THE LEGACY OF FASCISM
Generational Differences in Italian Political Attitudes and Behavior

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Mussolini's new Roman Empire did not last as long as the first, but it was more ambitious, for Fascism sought not only to dominate but also to remold a large population. As an innovative form of modern dictatorship, Fascism experimented with techniques of totalitarian control that sought to go beyond the then traditional methods of coercion and to seek new approaches to resocialization and cultural change. It is not necessary to resolve the question as to whether Italy was totalitarian or not; certainly these *tendencies* were present. No detailed proof is necessary to demonstrate that Fascism made great efforts to alter Italian cultural patterns. To evaluate the significance of these efforts is more difficult, for they go to the heart of Fascism, to the interaction of myth and reality at the core of the system, to the fundamental ambivalence of the regime's attitudes toward Italian culture and its institutional pillars.

Fascism was many things, but it was first and foremost a political style. Mussolini exhibited this quite well. He developed and imposed upon the Fascist Party and the Italian people a grandiose, military, and demogogic political style and sought to create a heroic destiny for himself and for Italy.

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He also tried to create a reality to match the image. To achieve his public goals, he needed to change the society for which he had assumed responsibility, and this was a difficult task. The actual policies followed by the fascists reveal the poverty of intellect and will at the core of the system. Italy in the 1920s was a polity in the process of becoming a modern nation-state. Its territorial integrity and national identity were largely achieved. It had a unified high culture. In the early years of the century, it was modernizing industrially and politically at a rapid pace. Although challenged by the new political forces of socialism and Catholic mass politics, its industrial and traditional elites still possessed vitality and political acumen. Mussolini could not rule over the determined and united opposition of these elites and the Catholic church.

Despite these limitations, the Fascists devoted great resources toward the creation of a society and polity that would reflect the image that the regime had projected. They established a single-party dictatorship that penetrated deeply into the state machinery, and they made party membership—probably unwisely from the perspective of achieving the goals of Fascism—a prerequisite for advancement in most areas of public life. They devoted special attention to youth, with the party recruiting its future elite at an early age. But the long-standing feud with the Church over educational policy resulted in a standoff that reflected the limitations of the regime's actual power to control the socialization of the young. The poor performance of the economy likewise demonstrated the Fascists' limited control over events.

The regime was more successful in inhibiting opposition than in mobilizing support through resocialization. The parties and associations of the opposition were destroyed; their communications networks were gravely compromised. Yet the basic structures of hostility to the regime—especially the face-to-face relationships that are so important in the transmission and reinforcement of attitudes and cultural norms—were never thoroughly broken up. Primary relationships were not greatly altered by the system. Indeed, they may have acquired greater importance due to the decline in the vitality of associational life under Fascism. Furthermore, Fascism seems to have retarded many aspects of social change. Industrialization, that great revolutionary force, slowed during the era. In addition, the severe limitations placed on rural-urban migration attenuated another important source of what Deutsch calls "social mobilization," that is, the breakdown of traditional patterns and the freeing of people for new forms of social interaction (1961). Thus, by "sitting on the lid" of social upheaval for twenty years, the Fascists may have assured their own failure,

for, by breaking up old patterns and molding new ones, the regime might have improved its chances for long-term survival. Instead, it settled for a façade of totalitarian mobilization behind which change was minimal. Like the snail in the poem, Fascism was a failure socially.

Of course, its impact was uneven. Many groups and individuals were seriously caught up in the movement, and some party people were deeply committed to the cause. Moreover, political opponents who were killed or jailed could rightly argue that there was a reality there. But despite its selective successes, Fascism never penetrated deeply into the structure of Italian society. The Church was a major stumbling block. So was the regime's dependence on traditional elites, or at least its failure or unwillingness to replace traditional elites. Perhaps the clientelistic, face-to-face nature of much Italian social interaction is a major cause as well, though development of this theme would carry us far from the topic of this paper.

Considering that it survived about twenty years, Why? and How? are interesting questions. It achieved a moderate level of institutionalization. The population adapted to it, seemingly with minimal effort. Internal opposition never threatened the regime seriously. Only defeat in an unnecessary foreign war revealed that the emperor had no clothes. Why it survived and what is its contemporary significance are thus intriguing issues of cultural criticism. We use the term "cultural criticism" deliberately, as the general "significance" of Fascism can hardly be given a scientific meaning. The interpretation of an historical phenomenon inevitably varies according to the purposes, needs, and values of the interpreter. At the same time, empirical analysis can assist cultural criticism by limiting the scope of what is being disputed. It can, so to speak, resolve some questions of fact, thereby permitting the debate to be waged more knowledgeably on the general cultural level.

These are several general cultural points of view or the interpretations of particular intellectual traditions that merit mention as illustrations of the debate. The liberal tradition, which dominated Italian public life until the rise of Fascism, tends to view Fascism as a mere parenthesis in the evolution of liberal democracy in Italy, the results of particular errors of individuals in a time of great crisis. In this view, the period since World War II takes up where the liberal era ended. Of course, this view has the further advantage of ignoring both how Fascism came about and its relationship to the society of the liberal era. There are several inadequacies in this explanation. Fascism did not arise in a political and social vacuum. Sociological bases alone may not be *sufficient* ingredients for the rise of a

mass movement, but they are *necessary*. A second (and not unrelated) weakness of the liberal interpretation is that even without Fascism the liberal era was fast drawing to a close. The new mass parties of the Socialists and Catholics (Popular Party) were about to threaten and usurp the Liberal dominance of the polity. This is not to suggest that the Liberals had no future. They might have continued as the balancing point essential to any majority much like the Radical Socialists in the Third and Fourth Republics or the Belgian Liberals. But this continual electoral importance would only have rendered somewhat more palatable the legislative programs of the new majorities. Postliberal Italian party structure might have resembled that of mid-century Belgium, had not the Fascists come to power. During their long dominance, the Italian liberals, like other European liberal parties, had failed to mobilize the emerging mass electorate. At first they did not need the masses, and then it was too late.

In the Marxian view, Fascism was merely liberal capitalism in an organizational form better suited to the need for repression in an age of mass political involvement and was thus a natural outgrowth of trends inherent in liberal society. This explanation has some truth and even more elegance than many of its competitors, but simplicity is achieved at considerable cost. In particular, it overemphasizes the sociological and economic at the expense of the political and organizational. Against the background of the importance of these latter two dimensions in contemporary Communist strategy, this seems to be more a weakness of theory than of practice. But it does permit the neglect of the role of the mistakes of the Italian Left in the rise of Fascism.

In the Italian version of Marxism, the new society matures within the old. Insofar as this theory of the counter-culture describes the coexistence of competing subcultures in Italy, it provides considerable insight into what was happening under Fascism. However, the Left counter-culture seems to be more of a reaction to an earlier dominant culture than to Fascism as such; certainly, it was not produced by Fascism, though it expanded greatly during that era.

The Marxian analysis thus reaches much the same conclusion as the liberal about the impact of Fascism on Italian culture, albeit from different perspectives. The one views it as a momentary error, leaving no lasting impact; the other sees it as a continuation of a repressive cultural system and as having no separate impact of its own. They seem to concur that Fascism had little lasting independent impact on Italian culture.

The Catholic view is more difficult to specify, both because of a certain official ambivalence and an unofficial multiplicity of viewpoints. Although

Italy is an overwhelmingly Catholic country, the Church has opposed most of the cultural trends that have dominated the politics of unified Italy. Only since World War II have Catholic politicians been able to assure political access to the Church; even now Catholicism is not as well represented in the high culture—the universities, creative and performing arts, and the literary world—as in the political sphere. Despite the dominance of Christian Democracy, Italian Catholics have not in the twentieth century been as culturally creative as, for example, their French or Dutch counterparts. The Italian Church seems to be continually trying to come to terms with a world it never made, one in which it knows it must function, but in which it feels ill at ease and awkward—indeed, at times, somewhat *gauche,* if the pun can be excused. Since World War II, it has exercised great influence and power. Its doctrine permits it to get along with most regimes that permit it to fulfill its mission, and it has quarreled with every Italian regime since unification over whether or not this is being permitted. It was making its peace with the liberal regime when the Fascists took over. It quickly came to terms with the Fascists in the Lateran Pacts, only to back away as the totalitarian tendencies of the regime began to interfere with the Church's mission. At present, the Church may be slowly reaching accommodation with Marxism, just as in the past it made peace with liberalism and Fascism.

At the end of World War II, it became the rallying point for numerous tendencies that were held together by anti-Communism and a concern for order rather than adherence to Catholic doctrine. It could be expected, consequently, that there are many attitudes toward Fascism within the Catholic subculture. Few, however, seem to attribute specifically to Fascism much particular significance for contemporary Italian politics. Like other Italians, Catholics tend to label as Fascist those attitudes and behaviors that reflect elitist and dictatorial tendencies without bothering to demonstrate any functional or historical relationships.

Thus, in the popular political language, Fascism gets the credit and blame for a multitude of phenomena that may or may not have a real connection with that discredited regime. Knowledgeable observers and empirical researchers tend to share many of these popular attitudes toward Fascism. It seems reasonable that there must be some relationship between the Fascist experience and the low political involvement, knowledge, and sense of efficacy; feelings of alienation from the polity; and ideological rigidities of the Italian electorate. However, the difficult problem of sketching in the empirical connections is seldom confronted. This paper will examine several aspects of Italian attitudes and behavior in order to

determine if and to what extent these seem to be related to the Fascist experience. Only then will it be possible to return to the question raised by the title of this paper—the legacy of Fascism.

ANALYSIS

We will use a simple technique to examine the impact of Fascism: We will analyze several aspects of the attitudes and behavior of Italians of different ages in order to evaluate the extent to which these differences might be attributable to the socialization experiences of the Fascist era. This procedure rests on assumptions of the importance of youthful experiences that are well grounded in learning theory and, more specifically, in the literature on political socialization. If the age cohorts that reached maturity during the Fascist era were indeed effectively socialized by the regime, some residues should remain in their political attitudes and behavior that set them apart from those socialized before and after. These residues should reflect, over large numbers of individuals, the prevalent norms of the era, which are, of course, more likely to be those of the immediate surroundings of the individual rather than some abstract national norm. We are making no assumptions concerning the existence of national patterns, which would be especially misleading in light of the patterns of communication and national integration prevalent during the youth of the older portion of the sample. In addition, the length of exposure to particular political phenomena has an independent impact on the development of political norms. That is, averaging over large numbers of individuals, there will be a difference in the impact of a political phenomenon between those exposed to it for differing periods of time, all else being held constant. Finally, those who are higher in their involvement in national cultural life and in political activity will be more exposed to the influence of political stimuli than those less involved.

A factor that complicates the entire analysis is the impact of aging on attitudes and behavior. It has been widely demonstrated that the simple process of aging is itself associated with many changes, hence particular attention is necessary to avoid attributing to genuine generational differences results that are in fact due to aging. It is here that the presence of pre-Fascist respondents is of greatest utility, for they provide a control group. The problem cannot be completely eliminated by mechanical controls, however; while theoretical considerations are extremely useful, the problem of generational differences versus life-cycle effects remains.

Because of this problem, it would be ideal to use panel data to sort out these effects. Of course, there are no data from the Fascist and pre-Fascist periods, so inferences must be gleaned from contemporary attitudes and behavior. The data presented here are from questionnaires administered to a national mass sample of 2,500 at the time of the 1968 parliamentary elections.[1]

The variables used in the analysis require little explanation. Party identification has been used as a measure of partisanship, as the mores of Italian politics and the survey fraternity precluded asking directly about the vote. However, the high regularity in voting claimed by the respondents suggests that the relationship between identification and the vote is very strong, as about eighty percent claim to have always voted for the same party. We have examined several measures of attitudes and behavior. Measures of participation used include party, union, and other organizational memberships. Political interest was measured by the subjective evaluation by the respondent of his interest in politics. Measures of communications include a summary index of the importance of the mass media that is based on evaluation by the respondent of the importance to him of newspapers, radio, and television.

We examined attitudinal measures of several types. One is an index of eight agree-disagree statements about controversial issues of Italian political life. We created a second index, using four of the same items from a factor analysis of these eight items; the four form a left-right factor and hence more efficiently differentiate contemporary left-right policy preferences. Efficacy questions form a battery designed to measure trust in others and in the government, plus the respondent's evaluation of his own efficacy as a political actor. A final series of questions probed two other dimensions. One concerns the respondent's left-right perceptions of parties and of his own self-location on a scale that goes from zero to one hundred. The second involves an affect score given by each respondent concerning several parties, groups, and institutions. This also goes from zero to one hundred, with a score of fifty representing affective neutrality.

The age categories used in the analysis are five-year groupings that permit the examination of differences within the age cohorts that matured under Fascism. All the variables were first analyzed with larger groupings that included everyone socialized before Fascism, during Fascism, and two post-Fascist groups. The small size of the sample when it is divided several ways encourages the use of grosser categories. However, this division did not reveal what is one of our most important findings—that is, that those who were socialized late in the Fascist era are among the most anti-Fascist

of all. Consequently, in the analysis that follows, only the five-year groupings will be presented.

FINDINGS

Our most important finding is that very little of contemporary Italian political attitudes and behavior can be linked to Fascism using the data available to us.

Fascism seems to have left few traces. Of this there is little doubt. There are differences in the attitudes and behaviors of different age groupings, but it is not possible on the basis of the data obtained in the mass survey to attribute very much to the Fascist experience. Many differences seem due to general cultural changes that were hardly touched by the Fascist experience. For example, this is true of positive feelings for the clergy, which increase regularly with age (see Figure 1). This is a classic case of our being unable to separate generational differences from those



Figure 1: AFFECT SCORES (50 = AFFECTIVE NEUTRALITY) TOTAL SAMPLE

due to aging. That is, we do not know whether the young will remain less favorable toward clerics as they get older or whether will gradually come to feel more positively toward them. Both forces probably are at work, but this cannot be demonstrated with data from a single point in time.

The aging effect seems especially to be at work in the patterns of various forms of participation. In this, Italians reflect well-established life-cycle patterns; interest increases gradually and then declines with old age. Interest in politics reflects some of the discontinuities in Italian political culture, but it is the wartime generation (aged 45-50 in 1968), rather than the Fascist, that seems most deviant (figure not shown).

Partisan identification likewise demonstrates age differences, but it is difficult to relate them to Fascism (see Figure 2). The Christian Democratic share of the vote, for example, increases with age; the chief exception is the five-year group that was socialized in the late 1930s. Much of this is undoubtedly due to differential survival rates of men and women (82% of women seventy and over voted Christian Democratic!). The Right does slightly better with the oldest Fascist generation, but differences are



Figure 2: MEAN PARTISAN IDENTIFICATION (1-8 = LEFT-RIGHT)

so small—as is the sample portion—that little should be made of this phenomenon.

Mass organizational activity likewise reflects no significant impact of the Fascist period. Membership in political parties, in unions, and in other types of organizations follows normal life-cycle expectations. The overall patterns demonstrate only a modest difference in involvement between age groups, and it is difficult to associate these with Fascism. No firm conclusions are possible, for the small number of party and organization members in the sample renders cells too small for breakdown by age. (For this reason, organizational activity is not presented graphically.)

While Fascism may well have greatly affected the communications patterns of Italy, the results are not apparent in the general population (figure not shown). Patterns of attributing influence to the mass media demonstrate a sharp rise between the oldest two five-year categories and the others. With aging, people seem to lose interest. The greater involvement of those reaching maturity during the war and postwar years is also apparent here. Other groups are remarkably similar except for a slight decline in the younger two that reflects their particular position in the political life cycle. The pattern that emerges for the influence of face-to-face contacts is roughly similar. People who score high on one measure of communication tend to score high on others as well.

Perhaps even more surprisingly than the absence of strong behavioral generational differences are the similarities in attitudes. Affect toward the clergy has already been referred to above as an example of the problem of the impact of generations versus that of aging. Not surprisingly, the pattern of affect toward the Christian Democratic Party is quite similar, though it does reflect a very small but conspicuous decline in sympathy for that party among those maturing during the Fascist era (see Figure 2). Other affect items show less variation by age. Positive affect toward the Italian Communist Party, for example, is lowest among the oldest cohorts and then rises sharply until the age 45-49 category, which is the most favorable, after which it declines moderately. Positive affect toward the Russians and toward trade unions follows a similar pattern, though it peaks in the 40-44-year-old category. Sympathy for the PSI-PSDI, on the other hand, oscillates considerably among the categories; it is highest among the post-World War I and post-World War II groups, undoubtedly reflecting the enthusiasms of those heroic times. But these differences are so small that one would probably not notice them if one were not looking for them.

Measures of opinion on matters of public policy likewise reveal considerable differences among ages, but few of these can be traced to



Figure 3: INDEX OF POLICY PREFERENCES

Fascism (see Figure 3). Taking the entire set of eight policy questions scored on a left-right basis reveals a steady progression from less than one-quarter of those seventy and over scoring on the leftist half of the scale to almost sixty percent of those under thirty in that half. But the progression is monotonic, with those under sixty within about eight percentage points of one another. That is, the greatest differences are between those sixty and over and the others.

We also have used four questions that differentiated even more sharply the issues that separate the parties today and the more sensitive index that emerged gives similar, though more dramatic, results (see Figure 3). However, there is actually a small decline in the percentage in the most leftist category between those seventy and beyond and those sixty to sixty-four, which is the oldest group that matured during the Fascist period; the increase in the percentage leftist is dramatic only between that category and the younger two five-year groups that matured under Fascism. In other words, the cohort that matured during the latter period of Fascism moved to the left in policy preferences somewhat more rapidly

than did other groups, but it only hastened a process that is common to the entire sample. This is one of the few possible traces of the residual effects of Fascism. But in the absence of controls and comparable evidence from other countries, we cannot be sure that this is neither a generational shift common to all industrial countries that experienced the unrest of the 1930s nor a normal acceleration of opinion to the right that comes with certain age levels.

However, we have suggestive evidence for a general shift to the left under Fascism in the self-location of the sample on a left-right scale of zero to one hundred, with zero representing the extreme left and one hundred the extreme right (see Figure 3). The graph shows a trace of a movement to the right in the mean score of each five-year group as we move from those who matured in the pre-Fascist period to those who reached age twenty-one in the first five years of the regime; it is followed by a sharp turn to the left among those growing up in the later years of the regime. In fact, the group with the most rightist mean score was that which reached maturity during the first five years of the regime and hence was exposed to it longest, while the most leftist five-year group was the last of the three Fascist groups! The middle Fascist group was about midway between the others, which adds to our confidence that the results are not an artifact of sampling. Indeed, the differences are from a low of about forty to a high of almost fifty, which is quite a spread. This finding suggests that early socialization experiences affect basic underlying orientations more dramatically than they do actual behavior or policy preferences.

This theme was followed up by examining a number of indicators of basic underlying attitudes toward government and politics, such as sense of efficacy and trust in people. The results were completely negative: There is no pattern of differences among the age groups on these measures. More than any other single category of findings, this one seems to confirm most strongly the basic hypothesis that the attitudes that are often labeled Fascist seem to have little to do with the socialization experiences of those Italians who were most exposed to Fascism. Otherwise it would seem that some traces would appear in the data. These attitudes toward government and politics undoubtedly are older than Fascism; they may have been encouraged and strengthened by that regime, but they did not originate with it.

We have also examined regional differences in the attitudes and behaviors of the five-year age groups, because the conventional wisdom suggests that Fascism had a greater impact in some areas than others. This

analysis is complicated by the small number of respondents that remain in each category when more than a few simple controls are utilized. Even with the crude results obtained, it seems clear that though there are considerable differences among the regions—and hence among the same age cohorts across regions—the within regional age differences do not reflect strikingly different patterns of differences between the old and young. These differences between regions in Italy reflect far more than simply the differential impact of Fascism. Within-region variations in the legacy of Fascism do not emerge from the data available.

SUMMARY

The above findings suggest that the residual impact of Fascism on contemporary Italian mass behavior is slight, and that it is only somewhat greater on attitudes. However, it is likely that the inclusion in a mass sample of so many relatively uninvolved citizens attenuates its impact. For this reason, we repeated the above analyses with the sample divided into elite and nonelite components.

As Butler and Stokes (1969: 59) have written, "We must ask not how old the elector is but when it was that he was young," because, according to the conventional wisdom, the political atmosphere of the period in which the elector grew into maturity should be highly significant in forming basic attitudes. This conceptualization fits nicely with our interest in the legacy of Fascism; consequently, we have used several crude but effective indicators of probable elite and nonelite socialization experiences. One is high and low education (more than five years and five years or less of formal education), chosen because of the obvious role of education in the socialization of elites. We also used an operational definition of elite that included only those with at least a high school *(liceo)* diploma. The differences between these respondents and those with more than five years of formal education was very slight; in fact, the better-educated group was consistently two or three points more conservative on almost all measures. Because the smaller group contained only 180 respondents, compared with 629 for the larger, we are presenting the findings for those with more than five years of formal education.

The other two measures of elite membership relate more directly to the family situation of the respondent. One is the occupational status of his father, which is divided into white-collar, skilled worker and owner-farmer, and unskilled workers and peasants. The third indicator of elite member-

ship taps, in a crude fashion, the level of politicization of the family. It divides respondents into those whose fathers discussed politics at home and those who did not, on the assumption that those who are exposed to political discussions in the home are, as a result, more knowledgeable about and in some measure more influenced by the political events of the times.

The general conclusions of this analysis can be stated simply; the nonelites were hardly penetrated more than superficially by the Fascist experiences. On all three indicators, the lowest and largest categories–low on education, low on occupational status of parents, and "no" on father's discussion of politics in the home–reveal the smallest fluctuation in the age categories affected by the Fascist experience. On the other hand, the elites, no matter how operationalized, are more volatile in their responses to changes in the political atmosphere. While this is not surprising, it is less obvious that strong traces should remain in elite attitudes and behavior decades later, while the nonelite show few reminders of the experience. For the sake of simplicity, the remainder of the analysis will present data



Figure 4: SELF LOCATION ON LEFT-RIGHT SCALE

only on the elite as operationalized as having more than five years of formal education.

The most striking finding concerning the impact of Fascism on the elites is that the impact varied greatly between those maturing early in the Fascist experience and those growing up near the end. No matter how measured, elites that were socialized during the late 1920s are more conservative in partisan identification and left-right self-placement (see Figure 2). However, the later Fascist cohorts turned strongly against the regime, and the elite becomes progressively more leftist as it becomes younger. Identification with the right is highest among those with high education who were most exposed to Fascism; in fact, it exceeds 30% of those aged 60-64. Identification with the Christian Democrats fluctuates. Identification with the left is low among those high in education growing up under Fascism, except near the end of the era.

Attitudinal variables exhibit the same pattern (see Figure 3). The four-item policy index, in particular, reflects impressive differences between the early and late Fascist cohorts. And the left-right self-place-



Figure 5: AFFECT SCORES (50 = AFFECTIVE NEUTRALITY) MORE THAN 5 YEARS' EDUCATION

ment scale shows that the first Fascist cohort is the most rightist of all on this measure. The affect scores also follow this pattern (see Figure 4).

To summarize, among members of the elite the most important differences are to be found between those socialized early in the regime and those socialized later. These latter turn sharply away from the patterns dominant among those socialized in the 1920s. The regime had little success with the young elites during its later years.

CONCLUSIONS

Considering the methodological problems encountered in this kind of analysis, our conclusions can only be stated negatively; the data do not reveal a strong lingering impact of Fascism on the attitudes and behaviors of the mass segment of the sample. Although this does not demonstrate that there was no impact, it does suggest that it is difficult to specify any particular significance of the Fascist era for contemporary mass attitudes and behavior. The burden of demonstrating that certain aspects of contemporary Italian mass political behavior and attitudes are the result of the Fascist experience would seem to rest with those making the argument. It finds no strong support in these data. Elites, on the other hand, do exhibit generational differences on a number of variables. It is more difficult to evaluate the importance and significance of these differences for the present Italian political system. Differences seem to be most pronounced on variables that are further removed from behavior, such as on the left-right dimension, while attitudinal differences fall in the middle.

It is probable that extensive resocialization has taken place. The disruptions and discontinuities of the war and postwar period undoubtedly facilitated this; certainly the age cohorts maturing during that period exhibit the most interesting patterns. In highly stable systems such as the United States and Great Britain, the effects of the Great Depression are visible in partisan identification even today (Campbell et al., 1960: ch. 7; Butler and Stokes, 1969: ch. 3). In periods of rapid change and dislocation, however, the socialization experiences of youth may not provide secure guides to action and thus may be superseded.

But if this can be accomplished so easily, we can at least raise questions concerning the nature of the socialization experiences of the Fascist regime and the depth of its penetration of Italian society. While extensive resocialization is possible, there was little effort of a formal nature in Italy

to bring this about. A simpler explanation is that Fascism did not make a great impact on the attitudes and behavior of the mass of Italians. It was a repressive system, but, for the masses, so were the regimes that preceded it. On the other hand, even with the crude measures of elite membership employed herein, it is evident that the impact was greater on elites. Given the differential involvement of elites and nonelites in the cultural life of Italy, it is not surprising that elites were more affected than the mass. But the scant residue of Fascism that remains at the mass level today is testimony to the superficiality of the Fascist revolution.

NOTE

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