societies:

> Self-governance, as one of the three modes of societal governance, points at ways in which actors-in-interaction, differentiated societal groups or even sectors of societies develop problem-solving or opportunity-creating procedures and institutional arrangements to do so 'on their own' and 'by themselves'. As a working definition we state that self-governance is the capacity of societal entities to provide the necessary means to develop and maintain their identity, by and large, by themselves – and thus show a relatively high degree of social-political autonomy (Kooiman and van Vliet 1993, 360)

The idea that networks are difficult to control from the outside is, however, a well-recognized problem. As Kickert observes:

> The network approach considers public policy making and governance to take place in networks consisting of various actors (individuals, coalitions, bureaus, and organizations) none of which possesses the power to determine the strategies of the other actors. The government is no longer seen as occupying a superior position to others, but as being on equal footing with them (Kickert, Klijn, and Koppenjan 1997, 9)

Networks are not themselves organizations since they lack one of the necessary defining characteristics, namely, an overriding and unifying leadership. There are rarely any formal sanctions that a given actor can impose on others, and the possibility to command either the network or its actors to comply with a decision is limited. The autonomy and interdependency of participating actors in fact prevents the exercise of the hierarchical control that is normally associated with public administration. Nor is it possible to define even stable and well-functioning networks with a long history of successful cooperation as institutions in the strict sense. Sorensen observes in this regard that "Governance networks are complex and dynamic systems in which centripetal and centrifugal forces constantly undermine each other so that order and stability only exist as a partial limitation of disorder and instability" (Sorensen and Torfing 2007, 26). It is also important to note that governance networks and their policy production concern not only those who are active members of the network, but also the wider public. The presence of networks in a political field leads to a change in the entire context of policymaking, particularly to the extent that solutions to pressing public issues cannot be found within the boundaries of sovereign polities and their formal institutions. Insofar as formal public agents are unable to deliver the required or requested policy results using the state's traditional public administration, the latter comes to be replaced or supplemented by polycentric networks of governance in which power is dispersed (Hajer 2003, 175). In respect to public administration, we find an increasing number of situations in which public actors arrange policy-making, service delivery, or policy implementation in the form of networks of actors within a type of networked administration that operates through a web of relationships that exist between administration and public agencies, businesses, civil society actors, and other public agencies on a number of different levels (Verweij et al. 2013, 1036). The overall notion is that hierarchical control will come to be replaced by ongoing processes of bargaining among interested parties within most fields of public administration (Bogason and Toonen 1998, 205). Politicians and bureaucrats have thus "embraced network governance as a means for dealing with contemporary governing issues, as is demonstrated by the rapid proliferation of new governance arrangements" (Lewis 2011, 1223). In a networked administration, policy processes must be understood as an interaction process in which actors exchange information about problems, preferences, means, trade-off goals, and resources. One criterion of success for policy is the realization of collective action in order to establish a common purpose or avert common threats (Kickert, Klijn, and Koppenjan 1997, 9).

Researchers suggest, however, that the presence of networks substantially changes the nature and defining character of public administration since, in such cases, actions and solutions take place in an "institutional void." Hajer states that "there are no clear rules and norms according to which politics is

to be conducted and policy measures are to be agreed upon…. [T]here are no generally accepted rules and norms according to which policy making and politics is to be conducted" (Hajer 2003, 175). Network governance is informal and, regardless of its policy production and implementation, difficult to evaluate and hold accountable. As Hajer remarks, "Governance networks typically function in the absence of clearly defined constitutional rules" (Hajer and Versteeg 2005, 340). Moreover, describing networks as webs of cooperation between private and public agents that both is self-regulating and also manages issues that concern the wider public indicates that they may exercise substantial influence over public politics. Such influence concerns not only specific policy issues, but also the forms and procedures through which public policies are produced and implemented (Larsson 2013).

Marsh and Rhodes wrote that insofar as networks are characterized by non-transparent and impenetrable structures in which powerful interests and stakeholders may prevent necessary innovations and alterations in public policy, they may constitute a threat to the effectiveness, efficiency, and democratic legitimization of the public administration (Marsh and Rhodes 1992, 249f). Networks are often identified as possessing specific qualities in respect to relations among network participants, their mutual dependency and gains, horizontal relations, as well as processes that are consensus-oriented and involve deliberation. This is an empirical question, however, and networks may also be investigated as an arena of political struggle between powerful stakeholders (c.f Marsh 2011, 40, Kjaer 2011, 107). The distribution of power within a network can thus be viewed as a force that facilitates or hinders network processes. McGuire notes in this respect that:

> As a blocking force, agency/organization power is very real when lead organizations serve to keep certain problems off the agenda, withhold support for key network strategies or decisions, or withhold required agency-controlled resources, all of which represents a sort of negative social energy that sometimes is overlooked (McGuire and Agranoff 2011, 267)

Davies discusses "network closure" as a major threat to the emergence of the new pluralism of network governance. There are studies that show that voluntary and community actors are excluded if they lack the financial resources needed to warrant a leading position in the partnership. Ironically, closure around the congruent interests of powerful actors may be a precondition for sustainable and continuing networking. If consent cannot be achieved, for instance, one solution is for powerful interests to oust or otherwise exclude dissenting voices. Another solution is to limit the scope of network collaboration to problem solving rather than address conflicting values (Davies 2011, 62). In the absence of formal citizen representation via democratic institutions, the openness of networks and the involvement of

civil society are often taken as fostering both public dialogue and responsiveness to citizens as well as providing legitimacy to the political process that takes place inside networks (Héritier and Lehmkuhl 2010). However, Stijn Smismans, who has investigated this issue empirically, concludes that a heterarchical and horizontal image of network governance, even though it may prescribe involvement by all affected stakeholders, does not always lead to such practices (Smismans 2008).

Even though networks are proclaimed to be a necessary solution to contemporary problems and increased complexity, it is also the case that networks are complex in themselves. This complexity arises from the fact that actors are interdependent but have different interests and perceptions of problems and solutions, and that decision-making takes place in many different arenas and organizations at the same time. The complexity of a network is greater when network actors are more diverse and when the substantive issues they deal with are themselves highly complex or contested (Verweij et al. 2013, 1036). Another problem involves the difficulties of coordination. In a seminal article on this issue, Fritz W. Scharpf (1994) concludes that:

> while network structures will reach across organizational boundaries, their effectiveness will be equally or even more selective, depending on pre-existing distribution of strong and weak ties among formally independent individual and organizational actor…. [T]here is surely no reason to think that all or most opportunities for optimizing will in fact be utilized and that all or most interests will be protected against the negative externalities of decisions taken elsewhere…. The concept of embedded negotiations, in other words, provides no promise of welfare optimality under real-world conditions (Scharpf 1994, 49)

Scharpf argues that networks are also prone to governance failure, and that they have their own problems when it comes to the coordination of actions. He states that "Negative coordination, in other words, is likely to work in network structures as it does in hierarchical structures" (Scharpf 1994, 48). Networks may help actors avoid certain negative externalities and increase the welfare gains that can be achieved through negotiated positive coordination. But since they are self-organizing rather than hierarchically controlled, problems with coordination and the ability to solve conflicts or manage misunderstandings and distorted communication are difficult to overcome. Networks and network governance have their own sets of problems that may give rise to governance failure in a way similar to how states and markets can fail, and the fact they can fail to reach satisfactory solutions to common problems calls for network management. To the extent that networks partially or fully replace traditional public administration, the governance failure of networks may have equally negative or worse consequences for the citizens who are the end-recipients of the services and

policies that the network should deliver. Kickert has drawn attention to such second-order collective action problems of networks, observing that:

> If actors do not succeed in achieving cooperation with regard to concrete problems, how then is it conceivable that they should succeed in building consensus on how they are going to organize that cooperation[?].... [I]n certain situations, given the attitude of actors concerned, the current game rules and the social capital available, actors might independently reach a consensus on collective action, whereas in other situations an outside impetus is needed (Kickert, Klijn, and Koppenjan 1997, 43)

Another related problem with networks is the risk of "over-processing," which has its own tradeoff costs in preventing successful network governance. That is to say that too much action or process within a network can lead to suboptimal outcomes and collaborative inertia. Failure to obtain a collaborative advantage can also occur when collaboration is marked by slow progress, painful experiences and disappointments, and a lack of achievements, which may eventually lead to network collapse (McGuire and Agranoff 2011, 268). Huxham and Vangen's work on collaborations in Scotland suggests that collaborative inertia has many sources, and that networks may be affected in a negative way by such factors as mixed aims or intentions on the part of participants as well as the existence of complexities involving explicit, assumed, and hidden aims. Their study also shows that networks can be affected negatively by distrust between stakeholders, the constant reworking of the rules of the game, and a changing set of participators. They conclude that it is necessary to find ways to overcome collaborative inertia so that both the agenda and work move forward and "partnership fatigue" is avoided (Huxham and Vangen 2013, 225). Furthermore, network governance has certain costs attached to it, such as the time and costs associated with network activity of which network participants are aware, as Agranoff and McGuire have revealed. In addition, since the normal form of decision-making in networks involves consensus and respect for other stakeholders, problem resolution is not always optimal. As a result, networks with many participators who could potentially disagree or become engaged in active conflict with each other need to carefully consider how it will be possible to maintain relations within the network while finding solutions to problems. This may lead to decision-making based on the lowest common denominator (McGuire and Agranoff 2011, 269).

Governance and the presence of networks involve a shift or change in the way governments produce and implement public policy. While network governance need not ultimately eliminate or replace formal institutions and the public administration, the nature of public politics and administration is nevertheless changed. Kauppi et al. maintain that we may speak of a "network bureaucracy" (Kauppi, Lahdesmaki, and 2003 2003, 192) that is characterized by a culture of interaction, co-production, flexibility, client

focus, and community orientation. These functions overlap with the traditional functions of planning, organizing, staffing, budgeting, and implementing policies and laws. To the extent that governments and public administrations have become more involved in network governance that transcends the public-private divide, there is a grey zone in which many public policies are produced and implemented, and public administrations in fact often tend to mimic or resemble non-public organizations when they engage in networks. Such trends suggest that government must now engage in indirect forms of control and influence based upon regulation and persuasion at the expense of direct intervention and the use of formal and sovereign powers. A large amount of the research on network governance confirms the prevalence of networks in and their relevance for public politics in general, even though there often is little understanding of the limitations and problems associated with network governance (McGuire and Agranoff 2011, 280).

Bogason and Musso (2006) argue that network governance has the potential to promote deliberation and improve flexibility and responsiveness in service production, but, unfortunately, networks often have problems regarding equality, accountability, and democratic legitimacy (Weale 2011, Hazenberg 2013a, Follesdal 2011). One possible solution would then be to improve political coherence through the meta-governance of the activities in which networks are engaged. Bogason and Musso therefore maintain that it is important to evaluate the character of the actors who take responsibility for meta-governance and the tools they will use to steer the governance processes (Bogason and Musso 2006). Their conclusion is that even though networks may not be democratic in themselves, they can not only be made compatible with traditional democratic institutions, but even regarded as amendments to them.

Today, governance networks often arise and replace traditional public administration. Skelcher and Mathur observe in this respect that the key task for researchers is "to develop an appropriate conceptualization of democratic performance in network governance and, on this basis, design effective methodological tools to generate knowledge that will be of relevance to academic and policy audiences"(Mathur and Skelcher 2007, 228). They further maintain that:

> network governance obscures the process of and accountability for public policy formulation, decision making, and execution. Yet conversely, it opens the door for involvement by a wider range of actors and in ways that are less constrained than those applying to institutions of elected political authority.... [N]etwork governance reshapes the role of public administrators, positioning them as responsively competent players in a polycentric system of governance rather than neutrally competent servants of a political executive (Mathur and Skelcher 2007, 235)

In spite of the potentially democratic nature of networks, however, it is often noted that networks cannot stand alone. They must serve as a complement to traditional forms of administration and be sufficiently controlled by democratic institutions and elected politicians in order to be legitimate. The identification of pathologies and of a democratic deficit in network governance has launched a new theoretical perspective, with the solution proposed for these issues being that governments, elected politicians, and public mangers should *meta-govern* networks. This new perspective is interesting since it recognizes the problems of networks while also acknowledging that they may have many positive benefits. The perspective of meta-governance thereby offers ways in which to overcome the pathologies indicated and provides hope that networks can be controlled and harvested by utilizing the appropriate instruments. The second generation of network theory suggests that states can and should meta-govern networks. The idea behind this approach is that while networks comprise potentially better structures that traditional public administration insofar as they make possible flexibility and a greater participation on the part of the various stakeholders, they must nevertheless be controlled since they are prone to failure, just as are markets and hierarchical rule. The basic tenet of meta-governance is that states must recognize the presence and importance of networks, and that they should facilitate and promote the emergence of networks, through which they can later govern. States would thereby be able to harvest the fruits of networks while guarding them from failure and a lack of democratic legitimacy. The government, chief public administrators, and various formal state institutions should be in a position to provide the proper institutional rules, serve as meta-governors of networks, and function as a democratic anchor for the latter (Sørensen 2006a). By means of a careful strategic calibration of either hands-on or hands-off tools, meta-governors could be able to control and *steer* a network without disrupting the core characteristics and advantages of the spontaneous and self-organizing structure (Sorensen and Torfing 2007, 169, Torfing and Triantafillou 2013, 10).

The theoretical approach of meta-governance is concerned precisely with finding ways for utilizing the positive aspects of networks in order to provide public goods to citizens. Given that we acknowledge the many challenges to the state today, which were discussed above, the notion of meta-governance appears promising insofar as it argues that it is possible for the state to have a heightened role in a networked polity. I believe that this perspective needs to be taken seriously but it should be viewed from a more critical perspective, namely governmentality.

2.3 The Governmentality Perspective

Michel Foucault developed the term *governmentality* in a series of lectures at the Collége de France in the late 1970s (Foucault 2004, Foucault and Senellart 2008, Foucault 2007). The recent publication of these lectures has increased the interest in this approach and the development of a tradition called governmentality studies (Kurki 2011, Walters 2012, Miller and Rose 2008, Triantafillou 2004, Triantafillou 2007, Jessop 2007). A number of scholars have tried to combine network governance with governmentality, since both approaches share an interest in the collaboration of public and private actors and in the practice of governance beyond the domain of the state and formal institutions (Lemke 2012, Walters 2012, 65). The two are however not as good bedfellows as might be imagined at a first glance. Governmentality makes a more distinct break from the traditional image of the state and seeks alternative understandings to political orders that do not stem from sovereign powers. Rose and Miller remarks that:

> we have found the insistence on analyzing power and politics without necessary recourse to the state as locus, origin or outcome to be incredibly fruitful. This is not because states and the political apparatus are unimportant – that would be to misunderstand our argument. Rather, we argue that analyses should start from elsewhere, from the practices of governing themselves. These might be forms of calculation, ways of categorizing persons, rearrangements of factory outlets, treatments of various disorders, the testing of various groups or populations, and so on. In this way, as has now been shown, one might be able to map out the multiple centres of calculation and authority that traverse and link up personal, social and economical life. And it might even allow us to understand that 'non-state' modes of exercise of power are one of the defining features of our present (Miller and Rose 2008, 20)

Rose and Miller argue that the binary notion of a political and non-political sphere within the state produces an image of non-political zones:

> As post-war 'welfare states' in the West and centralized 'party states' in the East have come under challenge, contemporary political debate has become suffused by images of the state as malign and potentially monstrous. Only 'beyond the State' it appears, can a life worthy of free human individuals begin. Criticizing the excesses, inefficiencies and injustices of the extended state, alternatives have been posed in terms of the construction of a 'free market' and a 'civil society' in which a plurality of groups, organizations and individuals interact in liberty.... But the political vocabulary structured by opposition between state and civil society, public and private, government and market, coercion and consent, sovereignty and autonomy and the like, does not adequately characterize the diverse ways in which rule is exercised in advanced liberal democracies (Rose and Miller 1992)

No doubt is Michel Foucault, as the initiator of and inventor of the concept an important source but subsequent authors in this tradition have borrowed, developed, discarded and altered initial concepts and understandings (Walters 2012, 5, Miller and Rose 2008, 8). As I try to specify governmentality as an alternative approach, I will use both original writings (speeches) of Foucault and key commentaries and contemporary elaborations (see Hindess 1996, Dean 2007, 2010, Walters 2012, Miller and Rose 2008, Jessop 2007). Whereas the literature on network theory and meta-governance of networks propose a recent and radical shift in how policy is produced and implemented the broader notion of 'government' suggests that these alternative ways of governing is synonymous with neo-liberal styles of governance (Foucault 2007, Foucault and Senellart 2008, Walters 2012, 30, compare Davies 2011, 119f).

Colin Gordon suggests that governmentality is an approach that believes that contemporary rule is characterized by a "… range of distinct modes of pluralization of modern government which contribute towards the relativization of the notional boundary line between state and society" (Gordon 1991, 36). Studies in governmentality often seek to interrogate how individuals and organizations explore and define new governmental tasks, the propensity of public institutions of government to secrete within themselves their own multiple spaces of authority, different forms of delegation, arrangements of the quango, municipal privatizations and the renewed mobilization of the voluntary sector in social services, new social partners and other ways in which governing institutions rests their positioning exterior to the state apparatus (Gordon 1991, 36).

In the broadest sense governmentality is an approach that examines power in terms of the 'conduct of conduct' (Foucault and Senellart 2008, 186, Walters 2012, Dean 2010). "The notion of government as the 'conduct of conduct' refers to the diverse schemas, programs and methods seeking to structure and nurture the field of actions of others" (Triantafillou 2007, 186). Foucault remarks that:

> [T]he term itself, power, does no more than designate a [domain] of relations which are entirely still to be analyzed, and what I have proposed to call governmentality, that is to say, the way in which one conducts the conduct of men, is no more than a proposed analytical grid for these relations of power (Foucault and Senellart 2008, 186)

We should also note that the word *conduct* could be used as a noun and a verb. As a verb, to conduct means to lead, to guide, or to direct; as a noun, conduct may be viewed as roughly equivalent to behavior, action, and comportment. Governance in the broadest sense thus focuses on deliberate attempts to shape the way we and others act (Dean 2007, 82, 2010, 17):

> Government is any more or less calculated and rational activity, undertaken by a multiplicity of authorities and agencies, employing a variety of techniques and forms of knowledge, that seeks to shape conduct by working through the desires, aspirations, interests and beliefs of various actors, for definite but shifting ends and with a diverse set of relatively unpredictable consequences, effects and outcomes (Dean 2010, 18)

Studies of governmentality inquire into the art of government and investigate the mechanisms of the conduct of people, individuals and groups. The focus is on the technologies and rationalities of self-government in distinct fields (Lemke 2012). Foucault offers or complements with an alternative understanding of political power. Political power is for Weber the exclusive prerogative of the state. The modern state absorbs, centralizes and monopolizes powers once retain by many and power becomes political, spate and dominant with respect to other sources and forms of power, it is sovereign. The relation between the state and its subject is domination backed by coercion and the question of whether political power is legitimate is an issue of legal rationality. Foucault offers a more complex understanding of power. Power is not negative or restricting but productive. Power is always associated with knowledge and knowledge with power (Di Palma 2013). The knowledge incorporated in governmental practices is a type of practical knowledge. For this reason, the analytical perspective of governmentality are centered on the question of how practices and thinking about these practices constitute themselves mutually and translate into each other (Bröckling, Krasmann, and Lemke 2010, 11). In that regard, it is important to investigate how those who attempt to govern reflects on the problems that they wish to address and how to do that by governing the conduct of others. By reading relevant texts, reports, guidebooks and governmental bills, investigations the underlying assumptions of how to govern the researcher can make explicit the specific governmentality (Walters 2012, 11).

Reconstructing local orders of knowledge and practices of varying scope the notion of rationality is not based on universal reason. Governmentality studies do not assume a single rationality but insist on a plurality of governmental rationalities. The rationality may vary from case to case and must be empirically investigated. What is considered rational depend on the starting points, means available and achievable goals, criteria of legitimacy and potential resistance expected from those who should be governed. Rationality within governmentality studies are thus different from models of rational actors who arranges his actions according to a calculus of utility maximization ascribed from the outside (Bröckling, Krasmann, and Lemke 2010, 11). Consequently, rationality is within governmentality studies understood in relational and local terms. Rationalities are ways of thinking that makes reality conceivable and thus manageable. This also means that

rationalities and technologies of governance, modes of thinking and specified forms of intervention are "inextricable interconnected and co-produce one another" (Bröckling, Krasmann, and Lemke 2010, 11).

The programs of governance are thought of as both descriptive and prescriptive since they both describe a reality that they later intervene in by changing or transforming it. It is however not enough to describe the blueprint that guides the governance and those specific interventions that the governors wish to do in order to achieve some specific goal. The act of governing is not the 'realization' of a programmers dream. The reality always offers resistance which give rise to revisions and alterations of the initial ideas and knowledge that launched a specific program (Bröckling, Krasmann, and Lemke 2010, 11). That also calls for the need to investigate empirically the various attempts of governing and the alterations that a specific programs and the resistance it produces.

2.3.1 Liberal Governmentality

Governmentality concerns itself with many forms of power relations but certainly not all forms of power relations. Governmentality studies are foremost conducted to capture alternatives to traditional sovereign power. Shifting focus from a repressive to a productive conception of power, Foucault did his best to leave the traditional figure of Sovereign, Law and Right but it is noted that the entire project of governmentality always seem to return or at least reconnect to the headless beast of the state (Dean 2013, 24). Foucault sketched in his lectures a range of different and overarching rationalities that worked in the shadow of the sovereign but rarely contradicted the institutions of the state. Most rationalities actually serve as complements to sovereign power (Dean 2013, 28). Governmentality studies include and enable a wide range of studies but Foucault used this analytical perspective to investigate alternative *governance of and by the state* (Walters 2012, 12).

> [B]y governmentality I understand the ensemble formed by the institutions, procedures, analyses and reflections, calculations, and tactics that allow the exercise of this very specific, albeit very complex power that has the population as its target, political economy as its major from of knowledge, and apparatuses of security as its essential technical instrument (Foucault 2007, 108)

Foucault separated in his lectures between different overarching and historical themes of governmentality, Pastoral, Discipline, Raison d'etre, Liberalism, Neo-liberalism (Foucault 2007, Foucault and Senellart 2008). These governmentalities rest upon different historical assumptions, claims of knowledge that are different from a clinical juridical or sovereign

understanding of public rule and order (Miller and Rose 2008, 17). Contemporary governmentality studies are foremost directed towards one particular family of arts and techniques for governing societies, namely that of a liberal approach that emerged in the eighteenth century (Walters 2012). Foucault's analysis of liberalism offers many important and novel insights on how political power works in the shadow of hierarchy. Liberal art of governance is much more frugal than that of the police state and traditional sovereign power. It is a particular style of governance that is well aware that it is possible to govern too much and tries to practice the least possible and visible form of government. Liberalism, if understood as something other than a political doctrine of limited government entails a specific relationship to the economy and expert knowledge of the market. The market is often described as a 'natural realm' of processes outside the political sphere where frugality already is present. The liberal art of governance also involves a particular set of relationships to freedom. Freedom is not the absence of governance but the liberal art of governance works and manages the freedom; it governs through freedom. Freedom is both understood as something natural which flourish under limited governance but is also something that is actively cultivated and managed (Walters 2012, 31). Rose and Miller write: "contemporary governmentality… accords a crucial role to 'action at a distance', to mechanism that promise to shape the conduct of diverse actors without shattering their formally autonomous character" (Rose and Miller 2013, 39). As we shall later see, this is the main premise in the meta-governance approach.

Studies of governmentality is often concerned with a more limited 'government of the present' (Miller and Rose 2008, 6, Walters 2012, 38) and gives priority to questions of how governance is organized (Miller and Rose 2008, 6, Dean 2010, 39). The state often has an elevated position within governmentality studies. The focus is most often directed towards how the state utilizes different kinds of instruments of powers than the juridical and coercive means normally associated with state governance. Foucault referred to this as the "the governmentalization of the state" (Foucault 2007, 109). The state is by Foucault investigated and historicized via specific elements that allow different forms of 'governmentalization of the state' to emerge which are connected to scientific and philosophical discourses of the present. The history of 'governmentality' tells us how the state has become what it is through its adoption and adjustment to certain arts and techniques of governing human behavior. Historical studies of governmentality are closely related to a genealogy of the modern state. Governmentality in this sense explores the conditions of possibility of the modern state by investigating the specific arts, practices and techniques that have been combined in different ways and at different times (Walters 2012, 12, 39). It is however not a concept that captures all forms and contexts (Foucault 2007, 116). It does not address situations of absolute domination or the 'strategic games

between liberties' that concerns private power struggles of a couple, family or community. "Governmentality addresses a zone between these two poles of strategic relations and states of domination" This zone contains the arts of government, which can be analyzed through, its specific rationality.

This is why studies in governmentality have a special interest in liberalism and neoliberal ways of governing. The variants of liberalism should be understood as specific approaches to governance that operates through dispersed forms and figures of expertise and practices, that utilizes regulated freedoms and choices, self-regulation, and the promotion of certain kinds of subjectivity (Walters 2012, 72, Dean 2010, 62f). Even if the focus is with the alternative forms of power that the state may utilize in its governance of society and political actors it makes a lot of sense to assume that the governance undertaken by a state will not take one single form. Instead, it might be expected that there are hybrids and coagulations of different rationalities and powers. Even if self-government is the ideal and first choice Mitchell Dean show that when it comes to unemployment and workfare in Australia there is also a high degree of sovereign power that kicks in when self-government fails (Dean 2007, 97). "Liberal government is total not because it is equivalent to authoritarian rule riding roughshod over all civil liberties, or because it is completely successful in the realization of its aim. Rather it is total because its program of self-limitation is linked to the facilitation and augmentation of sovereign, disciplinary and bio-political powers of the state itself, to establish a comprehensive normalization of social, economic and cultural existence" (Dean 2007, 98). The danger to assume that we are dealing with a pure form of liberal governmentality is that other kinds of instruments are made invisible. A better approach would thus be to see how different coagulations and logics of governmentality, liberalism, policing, sovereignty, intersect (Walters 2012, 72f). The notion of present governance as an exclusive liberal form of governmentality is difficult to imagine and it is perhaps more fruitful to investigate the specific combination of liberal and sovereign means of governing.

Governmentality must be seen as an analytical perspective that assists the analysts to see alternative modes of governance beside sovereign means. Some network theorists have however wanted to adopt and transform governmentality into a specific policy instrument that meta-governors can use to steer from a distance. For example, Bevir suggests that *governance* and *governmentality* are surprisingly promising bedfellows, arguing that both governance and governmentality draw attention to the diffusion of power and rule throughout civil society and explicitly address the disaggregating of the state.

> The new governance arose following the collapse of the bureaucratic narrative. It did so in two waves. The first neo-liberal wave took us from bureaucratic narrative to marketization and NPM. The second took us to

partnership and network management [i.e. meta-governance]. The literature on governance has been active in the making of both sets of reforms (Bevir 2011, 467).

Bevir also maintains that the Foucouldian analysis may be criticized for having been notoriously elusive about its normative commitments, although he believes that this shortcoming can be remedied by an encounter with the governance perspective. Governmentality could also help foster a more democratic and dialogical approach that may form part of a third wave of governance reform (Bevir 2011, 468, c.f Bevir 2010a, 269). However, this way of regarding governmentality as a reform in governance that can heighten the democratic quality of the latter misconstrues governmentality as a way of performing politics rather than analyzing it.

Eva Sorensen and Jakob Torfing (2007) regard governmentality as a particular way of performing meta-governance. They remark that it:

> constructs and mobilizes the networks actors' energies resources, capacities and knowledge, and it ensures that the empowered, self-regulating actors act within the limits set by specific discursive conditions of possibility, which do not manifest themselves as external boundaries of self-regulation, but through their presence in the minds of the self-regulating actors (Sorensen and Torfing 2007, 178f)

They further maintain that meta-governance by means of governmentality functions through various interrelated forms of subjectifications. They add that subjection is predominantly exercised in a hands-off manner by means of institutionalized technologies and the construction of meaning, and that it has a decisive interventionist, top-down character. They also argue that the state may play a central role in setting the scene for self-regulating actors and for governing the "conduct of conduct" (Sorensen and Torfing 2007, 178f).

However, to simply adopt governmentality as a tool of governance rather than using it as an analytical grid misses key points associated with the deployment of an analytical model for studying networks. Mitchell Dean points out that it is not necessary to grasp the rationalities of governance from within the latter's own perspective, and that governmentality as an analytical approach focuses on the rationality of specific forms of governance (Dean 2010 24f, Miller and Rose 2008, 56). Governmentality should remain to be seen as an analytical perspective rather than as an instrument or strategy that meta-governors can use. Transforming governmentality into a meta-governance strategy is a serious misconception of the nature of governmentality studies and the critical foundation it offers. Peter Triantafillou believes that Foucault's concepts and analytical approach allow us to critically address new forms of governance (Triantafillou 2012, 2), and he also uses governmentality as an analytical model to analyze

notions of network governance that he regards as paying insufficient attention to rationalities that underlie them. He states that:

> More specifically, I believe that contemporary studies pay insufficient attention to the ways in which network governance depends upon particular constellation of power-freedom relations, and how particular norms of autonomy, efficiency and accountability informs and structures the scheming, exercise and even the contestation over network governance (Triantafillou 2004, 490)

Triantafillou recommends governmentality as a conceptual framework that seeks to address the manifold ways in which network governance as a set of diverse practices enables, urges, and at times even forces individuals and organizations to act in specific ways. He adds that network governance is characterized by a diverse set of governmental rationalities, technologies, and norms that foster the self-steering capacities of individuals and organizations (Triantafillou 2004, 498). Triantafillou thus maintains that there is:

> a proximity between the problem space of advanced liberal government and the theoretical imagery underpinning many governance studies [that] poses important limitations on the capacity of these studies to address critically the role played by agency, autonomy and interdependency in the shaping of governance networks (Triantafillou 2007, 185)

By adopting and using the governmentality approach, we may overcome such limitations and thereby open a space for the critical analysis of the formation and mobilization of governance networks. Following the tradition of governmentality studies, I would thus argue that meta-governance is a specific type of neo-liberal governmentality that aims to provide politicians and top-managers with a specific outlook and alternative ways of governing than traditionally sovereign means. The idea of meta-governing networks is precisely action at a distance that aims to shape the conduct of diverse actors without shattering their formally autonomous character (Rose and Miller 2013, 39). By refereeing to meta-governance as a governmentality, I wish to provide a counter claim to the necessity of networks. Rather, networks have become a heralded way of managing public problems in the neoliberal era (Davies 2011, 152). They are normatively desirable since they offer a connection between the state and the civil society and thus a way to govern that rebuts sovereign power of the state. However, viewed from the lens of governmentality studies they open up for alternative and liberal arts of governance. Meta-governance should therefore be seen as a continuation of network governance even though it offers various instruments for retying networks to democratic institutions while leaving sovereign power behind.

2.4 Meta-governance as a Governmentality

The main concerns of the meta-governance approach are to address the potential downfall of network failure and to address the democratic deficit of networks. The core claim is that central state actors need to learn how to govern network structures and thereby be able to deliver public goods to the broader public. Meta-governance is even referred to as "the art of governing interactive governance" (Torfing et al. 2012, 122). It is also suggested that meta-governance "poses a significant challenge to government at all levels, especially those employing a top-down style based on sovereignty and imposition; they must now learn the art of governing interactive processes at a certain distance and through more or less indirect measures that aim to respect the relative autonomy of the interactive policy arena" (Torfing and Triantafillou 2013, 10). But although the theoretical perspective of meta-governance is critical towards certain aspect of networks, it regards networks as both necessary and desirable insofar as they provide flexibility as well as potential links between the actors affected, thereby possessing the potential to improve public policy. Meta-governance is a theoretical approach that accepts networks, but seeks to overcome the various problems that have been discussed above.

Bob Jessop states that "[t]he growing interest in meta-governance is closely linked to (but not solely explicable in terms of) the recognition that, like market exchange and imperative coordination, heterarchic governance is prone to failure" (Jessop 2009, 113). More specifically, the need for meta-governance comes from the fact that networks regularly fail to sustain processes that serve public purposes. Sorensen notes in this regard that "[t]he recognition of the possibility of governance network failure calls for a systematic analysis regard to the formation of well-functioning governance networks that contribute to societal problem solving (Sorensen and Torfing 2009, 15). How then can meta-governance be conducted and who should be a meta-governor. In the broadest sense, meta-governance means the *governance of governance*. That means that networks or other forms of governance do not simply emerge but require reflexive choice, understanding, and management (Torfing et al. 2012, 130). This position contradicts the understanding of networks as self-regulating and involves a degree of mistrust in the possibility that stakeholders will collaborate with each other spontaneously. Other scholars, however, do not believe that networks can be externally meta-governed due to their self-governing nature, and that any form of meta-governance must be produced within the network as it establishes its own norms and principles (Kooiman and Jentoft 2009). Meta-governance also hopes to address the democratic deficits of networks. This problem can supposedly be corrected if politicians and public authorities adopt and utilize the notion and strategies associated with meta-governance. The idea in this regard is that meta-governance can provide a

"democratic anchorage" for governance networks by reconnecting them to elected politicians and public authorities (Sorensen and Torfing 2009, 5). Sorensen and Torfing state, for example, that:

> [g]overnance network theory and post-liberal theories of democracy draw our attention to the democratic potentials of governance networks and urge us to contemplate how they can be further democratized.... Governance networks have become a seemingly indispensable part of the governance of our complex, fragmented and multilayered societies. So, instead of writing them off as inherently undemocratic, we should attempt to enhance their democratic performance (Sorensen and Torfing 2005, 201)

They add that the solution for this issue is that networks be tied to and controlled by traditional democratic institutions.

> Governance networks are democratically anchored to the extent that they are properly linked to different political constituencies and to a relevant set of democratic norms that are part of the different forms of democratic legitimacy…. [T]he basic rationale for aiming to anchor governance networks in democratically elected politicians is that government control of governance networks helps to make sure that the public policy and governance produced by these networks is in line with the popular will expressed by the political majority of the elected assemblies (Sorensen and Torfing 2005, 201f)

The meta-governance theoretical approach proposes that even though the expansion of networks may be inevitable, they can still be anchored in traditional democratic institutions and tied to traditional political actors. The fundamental idea is that the democratic legitimacy of networks will be enhanced if they are meta-governed by democratically elected politicians (Sørensen 2013, 81). The meta-governance perspective thus combines normative and managerial concerns and introduces a new form of statecraft that aims to regain control over a networked administration.

Torfing remarks that the concept of meta-governance is "increasingly important for understanding how modern government – and other legitimate and resourceful actors – can govern contemporary societies in the face of the current surge in interactive governance" (Torfing et al. 2012, 122). The idea of meta-governance should not be confused either with the survival of the absolute state as the final authority, or with the emergence of some form of "mega-partnership" to which all other partnerships are somehow subordinated (Jessop 2009, 55, cf. Sorensen and Torfing 2009). The idea is rather that governments can regain control by steering *via* networks.

> Quasi-markets, partnerships, and governance networks are proliferating in response to rising demands, the need for resource mobilization, and a growing complexity of societal problems…. However, interactive forms of governance do not emerge spontaneously but are often facilitated, initiated,

and even designed by public authorities. In addition, the interactive governance arrangements might fail to produce effective and legitimate ideas and solutions. Finally, elected governments must impose some kind of direction on the interactive policy processes in order to realize their overall objectives, enhance pluricentric coordination and policy alignment, and ensure democratic accountability. Hence, the attempts of governments at multiple levels to reap the fruits of interactive governance call for a reflexive and strategic metagovernance. Metagovernance can be defined as the "governance of governance" as it involves deliberate attempts to facilitate, manage, and direct more or less self-regulating processes of interactive governance without reverting to traditional statist styles of government in terms of bureaucratic rule making and imperative command (Torfing et al. 2012, 122)

These specifications of meta-governance imply that governments must adjust to and develop ways for managing networks. This should not be done by means of the classic state instruments that involve regulation and instructions backed by coercion, but by managing and thereby "harvesting" networks on their own terms (Jessop 2009, 55). Meta-governance is concerned with finding the proper way of steering without destroying the dynamics of network governance itself since, as Sorensen states, it "requires a carefully calibrated combination of different meta-governance tools" (Sorensen and Torfing 2009, 252). Scholars using the meta-governance approach endeavor to identify various ways in which public officials and politicians may make the best of the contemporary situation. They also argue that it would be desirable that those who are still accountable or at least formally responsible for the link between citizens and political authority be in control of those structures that actually influence the lives of citizens, that is, governing networks. Stated otherwise, meta-governance should be performed by elected politicians or public officials who have a clear mandate from the wider public to govern (Jessop 2009, Sorensen and Torfing 2009).

The core idea of meta-governance is that governments and state agents are able, in the shadows of hierarchy, to steer and possibly control networks. Networks are different from traditional forms of public administration, and they may have both positive and desirable advantages in comparison with rigid forms of hierarchical rule for managing complex policy problems of today. States should therefore facilitate and promote the emergence of networks, which they can later control. However, we are not talking about implementation in a strict sense since networks still must be seen as self-regulating and autonomous from the state. The analytical approach of governmentality is in this regard more fruitful since it explicitly is attuned to the conduct of conduct, which is what is promoted by meta-governance of networks. The challenge for the state is in the absence of hierarchical and formal structure to implement and realize its politics through to identify and develop instruments and tools that are not disruptive of the flexible, spontaneous, and deliberative nature of networks. Even though networks are

characterized by collaboration between public and private actors who address public issues and problems and are to some extent self-governing, the idea underlying meta-governance is that the state can and should govern through and by means of networks. Governments and public managers should thereby adjust to networks and develop new ways for managing and "harvesting" them on the latter's own terms (Jessop 2009, 55). Meta-governance is thus an important concept for understanding how new and emerging forms of governance are merged with traditional forms of government. Governments are still responsible for controlling large-scale regulatory and service-delivering bureaucracies, but they now need to become engaged in the meta-governance of networks as well.

There are, however, two different understandings of meta-governance. One would argue that meta-governance involves finding and implementing the most appropriate governing structure or combination of governing mechanisms. Given the nature of a given problem, meta-governors may then use hierarchies, markets, or networks to address and resolve it (Meuleman 2008, Christopoulos, Horvath, and Kull 2012). Louis Meuleman proposes that when meta-governance refers to the strategic combination of these three different styles, we may speak of *second-order meta-governance*. I regard this understanding of meta-governance as too broad, however, since it includes all types of actions taken by any authority, thereby rendering meta-governance both all and nothing. Meuleman also proposes a more narrow understanding that he terms *first-order meta-governance*, which he understands as "supporting a chosen governance style by the use of elements of the other two styles" (Meuleman 2011, 101). The preferred governance style may thus be networks that are managed or meta-governed using elements of NPM as well as by traditional sovereign powers. Other scholars place even greater demands upon the meta-governance of networks by maintaining that traditional sovereign powers may not be involved since their participation would disrupt the whole point of the meta-governance approach. Torfing et al state that

> Metagovernance aims to facilitate, manage, and direct multilateral policymaking, but as various actors have their own rule and resource bases and can freely decide whether to exchange or pool their resources, metagovernance cannot take the form of imperative command. Attempts to meta-govern by issuing orders and commands, providing a detailed set of authoritative and non-negotiable rules, or in other ways trying to scare off private stakeholders or provoke fierce resistance giving rise to damaging conflicts. Metagovernance cannot revert to traditional forms of hierarchical steering as meta-governors must respect the capacity for self-regulation of the interactive governance arenas in order to preserve the commitment of public and private actors. As such, the concept of metagovernance does not, as it has been suggested endeavor to 'bring the state back' insisting on its omnipotence and, consequently reduce governance to the 'tools, strategies

and relationships used by the governments to help govern (Torfing et al. 2012, 132).

The quote captures well the demand that meta-governance should be regarded as a governing style that has been freed from the involvement of sovereign powers in terms of orders and commands or other forms of detailed set of authoritative and non-negotiable rules.

Meta-governance cannot revert to traditional forms of hierarchical steering since as meta-governors must respect the self-regulating capacity of networks. Torfing adds that "Meta-governance tries to capture the diverse political and administrative measures and interventions that aim to facilitate, manage and direct interactive policy processes without reverting to traditional forms of hierarchical rule based on control and command" (Torfing and Triantafillou 2013, 9). It may thus be concluded that meta-governance promotes and approach where meta-governors should focus on the "conduct of conduct". It is optimistic about the possibility of indirect rule where the formal autonomy of network actors remains intact and there is no need to use sovereign power. In order to test the viability of this governmentality including the important caveat that meta-governance should be distinguished from sovereign power, it is thus necessary to separate between meta-governance tools and sovereign forms of steering and control. As discussed above, sovereign power involves the formal control in various ways, including direct command over other actors, of the processes or tools used to solve a specific issue on the part of governments or public authorities. Public authorities may also exercise sovereign power when they provide a detailed set of authoritative and non-negotiable rules. How can meta-governance be conducted without the use of sovereign powers? In the following section I identify specify two different types of meta-governance tools.

2.4.1 Tools of Meta-governance

A distinction is commonly made between hands-off and hands-on meta-governance tools (Sorensen and Torfing 2009). *Hands-off meta-governance* is exercised at a distance from the network without the meta-governor having any direct interaction with the network participants. It involves, for example, alterations in the institutional design and structures of policy processes, and also includes changes in the provisioning of material and immaterial resources and in the political, legal, and discursive framing of network policy-making (Torfing and Triantafillou 2013, 11). In contrast, *hands-on meta-governance* includes direct interaction with the participating actors, such as through process management or direct participation in the network. Hands-on tools can help overcome tensions, resolve conflicts, or change the balance of power between different stakeholders, thus ensuring

that no single powerful actor hijacks the network. The direct participation of meta-governors helps to shape the policy agenda, define policy problems, and identify the political premises for finding a joint and feasible solution (Torfing and Triantafillou 2013, 11).

The meta-governor may, for example, design a specific organizational and legal framework aimed at facilitating network governance. Meta-governance may also involve various attempts to influence and shape patterns of interaction and communication between network actors, such as by creating incentives for collaboration or allocating resources with more or less strict criteria that promote certain activities. In addition, it may be possible to set the overall agenda for network governance by actively fostering certain types of collaboration (Torfing and Triantafillou 2013, 11), which is referred to as the mobilization of bias. This means that meta-governance may be exercised either through "invoking, maintaining and shaping the political, organizational, and socioeconomic structures of society, or it can involve the deployment of a variety of tools that are chosen and manipulated in order to produce a particular impact on processes and outcomes of governance" (Torfing et al. 2012, 134). Metagovernance through the "mobilization of bias" is a form of the top-down creation of networks through "more or less conscious attempts to invoke, maintain and gradually transform the structural context for interactive forms of governance" (Torfing et al. 2012, 134).

In light of the distinctions between constitutional, legislative, and operational sets of rules, meta-governors can change the actual content of constitutional or legislative rules or offer a re-interpretation of existing rules in order to redefine the rules of the game for network governance and policy-making. It is arguably easier to change operational rules since they consist of the day-to-day practices in a specific policy area. Another way in which meta-governors can actively facilitate network governance is to consciously transform country-specific traditions that they regard as restricting the development of network governance. The institutional design of rules, norms, and procedures determines the basic functions of network governance arrangements by influencing the scope, character, and compositions of networks. In addition, the steering of goals and frameworks can provide purpose and direction to the stakeholders involved and facilitates systemic auditing as well. Meta-governors should thus seek to define the overall objectives, financial infrastructure, legal parameters, and discursive storylines of networks (Torfing and Triantafillou 2013, Sorensen and Torfing 2009).

Hands-on approaches permit the direct participation of meta-governors, but such participation must take place without meta-governors utilizing steering techniques that command and control participating actors. *Hands-on meta-governance* involves the direct participation of the meta-governor in process management with the aim of reducing tensions and resolving

conflicts between network participants. Direct participation is intended to influence the policy agenda, the definition of problems, possible solutions, and the establishment of a joint view of the problem at hand. Hands-on meta-governance thus facilitates policy interaction in a way that is conducive to the alignment of interests and decision-making that goes beyond the least common denominator, but also avoids unwarranted cost-shifting (Torfing and Triantafillou 2013, 11). Such direct participation may also support the network process by providing different types of both material and immaterial inputs and resources. Briefly stated, meta-governors may be able through to shape the policy agenda, the premises for decision-making, and the negotiated policy outputs by means of their active leadership, direct involvement, argumentation, and coalition building (Torfing et al. 2012, 135, Sorensen and Torfing 2009, 247).

In spite of the outspoken ambition on the part of meta-governance theorists to separate between sovereign powers and meta-governance tools, it is evident that certain meta-governance instruments also include the use of sovereign powers. For instance, the idea that meta-governors may change the legal framework, institutional design, as well as constitutional and legislative rules does in fact invoke what normally is referred to as sovereign power. At the same time, however, meta-governance supposedly cannot revert to traditional forms of hierarchical rule based on control and command. If meta-governors do so, this must be taken as a proof of the failure of meta-governance. However, in order to be able to decide whether a given reform or policy instrument is part of the meta-governance tool box or an expression of sovereign powers, it is necessary to differentiate between these two alternatives. I therefore accept the narrow and negative definition of sovereign power provided above, whereby the latter is regarded *as hierarchical and reliant upon command and control, direct instructions, or a detailed set of authoritative and non-negotiable rules or demands issued by a public authority*.

The meta-governance approach maintains that meta-governors can use both hands-off and hands-on tools, some of which come very close to what can be understood as various *NPM steering techniques*, to direct and control networks without using sovereign powers. NPM, which is influenced by neo-liberal ideals, aims to create market mechanisms by which to govern both the state and contracted private companies, and the steering techniques it utilizes should be viewed as instruments that reside somewhere between sovereign powers and meta-governance tools. It is concerned less with sovereign command and control than about seeking compliance with public policies through the creation of incentive-structures, which has led to the creation of internal markets within public administrations. The assumed incapacity of the center to exercise effective control and monitor what happens on the ground has also led to an increased contracting out of public services, to public-private partnerships, and to arm's-length government

(Goodin, Rein, and Moran 2009, 897). That means, however, that it is difficult to clearly distinguish meta-governance not only from sovereign powers, but also from traditional NPM steering techniques insofar as meta-governors may allocate resources and/or change the financial infrastructure in order to create incentives for collaboration and promote certain activities. Reforms and governance efforts based on NPM and on notions of economic incentives for establishing either compliance or collaboration should indeed be regarded as NPM steering techniques. But when these techniques are used in combination with meta-governance tools, they can be regarded as assisting rather than contradicting the logic of meta-governance to the extent that they encourage indirect steering in contrast to the exercise of sovereign powers.

The following table summarizes these various tools and strategies:

Table 1:

Policy strategies				
Hands-off Meta-governance	Institutional design	Political, Legal, and Discursive Framing	Mobilization of Bias	
Hands-on Meta-governance	Process management	Influencing the overall agenda	Facilitating networking	
NPM-influenced	Economic incentives	Material resources	Grants	
Sovereign powers	Hierarchical	Command and Control	Direct instructions	Authoritative and non-negotiable rules

The notion of meta-governance taken together with the tools indicated above provides an optimistic account of the possibility that politicians and public authorities can regain control over and increase their ability to govern networks and networked administrations. The proponents of meta-governance are quick to point out, however, that there are no manuals or general recommendations for meta-governors that are suitable for all situations and all types of policy fields (Torfing et al. 2012, 134). Torfing observes in this regard that:

> How metagovernance is exercised and precisely which meta-governance tool is used depends upon the specific context and upon the goals that the meta-governor(s) aims to achieve. Whatever the form of meta-governance, it is clear that not all policy actors can exercise meta-governance as it requires

reflexive and operational capacity, and general acceptance from the actors and arenas that are meta-governed (Torfing and Triantafillou 2013, 11)

Meta-governance may fail due to too much or too little steering or through the use of inadequate meta-governance tools. The choice between hands-on and hands-off meta-governance is also likely to vary between different political fields. In short, meta-governance is a:

necessary but inherently imperfect governing practice, which is facing a range of challenge, limitations, and dilemmas. Meta-governors must exploit the opportunities they have for influencing the interactive policy processes and come up with pragmatic and innovative responses to the challenges and dilemmas they encounter (Torfing et al. 2012, 140)

Against this background, Jessop highlights the need for meta-governors to learn from meta-governance failure (Jessop 2009). It is also important to note that research concerning the problems and merits of meta-governance is very much in its infancy, and that there is a need for additional empirical studies in order to investigate the conditions under which specific meta-governance tools provide specific results (Torfing and Triantafillou 2013, 12). Provan and Kenis (2006) also point to the need for empirical studies that investigate longer time periods in order to assess the development of meta-governance. They state that networks have been widely recognized by both scholars and policy makers as an important form of multi-organizational governance, and that the advantages of network coordination in both public and private sectors are considerable, including enhanced learning, increased capacity to plan for and address complex problems, and better services for clients and customers. However, there is still a considerable discrepancy between such claims and the knowledge we have about the overall functioning of networks. Provan and Kenis in fact remark that networks do not really function quite as well as expected, and that the *effective* use of networks may not be achieved without proper meta-governance. A core problem in this regard is that networks evolve and may well change form in different phases of development. They may begin, for example, as an arena for debate and for input on the part of affected stakeholders, but then become engaged in the actual implementation of these and other public policies. Consequently, the meta-governance of networks needs to adjust as networks evolve. Provan calls in this respect for further research on transformations and changes in meta-governance styles (Provan and Kenis 2008, 247). Not only is research concerning meta-governance strategies not well developed, most studies consist of single or paired cases that are investigated over relatively short time periods. New insights can be generated by conducting investigations over longer periods of time, with particular attention directed to developments and changes in meta-governance. Even though the concept of meta-governance is relatively new and has so far been dominated by

theory, certain empirical studies do exist that may provide initial empirical assessments with which my own study can later be compared.

2.4.2 Previous Studies of Meta-governance

There are a certain number of empirical studies from which both knowledge and expectations can be drawn. Not only do most more or less unanimously regard public authorities and elected politicians as meta-governors (Baker and Stoker 2013, Koppenjan, Kars, and van der Voort 2013), one of the stated purposes of meta-governance is that politicians and public managers regain control over networks and increase the in-put legitimacy of the latter (Sørensen 2006a).

Keith Baker and Gerry Stoker set out to test the emerging theory of meta-governance by adopting a framework that makes possible an examination of the tools available to the state. They investigated the United Kingdom's attempt to meta-govern the nuclear industry – or more precisely, the attempt to promote a revival of nuclear power production. They state that much of the existing work on meta-governance "tends to make claims about the capability of the state to meta-govern using evidence from cases where the state has had a chance to learn new tactics and techniques and where its resources tend to dwarf those around it" (Baker and Stoker 2013). These conditions do not apply, however, in the case under scrutiny. Baker and Stoker instead observe that the odds appear stacked against meta-governance in the nuclear industry, which indicates that it is a "least likely case" for successful meta-governance. Using NATO-produced criteria, they assess the state's ability to meta-govern in order to promote the construction of new nuclear power plants. Their study shows that although the state fulfils the condition of nodality, it has nevertheless been unsuccessful in its attempt to achieve its policy objectives because of the limitations imposed by political conflicts, international pressures, legal requirements, limited resources, and organizational complexities.

Baker and Stoker's study thus illustrates the difficulties associated with meta-governance in a least-likely case, and although it does not provide a "knock-out blow" to the theory, it plainly demonstrates the need for it to be "refined or qualified" (Baker and Stoker 2013, 122). They maintain that we need to better understand when meta-governance processes are likely to be successful and when they are likely to break down, and they consequently argue that meta-governance needs to be tested and evaluated in cases in which conditions appear to be more favorable. The empirical investigation of the present discussion thesis has a most-likely case design and evaluates meta-governance strategies in a policy sector that is favorable to the success of meta-governance.

Koppenjan, Kars, and van der Voort have in a recent study examined a case in which elected politicians acted in a meta-governors role. In response

to the swine flu epidemic in 1997, the Dutch national government decided that areas with intensive livestock industries should be reorganized into zones that would reduce the risk of new epidemics through a swift and uncontrolled spreading of virus. The province of North Brabant began the implementation of this law in 1999, but it took the form of an interactive process in which stakeholders, municipalities, farmers, and environmental groups all participated in drafting the provincial white paper. The latter presented the framework that would guide the process of zoning and reconstruction, and crucial interests and economic values were represented in the process. The authors found that the provincial politicians were in fact able to function as meta-governors by supporting the reconstructing process and successfully coping with information overload as well as divergent interests. They did so by leaving party politics and micro-management behind, focusing instead on the larger picture and on the processes involved in governing the emergent networks. The researchers drew the conclusion that meta-governance may help representatives and representative bodies to redefine their roles in such a way that they succeed in representing societal values, providing steering, and assembling core network actors without disturbing network processes. The researchers use this case to demonstrate that in spite of both theoretical and empirical criticism of meta-governance, examples exist in which it has been successful, even when have had restricted access to the resources necessary They are not prepared, however, to generalize from this single case study, stating that although "the case shows that meta-governance can be successful, it does not imply that all forms of meta-governance will do" (Koppenjan, Kars, and van der Voort 2013, 145). They also conclude with a call for further research concerning the forms and effects of meta-governance.

Stephen Bell and Alex Park (2006) have utilized the lens of meta-governance to analyze water reforms in New South Wales, Australia. While they accept that the role of the state is changing, they note that the concept and approach of meta-governance suggests that government and the broader state apparatus still have a crucial function, namely, to support and govern new forms of governance (Bell and Park 2006, 64). The initial theoretical problem that Bell and Park identify is that "the theory of meta-governance (not to mention its empirical exploration and testing) is underdeveloped. For example, it remains an empirically open question as to whether governments in fact have the requisite meta-governance skills and capacities" (Bell and Park 2006). Their case study illustrates that meta-governance involves real costs, requires politically loaded decisions, and has a direct impact on policy outcomes. The particular processes in question, however, were characterized by hierarchical steering that thwarted both participation and power sharing among the actors involved – even though the advice of stakeholders was requested, they were involved neither in power sharing, nor in joint decision-making. Bell and Park maintain that the subsequent gap between the rhetoric

of networking and the realities of stakeholder involvement likely frustrated participants and threatened meaningful forms of mutuality and future collaboration. The failure of meta-governance in this case consequently consisted of the fact that the government was unable to exploit the potential of network governance and thereby frustrated local knowledge and commitment. In order to avoid this sort of failure in future attempts at meta-governance, the researchers' advice was that meta-governors must clearly establish the rules of the game for the stakeholders involved (Bell and Park 2006, 80).

Robert Agranoff provides practical insights for public managers working within networks that stem from a study of 14 networks at different administrative levels. The main findings indicate that even though networks have hardly replaced the role of public agencies, they still play an important role in respect to the outcomes of policy by limiting the scope of action available to those agencies. Moreover, they can add collaborative public value in addressing joint problems and thus contribute to public policy if they are properly managed. While Agranoff does not provide a manual for how public agencies should meta-govern networks, he identifies important pitfalls that should be noted and possibly avoided. Most interesting from a meta-governance perspective are those specific findings related to the possibility of governing networks and making them function properly. He suggests that in spite of a cooperative spirit and an aura of accommodation in collaborative efforts, networks are not without conflicts and power issues. In order to overcome the latter, it might be necessary for there to be a visible, powerful, and prestigious head of a public agency or a non-profit chief executive officer who organizes and sustains the network. It can thus be important that those involved in the network are key figures in their respective organizations. A political core that consists of primary heads of department, federal government directors, and chief executive officers from non-public agencies often indicates the importance of a given network. There should also be a technical core that consists of workgroups or committees that have important knowledge of the relevant topics insofar as most public problems calling for network governance also require the creation of knowledge and of feasible solutions, which often gives these groups a pivotal role in public policies and outcomes. Agranoff finally observes that there should be paid staffs who work exclusively with sustaining and supporting network relations. Since networks frequently do not form and function spontaneously, they require the lubrication of arrangements, negotiations, meetings, and happenings (Agranoff 2006, 62).

It should be noted that even though networks may partially replace traditional administration, they are not free and have their own alternative costs. If public agencies and managers give up at least some of their turf, authority over internal operations, and financial resources in order to maintain network relations cooperate with other actors, they obviously do

this at some expense to themselves. Agranoff specifies six cost categories of importance in this regard: (1) time and opportunity costs lost to the home agency because of network involvement or network management; (2) time and energy costs resulting from protracted decision-making based on non-hierarchical, multi-organizational processes involving people with divergent interests and abilities; (3) agreements not reached because of either the exercise or withholding of organizational power; (4) network gravitation toward consensus and risk-aversion agendas; (5) resource hoarding, or the failure or unwillingness of agencies to contribute their resources; and (6) public policy barriers embedded in legislation, coupled with legislators' or other key policy makers' unwillingness to make sufficient changes, which may lead to frustration and network breakdown (Agranoff 2006, 62).

The conclusion drawn from Agranoff's empirical investigation is that network governance, the involvement of other stakeholders in decision-making processes, and the implementation of decisions reached in this manner are not without their own costs. Against the background of the other difficulties associated with making meta-governance work, this indicates that it may be very risky to replace traditional administration and hierarchical control with more loosely but potentially less effective network governance. Research concerning attempts at meta-governance and the conditions for its success or failure is still very much an emerging field, and there is but little general knowledge and empirical evidence concerning the conditions under which the use of specific meta-governance tools could be successful. This thesis contributes to this particular field by investigating a most-likely case for the success of meta-governance, namely, the possibility for public meta-governors to manage emerging networks in the political field of security.

2.5 Conclusion

This chapter has discussed the shift from government to governance and the emergence of networks. Network governance is specified by the fact that public and private actors collaborate and together address public problems. They tend to do so in what normally is considered to be self-organizing networks with significant autonomy of the state and the absence of sovereign powers. On the one hand is network governance a type of public rule that potentially has certain benefits of inclusion, flexibility and increased problem-solving capacity. On the other hand, network governance also has a set of pathologies and challenges. Networks often lack transparency and accountability, exclude deviant voices, and may suffer from coordination problems that thwart positive outcomes and the realization of public policy. A new approach to networks in terms of a meta-governance hopes to address and overcome these problems. It prescribes a new approach for politicians and top managers, suggesting that they should accept and embrace networks

at the same time as they adopt new ways of governing through networks. Politicians and top-managers should master the art of meta-governance. In this chapter I contrasted and analyzed the notion of meta-governance with the analytical perspective of governmentality. I found that meta-governance could be seen as a specific type of governmentality as it defines specific perspectives and strategies of indirect governance. Meta-governance "poses a significant challenge to government at all levels, especially those employing a top-down style based on sovereignty and imposition; they must now learn the art of governing interactive processes at a certain distance and through more or less indirect measures that aim to respect the relative autonomy of the interactive policy arena" (Torfing and Triantafillou 2013, 10). The meta-governance perspective suggest that it is possible to govern networks through the conduct of conduct and that it can be done without resorting to sovereign powers and governing techniques. This proposition is very interesting and calls for an empirical investigation. The empirical investigation should consider both to what extent meta-governors indeed has adopted a meta-governance stance but also consider if this governmentality or specific art of governance indeed is possible with regard to networks. I therefore identified hands-off and hands-on meta-governance tools that were brought forward by the literature on meta-governance as potential steering instruments. Following the bold claim that meta-governance of networks is possible without resorting to sovereign powers, I distinguished them from traditional sovereign means. I also provided a further distinction between NPM steering techniques and meta-governance tools. The former are however regarded as assisting rather than contradicting the logic of meta-governance. Against this background, the aim of the empirical investigation is to examine the viability of the meta-governance steering techniques. The question is how such an empirical investigation should look like and what specific type of cases is appropriate. I wish to try the meta-governance perspective in a political field where the state traditionally have had a prominent role and thus should be able to govern emerging networks. I argue that the political field of security constitutes such a case. In the next theoretical chapter I wish to discuss and clarify the dynamics and recent developments that have enabled the emergence of security networks. The theories and arguments presented in this chapter assist the analysis and process-tracing conducted in chapter five.

3 Security Networks

In the previous chapter I discussed the suggested general shift from government to governance that has occurred. The emergence of networks provide new challenges for the state and the recent approach of meta-governance is suggesting that state actors should not oppose networks but promote them under the pretext that they will be able to meta-govern them. I claimed that meta-governance insofar it is suggested that the meta-governance of networks should be understood as a specific form of governmentality that attempts to conduct the conduct of various organizations that are part of governance networks. The notion of government to governance is similar to the suggestion of "governmentalization of the state", which means that the state finds alternative ways to govern without using sovereign power. This is also specifically pointed out in the meta-governance approach. There is however one political field where it initially seems very unlikely to follow the general claim of government to governance and the governmentalization of the state and that is the political field of security. This is a field that has traditionally been regarded as both the competence and core purpose of the state and where sovereign powers in terms of coercion, violence, command and absolute control have been most accentuated. The emergence of *security networks*, in terms of close collaboration between public and private actors in managing crises and security, implies a major restructuring of this political field. It also gives that the state must find new ways to govern the field and the emergent security networks. This chapter aims to provide a theoretical background that illustrates the logic behind the transformation of the political field of security. I suggest that this development follows upon two contradictory trends. One concerns an increasing involvement of private actors in the management of political violence and security in both the international and domestic arenas. There is also a broader understanding of security that involves new security objects and issues that are not immediately related to violence and threats by external actors. The expansion of the political field of security can be understood by using the theory of *securitization*. Securitization is a process in which objects and values become framed as security issues by some actors and thereby gets an elevated status as both important and urgent to manage (Buzan 1998, 25). It appears neither possible, nor desirable to manage many of these new security issues by controlling the national border or through the use of force. A range

of different knowledge, expertise, and practices can instead be called upon when dealing with the "securitized" issues of environment, poverty, social and political inclusion, terrorism, epidemics, floods, electric power failure, and so forth. In addition, due to extensive privatization the state has lost its immediate control over these vital systems and is forced to collaborate with private actors because they do no longer have the immediate control, knowledge or access to manage the new security issues (Collier and Lakoff 2008).

However, given the history of state dominance, it should nevertheless be rather easy for the state to meta-govern this field and control the governing process and the involvement of new issues and actors. Following this line of reasoning, one could argue that the political field of security is a most likely case for successful meta-governance.

3.1 The Political Field of Security

The terms *political field* and *policy field* is used interchangeably in this thesis. These terms, or the way I intend to use them, refer to a bounded substantive field that concern one specific type of issue(s). Both public and private actors can inhabit a political field. A political field consists, among other things, of formal institutional framework and regulations as well as informal institutions that may include norms, traditions, intersubjective and subjective ideas, and operational standards. It should also be understood as dynamic and changeable because of constant interactions between actors in addition to new understandings of how this field is constituted. How a given field is framed and understood is important. Furthermore, alterations in formal and informal institutions may shape how state agents and other stakeholders work to solve public problems. Solutions to emerging problems and the effort to identify the proper issues also shape the policy field (Sandfort and Melissa 2008). A similar understanding is provided by Bourdieu, who refers to a policy as both "a field of forces, whose necessity is imposed on agents who are engaged in it," and "a field of struggles within which agents confront each other, with differentiated means and ends according to their position in the structure of the field of forces, thus contributing to conserving or transforming its structure" (Bourdieu 1998, 32).

The political field of security is interesting since the wider understanding of security and the possibility to secure new issues, objects and values enable it to expand and intrude on other political fields. The political field of security has a sort of overarching logic since a successful securitization of an issue means that it can partly or fully, temporarily or permanently be moved into the field of security. The emergence of private security actors and policy makers in the field of security is a relatively new phenomenon that further

adds to the new dynamics and the need to analyze the state's ability to govern networks and thereby provide security for its population.

However, all public-private relations should not be labeled as networks insofar as the latter term refers to more institutionalized collaboration and joint public policy *production*. Networks are different from marketization and the privatization of public services since privatized services can be both highly regulated and hierarchical and also characterized as a principal-agent situation in which the state may revoke the task and power that is temporarily given away. Networks, in contrast, are characterized by a more comprehensive interdependence between public and private actors, and they concern not only the implementation of public policy, but also its production. It is therefore not possible to talk about implementation in a traditional sense. Instead the ability of the state to control and steer networks is dependent on the possibility to conduct the conduct. The emergence of networks and the turn to meta-governance in the political field of security may therefore be seen at first glance as a peculiar development since this political field has traditionally been connected to the sovereign state and to such sovereign instruments of power as direct regulation, law, hierarchy, control, and the use of force. From a normative point of view, this might be a good thing to the extent that public rule is somewhat transparent and also accountable for its actions. In addition, all political systems must somehow manage violence and security, and there is consequently a political tradeoff between liberty and security, particularly as it pertains to democratic states (Neocleous 2000). Even though modern democratic states recognize the civil rights of citizens, their monopoly over and control of physical violence and sovereign powers remains an essential part of the state apparatus. In the name of security, the state may invoke a "state of exception" which comprises a temporarily abolishment of rights for dealing with various threats. This way of understanding the liberty-security nexus has been redefined by the application of a broader understanding of security and the emergence of security networks (Aradua 2009, 2).

3.1.1 Security and Control of Violence

The presence of networks and the suggestion that state actors should engage in meta-governance challenges some of the more familiar images of the state. Since security is intimately connected with the state and its legitimacy, it has been a competence of the state *par excellence*. For instance, Thomas Hobbes said that the main source of legitimacy for the modern state is its ability to provide and cater for the security of the citizens (Hobbes 1994, 74-78). There are also conceptual and empirical connections between security and the state, with the apparatus of the state and its monopoly over violence being regarded as necessary characteristics of the modern state, not least for its self-protection and ability to uphold law and order on its territory

(Krasner 1999). Security has historically been regarded as "high politics" – a first priority issue and a necessary condition for democratic and civil institutions. Political security is, moreover, a core public good and often taken to be the very foundation for public politics and democratic institutions, but this idealized and normatively oriented image of the sovereign state and its absolute control in the political field of security is seriously challenged by contemporary trends.

The involvement of private contractors in doing the work of governments has however been a fact since the early post-World War II period, and concern with the negative consequences of such activities has accompanied this development from the beginning. The United States President Dwight Eisenhower was well aware of these consequences, maintaining that "In the councils of government, we must guard against the acquisition of unwarranted influence… by the military industrial complex" (Verkuil 2007, 23). This raises the question of how specific state-society relations make it possible for big business to have an impact on public decision making, even if decisions are still taken by state councils and public bodies. Hugh Heclo described this type of relations that as iron triangles and loosely constituted issue networks (see Heclo 1992).

The close relation between the government and the military industrial complex may also be viewed in the light of corporatism (Öberg, Svensson, et al. 2011). For example, Sweden has a well-developed military industry due to her policy of neutrality during the Cold War and the need to be self-sufficient in arms. However, this industry has continued to be lucrative even after the end of the Cold War, with Sweden being the world's largest per capita weapons exporter in 2011. Sweden has exported more than 50% of her weapons production since 2005, and even though the stated policy is to export only to countries that respect human right and are not active in war, certain customers are states that could be classified as dictatorships, such as Saudi Arabia (The Swedish Peace and Arbitration Society 2014).

Other trends and occurrences further contradict the notion that the state is the sole and absolute actor that manages sanctioned violence. In both the international and domestic spheres, states have begun "outsourcing" their security management and sovereignty, which gives rise to an emptiness at the center and a fragmentation of the state in the political field of security. The increasing use of Private Military Companies (PMCs) in armed conflicts and for intelligence gathering is a post-Vietnam phenomenon that has grown to startling proportions. Paul Verkuil maintains that this is associated with the private production of military equipment and weapons systems insofar as the domestic military industry lobbies for a militaristic worldview and encourages the use of violent means in solving conflicts. Today, private armies and companies supplement or even replace what earlier could be regarded as the "public" military. The importance of the latter is not that it is open or transparent, but that the military belongs to a specific state that is

accountable for its actions in accordance with international rules for warfare and public of conduct for war situations (Verkuil 2007, 24). This is not the case with private military forces and PMCs, who often work under contract with specific states and provide the surge capacity necessary to prepare or extend military operations. Contractors such as Blackwater (now Academi), MPRI, CACI, and others provide battlefield personnel, escort convoys, protect civilians, civilian targets, and leadership, and even interrogate prisoners. The only limitation is that they should not engage in offensive actions, but the difference between protective and offensive actions is often difficult to determine, for, as Paul Verkuil observes, "Once the decision is made to permit the private military to enter the battlefield, combat support devolves into combat services" (Verkuil 2007, 27). Anna Leander argues that it is important to note that these private contractors not only implement security policies, but also shape them to a great degree (Leander 2005a, 804). She states in this regard that:

> PMCs appear to have gained considerable power over security understandings and discourses. They increasingly shape which issues and problems are 'securitized' – turned into existential threats – and which kind of (re-)action is to be considered most appropriate (Leander 2005a, 804)

The presence of these private security actors also produces effects beyond the immediate case and mission for which they have been contracted since the externality of the market in military force weakens existing security institutions by draining resources and worsening security coverage (Leander 2005b, 65). The use of PMCs in conflicts is thus problematic, and it not only disrupts the legal and institutional setup that manages interstate conflicts, it also gives rise to moral dilemmas. For example, some argue that the literature which investigates the presence of private militaries suffers from a "mercenary misconception" that leads to an excessive focus on the more sensational private military companies and their operations. This would result in a disregard of both the expansion of commercial private security companies and of the nodal/network governance analysis that would allow for a more nuanced picture of the new relations between private and public actors in the field of security (Abrahamsen and Williams 2010, 11).

In addition to the use of contracted PMCs in military situations and conflict zones, private security companies have also come to play an increasingly prominent role in managing and executing core state functions involving domestic security, including the protection of specific areas and persons as well as border and airport controls (Verkuil 2007, 35, Salter 2007, Berndtsson and Stern 2011, 408). It is notable that their inroads into public functions and decisions on the civilian side of government have often received much less attention and scrutiny than their military activities. Security companies also now play a heightened role in specific situations

and crises, such as natural disasters or other unexpected and large-scale crises, when the temporary outsourcing of functions also concerns and involves inherent government functions. Many public agencies do not have the necessary competence and financial resources ready when natural disasters or other major crises occur, and this renders the exercise of government functions by private contractors both instinctive and more common (Verkuil 2007, 31).

However, the presence of new private security actors that partly or fully replace public agencies contributes to a hollowing out of the state's ability to ensure public order and security on its own. Hurricane Katrina is an example of extensive collaboration between non-governmental agencies and the state when the latter appeared unable to provide the necessary relief services. The fact that official agencies were accused of poor planning, poor coordination, and a lack of government personnel was aggravated by rivalry among official administrative levels and the failure to call upon non-profit organizations for assistance. Private vendors of goods and services have also been employed without adequate consideration of their suitability and proper descriptions of the roles they were to assume. Blackwater, a private firm associated with the provision of military force, was awarded contracts to perform core tasks that would normally be performed by public police authorities, such as patrolling the streets of New Orleans and controlling public order (Parker et al. 2009, Verkuil 2007, 31, Hayward and Lukes 2008).

PMCs may thus have an impact upon individual states in times of armed conflict and alter the "market in force" in the international system. In a similar manner, private security companies that manage border control and perform other core functions of domestic security, even temporarily, may exert an unwarranted influence in the political field of security. Even though these Private Security Companies (PSCs) operate under contract with public authorities, they may possess vital resources and contextualized knowledge that gives them the upper hand in their relations with the state. For example, by having control over such resources as expertise and experience, these private actors often gain an agenda-setting role in how to frame and solve security problems. A recent study in the Czech Republic conducted by Oldřich Bureš investigates a case in which the largest Czech private security company, Agency of the White Lion/Mark2 Corporation, attempted to take over an existing minor political party. Bureš maintains that not only is there little if any specific legislation concerning the activities of PSCs, their practices and interests have already contributed to a significant re-articulation of the Czech security field by enhancing the commodification of security. Such companies may also find new ways of influencing the political systems in consolidated democracies because of the agenda-setting power they possess due to their extensive knowledge and daily management of security issues (Bureš 2014).

The use of private companies in armed conflicts and the involvement of private actors in the management of domestic security and public order are controversial. Moreover, the privatization trend in the political field of security is far more substantial than the few controversial examples we have presented, and they also concern more than simply temporary crisis management. In the United States, for instance, there are both private prisons and private police forces, and such reveal that the political field of security has not been guarded from administrative reforms guided by NPM and neoliberal trends. On the contrary, there is indeed substantial marketization and privatization in the field of public security, with core characteristics of state sovereignty having been "outsourced" and contracted to private organizations. Furthermore, in addition to the privatization of security, security networks and networked administrations have emerged in the effort to manage security threats and crises (Robinson et al. 2013).

3.1.2 A Broader Understanding of Security

The emergence of networks within domestic security must be viewed in the light of the re-conceptualization and broader understanding of security that have followed the end of the Cold War. The political field of security and the practices associated with national security were until quite recently associated with the survival of the state as the basic object as well as main source of security, with the idea of defense against threats to national security being the generally accepted understanding of security (Collins 2007, 2). How security should be understood was regarded both as more or less self-evident and as related primarily to the survival of the state through the control and application of violence. If military force was relevant to an issue, the latter was viewed as a security issue; if military force was not part of the solution, the matter would be viewed as "low" or normal politics (Baldwin 1997). Consequently, the organization, control, and deployment of armed forces were understood as the key instrument of security.

However, the concept and understanding of security has been transformed and broadened since the end of the Cold War, which opens up the possibility that objects other than the state can be "securitized." For example, in addition to seeking to guarantee the survival of specific objects, it is now possible to speak of security in respect for values, issues, and interests as well. Within this broader context, the researcher can now raise such questions as security for what, for whom, by whom, with what means, and at what cost in order to gain an understanding of a specific security issue (Baldwin 1997, 13f). Security issues may also appear at many different levels, with global, regional, national, local, and even individual security associated with the new understanding of security (Collins 2007, 2f).

Furthermore, the previous connection between security and violence is no longer taken as obvious since the political field of security has incorporated

new objects and issues. In the absence of external military threats, many states have begun focusing more on domestic security issues, as a result of which the strategic focus in the political field of security has gradually shifted from national state security and the management of military forces to a societal security that is associated with "safeguarding the critical functions of society, protecting people and upholding fundamental values and structures of democratic governance" ('t Hart and Sundelius 2013, 445). But although security is now more loosely concerned with the wellbeing of individuals and the protection of important objects and values, many issues still relate to the immediate survival and protection of people. Consequently, a broader understanding of security effectively deconstructs and opens up the political field of security to a wide range of issues that may be resolved without the use of violence, even though issues of state security still possess an elevated status that demands special measures and immediate attention whenever necessary.

3.1.3 Securitization

According to the theory of securitization there are no pre-given objects or issues of security in respect to the broader understanding of security that has emerged in recent decades. Furthermore, not only is securitization understood as a process in which objects and values become "securitized" and receive the status of "security issue," the *theory of securitization* (Copenhagen School) in fact maintains that any issue and object may be articulated and framed as a security issue. A central aspect of the theory of securitization is the "security speech act," in which security issues are "created" by specific actors who endeavor to convince others that a specific issue should be viewed through the lens of security. This theory also proposes that once an issue is successfully securitized, it receives an elevated status of importance and acuteness. In addition, since security issues need to be managed relatively quickly, they may supposedly be managed outside the normal political or bureaucratic procedures and receive additional allocations of funds (Buzan 1998, 23). The sociological aspect of security associated with this view, which Stefano Guzzini highlights (Guzzini 2011), regards security as a self-referential practice insofar as an issue "becomes" a security issue not because there is necessarily an actual threat, but because the issue is presented as such (Buzan 1998, 24). This intersubjective establishment of an existential threat has substantial political effects, including the fact that dealing with security and acute threats is taken as allowing for extraordinary measures that may violate formal and informal rules and procedures. Both Buzan and Goldman argue that the survival of collective units and principles is the core of security studies, and that we may apply security analysis to a variety of sectors without losing the essential quality and function of the concept. A more traditional view would

maintain, in contrast, that security studies cannot go beyond the traditional military-political nexus without destroying the elevated status of security as part of high politics (Buzan 1998, 27, Goldman 1997, 15).

However, the political field of security now also concerns risk management, involving calculated disturbances in respect to ordinary life, whereby today's broader understanding comes to downplay emergencies and the evaluated status of security issues. Michael Williams argues in this regard, however, that securitization theory fails to grasp the new dynamics of the political field of security. He considers it problematic that securitization is no longer associated solely with extreme situations and emergencies, but also now involves a wider range of public issues associated with uneasiness and risks in a general sense. He remarks that:

> If it is not the word, 'security', nor the breaking free of rules in a spectacular sense, that defines a 'security' act, what makes a securitization different from any of the myriad tactics, logics, rhetoric, strategies, that actors use in attempts to change or break 'the rules' in governments or in societies in large? (Williams 2011, 218)

Williams suggests that the answer to his question is fear. More specifically, fear is intimately related to security such that fear is the putty that holds the political field of security together.

Both the broader understanding of security that has become current and the theory of securitization have been challenged by "traditionalists" who question the rationale and normative foundation for regarding issues of wellbeing rather than survival as basic security issues. Nevertheless, Buzan et al. do address the potential for expanding the concept of security and securitization beyond the traditional military sector. They argue that because:

> the analytical purpose of sectors is to differentiate types of interaction (military, political, economic, societal, and environmental) it seems reasonable to expect (1) that one will find units and values that are characterized of, and rooted in particular sectors (although, like the state they may also appear in other sectors; and (2) that the nature of survival and threat will differ across different sectors and types of unit. In other words, security is a generic term that has a distinct meaning but varies in form. Security means survival in the face of existent threats, but what constitutes an existential threat is not the same across different sectors (Buzan 1998, 27).

To the extent that securitization theory is an empirical theory, it invites us to study securitization through the effects that a securitizing moves or statement produces. Buzan and his colleagues maintain that "the exact definition and criteria of securitization is constituted by the intersubjective establishment of an existential threat with a saliency sufficient to have substantial political effects" (Buzan 1998, 25).

Thierry Balzacq argues that the various stages of the process of securitization have been under-theorized insofar as securitization theory has not yet provided a coherent model that can account for the success or failure of specific attempts at securitization (Balzacq 2010, 2). It might thus be necessary to identify and investigate the conditions in which the securitization *move* does not lead to the *process* which, in turn, generates the elevated status of the issue and allows for special measures. Mark Salter points out that if the Copenhagen School's theorization of securitization involves the modelling and explaining of actual securitization moves, then it must disaggregate the speaking/hearing processes of approval and rejection (Salter 2011, 117). Securitization is presented as a sociological and political process that involves the act of "speaking security." However, the speech-act itself does not fully explain success or failure, and it needs to be complemented with such factors as the effects of power, interests, intersubjectivity, bureaucratic (or systemic) position, and process. Salter maintains that "Different securitizing moves have different effects in different settings, which provide different basic power dynamics, different linguistic rules and different local knowledge structures" (Salter 2011, 117). It is evident that the role of the audience, the conditions of success and failure in attempts to securitize, and the specific outcomes and/or entrapment of security frames (Björnehed 2012) significantly complicates the theory of securitization. The speech-act and framing the issue are by themselves not enough to clarify the nature of securitization since there must also be an acceptance by an audience who would agree that the issue has certain characteristics that make it a candidate for "security" management.

3.1.4 Security and Risk Management

The new understanding of security, along with the multiplication of objects and issues that now are managed under the pretext of security, has altered the dynamics of the field and the role of the state as the sole provider of security. But when violence and immediate survival are no longer elements of every security issue, security and risk-management become conflated. Aradau et al write that:

> Risk-based perspectives to security differ considerably from their threat-based counterparts in how they approach the question of security and in the policy prescriptions and governmental technologies they instantiate. Whereas the latter tend to emphasize agency and intent between conflicting parties, risk-based interpretations tend to emphasize systemic characteristics, such as populations at risk of disease or environmental hazard (Aradau, Lobo-Guerrero, and Van Munster 2008, 148)

This rearranges the political field of security towards more heterogeneous and diffuse concerns ranging from disturbances and disruptions in normal

life to survival itself that cannot be understood through "the simple binary dichotomies of normality/exception and politics/security." Therefore, in order to understand practices and politics in the field of contemporary security, it is necessary to understand that risk practices both overlap and contest with the military-political nexus normally associated with security (Aradau, Lobo-Guerrero, and Van Munster 2008, 148). The political field of security thus not only concerns threats posed by other actors, but also the calculable management of pandemics, organized crime, global warming, failed states, terrorism, poverty, trafficking, nuclear proliferation, as well as dangers that arise from domestic sources and everyday activities, the management of chemicals, electric power failure, and so forth. But since the understanding of security is no longer limited to the ultimate goal of survival and now involves calculable risk management as well, there is no longer a clear break between normal governance, which includes the calculation of risk and disturbances, and security governance, which concerns unexpected events and disturbances.

This broader understanding of security thus means that it is now possible to securitize a range of domestic political issues and "vital systems" in society that would previously have not been defined as security issues. At a time characterized by neo-liberal trends, fragmented states, extensive outsourcing, and contractual support from private actors, policy-makers have come to recognize the increased interdependence between vital systems and the vulnerability of modern life networks. In order to control and protect these systems, the neo-liberal state has been forced to seek new ways and new forms of collaboration with private actors, which has led to networked administration becoming a central aspect of the field of security. Civil society and private actors were not completely absent from the field of security prior to these recent developments, and during the Cold War there was a similar involvement of private actors and citizens even in connection with preparedness for nuclear war and large scale natural disasters (Collier and Lakoff 2008). Today, however, the preparedness to both meet and also combat and manage security issues has been "societalized" (Chandler 2013), which means that "security" is now a discourse that involves most aspects of social and political life as well as potential disturbances to the latter. The point is that the security management of vital systems and disturbances does not invoke a state of exception or direct emergency, but calls for a readiness and preparedness that, in turn, gives rise to a normalization and "manualization" for managing security threats (Collier and Lakoff 2014).
This also redefines who can be a security actor as well as the nature of relations between diverse security actors. The number of agents that potentially could become security actors has multiplied, the agents themselves now comprise a more heterogonous group, and not all security providers are capable of playing important roles in all securitized issues. One of the core challenges for the state is in fact to foster new forms of

collaboration and to secure compliance from a heterogonous set of social and political actors. The state often finds it necessary in the management of vital systems and disturbances of societal functions to collaborate with private actors today, many of whom are unfamiliar with this role and reluctant to embrace it. Such actors need to be *activated* (Triantafillou 2007, Collier and Lakoff 2008), or made aware of the many potential security threats and of their new role as security providers and collaborative partners, while others are more willing and able to assume their new role as security actors and partners.

The wider understanding of security has substantially altered the political field of security, introducing new objects, issues, values, actors, relations, and policy instruments. It is in this setting that security networks have begun to emerge and replace traditional public administration. In Chapter 5 I empirically follow this development in Sweden, which is a highly interesting case in this regard since it adopted a broader understanding of security early the post-Cold War period.

Given the broader understanding of security and the emergence of security networks, it is necessary to combine the security and crisis management perspective with suggestion that meta-governance is a potential route forward.

3.1.5 Combining Crisis Management and Meta-governance

Crisis and leadership are closely intertwined phenomena, with crises typically being regarded as episodes of threat and uncertainty that demand urgent action. In these situations it is natural that people and organizations turn to leaders and expect them to "do something" (Boin and Hart 2003, 544). At the same time, collaborative networks that manage security and crises have become more widespread. New types of security and crisis issues, such as natural hazards, pandemics, and large scale accidents, often require that a range of organizations collaborate. Actors, both public and private, from different policy fields and sectors and levels of government (local, regional, and national), are often required to cooperate when dealing with different security and crisis issues (Robinson et al. 2013, 346), but the institutional design of governments has nevertheless been slow to adopt to the changing context for societal security. In addition, although the broader understanding today of societal security can be characterized by the convergence of domestic and international arenas, there is also an historical legacy which separates agencies and departments that operate in the domestic and international spheres. Domestic security issues today increasingly defy jurisdictional boundaries and institutional routines of government. The complexity of managing collaboration across policy fields, jurisdictions, and the public-private divide should not be underestimated. Jurisdictional disputes and financial responsibility for operation and long-

term collaboration inevitably challenge willingness to participate and the effectiveness of security networks ('t Hart and Sundelius 2013, 453). Managing security and crisis networks would thus count as a specific form of meta-governance to the extent that it involves an attempt to facilitate and promote multi-organizational arrangements capable of solving security problems that cannot be successfully addressed by any single organization. For such reasons, Nohrstedt et al. stress the need to utilize the literature on both Crisis Management (CM) and Collaborative Public Management (CPM),[1] arguing that a dialogue between these academic sub-fields may help advance research on collaborative crisis management (Nohrstedt et al. 2014). The fact that crises always appear to transcend organizational boundaries underlines the need for collaborative efforts in dealing with them (Ansell, Boin, and Keller 2010, 196). This calls for analytical approaches that investigate information-sharing, the alignment of expectations and actions across organizational boundaries, and the willingness and ability of policy makers and managers to share their resources and possibilities to effectively govern crisis management networks.

Previous research that has examined collaborative *emergency* management indicates that emergency managers face extraordinary challenges and, as a result, prepare for and respond to natural hazards and disasters through extensive collaboration with both public and private actors. Case studies have often shown that collaboration between public and private actors is a potential success factor, and that the breakdown of collaborative networks often leads to poor outcomes (McGuire and Silvia 2010, 279). McGuire and Silvia believe that success in crisis management greatly depends on the professional competencies of emergency managers, although there clearly is a need to further develop theories concerning collaborative crisis management (McGuire and Silvia 2010). Ansell et al., who promote an agenda for research that addresses the "transboundary dimensions" of crises and disasters, have identified four mechanisms that seem to be helpful in effective collaborative responses to crisis, namely, distributed sense-making (merging of problem definitions and understandings), networked coordination (institutional design to support cooperation), surge capacity (overcoming problems of supply logistics), and formal scaling procedures (clarifying decision-making structures and procedures (Ansell, Boin, and Keller 2010). They conclude that the challenges faced by crisis managers who must respond to transboundary events are similar on local, regional, and national levels, and they argue that the key to solving transboundary crises is:

> extreme adaption [to the situation] and unprecedented cooperation under conditions in which these are the most difficult to achieve – when the

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[1] Collaborative Public Management is a different term for meta-governance.

capacity and authority for response is distributed across multiple
organizations and jurisdictions and when crisis itself creates difficult patterns
of interdependence among the actors involved (Ansell, Boin, and Keller
2010, 204)

The tension in the literature is very much between, on the one hand,
leadership and control and, on the other, the possibility for spontaneous and
dynamic responses across organizational boundaries. Wimelius and Engberg
points out that there is both in the academic debate but also in government
publications in Sweden and the general public debate an un-problematized
contradiction that suggest that command and control can be combined with
cooperation and coordination by using a network governance approach
(Wimelius and Engberg 2015, 129). Especially in the Swedish policy field
there exist a repeated emphasis on the need for clarity, command, control,
explicit goals, pronounced responsibilities, mandates, roles and improved
ways of political steering. At the same time politicians and practitioner
believe and advocate a system of crisis management underpinned by
"…horizontal, inter-organizational networked-based coordination and
cooperation" (Wimelius and Engberg 2015, 129). They author's study how
directors at the County administrative Boards perceive and manage these
contradictory requirement when it comes to crisis management. The authors
conclude that the various attempts at providing governance in this political
field is resource intensive and may generate huge differences in how well the
safety of the citizens are catered for in different counties. In addition, they
also found that "…when it comes to conflicts, power asymmetries and
decision-making, it is notable that that there is no clear mechanism for
solving conflicts between actors involved in crisis management in the
Swedish system" (Wimelius and Engberg 2015, 136). In order to overcome
these problems and the contradiction in the Swedish crisis management
system it might be necessary to find tools that would enable an element of
command and control with cooperation and coordination and introduce
instruments that foster network coordination (Wimelius and Engberg 2015,
137). The case study in this doctoral thesis is thus a response to the emerging
call for more empirical studies concerning collaborative emergency
management and the possibility of meta-governance of security networks.
Following the broader security agenda, and subsequent to the changes
indicated above in a policy field where sovereign powers and instruments
have long dominated, collaboration between public and private actors has
begun to emerge and replace traditional public administration. Multilevel
and networked administration has also been also promoted to deal with new
security issues. However, not only is traditional Weberian bureaucracy not
designed to produce highly dynamic responses, Daniel Nohrstedt adds that
collaboration and networks are often necessary to combat intransigent
problems and difficult crises in the field of security (Nohrstedt 2013). But

while networks are said to have adaptive capacities that may help to address unexpected and complex problems by means of flexibility and improvisation, what are the downsides of these collaborative forms in security management? It must be noted, above all, that certain normative considerations and principles are activated and accentuated because of the nature of security. For example, given that crisis and security management relates to the survival and wellbeing of society and citizens, difficulties concerning the accountability of networks become emphasized. Even if networks are heralded for being spontaneous and flexible, and may increase improvisation as well, it is still important to know who is responsible when something goes wrong and citizens are negatively affected. Investigating the viability of meta-governance in this political field is therefore an important contribution both to meta-governance literature and the broader understanding of managing security networks. A problem here is how such an investigation should look like. It might be necessary to zoom in on one specific aspect of meta-governing networks and conduct the conduct of participating security actors. Threats and crises are by their very nature unexpected events that disrupt bureaucracy and routine, and spontaneous and swift responses are often necessary. This draws attention to the fact that cooperation and collaboration rely upon shared information and communication among actors. I therefore argue that one might try the viability of the meta-governance approach by investigating the management of communication. The ability to communicate within and between the participating actors that comprise networks and a multilevel networked administration that deals with security and crisis management is a sort of fundamental ingredients for security networks and their ability to respond to emergent crisis. The Swedish context provides a unique possibility to follow up on the meta-governance of security management since it installed a new security communication system in 2003.

3.1.6 Security Communication and Technology

Although security issues and crises immediately trigger a need for information and information sharing, coordination between collaborating partners is a substantial challenge in virtually all situations of crisis and emergency. Difficulties or restrictions in communication are likely to compound this challenge, especially if there is no established high-status organization that can act as a hub for information collection and dissemination (Ansell, Boin, and Keller 2010, 199). Francis J. Marra remarks in this regard that "organizations or individuals that communicate poorly during crisis often make bad situations worse" (Marra 1998, 461).

The nature of emergencies requires collaborating partners to communicate effectively with each other in order to make informed decisions under conditions of uncertainty and to engage and call upon the assistance of

additional actors in the security network to mitigate, prepare for, respond, and recover from disasters. Effective communication and coordination are thus crucial aspects of security networks. Furthermore, the need for communication is particularly important in security networks and in a networked administration since both the element of self-organization in networks as well as each new crisis creates new patterns of communication and collaboration (Hu and Kapucu 2014). In addition, the shifting nature of challenges and crises make it necessary for networks to be spontaneous, dynamic, and capable of incorporating new actors if necessary, and today's broader understanding of security and the emergence of security networks have in fact expanded the number of participators in crisis management.. Historically, public safety agents have been key actors in crisis and domestic security management, and a central aspect of their professional training is to be able to communicate with each other via radio-systems. New security challenges and the turn to societal security, in combination with the extensive privatization of vital systems, also require that new actors be able to communicate within their security network. It is thus a core challenge for meta-governors in the political field of security to facilitate and manage security and crisis communications. In this respect, recent innovations in information communication technology (ICT), if they are applied appropriately, have the potential to improve communication and help to both prevent and mitigate the disturbing effects of threatening situations (Vogt, Hertweck, and Hales 2011, 1).

ICT has been utilized in security networks to help organizations share and process information, establish communication channels, reach and engage all necessary stakeholders, and, not least of all, to coordinate collaborative efforts among a large number of collaborating partners (Hu and Kapucu 2014, 2). TETRA (Terrestrial Trunked Radio) was standardized in 1997 by the European Telecommunications Standards Institute (ETSI), and has been available since then on the world-wide market. It came to be promoted as a solution useful for "borderless Europe" and is now the leading digital ICT of choice for security networks. The idea in this regard was that all public safety agents in all European countries would replace their national communications systems with a single "borderless mobile communications system" that would enable cross-border policing and ensure the safety and security of the population in Europe. TETRA became established as the only multi-vendor standard available which guaranteed interoperability with unmatched versatility, efficiency, robustness, longevity, and security in respect to communications (Mikulic and Modlic 2008, 207). Due to the need for sharing information and resources and coordinating efforts under time restraints, all organizations involved in crisis management can benefit greatly from ICTs capable of improving their communications and coordination (Hu and Kapucu 2014). However, there are only a limited number of empirical studies that have investigated the role of ICT,

particularly the TETRA solution, in security networks (Hu and Kapucu 2014). Most of the research in this area has instead focused on technological advances in ICT without investigating implementation and management as such. Hu and Kapucu, who have investigated the utilization of ICT among organizations, report that it is often under-utilized even by emergency management organizations, and they suggest that emergency managers need to ensure that their organizational use of ICT is in line with their emergency management practices. They also call for additional ore research in order to further understand the adoption and utilization of emerging ICTs in central organizations and security networks (Hu and Kapucu 2014, 19).

The way in which Sweden has managed her new national ICT system (RAKEL), which is based on the TETRA standard, is particularly interesting. Sweden adopted early on a broader understanding of security that expanded the field beyond traditional public safety issues and agents. Almost from the outset the ambition was to have a wide circle of end-users, both public and private, who would be able to communicate with each other in the event of a crisis. Given the central role of communications in crisis management, particularly in loosely constituted security networks, the management of crisis communications in Sweden is thus a highly significant case. Investigating Sweden's meta-governance stance and strategies for implementing RAKEL may thus contribute to advancing knowledge concerning ICTs and security networks in general.

The present discussion examines developments in Sweden that began in the mid-1990s in connection with the adoption of a broader understanding of security that promotes and encourages extensive collaboration between private and public actors. This made it necessary for the Swedish state to adopt a meta-governance stance, accept the utilization of security networks, and attempt to govern on conditions favorable to their continuation. Examining events associated with the launch of RAKEL in 2003 and its further implementation make possible a detailed study of various meta-governance tools in the management of security communications, which is a significant aspect of security networks. In addition, investigating both the ideational change in security management and the governance of the new ICT security communications system allows for closer scrutiny of the possibility of meta-governance and specific policy tools. Before I investigate the process that led to the meta-governance stance and the attempts to govern at a distance with indirect policy tools I clarify in the following chapters the methodological considerations, the methods and materials I have used in order to answer the research questions.

4 Interpretive Policy Analysis

Methodology is an encompassing term that refers to basic assumptions and convictions which the researcher holds concerning the world that shape the research interest and the methods used in the empirical investigation. A methodology may be understood as a set of ontological and epistemological considerations that informs and formulates specific scientific standards and criteria for evaluation (Pouliot 2007, 360), while research design concerns making choices and articulating a rationale for the decisions one has made. If methodology refers to the logic of inquiry, the conduct of the inquiry itself might be thought of in terms of the particular methods through which the research design and its logic are implemented in practice (Schwartz-Shea and Yanow 2012, 4). This chapter discusses the overall research design as well as specific methods that I have utilized in order to answer the research question.

In Chapter 2 I discussed the nature of networks and outlined the meta-governance perspective. Meta-governance may be understood as a concrete and ongoing practice that is informed by specific ideas and assumptions about the possibility of to govern organizations that take part in networks. Meta-governance is a form governmentality that aims to conduct the conduct of network participants without resorting to sovereign means. Consequently, investigating a case of meta-governance will also include a recovery of the underlying ideas and assumptions that guide that particular instance of meta-governance. I have selected a most-likely case for meta-governance to work, namely the political field of security. The empirical investigation is divided into two parts that responds to the two empirically oriented research question posed din chapter one:

4. Has the Swedish state taken a meta-governance stance in the political field of security (if so)?
5. What meta-governance tools can be identified and what problems did the Swedish state experience in its attempt to meta-govern security networks?
6. What are the implications of the theoretical and empirical findings of this thesis?

The third question is a question that is directed towards an end-discussion and serves foremost as a guide for discussing the theoretical and empirical findings of the thesis.

The first part of the empirical study that corresponds to the first question provides a broad contextual and historical background for the *meta-governance stance* that the Swedish state has taken in the field of security that could be said to follow the wider understanding of security that emerged in the mid-1990s. Chapter 3 provided a theoretical background to the political field of security but investigating it empirically allow me to specify a causal process and the logic behind the adoption of meta-governance. This process is described in chapter 5. In chapter 6, I investigate how the Swedish state and specific meta-governors attempt to govern security networks and a networked administration. In this part of the study I zoom in one particular but very important aspect of security networks namely security communication. The Swedish state decided to build a new ICT for security communication and this is a case within the case that allow me to investigate if meta-governance is fruitful approach to managing security networks.

The empirical investigation utilizes a methodology that is called Interpretive Policy Analysis (IPA), which draws attention to the role played by ideas and conceptions in guiding the policy process. The particular methods that I use are *process-tracing* combined with *qualitative text analysis*, *interviews*, and *observations*. Before describing these methods in detail, however, I wish to discuss both the possibilities and limitations associated with single case studies.

4.1 Single-Case Studies

Single case studies are much more than thick descriptions and building blocks for comparative studies (King, Keohane, and Verba 1994, George and Bennett 2005, 8f, Brady and Collier 2010, 20f). Many scholars in the social sciences have in fact called for a return to history, putting forward case studies as a compelling research design for theoretical and empirical contributions. An orientation to theory in combination with the logic of historical explanations, along with an attention to processes rather than variables are some of the reasons for why case studies have recently become more accepted. The main problem with case studies, however, concerns the ability to handle the tension that emerges between the specific findings of the case in question and theoretical and empirical contributions at large, for while the case itself is seldom interesting, it is motivated and framed as a "case of something specific." That is to say that the knowledge and inferences generated by the case study are referred both to a specific population and to a theoretical discourse (George and Bennett 2005, 69). The case study presented in this thesis is to be understood as a case of meta-governance, specifically, of meta-governance within the political field of security in Sweden.

While the case study approach is always torn between the universal and the particular, it typically allows a researcher to attain high levels of conceptual validity and identify the indicators that best represent the theoretical approach that the researcher intends to investigate. George observes that the attention to context in respect to the detailed examination of a concrete case in fact comprises the particular strength of a single case study (George and Bennett 2005, 74f). He adds, however, that although a detailed consideration of contextual factors makes possible a high degree of internal validity and a good level historical explanation, difficulties arise in respect to making generalizations for large populations (George and Bennett 2005, 22, Flyvbjerg 2001, 38).

The case study presented in this thesis may be described as *a most likely case design* (George and Bennett 2005, 121), which concerns cases that are favorable to the theories or theoretical perspectives that are to be investigated. Meta-governance is not a precise causal theory that provides a clear hypothesis, such as X➔Y but it provides strong claims and recommendations about specific policy instruments that will allow meta-governors to govern networks. It should rather be regarded as more closely resembling if not a paradigm as such, then at least an approach and perspective (Kuhn 1970). Nevertheless, it is sufficiently precise to provide recommendations for how meta-governors should act in order to govern networks, and it is the specific tools and strategies it recommends. Their viability is certainly examinable. If meta-governance has problems in this political field it casts serious doubts upon it and its chances of success in other instances as well (George and Bennett 2005, 122).

The present study may therefore contribute new knowledge concerning the possibilities of meta-governance in the particular field of security as well as meta-governance at large. Previous studies have pointed to both the advantages and difficulties associated with meta-governance. The initial theoretical problem which Bell and Park identified was that the theory of meta-governance is underdeveloped, and that it remains an empirically open question whether governments in fact possess the requisite meta-governance skills and capacities (Bell and Park 2006). When Keith Baker and Gerry Stoker examined meta-governance in the United Kingdom, they concluded that although the existing theories concerning meta-governance make claims about the capability of the state to meta-govern (Baker and Stoker 2013), the state had in fact been unable to do so. However, since their study involved what was regarded as a *least likely case* for successful meta-governance, they suggested that meta-governance should be tested and evaluated in cases where conditions appear to be more favorable. Koppenjan, Kars, and van der Voort examined meta-governance as it was carried out by elected politicians, and they concluded that politicians were in fact able to function as meta-governors. As a result, they argued that this case demonstrated that examples of successful meta-governance can be identified in spite of the theoretical

and empirical critiques of meta-governance. But they were not willing to make generalizations about meta-governance on the basis of their single case study since the latter did not demonstrate that all forms of meta-governance can work (Koppenjan, Kars, and van der Voort 2013, 145). They also state that further research is needed concerning the forms and effects of meta-governance.

This thesis is intended to reply to this need by studying meta-governance in the political field of security. Since networks are described as self-regulatory structures within their own policy sectors (Pierre and Peters 2000, 20), it is also necessary to investigate how networks emerge in a given policy sector and how meta-governance becomes the preferred approach in that field for public authorities. In addition, since previous studies of meta-governance have often been conducted in respect to specific instances and particular reforms within a brief time period, it has also been proposed that it would be fruitful to conduct a study that covers a longer time period. Provan and Kenis, for instance, state that additional empirical studies that investigate longer periods of time are needed in order to assess the development of meta-governance tools within a single case (Provan and Kenis 2008, 247). The empirical investigation presented in this thesis follows the development within a particular sector during a longer time period by analyzing it as an unfolding *process* (Bennett 2010).

4.1.1 Process Tracing

Process-tracing is a research method that articulates the various stages of development in a given case. The basic version of process-tracing takes the form of a detailed narrative or story presented in chronological order that casts light on how an event or outcome came about (Hay 2002, 149). A more strict use of process-tracing involves identifying "the intervening causal process – the causal chain and causal mechanisms – between an independent variable (or variables) and the outcome of the dependent variable" (George and Bennett 2005, 206). As was mentioned above, the meta-governance perspective does not involve a causal theory or possess specific variables that can take on concrete values. The type of process tracing that I utilize in this thesis may therefore be regarded as thick description and a detailed narrative of the development in the political field of security. As such, it may be described as an attempt to transform an historical narrative into an analytical and more general explanation rather than present a detailed tracing of a casual process. This variant of process tracing is often used when the "theory or laws necessary for a detailed explanation are lacking or because an explanation couched at a higher level of generality and abstraction is preferred for the research objective" (George and Bennett 2005, 211) Renate Myantz also maintains that a causal reconstruction may be regarded as an analytical narrative, the aim of which would be to provide an explanation

that "does not look for statistical relationships among variables but seeks to explain a given social phenomenon… by identifying the processes through which it is generated (Mayntz 2004, 238). Most processes are *path-dependent*, which means that certain events in the sequence which takes place shape or foreclose subsequent paths and thereby steer the outcome and development in certain directions. Path dependency can be dealt with in several ways, such as by identifying *key decision points* or *branching points* in a longitudinal case. Although it may not always be possible to identify a single branching point that immediately and permanently closes off certain branches of development or specific actions, previous branching points nevertheless render a process is path-dependent, with specific outcomes or actions becoming more or less likely (George and Bennett 2005, 213, Bennett 2010, 208). Studies of both macro- and micro-level phenomena benefit from use of the process-tracing method insofar as the latter offers an alternative means for making causal inferences when it is not possible to do so through the method of controlled comparison (George and Bennett 2005, 214).

In my empirical investigation only the first part is organized as process-tracing in a strict sense. The second part is chronological but investigates specific policy instruments without trying to establish causality. The reconstruction of the development of the political field of security starts with the introduction in the mid-1990s of a broader understanding of security in Sweden. This makes it possible to follow the path-dependency and restructuring which began with the adoption of a broader understanding of security that invites the participation of private actors in security issues, calls for extensive public-private collaboration, introduces the idea of security networks, and reveals the need for leadership and control of the networks that are formed. I also identify the key decisions and branching points in this process that lead to *the meta-governance stance*. This particular process study is important since it reveals how networks develop due to specific understandings and interdependencies. This chapter also provides the ideational and contextual background for the second process tracing I carry out in Chapter 6, where I investigate a specific aspect of meta-governance of security networks, namely, security communications.

In 2003 Sweden launched a new radio system for security communications, RAKEL (Radio Communication for Effective Management). Insofar as a key element of the meta-governance stance is that the state attempts to avoid using sovereign power and direct regulation, the Swedish state and the responsible public agents employed the various meta-governance tools described in Chapter 2 in the construction and implementation of this system. The investigation presented in Chapter 6 will make possible a better understanding and assessment of the possibility of meta-governance and of the various changes in governance strategies in the political field of security.

With the additional analytical grid of governmentality the empirical investigation does not only follow specific practices but also tries to recover the underlying ideas and assumptions of specific measures. Governmentality studies, which often take a fragmented state as their starting point, have a particular focus on how rationality and power are used in governance strategies but are open to the possibility of governance failure.

4.2 Interpretive Policy Analysis and the Role of Ideas

Interpretive approaches to policy analysis focus on the various meanings that policies and policy instruments have for different policy actors. Interpretive research regards human beings as agents who actively and collaboratively construct and destruct meaning by critically assessing and changing their understandings, preferences, and actions. Reflexive human beings constitute and establish societies, cultures, institutions, organizations, practices, and physical artifacts, and these differing settings are populated by diverse discourses and concepts. Against this background, interpretive policy analysis searches for the motivations that animate social and political activities and help generate their meaning. And insofar as language is the nexus of meaning and action, interpretive research is particularly interested in language since the language characteristic of a given setting shapes and frames agents' worldviews (Schwartz-Shea and Yanow 2012, 47).

Indeed, if ideas and social types are essential elements of the social world that are central to political and social practices, then it is necessary to recover the underlying assumptions and ideas that, in turn, generate specific actions and meaningful strategies. Ideas do not exist merely in the minds of individuals, for they can be institutionalized to a certain extent, shared, and thereby transformed into an intersubjective frame of reference. A strict division between explaining (from the outside) and understanding (grasping why reflexive agents act in a certain way) is thus not viable if we accept that the ideational aspects of social and political reality are what matter (Larsson 2015). Constructivists, who emphasize the social construction of reality, maintain that ideas are indeed important since they in fact are constitutive of their referent object. That is to say, reflexive agents have subjective and individual understandings of their environment, and they constantly interpret and give meaning to their surroundings. In addition, social types would not exist in their current concrete forms but for the ideas and meanings that have constituted them. Consequently, if we wish to understand and explain a specific process, then we need to include the ideas and understandings that underpin it in our analysis. The present study is supported by this key conviction that underlies constructivism (Adler 1997, Wendt 1998, 1999, Gofas and Hay 2010, Guzzini 2005).

Yanow and Schwartz-Shea maintain in this regard that

methodological interpretivists seek understanding within specific settings: how the actors in them understand their contexts, explicitly and/or tacitly, and why they conduct themselves in particular ways. This 'why' takes the form of 'constitutive' causality, which engages how humans conceive of their worlds, the language they use to describe them and other elements constituting that social world, which makes possible or impossible the interactions they pursue (Schwartz-Shea and Yanow 2012).

Vincent Pouliot furthers argues that a constructivist style of reasoning is inherently historical since it "sees the world as a project under construction, as becoming rather than being" (Adler 2005, 11). The dialectic constitution of knowledge, understanding, and reality thus demands a process-centered approach precisely because the world is regarded as coming into being (Pouliot 2007, 364). Such a historicized understanding of social life is also in tune with the denaturalization that underlies constructivism.

However, the types of material that will be used in an analysis are important in the effort to conduct process-tracing and uncover the ideas and understandings that underlie public policies. I will thus now direct attention to the materials I have used in my empirical study as well as the specific methods I have employed.

4.3 Methods and Materials

The methods I have used are *qualitative text analysis* and *interviews* supplemented by *observation*. These are closely intertwined with data collection in the sense that interviews, for example, comprise a method but also produce data as they are conducted. Text analysis was carried out with written sources consisting of governmental and legal documents, reports and studies from public agencies, as well as annual reports, memos, and meeting protocols produced by the responsible public agencies (Yanow 2000, 38). I performed observations at meetings and events that were organized by various meta-governors, which provided further insight into the policy tools used by public agencies as well as the rationalities underlying the latter. Such observation is a vital part of ethnographic studies, but it has also proven very useful in the present study as a complement to the other two methods.

4.3.1 Qualitative Text Analysis and Written Sources

I have utilized various forms of official documents in my study, one of the main sources being Swedish Government Official Reports (SGOR), which are known in Sweden as the SOU series. More involved public investigations, conducted by either an individual or a group of investigators, are often called for in the event of large changes in the political and

administrative organization, new policy problems, critical events that need to be investigated, and so forth. The instructions for such investigations can be broad, such as when they involve unbiased study and the establishment of new directions for the near future in a political field on the basis of a situational analysis. They can also be narrow, such as when the instructions are to evaluate the possibility of transforming or closing specific public agencies or investigating a specific event. The public reports produced by such investigations often, but not always, are influential since they define problems and propose solutions. Together with the instructions provided, they comprise important sources for understanding major transformations in public policy. They themselves are not regulatory documents, however, and the findings, descriptions, and solutions they provide need to be formally adopted and transcribed into such official documents as government bills or regulatory documents. For such reasons, I first reviewed all major public investigations in the policy field before investigating any subsequent bills and regulatory documents to determine whether they followed or described a different policy recommendation.

Another important source of information was the governmental bills that concern the field of security. These documents are not brief descriptions of specific new laws, but rather large documents that often summarize previous decisions, the development at large, descriptions of problems and solutions, and statements of intention.

Documents produced by the responsible ministry and made available in the Ministry Publication series serve as important sources for detecting overarching policy problems and solutions. They may comprise minor changes in policy and amendments to existing rules as well larger investigations and reports concerning policy areas and specific policy problems. The respective ministry also provides direction to all public authorities and agencies in the form of a government appropriation (instructions). These documents, which are sent out to all public agencies on an annual basis, provide the specifications of the desired results and also indicate the financial resources that each agency is permitted to use for attaining these goals. These documents also make it possible to detect and recover how policy problems and steering instruments are evaluated and reshaped.

Two public agencies have been responsible for the overall management of RAKEL, namely, Krisberedskapsmyndigheten (KBM) and Myndigheten för Samhällsskydd och Beredskap (MSB). The restructuring in 2009 of the KBM into the MSB, which is discussed in Chapter 5, formed a vital part in the development of the political field of security. Both of these public agencies have produced important documents that I carefully examined, not the least of which are the annual reports informing the government concerning how their activities have proceeded. They have also conducted studies that explicitly concern problems with RAKEL and security

communications. Some of these contain proposals to the government recommending changes in regulations, while others are manuals for end-users or simply newsletters. These documents also contain descriptions of problems and possible resolutions in respect to both policy and steering instruments, which are of great interest for the present investigation. I have also examined such other sources as previous research and reports from meetings in order to obtain cross-references.

I have utilized the method of qualitative text analysis in carefully studying all of these documents. The basic notion underlying this method, which was first specified by Kracauer in 1952 (Kuckartz 2014, 31), is that an analyst can recover the basic ideas and assumptions concerning a given policy field and how public authorities attempt to govern it from such official documents. A qualitative type of content analysis addresses the latent meanings and intersubjective understanding communicated in specific texts. Insofar as it focuses on discovering the *meaning* within texts and analyzes their communicative content, it comprises an *analytical* method that may include such sources as interviews and observations in addition to written documents. (I do, however, distinguish between these differing methods and materials.) Briefly stated, qualitative content analysis emphasizes the need to interpret and contextualize the text, and its main aim is to highlight important passages and changes while eliminating more insignificant information in the presentation. This enables an analyst to reconstruct and retell a process of change. Content analysis thus involves reducing complexity while adhering to a certain research-based perspective.

I roughly adhered to the following points in studying the official documents and texts indicated above:

- Situating the text (Who has written it, for what purpose, and for what audience?).
- Analyzing the text in the light of the research question.
- Closely reading the text.
- Highlighting the central terms and concepts.
- Marking and making notes concerning important passages.
- Marking passages that are difficult to understand when analyzing the arguments and reasons given for specific actions taken.
  (Kuckartz 2014, 51).

Dwora Yanow states that policy analysts begin analyzing documents as they access them by constructing a context within which it is possible to organize and evaluate various data. The researcher thereby gradually comes to recognize and access local and contextual knowledge and understandings. Being able to know what specific object or element of language is significant comes from the situational familiarity that is built up in this manner. For example, I noted that a public investigation came up with principles for how

to organize responsibility in the political field of security, and the fact that these principles were later adopted in governmental bills further points to the importance they had for the policy field. The same principles later appeared in working papers and documents and were also referred to in interviews. Through tracing this sequence it became possible to detect contextual knowledge and important understandings that at first glance, or with limited data, would not seem to possess the degree of importance they in fact held. Stated otherwise, this type of triangulation between different materials and methods provided a situational familiarity with the case, and a causal reconstruction of the policy process became possible through such analytical activities (Yanow 2000, 38).

4.3.2 Interviews

I conducted seven interviews at different stages of the research process between 2010 and 2014 with persons involved in the direct management of RAKEL or being representatives for specific categories end-users. I have also interviewed experts on security communication that has been involved in different ways in managing or reviewing the work with RAKEL. Seven interviews can be seen as a small number and it might have been beneficial to have conducted more interviews. One set of interviews that may have been particularly interesting could have been the organizers of different RAKEL-forums or the director general at MSB. These elite persons are however very difficult to get a hold. I therefore consider my prime material to be the documents and written reports and the conducted interviews as additional sources for verification and additional insights. All these interviews were conducted in what is normally referred to as an "open-ended" or "unstructured" manner. In contrast to a structured interview with a range of fixed questions that are posed to all interviewees, the unstructured interview somewhat resembles a conversation in which the researcher can adjust questions in light of who is interviewed and also pose new follow-up questions (Kvale 1997, 13).

An interview may be regarded as a type of conversation with a particular structure and purpose, whereby it is distinct from a normal conversation in which views and opinions are exchanged. Although the interviewer is dependent on the cooperation of the person being interviewed, s/he nevertheless defines and controls the situation through the questions posed (Kvale 1997, 13). The situation does depend to some degree, however, on specifically who is being interviewed. Steinar Kvale might well be correct when he remarks that it is very much the researcher who controls the situation and the conversation when ordinary persons are interviewed, but that the situation is very much reversed when members of an elite, politicians, top public managers, and experts are interviewed. My own experience was that such individuals indeed controlled the situation to a

significant extent when I interviewed them, not least because we often met in their office buildings and in non-public meeting rooms, where they felt much more at home than me. In addition, since I was very much in need of their information and knowledge of the issue being investigated, it was often the case that they were in control of the conversation (Harvey 2011, 434).

I sought to be as transparent as possible prior to the interviews, providing the interviewees with information about who I am, where I work, what the nature of my research is, how much time the interview might take, and how the information will be used. But since RAKEL has been a highly criticized project – and those working with it know that this is the case – I observed that the higher the interviewee was in the hierarchy, the more reluctant s/he was to discuss problematic issues or reveal sensitive information. I therefore often had to demonstrate that I was well aware of specific issues, including changes in laws and regulations. Harvey writes that it is typical that researchers must show that they have done their homework because elites often consciously or sub-consciously challenge the interviewer. I also noticed that the more I showed I was familiar with the case, the more the interviewee was willing to share information and openly discuss problems associated with RAKEL. Another strategy might have been to "dumb-down" in the expectation that I would thereby receive more sensitive information or discuss various problems. I admit that I tried this strategy in most interviews with top managers, but insofar as it only left me with shallow answers, I found that it was more effective to demonstrate that I knew the case very well, and even confront the respondent with specific problems or issues, in order to make them speak in a more productive manner (Harvey 2011, 434, Björnehed 2012, 72). I also often used open-ended questions that could be answered either face-to face or over the telephone. Interviewing experts or members of the elite with open-ended questions encourages them to speak more openly about related issues that I as an interviewer might not have considered previously. Interviews have proven to be a very useful complement to written sources.

I selected interviewees using a snowball approach, that is, I asked a given interviewee for recommendations concerning other potential and useful persons to interview when our meeting was completed. All persons who were interviewed were strategically selected either for their specific role or function in the political process associated with RAKEL, or because of their insights into the latter. All interviews that were conducted face-to-face were recorded, which all interviewees found to be both necessary and natural. No one objected to this. Some of my interviews were conducted over the telephone because of geographical distance, and these were recorded with a speaker function.

4.3.3 Observations

In addition to conducting interviews and examining official documents, I attended a number of important meetings and events. I also participated without an active role in RAKEL day[2] and in forums with both end-users and municipalities. All these observations added yet another dimension to local knowledge and to a sense of how meta-governors seek to utilize meta-governance tools. Such activities may be described as a type of policy field work through which the analyst becomes familiar with the tone, set-up, and discourses used in actual settings, meetings, and events. Attending such meetings also made it possible for me to interact and speak with both meta-governors and network participants without conducting formal interviews. Collecting data from several different types of sources in this way made it possible to put together a more coherent picture of developments by gaining a view of both the issue and policies from a number of different angles (Yanow 2000).

4.4 Summary

In this chapter I have discussed the methodological premises and research design of the study as well as the specific methods used for data collection and data analysis. The research design involves a most-likely single case study the first part of the study use process-tracing as its overarching method while the other intends to investigate specific ideas and practices of meta-governance. Both parts utilize official documents, interviews, and observations for data collection in order to perform two causal reconstructions of the meta-governance processes in the political field of security in Sweden. In the following chapter I focus on the development of the political field of security and the ideational changes that have taken place since the beginning of the 1990s that led up to what I term a *meta-governance stance*. This causal reconstruction later serves as the context and historical background when I look more closely at specific meta-governance tools in Chapter 6, which focuses exclusively on security communications as a specific case within the case of meta-governance of security networks.

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[2] This event will be discussed later in the text.

5 The Meta-governance Stance

In order to understand the development of the political field of security and the meta-governance stance that the Swedish state has taken in this respect, it is necessary to provide an historical account of the ideational underpinnings that led to the latter. The primary aim of this empirical chapter is to investigate and specify the ideas, problem, and rationalities underlying the meta-governance stance by providing a reconstruction of the development of this field. The process-tracing presented in this chapter makes it possible to identify *key decisions* and *branching points* that have shaped the political field of security. The starting point of this process is taken to be the introduction in the mid-1990s of a broader understanding of security that permits additional issues to be securitized and invites the participation of new security actors who previously were not involved in the security and crisis management system. The adoption of this more comprehensive view concerning security and the subsequent securitization of vital systems and sensitive infrastructure have contributed to a situation in which the Swedish state is no longer the sole security provider.

New interdependencies between public and private actors have led to the emergence and encouragement of security networks. This development is not unintentional, however, insofar as the present investigation has shown that the government and responsible public agencies have actively promoted the emergence of security networks. Such interdependency and collaboration have altered the way governance is performed in this sector. But although the involvement of private actors and networks has disabled traditional governing tools and sovereign powers, there in fact has been little control and guidance over networks even as they have been encouraged to take shape. KBM (Krisberedskapsmyndigheten), the new public agency designed to be the meta-governor in the political field of security, was assigned functions that were supposedly adequate for leading operations in the crisis management system. Nevertheless, the large-scale crises experienced by Sweden at the beginning of the new millennium not only revealed substantial weaknesses in network management, they also drew attention to the lack of operational abilities on the part of the government and KBM. The government therefore sought to increase its control over networks in the field of security by creating a new public agency with even broader powers, MSB (Myndigheten för Samhällsskydd och beredskap), which would possess principal meta-governance capabilities and responsibilities. In this chapter I

intend to investigate if the Swedish state has taken a meta-governance stance in the political field of security. Such a stance would include a positive outlook on the emergence of security networks rather just a troublesome development but also indications on different adjustments to network governance that does not run counter to the self-organizing nature on networks. The chapter also aims at describing the rationality behind the development in this political field.

5.1 The Broader Understanding of Security (1993-2000)

Sweden found itself in a position after the end of the Cold War in which the likelihood of military invasion by a foreign power was very unlikely. This led to a substantial reorganization of the political field of security. A major public investigation was undertaken in 1993 with the aim of analyzing how the Swedish state should develop its defense and protection services. The initial and most important report was *A More Secure Society* (Ett säkrare samhälle) (SOU 1995), which found that the absence of military threats made it both possible and desirable to redirect attention and resources from traditional defense and military forces to a more *comprehensive view* of security This meant that a greater focus should be placed upon managing civil protection and disturbances, along with the provisioning of increased resources to do so. Instead of the former narrow focus on military threats, the investigation proposed that the state should adopt a comprehensive view concerning and examine how to achieve a more cost-effective use of society's collective resources. The comprehensive view for which the investigation argued implied that everything from larger accidents and severe disturbances in vital systems to war should be viewed and managed in terms of a single scale (SOU 1995, 37).

The investigation explicitly maintained that security for modern states in a globalized world included such "severe disturbances in peacetime" as problems associated with radioactive waste, severe disturbances in the infrastructure, flooding, mass movements of refugees and immigrants, pandemics, terrorism, and severe accidents with chemicals or bio-hazardous materials (SOU 1995, 18). The main purpose of the report was not to provide a risk analysis for Sweden, but rather to "increase awareness in public agencies and elsewhere that they must perform their own assessments of risks and threats so that they can take the actions necessary for protecting people, property, and the environment" (SOU 1995, 18 author's translation).[3] The investigation found it to be "natural" that the state adopts a comprehensive view of the responsibilities and powers of public agencies in the field of security other than the military that are involved in the protection

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[3] All translations in this chapter are by the author unless stated otherwise.

of society and individuals in both peacetime and war. This view was based on the notion that society as a whole must be prepared to intervene in order to combat all types of disturbances (SOU 1995, 19).

A More Secure Society was the first major official re-articulation of security that called for a new way of thinking about security, including who should participate in the governance of security issues. This report, which was very influential, provided the background and fundamental impetus for the political restructuring of the field of security that took place during the 1990s. This is evident from the fact that it has often been referred to explicitly in subsequent governmental bills and working documents and therefore constitutes a core branching point in the process.

Total Defense in Renewal (Totalförsvaret i förnyelse) (1995/96:12 1995) was the first *government bill* that placed a major emphasis on the need to adopt a broader and more comprehensive view of security. This bill, in which the government made explicit the new spectrum of threats and risks that had come to form the background for Swedish security politics, presented an overview of how the state should work within the field of security between the years 1997-2001. It stated that Sweden's security situation had been *dramatically* transformed after the end of The Cold War, with the previous military and traditional threats against Sweden having disappeared or at the very least reduced. But since new threats and challenges had arisen in the changed situation, new orientations within security management had become necessary. In addition, the new period that emerged should be guided by the understanding that non-military threats and risks comprise an integral element of Total Defense, and that there are both military and civil aspects of security in war as well as in peacetime (1995/96:12 1995, 2 author's translation). The bill also noted that Total Defense needed to direct more attention to domestic issues than before insofar as Swedish society stood before a range of serious threats, risks, and unforeseen events that could bring about severe national disturbances and thus had to be taken into serious consideration. A range of potential disturbances were mentioned, including those addressed in *A More Secure Society*, as examples of serious security threats of a non-military nature.

> Interruptions in electrical power supply, nuclear accidents, and environmental disasters can have far-reaching consequences for the population. International terrorism is becoming more dangerous, can place severe restrictions upon society, and affects many people. War, oppression, and poverty can lead to large refugee flows and migrations. Natural disasters should not be met in our time with a resigned fatalism…. Non-military threats and disruptions put our country and our national security at risk just as do armed attacks. In order to ensure our security against such threats, the Government believes that a broader concept of security, which includes everything that can affect our national security, is more appropriate. To consider security only from a

military perspective is an outdated approach on the eve of the third millennium (1995/96:12 1995, 6 author's translation).

A More Secure Society coupled with *Total Defense in Renewal* make it clear that Sweden had adopted a broader understanding of security that included a range of minor as well as major disturbances and restrictions. The term "comprehensive view," which recurs frequently in these documents, illustrates how the Swedish state had expanded the boundaries of the political field of security such that threats and risks that can bring about severe restrictions in peacetime demanded greater attention in the absence of external military threats.

In September 1996, the new government presented a governmental bill entitled *Preparedness against Severe Restraints on Society in Peacetime* (Beredskapen mot svåra påfrestningar på samhället i fred) (1996/97:11 1996), the main purpose of which was to describe to the parliament the direction that the government believed was necessary in order to prevent and manage severe disturbances in peacetime. This bill was in its style more a doctrine that specified the new foundation and orientation of the field of security rather than proposes specific new laws or changes in existing ones. It presented a range of issues which needed to be prioritized that were basically the same as those used in *A More Secure Society* to illustrate the new potential threats facing Sweden. It also further advanced the need to adopt a comprehensive view of security and to redirect resources and efforts to domestic security issues (1996/97:11 1996). The bill greatly relied upon the situational analysis presented in the public investigation previously mentioned (1995/96:12 1995), but it also explained how to realize and work with a broader security agenda. Severe peacetime disturbances calling for crisis management were defined as those situations which:
1)
    1. Deviate from what is considered normal;
    2. Occur rapidly, more or less unexpectedly, and without warning;
    3. Threaten fundamental values; and
    4. Require quick decisions and coordinated efforts in multiple instances.
2)
The last point show how a wider understanding of security or a comprehensive view invites and encourages an understanding that crisis requires the effort of many different actors. The bill also highlighted the need to establish extensive collaboration between the military and civil defense so that resources can be used both more cost-effectively, but also more effectively in contributing to the full protection of Swedish society. The meaning of civil defense in these early documents and bills concerned, above all, traditional public safety agents who already had a close relation to military institutions as well as clearly defined roles in war time. For instance, the Swedish Agency for Civil Emergency Planning, the National Board of

Psychological Defense, the Police Board, and the Swedish Rescue Service Agency were pointed to as agencies central within the new context established for managing domestic security issues. In addition, cooperation between traditional security agents and the military was indicated as being of the greatest importance. The bill also noted that a comprehensive view of security may require the *activation* of additional public agents. This also shows how the broader security approach requires more actors to get involved in the security management as well as a new mindset by public actors and serve as a key decision for implementing a wider understanding of security among public agents.

Preparedness against Severe Disturbances in Society in Peacetime stated that all public agents needed to begin thinking in terms of risk and security in relation to their daily operations, and that security and risk needed to become a key aspect of all public management (1996/97:11 1996, 21). The bill noted that "Every actor who can become engaged in crisis management should create a special group that is able both to support 'threat- and risk-awareness' within the organization and to keep this awareness active as well" (1996/97:11 1996, 19 author's translation). Not only should security and risk become a key aspect of the activities of public agents, citizens also needed to be made aware of and prepare themselves for crisis. The government feared that:

> knowledge concerning first aid, simpler firefighting, and how to endure long interruptions in electrical power, water, or heating is not sufficiently high. It is therefore necessary to increase such basic security knowledge among the adult population

Although younger groups of citizens could be taught about such issues through their general education in schools, public agencies needed to examine ways in which to raise the level of awareness among older citizens, who can no longer be socialized through the educational system (1996/97:11 1996, 12).

At this stage of the process the consequences of implementing a comprehensive understanding of security became evident. For instance, public agents, especially traditional public safety agents, needed to redirect their attention to domestic security issues and seek collaboration with other public agents. It also became clear that it was necessary to take *security* into consideration in all sectors and spheres of the state and become aware of risks and threats in the immediate surroundings and in everyday operations. It should be noted, however, that the activation and direct involvement of civil society organizations, corporations, and individuals in security management was not yet underlined to the degree that it would later be. The new orientation in defense and security still primarily comprised a redirection from international to domestic security issues, and the

collaboration called for primarily concerned the more traditional public agencies in the field. The extensive collaboration between public and private that would later become a key issue was not called for at this early stage in the process.

5.2 Extended Collaboration (2001-2005)

The new comprehensive understanding of security that had been adopted and institutionalized demanded a considerable rethinking of the political field of security. First, the redirection of attention and resources from traditional military threats and security management to new issues served to expand the political field of security and make security issues much more varied. This meant, in turn, that security was no longer focused on controlling and directing military forces insofar as efforts to prevent and manage severe disturbances in normal peacetime life highlighted the civil side of "Total Defense."

   Although the first phase of this process had diversified the nature of security threats and potential disturbances, the responsibility for meeting these new challenges still resided with traditional public safety agents and other agencies that would normally be considered the *civil side* of total defense. While these actors were already familiar with the general type of preparedness required for dealing with crises, threats, and severe disturbances, they nevertheless needed expanded resources to meet the new security challenges they now had to face. As the 1990s were coming to an end, the government undertook a new public investigation entrusted with identifying the principles needed to guide the overall work, lead to an improved "comprehensive view," and increase civil preparedness for major emergencies in society in peacetime. The investigation was also expected to propose new organizational structures and goals appropriate for the political field of security. Åke Pettersson was appointed to head this investigation on March 1st, 2000, by the director of the Department of Defense, to whom the government had assigned the task. The resulting report, *Security in a New Era* (Säkerhet i en ny tid: SOU 2001:41), which was completed in May 2001, confirmed the previous changes that had taken place in the field of security. It also agreed that the preconditions for security politics had radically changed during the 1990s insofar as the major concern of civil defense and civil preparedness was no longer to assist the armed forces in the event of war, which in any case appeared very unlikely in the near future. Against the background of this revised understanding of contemporary security issues and threat analysis, the report emphasized that Sweden needed to advance its understanding and organization of security and risk-management.

While the public investigation determined that the comprehensive view of security was a good first step in the needed direction, it noted that the notion of "severe peacetime disturbances" remained associated with crises and dangers on a national level even though most occur at lower administrative level and within geographically delimited areas. The report therefore suggested that "crisis management" was a better working concept in respect to the comprehensive view of security in that it referred to all actions taken to prevent and/or manage crises as they happen in order to minimize their damaging effects (operative crisis management) and learn from past events. The report in fact stated that the then current system for managing crises in society had substantial flaws, the most pressing of which were:

1. The concept of a "comprehensive view" had not been institutionalized in a satisfactory way within security and crisis management.
2. The system for management and collaboration that should exist within civil defense had not yet been adapted to contemporary threats and challenges.
3. The weaknesses in society's ability to manage complex crises was above all evident in severe crisis situations that demand the joint efforts of several different sectors and administrative levels (SOU 2001:41, 16 author's translation).

Security in a New Era maintained that the planning and design of security and crisis management must be renewed. Insofar as existing systems and principles were still appropriate for military situations rather than other security treats, they needed to be changed to meet the requirements associated with the new security challenges that had emerged (SOU 2001:41, 17 author's translation). Particular attention was drawn to critical infrastructure, which was "securitized" as being of particular importance for protection within the new security context. Although the goals of crisis management should be reformulated in relation to specific public agencies, it was important that "stricter security demands should also be placed upon operations that may generate severe crises in society" (SOU 2001:41, 17 author's translation).

The investigation also pointed out that the state and public agencies should bear overall responsibility in situations of severe crisis, and that specific public agencies must be able to govern crisis management operations. Nevertheless, such responsibility must also be divided between the state, municipalities, and private actors. In this regard, the report argued that three main principles that should guide all operations in the field of security. These were:

1. **The principle of responsibility**: Whoever is responsible for operations under normal conditions should have equivalent responsibility during crisis and security situations.
2. **The principle of similarity**: The organization and location of war and peacetime security operations should resemble each other as much as possible.
3. **The principle of subsidiary**: Crisis and security situations should be managed at the lowest possible level in society (SOU 2001:41, 18 author's translation).

These have been the guiding principles of the development and organization of the political field of security in Sweden since they were first presented in *Security in a New Era*, and they were officially adopted in subsequent governmental bills (Prop. 2001/02:10, 2001/02:158, 22). These principles are in fact often referred to in official reports and government bills, and I have also been told in interviews that they remain the main guiding ideals. In my judgment, these three principles further strengthen a decentralized approach to security management and calls for further collaboration and activation of public but also private actors that manage societal functions. Security management went from being something which referred to extraordinary events that required special treatment to something that is an aspect of everyday activities. As such, it both requires the activation of all public and private agents involved in society's functioning and wellbeing, and also demands that they be concerned with security. This is yet another important branching point towards the meta-governance stance. *Security in a New Era* also pointed out that it is neither possible, nor desirable to differentiate between accidents, minor or major disturbances, and regular dangers insofar as even minor accidents can escalate into severe crises and security threats if they are not dealt with in a timely an appropriate manner (SOU 2001:41, 31).

The investigation also stressed the need for expanded collaboration, both between the military and *civil* sides of public administration, and also between public and private actors. The investigation established that there were good prerequisites in place for the development of collaboration between the military and civil sides in crisis management, which would result in the more effective and economical use of existing resources. Previous experience from various crises had shown that the military can contribute valuable resources and knowledge in such events. The report therefore stated that it was necessary to innovate and remove constitutional obstacles that could hinder deeper collaboration. Stated otherwise, it was necessary to provide public agencies as well as the civil side of total defense with a better understanding of the precise extent to which the military can support civil society during severe peacetime disturbances (SOU 2001:41, 25).

The broader understanding of security that included the *securitization* of vital systems and infrastructure also required extended collaboration between state and private actors in respect to the co-governance of these systems. *Security in a New Era* noted that vital infrastructure and key systems have been privatized and deregulated in many countries, which means that the state has lost its ability to implement security and preparedness requirements within these systems. It is also difficult to establish collaboration and joint efforts without the direct involvement and clear consent of private actors. Many public authorities that previously had been organized as ordinary public administrations either have been transformed into public companies, or their functions have been outsourced to private actors, which has made it much more difficult to demand that public and private agents cooperate, particularly in respect to aspects of security beyond their own organizations. Insofar as the expansion of securitization has made extensive cooperation between public and private agents necessary, it has also become necessary to actively foster collaboration between public and private actors within the field of security and crisis management (SOU 2001:41, 58, 116f). That is to say that the adoption of a comprehensive understanding of security, coupled with the securitization of vital infrastructure that is managed by both public and private actors, has created strong interdependencies in the political field of security and the need for extensive collaboration between the actors involved. The boundary between public and private is therefore blurred also in this political field.

Just as was the case with the previous public investigation conducted at the beginning of the 1990s, *Security in a New Era* served as the main source for future governmental bills. For example, the bill *Continued Renewal of Total Defense* (Fortsatt förnyelse av totalförsvaret 2001/02:10) followed soon after the 2001 public investigation was completed. While this bill was directed primarily towards the military side of the Total Defense, it also touched upon important organizational changes that were soon to come. At a general level, it confirmed that the Swedish defense system was in an era of transformation that must be recognized as one "of the major reforms to have taken place in modern times in the area of defense" (Prop. 2001/02:10, 1 author's translation). It acknowledged that although the report from the public investigation had been completed, details of how to respond to the proposals put forward were not yet ready. There would consequently be an additional bill in the spring of 2002 that was more directly based on the findings and recommendations of the report. *Continued Renewal of Total Defense* also recognized the need for a comprehensive view of security and extensive collaboration, but it maintained that such work should be conducted in terms of the "security and preparedness of society," which was taken to include both the preparations and the operations involved in managing crises and security threats. In addition, crisis management was

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accepted as a suitable term for all efforts to prevent, combat, and manage crisis and draw lessons from the latter (Prop. 2001/02:10, 40). The government furthermore maintained that it was necessary to redirect the focus and resources within this political field, and that the institutionalization of a comprehensive understanding of security did not remove the responsibility for crisis and security management from public agents.

The previous functional division whereby society and civil public administration assisted the armed forces and public defense in situations of severe crisis and war was no longer valid. The three principles indicated above reflected the fact that the central state was no longer the obvious security provider, and that all public agents should aim and be prepared for coordination with other public agencies and private actors. In addition, the responsibility for geographical coordination existed on local, regional, and national levels as well. Every crisis and threat should be managed at the lowest possible level in accordance with the principle of subsidiary, although a need for more widespread and even national collaboration might emerge as a given crisis became more serious and extensive. The report maintained that the national level, where now there was in fact little administrative power to coordinate, had become the weakest administrative level.

The report *Security in a New Time* (SOU 2001:41) had recommended that the state establish a new agency at the national level in the Government Offices (Regeringskansliet) in order to coordinate security operations in severe crises, and that it must have the power to foster collaboration during crises not only between private and public actors, but across sectors as well. Although the government decided not to adopt this particular recommendation, it did recognize the need for further investigations to address the possibility that the Government Offices manage and coordinate severe crises (Prop. 2001/02:10, 77-78). This agency would later come be established in response to a specific event. Here we see that first suggestion to create a type of meta-governor that are to control and manage the otherwise decentralized approach to security and crisis.

The bill argued that the character and scope of coordination was so great that it could only be managed by a new public agency, and the government did accept this point, although this agency was not to be situated in the Government Offices. This was in line with the ambition to have a leaner government. However, the new agency should be concerned with planning rather than operations, should not assume the responsibilities of other public agencies, and should not have too far-reaching powers. For instance, the Swedish Rescue Service Agency should continue to be an independent agency. The government also decided that assigning new responsibilities to the Swedish Agency for Civil Emergency Planning, which was the existing agency for civil defense, was not a desirable solution insofar as it was tainted by the old view that the main responsibility of the civil side of the defense was to support the armed forces. This was consistent with the new view that

civil defense should be redirected from supporting military forces to attending to domestic security and crisis situations. Consequently, the decision was taken to close it effective June 30th, 2002, and create a new public agency to replace it whose primary responsibility would be planning and preparedness for severe disruptions in peacetime. Since this new agency was to be established as soon as possible, the government planned to form a committee that would specify the new agency's main responsibilities as well as its relations to other agencies and organs as expeditiously as possible.

The provisions for the new public agency were introduced as promised in the spring of 2002 in a government bill entitled *The Safety and Preparedness of Society* (Samhällets säkerhet och beredskap, Prop. 2001/02:158), the main purpose of which was to improve the collective ability to meet and combat extraordinary events. This new public agency was the Swedish Emergency Management Agency, or KBM, and it was to begin operating July 1st, 2002. KBM would have a much broader set of responsibilities than the Swedish Agency for Civil Emergency Planning, and it would also have a greater orientation towards meeting domestic security threats. The decision to create this new agency is yet another key decision that would further the need to also adopt a meta-governance stance. The government thus sought to create an improved structure that would both heighten security and incorporate concerns with peacetime threats. The former agency, which was primarily engaged with issues involving civil preparedness in times of war, had four main responsibilities, namely, overviewing the preparedness of different sectors, civilian control, transportation, and the supply of industrial goods (Prop. 2001/02:158, 53, 57f). The new role and many responsibilities assigned to KBM clearly indicated a major shift in how security and crisis in peacetime was understood.

The government maintained that a range of areas for potential collaboration needed to be established in order to make crisis management more flexible in respect to both minor and major peacetime disturbances as well as heightened alerts. Thinking in such terms would supposedly make it easier to foster cooperation and improve crisis management. KBM was intended to play an important role in defining these areas of collaboration areas and was given the overall responsibility for managing them. The main responsibilities of the agency were:

- to contribute to collaboration in the planning of severe disturbances and civil defense
- to be the cohesive agent in the new planning system
- to develop and manage principles for collaboration between the public sector and private business
- to analyze developments in society and the world, in interdependencies and vulnerability in vital systems, and contribute with research and knowledge in the field of security and crises
- to be responsible for and work actively with information security

- to report to the government concerning the allocation of resources in the field of civil defense and security at large as well as allocate resources to other public agencies in their work with security and crisis management
- to secure and strengthen crisis communication
- to establish and nourish contacts with similar agencies in other countries
- to support the Government Offices in their international work concerning crisis management, including EU crisis management and EU requirements concerning security issues
- to support the Government Offices and any other public agencies that request support during a crisis (Prop. 2001/02:158, 13f).

While these varied responsibilities were both substantial and broad in scope, KBM was to be primarily involved in planning, supporting, and evaluating the ongoing security and crisis management of other public and private actors. As such, it was explicitly given the mandate to lead the ongoing work in the political field of security, contribute to improved crisis management by means of its support and leadership role, and be the cohesive force in the new planning system. Furthermore, it was to develop an overarching view and orientation concerning overall civil defense and preparedness for severe disturbances. In accordance with the general trend in public administration, the agency was to follow the model of management by objectives as well as develop methods for managing and evaluating reports concerning the overall development of the field of security in light of its responsibility to provide information and other types of support to the government. The agency was also responsible for investigating the resources available in the field of security, propose how they were to be distributed, and also initiate, coordinate, and gather together relevant information. The agency is in fact instructed to foster collaboration between the public sector and private business. This indicates a positive attitude towards extensive collaboration and security networks.

That is to say that KBM was not only to implement relevant decisions taken by the government, but was also delegated the task of investigating, initiating, and developing the procedures and understandings that were to guide work in the field of security. As a result, KBM became a major securitizing agent within the Swedish context, contributing in many ways to the *securitization* of new issues. Insofar as the government's intention was to improve security and crisis management, it placed an emphasis on providing KBM with the conditions necessary for being "a strong actor in the new crisis management system" (Prop. 2001/02:158, 12 author's translation). More importantly, the agency's many responsibilities were associated with indirect governance, whereby it became the primary meta-governing agency in the political field of security. But while KBM was clearly responsible for fostering collaboration, disseminating information, and developing public

awareness concerning security, it in fact had few responsibilities connected with actual operations.

The Safety and Preparedness of Society also presented a more programmatic outlook concerning how the relations between state and society had been altered in the face of new social, technological, and economic security treats. The government in effect argued that the state could no longer provide for the security and wellbeing of citizens without extensive collaboration with private actors:

> The Government wishes to emphasize that the activities of the public sector are not sufficient to ensure a safe and robust society. Problems must be solved from the bottom-up through close collaboration between the public and private spheres. The Government therefore believes that private and public actors must establish a structured collaboration. Failure to do so will have a negative effect on our ability to prevent and manage crises. The Government consequently intends to initiate the creation of various collaboration forums between industry and the public within the proposed areas of collaboration (Prop. 2001/02:158, 11author's translation).

This passage points to a radically different role for the state in the political field of security, offering a clear disclaimer concerning the state's limited ability to provide for the security of society and the population. Given the historical and theoretical connection between the state and security, it is rather remarkable how the Swedish government redefines the role of the state and actively promotes security networks.

A Department of Defense report entitled *A New Structure for Increased Security – Network Defense and Crisis Management* (Ny struktur för ökad säkerhet – nätverksförsvar och krishantering, (Ds 2001:44, 79f) stated that technical infrastructure was of fundamental importance for both a well-functioning society and also good living conditions. It is thus not only necessary to improve critical infrastructure in order to provide security for both the country and the population, it should also be in the interest of the business community to improve and protect the infrastructure that is vital for a functioning market. This is reflected in the subsequent governmental bill, which stated that:

> Several issues are common to the public and business sectors, both of which are dependent on infrastructure as well as measures to increase robustness and crisis management. The Department of Defense maintains that there are both needs and opportunities for a strategic partnership between government and business that is voluntary and based on mutual benefit in matters relating to increased security (Prop. 2001/02:158, 50 author's translation)

The government argued in this bill that a more developed collaboration between public and private actors is an important element in the new structure for managing security:

Such interaction reveals complex relations and co-dependencies within critical societal infrastructure systems and between those systems and the rest of society. Such interactions also enable the identification and initiation of networks through proactive measures that can help to increase the safety of infrastructure and reducing vulnerability (Prop. 2001/02:158, 50f author's translation)

A shared view and understanding of the interdependence that exists in society is consequently a necessary precondition for well-functioning collaboration. It is therefore to be expected that partners would share a common interest in developing and maintaining secure infrastructure as well as overall collaboration in the management of security and crises. In addition, such collaboration should be guided by a common understanding of mutual accountability. The government pointed out that one of KBM's main responsibilities was to support and encourage the establishment of public-private relations in the field of security (Prop. 2001/02:158, 11), which necessarily included the establishment and management of the principles underlying collaboration between the public sector and business (Prop. 2001/02:158, 46).

KBM was also tasked with creating a council to oversee collaboration between civil society and the business community which should be composed in such a way and possess such responsibilities that it could significantly influence how the agency dealt with established collaboration between public and private actors (Prop. 2001/02:158, 46). In addition, the bill stipulated that other public agencies associated with specific sectors should further develop their engagement with the business community. KBM would assist with coordination, strategies, and evaluations in each sector and also have the overall responsibility to survey both the political field of security as a whole and the establishment of collaboration between public and private actors on all levels (Prop. 2001/02:158, 46).

In line with this bill's emphasis of the need for collaboration between public and private agents, the government encouraged public agents, particularly the KBM, to actively seek and establish relations in the form of networks. The idea of extensive collaboration between public and private agents in combination with the three principles mentioned above substantially altered the political field of security during this second period. All public and private agents were encouraged to actively think about the crisis and security aspects of their own organizations, including daily operations. That is to say that security and crisis management was no longer to be associated solely with extraordinary measures, but rather incorporated into everyday activities. The comprehensive understanding of security that had been adopted, together with this drive for more security awareness in respect to everyday preparedness and activities, erased the difference between normal operations and security management within both every

organization and society at large. This period of development in the political field of security was thus characterized by a substantial decentralization and normalization of security management.

The *securitization* of vital systems and infrastructure also drove the state to seek extensive collaboration with private actors due to the marketization and "contracting out" of these systems. "Securitization" became a specific way to regain control of political fields and functions that had been "contracted out." In addition, the new role for civil defense and the new comprehensive view of security intensified the need for cooperation and coordination in crisis management. This underlined the need for extensive collaboration between public and private actors and led to the Swedish state finding itself in the new position of having to actively promote the emergence of security networks. I would thus argue that this is an important part of the logic behind the emergence of security networks and a positive attitude for extensive collaboration.

5.3 Major Events and the Call for More Governance (2006-2009)

To summarize the discussion to this point, we may say that after Sweden adopted and institutionalized a broader understanding of security, it became evident that extensive collaboration by means of networks that unite public and private actors were needed to address many of the new security issues that emerged. This was especially notable in respect to vital systems and infrastructure, which often came to be co-governed by public and private actors in the current era of neo-liberalism that is characterized by extensive marketization reforms. The political field of security had in a relatively short period thus been redirected from a field dominated by military concerns to one in which domestic security issues, crises, and severe disturbances in society are emphasized.

A new public agency was established within this context, KBM, which was intended to play a central role in planning and organizing the broad and heterogeneous crisis management system in which all public and private actors were to participate. Shortly after this reorganization took place, however, a series of important security events occurred that severely tested the new system and structure, and the lessons drawn clearly showed that the new system was inadequate for dealing with such major occurrences on a national level. Consequently, a new public investigation was undertaken in 2006 that was aimed at laying the foundation for a new public agency to replace KBM, only four years after the agency had been established. This investigation was also charged with examining whether the new agency should assume various responsibilities of other public agencies (SOU 2007,

17). In what follows I look further into the problems identified in the face of the national events that motivated the closure of KBM and the creation of a new public agency with broader competences.

The Defense Committee presented a report in 2006 entitled *A Strategy for the Security of Sweden* (En strategi för Sveriges säkerhet, Ds 2006:1) that proposed a range of far-reaching reforms in the political field of security. This report was consistent with the new comprehensive understanding of security and with the established understanding that collaboration and coordination between public and private actors and sectors was necessary. But although the report did not challenge the position that the three basic principles of responsibility, similarity, and subsidiarity provided the appropriate guidelines for security and crisis management, it argued that it had become necessary to re-centralize a degree of control in the field of security insofar as the ability at the national level to provide direction and guidance during major crisis was evidently underdeveloped (Ds 2006:1, 25-27). These views were based upon specific events that had drawn attention to the vulnerability of modern states in a globalized world, some of which were particularly notable in Sweden.

The report highlighted the international dimension in security and crisis management in reference to certain spectacular events in international terrorism, such as the 2001 attacks in the United States, the 2004 Madrid bombings, and the 2005 London bombings. Even though nothing similar had taken place in Sweden, such incidents were reminders of the dangers associated with an open and globalized world. Moreover, they are often mentioned in the discussion in Sweden and have become both vital parts and a driving force of the national security awareness and sense of vulnerability (Ds 2006:1, 17-19), leading to a heightened awareness of the international dimensions of new security threats. The report remarked that "Dangers are often boundless and complex… and may spread across national boundaries" (Ds 2006:1, 17 author's translation). It should also be noted that the 2001 attacks in the United States had already motivated a public investigation that investigated Sweden's capacity for dealing with international terrorism and offered a range of proposal for greater regulation and surveillance, including the securitization of sensitive infrastructure (SOU 2003:32).

Another international event that became a prominent security issue in Sweden was the South East Asia tsunami on Christmas Day, 2004. Sweden was one of the countries outside Asia most affected by the event, with 543 killed and approximately 1500 injured, because of the numbers of Swedes who were vacationing for the holidays in the region. A public investigation was launched soon after the tsunami to investigate the actions taken by both travel companies and the Swedish state to assist the victims of the disaster. The subsequent report, *Sweden and the Tsunami – Review and Proposals* (Sverige och Tsunamin – granskning och förslag) (SOU 2005:104), which was published on December 1st, 2005, established that substantial problems

in the Swedish crisis management structure hindered an adequate response and the provisioning of assistance to the Swedish victims as well as the countries in the region. It criticized the Swedish government for its management of the disaster, even if it had happened on the other side of the world, and the general conclusion was that Sweden should have been able to respond in a much better way. The report argued that the fundamental flaw in this regard was that there was no unit or structure in the Government Offices lacked a structure for dealing with severe crises of this magnitude. No one was in a position to take charge on the highest level, particularly since much of the administrations were away from work because of the holidays, and this delayed efforts to respond to the catastrophe. That is to say that Sweden had still not managed to create a structure capable of dealing with national crises of this order in spite the restructuring of the security field.

The report proposed that the Government Offices create a special crisis management unit (SOU 2005:104). It noted that although this had been proposed following an earlier public investigation (SOU 2001:41), the government at that time had chosen not to follow the recommendation. Since the main responsibility of such a unit would be to assist the government and provide strategic guidance to the public administration in times of crisis, it needed to be able to initiate actions, make decisions, and have leadership authority over operations (SOU 2005:104, 24-25).

> A central crisis management unit must also be able to take charge of operations and direct other public agencies and departments. In order to so, it must have political authority since a crisis in society almost always has political implications…. [I]t seems both necessary and natural that such a central national unit be located in the Government Offices (SOU 2005:104, 25 author's translation)

The report also emphasized that the state needed to expand its collaboration with non-state actors.

> The evaluation has shown that non-public actors can be utilized to a much greater extent than has so far been the case. Cooperation between private and non-state actors can even be vital for information and for specific operations in acute situations. In addition, collaboration with volunteer organizations is important in order to utilize all of society's resources during a crisis. It is therefore important to establish contacts and build up relations prior to a crisis in the form of networks (SOU 2005:104, 33)

Hurricane Gudrun, which struck southern Sweden in January 2005, was another event that challenged the nation's crisis management system and spurred further development of the field of security. Unlike the other events that have been mentioned, this was domestic in nature. Sweden has had few natural disasters on such a scale, and the extensive damage caused by the

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storm, including eleven related deaths, 415,000 households without electrical power, very substantial economic losses, and severe disturbances in communications, clearly illustrated that further planning and preparations were still necessary. Hurricane Gudrun has often been pointed to as the type of event that should remind us of the vulnerability of society, being regarded above all as an example of the importance of communications between security actors in the event of power failure and the break-down of regular channels of communication. It thus showed the need for a dedicated and robust communications system to ensure the proper functioning of a security and crisis management system, as was stated in a report from the Defense Committee (Ds 2006:1, SOU 2007).

Sweden had experienced in a short period of time a range of major security events on the national level that significantly challenged the new crisis management and structure. These events, each of which illustrated in a different way the inability of the Swedish state to manage large-scale crises, demonstrated the need for a security actor who would have overall responsibility for coordination and management. It was not mistaken to promote security networks and extensive collaboration, but they require guidance. The Defense Committee report explicitly argued that in spite of the positive changes that had taken place in recent years, the structure for managing security was overly complex and blurry. The key problem was that responsibility for security remained divided between a number of department, agencies, and organizations in different sectors, with sector perspective contributing to fragmentation and complexity in respect to contemporary transboundary security challenges. What was needed was an overarching and cross-sectional perspective that can further strengthen overall security in Sweden (Ds 2006:1, 24).

The report did not regard a broader understanding of security, including extensive collaboration between public and private actors, as the problem that had to be addressed. This was in fact a positive and necessary aspect of security:

> Comprehensive security management must include everything from cause prevention and the reduction of vulnerability to operational management and reconstruction. This chain of steps in constructing security makes it obvious that our political efforts dedicated to security involve many more policy fields than Defense and Foreign Policy, which has traditionally, have been central to security. Security now involves policies that concern foreign aid, criminality, the environment, social issues, labor, the market, and business (Ds 2006:1, 18 author's translation)

The major problem was rather the inability to lead and coordinate operations during major and acute crises, which often have spillover effects regarding other issues and sectors. This places great importance upon the ability to manage crises that appear suddenly and demand swift cross-sectional

responses. The Defense Committee sought to address these shortcomings by introducing a set of reforms that were intended to strengthen the national ability to lead and coordinate the crisis management. Even though the Committee did not use the term itself, I would argue that what they hoped to achieve was a meta-governance of security networks.

The Defense Committee report established that the Swedish system for management and coordination functioned relatively well within sectors and on the local and regional levels. It was primarily on the national level that crisis management had to be improved in order to better assist the local and regional levels and coordinate cross-sectional operations, necessary conditions for which included sound principles for crisis management as well as a clear organizational structure. Furthermore, the report saw no contradiction between the three key principles mentioned above, particularly responsibility, and the centralizing reforms needed to strengthen operational abilities on the national level. Here we see the contradiction between self-organization and the notion of control and political steering. It argued that in order for the national level to decide and act correctly, it was necessary to have a structure that assisted decision-making, facilitated a cross-sectional view, promoted awareness, and helped establish routines for rapidly disseminating information across sectors and geographical areas. However, a well-developed cross-sectional structure that would make possible an overall image of the situation and foster the ability to act swiftly was still lacking at the national level. The report proposed that two centers were necessary for this purpose, one in the Government Offices that would inform and assist the government and one at the administrative level. In addition, they needed to work in close collaboration and exchange information on a regular basis in order to avoid potential conflicts between them (Ds 2006:1, 27).

The government had already established the Unit for Preparedness and Analysis in the Government Offices in order to address crisis management. The Defense Committee report suggested that this unit needed to have further authority and additional responsibilities, specifically, the *operative authority* to act on its own and alert the government at an early stage of a crisis. The Government Offices would then have the ability to identify and alert those actors who needed to be involved in managing the particular crisis. This implied a constant monitoring of the world as well as close cooperation with the police, the alert agencies, the coast guard, the defense forces, and other security agents. The unit would thereby function as a collaborative tool for management support throughout the Government Offices The report emphasized that the most important role for the government during a crisis was to provide information and maintain its own operations so that it could sustain and support the ability of public agencies to care for the wellbeing of the population and protect the key values and functions of society (Ds 2006:1, 30).

The report also proposed reforms in the structure and organization of public agencies. In addition to the fact that recent events had indicated illustrated that the boundary between an accident, a major crisis, and severe disturbances are diffuse, general development in the EU was towards a broader focus and joint efforts in dealing with protection and security as a single policy field. While two different agencies worked at that time in Sweden with these issues, namely, KBM and the Swedish Rescue Service Agency the report maintained that both efficiency and effectiveness would be enhanced of protection and security could be managed as a whole.

> The creations of a public agency for dealing with a broad spectrum of events ranging from accidents in everyday life to severe crises in society may be viewed as a natural step in the development of crisis management as it has taken place since the middle of the 1990s…. An additional step would be to bring together KBM and the Swedish Rescue Service Agency, thereby focusing on both the security of society and crisis management as such possible events are addressed (Ds 2006:1, 39 Author's translation)

The Defense Committee report added that this new agency should not only deal with both planning and preparations for crisis management, it must also have operational capabilities (Ds 2006:1, 39). It also highlighted the need to improve private-public relations in order to increase security in society. The report noted that large segments of vital functions in society, such as communications and electrical power supply, are now owned and managed by some form of private or corporate organization. However, insofar as the regulation of such firms is often limited, with actors often responding more to commercial demands and economic incitements, the security of these systems requires extensive collaboration between public and private agents:

> Establishing and institutionalizing private-public collaboration leads to the sharing of risks, information, responsibility, and costs among the actors involved. Sound private-public collaboration may also provide increased knowledge, mutual understanding, and better access to and exchange of expertise, thereby enhancing the possibility that both the public and private spheres may have a positive influence over the other's development (Ds 2006:1, 56 author's translation)

The report argued that private-public collaboration must be a vital element in the crisis management system at all levels – central, regional, as well as local. Moreover, collaboration should be based on voluntary agreements guided by shared trust and the exchange of information between equal partners (Ds 2006:1, 56). The report expressed the strong conviction that extensive collaboration between public and private actors is positive in nature and may further increase the capability for dealing with security issues.

Due to the consensus-oriented nature of the Defense Committee, which included representatives of all the political parties in the parliament as well as key managers in the security policy field, the views and ideas expressed in its reports are often very influential. This was the case with the report in question. Soon after it was published, the government decided to undertake a public investigation that would present an overview of the various responsibilities of KBM, the National Board of Psychological Defense (NBPD), and the Swedish Rescue Service Agency (SRSA) and recommend whether and how these public agencies might be merged. Cabinet Minister Leni Björklund appointed General Director of the Defense Department Mats Sjöstrand as special investigator, and the subsequent report, *Always Ready – A New Public Agency against Accidents and Crises* (Alltid redo! En ny myndighet mot olyckor och kriser 2007:31), was released in May 2007 (SOU 2007).

This report maintained that a new agency of the type discussed might very well comprise the solution for the problems displayed by the then current crisis management system, and that a new agency with a broader authority and power would hopefully better meet the challenges facing Swedish society presented by accidents, threats, and crises. It would also better assist the government in attaining the objectives decided upon by parliament. The report stated that insofar as it is very difficult to separate between different types of security events, the same types of actions are necessary for dealing with the full scale of threats and disturbances. The creation of a new agency would create new conditions for integrating work in this regard rather than treating different events in different ways, from which a range of benefits would follow and against which there were no decisive arguments.

The report recommended that both NBPD and SRSA be closed and their responsibilities transferred to a new agency that would begin operations July 1st, 2008 (SOU 2007, 221). This agency would be responsible for the entire range of actions taken in regard to accidents and crises, including planning and reducing vulnerability, increasing robustness and preparedness, and normalization and learning after events. Furthermore, the agency was to manage all types of security – from individual to societal – and embody in its work the new comprehensive view that had been adopted. The new agency would thus be the main agency responsible for the management of civil defense, severe peacetime disruptions, and ordinary accidents, and also serve as the "driving force" for the development of the ability to prevent and manage both accidents and extraordinary events. It should therefore provide a substantial overview over accidents, threats, and crises in society, and develop methods and strategies for the effective management of security events on all levels. The agency would also be responsible for the technical systems for communications and information transfer during crises (SOU 2007, 221-223).

While a Social Democratic led government had undertaken the public investigation in June 2006 concerning the possibility of creating a new crisis management agency, the final report was issued after the 2006 elections that resulted in a cente-right coalition government led by Prime Minister Fredrik Reinfeldt of the Moderate Party. However, the change in governments did not alter any important element of the work underway concerning crisis management, and the new government more or less continued the reforms already in progress, including the planned installation of the new public agency. The Reinfeldt government also presented a bill in March 2008 that closely followed the recommendations of the public investigation concerning the specifications for the new public agency, which was announced in the 2008 budget bill (Prop. 2007/08:1) and instituted through the subsequent bill *Strengthened Crisis Preparedness – For Safety's Sake* (Stärkt krisberedskap – för säkerhets skull) (Prop. 2007/08:92). The formulation and description of the issue in fact followed the recommendations almost word for word. The bill also stated that it was above all on the national level that crisis management needed to be further developed, and that the new agency should be the engine driving work in this regard.

> The Government's assessment is that a new agency must be established that should have cohesive and supportive tasks before, during, and after a crisis. This new agency should be tasked during an emergency with supporting the coordination of the actions of the central authorities by facilitating contacts across administrative and geographical boundaries. It should be proactive, support other players in the field, and both develop and monitor the work of crisis management in society. This public agency will be established January 1st, 2009 (Prop. 2007/08:92, 56-57 author's translation)

The creation of a new agency should be regarded as a key decision and a further commitment to foster security networks and the hope of meta-governing these. This new agency was the MSB (Myndigheten för Samhällsskydd och beredskap, or the Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency) – the name was chosen in order to emphasize the changes that had taken place in Sweden in the political field of Security – and it was to assume the main responsibilities of NBPD and SRSA (Prop. 2007/08:92, 56-57). MSB was assigned a broad and varied set of responsibilities, including preparing and developing methods and strategies for crisis management, managing the relevant technical systems, and assisting the government and other public agencies in their work with crisis management. Perhaps most importantly, it was also to have operational responsibility in crisis management (Prop. 2007/08:92, 57ff).

Although it might at first seem that the new agency constituted a radical break from the previous order, the Director General of KBM, Helena Lindberg, was later appointed to be the Director General of MSB. She and other experts had been involved in the "MSB committee" working group,

which had been created by the government in order to facilitate the transition to the new agency (Fö 2008:03). MSB was not only very large, it was also an unusual public agency on the Swedish landscape in that it was permitted to survey other public agencies and develop methods and strategies for the ongoing work to improve the crisis management. The government bill estimated that the new agency would have administrative resources of one billion SEK and a staff of 600-620 full-time employees, but it in fact had a staff of 850 full-time employees by 2014.

In addition, Prime Minister Reinfeldt made the decision on January 11th, 2007, on behalf of the Government Offices to assign Coast Guard Director General Christina Salomonsen the task of investigating whether the national crisis management unit that had been recommended in response to the critique of the inadequate response to the 2005 tsunami should in fact be established. The subsequent report, which was released in October the same year, concluded the position of Director General for Crisis Management should be established within the Prime Minister's office to oversee and ensure crisis management coordination and planning (*Krishantering i Regeringskansliet*, p. 5). This proposal was accepted by the government, and Christina Salomonsen became the first person to hold the post, which would be responsible for fostering and facilitating coordination with the state secretaries of the ministries involved in crisis management. An Office for Crisis Management should also be established within the Prime Minister's office to assist the Director General by elevating awareness, assembling and coordinating information and analysis, initiating inter-ministerial coordination, and supporting decision-making during a crisis. The unit to be created should identify and advise upon the appropriate measures to be taken within the Government Offices and in the interplay between ministries and authorities (Regeringskansliet 2007). The report added that crisis management in the Government Offices must be based on a cross-sectional approach, and maintained that planning and preparing for crisis require an efficient and professional organization as well as an executive leadership that cuts across sectors as well as the responsibilities of each individual ministry. It was also recommended that a new Government Offices Crisis Coordination Center should be set up within the Government Offices that could be utilized by the government during crisis periods.

Another important reform taken by governmental decree was that key public agencies must have a chief manager (Tjänsteman i Beredskap or TiB) on duty at all times effective January 1st, 2008 (Förordning 2006:942). The aim in this regard was to secure the ability of public agencies to support crisis management immediately when needed insofar as a responsible authority would always be available (Prop. 2007/08:92, 14-15). This provided a means to ensure that such agencies maintained a necessary level of readiness around the clock throughout the year, even during holidays. The government also decided in 2007 that all County Administrative Boards and

public agencies with special crisis responsibilities must always have a chief manager on duty, whose responsibility was to initiate and coordinate the important initial response in crisis management of detecting and verifying the event and then alerting and inform other responsible agencies and persons concerning the situation. Those public agencies required to have a TIB also had to establish management operations for when a crisis emerges. However, many of the public agencies affected by these decisions already had similar functions in place and were prepared to assist in crisis management in their own and other sectors. Furthermore, it was only to be expected that such public agencies as the National Police Board, KBM, the Coast Guard, the Swedish Radiation Protection Authority, and the Swedish Nuclear Power Inspectorate should have such operational routines in place. But to demand the same level of readiness of, for example, the Swedish Tax Agency or the Swedish Board of Agriculture arguably seemed excessive.

Contradictory currents existed during this period in the political field of security. The reports from the defense office and the public investigation had both pointed to *the need for stronger and clearer central management in times of crisis*. The creation of MSB was in part based on the idea that it was both difficult and often unnecessary to distinguish between accidents, severe disturbances, and civil defense in peacetime, and that a single super agency would be able to deal properly with all aspects of crisis and security management, and both coordinate and assist other security actors, if it had operational authority and power. MSB was also responsible for performing evaluations which would lead to new knowledge and strategies that would heighten crisis management capabilities. This was a substantially broader mandate than was the case with KBM, which had primarily been involved in preparation and crisis prevention, but was a weak actor during an actual crisis because it did not have operational powers. MSB not only covered a broader field that ranged from accidents to severe disturbances and civil defense, but was also given the role of leading and assist other agencies at all administrative levels during a crisis.

While the new comprehensive understanding of security had multiplied security issues and security providers, spurred substantial decentralization, and promoted the emergence of security networks, security events such as those discussed above had illustrated that the political field of security lacked the political leadership needed to guide and direct the various security actors. The reforms adopted to address the evident shortcomings in this regard, including the creation of MSB, the establishment of the office of director general for crisis management, and the institution of a TIB in specified agencies, constituted a response to the perceived need to re-centralize control over the crisis management system. However, this called into question neither security networks, nor the need for extensive collaboration. If anything, the application of the responsibility principle grew even stronger in the sense that not only did all public and private actors still

need to take responsibility for their own security, but also had to be ready to collaborate and assist the state and society in the event of a crisis. In addition, the report *Always Ready – A New Public Agency against Accidents and Crises* had explicitly stated that public administration at large needed to take an even greater responsibility for security than it had already done (SOU 2007, 18-19), and it was clear that more power instruments were needed to coordinate a crisis management system that had come to involve both private and public actors.

This tension between a decentralized political field built upon on the principle of responsibility and the need for stronger coordination and political control resulted in the emergence of meta-governance within the field of security. Furthermore, it had come to be accepted that it was possible to combine networks and close collaboration with strong coordination and political leadership and control, with indirect governance from a distance and the continuation of networked security governance remain key governing ideals. But governing security networks that included private actors required different steering instruments than those used in traditional state administration. The state hoped to use indirect governing tools that would make it possible to govern the conduct of conduct of participating organizations rather than relying upon its sovereign power and direct control.

5.4 Security and Capable Individuals (2010-2014)

The period discussed in Section 5.3 was characterized by organizational re-centralization in order to increase political control and strengthen the operational capabilities of leading organizations. But as a government bill in 2013 noted, there is no end station in this political field, and the developing of crisis awareness and management demands a constant effort (Prop. 2013/14:144). The final period examined in the present discussion, 2010-2014, underlines precisely this point. It also shows that collaboration became almost synonymous with crisis management, and that it was not only discursively encouraged, but also financially supported by specific crisis management grants in order to promote extensive collaboration between security actors. This period was also characterized by an extension of security and crisis management beyond public and private organizations to include "capable individuals" as well (Prop. 2013/14:144). This in fact constituted a reversal of the relationship between the state and citizens insofar as such individuals came to be called upon to provide for their own security and not expect assistance from the state. On the contrary, capable citizens should instead assist the state in overall crisis management. This should be interpreted, I believe, as a radical "socialization" of security and crisis management.

As we have seen, the government carried out a series of organizational changes intended to reestablish political leadership and control after the major crises that had taken place during the previous period. Nevertheless, a report published in 2008 by the Swedish National Audit Service (SNAS), which audits public affairs and institutions, concluded that although government had made many improvements since 2005 in the crisis management system, substantial weaknesses still remained. The report in question, *Government and the Crisis* (RIR 2008:9), focused on the political field of security and the role of the government in crisis management. One issue to which it drew attention was the fact that the government's monitoring of the system had been unsystematic and poorly coordinated at the level of the Government Offices. A second significant shortcoming was that the government provided no general assessment of the overall level of crisis preparedness and of various security scenarios. Finally, the report highlighted the fact that the government had not steered public agencies in an adequate way.

SNAS determined that a number of public agencies had in fact no adequate ability to act in the event of a major crisis. The report consequently recommended that the government ensure that public agencies do their risk- and vulnerability analysis in such a way that they can be utilized in deciding upon an acceptable level of preparedness. In addition, SNAS indicated that the government needed to establish exceptional regulations that were valid in times of national crisis and also clearly define the conditions for when the state must intervene in crisis management. The report further argued that the *principle of responsibility* was simply not adequate for specifying when extraordinary measurements are called for. Finally, it recommended that the government needed to establish procedures for monitoring and evaluating the ability of public agencies to manage crises and also periodically present to the parliament their evaluation of society's general ability to manage and face crises (RIR 2008:9). The parliamentary committee for defense and security issues made a similar recommendation that the government evaluate the general level of capability and progress within the field of security and crisis management. That is to say that it was necessary for the government to provide parliament in general and the committee in particular with additional information in the form of *pleadings*.

Perhaps SNAS demanded too much of the government in light of the contingency that characterizes the field of security and crisis events. The unpredictable nature of crisis management makes it difficult to set up specific goals and to evaluate in advance the overall ability of society to deal with new and unforeseen specific crises (Ansell, Boin, and Keller 2010). Although the notion that management in terms of objectives can be used in this field responds well to the general trend towards NPM in society, it may nevertheless not be appropriate for the political field of security. However, the government did take seriously the criticism directed against it by the

parliament and SNAS, and it emphasized during the following period that clear objectives must be established that are subject to evaluation.

The government introduced important specifications in the budget bill for 2010 concerning the use of such objectives in crisis management. It also introduced a program of grants earmarked for stimulating collaboration between security actors. The bill in question also referred to the prior report *Security in a New Era* that although the level of crisis management in society was fairly good, it still had flaws. The central problem in this regard was that few public agencies had the ability to maintain necessary levels of staffing in their key operations if a crisis would last for more than a very limited number of days. In addition, operational capabilities as well as the ability to secure vital systems were poor. MSB also argued that few public agencies had sufficient knowledge concerning their interdependence with other agencies and, as a result, were ill-prepared when crisis response demanded collaboration among many actors. It was also a problem that few public and private agents had identified clear objectives for what their daily operations should be able to deliver in the event of a crisis. The bill stated that "Since society's collective ability to meet and overcome crises depends on the abilities of every actor to persevere and contribute, the government finds that more must be done to develop each actors' ability in this regard" (Prop. 2009/10:1, 69 author's translation).

The bill defined the main goals of crisis management to be 1) to lessen the risks and consequences of severe disruptions, crises, and accidents, 2) to secure the health and individual wellbeing of children, women, and men, and 3) to prevent or limit damage to property and the environment. Crisis management should also strive to lessen the suffering and harmful effects that stem from severe accidents and catastrophes in other countries (Prop. 2009/10:1, 68). Such goals were rather broad and difficult to assess, however, and the government stated that management by objectives, which should be the guiding principle for governance in this field, must be broken down to a level that is accessible and measurable, however difficult it might be to align this with the contingent nature of security. At the same time, the government must also be able to provide an overall evaluation of society's ability to meet crises that specifies what actions can be taken to improve the situation, their effects, as well as the reforms and improvements that are under way (Prop. 2009/10:1, 71). The government also accepted the need to provide a pleading in order to further inform parliament and the defense committee concerning the status of security and crisis management. Furthermore, the government maintained that, at a general level, the principle of responsibility must continue to be the key principle of security management while acknowledging that the challenge was to develop "a flexible and effective" management system that resided upon specific and clear goals as well as good governance (Prop. 2009/10:1, 71 author's translation). The government was convinced that if crisis management was

going to be improved, then it must bring together in an effective efforts concerning the basic levels of security, the development of risk and crisis analysis, dependency analysis, and the assessment of abilities into an overarching image that incorporated all actors and potential events (Prop. 2009/10:1, 71 author's translation).

Another important issue was how to finance crisis management and promote the collaboration upon which security networks are based. The important principle of responsibility was taken as implying that each actor with responsibility in normal circumstances must also be able to meet crises and security issues, which is to say that the costs for doing so must be regarded as covered by ordinary funding. As a result, public and private agencies should not receive additional funding for their role in and contributions to the overall crisis management system. The government and governing agencies were very keen to stress this principle. In 2008 the government decided to introduce additional grants, namely, the 2:4 crisis management grants, with the aim of encouraging public agencies and private contractors that have official duties to elevate their capability to manage severe accidents and crises. Public agencies as well as private actors who had public roles could apply for such grants if they planned to create or improve crisis management in some way, especially collaboration between agencies. These grants were intended to enable and assist efforts taken to increase society's ability to manage crisis for a limited period of time – there were not permanent budget contributions to a specific agency or project. Furthermore, such grants were not to be used to cover administrative costs or wages, and they could not be used to finance either management operations during a crisis, or the management of the effects of a crisis (Prop. 2009/10:1, 72).

MSB was appointed as the public agency responsible for following up and evaluating both the use and usefulness of the 2:4 crisis management grants. 1096 million SEK were distributed in 2013 to public agencies, regional offices, municipalities, volunteer organizations, and researchers under this program. MSB now believes that the ability to face crises has increased on all levels through the use of these grants, which it views as a "vital instrument for engaging in and initiating systematic collaboration between actors in the crisis management system" (MSB 2013f, 5). The 2:4 crisis management grants were redirected in 2010 to include efforts that lie outside a given individual agent's responsibility in order to promote collaboration between agents in the crisis management system. MSB noted that it had been very difficult to distinguish between efforts that should be covered by the principle of responsibility and those that should be viewed in terms of additional efforts, which would qualify a candidate for extra financial support (MSB 2013f, 5-7).

The government directed the Swedish Agency for Public Management (SAPM) to investigate how well MSB had managed the 2:4 crisis

management grants and propose improvements (Statskontoret 2014). SAPM stated in its 2014 report *More Crisis Management for the Money? MSB's Management of the 2:4 Grants* (Mer krishantering för pengarna? MSB's hantering av anslag 2:4) that it is very difficult to assess the impact and usefulness of this particular program. The agency also found it unusual that MSB manages both internal and external applications and noted that in both cases there is a lack of proper documentation concerning how the applications have been managed. In addition, MSB itself is one of the public agencies that are permitted to apply for these grants, and it has frequently done so, but it also manages its own applications. SAPM also stated that the reports which MSB provides the government are not clearly written, that relevant information is omitted, and that evaluations of particular projects have been based on the self-assessments of grant recipients. Moreover, insofar as MSB has not followed up on or reviewed projects that have previously been completed, it is in fact impossible in practical terms to determine whether these grants have had any lasting effects (Statskontoret 2014, 10). Such problems raised serious doubts about both the usefulness and the management of the 2:4 grants. However, the criticism raised in the SAPM report was directed not only against MSB, but also against the nature the 2:4 crisis management grants. That is to say that while it had been difficult to stimulate collaboration and cooperation across sectors by means of financial grants, it was even more difficult to evaluate the effectiveness of such efforts.

The ability of the government and MSB to in fact govern the overall crisis management system has been subject to criticism in a number of official reports from the beginning of this period, which have often sought more evidence that efforts within the field of security have indeed improved the ability of both public and private actors to successfully deal with crises. Even though this field has been difficult to control and evaluate, critics of the management system have nevertheless asked that clear goals be defined so that the results of the various reforms and grants could be accurately assessed.

The government itself was also keen to advance measurable objectives and goals in the crisis management system. In this regard, it described in its first pleading to the parliament how crisis management should proceed, stating that:

> Objectives should be developed for the crisis management of society, and the principle of responsibility should be complemented by laws that are formulated such that it is possible to distinguish between normal events and serious events and crises (Skrivelse 2009/10: 124, 1 author's translation).

The text went on to add that a vital aspect of crisis management resided upon the possibility of providing an overall assessment of the ability of Swedish

society to successfully manage crises. The pleading stated that MSB has an important responsibility in this regard insofar as it is obligated to provide the government with general evaluations of the capabilities of municipalities, public agents, regional offices, and other key actors upon the basis of risk and vulnerability analyses. These were taken to be "the most important instruments for analyzing society's crisis management abilities, and they can serve to help create the opportunity for an effective governing of central security actors" (Skrivelse 2009/10: 124, 18 author's translation). But although the government maintained that the quality of the analysis must improve in order to be able to effectively monitor the quality of crisis management and the effect of changes (Skrivelse 2009/10: 124, 18), the risk and vulnerability analyses that security agents have produced have nevertheless been mainly self-evaluations. Moreover, many municipalities and other public agents not only had no dedicated positions and/or qualified risk analysts; they often either reused old reports, or filed none at all. It thus appeared that both MSB and the government placed an inordinate amount of emphasis on self-assessments of uneven quality. Furthermore, it was very difficult to see how such self-assessments could be composed in a way that made it possible for the government to acquire an overall assessment of society's ability to manage unforeseen crises.

The government also highlighted a fifth level in the crisis management system in addition to the local, regional, national, and international levels – *the individual level*. The pleading in question argued that the individual possessed the prerequisites necessary for managing her own security in a reasonable way in a safe and secure society, in which the risk of accidents was small. And if an accident did take place, the individual could expect speedy assistance. It added, however, that society could guarantee security and safety in the event of severe accidents or disturbances only to a reasonable level. The pleading argued in this regard that

> [E]ven if the public has a substantial responsibility for the many functions of society, it is a prerequisite that individuals be prepared, informed, and able to act to meet their own needs, particularly in the initial phase of a crisis. This means that the individual citizen bears responsibility for his/her own preparedness, is sufficiently aware that severe accidents and events can arise, and that society in such circumstances may have to prioritize both efforts and resources (Skrivelse 2009/10: 124, 9 author's translation).

This was the first official document which explicitly stated that individuals should be prepared to provide for their own security, and that they should not expect assistance in the event of a crisis from the Swedish state since it may not be in a position to help them. This was a radical development in the socialization of security. Although providing for the security of its citizens has long been regarded as one of the most fundamental responsibilities of the state, here we find a new and radical understanding to the effect that citizens

cannot expect the help of security providers: "Vital aspects of individual responsibility are to be active before, during, and after a crisis, both within and outside the borders of Sweden" (Skrivelse 2009/10: 124, 9 author's translation). In addition, although individuals were not necessarily the main object of security, they were potential security providers:

> In order to reach general security objectives, the government believes that crisis management must be characterized by collaboration between public agents, municipalities and regional offices, private companies, volunteer organizations (civil society), and individuals in order to bring about joint preparedness and efforts in meeting severe disturbances and crises (Skrivelse 2009/10: 124, 9 author's translation).

This new orientation whereby individuals and citizens were regarded as security providers rather than objects of security was evident in later documents and writings as well. For example, in 2013 the Swedish government presented a bill in parliament, one part of which was concerned with increased control over explosives and explosives precursors, while a second part presented an overview and general assessment of crisis management (Prop. 2013/14:144). This document, which very strongly emphasized the need for extensive collaboration in issues of security, maintained that a vital part of crisis management involved strengthening the general robustness of society. Society as a whole must thus have a developed ability to prevent, endure, and manage accidents and crises and to recover and draw lessons when severe problems do arise in this regard. The key is to increase the effective use of society's total resources, and "The responsibility for this is shared, and it involves collaboration and cooperation" (Prop. 2013/14:144, 13 author's translation). That is to say that society as a whole must take responsibility for increased robustness by means of a high awareness of potential risks and crises. It was also noted that crisis management, preparations for enduring crises, and increasing robustness comprise a never-ending task:

> The nature of planning and preparing for crises is such that there can be no end-station. Crisis management is thus continuous, and there can always be improvements in the ability to resist and handle severe accidents and crises (Prop. 2013/14:144, 13 author's translation).

Furthermore, a shared understanding and a common value base are needed to improve crisis management, which is specifically evident in the three principles of responsibility, resemblance, and subsidiarity that guide the Swedish crisis management system (Prop. 2013/14:144, 14). The government regarded one of the main challenges in this regard to be the need to govern the many different actors that now form part of the crisis management system:

> Governance, monitoring, and evaluation are at the same time crucial for developing preparedness and acting during a crisis. The government wishes to continue to develop these aspects of control by developing the 2:4 crisis management grants, specifying the objectives and goals of crisis management, and enhancing the utility of the risk and vulnerability analyses that security actors in the system are both encouraged and obligated to conduct (Prop. 2013/14:144, 15 author's translation).

However, the crisis management system included both public and private actors, which rendered it both complex and difficult to evaluate. Indeed, the type of crisis management system that has developed in Sweden highlights the challenge of meta-governing networks: "Crisis management concerns all levels in society and includes many different actors, both public and private" (Prop. 2013/14:144, 15 author's translation). In addition, since many vital systems and infrastructure have been deregulated and contracted out to private actors, the government further encouraged collaboration between public and private actors on all levels. The government argued that the experience and lessons it has learned from previous accidents and events have shown that there must be a high level of awareness that crises can occur, and that the collaboration and involvement of private actors, companies, volunteer organizations, and individuals are important. The difficulties associated with governing private actors, and the extent to which the latter can replace formal agencies and responsibilities, are not investigated in the bill we have been discussing, but there is clearly a sense of the necessity of extensive collaboration in the text. The difficulties of meta-governing security networks are thus likely to remain.

The government's bill emphasized the role of individuals and citizens in crisis management. The individual was thus not only the object of security, but also a security provider who can contribute to the overall crisis management system. The text states that

> By placing the individual at the center of crisis management, it is obvious that the protection and health of the individual and of the population is prioritized. It also illustrates that the management of crisis is based above all on the awareness, preparedness, and capabilities of individuals (Prop. 2013/14:144, 28 author's translation).

It adds that capable individuals should not expect to receive the first priority in the initial phase of crisis management:

> In the initial phase of a crisis situation, resources must be directed to the most vulnerable groups in society and to those persons who are in the greatest need of society's support and assistance. Individual citizens should therefore, as far as it is possible, make their own preparations to provide for their own needs, such as water, food, and heat. They should also have access to vital information, advice, and directions from responsible agencies and other

security actors…. The balance between public and individual responsibility is that the individual citizen bears the primary responsibility for protect her/his life and property (Prop. 2013/14:144, 28 author's translation).

This is rather starkly phrased given that the security and protection of individuals has historically been one of the most fundamental responsibilities and rationales of the state. This constitutes a radical change in the notion of what the state should be able to provide.

Efforts have been made to implement and disseminate this view. According to the specifications of the governmental bill, MSB worked actively during 2013 to produce plans for how to raise the level of information and knowledge in society concerning the responsibilities of individuals when a crisis occurs. The government shares MSB's view that additional information campaigns may be conducted as needed so that citizens know they need to provide for their own security to a greater extent. Canada is held forward as a good example in this regard. The state recommends that Canadian citizens have the necessary supplies available to cope on their own for 72 hours in the event of an emergency. Good preparations on the part of security providers, including individuals, can help the state use its resources more effectively in order to focus on the most acute issues and support those in the most vulnerable positions. Furthermore, instead of the state having to provide for the security of capable individuals, it is proposed that individuals and volunteer organizations provide capable assistance in the event of a crisis. Following the notion of "don't ask what the state can do for you, ask what you can do for the state," the Swedish government seeks to both encourage and make it possible for individuals and volunteer organizations to play a greater role within the crisis management system:

> The role of the individual within the crisis management system can also involve contributing to a more secure society for others. The Swedish crisis management system follows a comprehensive view whereby it is desirable that all actors contribute to the continuous work of improving crisis management. Therefore, the necessary conditions must be in place for volunteer organizations and individuals to spontaneously take part in operations and assist people in need (Prop. 2013/14:144, 30 author's translation).

The government maintains that volunteer organizations must have a proper role in crisis management, and that the state must develop collaboration with such organizations in order to utilize their commitment and resources (Prop. 2013/14:144, 30). This new orientation, in which individual citizens and volunteer organizations are regarded as security providers, constitutes a radical change that challenges the fundamental understanding that it is the state that should provide for the security of its citizens.

While even the most neo-liberal and minimalistic views of the state normally reserve security and crisis management as the core competence and moral obligation of the state, this process study has instead revealed a substantial change in the political field of security. The new broader understanding of security that has been adopted, the increasing interdependence between public and private actors, and the securitization of many state functions have together led to the emergence of security networks. As a result, the governance of the political field of security has taken the form of meta-governance. In addition, individuals and volunteer organizations have come to be regarded during the final period investigated as security actors and potential partners in security networks rather than security objects.

5.5 Conclusion

This chapter has scrutinized the substantial reorganization of the political field of security in Sweden that began in the mid-1990s with the launch of a new comprehensive view of security. The main purpose was to investigate if the Swedish state has taken a meta-governance stance in the political field of security and if so describe the rationality behind this new approach to security. Security is often taken to be one of the main tasks of the modern state and a meta-governance stance would thus show that even in the core tasks of the state we can see a turn to alternative ways to govern that goes beyond sovereign means. In the mid-1990s and as a result of the end of the Cold War, the understanding of security was substantially broadened. At first that only meant placing more resources and consideration in the civil side of the Total defense but the political field was soon expanded bringing in new security issues and objects. With the expansion of issues and objects that became "securitized" followed the involvement of new security actors. Initially it was foremost public agents who were responsible for the civil side of Total Defense was to be made aware of security and risks as the scope of their roles in security management were broadened. However, due to neo-liberal trends and influence many key state functions, including infrastructure and vital systems had been outsourced or privatized. This leads to an expanded interdependency between public and private actors and calls for extensive collaboration in the political field of security. This combination of *privatization* and *securitization* provides the rationality behind the emergence of security networks.

How thus then the Swedish state try to govern the political field of security? By considering the response of the state in terms of a governmentality I would thus argue that the Swedish state takes a meta-governance stance. That means that the state is well aware of the emergence of security networks and tries to govern *through* networks rather than diminishing or otherwise halt this development. In fact we can see that the

Swedish state and the many reforms that take place after the middle of the 1990s in conducive to security networks to the extent that the government stated in a Bill that the state could no longer provide for the security and wellbeing of citizens without extensive collaboration with private actors. Instead it is suggested that that activities of the public sector are not enough to create a safe and secure society. This must be done in close collaboration with private actors and from bottom-up. The government therefore wishes to see and encourage a more structured collaboration (Prop. 2001/02:158, 11author's translation)

The redirection of focus and resources from traditional military threats and security management to new issues also expanded the political field of security through the inclusion of new actors, both public and private. The period between 2001-2005 was marked by an expanded understanding of security and the need for collaboration on the basis of *the principle of responsibility*, *the principle of similarity*, and *the principle of subsidiary*. The adoption of these principles in legislation was a key element in the development of this political field and in the promotion of security networks. But although extensive collaboration and networks were viewed as necessary due to the broader understanding of security that had been accepted, it was also recognized that security networks needed to be governed. As a result, a new agency, Krisberedskapsmyndigheten (KBM), was established that was intended to play a leading role in security and crisis management and serve in that capacity as a meta-governor. The government stated that since KBM was designed to improve security and crisis management, it should be "provided with the conditions necessary to be a strong actor in the new crisis management system" (Prop. 2001/02:158, 12 author's translation). Furthermore, KBM was not only to implement decisions taken by the government, but also delegated the responsibility to initiate, coordinate, and gather research; develop methods for managing and evaluating preliminary reports concerning the overall development of the field of security; develop and initiate procedures and understandings that would guide operations in the field; and propose the distribution of resources.

However, in spite of the many responsibilities assigned to KBM, the agency lacked both operative capabilities during crises as well as the authority to make decisions concerning the actions of the various public and private actors who were involved in crisis response. KBM's role as a meta-governor was thus limited primarily to fostering collaboration concerning efforts to promote security that were undertaken by others. But after a series of major events occurred at the end of this period which shook the Swedish crisis management system, it became obvious that KBM had no real ability to govern and control security because the crisis management system lacked the ability to act on its own and did not have the authority to coordinate the efforts of others.

During the following period, between 2006 and 2009, a range of organizational reforms were introduced in order to combat these shortcomings. Security networks continued, nevertheless, to serve both as an ideal and as reality since neither the notion of collaboration between public and private actors, nor the guiding principles of networks were questioned. Attempts to retake control of the political field of security can therefore be characterized as meta-governance in the sense that politicians and public managers sought to govern networks with attitudes and instruments that favored the existence and functioning of networks. One major reform concerned the requirement that public agents with a critical role in the crisis management system should have a duty officer (TIB) on standby at all times. Another organizational reform involved the creation of a new crisis management center in the Government Offices after KBM was found to be toothless. A public investigation proposed that KBM be replaced by a new agency, Myndigheten för Samhällsskydd och beredskap (MSB), which was intended to manage the full range of security issues, from accidents to serious threats. The aim was to increase the operative capability of the crisis management system in order to foster coordination and clear leadership.

The final period covered in this process study, 2009-2014, revealed the conflict between, on the one hand, efforts to increase leadership and coordination and, on the other, the continued promotion of collaboration and networks along with support for the role of volunteer organizations and capable individuals. Not only were the various tools utilized in attempts at governing called into question, it was also stated that capable individuals should not expect immediate relief from the state in the event of a crisis, but rather act themselves as contributors to the crisis management system. A number of auditing agencies have reached similar conclusions concerning the difficulties associated with encouraging, controlling, and evaluating encourage security and crisis management because of the absence of clear goals that could serve as markers. As was noted in one public report, there is no end point for crisis management since there is always room for improvement. However, the specific nature of this political field also generates problems in crisis management to the extent that each new crisis introduces concrete difficulties that most likely could not have been anticipated by security networks. Since it is not possible to expect the unexpected, the nature of crisis management requires spontaneous collaboration and swift responses.

The tentative conclusion must be that the political field of security remains substantially decentralized. The Swedish state has adopted a meta-governance stance and thereby accept and promotes security networks. The way in which the state tries to govern is then through security networks which shows that there is an awareness of networks and various strategies for how to govern these security networks. It is thus possible to answer the first research question affirmative.

In the next chapter I will therefore turn answer the second research question: What meta-governance tools can be identified and what problems did the Swedish state experience in its attempt to meta-govern security networks?

As mentioned earlier, a very important aspect of security networks and crisis management involves information and communication. In order to investigate the possibilities and problems with the meta-governance perspective I will closely examine this specific element of crisis communications management from a meta-governance perspective in the following chapter. The present chapter has provided an ideational and historical background for the recent development of the political field of security. But while the rationality behind the emergence of security networks and the meta-governance stance has been made clear, the conclusion of the discussion concerning the degree of difficulty associated with meta-governance should nevertheless be regarded as tentative because of its high level of abstraction. Although networks need to be investigated in terms of their development within a given policy sector as a whole, it is also necessary to thoroughly examine the specific tools and strategies that meta-governors have utilized in that sector in their efforts to meta-govern networks. As has been noted, the ideational shift in the political field of security was accompanied by the implementation of a new radio system built solely for the purpose of crisis and security communications. Insofar as communication is a necessary aspect of security networks, the introduction of a new communications system in this particular political field provides a unique opportunity to study specific meta-governance tools and strategies in detail. Consequently, we will now turn our attention to how the meta-governors sought to manage crisis communications within networks while adhering at the same time to a meta-governance stance.

6 Facilitating Collaboration – Security Communications and Meta-governance

In this chapter I present an analysis of the meta-governance strategies and tools that meta-governors used in order to get traditional and newly identified security actors to start using the new state-owned ICT system for security communications. The previous chapter described the context and the logic behind the substantial change that has been taken place in the political field of security in Sweden, whereby public and private are encouraged to together form security networks and actors from all levels and locations are expected to contribute to the overall crisis management system. However, it is very difficult to govern the political field of security and crisis management because of the contingent nature of threats and crisis, and the previous chapter made it clear that the state and central public agencies are well aware of this overarching problem. A lot of effort is invested in preparing for crisis. Crisis is understood as unpredictable events that demand swift resolution as well as cooperation involving a number of different actors and organizations. In addition, not only must such collaboration often arise spontaneously, it also is contingent upon the specific nature of the event that has taken place. There was still an outspoken aim to increase the control and governance in this field, to seek and establish collaboration and to develop tools for governance that increased the center's ability to steer other actors. In spite of the various attempts to increase control and set up effective meta-governors, the tentative conclusion reached is that efficient meta-governance has been very difficult to achieve.

I concentrate one specific aspect of the meta-governance of security networks, namely, communication between participating actors. If actors are to cooperate in the effort to respond to an unexpected crisis and find solutions, they must have a shared understanding of the problem. Furthermore, in order to respond to a crisis that may well require ad hoc collaboration, it is of vital importance that channels of communication exist between the actors involved. This is a well-recognized problem in both the academic literature and the documents examined in Chapter 5. Consequently, it will be useful to investigate the manner in which network meta-governors have sought to manage communications insofar as it is a crucial component of effective crisis management within a networked structure and administration.

This chapter begins with describing the basic organization around RAKEL, the new Swedish security communications system that was launched in 2003. Even though the state owns this new ICT system, the latter's basic organization and management consists of various relations and contracts between public and private actors. The basic management structure is itself an interesting aspect of private-public relations in the field of security that relates directly to what was discussed in Chapter 3 concerning the increasing reliance upon and interconnection between states and international security companies. The first part of the chapter also provides certain background information about RAKEL and describes the technical standards and improvements that it offers. The problems that the new communications system was intended to resolve, such as facilitating the inter-organizational communications that were not possible by means of the previous radio systems, comprise one of the first issues addressed.

The second part of the chapter focuses on the problem of convincing security actors to access the system and learn how to use it. This was much more difficult than initially expected, and the public agency responsible in this regard has used various steering instruments and meta-governance tools to encourage security actors to do so. These instruments and tools are in fact the main concern in this part of the discussion insofar as examining them makes it possible to determine whether meta-governance has been successful in this case and whether the meta-governors have had to resort to other types of steering techniques. For example, the use of sovereign power would indicate a meta-governance failure since the theories of meta-governance explicitly state that meta-governors must not resort to such instruments. Following the management of RAKEL, including the attempt to meta-govern the system, has made it possible not only to identify a range of meta-governance tools, but also the ways in which the meta-governors modified and revised them in the effort to produce the results desired. However, even though the RAKEL meta-governors used both *hands-off* and *hands-on* meta-governance tools (see Chapter 2), they became faced with the need to use both NPM steering techniques as well as traditional forms of sovereign powers – which contradicts both the logic and promise of network governance and meta-governance – because these tools proved to be ineffective.

6.1 Background and Organization of RAKEL

RAKEL – Radio Communication for Effective Management (RAdioKommunikation för Effektiv Ledning) – is the new radio system that has been constructed exclusively for security communications in Sweden. It responds to needs that have been newly identified by traditional public safety agents who have requested an improved radio system. However, since the

new comprehensive understanding of security has introduced new actors into security management, it also had to be adapted to their needs and wants.

Although the need for a new radio system began being discussed in the middle of the 1990s, the project was not begun until 2003 due to a lack of political will in combination with insufficient knowledge concerning how to realize such a project in technical and financial terms. On June 10th, 2002, the Swedish government appointed a public investigator who was charged with preparing and presenting the groundwork for how the new communications system would be owned, financed, and managed. This investigation took the name RAKEL, which was later adopted as the official name of the new radio system. Its conclusions, which primarily concerned how to finance the new radio system, were published on January 22nd, 2003, as *Safe Citizens – Secure Communications* (Trygga medborgare – säker kommunikation) (SOU 2003). It had already been decided previously that Sweden needed a new radio communications system to replace the over 200 different analog radio systems in use at the time, which were regarded as both costly and ineffective since they did not allow for communications between the individual systems (SOU 2003, 9f).

The public investigator noted that it was unusual that Sweden had not yet followed the example of its neighboring countries. All other Nordic countries, as well as a number of other countries in Europe, had already invested in new national radio systems based on the same technical standard – TETRA (TErrestrial Trunked RAdio) – that Sweden now sought to employ. The main reason for the delay on the part of the Swedish government was that no decision had been reached concerning how to finance the new system, which previous investigations indicated might be prohibitively expensive. *Safe Citizens – Secure Communications* proposed a number of ways for reducing the related costs, one of the more important of which was that RAKEL should utilize a financial model whereby end-users would share the expenses through a system of subscriptions and fees (SOU 2003, 20-23). However, even if this self-financing model would lower the initial costs for the state, it would have significant implications for how meta-governors could later manage accession to RAKEL. For example, this model meant, *inter alia*, NPM strategies would came to play a prominent role in encouraging security providers to use the new system. I will return to this point, including revisions to the model that became necessary, later in this discussion.

6.1.1 Technological Improvements

It was clear at the beginning of the 2000s that Sweden needed a new ICT system for security communications. The analog system that public safety agents had been using was outdated, insecure, and could be intercepted with a simple radio transmitter. The analog police radio had been identified as

problematic and inferior because it could be both intercepted and disrupted by external users, a shortcoming which had become accentuated during the 2001 EU meeting in Gothenburg 2001 and the visit by the American president, George W. Bush. The police experienced severe disruptions in their radio communications during these events, and the public investigation into the so-called Gothenburg Riot indicated that the Swedish police needed to have a more secure and robust communications system (SOU 2002). The TETRA standard quickly became the most viable option since it was much more secure against intrusion and interference.

Another problem with the old analog radio systems was that it was not possible for security actors from different organizations, particularly public safety agents, to communicate with each other. The Swedish government state was therefore eager to find a technical solution that made possible not only communications between all public safety agents, but also between them and the security actors that had been newly identified in respect to the new comprehensive view of security that had been adopted. It should be noted that the equipment needed to operate the old analog systems was expensive because of the large number of individual units needed, each of which had limited range. However, a key reason for the sudden urgency in 2003 to find a way to finance the new communications system that had long been discussed was that the analog system which the Swedish police had been using was to be shut down. It relied in part on Danish transmitters and frequencies that the Danish state no longer wished to support since they had already switched to the TETRA standard. As a result, the new national radio system in Sweden had to be operational by December 31th, 2004 (SOU 2003, 22-23).

The specifications required for a new national radio system, particularly robustness and security, made most alternative to the TETRA standard unsuitable or too expensive insofar as the system had to ensure secure communications between all actors that would be involved in public safety and security management. The new comprehensive understanding of security also meant that security actors other than the traditional public safety agents should be able to use the system, a need which had been noted by the public investigation. In the end, however, the public investigator decided for a rather narrowly defined set of end-users who were more or less comprised traditional public safety agents (SOU 2003, 48). The investigation noted that the circle of users might needed to be adjusted not only because of the increasing involvement of commercial actors in public safety, but also because the new comprehensive understanding allowed for at least temporary access to the system by other agents having a role in security and crisis management (SOU 2003, 48).

In addition to responding to new organizational and institutional demands, the system also introduced a range of technological improvements associated with the TETRA standard. TETRA, which is a trunked radio

system, automatically chooses an available radio frequency every time a signal is sent, resulting in a very efficient use of frequencies. In comparison, an analog radio signal occupies one and the same frequency during a conversation. Furthermore, as an expert on security communications noted during an interview (Trnka 2013), the TETRA standard are not able prioritize the type of communication that will take place. As a result, its widespread use in everyday operations quickly exhausts fills up a system having limited capacity, which means that the latter must be expanded as the number of users and the amount of traffic increases. Since this can clearly generate additional costs for both the state and end users, it may well become necessary to make difficult decisions about how best to manage the system. This could also give rise to the need to limit the number of users and revoke licenses already granted to security providers who do not have key positions in the crisis management system (Mårtensson 2013).

The TETRA standard upon which RAKEL is based possesses other technical advantages as well. For example, analog radio only provides for oral communications, while the TETRA standard makes it possible to transmit a broad range of written and pictorial information that includes written messages, maps, patient journals, reports, fingerprints, and so forth. In addition, communications can be encrypted so that sensitive and confidential information can be transmitted without the risk of unauthorized interception either within or outside the system. Besides these technical improvements in radio communication system, RAKEL's infrastructure is built with increased robustness. That means that the system may endure in crisis that includes electrical power failure or similar disruptions of ordinary communication systems, telephones mobile phones or Internet. RAKEL is also built with its own power reserve in case of long term electrical power failure. While the new radio system was a tool designed to facilitate potentially effective communications in crisis situations, getting security actors on board the project proved to be a more challenging task than anticipated, and it became necessary to deploy a range of meta-governance tools in order to attain the stated goals. Before examining the strategies employed involved in greater detail, it is first necessary to describe the basic structure and organization that developed in respect to RAKEL insofar as a large number of both public and private actors became involved in managing it even though the Swedish state was the owner.

6.1.2 The Organization behind RAKEL

Since RAKEL was to be used exclusively for security communications, it was decided that it would be optimal for it to be a state-owned system because of the associated advantages. The 2003 investigation had concluded that no commercial actor would likely be willing to make the financial investments necessary since the circle of end-users was restricted to security

providers. Furthermore, the fact that RAKEL would also be used by the armed forces made it possible for the state to use existing military equipment and material, such as antennas and radio control centers, and also have better control over who accessed and used the system. Security operations would be prioritized over commercial interests, which would make it possible to exempt RAKEL from certain EU regulations concerning open competition in the commercial sector. The basic model chosen was for the state to own the system as a whole, including the infrastructure, and control accession to the system through the issuance of licenses to constitutionally defined and regulated security providers. In addition to state ownership and overall control, however, a number of private and commercial actors would be involved in the direct management of the system. For instance, the construction and maintenance of RAKEL, which was managed in a complex set of private-public relations, was contracted out to several private actors that formed the RAKEL Consortium. The fact of state ownership thus did not preclude a very close relationship between the state and the RAKEL Consortium.

The Swedish state entrusted the development, management, and overall responsibility for the system to KBM, the main meta-governor of the political field of security. KBM was responsible for RAKEL in the initial phase, from 2003 to 2009, when it was replaced by MSB for reasons discussed in the previous chapter. These agencies were tasked with overall responsibility for the infrastructure, technology, software, meeting the needs of the end users, and promoting potential users to acquire access to the system.

The state has utilized private companies to construct and maintain the infrastructure. In addition, it has purchased the software and technology from international companies that are specialized in installing, operating, and managing these types of secured radio systems. These services, which provided in accordance with standard procurement regulations, were contracted out to SAAB, Cassadian (later Airbus), and Eltel Networks, private companies that together formed the RAKEL Consortium for this purpose (MSB 2009b). The highly technological standard that RAKEL provides demands that the state have very close relationships with the private companies that control and manage it.

Cassidian (EADS) is a worldwide leader in global security solutions and systems, providing Lead Systems Integration and value-added products and services to civil and military customers around the globe. These include aircraft and unmanned aerial systems; land, naval, and joint systems; intelligence and surveillance; cyber security; secure communications; test systems; missiles; and services and support solutions. Cassidian had approximately 28,000 employees in 2011, with annual revenues of € 5.8 billion. The EADS group, which includes Airbus, Astrium, Cassidian, and Eurocopter, is a global leader in aerospace, defense, and related services. It

employed a workforce of more than 133,000 in 2011 and generated revenues of € 49.1 billion (Defence 2014). SAAB Communications, a multinational company with around 13,000 employees, is specialized in providing security solutions to both private companies and national governments, serving the global market with world-leading products, services, and solutions that range from military defense to civil security. SAAB's most important markets are Europe, South Africa, Australia, and the Unites States, but it has operations on every continent. Annual sales amount to around SEK 24 billion, with research and development accounting for approximately 20 per cent of sales (SAAB 2014). SAAB is a leader in the development and modification of new technologies to meet customers' changing needs. Eltel Networks, which presents itself as a company that, utilizes an effective interplay between electricity distribution, telecoms, and IT, is specialized in creating intelligent infrastructure (Infranet). Eltel's various business units contribute to the sustainable development of society by providing leading Infranet solutions for power transmission and distribution networks, fixed and mobile telecommunications, and rail and road infrastructures. Eltel Networks, which has over 8,500 employees and sales of € 1.15 million, operates in the Nordic and Baltic countries, Poland, Germany, and the United Kingdom (ELTEL 2014).

In today's technologically developed world, it is not uncommon for states to establish this type of close cooperation with private companies that specialize in both military and civil security. Nevertheless, such close relations between major global companies and the state raise important questions concerning influence and control over the systems involved insofar as it is virtually impossible to request documentation and information regarding the often long-term associated contracts, which are protected in respect to both security and commercial confidentiality. Stefan Kvarnerås, the RAKEL operational manager, maintains that such close relationships between the public agent and strong multinational companies should not pose any substantial problems. For example, it is not entirely impossible to change who delivers and manages the technology when contracts are renegotiated for the first time, although it can admittedly be difficult and costly to do so (Kvarnerås 2012). Nevertheless, it is not unlikely that such companies will exert a significant influence over the system and how it is used in light of their knowledge, technological expertise, and experience in the field. In addition, since both the Swedish state and the companies of the RAKEL Consortium have invested their time and resources in order to establish functioning professional relations, they share common interests associated with the wellbeing and management of the communication system. The close mutual interdependency between states and global security companies thus points to the future continuation of the security-industry complex, including its influence over the ability of states to manage

their security within an environment where most lack the capacity to construct their own security systems.

The construction and maintenance of the RAKEL system was carried out by subcontractors within a framework agreement between the state and RAKEL Consortium that regulated two key tasks (Försvarsdepartementet 2010). The first involved the delivery phase, or the actual construction of the system, which was more or less completed in 2010; the second consists of the operation of the system, which MSB purchases as a service from the private companies involved. The first stages of work began with KBM and the Consortium in January, 2005, after the finalization of the initial 10-year framework agreement. The time-frame agreed upon for infrastructure construction was five years, which was essentially met. This means that RAKEL has been more or less functional on a national level since December, 2010, with the total infrastructure cost estimated as 2.5 billion SEK. In 2013 MSB signed a new seven-year contract with Cassadian from 2015 (MSB 2013c). Additional contracts were concluded in 2014 as well, including a seven-year contract with a three-year option with Teracom AB for maintenance and customer support beginning April 1st, 2015. Teracom owns and manages private digital infrastructures that MSB Director General Helena Lindberg maintains may lead to a synergy which benefits the public (MSB 2014a).

The vital knowledge and technological expertise provided by these global companies makes it difficult for the Swedish state and the public operating agency to oversee and control both the development of the system and the delivery of services. Even though the state formally owns RAKEL, the private companies involved indirectly influence the development and utilization of the system. The consortium and the companies that constitute it are not the only private actors involved in the network of security agents involved in the management and use of RAKEL. The consortium is mainly responsible for the infrastructure, software and maintenance. However, if an end-user is to access and use RAKEL, it also needs to obtain the appropriate hardware, such as telephones, hand controls, earphones, and so on. While all the equipment used by the various security providers must be approved by MSB, each licensed end-user in fact purchases their own hardware equipment from authorized private companies. In 2014, RAKEL and Kammarkollegiet approved four companies for this purpose and included them in the procurement circle from which all participating actors, including state agencies, municipalities, regional authorities, and licensed private actors, must buy the necessary hardware as well as such additional services as programming, installation, planning, service, and maintenance (Kammarkollegiet 2014). It is a recurrent problem that a security actor wishing to buy hardware or services will receive differing offers from the approved companies according to the Law on Procurement (LOU). When a decision is made to make a purchase from one retailer, the other companies

have the right to appeal the procedure and challenge whether the agency in question has failed to recognize the better and less expensive products and services that best answer their needs and specifications. This prolongs the process of obtaining access to the system, and it may result that an extended period of time is necessary to obtain the equipment and services needed to access and use RAKEL after the formal decision was taken to do so (Mårtensson 2013). Private companies and equipment retailers thus clearly enjoy a strong position vis-à-vis public agents and other security actors, who often have little knowledge and experience of this type of equipment and technology, in respect to the basic organization and functioning of the system.

    This presentation of RAKEL's basic organization was intended to illustrate the complex relationships and interdependencies involving collaboration with both public and private actors associated with the management and operation of the system, regardless of sole ownership by the state. These various relations are significant for the present discussion insofar as they give rise to the question concerning the extent to which the state and public agencies are able to control the RAKEL's maintenance and development. The fact that a lack of transparency does not permit further investigation of these relations may become a problem concerning democratic practice since public rule and authority cannot be audited. However, it was initially thought that relations between the Swedish state and private companies were necessary only to make the system operational and manage it. The other important issue is to convince security providers that they should start using RAKEL. RAKEL is a vital tool for networked crisis management since it makes possible communication and a sharing of information that facilitate spontaneous collaboration among participants in combat emergencies and crises. It is the collaborating security actors that must have access, equipment and knowledge in order to use the system and communicate with each other. This is also the key challenge of the meta-governors and it is here we can detect various meta-governance tools. In the sections that follow, I analyze the process and management of accession to RAKEL. Approaching meta-governance as a process makes it possible to track changes and examine ideas concern how to foster such accession.

6.2 Tools and Strategies in the Implementation of RAKEL

If RAKEL is to function as a security communication system that make possible spontaneous collaboration in a networked administration, it is necessary that identified security providers have access to the system and know how to operate the equipment. While RAKEL was in part a response

to deficiencies in communications and the coordination of operations among public safety agents, the 2003 investigation briefly noted that newly identified security providers should also be able to use the system, suggesting that it would be more economically sound if the system could be used for a wide variety of purposes and by as many users as possible. But this would be difficult to motivate from a legal point of view, not least of all because the state did not wish to manage a commercial system that would compete with private actors. LOU and EU regulations concerning competition and the internal market stipulate that investments made by member states are subject to the rules and laws of the internal market. However, these rules can be circumvented on the basis of national security and public safety. Insofar as the procurement and construction of RAKEL was motivated specifically in respect to public safety and security, it constituted an exception to the general laws concerning public procurement in that the system was to be used "exclusively for activities fostering public order and security interests" (SOU 2003, 70 author's translation).[4] Doing so would generate a much more complex situation in which other rules would apply concerning procurement as well as use of the radio spectrum and radio transmissions. In addition, close connection with the armed forces as a key user and security provider could well have an impact on security and secrecy such that broadening the circle of users would make the system more fragile and insecure. In short, the main goal with RAKEL was precisely to construct a national radio communications system to support public safety, crisis management, and overall security (SOU 2003, 49). This justified state ownership and control of the system and also meant that end-users must somehow be identified and recognized as security providers. In addition, RAKEL should not interfere with market competition by giving access to specific firms or agents unless they could be identified as security providers. The 2003 investigation concluded that end-users comprised primarily traditional public safety agents and other public agents with key tasks concerning public safety, security, and health. Additional users, such as other public agents and private companies, were only to have access in specific circumstances and during extraordinary events.

The primary aim of the 2003 investigation was not to map the need of a new communication system, but to find a solution to the financial problems that hitherto had halted the construction of a new radio system. One of the main reasons why Sweden was so late in building a TETRA-based communications system was that no acceptable financial model could be identified. The 2003 public investigation concerning RAKEL was given the explicit task of defining a financial model that would make possible the construction of a radio system based on the TETRA standard while not overburdening state finances. A number of suggestions for cost-reductions

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[4] All translations in this chapter are by the author unless stated otherwise.

were discussed. First, a new and slower building plan for the infrastructure was presented, including fewer base stations and more mobile and temporary stations. The investigation also presented a section-based construction that was to ease the financial burden during the initial years and provide a more long-term and evenly distributed spending program. In addition, the state already owned certain infrastructure that the investigator believed could be re-used, such as the armed forces FTN communications that was to be operated together with RAKEL. However, the major innovation was that end-users and security providers should finance the system themselves through subscription fees and payment for additional services outside the basic model.

The end-users, who were referred to as *customers* in the 2003 investigation, were to be responsible for buying their own equipment and paying the fees for using the system. The latter would also include paying for education and organizational adaptation to the new radio system. The initial proposal was that all organizations should pay a fee for each subscription (unit) that they would use (SOU 2003, 104). The end-user fees and payment for additional services were also intended to cover the shared costs for the system, including operation, maintenance, development, and administration. The goal of the financial model was that the system would be self-financing in the near future (SOU 2003, 112). But even if this financial model of paying *customers* who are security providers solved the initial financial problem, thereby mollifying the unwillingness of the government to invest in a national radio system, it also generated a range of intricate problems. For example, the fact that security providers should pay for their equipment and for access to radio system has shaped the management and steering tools that the responsible public agency must use. This model is very much inspired by NPM and, as was argued in Chapter 2, this steering instrument lies somewhere between sovereign powers and meta-governance tools as it seeks to ensure compliance from security actors by setting up an internal market-structure. The basic idea and premise of this model was, of course, that many private and public actors would identify themselves as security actors and thereby be willing to pay for taking part in the new security communications system. However, one of the main problems with RAKEL has been convincing actors to acquire the required equipment and licenses. In the beginning it was imagined that each potential end-user would contact the meta-governor and responsible public agency and simply request a RAKEL license. If an aspiring actor could demonstrate and call upon a constitutional or law-regulated function in the area of public safety, security, or health, then it would become a licensed user of RAKEL. The organization would then purchase the hardware needed in accordance with the Law on Procurement. The latter involved requesting quotes from the relevant and authorized companies permitted to supply RAKEL equipment (Kammarkollegiet 2014). A prerequisite in this regard is that actors identify

themselves as security providers who are willing to use their own resources to contribute to a common security system. It has become clear, however, from the low rate of accession that the initial public investigation had placed too much hope in self-organization.

It would seem as if RAKEL is a well-functioning meta-governance system in which the meta-governor (KBM/MSB) purchases whatever services it needs from security companies, grants permission to hardware suppliers to provide the necessary products, and makes licenses available to legally grants licenses to law-regulated and legally defined security actors. The security actors then supposedly apply for licenses and join the security networks as RAKEL users. The financial model emphasizes the need to avoid the use of sovereign tools since making RAKEL obligatory would ruin the model. The 2003 investigation was so confident in the advantages of the new system for both individual actors and society at large that it assumed that RAKEL would practically sell itself, and that the main problem would be to fend off undesired applicants. Since the broader understanding of security and the decentralized crisis management system have spurred a development in which practically all public agents and many private agents are potential security providers, RAKEL should thus have had a clear and broad market and a wide set of eager *customers*. The state should have been able to *sell* the ICT both within the state administration at all levels and also to private actors who have certain public functions.

The financial model chosen enforced the need to utilize indirect governance tools in order to foster accession to and the use of the system as well as increase revenues. The rest of this chapter analyzes the various efforts undertaken and steering instruments used to meet these goals and to manage security communications within the system. Specific reference is made to the various steering techniques indicated in Chapter 2 and summarized in Table 1.

6.2.1 The Opening Phase – A Wider Circle of Users (2003-2005)

In its regulation letter for 2004, the government mandated KBM to be the agency responsible for the construction, management, and development of the RAKEL system in collaboration with the private companies of the RAKEL Consortium and other companies associated with technology, service, and hardware products, effective February 1st, 2004. A vital element of these responsibilities was managing access to and usage of the system by relevant security providers. As was discussed in Chapter 5, although KBM had been designated as the main meta-governor in the political field of security, it had few measurable administrative standards at its disposal and also had to rely on indirect governance tools. KBM took over the management of RAKEL from the Swedish Defense Materiel Administration, which had handled the transition from the RAKEL committee to KBM.

KBM was also given the task of reporting to the government concerning the development of RAKEL. It is noteworthy that KBM stated in its first annual report that it regarded one of the key tasks in maintaining and developing RAKEL to be exploring the possibility of widening the circle of users (Annual-report 2004).

The 2003 public investigation had identified a set of key users who should have permanent access to RAKEL and use it in their everyday operations, specifically, public agents who work exclusively with security and public safety. The police, customs, the coast guard, the rescue service, emergency care services, and the Armed Forces and its civil departments were mentioned in particular. Additional users, including both other public agents and private companies, were to have access only in specific circumstances and during extraordinary events. The public investigation also noted that there were a number of private companies, such as energy producers and suppliers and healthcare companies that were indispensable for security communications because they either assist public safety agents, or are important security providers themselves. In addition, other agents that under help to maintain society's protection and security under specific circumstances, including the Civil Aviation Authority, the Maritime Administration, county administration boards, and electrical production and distribution companies, should be granted access to the radio communication system only during extraordinary events (SOU 2003, 48). However, KBM proposed almost immediately after taking over the responsibility for managing RAKEL that "more actors could have access to RAKEL, with some in the wider circle even being allowed permanent access" (Annual-report 2004, 31). KBM in fact informed the government that it was actively looking into the possibility of increasing the circle of end-users and would provide recommendation in this regard in 2005.

Construction of the radio system, originally scheduled to begin in the first part of 2005, was delayed for a full year because competing companies that had not won procurement awards appealed against the contract. The RAKEL committee had put forward a plan that the system was to be built in sections, which would make possible the first section to begin operations as additional sections were being constructed. The entire project was consequently delayed, and it was not possible to raise the revenues anticipated from the fees end-users of the first section would pay.

KBM had also undertaken to inspect the various radio stations previously owned by the military, police, and rescue services that might be of use to RAKEL. It also began preparing various aspects of user access by investigating connection conditions, frequency applications, safety precautions, and the handling of mobile stations. A web-page was created during the first year of the project and a number of activities were organized in order to provide potential end-users with information concerning the nature of RAKEL and the type of preparations needed a swift and problem-

free transfer to the system. Although this included eight seminars and five meetings with delegations of such primary end-users as the Police, the Armed Forces, SRS, the Coast Guard, municipalities, and regional authorities in charge of healthcare, KBM found it difficult to determine the overall level of interest in RAKEL (Annual-report 2004). Public safety agents, who had been looking forward to a new communications system that would overcome the previously mentioned shortcomings of the outdated analog radio systems they had been using, seemed most enthusiastic. Regional authorities were also interested since they could use RAKEL in their healthcare and public safety programs. The most hesitant actors were the municipalities, and a key issue for them was the difficulty involved in trying to estimate the expenses associated with accessing and using the system. The financial model that had been adopted proposed that end-users should bear the full costs of the system, which meant that costs per user would decline as the number of users grew. At the beginning, however, the total cost for each organization could be very large, and even increase over time, if there were few users. It was simply very difficult in this initial phase to calculate costs and grasp the utility of a system dedicated to security communications. Consequently, many municipalities, and other actors as well, hesitated to adopt RAKEL. One of the most pressing problems facing KBM was in fact the slow pace of accession to the system on the part of potential end-users.

The aim of increasing the circle of end-users could be justified on the basis of the comprehensive understanding of security, which regarded a greater number of actors as security actors who must be able to communicate with other actors via RAKEL. Yet this was also a solution that fit the financial model insofar as more end-users would lead to greater revenues for supporting the system and possibly lowering the costs for all actors involved. This logic did not pass unnoticed by the new security providers, who consequently viewed the new communications with suspicion and felt that they were to be used to support the key users. A common stance by the municipalities, who often regarded RAKEL as primarily a communications system for the police and other public safety agents, was that they did not wish to pay for the police radio. The majority of municipalities did not believe that RAKEL and the type of communications and services it provided were useful for their everyday operations. The very idea of a common communications system did not appeal to them, and they felt that the necessary equipment and fees would involve additional costs for them with little added value in return (Högberg 2012). The overall response to RAKEL by potential end-users was thus not overwhelming.

KBM clearly had a number of reasons for being eager to widen the circle of RAKEL users and include new categories of users, and they presented a proposal to the government with this aim in mind in April 2005 (KBM 2005b). KBM pointed out that the circle of end-users whom they were then

trying to convince to join RAKEL was too narrow. KBM argued that the radio system should be used by all actors who have important obligations within the crisis management system even if they had other primary responsibilities in terms of their everyday operations. From this point of view, RAKEL was not to be used exclusively by public safety agents and traditional security providers such as firefighters, the police, and Rescue Services but also by all actors that somehow contribute to public order and security. This suggestion was in accordance with the principle of responsibility discussed in the previous chapter, which comprised an important element of the argumentation in the 2005 annual report. Moreover, KBM argued that these additional users should have permanent access to RAKEL. The 2003 public investigation had discussed the possibility that certain actors should have temporary access to the system during emergencies and crises. KBM's position was that not only would this make it difficult for important security providers and collaboration partners to have sufficient familiarity with the system to operate it easily when it was necessary to do so, having to distribute equipment in the event of a crisis would pose an added problem. Consequently, KBM requested that their task be broadened, and that any government instruction that restrict the extent of the circle of users be changed (KBM 2005b).

KBM noted in this respect that

> The current law concerning electronic communications has not been designed to foster a modern understanding of how society shall defend itself against severe disturbances. The law grants a special status to the Defense Forces and the Police, but not to actors who are of vital importance in the management of crises during peacetime (KBM 2005b, 7 author's translation).

The report maintained that this reflected a traditional and outdated understanding of who may be a security provider as well as the nature of threats and crises facing modern societies (KBM 2005b).

The report solicited a quick response from the Department of Defense, the responsible ministry in this case. In June of the same year, the head of the department, Leni Björklund created a working group tasked with identifying solutions to such issues and with outlining proposals that would make possible a wider circle of users. The working group, which consisted mainly of KBM personnel, issued a report in October 2005 that supported the initial suggestion that more actors needed to have access to RAKEL because of their involvement in security management (Försvarsdepartementet 2005, 18). It stated that the ability to address and solve new security threats in respect to the broader understanding of security resided upon communications and the ability to coordinate cross-sectional operations, which provided the motivation for extending the circle of RAKEL users. A major difference was drawn between primary RAKEL users, who worked exclusively with

security and public safety, and secondary users, who assist these key actors and require only temporarily access to the system. However, the working group proposed that both public and private organizations could be permanent users of the system if they had *certain tasks* that were associated with public safety and security management. In the light of the broader understanding of security that had been adopted and the three principles for security management discussed in Chapter 5, the group of potential end-users was thereby substantially broadened. The latter included municipalities, regional authorities, other public agencies, owners and operating actors of hazardous facilities, electronic companies, electricity suppliers, as well as private actors and companies that work with security and secure specific interests. Nevertheless, even though these actors had right to use RAKEL, they still needed to apply for licenses and purchase equipment on their own.

The working group also recommended that all actors who had the right to use RAKEL have permanent access so that they would be adequately familiar with the equipment and with radio communications. It was also noted that security communications must provide for cross-sectional communications when working with health, public order, and security, and that this can involve a significant number of public agencies. Not only were these recommendation consistent the new comprehensive view of security, the three guiding principles of security, and the need for collaboration between sectors, including extensive collaboration between public and private actors (Försvarsdepartementet 2005, 9), it also substantially increased the potential market for RAKEL licenses. This made it possible for KBM to expand its efforts to promote access to the system and increase revenues.

This may at first appear to comprise a rather small alteration in the then existing laws and rules regulating security communications at the request of the meta-governor security networks, KBM. I regard this, however, as constituting an example of the use of a *hands-off meta-governance tool* insofar as the facilitation of network governance did not involve the direct participation of the meta-governor. Since KBM had no authority of its own to change laws and regulations, it had to encourage the government to take action, which required that the government present a bill in parliament in order to widen the circle of users as per the recommendation. The resulting 2005 government bill *Collaboration in Crisis for a More Secure Society* (Samverkan vid kris för ett säkrare samhälle) stipulated that permission to access RAKEL is to be based on the overall responsibility and role that a given agent has in the crisis management system. This made having operations of importance the criterion for enjoying permanent access to the system rather than an exclusive involvement with security and crisis issues, as was the case previously. In addition, not only did this change the legal conditions for access to RAKEL and re-interpret the applicable laws (Prop.

2005/06, 139f), it also substantially broadened the circle of potential *customers*.

RAKEL as an ICT system is regulated by a specific law on electrical communications (LEK), which itself is based on certain EU directives. These directives state that the Swedish national authorities must support competition in the provision of electronic communications systems and services as well as ensuring that there is no distortion or restriction of competition in the electronic communications sector. This implies that the state cannot and should not own a communications system if a proper invitational procedure has not been made available to private actors. However, these regulations and legal restrictions do not apply if the given system and its end-users are involved in the management of public order and safety. That is to say that the Swedish government redefined and re-interpreted EU directives in order to increase the number of potential RAKEL users. As a result, it has become necessary to understand in a broad sense the requirement that a given actor should have constitutionally regulated functions in respect to security management in order to obtain a license to access RAKEL. The government bill in fact proposed that all participating organizations have permanent access to the system.

Consequently, RAKEL can now be used in the daily operations of a diverse set of organizations, public agents, electrical power companies and traffic companies. This makes RAKEL much more attractive for many actors since they can not only avoid the need for more than one communications system, they can also utilize the security and robustness of RAKEL. However, the proposal that all actors who have at least some responsibilities associated with crisis management should be permitted to have permanent access to RAKEL in their daily operations also means that RAKEL could then be used for other purposes than those initially intended. Another consequence of the changed situation is that it is no longer necessary for organizations to acquire individual licenses. For example, a licensed end-user such as a municipality, regional authority, or even private company can permit their equipment and subscriptions to be used by organizations with which they collaborate when they need to communicate with them during a crisis. Although such decentralization of decision-making concerning the usage of RAKEL accords with the practice of network governance, not least of all its defining character of self-regulation, it leads to the loss of some degree of control and authority over the system on the part of the meta-governor.

As was noted above, all public agencies on national, regional, and local levels are required to conduct a Risk and Security Analysis (Förordning 2006:942, Lag 2006:544), and the resulting documents typically involve potential threats, risk scenarios, and response plans. This further decentralizes the notion of security and risk management in that individual organizations may very well have their own subjective notions and analyses

of potential threats and scenarios for which they feel it necessary to prepare (Zetterberg 2012). Moreover, it is often the case that these documents specify the communication needs of a licensed security provider, indicating how it uses its RAKEL equipment and subscriptions with other organizations. In this way, a given organization can obtain permanent access to a system reserved for security communications and use it in everyday operations and communications from an already licensed organization, even though it is not a constitutionally regulated security provider (Zetterberg 2012).

Such decentralization in fact allows for a widespread and uncontrollable spread of RAKEL equipment, and this is not without risks for the system. The risk that units might be lost or stolen increases as the number of users and dispersed ownership grows. The worst case scenario would be that stolen equipment leads to intrusion by unauthorized users who seek to either intercept or monitor the system, although this is a rather unlikely scenario. Another danger would be that the given capacity of the system might be exhausted by non-security related communications, which would then hinder its legitimate use. This issue will have to be managed in the near future by the meta-governor, and it may require tough decisions regarding prioritization among users, an increase in capacity, costs, and limit or even recalling licenses (Trnka 2013, Mårtensson 2013). Although RAKEL was developed and constructed exclusively for security communications, a subsequent range of reforms and changes have altered this basic principle. In spite of the fact that there is a public agency responsible for licensing access to the system is fairly self-regulating due to the decentralization and extensive networking of licensed agents. But since KBM needed to increase the number of RAKEL *customers*, there is a goal conflict between providing a well-functioning system of security communications and financing its operations.

How can this initial period be analyzed from a meta-governance perspective? The financial model is clearly inspired by NPM, which tends to reinforce the meta-governance stance since it discourages direct regulation as well as rules that force security actors to join the system, particularly since they might then request financial compensation. NPM strategies and models are not precisely meta-governance tools insofar as they are above all based on market principles rather than on the notion of self-regulating networks. However, insofar as some of proposed hands-off concern changes in incentive structures, they can also be included in the meta-governance tool box, although I endeavor to discuss them separately on a case by case basis. Providing *information* was one of the meta-governance strategies used. I would argue that information in the general sense that KBM used it should be understood as a hands-off meta-governance tool since it involved little direct involvement of the meta-governor with the network security actors. The agency simply spread information by means of meetings and web-pages

that RAKEL was available for the use of security actors. It is perhaps more interesting that the meta-governor encouraged the government to change the legal rules regulating security communications in order to widen the circle of potential end-users and customers, whereby the government was also a meta-governor in the political field of security. The legal changes noted above should also be viewed as comprising a hands-off meta-governance strategy because they are intended to facilitate network governance (Torfing and Triantafillou 2013, 11). An additional strategy of hands-off meta-governance involves influencing and shaping the patterns of interaction and communication between network actors. This was clearly the case with the initial strategies and efforts undertaken in managing RAKEL, including extending the circle of potential users.

However, the use of such tools was not sufficient to convince actors to join the system.

6.2.2 Accession and Resistance (2006-2007)

With this increase in the number of potential end-users who could be granted permanent access to RAKEL, the market and potential usage of the system was substantially broadened. Nevertheless, KBM continued to encounter difficulties in convincing end-users to participate in the project. In addition, KBM's annual reports for 2005 and 2006 note a number of other problems. For example, the initial plan for building the radio system in sections was delayed by appeals and by conflicts between firms. SAAB AB was finally granted the contract for constructing the system, but further delays ensued when the company failed to meet the schedule it had promised. This meant that the plan for the entire project had to be modified once again. The immediate consequence of this situation was that the revenues for 2006 were much lower than was initially anticipated (Annual-report 2006).

Additional financial problems emerged in 2005. KBM noted that operating costs would be higher than expected since some of the costs that the 2003 public investigation viewed as investment costs should in fact be viewed as operating expenses. The system also requires more maintenance than expected. In addition, the possibility to use the armed forces existing equipment which was another suggestion brought forward by the 2003 investigation was much more limited than expected. This was due to the more sensitive and classified information that the Ministry of Defense managed which they believed should not be handled in a military-civil ICT. All these aspects made the management of RAKEL more expensive than expected. Since the system should be self-financed by subscription fees and other taxes KBM had to present the cost for 2006-2008 to potential end-users. The different end-users did however consider these prices to be too high and KBM suspected early on that even fewer actors will access the system. That would then lead to even higher prices for those organizations

that already have accessed the system. It is noted that the full cost for managing the system are only somewhat smaller with fewer users which means that the organizations that already are connected or must be connected have to pay an even higher rate (Annual-report 2005, 20f).

Another problem was brought up in a report concerning the development of RAKEL, namely, that different end-users have widely varying knowledge of radio communications. Such traditional security actors and public safety agents as the police are familiar with radio communications, and they announced early on that they would adopt RAKEL as soon as possible. The police were in fact one of the main actors who requested a new and improved with more secure radio communications. Other actors within the civil administration and the municipalities are often not familiar with this type of ICT and have little knowledge of radio communication and barely know that RAKEL exists. Smaller municipalities with tight public spending budgets also find it difficult to identify resources and justify a relatively expensive system with little added value outside specific crisis situations. Within differing organizations the knowledge of and willingness to adopt RAKEL varies greatly. KBM thus fear that accession will be prolonged, and that certain organizations will not be able to use the system. Many potential end-users are also frustrated by the fact that KBM cannot present stable costs since the latter will vary with the development and changing design of the system. The costs for each organization are also dependent on the number of other organizations that join RAKEL. This creates a situation in which the rational decision for all actors is to wait and see how many others join. This waiting game is self-reinforcing. KBM therefore concluded that "there must be an increased effort to inform the municipalities and other potential users" (KBM 2005a).

In the annual report for 2006, additional technical problems were identified that further increased the overall costs of the system. In addition to further delays with the building of the system, it was noted that the sections already constructed needed more base stations to manage the level of radio coverage. The system also needs more capacity to manage a larger volume of radio traffic than was previously expected. Another issue is that the system has difficulties with functioning in certain indoor environments, such as malls, airports, automobile and train tunnels, the subway, and various private areas (Annual-report 2006, 9). Since this had not been taken into consideration in the initial budget estimation presented by the RAKEL committee, KBM had to turn to the government to find a solution to cover the additional expenses. In addition, Sweden experienced a major storm in 2005, the Hurricane Gudrun. This incident revealed that the system needed to be built even more robustly since it partly failed during the storm. KBM also requested that the government provide assistance in resolving this issue (Annual-report 2006). The report also revealed that further construction delays had led a number of end-users to remain hesitant about joining the

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system since they wished to wait and see how the system as a whole would operate when completed. That means that the revenues from end-users continue to be lower than expected. The government finds this development troublesome and requests that KBM propose an improved system for fees. The government also requests that KBM to provide recommendations for how to improve financial support for accession as well as develop new models for calculating the fees that municipalities and regional authorities should pay since these actors have been particular reluctant to join RAKEL.

In 2006 KBM further intensified their efforts to convince security providers to adopt and use the system since there was still little general interest in doing so outside of the group of traditional public safety agents, regardless of the optimistic outlook of the RAKEL committee in 2003. One strategy is to provide more *information* about the system and make information about the benefits of using RAKEL more accessible. However, this strategy requires that additional funds be spent on this meta-governance tool. A key aim of information is to *raise awareness* on the part of actors on the regional and local levels concerning the benefits and added value associated with RAKEL (Annual-report 2006, 10). Another strategy that KBM decided to implement involved educating 20 persons from key organizations about RAKEL, including members of the Police, the Coast Guard, the Alerting Services (SOS alarm), and the Armed Forces, who would then spread their new knowledge of the system within their respective organizations. KBM also organizes and take part in meetings and fairs in order to present RAKEL. The targets are described as both users of the system and decision-makers within various organizations (Annual-report 2006). This was previously coded as a hands-off strategy. The strategy of organizing meetings and fairs to spread information about RAKEL should also be regarded as part of this tool. However, if the meta-governors themselves organize and invite network participants to meetings, I believe that this should be regarded as a hands-on meta-governance tool since it involve more direct involvement and strategic planning by the meta-governor.

The plan to invite and educate persons in key user organizations goes beyond mere information sharing and should instead be regarded as the *mobilization of bias*. Meta-governance through the mobilization of bias is a form of the top-down creation of networks through "more or less conscious attempts to invoke, maintain and gradually transform the structural context for interactive forms of governance" (Torfing et al. 2012, 134). This was coded as a hands-off tool by key authors in the meta-governance discourse. However, since this case we are examining involves the direct participation of the meta-governor, I believe that the mobilization of bias also can be regarded as a hands-on meta-governance tool.

The 2003 RAKEL committee estimated budgets for each year based on the assumption that all potential end-users would join the radio system as

soon as each section was ready. KBM regarded this as having been overly optimistic. Accession in fact proceeded much more slowly insofar as many security actors remained hesitant concerning the progress of the RAKEL project. RAKEL only had 400 individual users by the end of 2006, primarily from the Police and the Coast Guard. A special report to the government observed that many potential end-users had little or no knowledge of the system and its potential applications. Moreover, many of them had no interest in even exploring the terms and the costs for joining the system. Decision-makers at the regional and local levels had no basis for making such *strategic decisions* as investing in and using a sophisticated communications system. KBM admits that "KBM and other collaborating partners have not been able to present a clear message concerning the system and its benefits" (KBM 2006 author's translation). It is noteworthy that the report was based on investigations conducted by KBM exclusively with respondents from public safety agents and public agencies on the national level. One may well assume that knowledge and interest were even lower among the newly identified potential users. The report also notes that many potential end-users are more concerned with the financial aspects of accessing the system rather than with the technical benefits of the TETRA standard, including the possibility of collaborating with other organizations (KBM 2006, 14). I take this as indicating the lack of a shared view and understanding of policy problems in the political field of security.

Given that both interest and knowledge are low among potential RAKEL *customers*, it is useful to examine how KBM intended to tackle such problems. KBM believed that they need to be more organized in their *information* and *marketing* as well as more aware of how different organizations need different types of information about RAKEL. KBM therefore intend to invite a variety of end-users in order to get a better image of what each group and category wished to gain from the system. Here we see another variant of the *mobilization of bias* strategy. By getting to know and understand how different categories of end-users regard RAKEL, it would become possible to adjust the system, information, and marketing to make it look more attractive. Another part of the mobilization of bias involves efforts directed to particular end-users. KBM believes that it needs to increase its efforts and to convince decision-makers in the municipalities about the benefits of RAKEL. KBM also believes that the financial system needs to become more transparent concerning fees and additional costs. The fact that end-users had little insight into what the total costs would be in the short term was a primary reason for why many organizations were hesitant to join the system (KBM 2006, 23f). The initial belief that the system would practically sell itself to various end-users, and that a wider circle of users would lower the costs for all, was proven to be too optimistic. KBM instead found that many organizations, including public safety agents, were very hesitant to join the new system. This might not be so unusual insofar as

RAKEL had a poor reputation because of obvious major problems with both construction delays and coverage. The self-financing model presented by the RAKEL committee that had and initially made possible the entire project instead became one of the main reasons for why many potential end-users were hesitant to join the system. The fundamental problem, however, was not limited to RAKEL's finance structure, but instead involved the entire crisis management system in Sweden. If organizations that had certain responsibilities in the crisis management system were unwilling to request access to RAKEL due to high prices, the entire crisis management system and network structure suffer since key security actors will not able to communicate with each other. Both the self-financing model as such and the associated voluntary accession are very sensitive to distrust by security actors. The distrust was produced by both the financial model and the technical problems that RAKEL encountered (Högberg 2012). The self-financing model and the meta-governance strategies used might in fact have been counterproductive in respect to the main goal of the system, which was to improve communication within organizations and between key security actors in order to provide enhanced protection and security for citizens.

6.2.3 Reaching Out (2008-2009)

2007 was another difficult year for RAKEL and KBM. The RAKEL system failed during the Hurricane Per in much the same way it had during Cyclone Gudrun in 2005. The incident showed that the system needed additional robustness, which would add to the already stressed financial situation with RAKEL. In addition, the police had to put a temporary halt to their use of the system because of inferior sound quality. These incidents further damaged the image of RAKEL, which was a supposedly robust security communications system. Even though KBM could present a substantial increase of subscriptions primarily among national public agencies, the government remained displeased with the overall progress and decided to take action (Annual-report 2007, 8). In 2007 the government realized that many organizations, both public and private, held a great deal of distrust towards RAKEL. Many actors were particularly critical towards the difficulties of knowing the costs involved in joining the system. The financial model simply had to be adjusted, and the government tasked KBM with fixing and stabilizing fees and with developing an alternative fee model for municipalities, regional authorities, and both commercial and private actors. Public agencies on the national level already paid a fixed price based on the anticipated full accession when the system as a whole was completed. It was estimated that the completed system would have around 50,000 individual subscriptions, and that public agencies would comprise about 40 per cent of the users. The government decided that it would be preferable to provide fixed rates to public agencies having special responsibilities in the

crisis management system and permit them to use their licenses as they saw fit. The idea is that a swift accession by public agencies on the national level would both stimulate and accelerate accession among other potential users, such as municipalities, regional authorities, and commercial and private actors. In 2008 we see the first alterations of the financial model initiated by the government. This has implications for the present analysis. The first is that NPM-inspired models are difficult to align with meta-governance. Rather than creating trust, which is an important aspect of network governance, they instead create suspicion and a type of waiting game, which leads to a situation in which actors are unwilling to pool their resources. This means that the meta-governors, both KBM and the government, are motivated to begin using a new hands-off meta-governance tool, that is, *economic incentives*, as way to favor certain activities. Torfing et al. argue that this indeed constitutes a hands-off meta-governance strategy since it is intended to both foster collaboration and provide the material resources required for this purpose (Torfing and Triantafillou 2013, 11). It should be reiterated, however, it is difficult to separate between NPM management techniques and meta-governance tools.

Revisions of the financial model and the fees are discussed in particular in the budget proposition for 2008. But although the financial model was changed in 2008, the government finally had to use *sovereign power* and give *formal instructions* to public agents that they must join RAKEL and pay a fixed rate. This is a clear indication of meta-governance failure because, in spite of all the efforts of KBM and the government to encourage public actors to join the new ICT, many had decided not to do so. This endangered both the system financially and added to the bad image of RAKEL. The idea was that if public agencies joined the ICT, it would serve as a good example and lead to other public and private actors also wishing to join. The initial plan was that the system was to be self-financed by 2008 even if the last section was to be completed in 2010. In the proposition it is acknowledged that since the accession has been much lower than expected, it is impossible for the system to reach the goal of self-financing by 2008, and it is not likely that this goal would be reached in the near future either (Budget-Prop. 2008, 86). Besides altering the financial model, the government also decides that KBM needed further assistance in their effort to increase the number of end-users. The government decides that KBM needs to work together with other public agencies to achieve this end. The government appoints the Swedish Rescue Services Agency, National Board of Health and Welfare, Swedish Nuclear Power Inspectorate, Swedish Radiation Protection Authority, and the Swedish National Grid as special partners that should cooperate with KBM and try to increase accession in their own sections and policy areas (Budget-Prop. 2008, 86). In 2008, the government also decides to further investigate the development with RAKEL. The usage of and accession to the new system is regarded as dangerously low, which tends to threaten the

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whole project. The government wishes to see suggestions for how to improve usage and accession (Prop. 2008, 25). Here we find further steering attempts in terms of altering economic incentives and material resources for network participants. This should be seen as a kind of hands-off meta-governance since it is about encouragement through economic incentives rather than direct instructions to the public agencies. The other strategy to give public agencies the task to cooperate with KBM and try to increase the accession in their own policy sector could be seen, on the one hand, as a direct instruction and thus a form of sovereign power. The task and instruction is, however, rather vague and more an encouragement to boost collaboration between public and private agencies and a way to broaden the effort to increase the accession to RAKEL. I thus interpret this to be a form of the mobilization of bias, that is, a form of top-down creation of networks (Torfing et al. 2012, 134).

In 2009, MSB replaces KBM, the Swedish Rescue Services Agency, and the Board for Psychological Defense. These three public agencies ceased to exist, and MSB takes over most of the old agencies tasks, but also additional ones. The first year for MSB is very much a start-up year, and little happens with regard to the management of RAKEL. RAKEL is still under construction, but in the beginning of 2009 the first three out of six sections was finished and in use. Sections four and five were finalized by the end of 2009. That meant that all major cities and the regions with nuclear power plants were covered by the end of 2009. The last section concerned the northern regions of Sweden, which covers a huge geographical area, but with relatively few residents. These regions therefore had a low priority. In addition, during 2009 several improvements were finalized with sound quality and indoor coverage. By the end of 2009 there were 22,500 subscriptions in the system, but the accession was very unevenly spread among different types of organizations. The police alone are one of the driving actors behind the development of RAKEL and had an outspoken aim to join the new ICT held 16,138 of the subscriptions. The initial goal was that RAKEL should have close to 50,000 subscriptions in 2009. The current rate, which also was very unevenly spread among end-users, covered only around 45 per cent of the initial goal (Annual-report 2009, 24).

What was the first action taken by the new agency concerning RAKEL? The government had redirected the newly instituted 2:4 crisis management grants so that actors who started using RAKEL in cooperation with others could aspire to get this grant. MSB was responsible for handling this grant. This is a clear example of a mixed form of economic incentives and hands-off meta-governance. This grant was discussed in Chapter 5, but it can briefly be mentioned that evaluation of the utility and usage of that grant was overall disappointing, and few public agencies have used this grant for developing their usage of RAKEL (Statskontoret 2014, 10).

There are few specific actions and attempts to govern the implementation of RAKEL in 2008 and 2009 besides those already mentioned. A lot of time and energy are spent on solving technical problems with the radio system. The shift of the responsible public agency from KBM to MSB also required additional resources. Still, it is a period that is very interesting from a meta-governance perspective. The self-financing model based on the idea that end-users should bear the full costs of the system is temporarily abandoned. It is deemed that this model creates uncertainty and, therefore, unwillingness among end-users to join the system. The government loses confidence in KBM's ability to manage the accession of public and private agents on its own, and therefore decided to use sovereign power and give direct instructions to public agencies that they must pay a fixed fee and acquires RAKEL. Other public agencies are also encouraged the work with the accession in their own policy sectors and cooperate with KBM. This could be seen as a form of top-down creation and encouragement of network governance. This development and the use of direct sovereign policy tools show how difficult meta-governance and indirect steering really is. Even if the meta-governors, KBM and the government, try to create a more transparent system and encourage accession by altering the economic incentives, few actors join the system voluntarily. What seems to be lacking among the customers is a shared understanding of the problem, and the overall crisis management system, and the role that RAKEL might fulfill in that regard. The meta-governors have in spite of all their efforts not been able to create the necessary mobilization of bias and a discursive framing that can convince the newly identified security actors to join the new ICT. The suggestion that meta-governors should or could do such a thing with regard to a networked administration seems exaggerated. In the Swedish case many of the potential collaborating partners and security providers simply do not recognize themselves as participants in security networks, and they are thus reluctant to invest time and resources to take part in such a network. A crisis management system that tries to take the form of a networked administration must make sure that participating actors see themselves as security providers and are thereby willing to invest time and resources to fulfill that role. In the investigated case many public and private actors simply do not share the image that KBM and MSB give of a broader understanding of security with decentralized responsibility and commitment. This provokes stronger action by the meta-governors and a shift in the meta-governance tools.

6.2.4 Active Meta-governance (2010 – 2013)

In the end of 2009 the Ministry of Defense presented, *RAKEL, Present and Future – Communication, Collaboration and Interoperability* (RAKEL, nutid och framtid – kommunikation, samording och interoperabilitet), a

report prepared by a working group from the Government Offices that had been given the task to evaluate and give suggestions how to best proceed with RAKEL (Försvarsdepartementet 2010). The government and the Ministry of Defense had created working group because of the many problems with RAKEL and the low accession rate. The working group believes that RAKEL must be seen as a necessary tool in the Swedish crisis management system. The ICT with the TETRA standard is modern and up to date system that may serve well as a security communication system. What is lacking is clear vision and strategy from the government that would make it possible for RAKEL to have a more important role in crisis communications. One of the key problems, according to this report, is that the accession among municipalities and regional authorities has been much lower than expected. Again the financial model is criticized since the cost for joining RAKEL is one of the main reasons mentioned among the municipalities why they have not start using RAKEL. The regional authorities already have costs associated with existing analog radio systems, and they should therefore be more willing to change their communication system to RAKEL, which offers improvements in technology and robustness. The problem is that regional authorities see no benefits with joining RAKEL. It would cost more and their current analog systems works fine for their communication needs (Försvarsdepartementet 2010, 2-4).

The report finds that one of the most pressing problems is that RAKEL has not improved communications between organizations. The different end-users must make explicit arrangements about how to manage group-conversations, and very few organizations have the ability to create dynamic conversation groups. This may seem strange since dynamic, flexible intercommunication between organizations was one of the stated purposes with RAKEL. Another problem is that many potential end-users have not yet joined RAKEL since they ask for additional services for which there are no current solutions. The report concludes that even though RAKEL has solved a range of technical problems and has a high level of robustness, it continues to suffer from a bad reputation, and potential end-users remain hesitant to join the system. Since the number of end-users is directly connected with the economic model, this is an acute problem. In September 2009 RAKEL served 21,000 units. The police alone had 16,000 units. Municipalities and regional authorities only had 1300 units, which were used mainly by the local rescue services. There were only around 200 subscriptions that non-public actors used. The initial prognoses from 2003 suggested that by 2009 the municipalities and regional authorities should have 19,000 subscriptions, but there were only 550 actual full-year subscriptions. The report therefore comes to the conclusion that if the system is ever to be self-financing, the accession rate among municipalities and regional authorities must be substantially increased (Försvarsdepartementet 2010, 6). The report suggests that the government might even consider using a private actor for the

management of RAKEL, at least when it comes to increase the accession rate and customer support. This is severe critique against the work and effort that KBM so far had performed and that MSB would now shoulder.

The working group suggests that MSB are given the task to come up with *a national strategy for RAKEL*. This should include:

- a definition and description of the need for RAKEL in crisis management
- structures and strategies for intercommunication and collaboration
- how to make RAKEL more customer-friendly
- the need for and management of information about RAKEL
- training and practice with RAKEL
- how to distribute the costs
- how to follow up and evaluate work with RAKEL

The report suggests that MSB needs to support information exchange between end-users, and that *different forums* and a *strategic council* be created (Försvarsdepartementet 2010, 8). MSB must also come up with different ways of increasing knowledge and abilities among end-users concerning how to operate the system. The working group also makes the conclusion that the governance strategies have so far been inadequate. In order to make sure that key public agencies, particularly those required having a TiB (described in the previous chapter), participating in RAKEL, the government and MSB must come up with other governance instruments. The report suggests that the government use its sovereign powers and give direct instructions to the most important agencies in order to force them to use RAKEL. This explicit request for the use of sovereign powers should be taken as a clear indication that the working group does not believe in indirect governance tools. At the same time, however, the working group believes that direct instructions to the municipalities and regional authorities would be inappropriate. The problem is that the government is not constitutionally allowed to give detailed instructions to these levels of the public administration. Such instructions would also undermine the financial model that still serves as the basic idea for how to finance security communications in Sweden. The working group believes that the government should use *economic incentives* in this regard. One way to increase accession is that the state immediately stop financial support for analog radios so that the actors are strongly encouraged to switch to RAKEL (Försvarsdepartementet 2010, 8).

The working group also finds that MSB is not able to give the proper customer support to regional authorities and municipalities. All organizations must start from limited knowledge and work out on their own how their security communications should look. The suggestion here is that

MSB develops its assistance to potential customers and provide support in their progress to join RAKEL.

One way to summarize the 2010 report is that it finds the current *hands-off meta-governance tools* to be inadequate, and it therefore requests that MSB use more active *hands-on meta-governance tools*. The report also recommends that the government use sovereign power in the form of direct instructions to key public agencies that they must use RAKEL. The model of voluntary accession by central security providers is simply not working. This report both evaluates and makes recommendations for how to improve the implementation of RAKEL. The severe critique immediately generates a response from the meta-governors.

MSB presented its response to the critique and the problems pointed out in the report from the Defense Department. It is suitably called *A National Strategy for RAKEL* (Nationell strategi för Rakel) (MSB 2010c). MSB also believes that RAKEL is a central tool in the current crisis management system. MSB has therefore begun *consciously* presenting RAKEL in such a way. Some of the actions taken for doing this involve using RAKEL more in its own organization and in the many educational, practice, and crisis management scenarios that are used as training examples. MSB also states that it intends to pay special attention to the communications aspects when it evaluates the various crisis management plans. MSB further believes that RAKEL must be marketed better. MSB must be able to meet the decision makers and other influential key persons in those organizations that are potential customers. A communication strategy is developed to this end that should "help MSB in their efforts to create, build, cherish, and deepen the relationships with present and future RAKEL users and other important target groups" (MSB 2010c, 39). Another way to further accession to RAKEL is by drawing attention to *good examples* among the various categories of organizations. This has resulted in commercial-like pamphlets and ads in their own magazine, *24/7*, and in trade journals. This is a type of *biased information* and forms part of the *marketing strategies* that should also be regarded as a hands-off meta-governance tool.

Another reform that MSB intends to make was specifically mentioned in the report, namely, to work closer with security providers in different councils and forums. The *RAKEL Council* in particular is mentioned in this strategy plan (MSB 2010c). It was launched in May 2010, and since then meets twice years to discuss general issues. The council gathers all major organizations that use RAKEL. Among the most important members are the National Police, the Prison and Probation Authority, the Swedish Power Grid, SSK (the association of municipal and regional authorities), and the Director General of the Armed forces. It is chaired by the Director General, Helena Lindberg. The idea is that the RAKEL Council should assist and give advice to the DG of MSB on issues that concern finances, collaboration and management, additional potential categories of end-users, and the various

terms for accession (MSB 2010d). The RAKEL Council is interpreted to be a hands-on meta-governance tool since it requires the direct participation of the meta-governor and other security providers. The Council can thus be taken as a form of *process-management*. Process management aims to reduce tensions and resolve conflicts among network participants. In this sense, the direct participation of the meta-governor may help shape the policy agenda, define problems, and establish a joint view (Torfing and Triantafillou 2013, 11). With the direct participation of meta-governors, the idea is that tensions and conflicts can be resolved. I view this as one of the key purposes of the RAKEL Council.

In May 2010 MSB also held the first meeting of the *User Forum* (MSB 2010a). In this forum, the needs and suggestions of RAKEL users in various organizations are discussed. The discussions and suggestions that end-users have are forwarded directly to MSB and transformed into new directions. Larger issues are forwarded to the RAKEL Council for further discussion. The author attended one of these meetings in 2011 as an observer. This was a full-day meeting, and MSB, the organizer, offered lunch and coffee during the breaks. The day started with lectures and information about various new items and innovations concerning RAKEL. This was followed by a number of discussion groups and workshops led by MSB personnel. It was clearly stated during the opening that the meeting should above all be regarded as a forum for new connections and for open discussions about RAKEL as a tool in crisis management (Observation 2011). The idea was to create an environment that allows for open discussions and serves as a meeting point for RAKEL users so that they can exchange experiences and make new connections (Gallin 2011).

The *Collaboration Forum* was also started in 2010. This forum is very much oriented towards technical issues, and its key aim is to develop national guidelines for collaboration between organizations. This resulted in a first guideline document called *National Guidelines for Collaboration within RAKEL* (Nationella riktlinjer för samverkan i RAKEL), which was to be used from January 2013 (MSB 2013d). Stefan Kvarnerås, RAKEL operational manager, writes that these guidelines are intended to make it easier, more effective, and more secure to cooperate across organizational boundaries. This is necessary for good preparedness and effective crisis management (MSB 2013d). The guidelines are produced in cooperation with the end-users, and they are intended to assist the current need for cooperation. The idea is that the guidelines can be developed further and respond to the needs and desires of RAKEL's end-users. There is now a permanent group, which meets four times a year and includes all major organizations, that works with the development of national guidelines. MSB is the convener for this group (MSB 2013b).

MSB also announces in the *National Strategy* from 2010 that additional *target-group forums* may be established (MSB 2010c). There are three target

group forums in 2014. One forum was created particularly for users in the energy industry. The energy industry involves many private actors, in both the production and maintenance of supply. This forum was created as an attempt to make possible an active discussion with the private actors in this category of RAKEL customers. While National Grid (Svenska kraftnät) is the Swedish authority primarily responsible for organizing this forum, MSB assists with such practical matters as meeting venues, note taking, and so forth. The forum for actors in the energy sector had their first meeting in 2012. It meets 3-4 times a year to discuss issues and news related to RAKEL and how to best coordinate communication between organizations (MSB 2013a). This is also interpreted to be a hands-on meta-governance tool in the form of *process management*. The key aim with the forum is to exchange experiences and create a shared view between the meta-governors and the end-users of RAKEL. However, this is combined with the use of *sovereign powers*. (MSB 2013a). The public authority, the Swedish National Grid, has as part of its task from the government, and in cooperation with MSB, made it mandatory for private actors to use RAKEL if they have a public task (kraftnät 2014). This is a form of sovereign power since the authority issues a specific and non-negotiable demand that network participants are obligated to follow (Torfing et al. 2012, 132) This also explains why there is a huge interest among this user group to take part in the forum that MSB organizes. In order to have a license and be able to operate the RAKEL system, private energy actors need to participate in the forum, which makes it more mandatory than optional.

Another forum involves the regional authorities. This forum is intended to create a platform for the exchange of views between MSB and the regional authorities. MSB can be informed about special issues and requests that regional authorities may have. MSB can also assist and answer questions on how regional authorities can access and use RAKEL. MSB also seeks to assist regional authorities in their efforts to increase accession among the municipalities in their region. The forum also serves as an arena for exchanging experiences and best practices concerning RAKEL issues. It is similar to the other forums, and meetings are arranged a couple of times each year. The day-long meetings start with news concerning RAKEL, and participants are encouraged to pose questions and discuss RAKEL related issues with each other and with MSB personnel (MSB 2011).

MSB has also started a forum for municipalities. The first meeting was in 2010, and participants meet two-four times a year. The setup is similar to the forum for regional authorities. It is above all a platform for MSB to meet and inform municipalities of new items and innovations in RAKEL, answer questions, and facilitate discussion and the exchange of experiences (MSB 2010b). The meeting is often a day long and set up as a mini conference. I participated in one of these meetings in 2013. The impression was that MSB personnel are very keen to trigger discussion and mutual learning among the

participants. They often stress that it is the municipalities that *own* the forum, and they should decide on the content and program for the next meeting. The level of enthusiasm varies among the participants. Some of them work full-time with risk management or public safety, and they are very familiar with radio communications, while others have been invited to participate, but have no mandate from their home municipalities. Some even acknowledge that their *boss* has signaled that there is no way they will invest in RAKEL. These participants simply sit through the meeting. Other participants, who represent municipalities that have implemented RAKEL in all administrations within their municipality, hold mini-lectures. This is another example of how MSB uses good examples to promote RAKEL. The number of participants in this forum is normally limited to around 30-35. I asked the responsible convener from MSB, who works full-time with launching and selling RAKEL to municipalities, what the selection criteria and background logic are for inviting these particular representatives. Sweden has 290 municipalities. The answer was that the invitation is based on a range of criteria, including geographical spread across the nation, size of the municipality, and the level of commitment to and implementation of RAKEL. There are, however, few ideas about how the knowledge and information shared among the participants can reach other municipalities. The same participants are in fact invited to the next meeting as well, which means that a large number of municipalities are not reached (Observation 2013a).

These forums are very interesting since there is no formal requirement that the regional authorities and municipalities attending acquire RAKEL. These two forums should be regarded as a type of *process management*. They have been established in order to reduce tensions and resolve conflicts among network participants. The direct participation of meta-governors can, according to the theories of meta-governance, also support the network process by making available various types of material and immaterial inputs and resources. Meta-governors can shape the policy agenda, the premises for decision-making, and the negotiated policy outputs by their direct involvement, active leadership, argumentation, and coalition building (Torfing et al. 2012, 135, Sorensen and Torfing 2009, 247). These forums are managed and convened by MSB, which largely controls the agenda and the information provided during the meetings. Even if MSB tries to convince participants that it is they who own the forums, their interest in engaging in further activities and discussions are low. Even if it is explicitly announced that these meetings are not about *selling* RAKEL, it is obvious that this issue is always present due to the financial model that remains valid for these target groups.

MSB also began in 2010 to organize an annual *RAKEL Day*. Invitations are sent out to all organizations that already are or potentially could be RAKEL users. 700 persons came the first year to attend seminars, listen to

presentations, and look at the exhibition of products that various hardware companies are permitted to display. The first year's venue for RAKEL Day was the Clarion Hotel in Stockholm, but it was changed the following year to *Älvsjömässan*, which is the largest venue in the Nordic countries for all types of fairs and major events. Around 700 persons representing various organizations attend RAKEL day every year. The invitation includes lunch, coffee, and a reception in the evening. The author has attended the 2013 and 2014 RAKEL Days as a visitor after requesting an invitation. It is a major event, with 35-40 service providers having booths to display a very wide assortment of technical equipment. The opening speeches on the two RAKEL days I attended were held by the MSB General Director, Helena Lindberg, and the RAKEL Operating Manager, Stefan Kvarnerås. This clearly indicates the effort that MSB puts into this event and the importance it places on it. The MSB and RAKEL representatives are both quick to point out that the fair is not about *selling* RAKEL but rather about showing the advantages of the system and the new products available to customers. The discourse used is that this is an event that should *inspire* and encourage the increased use of RAKEL (Observation 2013b, 2014).

The organizations participating in RAKEL Day can establish new contacts and collaborating partners there. For example, Helena Lindberg stated in her opening speech in 2014 that "one of the most important aims of RAKEL Day is that participants will meet new collaborating partners and *create networks*" (Observation 2014). Stefan Kvarnerås also stated the same year that "RAKEL Day is about letting narratives travel from organization to organization about the functionality and utility of RAKEL" (Observation 2014). The image that MSB consciously tries to convey of RAKEL is that it resides within a discourse of narratives, utility, and networks, but the venue and the set-up of a fair, with the numerous software and hardware producers in attendance, tells a different story. Because of the financial model, two of the major aims are clearly to sell equipment and subscriptions to organizations that have not yet begun using RAKEL and encourage those organizations that already participate in the system to find new ways in which to use it. However, there is strong contradiction between networks and collaboration, on the one hand, and *selling*, on the other.

I interpret RAKEL Day as a strategic event and a hands-on meta-governance tool. RAKEL Day is about *facilitating networking*. The direct participation of the meta-governor helps shape the policy agenda and the premises for decision-making. The means are active leadership, argumentation, and coalition building (Torfing et al. 2012, 135, Sorensen and Torfing 2009, 247).

The construction of RAKEL was completed at the end of 2010, which led to a major restructuring of the RAKEL organization at MSB (Annual-report 2011b). This re-organization marked a new era for RAKEL and for how MSB works with RAKEL (Kvarnerås 2012). The new organization has a

clearly-stated focus on *marketing* and *selling* RAKEL and developing its customer services. The national strategy from 2010 also brings forth suggestions on how the accession process can be made more customer-friendly. Many potential end-users have complained that accession is so complex and time-consuming that it itself constitutes a reason to not join RAKEL. MSB has therefore decided to launch *start packages* and provide instructions on how to join RAKEL and acquire equipment. One of the complaints directed towards MSB by potential end-users was that organizations have to start from scratch when applying for a license and that MSB almost seems reluctant to help organizations get started. In addition, the descriptions of the RAKEL system and the accession procedure found on various web-sites are not regarded as helpful. For these reasons, MSB has developed a number of tools and packages that may help organizations to do get started (MSB 2012). Three start packages were created – *RAKEL mini*, *medium*, and *large* – in order to help security providers understand the types of equipment they would need to have access to differing levels of services. Software companies offer a wide set of services, but there is also an increasing number of requests for additional services by various end-users. For instance, many organizations wish to have GPS functionality in their RAKEL equipment. There is thus a constant development and ongoing negotiations between what security providers demand and what software and hardware providers can deliver. In addition to the three start packages provided by MSB, security providers can request additional services and products for extra fees (MSB 2009a, Bram 2014).

The self-financing model that was adopted to make the new system possible influences the way MSB works with implementing RAKEL. The reorganization at MSB has been subject to criticism. The problem with the new focus is that it pays less attention to how organizations should be able to communicate with each other and increase the user-friendly aspects of RAKEL. Many end-users who are unfamiliar with radio communications are still not comfortable with RAKEL and its equipment. This is a major problem that limits their use of the system. MSB works hard to increase the number of subscriptions, but how users who are unfamiliar with radio communications can use the system and contribute to the overall crisis management system is an issue that has basically been ignored. RAKEL's functionality is very much adjusted to the needs and requirements of public safety agents, and new security actors often find it difficult to operate the equipment or request functionality altogether different from those needed by public safety agents. It is not uncommon that municipalities which have paid for licenses and bought equipment in fact place such sophisticated equipment into storage and forget about it because users unfamiliar with radio communications find it difficult to operate. This shows a clear conflict of interest concerning the various end-users (Mårtensson 2013).

The emphasis on selling equipment increasing the number of subscriptions is evident in many interviews and reports. A staff member at MSB responsible for strategic innovation stated that the MSB's key task is "selling the concept of crisis management to other public agencies and organizations" (Bram 2014). The idea of selling both a new idea of crisis management as well as the possibility of security communications appears to be at odds with the concept of networked administration. The annual reports are often concerned with the number of subscriptions rather than with the usage of the system. There are few investigations concerning how RAKEL is used and whether it has improved crisis management communications. A number of recent incidents indicate that RAKEL neither functions as it should, nor makes possible inter-organizational communications.

In 2013, there was a major traffic accident on Tranarpsbron, an important bridge on the E4 highway in southern Sweden. All the actors who participated in the rescue action had access to RAKEL. According to the MSB reports, there were serious problems with inter-organizational communications as well as difficulties with establishing an incident control central at the scene (MSB 2013e). This is very discouraging since RAKEL was precisely intended to be a central tool for collaboration in such events. As a result, MSB concluded that it must continue efforts to develop new methods, educate users, and practice collaboration. The national guidelines for communications and collaboration by means of RAKEL that were developed in 2013 are clearly inadequate for the purpose. The lesson to be learned from this accident is that although the RAKEL technology is functional, collaboration and communications among the various actors remain underdeveloped.

Another example of such shortcomings is provided by the major forest fire in Västmanland in 2014, which was the largest forest fire in Sweden since the 1950s. The fire-fighting operation began at the local level with the local service, but the fire spread rapidly and operations had to be taken over by the regional level in order to coordinate the actions of the numerous participating organizations. Local rescue services from various municipalities, the MSB, the military, voluntary civilians, and regional authorities in the areas affected had to cooperate with each other, with over 300 firefighters working at the same time on the worst days. While RAKEL functioned in a technical sense, the participating actors were once again unable to communicate with each other. MSB believes that the communication failure was mainly due to improper use of the system by the participating organizations rather than because of deficiencies with the system itself (MSB 2014b). A different picture is presented by people who participated in the rescue and firefighting operations. They state that RAKEL had poor coverage and severe disturbances, and that they consequently had to use private mobile phones during the operation. Another problem was that the code for directing calls to the right conversation groups stopped working

(Kommunförbundet 2014). These two recent incidents show that in spite of MSB's efforts to create guidelines for communication between organizations, the latter remain a major problem in crisis situation since even though RAKEL functions in a technical sense, organizations involved in joint actions are unable to communicate with each other. It is clearly necessary to increase efforts and resources concerning the operational problems with RAKEL rather than continue to sell it to additional actors.

In 2011 the main focus at MSB was very much to follow and implement the national strategy from 2010, the main aim of which was to increase the number of subscriptions. MSB describes in the annual report how they try to reach different target-groups. Much effort is invested in the different forums, RAKEL Day, and programs to provide information to potential customers. MSB explicitly mentions a video clip about wider usage and the possibility to join RAKEL (annual-report 2011a, 20f). Although these meta-governance tools have already been discussed above, it should be noted once again that the repertoire includes both hands-off and hands-on strategies. The re-structuring at MSB and the new customer-friendly approach adopted involve different marketing strategies as well, which should be regarded as combining NPM and hands-off meta-governance. MSB is also innovative in the way it utilizes *sovereign power*. A strategist at MSB revealed in an interview (Bram 2014) that MSB often informs the government how to place specific demands in regulation letters to other public agencies and otherwise regulate the standards for security communications. In effect, private actors are left with no alternative than to begin using RAKEL. This form of non-negotiable specification must be viewed as a form of sovereign power since the meta-governors, both the government and the MSB, provide a detailed set of authoritative and non-negotiable rules for communications (Torfing et al. 2012, 132).

Work continued during 2012 at implementing the national strategy for RAKEL. The focus was above all on *marketing*, *selling*, and *encouraging* accession (Annual-report 2012, 26). The accession rate continued to be lower than expected, and many actors were still hesitant to join RAKEL, because of unclear future costs. At the end of 2012 there were around 46,000 subscriptions to RAKEL, but MSB was confident that, with the wider circle of users, there might be as many as 70,000 in the near future. Public agencies at the national level held 32,473 subscriptions of the 46,000 that had been issued at the time. Municipalities held 7,269 subscriptions, but these were mainly utilized by the local rescue services. There was also a very large difference in the number of subscriptions held by municipalities if the local rescue services were excluded from the figures. Some municipalities have one subscription, whereas others can have over a hundred. Regional authorities hold 3,778 subscriptions, which are mainly associated with the health services. There are also a range of publicly owned traffic companies that have begun using RAKEL as their main communications radio in both

vehicles and central offices. These traffic companies are viewed as security actors since they are publicly owned and may be used for transporting people during crises. The category of commercial actors holds a total of 2,316 subscriptions. It is perhaps here the most interesting development takes place. With the new demand that collaborating partners in the electrical industry must master and use RAKEL in order to receive contracts, these actors are clearly keen to quickly acquire the equipment and knowledge necessary for using the system. There are also other commercial actors, primarily in the health sector, that have obtained RAKEL licenses, bought the necessary equipment, and utilize it in their operations. While the total number of subscriptions may seem high, 400 organizations and public agencies still simply refuse to join RAKEL (Annual-report 2012).

In 2013 the number of organizations using RAKEL increased to 460, and these account for 50,000 individual subscriptions. They comprise a rather mixed group, including public agencies, regional authorities, municipalities, public and private health care providers, public transport, electrical companies, and various NGOs. MSB is continuing its efforts in *marketing* and *selling* RAKEL, and the number of subscriptions is slowly increasing. The self-financing model is still problematic, however. In 2012, the government gave MSB the task of investigate how the 2:4 crisis management grants can best be used. One element of this undertaking was to come up with a proposal that made possible a transfer from general to specific collaboration grants in order to encourage the accession of municipalities to RAKEL. MSB recommended that part of the grant be used to subsidize costs associated with joining RAKEL and cover part of the subscription fees, with the subsidized price of each subscription being 6,000 SEK. This subsidized price, which will be available until 2018, is explicitly intended to promote accession to the system among municipalities (Annual-report 2013, 23). This is yet another example of an *NPM steering technique* designed to alter the incentives for networking actors. It also means that the self-financing model, which has now been substantially altered twice since 2003, should be regarded as a liability rather than something that has fostered the implementation of the new communications system.

This most recent period is very interesting from a meta-governance perspective. Between 2003 and 2010 the meta-governors tended to mix NPM steering techniques, sovereign power, and hands-off meta-governance tools. After 2010, particularly after the Ministry of Defense report but perhaps also because of the restructuring of the organization surrounding RAKEL after the completion of construction, MSB also utilized hands-on meta-governance tools. Nevertheless, both the government and the public authorities involved in the management of RAKEL still were forced to rely upon the use of sovereign powers.

6.3 Conclusions

What conclusions can be drawn from this case study concerning the possibility of meta-governance? The preliminary result of Chapter 5 was that regardless of various attempts to set up meta-governance structures and appoint meta-governors, the political field of security was difficult to control and govern. This chapter has closely examined one specific aspect of security networks, that is, the ability to communicate. It has done so by analyzing the management of RAKEL, which is a new communications systems based on the TETRA standard that the Swedish government decided to build in 2003. In the previous chapter it was shown that the Swedish state has adopted a meta-governance stance. That means that security networks are not only acknowledged but also promoted. Meta-governance can be understood as a type of governmentality that may or may not be successful in its attempt to govern but there is an awareness of networks as the basic structure in which policy should be implemented and managed. I have in this chapter therefor analyzed and specified the different strategies and policy tools that meta-governors have used in this political field for governing public and private organizations without interfering with their formal autonomy, at least not as a first choice for getting things done.

Is the implementation of RAKEL to be viewed as a failure or success? It depends on the perspective one uses to answer this question. The number of security actors that use the system have increased, which is likely to continue. In the long run, RAKEL might be broadly used, including by all relevant security actors. But it is also a project that has faced many difficulties in terms of delays, technical problems, operational problems, communication problems, and, not least of all, financial problems. The number of end-users has consistently been lower than desired and expected. Due to the financial model used, this has threatened the project and placed an emphasis on trying to get more actors to join the system rather than focusing on how RAKEL can improve inter-organizational communications in security networks. If we use the initial hope that the system should be able to bear its own costs by 2010, it must be regarded as a failure in the sense that this goal has not been reached by 2014 and will probably not do so in the foreseeable future. How to overcome the obvious suspicion and resistance among security providers is still a major challenge for the meta-governors. It is evident that the self-financing model initially adopted has been problematic, comprising one of the main contributing factors to the unwillingness of security actors to use RAKEL. The responsible public agencies, KBM and MSB, have both utilized a range of steering techniques in order to convince security actors to join the new radio system.

The first period of the project covers the 2003-2005. KBM suggested almost immediately after they have taken over responsibility for RAKEL that more actors could have access to the system. KBM worked within a

broader understanding of security in which more actors are involved in security management. It was therefore believed that many more actors needed to have permanent access to RAKEL, and it encouraged the government to alter the relevant laws to make this possible. The *alteration and reinterpretation of legal regulation* is a type of hands-off meta-governance tool since it does not involve direct interaction between the meta-governor and the participating actors. It may include changing the institutional design and structure of the network as well as the political, legal, and discursive framing of networks (Torfing and Triantafillou 2013, 11). The action taken should be regarded as a way in which to facilitate the functioning of security networks. Another hands-off meta-governance tool that KBM initially used is *information*. I would argue that information in the general sense that KBM used it is a hands-off tool since it the agency simply informed security actors that RAKEL was available tool for them to use.

During the following period of 2006-2007 KBM introduced new steering techniques. It intensifies its work with potential customers. One strategy was to make more *information* available, particularly about the benefits offered by RAKEL. An outspoken aim with using information as a governance tool was to *raise awareness* on the part of different actors concerning the benefits and added value associated with using RAKEL. KBM also organized and took part in meetings and fairs in order to present RAKEL. The targets of such efforts were both potential end-users and key decision-makers within various organizations. KBM also invited and educated 20 persons from key organizations that should use RAKEL, which may be regarded as the *mobilization of bias*. Meta-governance through the mobilization of bias is a form of the top-down creation of networks. Even if the mobilization of bias is spoken of as a hands-off meta-governance tool, I would argue that it should be viewed as hands-on tool when it involves the direct participation of meta-governors and the strategic selection of actors with whom the meta-governor wishes to further engage.

A range of new steering techniques was introduced during the period of 2008-2009. In 2008 we see the first alterations of the financial model initiated by the government. This has two implications for the present analysis. The first is that NPM inspired models are difficult to align with meta-governance. Rather than creating trust, which is an important aspect of network governance, it instead creates suspicion and a type of waiting game, which leads to an unwillingness on the part of actors to pool their resources. It also means that the meta-governors, both KBM and the government, begin using a new hands-off meta-governance tool, namely, *economic incentives*, as way to promote certain activities. Torfing et al. maintain that this comprises a hands-off meta-governance strategy since it aims to foster collaboration and provides material resources for this purpose (Torfing and Triantafillou 2013, 11). Another example of altering economic incentives involved changes in the 2:4 crisis management grant program whereby

grants were made available to actors who began using RAKEL in cooperation with others. This is a clear example of a mixed form of economic incentives and hands-off meta-governance. Although the financial model was changed in 2008, the government nevertheless also had to use *sovereign power*, issuing *formal instructions* to public agents that they must join RAKEL. This is a clear indication of meta-governance failure because, in spite of all the efforts on the part of KBM and the government to encourage public actors to join the new ICT system, many had decided not to do so. This both endangered the system financially, and also added to RAKEL's poor public image. The government also decided that KBM needed to work together with other public agencies in order to achieve this end. It appointed the Swedish Rescue Services Agency, the National Board of Health and Welfare, the Swedish Nuclear Power Inspectorate, the Swedish Radiation Protection Authority, and the Swedish National Grid as special partners that should cooperate with KBM and also seek to increase accession in their own sections and policy areas. The strategy of tasking public agencies with cooperating with KBM and endeavoring to increase accession to RAKEL in their own policy sectors could be regarded as an instruction and thus a form of sovereign power. But insofar as this instruction was rather vague and more of an encouragement to boost collaboration between public and private agencies and broaden efforts to increase accession to RAKEL, I interpret it as a form of the *mobilization of bias*.

The last period investigated covers the years 2010-2013. The period is very interesting from a meta-governance perspective because the meta-governors now use all four steering techniques that were defined and categorized in Chapter 2. The major change is the more intense use of hands-on meta-governance tools. After 2010, particularly after the Ministry of Defense report and the shift in the management of RAKEL from construction to implementation, MSB became very active in its meta-governance of crisis communications. It organized forums for various end-users and set up the RAKEL Council. I interpret both these actions as process-management in which the meta-governor engages and interacts with network participants in the effort to resolve conflicts and shape the policy agenda. MSB also began organizing the annual RAKEL Day, which is intended to *facilitate networking*. The direct participation of the meta-governor helps shape the policy agenda and the premises for decision-making. The means for promoting network governance are active leadership, argumentation, and coalition building. Hands-off meta-governance tools used during this period are *information* and *strategic marketing*, including the use of advertisements and pamphlets directed to potential customers. MSB also developed its assistance to organizations that wish to start using RAKEL through the use of starter packages and communications consulting. NPM steering techniques were used during this period and economic

incentives were altered. The most significant change may be the transformation of a collaboration grant into a direct subscription subsidy for municipalities.

Regardless of extending the range of meta-governance tools used, however, the government and the public authorities involved in the management of RAKEL still had to rely upon sovereign powers. For example, the Swedish National Grid specifically demanded that private contractors use RAKEL for communications purposes. MSB, which has no authority itself to place demands on other public agencies, instead requested the government to do so through changes in the regulations that pertain to security communications. Systems other than RAKEL were thereby disqualified from use, leaving both public and private actors with no alternative other than RAKEL. This type of authoritative and non-negotiable specification can only be regarded as a use of sovereign power.

The idea that meta-governance takes place in the shadow of hierarchies *without* having to resort to sovereign means is thus not supported in this case. Even though the initial idea was that public and private agents should aspire on their own to join the system, the government had to intervene with traditional forms of state governance on a number of occasions. For instance, when national public agencies had not joined the project in satisfactory numbers, the government used letters of regulation instructing them that they must do so. Strict specifications concerning the standards with which security communications must comply comprise a similar example. These "standards" were in fact provided by MSB to the government, which then informed all levels of the public administration about the new requirements. Although this left supposed potential *customers* with no choice but to adopt RAKEL, certain public agents still refuse to join the system. In addition, it was decided that all collaborating partners working with electronics in some way were required to manage RAKEL in order to receive contracts. After this stipulation was issued, commercial actors in the sector began accessing the system and attending the MSB forums. Consequently, the case we have investigated leaves no doubt that traditional sovereign power in the form of regulations, instructions to public agencies, and specifications of standards for collaborating partners is readily used when meta-governance instruments fail or are deemed to be inefficient.

The RAKEL case illustrates the use of a mix of governing strategies that include NPM steering techniques, various hands-off and hands-on meta-governance tools, and the use of sovereign powers as well. However, insofar as meta-governance tools were thus not adequate by themselves, this process of managing security communications constitutes *a case of meta-governance failure*. The fact that meta-governance did not succeed in a particular case and in a political field where it arguably had good chances to do so is discomforting both for the theory and for the promises put forward by proponents of meta-governance. Governing networks thus appears to be a far

more difficult task than anticipated by meta-governance theories, and there is good reason to be cautious when a traditional administration is partially or fully replaced by networks and/or a networked administration is encouraged. On a more general note, it is difficult to imagine cases in which meta-governance tools can be completely isolated from other governing tools instead of being used in combination with the latter. This makes it difficult to evaluate meta-governance as a theory.

Networks and a networked administration possess a positive connotation today. Network discourse suggests that newer ways of governing, including network governance, are characterized by flexibility, knowledge, deliberation, and voluntary collaboration between equal partners. However, the idea of a meta-governor who participates in a given network but at the same time attempts to steer it in a particular direction is contradictory to the very notion of self-governing networks. Regardless of the discursive use of *networks* and of the concept of networked administration, the meta-governor in the case we have investigated had little understanding of networks and how they might differ from traditional forms of administration.

The role of meta-governor is challenging since it demands that you govern with certain governance tools and under conditions that take into consideration the specific self-regulating character of networks. However, the knowledge and skills thereby required appears to be largely missing in many instances. Perhaps this points to the fact that the meta-governors in the particular case we studied had not yet mastered the art of meta-governance in spite of the meta-governance stance they had adopted. There was, nevertheless, an aspiration and belief that RAKEL would be swiftly adopted by security providers and meta-governors could therefore use soft steering tools to manage security communications. After the initial problems encountered, the RAKEL meta-governors have consciously developed a range of strategies that can be classified in accordance with the schema of meta-governance tools that was developed in Chapter 2. The overall conclusion based on the findings of this process-study must therefore be that meta-governance was not possible in this case, and the meta-governors consequently had to resort to the use of various sovereign powers and NPM steering techniques. The wider theoretical implications this has for the possibility and desirability of meta-governance are addressed in the following and concluding chapter.

7 Conclusions and Implications

The aim of this thesis was to investigate the theoretical and empirical problems of the meta-governance approach. In this chapter I respond to and elaborate on the research questions that have been posed in the present study:

1. Have the Swedish state taken a meta-governance stance in the political field of security? (if so)
2. What meta-governance tools can be identified and what problems did the Swedish state experience in its attempt to meta-govern security networks?
3. What are the implications of the theoretical and empirical findings of this thesis?

The first two questions are answered in chapter five and six respectively. In this chapter I first intend to summarize the results of the empirical investigation. I then elaborate on the basis of the empirical results on the third question, what are the implications of the theoretical and empirical findings of this thesis and connect these results to previous research?

7.1 A Meta-governance Stance in the Political Field of Security

In chapter two I contrasted and discussed meta-governance with the theoretical approach of governmentality. Meta-governance is presented as a way for modern states to overcome problems of democracy, inefficiency and power asymmetries that are negative aspects of network governance. By learning the art of meta-governance the idea is that politicians and top-managers can regain control and anchor networks to democratic institutions. Networks are often considered as normatively desirable since they offer a connection between the state and the civil society and thus a way to govern that rebuts sovereign power of the state. However, viewed from the lens of governmentality it is possible to view the techniques of meta-governance as liberal forms of governing through the freedom of independent organizations. Following the tradition of governmentality studies, I would thus argue that meta-governance is a specific type of neo-liberal

governmentality. That implies that when it comes to network governance the state is not only reacting to the emergence of networks but also actively promote networks as an alternative arena for policy production and implementation. That also means that we need to expand our understanding of political power in order to understand how meta-governors tries to govern without resorting to traditional sovereign powers. Meta-governance of networks should thus be understood as type of governmentality directed towards organizations that participates in networks which the meta-governors tries to control at a distance without shattering their formally autonomous character. By refereeing to meta-governance as a governmentality, I wish to provide a counter claim to the necessity of networks. Meta-governance should therefore be seen as a continuation of network governance even though it offers various instruments for retying networks to democratic institutions while leaving sovereign power behind. This made me suggest that meta-governance can in fact be regarded as a type of governmentality that aims to provide *conduct of conduct* of public and private organizations that take part in networks.

This discussion opened up for an alternative theoretical understanding of meta-governance as a practice but did not answer if this type of indirect governance actually could work and allow for core state actors and meta-governors to govern networks and their participants. In order to answer this question it was necessary to investigate an empirical case where meta-governance and at least some suggested meta-governance tools had been applied. The emergence of security networks in Sweden was from this point of view interesting for several different reasons. First, the political field of security is a field where sovereign power and coercive force traditionally have a particular role and meaning. The emergence of security networks really challenges this image and spurs the question if the state is able to govern security networks. This in turn is connected to a normative concern and discussion concerning one of the main roles associated with the state, namely the ability and responsibility to provide security for its citizens. The potential of meta-governance theory is that it allows state actors to act as meta-governors and steer public and private actors with alternative methods and powers. This thesis connects the approach of meta-governance with crisis and security management literature. The latter argues that networks that manage security and crises have become more widespread. New types of security and crisis issues, such as natural hazards, pandemics, and large scale accidents, often require that a range of organizations collaborate. Actors, both public and private, from different policy fields and sectors and levels of government (local, regional, and national), are often required to cooperate when dealing with different security and crisis issues (Robinson et al. 2013, 346). Domestic security issues today increasingly defy jurisdictional boundaries and institutional routines of government. The complexity of managing collaboration across policy fields, jurisdictions, and

the public-private divide should not be underestimated. Managing security and crisis networks would thus count as a specific form of meta-governance to the extent that it involves an attempt to facilitate and promote multi-organizational arrangements capable of solving security problems that cannot be successfully addressed by any single organization. The potential of meta-governance is thus very promising and important in the political field of security. I have argued that this political field should be regarded as a most-likely case favorable to meta-governance theory, both because it concerns a field in which the state has historically been a prominent actor, and also because the emergence of security networks is a relatively recent phenomenon. In addition, there is a low probability of conflict of interest in this field insofar as security in the wider sense, including the management of crisis and emergence events, is something that most actors wish to see addressed in the most effective manner.

The first part of the empirical investigation was conducted through a process-tracing of the development in the political field of security. The study of this process was foremost historically oriented but it was still possible to identify important branching points in the development towards *a meta-governance stance* as well as following the implications and rationality of specific ideas. I took the middle of the 1990s as the starting point for this process since this was when Sweden adopted a comprehensive view of security (SOU 1995, 37). This wider understanding of security both led to the securitization of additional objects and issues, and also gave rise to new relations between various public agents as well as between public and private agents. New security actors, who previously had not been part of the security and crisis management system, now had to collaborate in order to address security issues. The adoption of a comprehensive view of security and the securitization of vital systems and sensitive infrastructure also contributed to the emergence of a situation in which the Swedish state was no longer the sole security provider in respect to domestic security issues. The next important decision that further spurred security networks to emerge was the development and adoption of three leading principles taken in 2001. **The principle of responsibility, The principle of similarity** and **The principle of subsidiary,** was presented in a public investigation that was called Security in a new Era (SOU 2001:41, 18 author's translation). They were later adopted in governmental bills (Prop. 2001/02:10, 2001/02:158, 22). These principles have since then been guiding ideals for the management of security. *Security in a New Era* also pointed out that it is neither possible, nor desirable to differentiate between accidents, minor or major disturbances, and regular dangers insofar as even minor accidents can escalate into severe crises and security threats if they are not dealt with in a timely an appropriate manner (SOU 2001:41, 31). The investigation also stressed the need for expanded collaboration, both between the military and *civil* sides of public administration, and also between public and private

actors. The investigation established that there were good prerequisites in place for the development of collaboration between the military and civil sides in crisis management. Previous experience from various crises had shown that the military can contribute valuable resources and knowledge in such events. The report therefore stated that it was necessary to innovate and remove constitutional obstacles that could hinder deeper collaboration. Stated otherwise, it was necessary to provide public agencies as well as the civil side of total defense with a better understanding of the precise extent to which the military can support civil society during severe peacetime disturbances (SOU 2001:41, 25). The broader understanding of security that included the *securitization* of vital systems and infrastructure also required extended collaboration between state and private actors in respect to the co-governance of these systems. *Security in a New Era* noted that vital infrastructure and key systems have been privatized and deregulated in many countries, which means that the state has lost its ability to implement security and preparedness requirements within these systems. It is also difficult to establish collaboration and joint efforts without the direct involvement and clear consent of private actors. Many public authorities that previously had been organized as ordinary public administrations either have been transformed into public companies or their functions have been outsourced to private actors, which have made it much more difficult to demand that public and private agents cooperate, particularly in respect to aspects of security beyond their own organizations. The expansion of the political field of security also turned security networks into a desirable development and the state should therefore actively foster collaboration between public and private actors within the field of security and crisis management (SOU 2001:41, 58, 116f). The adoption of a comprehensive understanding of security, coupled with the securitization of vital infrastructure created strong interdependencies in the political field of security and the need for extensive collaboration between all the actors involved. In a governmental bill, *The Safety and Preparedness of Society* further argued for the need to alter the relationship between state and society in the face of new types of security threats. The government argued that the state could no longer provide for the security and wellbeing of citizens without extensive collaboration with private actors (Prop. 2001/02:158, 11author's translation). The effort to try to create security networks in order to manage societal security increased and when the government decided to install a new public agency (KBM) that was to manage domestic security issue it gave instructions that this new agency must work according to the logic of meta-governance. That also included developing alternative ways to govern the political field of security(Prop. 2001/02:158, 13f).

However, in spite of the many responsibilities assigned to KBM, the agency lacked both operative capabilities during crises as well as the authority to make decisions concerning the actions of the various public and

private actors who were involved in crisis response. KBM's role as a meta-governor was thus limited primarily to fostering collaboration concerning efforts to promote security that were undertaken by others. But after a series of major events occurred between 2001 and 2005 that really shocked the Swedish crisis management system, it became obvious that KBM had no real ability to govern and control security because the crisis management system lacked the ability to act on its own and did not have the authority to coordinate the efforts of others. During the following period, between 2006 and 2009, a range of organizational reforms were introduced in order to combat these shortcomings. Security networks continued, nevertheless, to serve both as an ideal and as reality since neither the notion of collaboration between public and private actors, nor the guiding principles of networks were questioned. Attempts to retake control of the political field of security can therefore be characterized as meta-governance in the sense that politicians and public managers sought to govern networks with attitudes and instruments that favored the existence and functioning of networks.

Based on the finding of the process-study conducted in chapter five and summarized here I would thus argue that the Swedish state has taken a meta-governance stance in the political field of security. That means that the government(s) and responsible public agencies have in the investigated time period actively promoted and facilitated the emergence of security networks. This also implies that there is an awareness and active promotion of this development but also a range of considerations that aims to provide meta-governance of security actors and networks. That means that meta-governance also has established itself as a governmentality, a rational and strategic thinking about how to govern via autonomous actors by conducting the conduct of others. The Swedish state has sought to create meta-governance structures and agencies that should aim to govern indirectly in the shadow of the hierarchy. Nevertheless, it has been demonstrated that meta-governance and the various tools used for indirect governing tools appear unable to improve the crisis management system and increase control from the center. The tentative conclusion based on the first part of the empirical investigation was that the political field of security remains substantially decentralized and difficult to control and govern, regardless of the attempts that have been made in Sweden to establish meta-governance structures and appoint meta-governors. The purpose of this study was to follow the development and to answer the question if the Swedish state indeed has adopted what I refer to a meta-governance stance. Such a stance would include a positive outlook on the emergence of security networks rather than a challenge to the state but also indications on different attempts to govern over networks and participants through tools that did not run counter to the self-organizing nature on networks. Even though the state and its representatives would not themselves frame it in terms of trying to adopt meta-governance as an entire package, these features would still make it a

good case for investigating different meta-governance tools. As was shown in chapter five, it is not so that networks emerge naturally as an unstoppable necessity driven out of empirical changes and marketization. Rather, networks are viewed as normatively desirable and a potential structure to overcome problems of managing security issues. The possibility of meta-governance of networks, as suggested by theories of meta-governance would in fact promote and welcome this development but would also suggest that the state and meta-governors have the potential to tie these networks to the central state and that core meta-governors would be able to govern them at a distance without using sovereign powers.

While the process study thus provided an historical account of the transformation of the political field and the meta-governance stance it also showed that there are significant difficulties associated with meta-governance. Still, it is also necessary for us to be cautious concerning this tentative conclusion insofar as this part of the empirical study has addressed and captured overarching changes in the ideational structure of this field. In order to understand the emergence of networks and the specific meta-governance tools used in a policy field it is fruitful to try to map the historical development rather than simply assuming that networks emerge out of necessity. Investigating the development within policy sectors even though it gives a rather high level of abstraction makes it possible to identify ideas and rationalities that together shape a particular development and outcome. However, in order to examine and evaluate *meta-governance tools* in greater detail, it became necessary to conduct an empirical study that looked more closely at one specific aspect of the meta-governance of security networks. The area chosen for closer scrutiny was communications insofar as the latter is a vital element of security and crisis management, particularly in respect to security networks. In addition, the introduction of a new ICT constructed solely for the purpose of security and crisis communications proceeded in parallel with the ideational shift that took place in Sweden in the political field of security, which rendered it of significant topical importance. For such reasons, I performed the second part of the study in Chapter 6 that comprised the evaluation of the various governance strategies and problems encountered by meta-governors in the political field of security, with specific reference to the introduction of a new communications system, RAKEL.

7.2 Meta-Governance of Security Networks and Applied Tools

In order to answer the second research question: What meta-governance tools can be identified and what problems did the Swedish state experience

in its attempt to meta-govern security networks, I made an analytical schema in chapter two where I separated between *NPM steering techniques, hands-off meta-governance tools, hands-on meta-governance tools*, and *sovereign powers*. *Hands-off meta-governance* is exercised at a distance from the network, with no direct interaction between meta-governors and the participating actors. It includes, *inter alia*, making changes in institutional design, the provisioning of specific material and immaterial resources, as well as the political, legal, and discursive framing of networks in concrete ways in order to foster particular types of actions. This makes it possible for meta-governors to influence and shape the patterns of interaction and communication between network actors. *Hands-on meta-governance*, which is exercised in close proximity to the actual network, consists of direct interaction between meta-governors and network actors, such as process management and involvement on the part of meta-governors in the implementation of decisions. Process management aims to reduce tensions, resolve conflicts, and change the balance of power between network actors. Direct participation aims to influence the policy agenda as well as the identification of problems and of possible solutions. Hands-on meta-governance thus aims to facilitate policy interactions that are conducive to the alignment of interests and the making of good decisions (Torfing and Triantafillou 2013, 11). I utilized a narrow and negative definition of sovereign power that was distilled from a number of meta-governance theorists: *Sovereign power is hierarchical, utilizes command and control, involves direct instructions, and/or reflects a detailed set of authoritative and non-negotiable rules or demands that have been issued by a public authority*. I also distinguish as far as possible between meta-governance tools and *NPM steering techniques*, which are based upon the creation of internal markets in order to govern public agencies and private agents alike. The basic notion underpinning NPM steering techniques is to foster compliance with policies by manipulating the incentives structure. However, such techniques could be understood as indirect meta-governance tools since they can be utilized with the intention to manage networks or perform network governance. Theories of meta-governance also maintain that NPM and governing through economic incentives can be an aspect of meta-governance since they do not constitute the exercise of sovereign power (Torfing and Triantafillou 2013).

Nevertheless, since the Swedish state has actively promoted and facilitated the emergence of security networks which is the characteristics of a meta-governance stance, the question is whether the meta-governors who have been appointed are in fact able to control and manage them, regardless of the tools they use. The second part of the study can be seen as a case within the case that concerns one important aspect of managing security networks, namely the management of communication. This is not only about investing and provide a specific ICT. The case shows that both traditional

and newly identified security providers have problems with inter-organizational communication because there are no general guidelines or experience of having this type of security communication.

The Swedish government decided in 2003 to build a new radio system for security communications based on the TETRA standard, and it was proposed that it rely upon a self-financing model in order to do so. The latter meant that organizations that wished to join the system should pay fees and service taxes as well as purchase their own equipment (SOU 2003, 20f). This model, even though it was based upon NPM ideas, follows from the meta-governance stance insofar as the state had to rely upon indirect tools to foster the accession of security actors, both public and private, in order to increase revenues for the system. But even if this financial model of relying upon security providers as paying "customers" apparently resolved the initial funding problem, and thereby mitigated the government's unwillingness to invest in a new national radio system, such market-influenced management of security communications came to generate substantial problems and conflicts between the meta-governors and the security providers. KBM (Krisberedskapsmyndigheten), which was the initial main meta-governor in the political field of security, was assigned the task of managing the development and implementation of RAKEL. A vital element of this mission was to ensure that security providers joined RAKEL and began using it in order to foster communications between collaborating security providers. The management of RAKEL and security communication was then transferred to MSB. Let me first specify the different tools and strategies that the meta-governors used with regard to RAKEL.

The study of the different meta-governance tools was presented in chapter 6 as a chronological study and I divided the whole process into periods and recaptured the different governing tools and strategic thinking in each period. The first time period covers the first two years of RAKEL, 2003-2005. KBM that was the main meta-governor and responsible agency for security communication almost immediately suggested that more actors should have access to RAKEL. KBM, who clearly approached security and crisis management from a wider understanding of security, saw that a limited circuit of user, i.e. traditional security providers would not suffice in the new security context. They therefore believed that many more actors needed to have permanent access to RAKEL and encouraged the government to alter the laws to make this possible. The *alteration and reinterpretation of the legal rules* is a form of hands-off meta-governance tool since it does not include direct interaction by the meta-governor with the participating actors. Instead the meta-governor may work to alter the institutional design and structuring the network as well as the political, legal and discursive framing of networks (Torfing and Triantafillou 2013, 11). This effort should be seen as a way to facilitate security networks. Another hands-off meta-governance tool that KBM initially uses is *information*. KBM tries to in different way

reach security providers and end-users of RAKEL in order to convince them to start using the new communication system.

In the following time period 2006-2007 KBM introduces additional meta-governance tools and intensifies its work towards potential customers. One strategy is to increase *information* and make information about the benefits of RAKEL more accessible to end-users. The outspoken aim with additional information campaigns is to *raise awareness* among potential end-users on the benefits and added value with RAKEL. KBM also organizes and take part in meetings and fairs in order to present RAKEL. The targets of these efforts are both the users and key decision-makers within various organizations. KBM also invites and educates 20 persons from key organizations that should use RAKEL. This could be seen as a type of *mobilization of bias*. Meta-governance through the mobilization of bias is an attempt to create networks top-down. This was initially suggested to be a hands-off meta-governance tool. However, I would suggest that the mobilization of bias could also be hands-on if it involves the direct participation and strategic selection of actors that the meta-governor wish to engage further with.

In the period 2008-2009 a range of new steering techniques are initiated. In 2008, we see the first alterations in the self-financial model. The fact that the government must alter the self-financial model for the communication system implies two things for the analysis. The first thing is that NPM inspired models are difficult to align with meta-governance. Rather than creating trust that is an important aspect of network governance, the self-financial model creates suspicion towards the motives that non-traditional security providers should access the system. It also creates a sort of waiting game were many actors wish to see if others will join before they start pooling their resources. The alteration of the financial model is interpreted as a hands-off meta-governance tool, namely *economic incentives* as way to favor certain activities. According to Torfing et al. this is a hands-off meta-governance strategy since it has the ambition of foster collaboration and a way to provide material resources for achieving this end (Torfing and Triantafillou 2013, 11). During this time period other attempts are made to further increase the economic incentives to join RAKEL by changing the 2:4 Crisis Management Grant. The alteration meant that actors who started using RAKEL in cooperation with others could aspire to get this grant. This is a clear example of a mixed form of economic incentives and hands-off meta-governance. Beside these attempts to increase the economic incentives to join the new ICT the government had to start using *sovereign powers* and give *formal instructions* to public agents that they must join RAKEL. Despite all the efforts of KBM and the government to encourage public actors to join the new ICT many had decided not to do so. The fact that public agents did not join RAKEL challenged the whole system. If public actors did not join the system and paid for subscriptions and services as

prognoses suggested, the revenues would be lesser and place a higher financial burden on those who had joined. Potentially the entire project may suffer if it did not raise enough revenues. The fact that public agents on the national level did not join the system created a bad image and reputation among other "customers". The government also decides that KBM needs to work together with other public agencies to improve the accession among public agents. The government appoints the Swedish Rescue Services Agency, National Board of Health and Welfare, Swedish Nuclear Power Inspectorate, Swedish Radiation Protection Authority, Swedish National Grid as special partners that should cooperate with KBM and try to increase the accession in their own sections and policy areas. The strategy to give public agency the mission to cooperate with KBM and try to increase the accession in their own policy sector could on the one hand be seen as an instruction and thus a form of sovereign power. The instruction is however rather vague and more an encouragement to boost collaboration between public and private agencies and a way to broaden the effort to increase the accession to RAKEL. I therefore interpret this to be a form of *mobilization of bias*.

The last investigated period covers the years between 2010 and 2013. The last period is very interesting from a meta-governance perspective because the meta-governors now use all four steering techniques that were categorized in chapter two. The meta-governance activities and strategies are however much more oriented towards on hands-on meta-governance tools. In 2010, the Defense department issued a report with substantial critique against the management of RAKEL. The report states that MSB need to work even harder to convince security providers that they must access RAKEL. MSB Response to this criticism by initiating a range of hands-on meta-governance tools. The agency organizes forums for different end-users and it set up a RAKEL-council. Both these actions are interpreted as process-management where the meta-governor engage and interact with network participants, tries to solve conflicts and shape the policy agenda. MSB also start organizing the annual RAKEL-day. The RAKEL-day is about *facilitating networking*. The direct participation of the meta-governor helps shape the policy agenda and the premises for decision-making. The means for promoting network governance are active leadership, argumentation and coalition building. Hands-off meta-governance tools are still used in this period. Different campaigns that involve *information* and *strategic marketing* that includes ads and pamphlets directed to potential customers are taken to be important strategies. MSB also develop its assistance to organizations who wish to start using RAKEL with packages and communication consulting. NPM steering techniques are used in this period were economic incentives are altered. The most significant change may be the alteration of a collaboration grant that is transformed to a direct subsidizing of subscriptions for municipalities. This is yet an example of

trying to alter the economic incentives, which can be interpreted as a hands-off meta-governance tool NPM policy tool. However, despite the broadening of the meta-governance tools the government and the public authorities involved in the management of RAKEL still had to use sovereign powers. The Swedish National Grid place specific demands on private contractors that they must be able to communicate in RAKEL. MSB who lacks the authority to place demands on other public agencies instead informs the government how to place specific demands in regulation letter to other public agencies in order to regulate the standards for security communication. Thereby potential alternatives to RAKEL are disqualified and public and private actors are left with no alternative than to start using RAKEL. This form of non-negotiable specification must be seen as different usages sovereign powers in the sense that government and MSB provide a detailed set of authoritative and non-negotiable rules for communication on participants in security networks.

KBM, its successor MSB, and the government have been identified as the main meta-governors in this political field, and they have used several different steering instruments in the development and management of RAKEL. The case study presented in the current discussion has revealed a mixture of governing strategies that include NPM steering techniques, various hands-off and hands-on meta-governance tools, but also the use of sovereign powers. The conclusion drawn is that the meta-governance tools were not effective, and that the meta-governors were thus forced to use both NPM steering techniques as well as sovereign powers. The strong position in of meta-governance perspective suggests that meta-governors should be able to steer and control networks and those who participate in them without resorting to sovereign powers since the latter type of instrument contradicts the self-regulating nature of networks. Sorensen states that "Sovereign forms of regulation would inevitably undermine the self-regulating capacity of networks" (Sorensen and Torfing 2007, 169). In this regard, the use of sovereign powers must be viewed as a sign of failure for meta-governance. Since the empirical study revealed that meta-governors had to use sovereign powers because meta-governance techniques and NPM steering instruments were inadequate for the purpose the conclusion must be that the management of security communication and the management of RAKEL constitutes *a case of meta-governance failure*.

There is however another position within the meta-governance approach that suggests that meta-governance may in fact utilize any combination of networks, markets, and hierarchies. This less assertive proposition may be more empirically sound since it is very unlikely to find any one of these governance styles in a pure form. It is thus likely that most cases may show the involvement of more than one type of governance. Louis Meuleman draws a distinction between *second order meta-governance*, which allows for any type of combination of hierarchies, markets, and networks, and *first*

order meta-governance, which supports "a chosen governance style by the use of elements of the other two styles" (Meuleman 2011, 101). The case I investigated clearly is an example of Mueleman's conception of meta-governance as involving the three styles of governance identified. It follows from the meta-governance stance that the Swedish state seem to prefer a networked administration and management but it does not abandon all together the notion of market solutions and NPM or the use of sovereign powers. Even, so it might still be possible to view the management of security communication and RAKEL as a case of meta-governance failure. The case shows some the difficulties of managing public and private relations. The costs for building and the anticipated pace were miscalculated and added further public spending on the communication system. The system initially experienced technical problems which had to be resolved. The number of subscriptions and paying organizations has throughout the investigated time period always been lower than expected. A range of large-scale accidents and crisis also reveals that even when the technical aspects work, organizations still have problems with inter-organizational communication. There is thus a range of problems that continue to haunt RAKEL and the meta-governors of security communication.

The fact that meta-governance did not succeed within a most favorable case context, where it had great potential for success, is disconcerting both for the theory, and for the suggestion that states should promote networks which they can later control and harvest for public purposes. The conclusion must be that meta-governance did not work satisfactorily in this case, and that we therefore have reason to suspect that meta-governance will run into similar difficulties in other political fields where chances for success are inherently smaller. Based on the results of the empirical investigation presented in this discussion, I would thus argue that meta-governance is a far more difficult practice than is anticipated by the theories. That said, there are a number of valuable insights and contributions generated by this study that may be useful both in further research, and in other attempts at meta-governance. In the next section, I discuss in more detail the problems that the Swedish state and the meta-governors experienced and place them in relation to previous research concerning the possibility and problems of meta-governance. I then discuss the contribution of this study to the meta-governance perspective as well as some important implications of the empirical and theoretical discussions in this thesis.

7.3 Problems Identified and Connected to Meta-Governance

The meta-governance approach maintains that networks hold promise for both designing and implementing public policy since they make possible flexibility as well as a wider inclusion of stakeholders. But insofar as networks are not without their own problems, they can and should be managed by such legitimate meta-governors as politicians and public managers. The basic notion in this regard is that modern states should acknowledge the existence and importance of networks since state actors can thereby promote and facilitate the emergence of networks that they can later use in governing. Meta-governors will allegedly then be able to utilize the positive aspects of networks while functioning as democratic anchors for them and thus guarding them against pathologies (Sørensen 2006a). In addition, meta-governors should be able by means of the strategic use of hands-on and hands-off tools to control and *steer* networks without undercutting the advantages they possess as spontaneous and self-organizing structures (Sorensen and Torfing 2007, 169, Torfing and Triantafillou 2013, 10). Only a very limited number of empirical studies have investigated the problems associated with meta-governance and they have produced conflicting results. Some cases apparently indicate that meta-governance can work well (Koppenjan, Kars, and van der Voort 2013, 145), while others have shown the opposite (Bell and Park 2006, 64, Baker and Stoker 2013). Agranoff's study of network management identifies important pitfalls that are worth noting. For example, he states that networks are not devoid of conflicts between actors regardless of the cooperative spirit and aura of accommodation that characterizes collaborative efforts. Most public problems that call for network governance also require the creation of imaginative solutions and of new knowledge, which gives networks a pivotal role in public policies and outcomes. Agranoff also argues, however, that networks do not arise spontaneously, but need the lubrication provided by arrangements, negotiations, meetings, and events (Agranoff 2006, 62). The conclusion he draws from his empirical investigation is that network governance and the involvement of other stakeholders in making and implementing decisions possess significant costs. It seems as networks are sometimes held forward as a cost-effective structures that smoothens implementation problems and lower the cost for public actors. The self-financial model in my case was initially a solution that enables the decision to build an ICT for security communication even though there was little political will to pay for such a system. However, as costs increased and end-users were not as keen to join in and contribute financially the public costs grew. The low level of accession also meant that additional costs had to be spent for convincing security providers to adopt the new ICT. I would thus argue, even if I am not able to provide any calculation or comparison that

meta-governance is not without its costs, and that the costs associated with indirect rule may be, or become very high if network participants stand in need of much lubrication.

Another important issue that should warrant further research is the difficulty of operationalizes and distinguishes between the various meta-governance tools described. This problem was also noted by Bell and Park stating that: "the theory of meta-governance (not to mention its empirical exploration and testing) is underdeveloped. For example, it remains an empirically open question as to whether governments in fact have the requisite meta-governance skills and capacities" (Bell and Park 2006). In order to empirically assess the potential of different meta-governance tools it might be necessary to identify cases in which only hands-on or hands-off meta-governance tools were used. And even though one can find an array of tools within these two broad categories, and even these tools vary between policy areas and cases, the proponents of meta-governance do not provide very precise descriptions or empirical examples that can assist in operationalizing and evaluating them. Further efforts to specify various tools, in both theoretical and empirical terms, would thus be helpful. For instance, *mobilization of bias* can be regarded as both a hands-off and hands-on tool in the case I investigated, even though it was described and thus coded as a hands-off meta-governance tool. Torfing et al. (2012) state that it may involve either "invoking, maintaining and shaping the political, organizational, and socioeconomic structures of society, or… the deployment of a variety of tools that are chosen and manipulated in order to produce a particular impact on processes and outcomes of governance" (Torfing et al. 2012, 134). Meta-governance through the mobilization of bias is thus a form of the top-down creation of networks by means of "more or less conscious attempts to invoke, maintain and gradually transform the structural context for interactive forms of governance" (Torfing et al. 2012, 134). In the case I examined, however, there was an instance of meta-governance that I could code only as the mobilization of bias even though it involved direct interaction between meta-governors and the network participants. This took place in 2006 when KBM invited 20 persons to an educational program from such key security organizations as the police, the coastguard, the alerting services (SOS alarm), and the armed forces who were expected to spread the new knowledge they would thereby acquire within their respective organizations. This is clearly a top-down creation of networks through the conscious efforts of meta-governors to promote networks. But since it involves direct interaction between network participants, it should also be viewed as a hands-on meta-governance tool. Another example of the mobilization of bias that also involves direct interaction between network participants is the strategic extension of invitations to informational meetings by meta-governors to specific organizations that they wish to take part in a given network. This could in

fact vary between the mobilization of bias, process-management, and the facilitation of networking depending on the extent of interaction between the participants. It is evident that further studies and specifications of meta-governance tools are needed in order to assess the possibility of meta-governance in other cases and fields than those I have examined.

Another finding that may be useful in a reconsideration of the meta-governance perspective concerns the particular rules and regulations that can be readily altered in order to generate rapid change within networks. Some authors maintain that it is easier to change operational rules since they involve day to day practices in specific policy areas, or how things are done on the ground (Torfing et al. 2012, 134). However, the case I investigated instead revealed that meta-governors could relatively easily alter legislation or offer a reinterpretation of existing laws, such as took place in widening the circle of possible end-users and in respect to the decision that all involved actors should have permanent access to RAKEL. This constituted a significant legislative change that allowed for a much wider use of RAKEL than was initially intended. There are in fact many examples in the investigated case that shows that it is easier to change legislation than operational rules. For instance, it has been very difficult to make newly identified security actors accustomed to using radio communications. Traditional public safety agents have knowledge and experience of the latter, and they regard RAKEL as an upgrade of functions that are already familiar to them. In contrast, new security actors find it difficult both to understand how to use the system, and also to grasp the advantages it has for every day communications. Another significant example is that many organizations and traditional security providers are accustomed to radio communications only within their own organizations, and this is often how they use RAKEL, even though one of the advantages of RAKEL is that it makes communication possible across organizational and geographical boundaries. In spite of the various attempts by meta-governors to promote such communication, it continues to operate poorly and remains underdeveloped. This still constitutes a major challenge for those who manage RAKEL and security communications, regardless of their efforts to establish the necessary guidelines, promote change, and provide financial support for projects aimed at developing inter-organizational communications. Insofar as traditions, professional training, and organizational culture may strongly counter the use of various meta-governance tools, further studies are needed in order to determine how meta-governors may be able change different types of rules.

Furthermore, my study reveals that NPM-inspired steering techniques might also contravene the logic of networks. This is the case in respect to the allocation of material and immaterial resources by meta-governors in accordance with more or less strict criteria in order to create incentives for collaboration and favor certain activities as they endeavor to manage

networks (Torfing and Triantafillou 2013, 11). However, the mobilization of bias also includes economic considerations to the extent that it involves "invoking, maintaining and shaping the political, organizational, and socioeconomic structures of society" (Torfing et al. 2012, 134). This situation is further complicated by the fact that, as I observed in Chapter 2 and in the analysis, it is difficult to clearly distinguish between NPM steering techniques and meta-governance tools because the meta-governance tools described and examined have incorporated elements of the former. The meta-governors investigated in the present study in fact sought to combine meta-governance tools with NPM steering techniques by adopting a self-financing model for RAKEL, the idea being that an internal quasi-market could be combined with network governance. But this financial model generated insecurity and distrust among security providers, and it must be regarded as one of the foremost reasons for why accession to the system by potential end-users has been so slow. This model also had to be altered several times in an attempt to alter the economic incentives for security actors to join RAKEL. One of the main conclusions and contributions of the present study to the meta-governance approach would thus be that not only is it difficult to combine different steering techniques, the latter may well contradict each other. The problems associated with the use of sovereign powers in governing networks are obvious, but NPM steering techniques by themselves may also be destructive in respect to the creation and facilitation of network governance. The logic inherent in NPM resides upon market models, in which self-interest and competition are central elements of the corresponding rationality. NPM models are partly based on mistrust between actors such that market mechanisms and the notion of economic man would potentially work better in the governance of society than hierarchical control. Networks, in contrast, involve the pooling and sharing of resources among participants, and they are regarded as generating collaboration rather than competition – trust and mutual benefits are the logics behind network governance. NPM and network governance are thereby in contradiction with each other in principle, and I believe that this is something of which meta-governors must be aware. This issue demands further consideration in the literature on meta-governance.

Another question that merits discussion is whether it is possible to promote and facilitate networks from above, something which the literature on meta-governance explicitly states is possible (Torfing and Triantafillou 2013, 11). I discovered a discrepancy in the case I examined concerning the ways in which meta-governors and those whom they believed should take part in security networks understood security. For example, collaboration and security networks have been the explicit goals of KBM/MSB and the government since the end of the 1990s, and they have been promoted both in documents and at meetings. However, many of the newly identified security actors not only did not share the understanding meta-governors had of a

wider security concept, they did not even believe that they should be regarded as security actors. Many such actors were not willing to take part in security networks, especially if doing so was associated with accepting additional costs. A common stance adopted by municipalities and other new security actors was that they thought that RAKEL was a system that was mostly suited for the police, and that the state only wanted them to help pay for someone else's communication system (Högberg 2012). This issue indicates that it might be difficult to create networks from above if there is no shared point of view or common problem that the stakeholders wish to address. This can be contrasted to the study conducted by Koppenjan, Kars, and van der Voort that investigated the response to the swine flu epidemic in 1997. The fact that politicians was able to act as meta-governors and manage emerging networks may very well be explained by the fact that there was a common understanding of the problem as well as the solution among the participating actors (Koppenjan, Kars, and van der Voort 2013, 145). A network that arises from below, when different actors come together to address a common problem, might be altogether different. Such actors would have already identified themselves as stakeholders and likely have a specific interest in collaborating with each other in order to solve a problem. As noted above, Agranoff maintains that networks do not emerge spontaneously, but rather require what may be termed lubrication in the form of arrangements, negotiations, meetings and happenings (Agranoff 2006, 62). This type of efforts is close to what is called hands-on meta-governance with the direct involvement and process-management carried out by meta-governors. Even if such actions was done by the meta-governors in the Swedish case it still seemed difficult to create a consensus and a willingness to commit to the larger cause by public and private actors. The problem is that a lot of the actors share the new and wider understanding of security. The comprehensive view of security and the principles for crisis management adopted in Sweden give rise to a decentralized and networked security management. The discrepancy between the view of the meta-governors and the newly identified security providers helps explain the difficulties that meta-governors have encountered in trying to persuade such organizations to join RAKEL.

Such issues reveal that networks and network governance are built upon the willingness of participants to take part in such forms of collaboration. Nevertheless, it might be rather difficult to strategically and efficiently launch a network from above if there is no shared problem or interest in collaboration among the potential actors. Networks may instead come into being though a convergence of interests or a shared problem that a number of involved actors regard as requiring cooperation. There is thus a danger associated with relying on network governance as an alternative way for implementing public policies in that not only are networks self-regulating, actors participate in them only voluntarily. If the potential participants in fact

do not share a given problem, or do not regard network participation as giving them something in return, they may simply choose not to participate at all. It would thus be interesting to investigate whether there are examples of networks having been successfully created from above. My conclusion is that networks can only comprise a complement to traditional administration, and that they must grow out of a common interest or common problem that participants wish to address rather than arise from the hopes and actions of meta-governors to create networks.

7.4 The Normative Implications – The Meta-pathology of Meta-governance

Meta-governance is presented as a potential solution that may help networks to overcome both the democratic deficit and the coordination problems associated with networks. Networks are a substantial challenge for policy makers, elected politicians and top managers within the public administration. Networks may at the same time be seen as necessary due to complex and wicked problems that requires joint effort of both public and private actors that inhabit a policy field. Networks might even be seen as a desirable feature in contemporary politics since they may enable increased plurality and deliberation among stakeholders and thus function as a democratic injection. If networks are managed properly they can lead to substantial improvements in public rule. The idea and promise of meta-governance is that politicians and public managers can regain control over public policy and networks by carefully calibrating various *meta-governance tools* (Sørensen 2006a, Sorensen and Torfing 2009, Torfing and Triantafillou 2013, 10, Torfing et al. 2012, 133). Research concerning meta-governance is still an emergent field, and there is little general knowledge and evidence concerning the conditions under which specific meta-governance tools can be successfully utilized. This dissertation found the meta-governance approach very promising as it takes the problems and challenges of networks serious at the same time as it present a way to overcome the democratic deficit of networks by retying them to democratic institutions. This thesis has contributed to this literature by investigating and assessing the possibility of meta-governance in one specific political field, that of security, particularly in respect to communications, and it reached the conclusion that meta-governance had not worked well in this case. The study that examined the development of the political field of security indicated that meta-governors found it difficult to control and govern security networks. Furthermore, the evaluation of various meta-governance tools revealed that meta-governors, in spite of using a range of tools, were not able to reach its specified goals and overall purpose of successful security communication.

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This is discouraging in light and the important and necessary role that networks are assumed to have and the need to develop transboundary responses in respect to crisis. While the recent call for studies concerning meta-governance and crisis management seems to indicate that some researchers still hope that these approaches can be combined, I would argue on the basis of the findings obtained in the present study that it is very difficult to successfully employ meta-governance in respect to security and crisis management, if it is in fact at all possible to do so. Moreover, further studies that examine the meta-governance approach in other political fields and cases are needed in order to assess the possibility of meta-governance in general and what and when specific tools may be utilized.

Meta-governance is not only an analytical and scientific approach that scholars may use to analyze politics. In the introduction I discussed the performativity of meta-governance theory. The meta-governance theories are presented in such a way that they often leave strong policy recommendation for how policy makers should view and govern networks in the shadow of hierarchy. Networks are often presented in a positive way, as potent structures that can help policy makers to overcome wicked problems and infuse the policy process with additional voices and reason. Meta-governance are willing to admit that networks are not inherently good but may suffer from democratic shortcomings as well as significant power struggles that thwart desirable outcomes. Such problems can however be managed by politicians and top public managers should learn the art of meta-governance. Since networks can be controlled and retied to democratic and public institutions networks can even be promote and facilitated since they later can be controlled at a distance. The meta-governance approach seems to imply that meta-governors always enjoy democratic legitimacy, and that their management of networks expands democracy beyond formal institutions. But to the extent that meta-governors are always politicians or top-level public managers, and should be so from a normative standpoint, it is a great deal to ask that they should also learn to govern networks on conditions specifically favorable to the continuation of networks. In addition, although networks are perhaps more dynamic and flexible than traditional forms of administration, they are self-regulating as well, which would seem to mean that the notion of controlling and steering self-regulating networks is self-contradictory in theory and has little empirical support, both from the study conducted in this thesis and previous studies of meta-governance. The risk, as I see it, is that meta-governance theory offers a normative and desirable way forward as it suggests that the negative aspects of networks can be managed but the result is even more fragmentation and diminishing control over public policy by the democratic and public institutions.

Even though networks might be desirable from a democratic point of view as they may increase pluralism, deliberation and generate greater consensus for policies among participants they are still problematic if one

consider the some important predicaments for public rule, such as transparency and rule of law. Governance networks are characterized by informality and the prevention of legislation (Héritier and Lehmkuhl 2010, 133) and they operate in the absence of clearly defined constitutional rules (Hajer and Versteeg 2005, 340). Consequently, if politicians and top managers are to govern on conditions favorable to networks, they need to expend time and resources in various informal governance structures. This would necessarily comprise a substantial step away from, as well as a complex challenge to, public politics, transparency in public rule, and the possibility of holding politicians accountable for policy outcomes (Weale 2011).

The general claim put forward from the governance perspective is that the state is no longer able to provide public goods by itself, but has become dependent on other actors for the realization of public policy. The modern state is theoretically based upon the separation of the public and private spheres, but the border between them has become increasingly blurred by network governance. Moreover, the role and the institutions of the state are substantially transformed when it engages in networks. Networks are claimed to be the result of empirical changes and there is no alternative or no going back. Hence, if networks must be dealt with meta-governance might indeed be the golden middle way. However, by rethinking the different premises of meta-governance and contrasting them with the approach of governmentality important theoretical insights emerged. Meta-governance and a meta-governance stance is not only a way to respond to a networked society but by thinking of meta-governance as a governmentality we can see that network governance is an active strategy rather than a passive response. Networks are normatively desirable since they apparently diminish the traditional sovereign power of the state and foster collaboration with civil society actors. Governmentality offers in this context a way forward by considering other types of political and productive power as a way to understand the political dimension in various contemporary forms of governance. Rose and Miller write: "contemporary governmentality… accords a crucial role to 'action at a distance', to mechanism that promise to shape the conduct of diverse actors without shattering their formally autonomous character" (Rose and Miller 2013, 39). This is the core premise of meta-governance theories and the main logic behind the strategic actions that meta-governors used in the investigated case. It is manifested by a meta-governance stance which means a positive view of networks, encouragements and actions to facilitate networks or a networked administration but also various strategies for controlling the participants without removing their autonomous character or status, which means that the state avoids using sovereign and coercive powers. The investigated case does however show that the meta-governors and their different strategies faced fierce resistance.

I would thus argue that the meta-governance proposal to promote and facilitate networks runs the risk of further undermining the ability of public institutions and of democratically elected politicians to uphold public and democratic politics. If states choose to organize themselves in line with network structures, this may result in a substantial refurnishing of public political space (Larsson 2013). In this regard, we must recognize that networks pose substantial analytical and political challenges. They rearrange the public political space and alter the rules of public politics, and although they themselves neither formulate laws, nor coerce or command other actors, they may nevertheless shape the rules and procedures of public politics. There is no doubt that activities within networks have both direct and indirect implications for the wider public since networks shape public politics (Ansell and Gash 2008, 547, Héritier and Lehmkuhl 2010, cf. Walters 2004). But is it really desirable from a democratic point of view that politicians and top managers invest time and effort in informal structures that lack clearly defined procedures and transparency? This thesis has shown that meta-governance is a difficult and fragile practice. Turning to meta-governance as a way to govern and control organizations in networks is not necessarily a way to increase the democratic quality of network governance, but may instead lead to further fragmentation and distortion in public politics.

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