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The Korean War: Challenges in Crisis, Credibility, and Command

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exclamation points. Recounting the feud between the Marines at Chosin and their Army commander, General Almond, he depicts the inability of Almond to appreciate the Marines' predicament. Almond, while touring the ranks, confronted a group of enlisted Marines with the comment, "When I got up this morning there was a film of ice on the glass by my bed." The reply, "That's too ----ing bad, General," succinctly stated the feelings of a combatant who is freezing to death in the open.

There are chapters on intelligence, in which the toddlerhood of the CIA is related; the war in the air; and prisoners.

Generally, The Korean War is not the definitive book on the conflict, nor is it a reference work. It is a book of sensation and insight, evaluating the war through the comments of the combatants. In the final chapter, "Hindsight," the effects of the war are considered and a positive conclusion is drawn:

"We went into Korea with a very poor Army and came out with a pretty good one."

"We stopped Communism. Didn't we?"
"No Korean liked the war. It was worthwhile. I like our life very much now."

"The war revitalized NATO. It caused us to drop the tradition of demobilizing. . . . It hastened the schism between China and the Soviets. It saved Formosa. It contributed greatly to Japanese recovery. It probably saved the Philippines for a time."

A few technical notes are in order. It is expertly printed and easy to read. There are only five maps, but they are clear, concise, and located in the right places (a rarity); and seventy-five black and white photos (some from the Chinese Army Museum), which are well-chosen and reinforce the text. There is also an interesting appendix which details the military contribution of various U.N. members. A few word errors exist, but not enough to detract from this fine, readable, and thought-provoking book.

CLINTON B. JOHNSON Captain, U.S. Naval Reserve (Ret.)

Kaufman, Burton I. The Korean War: Challenges in Crisis, Credibility, and Command. New York: Knopf, 1986. 381pp. paper \$8

Do not look for a military, naval, or aviation history of the Korean war in this book. The author glosses over the war's background in deference to his interest in the contemporary politics of the period and its relation to the general topic of the war.

Kaufman's book emphasizes reasons why the United States became involved, when for five years it was uninterested in Korean affairs; how the United States behaved internally and externally in a coalition war; and just how politics influenced the battlefield. It is an excellent overview of the war from the viewpoint of the capital, SCAP in Tokyo, the U.N. Command in Korea, and the capitals of the participants. The majority of the book deals with the Washington and U.N. Command—crises, credibility, and command.

Before June 1950 the problems between Korea and the United

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States, among the World War II Allies in regard to Korea, and among the Koreans living in Japan made Korea an area that some wished would go away. Korea did not go away, and the invasion from the North put the Americans into a new arrangement with the Rhee regime. Kaufman covers the pre-1950 scene lightly and concentrates on the decision to intervene and the deepening American involvement. The key element in Kaufman's book is the weaving of the U.S. domestic scene into the setting. The reader is provided with opinions from conservative and liberal leaders at home and from others abroad. Heavy reliance is made on Department of State literature and other Government documents. The author's attempt to provide a comparison of the Korean war with the Vietnam war is limited, and there is only a short examination of the Korean conflict in the context of the larger cold war, although opportunities for such comparisons do exist.

Overall, Kaufman has written an interesting book with added dimensions for viewing the war. The individual observations and viewpoints on the Korean conflict are as varied as the individuals themselves. While this is evident, readers who are not familiar with the actual conflict would provide themselves with a better overall perspective by complementing this knowledge with a book that deals with the ground, naval, and air war.

PETER CHARLES UNSINGER San Jose State University Frank, Benis M. U.S. Marines in Lebanon, 1982-1984. Washington: U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1987. 196pp. \$10

This book begins with the bombing of the Battalion Landing Team 1/8 headquarters building on 23 October 1983 at the Beirut International Airport where 241 Americans died. It then moves back in time to the summer of 1982 and the deployment of the 32nd Marine Amphibious Unit. It describes the evacuation of the PLO, and continues with a chronological account of the several units deployed to Lebanon for a "presence" mission. The book closes with the departure of the 22nd Marine Amphibious Unit in February 1984, although the operations of other Marine units remaining in Lebanon until July 1984 are also mentioned. Although based primarily on the monthly command chronologies and biweekly situation reports of the Marine units deployed to Lebanon, other official documentation as well as information gathered by the author during 119 interviews with key personnel also has been incorporated.

Mr. Frank has illustrated his book exceptionally well with maps, photographs, and reprints of editorial page cartoons from major U.S. newspapers. General Kelley's remarks to the Senate Armed Services Committee concerning the bombing and the conclusions and recommendations of the Long Commission are also included.

This book does not deal with major high-level political decisions nor with diplomatic efforts in the Middle East.