

THE IMPACT OF THE SPANISH CIVIL WAR AND THE SECOND WORLD WAR ON PORTUGUESE AND SPANISH AFRICA

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THE British consul in Lourenço Marques after the war remarked, apparently with a touch of bitterness, that Mozambique had emerged prosperous and unscathed from the world conflict.¹ His colleague in Luanda added that the effects of the Allied naval blockade had been compensated in Angola by greater trade with the Portuguese metropolis.² There is some truth in both these assertions, which could be extended to all the Iberian colonies in Africa, and yet they are far from the whole truth. The first years of war were a time of considerable economic difficulties, as the Allied blockade of Axis Europe, the German submarine campaign, and a general shortage of shipping space played havoc with established trading patterns. Boom replaced slump from about 1942, but raging inflation and continuing shortages of vital imports often resulted in speculative 'windfall' profits rather than steady growth. Moreover, the burden of increasing production fell heavily upon the shoulders of the African masses, given the lack of fuels and machinery. To give but one example, Mozambican timber had to be slowly and painfully shaped with adzes because of a lack even of hand-saws to do the job.³ The repressive and authoritarian régimes of Salazar and Franco were none too delicate in their methods, and coercion of every kind probably reached a peak in the war years. The Spanish colonies were not even spared the physical violence of war, as they were dragged into the bloody and bitter civil war of 1936 to 1939, which was in many ways a prologue to the wider world conflict. As the impact of the Spanish civil war and the second world war was so intertwined for the Iberian peninsula, this article covers both conflicts.

War pulled the economies of the Iberian colonies in three contradictory directions. Officially, it was a case of institutionalizing the colonial pact, with the metropolises providing manufactures and the colonies raw materials. This was the hierarchical and autarkic system beloved of fascist ideologues, and in theory it had the advantage of insulating the neutral countries from the effects of war. However, neither Spain nor Portugal could make up for the withdrawal of foreign shipping and manufactured goods. One effect of these shortages was to encourage greater economic autonomy in the colonies, even in the industrial field, in formal contradiction to the theories of colonial pact. At the same time, the colonies were forced to import the vital goods, which the metropolises could not supply, from abroad. The war eliminated the Axis powers and seriously weakened the United Kingdom, so that the United States moved into the vacuum, creating new patterns of trade which persisted long after the war. Moreover, both Spain and Portugal were eager to

¹ C. Andrews, *Portuguese East Africa, 1948* (London, 1949), 1.

² D. Fynes-Clinton, *Portuguese West Africa, Economic and Commercial Conditions* (London, 1949), 1.

³ C. Spence, *Descrição económica de Moçambique* (Lourenço Marques, 1951), 58.

maximize colonial earnings of foreign exchange. Spain emerged from the civil war with almost no reserves and hefty debts to Germany and Italy, while the conditions of war disrupted the flow of emigrants' remittances into Portugal. Both metropolises therefore encouraged the sale of raw materials from the colonies to the Allies, and covertly to the Axis, again in contradiction to the purist model of colonial pact. Thus the economies of the Iberian colonies in some ways became more closely tied to the metropolises, in other ways became more autonomous, and in yet other ways became more dependent on trade with foreign countries.

The social impact of war is not so clear in the present state of research, although the general outlines can be perceived. Employers and government wanted cheap labour, cheap commodities, land, and in some cases military recruits. War in Europe distracted the attention of the international humanitarian lobby from conditions in Iberian Africa, while internal political opposition was ruthlessly stifled by police forces trained in the methods of the Gestapo. The demands of state and capitalists were thus brutally enforced, and inflation and shortages added to the misery of many colonial subjects. And yet some chiefs and rich peasants, often the same people, were able to profit from rising commodity prices and the urgent requests for specific goods, even though the dice were usually loaded against them and in favour of white settlers. There were 'windfall' profits for some in the urban sector as well, and again it was not just the whites who benefited. Racism reached a high point in the 1940s, under the influence of Nazi doctrines, and yet neither régime took the fateful step of introducing legal discrimination of a systematic kind based on physical racial characteristics.

The political consequences of war are those most difficult to determine in the present state of research. All-pervasive censorship and police repression drove any opposition underground. Pro-fascist political activity was tolerated and sometimes encouraged in the early years of the war, and most of the clandestine political activity appears to have taken anti-fascist forms. White separatism on Rhodesian lines and African nationalism seem to have been much weaker tendencies, although future research may well reveal that this is a misguided appreciation of the situation. Peasant opposition was essentially pre-political, it would seem, taking the form of emigration, smuggling, tax-evasion and a range of passive forms of resistance to the intensified demands of employers and government. But this whole story still awaits its army of researchers, when the records finally become available.

The Allied naval blockade was one part of a complex and dangerous diplomatic struggle waged between the Iberian countries, the Allies and the Axis, which had another African dimension in the form of Spanish claims to African territory. The Spanish civil war drew Franco very close to Hitler and Mussolini, and when France collapsed in June 1940 Franco was tempted to enter the war on the Axis side. Apart from Gibraltar and frontier rectifications along the Pyrenees, Franco desired a great empire in north-western Africa, to include western Algeria with its 'persecuted' Spanish settlers, French Morocco, and a large slice of Mauretania. In the Gulf of Guinea, the Spaniards wanted to expand their small footholds at the expense of Nigeria and French Equatorial Africa. But Hitler wished to persuade Vichy France to re-enter the war on the German side, feared a Gaullist uprising

in French North Africa, and had his own African ambitions to consider, as well as those of Mussolini. The Germans even had the effrontery to ask Spain to cede Spanish Guinea and one of the Canary islands, as well as bases in Morocco. The German refusal to take Spanish imperial ambitions seriously was one of the major factors which prevented Franco from declaring war on the Allies. Tangier, seized in 1940, was Spain's only gain in the war.⁴

Iberian neutrality was essential to the Allies, who used a mixture of bribery and coercion to attain this end. The British promised to look favourably on Spain's North African ambitions, which were a personal obsession for Franco, who had made his career fighting in the Rif. More importantly, the Allies used their naval power to threaten the Iberian countries with total economic collapse by stopping imports of fuels and foodstuffs, or alternatively to provide the Iberian countries with what they needed. This cat and mouse game was partly conditioned by the threat of the German armies on the Pyrenees and by the amounts of strategic exports from Portugal and Spain overland to Axis Europe. The Allies did not feel secure enough to prevent all exports of Iberian produce to Germany until late in the war, but they took an intransigent stand on goods exported directly or via the peninsula from the overseas possessions of Spain and Portugal. Compulsory navicerts were introduced in mid-1940, and the British only allowed Portugal and Spain to import goods from their overseas possessions for internal needs. Moreover, the British refused to issue navicerts at all for goods produced in the Iberian colonies by enemy aliens, and there were many German planters who had taken refuge in Portuguese and Spanish Africa after the First World War. Not only were the British not prepared to import most commodities from the Iberian colonies which used to be sent to European countries, but they also cut down on traditional 'non-essential' imports from the overseas possessions of Spain and Portugal.⁵

The disruptive effects of the Allied blockade varied according to the nature of commodities. Producers of perishable luxury foods were the hardest hit, such as the citrus fruit planters of southern Mozambique, the growers of pineapples in the Azores, and the producers of tomatoes in the Canary islands. The situation was only marginally better for stocks of Angolan coffee, cocoa from São Tomé and Spanish Guinea, or oilseeds from all the sub-Saharan territories. Planters in Spanish Guinea had one considerable advantage, in that their metropolitan market for coffee and oilseeds was not saturated with colonial produce, unlike that of Portugal. Cocoa planters in Spanish Guinea were able to switch fairly easily from cocoa to coffee for the metropolitan market, an option not open to their Portuguese colleagues in neighbouring São Tomé. The natural cycle of different plants also had a

⁴ There exists an enormous literature on this subject. For some of the recent work, see D. Smyth, 'Diplomacy and the strategy of survival: British policy and Spanish non-belligerency, 1940-1941' (Ph.D. thesis, University of Cambridge, 1978; forthcoming as a book in 1985); R. Serrano Suñer, *Entre el silencio y la propaganda, la historia como fue, memorias* (Barcelona, 1977); D. Pike, 'Franco and the Axis stigma', *Journal of Contemporary History*, xvii (1982), 369-407; C. Halstead, 'Aborted imperialism, Spain's occupation of Tangier, 1940-1945', *Iberian Studies*, vii, 2 (1978), 53-71. For the officious statement of Spanish claims and a set of maps, see J. M. de Areilza and F. Castiella, *Reivindicaciones de España* (second edition, Madrid, 1941).

⁵ Smyth, 'Diplomacy'; W. Medlicott, *The Economic Blockade* (2 vols., London, 1952, 1959); Andrews, *Portuguese East Africa*, 13.

bearing on substitution of one crop by another. It was much easier to change from groundnuts to another product than from palm oil or coconuts. The valuable okume wood stands of Spanish Guinea, which had been employed by the German aircraft industry, were left to grow for future exploitation, while the forestry companies cut inferior trees for the metropolitan market.⁶

Mining companies were in a rather different position, in that Britain was prepared to buy their products, if only to make quite sure they did not fall into enemy hands. Diamonds were Angola's single largest product, and the Germans laid hands on the output of three months when they seized Belgium. Angolan diamonds were then sent to London instead of Antwerp. Unfortunately for the diamond company, Angola produced more gem stones than industrial stones, but the rapidly rising prices of industrial stones made up for the stagnant market for gems.⁷ The iron ore of Spanish Morocco was the only other significant mineral export of the Iberian colonies. During the Spanish civil war, production increased to around a million tons a year, with Germany and Italy responsible for 80 per cent of purchases by 1939. British naval power in the Mediterranean was a good deal shakier than in the Atlantic in the early years of the war, and it was easy to rush the ore into Spain and re-export it overland to Axis Europe. The British thus resorted to pre-emptive purchasing. By 1942, production was well down on the halcyon days of the civil war, with Britain taking nearly half a million tons and Spain a little under 150,000 tons. Total German imports of iron ore from Spain in that year were under 400,000 tons, compared to 4,600,000 tons coming from Sweden.⁸

The turning point for exporters came in 1942, as Japan overran South-East Asia and the American war machine lurched into high gear. African commodities were suddenly in demand, and the United States was able to provide some of the necessary shipping, fuels and machinery to keep production rising. Moreover, the Americans agreed to buy the sisal produced by German nationals in Angola and Mozambique, which had previously been blacked by Britain. Exports of oilseeds and vegetable oils expanded dramatically. Mozambique was particularly well placed to benefit from this boom, as it was Africa's largest producer of copra, with huge groves of coconut palms planted during the earlier boom of the 1920s and underutilized during the depression of the 1930s. By 1945, Mozambique was exporting over 40,000 metric tons of copra, as well as 20,000 tons of groundnuts, and miscellaneous other oilseeds and vegetable oils. In western Africa, the emphasis was on oil palms, groundnuts and wild rubber. Mineral production surged ahead, and new small mines for mica, copper, gold and manganese were opened up in Angola.⁹

⁶ Spence, *Descrição*, 77; Great Britain: Admiralty (Naval Intelligence Division), *Spain and Portugal* (London, 1941–1945), IV, 99, 104; J. Nosti, *Agricultura de Guínea, promessa para Espanha* (Madrid, 1948), 43; M. Liniger-Goumaz, *La Guinée Equatoriale, un pays méconnu* (Paris, 1979), 217, 378–9.

⁷ Companhia de Diamantes de Angola, *Relatórios*.

⁸ K. Ruhl, 'L'alliance à distance: les relations économiques germano-espagnoles de 1936 à 1945', *Revue d'Histoire de la Deuxième Guerre Mondiale*, no. 118 (1980), 69–102; *idem*, *Spanien im zweiten Weltkrieg* (Hamburg, 1975), *passim*; S. Fleming, 'Spanish Morocco and the Alzamiento Nacional, 1936–1939', *Revue d'Histoire Maghrébine*, IX, 27–8 (1982), 231–2.

⁹ For Mozambique, see L. Vail and L. White, *Capitalism and Colonialism in Mozambique, A Study of the Quelimane District* (London, 1980), ch. 6; Andrews, *Portuguese East Africa*, 13; Moçambique, *Anuário Estatístico*. For Angola, see G. Lefebvre, *L'Angola, son histoire, son économie* (Liège, 1947); J. M. Cerqueira de Azevedo, *Angola, exemplo de*

This simple picture of slump turning to boom in 1942 was complicated by the pattern of exports to the Iberian peninsula. Both Spain and Portugal seized the opportunity of war to set up or to enlarge a complex web of official measures to control trade, notably through quotas and fixed prices. Contrary to a tenacious legend, prices were often fixed above world levels. Until 1942, Portuguese prices were nearly all above free market levels, in order to stimulate imports from the colonies and thus save foreign exchange. As world prices soared from 1942, Lisbon kept its prices steady in nominal terms, and thus declining in real terms. By the end of the war, colonial producers of oilseeds and vegetable oils complained bitterly that they were compelled to sell at a loss on the Portuguese market through the system of quotas and fixed prices. However, prices of other commodities were still above world levels, and Portuguese industrialists stressed that the poor quality and irregular supplies of many colonial products made them even more expensive than they seemed to be.¹⁰ In Africa, one of the consequences of this pricing system was large-scale smuggling, especially in enclave territories where peasant production was dominant. Thus, nearly three quarters of the hides exported from Portuguese Guinea and much of the coffee supplied by Spanish Guinea came from neighbouring colonies.¹¹

Cotton was by far Portugal's largest import in the field of industrial raw materials, and Salazar seized the moment of insecurity of supplies to realize his dream of imperial autarky. The Spanish civil war gave a great boost to the Portuguese cotton textile industry, which acquired a significant foreign market for the first time in its history in Nationalist Spain. To meet the sudden surge in demand for raw cotton without depleting reserves of foreign exchange, Salazar fixed the price of colonial cotton at 20 per cent above world levels in 1937 and kept it automatically pegged there. At the same time, a cotton marketing board was set up in 1938, empowered to increase the pressures applied to African cultivators under the forced cultivation system introduced in 1926. The outbreak of world war gave a new urgency to the drive for imperial autarky. In 1938, only about a quarter of the raw cotton consumed in Portugal came from the colonies, but by 1942 this proportion had risen to nearly nine-tenths, with imports going from some 2,500 tons to about 18,500 tons. Mozambique emerged as the major supplier, providing three-quarters to four-fifths of the cotton by the end of the war. The price was no longer pegged from 1942 and was allowed to drift downwards in real terms, but was still higher than the price paid by the Allies for Congolese cotton at the end of the war. Grading became more stringent and efforts were made to improve quality and regularity of supplies, but Portuguese industrialists remained far from satisfied.¹²

trabalho (Luanda, 1958). For Guinea, see R. Vaz Monteiro, 'Relatório do governador' (Bissau, 1944) (typescript in S.O.A.S. library).

¹⁰ See G. Clarence-Smith, *The Third Portuguese Empire, 1825-1975* (Manchester, 1985), ch. 6.

¹¹ Monteiro, *Relatório*, 188; Liniger-Goumaz, *La Guinée Equatoriale*, 230.

¹² C. Bastos, *Indústria e arte têxtil* (Oporto, 1960), introduction; Portugal: Ministério das Colónias (Junta de Exportação do Algodão Colonial), *Relatório de 1942* (Lisbon, c. 1943); Vail and White, *Capitalism*, 272-9; Azevedo, *Angola*, 233; Lefebvre, *L'Angola*, 142; M. G. Monteiro, 'A industrialização nas províncias ultramarinas portuguesas de África', *Boletim da Associação Industrial de Angola*, v, 19 (1954), 54.

Cotton accounted for about half of the increases in Portuguese imports from the empire during the war, and there was no other single commodity which could be manipulated in this way. Sugar and oilseeds were the two other pillars of the colonial import trade, but imperial autarky had already been more or less established in these fields before the war. The proportion of hides and tea imported from the colonies rose from about a third to almost all of Portuguese requirements, but absolute amounts remained small, and the tanneries complained about the abysmal quality of African hides. Wood imports were low due to the successful afforestation programme launched by the 'new state' in Portugal in the 1930s, and imports of tobacco were hindered by the treasury's insistence on high tariffs for revenue purposes. Although more rubber and sisal came from the empire during the war, the country's backward industrial sector had little need of these commodities. Imports of basic foodstuffs, especially maize and beans from Angola, helped Portugal to avoid the terrible food shortages prevalent in war-time Europe, although the situation deteriorated in the last two or three years of the war. São Tomé had for long supplied all Portugal's small imports of cocoa, and Angola increased its share of the metropolitan market for coffee. Overall, the proportion of all imports for consumption coming from the colonies went from around 10 per cent in the late 1930s to about double that level in the early 1940s, with a peak of 23 per cent in 1942. However, it is important to recall that this was partly a reflection of a drastic reduction in imports from foreign countries.¹³

The rise in Spain's imports from its overseas possessions was more striking and more directly linked to war. Only 3 per cent of the country's imports came from the Canaries and colonies in 1932 to 1934, whereas the figure stood at 16 per cent from 1940 to 1946, with a peak of 21 per cent in 1942. This was a remarkable change, in view of the fact that the population of the Canaries and colonies was only some two million, as against Spain's twenty-five million. In contrast, Portugal's eight million inhabitants were outnumbered by the eleven million in the empire. The spectacular increase in Spain's imports from its overseas territories in part reflected a conscious policy of imperial autarky, but it was also the result of a calamitous shortage of gold and foreign exchange reserves after the civil war. The Canary islands, technically two Spanish provinces but treated as part of the colonies for trade purposes, contributed a little over half of these supplies to Spain. Spanish Guinea provided most of the rest, with the scattered North African possessions exporting only some iron ore, goat-skins and dried fish.¹⁴

Spain's most urgent need in the harsh years of the civil war and the difficult years of reconstruction was for food. Control of the Canaries and Spanish Guinea contributed considerably to better supplies and lower inflation in Nationalist Spain than in the areas under the legitimate government, and thus helped Franco to win the war. In contrast, the North African possessions were

¹³ Clarence-Smith, *Third Portuguese Empire*, ch. 6; figures from Portugal: Instituto Nacional de Estatística, *Comércio externo*.

¹⁴ Spain: Ministerio de Hacienda (Dirección General de Aduanas), *Estadísticas del comercio exterior de España*. Population figures from statistical yearbooks of Spain and Portugal. For the economic situation in Spain, see J. Clavera *et al.*, *Capitalismo español, de la autarquía a la estabilización, 1939-1959*, 1 (Madrid, 1973).

a heavy burden, as they were consistent large net food importers.¹⁵ After the civil war, the food situation became worse rather than better, as heavy-handed state interference in agriculture sent production plunging down. There was a flourishing black market for the rich and strict rationing for the poor. Hunger stalked the land, and some people in urban areas died of starvation. The Allies used their naval control over supplies of foreign wheat to force the Spanish government to remain neutral and reduce supplies of strategic raw materials to the Axis. In this situation, Madrid extracted all the food it could from its overseas possessions. Fish was the single largest import, as foreign trawlers abandoned the rich Saharan banks during the war and allowed the Canary fishermen to increase production. The banana crop of the islands was all diverted to Spain at low fixed prices, as were smaller amounts of tomatoes, potatoes, onions and other vegetables. Spanish Guinea had for many years provided all Spain's cocoa, and from 1938 the government strongly encouraged coffee production, so that nearly three-quarters of Spain's coffee came from Guinea by the end of the war, in spite of complaints as to its poor quality. Dried bananas and dried manioc were also sent to Spain from Guinea in small quantities.¹⁶

The years after the civil war witnessed an intense effort to raise colonial production of industrial raw materials. Spanish Guinea provided nearly all the metropolis's rough wood and about half of its palm oil and copra by the end of the war, compared to negligible amounts of these commodities before 1936. Rubber was a crucially important raw material for Spanish industry, and it was in such short supply during the war that the Allies were frequently unable to meet their promises to Madrid. By 1944, 15 per cent of Spain's supplies came from the Canaries and colonies, mostly from Guinea, although industrialists disliked the poor quality of this wild rubber gathered from lianas. Experiments with sisal and similar fibres were made in both the Canaries and Guinea, with limited success, and the tobacco production of the Canaries was stepped up. Cotton cultivation on the islands was also encouraged, as in Spain itself, but only made a limited contribution to Spain's large imports of this raw material. A major mineral survey of the Spanish Sahara was launched in 1940, and although there were no immediate results, the first indications of the colony's huge phosphate reserves were found in samples collected in 1945.¹⁷

Spain felt constrained by the limited size and resources of its empire, and this encouraged imperial expansionism and plans to take over Portugal. In addition to the African claims noted above, the Spaniards hoped that the Japanese might give the Philippines back to them. Some of the more cranky

¹⁵ Hugh Thomas, *The Spanish civil war* (third edition, Harmondsworth, 1977), 417; D. Ndongo Bidyogo, *Historia y tragedia de Guinea Ecuatorial* (Madrid, 1977), 51; Fleming, 'Spanish Morocco', 231.

¹⁶ Clavera, *Capitalismo*, 46–53, 120; Pike, 'Franco', 375. For the Canaries, see *Información Comercial Española*, 156, 10 December 1946, 157, 25 December 1946, and 57, 10 November 1942. For Guinea, see Nosti, *Agricultura*, 57 and *passim*. Detailed figures in Spain, *Estadísticas*.

¹⁷ Spain, *Estadísticas*, for figures. For rubber, see Medlicott, *Economic blockade*, 11, 286–7; Clavera, *Capitalismo*, 83; Nosti, *Agricultura*, 19, 88. For the Canaries, see T. Bravo, *Geografía general de las islas Canarias*, 1 (Santa Cruz, 1954), 359–60, 379; J. Mercer, *Canary islands: Fuerteventura* (Newton Abbott, 1973), 124. For the Spanish Sahara, see J. Mercer, *Spanish Sahara* (London, 1976), 184–9.

Falangists even talked in terms of reconstituting the American empire. Fusion with Portugal, to recover the 'natural unity' of the Iberian peninsula and the historical empire of Philip II, was in some ways a more practical proposition. To stave off this development, the British provided credits to Spain, and encouraged Salazar to do likewise, in order to buy Portuguese colonial products. This enabled Britain to kill two birds with one stone, by relieving the shortages in Spain which could encourage belligerency, and by resolving part of the problem of Portuguese colonial products which were denied the Axis market and could not find alternative markets in the early years of the war. Spain thus purchased oilseeds, sisal, rubber and foodstuffs, both directly and through Portugal, with Angola emerging as the main source of supply.¹⁸

The other side of the colonial pact, the role of the colonies as markets for metropolitan products, was not stressed as much in time of war as in time of peace. The ravaged economy of Spain was hard put to supply even its small colonies with manufactures, and the food imports of Spanish Morocco were an unmitigated burden. And yet, certain producers were glad of an overseas market, and the state was desperate to avoid any leakage of foreign exchange occurring through colonial purchases of foreign goods. From 1936, all consumers in Spanish Morocco were obliged by law to employ only Asturian coal, and the same restriction was placed on merchant ships going to Spanish Guinea. Spain's possessions in northern Africa all had a customs status of either free ports or 'open door', but the *de facto* monopoly of Spanish shipping during the war placed the trade in national hands, and Tangier was rapidly drawn into this commercial nexus after its annexation in 1940. Throughout the second world war, about a quarter of Spain's total exports went to the Canaries and colonies, and they were virtually the only external market for Spain's influential cotton textile industry. In 1934, only a twentieth of the country's external trade had been directed to the Canaries and colonies.¹⁹

Portuguese industry was in a stronger position than that of Spain, and the government seized the opportunity of war to intervene directly on its behalf in the empire. Commissions to regulate imports into Angola and Mozambique were set up in 1939, prior to the outbreak of war between Germany and Britain, and the system was both extended to the smaller colonies and intensified in the larger colonies as the war progressed. Under this system of import quotas, Angola's imports from the metropolis rose from about half before the war to a peak of nearly three-quarters in 1943. For Mozambique the proportions were around one-third before and two-thirds afterwards, while for Guinea they were a third and four-fifths. However, this often reflected fairly steady imports from Portugal and a sharp decline in imports from abroad.²⁰ One of the two main exports from Portugal to its empire was

¹⁸ T. Hamilton, 'Spanish dreams of empire', *Foreign Affairs*, xxii (April, 1944), 458–68; Medicott, *Economic blockade*, 1, 519; Smyth, 'Diplomacy', 326.

¹⁹ Great Britain: Admiralty (Naval Intelligence Division), *Morocco* (London, 1941–2), 11, 233; R. Perpiña Grau, *De colonización y economía en la Guinea Española* (Barcelona, 1945), 270; Halstead, 'Aborted imperialism', 60; Spain, *Estadísticas*.

²⁰ Portugal: Ministério do Ultramar, *Legislação mandada aplicar ao ultramar português, 1926–1963* (Lisbon, 1965–74), 1, 138; J. Tristão de Bettencourt, *Relatório do governador geral de Moçambique, respeitante ao período de 20 de março de 1940 a 31 de dezembro 1942*

wine, and the volume of exports fell until 1943, largely because of shipping problems, only to regain and exceed 1930s levels in 1945. Rising prices may have compensated for a fall in volume, although rapid inflation must be taken into account. It is in the context of these difficulties for the wine industry that one must place the determined campaign launched in 1942 to eradicate the illegal distilling of rum in Guinea and the Cape Verde islands, and the smuggling of rum from the islands to the mainland.²¹

The war was a good period for the other pillar of exports to the colonies, cotton textiles. The capacity of the industry was built up in the heady days of the Spanish civil war, but in 1939 this market began to close up. A partial alternative market was found in France and the French empire, especially neighbouring French Morocco, but this market only really developed in the closing stages of the war. The colonial market was thus forced open by the imposition of quotas and by the providential elimination of Japanese competition. The proportion of cotton goods imported by Mozambique from Portugal increased from 58 per cent in 1939 to 85 per cent in 1942. The price of cotton goods sold in the colonies rose about four times faster than the price paid for colonial raw cotton, but this was not simply a question of the industry benefiting from protection to make super-profits. Machinery was almost unavailable during the war, and the Portuguese cotton textile industry was caught in the trap of archaic labour-intensive plant at a time of sharply rising wages. After the war, accumulated profits were used for a systematic programme of acquiring automatic looms. Problems were also caused by the poor quality and irregular supplies of expensive colonial cotton and by abnormally high rates of shipping insurance.²²

The war strengthened the grip of metropolitan firms over service industries and increased metropolitan ownership of colonial assets. Shipping was the most spectacular example of competition drying up to the advantage of Iberian firms. Portuguese companies had been very badly affected by the recession of the 1930s, and two of the principal firms had been rescued from bankruptcy by the state. During the war, they paid off their debts and re-established routes to Brazil and North America, although the latter provoked retaliation from German submarines.²³ Metropolitan banking, insurance and commerce all benefited from a difficult payments situation for their foreign competitors, and in Mozambique the government passed legislation to favour Portuguese insurance companies over their British rivals.²⁴ Legislation for the transfer of ownership of certain colonial assets, notably plantations, from foreign to

(Lisbon, 1945), II, 257–79; Monteiro, *Relatório*, 269–73. Figures for Angola from C. Rocha Dilolwa, *Contribuição à história económica de Angola*, (Luanda, 1978), 33, 42, 49. For Mozambique, see Andrews, *Portuguese East Africa*, 5–6; S. Kay and C. Ezard, *Report on Economic and Commercial Conditions in Portuguese East Africa* (London, 1938), 10. For Guinea, P. Ramos de Almeida, *História do colonialismo português em África* (Lisbon, 1978–9), III, 204; J. Cunningham, 'The colonial period in Guiné', *Tarikh*, VI, 4 (1980), 42.

²¹ Portugal, *Comércio externo*, for figures. For rum, see Cunningham, 'The colonial period', 42–3; A. Carreira, *Estudos de economia caboverdiana* (Lisbon, 1982), 281.

²² Portugal, *Comércio externo*; Lefebvre, *L'Angola*, 216, 226; Bettencourt, *Relatório*, 69–70, 135, 261–2; Fynes-Clinton, *Portuguese West Africa*, 13; Bastos, *Indústria*.

²³ Great Britain, *Spain and Portugal*, II, 367–72; III, 530–9.

²⁴ P. Anderson, 'Portugal and the end of ultra-colonialism', *New Left Review*, no. 16 (1962), 122.

Portuguese hands had been passed in 1937, but the decree had initially been suspended everywhere except Timor. During the war years, it was slowly extended to the whole empire. The great coffee and oil palm plantations of Angola, which had been acquired by Belgian corporations in the depression, were sold back to Portuguese companies in 1944–5. In Mozambique, the South African citrus plantations, the Luxemburg company which controlled about half the cotton concessions, and the Franco-British Mozambique Company all reverted to ‘national’ firms. In Guinea, the Germans who owned the oil palm plantations and factory in the Bijagos islands simply abandoned the whole operation in 1940, when the British refused to issue navicerts.²⁵

The Portuguese oligopolists, who made large profits under ‘industrial conditioning’ and from the opportunities provided by the Spanish civil war and the world war, not only bought insurance and plantation companies on the cheap in the colonies, but also clamoured to be allowed to set up industries in Angola and Mozambique. It was only in 1936 that legislation had been passed specifically to prevent import-substitution industrialization in the colonies in competition with Portugal, but the war revealed the vulnerability of the colonial economies. The merchant navy was unable to supply the colonies adequately, especially with bulky intermediary goods and basic consumer items, such as cement, sacking, metal tools and cheap cotton textiles. Most of the ships in the fleet were over twenty years old, and a German submarine sank one of the only large modern vessels in 1941. Two other ships were lost to German action, and this insecurity was no stimulus to the acquisition of new ships. Moreover, new ships could not generally be built in Portugal, and could not be obtained from abroad in times of war. The advantages of industrialization in neighbouring territories, notably the Belgian Congo and South Africa, suddenly became apparent, especially as smuggling began to be a problem.²⁶

In the teeth of violent opposition from small firms in Portugal, notably those in the textile industry, the Portuguese government decided to reverse its policy. Certain kinds of industry were to be permitted, and the state decided to explore the possibilities for hydro-electric development of the kind which the ‘new state’ had launched in Portugal itself. Because of the virulent opposition of the cotton textile industry, it was decided that not more than one mill should be authorized in Angola and Mozambique. In other industrial sectors, ownership in Portugal was often concentrated in the hands of a single oligopolistic concern, so that the relocation of production in the colonies did not raise the same problems. Cement was a typical example, with the Champalimaud group controlling nearly all of Portugal’s output. Although many of the key decisions were taken in wartime, most industrial development took place after the war, especially in the case of large units requiring a great

²⁵ J. da Costa Oliveira, *Aplicação de capitais nas províncias ultramarinas* (Lisbon, 1961), 12–14; W. G. Clarence-Smith, ‘Les investissements belges en Angola, 1912–1961’, in C. Coquery-Vidrovitch (ed.), *Entreprises et entrepreneurs en Afrique, XIX^e et XX^e siècles* (Paris, 1983), 1, 438–9; Spence, *Descrição*, 71, 77–8; H. Galvão and C. Selvagem, *Império ultramarino português* (Lisbon, 1950–3), IV, 192–3; F. Pinto da Cunha Leal, *Peregrinações através do poder económico* (Lisbon, 1960), 152; Monteiro, *Relatório*, 164, 168, 196.

²⁶ Azevedo, *Angola*, 326–30, 343–5, 360–1, 434–9, 452–3; Great Britain, *Spain and Portugal*, II, 367–72.

deal of machinery. However, many miscellaneous light industries developed during the war in both Portuguese and Spanish territories, in response to shortages.²⁷

Industry was the most striking form of colonial self-sufficiency, but the war also brought out the need for greater agricultural production. Mozambique was particularly vulnerable, with its large food imports and its supplies of rice from South-East Asia. The food situation was made much worse by the anarchic and poorly organized intensification of forced cotton cultivation, which frequently led to acute food shortages as peasants were obliged to neglect subsistence crops. The failure of the rains in 1941, a bad year in almost all the Iberian colonies, was the last straw. Compulsory rice cultivation was thus introduced in Mozambique in June 1941, and rice production rose from a scant 100 tons in 1939 to over 12,000 tons in 1946. Mozambique not only became self-sufficient but also exported some rice to neighbouring territories, at the expense of further heavy-handed interference in peasant agriculture. Maize cultivation in the rich valley soils of southern Mozambique was also encouraged, as African miners returned from South Africa with the ploughs necessary to work the heavy earth. This was a sharp reversal of earlier policy, which had tended to restrict marketed maize output to European farmers and the valley soils of the south to Portuguese settlers.²⁸

The Cape Verde Islands and Spanish Morocco were the other two colonies heavily dependent on imported food. The terrible drought of 1940–3 killed an estimated 25,000 people in the Cape Verdes, or about one-sixth of the population. Angolan maize was diverted to the islands, but in insufficient quantities, and the prohibition imposed on the cultivation of sugar-cane for distillation into rum was in part intended to keep the few rich irrigated soils for food crops. Given the lack of possibilities in the deforested, eroded and drought-prone Sahelian islands, the government also encouraged labour migration to the plantations of São Tomé, in spite of the reluctance of Cape Verdeans to face the unhealthy climate, low wages and bad conditions.²⁹ In Spanish Morocco, a ten-year development plan was launched in 1939, with the main emphasis on hydraulic works for irrigation purposes. However, the immediate impact was small, and in 1945 the area was afflicted by what was said to be the worst drought on record.³⁰

Greater economic self-sufficiency in individual colonies was linked to an emphasis on developing relations with neighbouring territories. In the case of the islands and enclaves, this mainly took the form of smuggling, tolerated and often actively encouraged by the authorities. In southern Africa, active smuggling was supplemented by barter agreements, especially with South Africa and the Belgian Congo. These two territories provided cement, coal, lubricating oils, metals, machinery, vehicles, spare parts, tyres and chemicals.

²⁷ Clarence-Smith, *Third Portuguese empire*, ch. 6, for details on Portuguese colonies. For Spanish territories, see Bravo, *Geografía*, 1, 376–7; Great Britain, *Morocco*, 11, 202–5.

²⁸ Bettencourt, *Relatório*, 64–7, 102–113, 126; Vail and White, *Capitalism*, 279–80; Spence, *Descrição*, 60, 71.

²⁹ Galvão and Selvagem, *Império*, 1, 151, 260; A. Carreira, *Migrações nas ilhas de Cabo Verde* (Lisbon, 1977), 235–8.

³⁰ *Enciclopedia Universal Ilustrada Europeo-Americana*, Suplemento 1945–1948, 824–5; D. Seddon, *Moroccan peasants, a century of change in the eastern Rif, 1870–1970* (Folkestone, 1981), 132.

The Belgian Congo imported mainly dried fish and salt from Angola to feed its rapidly growing labour force, and Angolan dried fish was sold throughout Equatorial Africa and in Mozambique. South Africa took coffee, timber, rubber and wax from Angola, and tea, timber, bananas, cashew nuts and oilseeds from Mozambique. However, the Allies kept this trade down to a minimum, as they were reluctant to export goods to the Portuguese territories unless they badly needed something in return. The loss of South-East Asia was particularly important in forcing South Africa to seek certain imports from its lusophone neighbours.³¹ Thomas Henriksen also asserts that labour migration from Mozambique to South Africa intensified, but the figures indicate the contrary. Numbers of legal migrants fell from 88,000 in 1936 to 79,000 in 1945, while the numbers coming to South Africa from the Rhodesias and Nyasaland rose from some 3,000 to about 31,000 over the same period.³² Here again, it would seem that the Allies preferred to rely on their own resources whenever possible.

Reductions in public spending because of the military situation tended to lessen the trend towards greater colonial self-sufficiency. Both Spain and Portugal spent abnormally high amounts on defence between 1936 and 1945, and colonial garrisons were reinforced with expeditionary forces from the metropolises in 1940. This had incidental positive side-effects on colonial economies, but it diverted funds from development plans. The Spaniards were unable to meet the target of fifty million pesetas a year on their Moroccan plan, spending an average of thirty million in 1942–5. The Portuguese plans launched in 1938 were similarly disrupted. In Angola, the Luanda harbour was rebuilt to take larger ships directly on the quay, and a branch railway line was built to Dondo on the navigable stretch of the Kwanza river, but plans for dams, with hydro-electric and irrigation components, had to be postponed until after the war. However, the export boom from 1942 sharply increased the ordinary revenue at the disposal of colonial governments. In Angola, this resulted in a spate of public works, with special emphasis on the building of bridges.³³

Although African peasants bore much of the brunt of economic growth in the war, some did well out of the conflict. This was especially the case in enclaves and frontier areas, where colonial governments were unable to prevent peasants from voting with their feet, and thus had to moderate their demands. Portuguese Guinea was the best example of this. Forced labour requisitions were slight, forced cultivation was almost non-existent, and land alienation was actually being reversed in this period.³⁴ African 'kulaks' were

³¹ A. de Freitas Morna, *Angola, um ano no governo geral, 1942–1943* (Lisbon, 1944), I, 7–8; Lefebvre, *L'Angola*, 223–4, 232–8; Bettencourt, *Relatório*, II, 165–6; Andrews, *Portuguese East Africa*, 7–8; Spence, *Descrição*, 55–8; Vail and White, *Capitalism*, 270–1.

³² T. Henriksen, *Mozambique, a history* (London, 1978), 130; R. First *et al.*, *The Mozambican Miner* (Maputo, 1977), tables.

³³ For general military spending in Portugal see R. A. H. Robinson, *Contemporary Portugal, A History* (London, 1979), 88. For Spain, E. L. Woodward, *British Foreign Policy in the Second World War* (London, 1970–76), IV, 14. For the Moroccan plan, *Enciclopedia Universal Ilustrada Europeo-Americana*, Suplemento 1945–8, 824–5. For Portuguese colonies see J. M. Vaz, 'Portugal and her overseas territories: a study in economic association and cooperation' (Ph.D. thesis, University of Exeter, 1978), 143–4. For Angola, Fynes-Clinton, *Portuguese West Africa*, 5; Morna, *Angola*, 43–6.

³⁴ Monteiro, *Relatório*, *passim*.

responsible for all the production of rubber and wax, and most of the exports of oilseeds, hides, coffee, tobacco, maize, beans and other foodstuffs in the Iberian colonies. The settlers complained of unfair competition and loss of labour, but the need for raw materials and foodstuffs was too pressing. Chiefs could also do well, and indeed were often the leading 'kulaks', although the Iberian administrative system was characterized by a dense network of petty white officials, who left less to the chiefs and headmen than in other colonies. Nevertheless, chiefs and headmen had the crucial power of deciding who actually went off to do forced labour, a lucrative source of bribes, and they were actively courted by the administration in Mozambique to enforce cotton cultivation.³⁵

Discrimination against the crops of 'kulaks' was frequent, especially when settlers competed directly in the production of the same crop. Whites were paid a special bonus for their maize in the central highlands of Angola, officially because it was said to be of higher quality, but in fact in order to develop the white population.³⁶ In Mozambique, African copra was reserved for the local needs of the colony at low fixed prices, allegedly in order to keep the price of soap down for urban Africans.³⁷ In Spanish Guinea, a special tax of three pesetas a kilo was placed on African coffee, in theory to finance welfare schemes but in fact to protect white planters.³⁸ In addition to such specific forms of discrimination, 'kulaks' were vulnerable to the illegal imposition of forced labour and land seizures. The only known case of major violence occurred in southern Angola, where conflicts over cattle between settlers and Herero nomads had flared up over many decades. In 1941 and 1942, the Portuguese army mounted a systematic campaign against one of these Herero groups, with 2,000 men and two aeroplanes; 20,000 cattle were confiscated and 4,000 men were sent off on contract labour.³⁹ But such extreme violence was rare, and many 'kulaks' benefited from rising commodity prices in spite of all the obstacles placed in their way.

Peasants subjected to forced cultivation were a great deal less fortunate, although even in these cases a few did manage to profit from the system. Nearly 800,000 Africans were constrained to grow cotton in Mozambique in the peak year of 1944, compared to a maximum of just over 90,000 in Angola in 1942. In the haste to achieve imperial self-sufficiency, regions completely unsuited to cotton were brought into the scheme, and Africans found that all their efforts were wasted when the crop failed or was washed away by floods. As the price was fixed by bureaucrats in Lisbon, actual returns to peasants varied tremendously. In the Quelimane province of Mozambique, the annual income from half a hectare of cotton in 1940-5 varied from a derisory nine escudos to 136 escudos, with an average at around 41 escudos, a little under ten shillings. Africans were usually obliged to cultivate a hectare, but in some areas men were obliged to go on contract labour, while their wives had to grow half a hectare of cotton. The price fixed for cotton fell from 2.17

³⁵ Information on peasant production is scattered through the sources. For chiefs, see Vail and White, *Capitalism*, 296, 306-8.

³⁶ Morna, *Angola*, 420.

³⁷ Spence, *Descrição*, 59, 94-5.

³⁸ Nosti, *Agricultura*, 55-6.

³⁹ R. Pélissier, *Les guerres grises, résistances et révoltes en Angola, 1845-1941* (Orgeval, 1977), 509-15.

escudos a kilo in 1942 to reach a low of 1.45 escudos in 1946. Some Africans, often women, had to carry huge bales of cotton fifty kilometres or more to the nearest market, because there were no roads and a shortage of transport. Famine conditions spread, and thousands of Africans fled over the border into neighbouring British territories. The government finally introduced reforms in 1946. Forced rice cultivation, which affected some 100,000 people in Mozambique by the 1950s, was not so bad, as Africans could at least eat the crop and sell it locally.⁴⁰ Attempts to force peasants to grow castor beans in Angola and to pick palm fruit in the Bijagos islands of Portuguese Guinea never really got off the ground.⁴¹

Land alienation was another problem for the peasantry, although little is known about it. New native reserves were demarcated in Mozambique in 1940, but there were reports of land alienation in the fertile valleys of the south, the Zambezi delta and the mountainous tea zones of the north in these years.⁴² In Angola, land alienation rose sharply in the central highlands as maize prices increased.⁴³ In Spanish Guinea, the 1930 ban on land concessions, already breached for forestry companies and oil palm plantations, was lifted in 1943.⁴⁴

Forced labour became a major burden on the peasantry from 1942, although again not enough is known about it. In that year, the governor-general of Mozambique issued his infamous circular ruling that the ambiguous 'moral obligation' to labour in the 1928 labour code was a binding legal obligation. The various legal exemptions to labour obligations were widely ignored.⁴⁵ In Angola, the governor-general also ruled in 1942 that the 'moral obligation' was a legal one. The state intervened even more blatantly than in Mozambique in directly procuring labourers for private employers, and in 1942 two-year contracts were authorized, in contrast to the six months imposed in Mozambique. Employers were in theory meant to allow wives of labourers to accompany them on two-year contracts, and to provide the families with accommodation on the Belgian model, but there are signs that this provision was often ignored. In the fisheries, three-year contracts were authorized, and this work was especially unpopular.⁴⁶

São Tomé and Príncipe remained the worst example of labour abuses in the Portuguese empire, and a confidential report of 1946 paints a sad picture. Children under eight years old were forced to work, the food was appalling, the cost of tools and clothing was illegally deducted from the pitifully low

⁴⁰ N. Saraiva Bravo, *A cultura algodoeira na economia do norte de Moçambique* (Lisbon, 1963); Vail and White, *Capitalism*, 314–25; Spence, *Descrição*, 64–5, 72; Dilolwa, *Contribuição*, 62.

⁴¹ International Labour Office, 'Report of the commission... concerning the observance by the government of Portugal of the Abolition of Forced Labour Convention...' (Geneva, 1962), 95 (published as second supplement to *Official Bulletin*, XLV, 2, April 1962); Monteiro, *Relatório*, 166–7.

⁴² Bettencourt, *Relatório*, II, map, 58–9; B. Muslow, *Mozambique, the Revolution and its Origins* (London, 1983), 37; Vail and White, *Capitalism*, 267, 298.

⁴³ G. Bender, *Angola under the Portuguese* (London, 1978), 148.

⁴⁴ Liniger-Goumaz, *La Guinée Equatoriale*, 124.

⁴⁵ Bettencourt, *Relatório*, 79–86; Vail and White, *Capitalism*, ch. 7.

⁴⁶ Morna, *Angola*, 40–2, 94–5, 101, 211, 229; J. Ferreira, *Província de Luanda* (Coimbra, 1945), 136–8; H. Galvão, *Santa Maria, My Crusade for Portugal* (London, 1961), 53; M. Marques Guimarães and A. Paiva, *A indústria de pesca* (? Lisbon 1942), 32–3.

wages of the labourers, the hours of work were extended beyond the statutory nine hours a day, the sick and pregnant were obliged to work, corporal punishment was constantly inflicted on workers, women were obliged to prostitute themselves, and Africans who had worked all their lives for planters were discarded with no land or pension when they were too old to labour.⁴⁷ For Angolans and Mozambicans, three- or four-year contracts in São Tomé were a kind of punishment, a threat held over the heads of Africans as a form of social control. However, recruitment for the islands was reduced in the labour shortage of 1942, and starving Cape Verdeans began to replace men from Angola and Mozambique. The overall labour force declined from about 28,000 in 1940 to some 24,000 in 1950, reflecting the crisis in cocoa and difficulties in obtaining labour.⁴⁸

In Spanish Guinea, illegal labour migration from Nigeria was the backbone of the labour system. Africans had to do labour services for the state in lieu of military service, and this was fixed at one day in four in 1939, but this kind of labour was used mainly for road building and repairs. Contract labourers for the plantations were smuggled into the colony by the owners of sailing canoes from the Cross River, who also dealt in other contraband. The British withdrew naval patrols in 1940, because of the demands of war, allowing this illegal traffic to prosper mightily. By the end of the year, there were an estimated 10,000 Nigerians on Fernando Póo, mainly from Owerri. In late 1942, the British signed an agreement with Spain to legalize and control this flow of labour, but it was not until the defeat of Germany became imminent that the Spaniards really began to co-operate with Britain to enforce the clauses of the 1942 agreement.⁴⁹

In Spanish North Africa, the emphasis was on military recruitment rather than labour proper. Franco's Moroccan troops played a crucial role in the victory over the Republic, especially in the first period of the civil war. The most recent calculations show that some 62,000 Moroccans fought for Franco, with the number deployed at any one time averaging around 35,000. A few nomads were recruited from the Spanish Sahara, but the overwhelming majority of these troops were Berbers from the mountains of Morocco, fighting in tribal units. The Spaniards cleverly exploited the close personal relations between their military representatives and the Berber chiefs, providing various presents and describing the war as a holy crusade against the 'godless atheists' of the Republic. In spite of high casualties, estimated by the French at 25,000 killed and wounded by March 1938, the Spaniards rarely had any difficulties in recruiting soldiers, except in the harsh winter of 1937. The steady wage, special bounties, regular army rations, the right

⁴⁷ A. Castro, *O sistema colonial português em África, meados do século XX* (second edition; Lisbon, 1978), 212.

⁴⁸ F. Tenreiro, *A ilha de São Tomé* (Lisbon, 1961), 106–7, for figures; Morna, *Angola*, 229, 242–7; Carreira, *Migrações*, 235–8.

⁴⁹ A. Osuntokun, *Equatorial Guinea-Nigerian relations, the diplomacy of labour* (Ibadan, 1978), ch. 3. For labour in lieu of military service, see Perpiña Grau, *De colonización*, 115–17.

⁵⁰ Fleming, 'Spanish Morocco', 227–9; Mercer, *Spanish Sahara*, 121; Archives d'Outremer, Aix-en-Provence, Carton 27 H 6, Bulletins Mensuels du Protectorat, 2160, May 1938 (I would like to thank George Joffé for giving me photocopies of the notes he took in the Aix archives).

to loot, and the possibility for adventure in a society with strong militaristic traditions attracted men from the over-populated, poor and drought-prone mountains. Indeed, men from French Morocco and Algeria crossed the frontier to join up.⁵⁰ Many Moroccans were demobilized from November 1938, but troop levels remained high during the Second World War, especially in Morocco prior to the Allied landings.⁵¹ Some 2,500 Moroccan and Spanish troops were also sent to Spanish Guinea in 1940, when the British navy seemed to be preparing to seize Fernando Póo.⁵²

The politics of wartime are the worst documented of all the aspects of this story, with the exception of the brief civil war in the Spanish colonies in 1936. The military rebellion began in Morocco, but the officer corps was divided. The rebels imprisoned or shot many of their colleagues, as well as trade unionists, left-wing politicians and any others who opposed the rising. The Republic retaliated by bombing Tetuán and Ceuta. The Spanish population, which had voted for the Popular Front in the *presidios* of Ceuta and Melilla, was cowed by the strength of the rebel forces and resistance ceased very quickly. By early August, all fighting in the Canaries and the Spanish Sahara was also at an end.⁵³ In Guinea, the Republicans held out a little longer. Although the Spanish population had not been allowed to vote in the 1936 elections, a Popular Front party was set up. Politically moderate and social democratic, the Popular Front was violently anti-clerical. They closed churches, arrested priests and alleged 'fascists', and made speeches about imprecisely defined black rights. The first attempt by the crew of a ship to 'pronounce' for Franco failed, but the commander of colonial troops in the island of Fernando Póo took over the government for the military rebels in September. On the mainland, the governor of Rio Muni held out for the Republic and repelled an assault by the forestry company bosses. However, Franco sent a ship with Moroccan troops from the Canaries, who seized Rio Muni and imprisoned or shot those Republicans who did not manage to escape into neighbouring territories. By October, it was all over.⁵⁴

Clandestine resistance to the authoritarian régimes of Franco and Salazar remains to be discovered. The Communist Party appears to have emerged as the main organized force, and in 1941 a revolutionary plot was uncovered in Mozambique.⁵⁵ White separatism in Angola and Mozambique on Rhodesian lines appears to have been an attitude of mind rather than an organized movement.⁵⁶

As for African nationalism, the received wisdom is that Iberian neutrality in the war slowed its development everywhere except Morocco. However, the Communist Party was moving towards a clearly nationalist position, and its role in the development of the M.P.L.A. in Angola was particularly important.⁵⁷ Increased racism must have affected the creole élite, especially

⁵¹ Aix archives, 5142, November 1938, for repatriation; Woodward, *British Foreign Policy*, IV, 14, for troops in Morocco.

⁵² Osuntokun, *Equatorial Guinea*, 37–8.

⁵³ Thomas, *Spanish civil war*, 216–24, 368; Fleming, 'Spanish Morocco', 233; Mercer, *Spanish Sahara*, 121.

⁵⁴ Ndongo Bidyogo, *Historia*, 47–51.

⁵⁵ Bettencourt, *Relatório*, II, 348–9; Munslow, *Mozambique*, 68–9.

⁵⁶ See Lefebvre, *L'Angola*, 102.

⁵⁷ See J. Marcum, *The Angolan revolution*, I (Cambridge, Mass., 1969).

as news of the new ideas behind the United Nations filtered through. In 1944, the Spaniards set up a complicated system of assimilation in Spanish Guinea, with two kinds of 'semi-emancipated' Africans as well as the 'fully emancipated'. Even these latter were forbidden to have sexual relations with white women.⁵⁸ Legislation of this kind was not passed in the Portuguese empire, but 'uncivilized' *mestiços* were distinguished from 'civilized' *mestiços* for the first time in the 1940 population census.⁵⁹

Morocco is a case apart in all this. Spanish attitudes towards Moroccan nationalism were profoundly ambivalent. Franco appears to have felt real gratitude towards his Moroccan troops, but he also hoped to manipulate Moroccan nationalism to achieve his dream of a great North African empire. The Spaniards were careful to distinguish between their claim to a protectorate in French Morocco and Tangier, as opposed to their demand for colonies in western Algeria and Mauretania. Nevertheless, they simultaneously gave the impression of favouring the emergence of a 'Greater Morocco' under Spanish tutelage. Franco thus ordered that prayers in the mosques of the Spanish Sahara should be said in the name of the Sultan of Morocco and no longer in the name of the Blue Sultan of Smara. The Spaniards made great efforts to convince the population of north-western Africa that they would be better off under Spanish rule than under the French. The development plan for Spanish Morocco and similar expenditure in the Spanish Sahara were exploited for propaganda purposes, and the well-stocked free ports in Spanish territory were a magnet for smugglers. Gestures towards greater autonomy for traditional institutions were made, and the Spaniards were careful to have Tangier occupied by troops of the Khalifa of Tetuán.⁶⁰

While Franco was quite happy to pose as the friend of the Sultan and the tribes, relations with modernising nationalist groups were uneasy. These groups were active among the small Arabic-speaking population of the towns, and they often had much greater sympathy for the Republic than for Franco. They were prepared to organize a rebellion against Franco during the civil war, on condition that the Republic gave them independence and intervened with France to grant independence to the whole of Morocco. The Republican leaders were afraid to lose French support, and tried unsuccessfully to bribe the Moroccan nationalists to organize a rising. After the fall of the Republic, the nationalists intrigued with both the Axis and Allies. The Spaniards reacted by playing off one group against another, and by making limited concessions over the arabization of indigenous education, the reorganization of Islamic justice, limits on land purchases by Spaniards, and a timid freedom of the press.⁶¹

Spanish and Portuguese Africa did not emerge unscathed from the war, and the long-term results of Iberian neutrality were far from positive. The worst

⁵⁸ Ndongo Bidyogo, *Historia*, 57.

⁵⁹ See statistical yearbooks.

⁶⁰ Fleming, 'Spanish Morocco', 232-4; Halstead, 'Aborted imperialism', 55-8; T. Garcia Figueras, *Santa Cruz de Mar Pequeña, Ifni, Sahara; la acción de España en la costa occidental de Africa* (Madrid, 1941), 329-30; V. Thompson and R. Adloff, *The Western Saharans, Background to Conflict*, (London, 1980), 107.

⁶¹ Fleming, 'Spanish Morocco', 233-5; Thomas, *Spanish Civil War*, 578-9; Seddon, *Moroccan Peasants*, 139.

outcome of the war was quite simply that the dictatorial régimes of Franco and Salazar survived and perpetuated authoritarian and illiberal forms of colonial rule in Africa for decades. If Franco and Salazar had been swept into the war on the Axis side in the summer of 1940, like Mussolini, the Iberian colonies might have suffered the violence of war in the immediate, but might have known easier days after the war. As it was, the Iberian metropolises seized upon the opportunities of war to tighten their control over the colonies. Many of the new administrative arrangements were initially temporary expedients to deal with immediate crises, but they were often retained long after the war had ended.

SUMMARY

In the present stage of research, it is easiest to discern the economic effects of war on the Iberian colonies. These were diverse in chronological, regional and sectoral terms, but the overall results were to tie the economies of the Portuguese and Spanish colonies more firmly to those of the metropolises. This did not exclude two processes pulling in other directions. Firstly, the foreign trade of the colonies persisted but was reoriented away from Europe and towards North America. Secondly, shortages and insecurity of transport led to a significant degree of import substitution and regional African trade in the colonies, in the fields of both industry and agriculture. The social impact of war resembled that in much of the rest of Africa, great hardships and labour pressures on the mass of the population, but windfall profits for a few, both black and white. The political consequences of the two conflicts remain most shadowy at present, but they appear to have heightened the covert struggle between pro-fascist and anti-fascist groups in a situation of strong repression, flaring up into open strife only in the Spanish territories in 1936.