

The Measure of American Religion: Toward Improving the State of the Art*

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Abstract

Recently, scholars have devoted renewed attention to the role of religion in American life. Thus, it is important that they use the most effective means available to categorize and study religious groups. However, the most widely used classification scheme in survey research (T.W. Smith 1990) does not capture essential differences between American religious traditions and overlooks significant new trends in religious affiliation. We critique this scheme based on its historical, terminological, and taxonomical inaccuracy and offer a new approach that addresses its shortcomings by using denominational affiliation to place respondents into seven categories grounded in the historical development of American religious traditions. Most important, this new scheme yields more meaningful interpretations because the categories refer to concrete religious traditions. Because of increased accuracy in classification, it also improves model fit and reduces measurement error.

Since the rise of the Christian Right in the late 1970s, scholars have devoted renewed attention to the role of religion in American public life. Social commentators now widely acknowledge that Americans are more religious than citizens in most other

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modern industrialized nations, and research has demonstrated that religious worldviews shape social and political attitudes in ways that cannot be reduced to social class, educational attainment, or other more traditional sociological factors (Davis & Robinson 1996; DiMaggio, Evans & Bryson 1996; Green et al. 1996; Legee and Kellstedt 1993; Manza & Brooks 1997; Wald 1987). The increasing recognition that religion plays an important role in the public sphere makes it crucial that scholars have at their disposal the most effective means available to categorize religious groups.

Schemes based on denominational affiliation are the most common approach to religious classification, particularly for Protestants. This approach dates back to Glock and Stark's (1965) discussion of the "new denominationalism" in American religion.¹ Denominations exert a strong influence on social life for a number of reasons. Numerically, Americans are more involved in religious denominations than in any other kind of voluntary association, including labor unions and ethnic organizations (Wald 1987). At the individual level, involvement with religious groups is, by and large, more intense than participation in other voluntary groups. Denominations generate their own worldviews through symbols, pedagogy, and rituals. They shape members' concrete views of political and economic issues through formal preaching from the pulpit and informal discussions among parishioners (Wald, Owen & Hill 1988; Welch et al. 1993). And denominational culture is a significant component of childhood socialization (Carroll & Roof 1993). All told, America is a "denominational society" (Greeley 1972). Given this importance, it is unfortunate that the most widely used denominational classification scheme in survey research (T.W. Smith 1990) does not adequately capture essential historical differences between American religious traditions and offers no way of measuring some recent trends in religious affiliation.

Drawing from recent work in sociology and political science, we offer a substantially revised classification scheme that is more grounded in the development of American religious traditions. For specialists in the sociology of religion, our scheme yields more meaningful interpretations than other widely used classifications because results can be more clearly situated within their concrete social context. We also incorporate into our scheme ways of distinguishing between increasingly significant religious groups, particularly nondenominational Protestants, who have previously been misplaced or ignored in most classifications. For nonspecialists of religion, our classification provides a relatively straightforward way of categorizing American religious groups and offers a firm foundation for interpreting the individual-level effects of religious affiliation on attitudes and behavior.

After outlining the rationale for our revised scheme, we assess its utility by employing a comparison with T.W. Smith's (1990) in which we predict a variety of religious, political, economic, and social attitudes and one measure of religious behavior. While we focus on classifying religious traditions using questions

available on the General Social Survey (GSS), our methodology can be replicated on other survey instruments that contain questions about the respondents' religious denomination.²

Improving the State of the Art

Precisely because of the predictive utility, it is important for social scientists to have the best means available for classifying denominations. The GSS, conducted by the National Opinion Research Center, is one of the most extensively used survey instruments that contains questions concerning respondents' denominational affiliation and religious beliefs and practices. For this reason, we focus on how religious categories are created by scholars using the questions available in this survey.

T.W. Smith (1990) has constructed the most widely utilized scheme for classifying religious groups using the GSS. Taking into account a number of factors — including organizational membership in ecumenical associations and the doctrinal beliefs of lay members and clergy — Smith places survey respondents on a fundamentalist-moderate-liberal continuum based on their denominational affiliation. In order to facilitate the use of this scheme, the GSS contains a variable that *automatically* assigns respondents one of these three labels; it is not a self-reported measure. Scholars have used this variable to categorize both Protestants and all religious believers. In developing this scheme and codifying its use in the GSS, Smith has significantly contributed to the study of American religion by making it easier for scholars to use religious variables in their analyses.

While we recognize his contribution and appreciate the difficulties of trying to reduce the complexity of America's denominational matrix to a few empirically useful and theoretically meaningful categories, we disagree with Smith's classification scheme on three levels: history, terminology, and taxonomy. In light of the criticisms that immediately follow, we propose a substantial revision of this prevailing classification scheme by drawing together recent work in sociology and political science.

HISTORY

Denominations are part of larger religious traditions with well-elaborated sets of creeds, teachings, rituals, and authority structures. These dimensions of religious culture shape members' nonreligious attitudes for well-grounded historical reasons. Following work by Kellstedt and Green (1993), we argue that in white Protestantism there are two dominant religious traditions: mainline Protestantism and evangelical Protestantism.³ Mainline denominations have typically emphasized an accommodating stance toward modernity, a proactive view on issues of social and

economic justice, and pluralism in their tolerance of varied individual beliefs. Evangelical denominations have typically sought more separation from the broader culture, emphasized missionary activity and individual conversion, and taught strict adherence to particular religious doctrines.⁴ The differences between these two religious traditions are the legacy of a number of combined influences — including the relative emphasis placed upon *ritualist* or *pietist* elements of religious belief and practice (Swierenga 1990), the denominations' origins from either churchlike or sectlike religious movements (Stark & Bainbridge 1985), and the adoption of either pre- or postmillennial eschatology (Hunter 1983; Marsden 1980). These historical trajectories account for the complex but socially significant differences between the two wings of white Protestantism, and these differences are reflected in the religious and social views of their members.

Recognizing the significance of historical religious traditions is also crucial to the matter of race. The Black Church has undoubtedly served as the central institution in the lives of African Americans from before emancipation through the civil rights movement until the present day.⁵ While in the lives of many white Protestants religion has increasingly become a separate sphere independent from the spheres of politics and economics (Wuthnow 1993), the Black Church has remained at the intersection between the worldly and the sacred (Lincoln & Mamiya 1990). Because religious and social spheres mutually influence one another to a greater extent in the African American community than in American society as a whole, the influence of denominational culture on social attitudes among African Americans is particularly strong. Importantly, however, the denominational culture of the Black Church is manifestly different from that of other white Protestant traditions. This is the result of the unique legacy of the Black Church in American history.

Historically, the Black Church has been composed of seven major denominations.⁶ While the religious-meaning system and the social organization of the Black Church are similar on the whole to those found in white evangelical denominations, African Americans emphasize different aspects and nuances of Christian doctrine, especially the importance of freedom and the quest for justice (Lincoln & Mamiya 1990; Roof & McKinney 1987). This legacy, which has historically reflected their material and psychological deprivation and their political marginality, continues to shape economic and political attitudes today. While more liberal on most economic attitudes, such as those related to poverty and the redistribution of wealth, black Protestants are generally conservative on social and family issues (Lincoln & Mamiya 1990; Reichley 1985; Wald 1987). Because the social experience of African Americans has subtly shaped their theological doctrines and has more explicitly influenced the social and economic implications they draw from them, we follow other scholars of religion and public life by distinguishing between black and white Protestant traditions (Roof & McKinney 1987; Wald 1987).⁷

TERMINOLOGY

Many social scientists place religious denominations on a fundamentalist-liberal (or conservative-liberal) continuum based on their doctrines and the beliefs of their members. We feel that characterizing religious groups in this manner is undesirable on a number of different grounds and often leads to unclear interpretations of findings. First, according to Smith's classification scheme, over 30% of the American population is described as "fundamentalist," a label that many respondents would probably deny because of its typically negative connotations in the media. We are not aware of any other scholarship that advocates the use of the term "fundamentalist" as the general label for conservative or evangelical Christians, since the term usually refers to a more narrow subpopulation of "evangelicalism" (Ammerman 1987; Hunter 1983; Marsden 1980). Second, in statistical terms the continuum suggests that religiosity can be conceptualized as an ordinal variable, whereas the distinct development of evangelical, black, and mainline Protestantism shows it is more accurate to think of the relationship between these three groups as being *nominal* in nature.⁸ In particular, a nominal categorization guards against mainline Protestantism being treated as a diluted form of orthodoxy. Third, the fundamentalist-liberal continuum assumes that all religious groups can be placed in categories based on the fundamentalist/modernist split of the 1920s. This is a dubious assumption, especially for non-Protestant groups to which this scheme is often applied (Woodberry & Smith 1998). Fourth, because "fundamentalist" is defined in opposition to "liberal," scholars often implicitly interpret it to mean "conservative." As a consequence, the conservative-liberal continuum that is meant to define *religious* worldviews can easily be confused with political and economic views.⁹ However, studies show that religious conservatism does not correlate as highly with other types of conservatism as might be expected (Hart 1996; Iannaccone 1993; Megnerus, Smith & Sikkink 1998).

TAXONOMY

One of the most significant demographic changes in American religion in recent years has been the growth of nondenominational Protestants (Woodberry & Smith 1998). This group tends to resemble evangelical Protestants in many theological beliefs, yet in most cases individuals actively decide to affiliate with independent "Bible churches" (or, increasingly, "mega-churches") that are not formally associated with larger denominational structures. The GSS places these "nondenoms" in the same category as those respondents who do not indicate a denominational affiliation on the survey instrument beyond the generic "Protestant." We term this second group "no-denoms." Unfortunately, no-denoms do not resemble nondenoms very closely. They attend religious services less frequently and have weaker attachments to a local church. As a result, religious affiliation

influences their beliefs and practices far less than it does more highly committed members of nondenominational congregations (Shibley 1996). Placing these two classes of respondents in the same religious category weakens empirical findings and obscures a significant religious distinction.¹⁰ For instance, this scheme makes research on secularization, a central issue in the sociology of religion, more difficult. As the nondenom/no-denom category increases in size, scholars cannot determine whether the increase stems from a growing (nondenominationally affiliated) evangelical category or an increasing number of people without strong religious affiliations of any kind.¹¹ Considering that one recent study estimates that over 10% of people who attend church are not affiliated with denominations (Chaves et al. 1999), clarifying this source of ambiguity is a pressing methodological goal.

Informed by the foregoing discussion of history, terminology, and taxonomy, we propose a new framework that enables scholars to capture the nuance of American religious traditions while at the same time reducing religious complexity in a manageable and historically meaningful way. Our scheme explicitly categorizes respondents based on their religious affiliation rather than their beliefs. While affiliation and religious beliefs are certainly correlated, they are analytically and empirically distinct dimensions of religiosity. Rather than conflating these two dimensions, as the GSS does by using denomination as a proxy for the belief dimension, we classify respondents based on affiliation, use historically accurate categories, and contend that this specificity leads to more readily interpretable results.

Data and Methods

The General Social Survey is a nationally representative sample survey of U.S. households conducted since 1972 by the National Opinion Research Center (Davis & Smith 1996). The survey is ideal for our purposes both because T.W. Smith's religious classification scheme (FUND) is used regularly in analyses of these data and because the GSS has a range of religious, political, economic, and social measures that allow us to demonstrate the differences between our religious classification scheme (RELTRAD) and Smith's FUND scheme. Our analyses focus on GSS items asked from 1984 through 1998 because the GSS adopted more precise measures of religious affiliation in 1984.¹²

Because we are interested in exploring whether our RELTRAD scheme offers more analytic precision than FUND in measuring the influence of religious affiliation across a range of issues, we use ordinary least squares (OLS) regression to compare the approaches on five attitudinal and one behavioral measure. To provide an even more stringent comparison, we also contrast RELTRAD to a variant of Smith's coding scheme, which uses his fundamentalist-moderate-liberal categories to code only Protestants (for a recent example, see Manza & Brooks 1997).¹³ In this variant

classification scheme, which we term “FUND2,” non-Protestant respondents are categorized as Catholic, Jewish, other, or unaffiliated using the denominational data found in the GSS.

Our analyses allow us to compare the significance of religious and demographic coefficients and the overall statistical power of the three classification schemes.¹⁴ We also test for statistically significant differences between the religious coefficients. We do not test for differences with Jews and “others” because we are primarily concerned with demonstrating how Smith’s FUND scheme obscures the important distinctions between the four largest religious traditions in the United States: mainline Protestantism, evangelical Protestantism, black Protestantism, and Roman Catholicism.

RELTRAD MEASURES

Given our emphasis on classifying American religious groups by affiliation rather than ideology, we divide Americans who indicate a religious affiliation into six nominal categories: mainline Protestant, evangelical Protestant, black Protestant, Roman Catholic, Jewish, and other (e.g., Mormon, Jehovah’s Witness, Muslim, Hindu, and Unitarian).¹⁵ More specifically, we used theological criteria derived from denominational creeds and associational criteria taken from denominational membership status in national religious organizations such as the National Council of Churches or the National Association of Evangelicals to classify various Baptist, Methodist, Lutheran, Presbyterian, and Episcopalian denominations into mainline and evangelical Protestant traditions (Kellstedt & Green 1993; Melton 1993; Roof & McKinney 1987).¹⁶ For black Protestant denominations and smaller sectarian groups, we used theological and historical information located in J. Gordon Melton’s *Encyclopedia of American Religions* (1993) to determine their proper placement in our coding scheme (see Table 1 for summary statistics of the religious variables in the three classification schemes).¹⁷

Classifying nondenoms and no-denoms proved more challenging. The GSS labels between 2% and 5% of respondents as nondenominational/no-denominational Protestants.¹⁸ This category has been growing over the years. Yet without differentiating between these two distinct groups, it is unclear whether this trend implies increased secularization or growth among nondenominational evangelical Protestants. An increase in the frequency of church attendance among this group suggests the latter, and qualitative studies on the changing nature of Protestantism support this interpretation (Miller 1997). However, because the GSS does not regularly contain additional questions about congregations or religious identity, any conclusions about this group must be tentative.

Given this lack of information, we assign individuals whom the GSS coded as nondenom/no-denom to the evangelical Protestant category if they attend church “about once a month” or more. We base this decision on two factors. First, there is

a substantial literature documenting the recent nondenominational movement among evangelicals; there is not a comparable movement among mainline Protestants. Second, respondents in this category who attend church frequently are similar in attitudes and behavior to evangelical Protestants. Respondents in the nondenom/no-denom category who attend church less than once a month are omitted from our analyses. (See the Appendix for further details on our classification scheme.)

OTHER MEASURES

For our dependent variables, we use three individual items and construct three simple additive scales. For the sake of analytic uniformity, all of our items and scales from the GSS were rescaled as necessary to assign higher scores to “conservative” answers. Two measures tap religious attitudes and behavior. We measure attitudes toward the Bible, ranging from 1 (the Bible as a book of fables) to 3 (the Bible as the literal word of God). We also measure church attendance, which ranges from 0 (never) to 8 (several times a week).

Two measures tap political attitudes. First, a party identification measure ranges from 0 (strong Democrat) to 6 (strong Republican). Second, an economic policy scale is based on four questions tapping attitudes toward government involvement in the economy (Cronbach's $\alpha = .738$). These questions asked about support for government financing of projects to create new jobs as well as the government's responsibility to provide employment to all who want a job, to provide a decent standard of living for the unemployed, and to reduce income differences between the rich and the poor.

Finally, two measures explore social attitudes. First, we created an abortion scale, which sums abortion attitudes on seven items (Cronbach's $\alpha = .890$), each specifying a condition under which “it should be possible for a pregnant woman to obtain a legal abortion.” Second, we created a sexual morality scale based on three items measuring attitudes toward premarital sex, homosexuality, and extramarital sex (Cronbach's $\alpha = .592$), with scales ranging from 1 (not wrong at all) to 4 (always wrong). For all of our dependent variables, cases coded as “not applicable” or “don't know” are treated as missing.

We control for age of the respondent (in years), gender (female = 1), GSS year (1984-94), region (South = 1), and race (black = 1). We also control for education, which is coded from 0 (high school dropout) to 4 (graduate degree). Cases with missing education values are recoded to 1 (high school graduate), which is the value closest to the mean. Finally, we control for income, which is coded in quintiles using the following income measures supplied in the GSS: Income82 for cases from 1984 to 1985, Income86 for cases from 1986 to 1990, and Income91 for cases from 1991 to 1994. Cases with missing income values are interpolated

**TABLE 1: Unweighted Mean and Standard Deviation Statistics
Comparing Fundamentalist-Moderate-Liberal and
Religious Tradition Models, 1984-1998**

Independent Variable	FUND Model	FUND2 Model	RELTRAD Model
Religion			
Fundamentalist	.339 (.473)		
Moderate	.389 (.488)		
Liberal	.272 (.445)		
Fundamentalist Protestant		.313 (.464)	
Moderate Protestant		.109 (.312)	
Liberal Protestant		.151 (.359)	
Black Protestant			.096 (.294)
Evangelical Protestant			.273 (.445)
Mainline Protestant			.210 (.408)
Catholic		.254 (.435)	.254 (.435)
Jewish		.020 (.141)	.020 (.141)
Other		.059 (.236)	.059 (.235)
Unaffiliated		.094 (.292)	.094 (.291)
N	21,589	21,733	21,785

using education data. In our regression analyses on biblical literalism, we control for church attendance. Finally, the data are weighted for the years in which black respondents were oversampled.

Results and Discussion

Which religious classification scheme works best? Because there are a number of different criteria by which we can evaluate this question, we divide the results and discussion into three sections: the first compares and discusses model fit statistics;

the second compares and discusses the estimated religious coefficients; and the third discusses how changes in the coefficients of our demographic control variables reveal further differences between approaches.

EVIDENCE FROM MODEL FIT STATISTICS

While the strongest evidence favoring RELTRAD is found in comparing coefficients and discussing interpretations, the model fit statistics merit prior discussion. Model fit statistics are important signposts in model construction, even if this importance is often overemphasized (Long 1997; McCullagh & Nelder 1989). At face value, the adjusted R-square statistics in the models indicate that RELTRAD outperforms FUND in all six models. The difference in R^2 between FUND and RELTRAD ranges from 0.002 to 0.046. Dividing these numbers by the original R^2 shows that RELTRAD improves the percentage of variance explained on biblical literalism by 9.5%, on church attendance by over 30%, on political party identification by 35.2%, on economic attitudes by 3.2%, on abortion attitudes by 1.8%, and on sexual morality attitudes by over 10%. Model fit statistics between FUND2 and RELTRAD are almost equivalent. However, with the identical degrees of freedom used, RELTRAD slightly outperforms FUND2 in all cases. Moreover, as we discuss below, RELTRAD provides results that are easier to connect with historical and qualitative research on religion, and thus allows for improved interpretations.

EVIDENCE FROM THE RELIGIOUS COEFFICIENTS

Contrasting the magnitude and sign of the estimated coefficients in each model is the best way to compare the three classification schemes.¹⁹ We begin by comparing the religious coefficients and in the following section discuss the demographic coefficients. Thus, our discussion of the results will proceed twice through the dependent variables.

Table 2 displays estimated coefficients on religious outcomes: biblical literalism and attendance at worship services. One straightforward way of comparing the results is to look at the important categories RELTRAD contains that FUND neglects. The FUND scheme does not capture the "other" religious category, which has been increasing in size and significance over the years. Respondents in this category exceed mainline Protestants in attendance and are comparable with Roman Catholics on both attendance and biblical literalism.

Second, neither FUND nor FUND2 contains a category for black Protestants. The results from RELTRAD suggest that black Protestants are situated between evangelical and mainline Protestants on measures of biblical literalism and church attendance. They also show that the effect of membership in black Protestant denominations is distinct from the impact of being black.²⁰

Third, RELTRAD also clearly shows a significant distinction between evangelical and mainline Protestants on attendance. In contrast, FUND2 shows

no difference between fundamentalist and moderate Protestants. Considering mainline Protestantism's well-documented decline in attendance rates, RELTRAD reinforces current scholarship, whereas the results from FUND2 remain unclear.

The differences between classification schemes are more striking in Table 3. In these models, the religious coefficients change substantially depending on which scheme we employ. Using FUND, the relationship between political party and religious tradition is curvilinear. Fundamentalists appear to be the most Republican, moderates the most Democratic, and liberals to be located somewhere in-between (all three are significantly different from each other). Because of this curvilinear relationship, if researchers entered FUND as an ordinal variable, rather than as two dummy variables, they might incorrectly conclude that there was not a relationship between religious tradition and political identification.

FUND2 exhibits an almost opposite pattern of party affiliation. Fundamentalists appear to be the most Democratic Protestant group and liberal Protestants the most Republican. This instability highlights the interpretive problems these two schemes can cause without a detailed awareness of the composition of the religion categories. Using FUND, liberals appear more Democratic because the GSS places Jews and the nonreligious in that category. Moderates seem the most Democratic because the GSS places Catholics there. RELTRAD, in contrast, shows that there is no statistical difference between evangelical and mainline Protestants on party identification and does not confuse religious and political ideology through misleading labels. It further reveals a significant difference, net of the effects of race, between black and white Protestants and between black Protestants and Catholics and Jews.

Our analysis of the economic attitudes scale shows a very similar pattern. Using FUND, fundamentalists appear to be the most economically conservative and moderates the most economically liberal. Again, this curvilinear pattern masks the relationship between religion and economic attitudes if scholars treat FUND as an ordinal variable. Using FUND2, this pattern reverses and liberal Protestants appear to be the most economically conservative. Using RELTRAD, these relationships change once again and evangelicals appear more economically conservative than mainline Protestants (although the difference is not statistically significant). This change between FUND2 and RELTRAD seems to be due to the fact that the black Protestants included in FUND2's fundamentalist category artificially reduced its coefficient. RELTRAD further demonstrates that black Protestants are more economically conservative than Catholics, Jews, and the nonreligious.

The instability of the religious coefficients across classification schemes in these models demonstrates how much the results and subsequent interpretation depend on the scheme employed. The results also show that scholars cannot simply posit a religious continuum, nor can they assume a consistent linear relationship between theological conservatism and conservatism on political and economic issues.

TABLE 2: Coefficients from the Regression of Biblical Literalism and Church Attendance on Selected Independent Variables, Comparing Fundamentalist-Moderate-Liberal and Religious Tradition Models

Independent Variable	Biblical Literalism			Church Attendance		
	FUND Model	FUND2 Model	RELTRAD Model	FUND Model	FUND2 Model	RELTRAD Model
Control						
Black	.048** (.016)	.024 (.016)	.090*** (.023)	.429*** (.054)	.469*** (.052)	.622*** (.077)
Age	.001* (.000)	-.000 (.000)	-.000 (.000)	.026*** (.001)	.021*** (.001)	.021*** (.001)
Education	-.123*** (.005)	-.121*** (.005)	-.120*** (.005)	.312*** (.017)	.265*** (.016)	.275*** (.016)
Female	.068*** (.010)	.055*** (.010)	.056*** (.010)	.712*** (.035)	.578*** (.034)	.582*** (.034)
GSS year	-.002 (.001)	-.000 (.001)	-.001 (.001)	-.035*** (.004)	-.026*** (.004)	-.028*** (.004)
Income	-.026*** (.004)	-.031*** (.004)	-.031*** (.004)	.116*** (.014)	.085*** (.014)	.086*** (.014)
South	.095*** (.011)	.073*** (.011)	.072*** (.011)	.375*** (.037)	.299*** (.036)	.253*** (.036)
Church attendance	.069*** (.002)	.063*** (.002)	.062*** (.002)			
Religion						
Fundamentalist	.389*** ¹ (.014)			1.957*** ¹ (.046)		
Moderate	.129*** ² (.013)			1.631*** ² (.043)		
Fundamentalist Protestant		.631*** ¹ (.021)			3.395*** ¹ (.064)	
Moderate Protestant		.482*** ² (.024)			3.309*** ¹ (.074)	
Liberal Protestant		.367*** ³ (.022)			2.464*** ² (.070)	
Black Protestant			.473*** ² (.031)			2.898*** ³ (.101)
Evangelical Protestant			.632*** ¹ (.020)			3.455*** ¹ (.063)
Mainline Protestant			.354*** ³ (.020)			2.394*** ⁴ (.064)

TABLE 2: Coefficients from the Regression of Biblical Literalism and Church Attendance on Selected Independent Variables, Comparing Fundamentalist-Moderate-Liberal and Religious Tradition Models (Continued)

Independent Variable	Biblical Literalism			Church Attendance		
	FUND Model	FUND2 Model	RELTRAD Model	FUND Model	FUND2 Model	RELTRAD Model
<i>Religion (cont'd)</i>						
Catholic		.289*** ⁴ (.020)	.279*** ⁴ (.020)		3.316*** ¹ (.063)	3.212*** ² (.062)
Jewish		.046 (.039)	.034 (.039)		1.479*** (.128)	1.364*** (.128)
Other		.265*** (.027)	.250*** (.027)		3.262*** (.086)	3.149** (.086)
Constant	4.899* (2.264)	2.615 (2.241)	2.954 (2.237)	70.476*** (7.559)	51.701*** (7.341)	54.242*** (7.330)
R ²	.264	.288	.289	.153	.199	.199
Adjusted R ²	.264	.287	.289	.153	.198	.199
F	484.14	391.08	393.98	426.28	408.05	410.29
Df	10	14	14	9	13	13
Significance of F	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000
Valid N	13,484	13,536	13,568	21,233	21,388	21,441

Note: In the FUND models, the omitted category is religious “liberal,” and in both the FUND2 and RELTRAD models, it is the religiously unaffiliated.

¹ = Coefficient(s) significantly different ($p < .05$) from coefficient(s) = ²

² = Coefficient(s) significantly different ($p < .05$) from coefficient(s) = ¹

³ = Coefficient(s) significantly different ($p < .05$) from coefficient(s) = ²

⁴ = Coefficient(s) significantly different ($p < .05$) from coefficient(s) = ³

^a = Coefficient not significantly different from coefficient = ¹ and coefficient = ²

^b = Coefficient not significantly different from coefficient = ² and coefficient = ³

* $p < .05$ ** $p < .01$ *** $p < .001$ (two-tailed test)

The contrast between the three schemes in regard to attitudes toward abortion and sexual morality is less striking but still instructive (see Table 4). For both dependent variables, “conservative” religious traditions have more conservative attitudes. This pattern does not change between coding schemes. However, FUND obscures Catholics’ strong antiabortion sentiment and conservative sexual attitudes, as well as Jews’ strong pro-choice sentiments and liberal sexual attitudes. Compared to FUND2, RELTRAD additionally shows that black Protestants have significantly more liberal attitudes on abortion and sexual morality than evangelical Protestants and are similar to Catholics and mainliners.

TABLE 3: Coefficients from the Regression of Political Party Identification and Economic Attitudes on Selected Independent Variables, Comparing Fundamentalist-Moderate-Liberal and Religious Tradition Models

Independent Variable	Party Identification			Economic Attitudes		
	FUND Model	FUND2 Model	RELTRAD Model	FUND Model	FUND2 Model	RELTRAD Model
Control						
Black	-1.191*** (.047)	-1.200*** (.046)	-.994*** (.065)	-2.304*** (.175)	-2.386*** (.175)	-2.095*** (.263)
Age	.004*** (.001)	.002* (.001)	.002* (.001)	.011** (.003)	.009** (.003)	.010** (.003)
Education	.079*** (.013)	.068*** (.013)	.071*** (.013)	.404*** (.051)	.378*** (.051)	.381*** (.051)
Female	-.188*** (.026)	-.226*** (.026)	-.224*** (.026)	-.446*** (.107)	-.466*** (.107)	-.473** (.107)
GSS year	-.002 (.003)	.000 (.003)	.000 (.003)	-.008 (.012)	-.009 (.012)	-.008 (.012)
Income	.088*** (.011)	.081*** (.011)	.080*** (.011)	.454*** (.042)	.458*** (.042)	.459*** (.042)
South	.031 (.029)	-.004 (.028)	-.001 (.028)	.339** (.115)	.261* (.115)	.250 (.115)
Religion						
Fundamentalist	.235*** ¹ (.035)			.248 ¹ (.142)		
Moderate	-.055 ² (.032)			-.098 ² (.131)		
Fundamentalist Protestant		.583*** ² (.049)			.432* ¹ (.202)	
Moderate Protestant		.641*** ^a (.057)			.539* ¹ (.228)	
Liberal Protestant		.729*** ¹ (.054)			.4231 (.219)	
Black Protestant			.215* ² (.087)			.033 ^a (.346)
Evangelical Protestant			.631*** ¹ (.048)			.556** ¹ (.198)
Mainline Protestant			.690*** ¹ (.050)			.458* ¹ (.201)
Catholic		.175*** ³ (.049)	.174*** ² (.048)		-.155 ² (.200)	-.123 ² (.198)

TABLE 3: Coefficients from the Regression of Political Party Identification and Economic Attitudes on Selected Independent Variables, Comparing Fundamentalist-Moderate-Liberal and Religious Tradition Models (Continued)

Independent Variable	Party Identification			Economic Attitudes		
	FUND Model	FUND2 Model	RELTRAD Model	FUND Model	FUND2 Model	RELTRAD Model
<i>Religion (cont'd)</i>						
Jewish		-.462*** (.104)	-.462*** (.104)		-.636 (.398)	-.607 (.397)
Other		.480*** (.067)	.468*** (.066)		-.066* (.277)	-.037 (.386)
Constant	5.939 (5.797)	1.735 (5.742)	2.607 (5.731)	23.681 (24.875)	26.527 (24.811)	24.526 (24.759)
R ²	.055	.073	.074	.193	.198	.200
Adjusted R ²	.054	.072	.073	.190	.194	.196
F	115.69	108.85	110.77	67.59	48.84	49.44
Df	9	13	13	9	13	13
Significance of F	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000
Valid N	17,928	18,002	18,047	2,552	2,579	2,585

Note: In the FUND models, the omitted category is religious "liberal," and in both the FUND2 and RELTRAD models, it is the religiously unaffiliated.

¹ = Coefficient(s) significantly different ($p < .05$) from coefficient(s) = ²

² = Coefficient(s) significantly different ($p < .05$) from coefficient(s) = ¹

³ = Coefficient(s) significantly different ($p < .05$) from coefficient(s) = ²

^a = Coefficient not significantly different from coefficient = ¹ and coefficient = ²

* $p < .05$ ** $p < .01$ *** $p < .001$ (two-tailed test)

EVIDENCE FROM THE DEMOGRAPHIC COEFFICIENTS

Comparing the change in the demographic coefficients between models also demonstrates the importance of measuring religion accurately. Because these demographic variables are identical across all the models, the differences between coding schemes can be demonstrated more easily. For many of the dependent variables, there is a consistent pattern of change in the demographic coefficients — particularly race, gender, and region — as we move from FUND to FUND2 to RELTRAD.

To begin our comparison, we return to the models with religious outcome variables in Table 2. The effects of living in the South on church attendance weaken consistently from FUND to FUND2 to RELTRAD, as they do on biblical

TABLE 4: Coefficients from the Regression of Abortion Attitude Scale and Sexual Morality Attitude Scale on Selected Independent Variables, Comparing Fundamentalist-Moderate-Liberal and Religious Tradition Models

Independent Variable	Abortion Attitudes			Sexual Morality Attitudes		
	FUND Model	FUND2 Model	RELTRAD Model	FUND Model	FUND2 Model	RELTRAD Model
Control						
Black	-.142** (.053)	-.103 (.053)	.144 (.079)	-.300** (.089)	-.347*** (.088)	.086 (.131)
Age	.007*** (.001)	.007*** (.001)	.008*** (.001)	.035*** (.002)	.031*** (.002)	.031*** (.002)
Education	-.171*** (.016)	-.186*** (.016)	-.182*** (.016)	-.272*** (.027)	-.283*** (.027)	-.273*** (.027)
Female	.084* (.034)	.059 (.034)	.056 (.034)	.135* (.056)	.111* (.056)	.112* (.056)
GSS year	-.001 (.004)	-.002 (.004)	-.003*** (.004)	-.029*** (.006)	-.023*** (.006)	-.024*** (.006)
Income	-.084*** (.014)	-.079*** (.014)	-.078*** (.014)	-.007 (.022)	-.009 (.022)	.013 (.022)
South	.136*** (.036)	.151*** (.037)	.137** (.036)	.550*** (.060)	.479*** (.060)	.464*** (.060)
Religion						
Fundamentalist	1.355*** ¹ (.045)			1.638*** ¹ (.075)		
Moderate	.930*** ² (.042)			.800*** ² (.069)		
Fundamentalist Protestant		1.419*** ¹ (.065)			2.267*** ¹ (.107)	
Moderate Protestant		.969*** ³ (.075)			1.927*** ² (.123)	
Liberal Protestant		.350*** ⁴ (.070)			1.335*** ³ (.117)	
Black Protestant			.897*** ³ (.103)			1.367*** ² (.173)
Evangelical Protestant			1.459*** ¹ (.063)			2.328*** ¹ (.103)
Mainline Protestant			.399*** ⁴ (.064)			1.256*** ² (.106)
Catholic		1.223*** ² (.064)	1.207*** ² (.063)		1.370*** ³ (.105)	1.302*** ² (.103)

TABLE 4: Coefficients from the Regression of Abortion Attitude Scale and Sexual Morality Attitude Scale on Selected Independent Variables, Comparing Fundamentalist-Moderate-Liberal and Religious Tradition Models (Continued)

Independent Variable	Abortion Attitudes			Sexual Morality Attitudes		
	FUND Model	FUND2 Model	RELTRAD Model	FUND Model	FUND2 Model	RELTRAD Model
<i>Religion (cont'd)</i>						
Jewish		-.460*** (.132)	-.478*** (.131)		-.509* (.219)	-.584** (.217)
Other		1.232*** (.088)	1.202*** (.087)		1.891*** (.146)	1.799*** (.144)
Constant	9.481 (7.243)	11.571 (7.271)	12.711 (7.248)	63.921*** (12.310)	51.634*** (12.280)	54.430*** (12.219)
R ²	.110	.108	.111	.202	.216	.222
Adjusted R ²	.109	.107	.111	.200	.214	.220
F	178.76	122.30	126.70	170.72	129.17	134.02
Df	9	13	13	9	13	13
Significance of F	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000
Valid N	13,046	13,113	13,141	6,093	6,114	6,127

Note: In the FUND models, the omitted category is religious "liberal," and in both the FUND2 and RELTRAD models, it is the religiously unaffiliated.

¹ = Coefficient(s) significantly different ($p < .05$) from coefficient(s) = 2

² = Coefficient(s) significantly different ($p < .05$) from coefficient(s) = 1

³ = Coefficient(s) significantly different ($p < .05$) from coefficient(s) = 2

⁴ = Coefficient(s) significantly different ($p < .05$) from coefficient(s) = 3

* $p < .05$ ** $p < .01$ *** $p < .001$ (two-tailed test)

literalism, though to a lesser extent. The effects of gender on attendance become substantially weaker. The coefficient for race increases considerably for both biblical literalism and attendance once the effects of race are separated from the effects of black Protestant affiliation in the RELTRAD model.

Tables 3 and 4 show that the coefficients for female and southern residence change across models for political, economic, and social attitudes, the most pronounced change being the effect of southern residence on economic attitudes. This effect weakens across models from being highly significant in the FUND models to statistically insignificant using RELTRAD. For other outcomes, southerners appear less Democratic and less sexually conservative moving from FUND to FUND2 to RELTRAD. The effects of gender increase consistently

across models for political and economic outcomes and decrease for attitudes toward abortion and sexuality.

African American attitudes toward sex and abortion demonstrate the most striking changes across models. Using FUND and FUND2, African Americans appear to have significantly more liberal sexual attitudes. However, when RELTRAD adds a category for black Protestants, the coefficient for race switches signs and the effect is no longer significant. The pattern is virtually identical for African American abortion attitudes. This suggests that African Americans do not have more liberal attitudes toward sex and abortion than other races (net of controls), but that they just appear to when black Protestants are categorized with white fundamentalists or evangelical Protestants in the other two schemes. The RELTRAD scheme shows that black Protestant attitudes toward sexual morality are indistinguishable from those of mainline Protestants and Catholics but are significantly more liberal than evangelical attitudes.

These comparisons suggest that when religious tradition is not measured precisely enough, the coefficients for race, gender, and region are often biased. In many of our models, the increased precision of the religion measures (from FUND to FUND2 to RELTRAD) corresponds to a monotonic increase or decrease in the coefficients of some control variables, that is, a variable's coefficient changes in the same direction across the models. In some cases these differences are large enough to change the statistical significance of the variable. The values of the coefficients would be even more likely to change in significance if the sample sizes in our models were smaller, such as the 1,500 or fewer respondents in a single year's survey.

These patterns provide two insights into the relative utility of these classification schemes. First, while many researchers may not be interested primarily in analyzing the effects of religion, measuring it poorly as a control variable may bias other coefficients more central to their analyses. Second, this evidence strongly suggests that RELTRAD is a better measure of religious affiliation than either FUND or FUND2. In comparing the three schemes, FUND2 clearly improves upon FUND. RELTRAD provides additional improvement beyond FUND2, as shown by changes in coefficients' values between FUND2 and RELTRAD in the same direction (and sometimes magnitude) as changes between FUND and FUND2. The fact that many of these changes are monotonic across the three schemes provides evidence that RELTRAD captures more of the variation falsely attributed to gender, race, and region or that it removes suppressor effects for these same variables.

Taken together, the foregoing results yield a number of general conclusions. First, in terms of model fit enhancement, RELTRAD significantly outperforms Smith's original FUND classification and is roughly equivalent to the FUND2 scheme. Second, because RELTRAD uses more religious categories than FUND, important religious distinctions (which are often countervailing in terms of their effects) are not collapsed in the RELTRAD approach, and thus the scheme yields

more information and stronger results. In comparison to FUND2, the use of historically more accurate categories increases interpretability because scholars can more easily discuss their results in light of historical and qualitative research on religion. We find this to be particularly the case with our inclusion of the black Protestant category and our terminological usage of “mainline” Protestantism as opposed to the problematic distinction between moderate and liberal religious affiliation. Third, this better specification of religious affiliation recaptures some of the effect that is mistakenly captured by the race, sex, or region variables in the other schemes.

Summary and Conclusion

Americans are more involved in religious groups than in any other type of voluntary organization, and the breadth and depth of this involvement exert a strong influence on contemporary social and political issues. Because of religion’s impact on attitudes and behavior, it is important that scholars adequately measure it. The GSS has provided social scientists with quality data on religion and social life, particularly since 1984. However, we argue that the FUND recode the GSS uses to automatically assign respondents to religious categories is suboptimal on a number of grounds. This inadequacy is troubling both because the GSS is so widely used and because most scholars are not familiar enough with the contours of American religious life to create classification schemes of their own.

We offer a new classification scheme that researchers can apply to both the GSS and to other surveys containing questions about denominational affiliation. Our RELTRAD approach offers four substantive and methodological advantages over FUND and similar classification schemes based on it. First, we categorize respondents using a classification that is attentive to distinctive religious traditions. This allows researchers to connect particular religious traditions (e.g., mainline Protestants) with specific empirical patterns (e.g., Republican Party affiliation) in a manner that improves interpretability because findings can be contextualized in relation to other research on religious life.

Second, RELTRAD demonstrates empirical benefits over FUND. It improves model fit across a wide range of attitudes. By improving model specification, RELTRAD also more accurately estimates demographic coefficients — such as race, sex, and region — for most of the models and religious coefficients particularly for political affiliation and economic attitudes. The increased accuracy of demographic coefficients is particularly important to highlight for nonspecialists in religion; if studies include poorly specified religion variables in models as *controls*, they may weaken the actual effects of variables more central to their analysis.

Third, our terminology is more straightforward. We employ terms that religious practitioners use themselves (C. Smith 1998). Moreover, while FUND's terminological continuum suggests a linear relationship between religiosity and attitudes, we argue that for historical reasons these relationships should be considered nominal. Furthermore, our results support this empirically. The FUND results suggest that "moderate" religious respondents are *less* likely to indicate a Republican affiliation, while "fundamentalist" and "liberal" religious respondents are *more* likely to be Republican. A similarly confounding pattern results when FUND is used for economic attitudes. RELTRAD's more appropriately named nominal categories yield more substantively clear results.

Fourth, RELTRAD is more useful for studying trends in American religion, including secularization, realignment, and the growth of small but significant religious groups. We offer ways of distinguishing between nondenominational evangelicals and no-denominational Protestants — groups that are miscategorized in the GSS. Using RELTRAD, we find trends consistent with the hypothesis that growth in the nondenom/no-denom category represents increasing numbers of nondenominational evangelical Protestants. Our scheme also allows for more fine-grained distinctions to be made between groups in the "other" religious category, though we collapsed these distinctions in our analyses for the comparison with FUND and FUND2 (see note 15).

As our understanding of American religious life advances, so too should the methods used to measure it; however, updated methods should also remain attentive to the ways in which long-standing religious trends continue to influence social life. In this article, we propose a new classification scheme that utilizes the *existing* data available in the GSS. This continuity is important because it allows ongoing longitudinal research. Yet scholars must also look toward the future to devise new or modified measures that respond to and even anticipate shifts in religious affiliation, belief, and practice.

In closing, we offer two brief suggestions along these lines that involve either increased specificity in existing measures or the addition of questions that permit triangulation of related measures. First, without much greater time or data entry costs, surveys can ask the specific name of the church the respondent attends.²¹ This question provides valuable information that can be used to clarify ambiguous responses to other affiliation questions. Second, the addition of a self-described identification on a religious conservatism-liberalism scale would tap the identity dimension of religiosity. This measure not only would be helpful in measuring the continued restructuring of American Protestantism (Wuthnow 1988) but also would provide a way to distinguish between progressive and orthodox Catholics and Jews. Using this conservative-liberal continuum in conjunction with denominational affiliation and church attendance would provide a multidimensional measure of respondents' religiosity based on belief, affiliation, and behavior, respectively.²² We suggest that further advances in measurement such as these are necessary to keep pace with American religion in all its complexity.

Notes

1. Another, more recent approach follows from Wuthnow's (1988) argument that many Protestant denominations are internally divided between religious conservatives and liberals. Thus, surveys ask respondents to place themselves on a conservative-liberal continuum. We consider this an important but separate dimension of religiosity — belief as opposed to affiliation (see Woodberry & Smith 1998 for discussion of this distinction). Unfortunately, most national surveys, including the General Social Survey, do not consistently contain this question.
2. SPSS and SAS syntax for our GSS classification scheme are available from the authors and can also be found at <http://www.princeton.edu/~sociolog/reltrad.html>.
3. The term “evangelical Protestantism” refers to denominations that have associated themselves with fundamentalist, Pentecostal, charismatic, or evangelical religious movements. For an overview of these distinctions, see Woodberry and Smith (1998).
4. We recognize that these tendencies are generalizations and, as such, will not capture some important exceptions. However, historical evidence does show these generalizations to be largely correct. For discussion of important exceptions and/or counterevidence, especially regarding views on poverty, see Davis and Robinson (1996), Hart (1996), and Regnerus, Smith, and Sikkink (1998).
5. We follow the usage of the term “Black Church” by Lincoln and Mamiya (1990).
6. The African Methodist Episcopal (A.M.E.) church; the African Methodist Episcopal Zion (A.M.E.Z.) church; the Christian Methodist Episcopal (C.M.E.) church; the National Baptist Convention, U.S.A., Incorporated (NBC); the National Baptist Convention of America, Unincorporated (NBCA); the Progressive National Baptist Convention (PNBC); and the Church of God in Christ (COGIC) (Lincoln & Mamiha 1990:1).
7. As we demonstrate in our analysis, simply controlling for race in statistical models cannot capture the differences between blacks who are affiliated with black denominations, white denominations, or no denomination at all.
8. Using these nominal categories also avoids making the problematic distinction between “liberal” and “moderate” Protestants. Roof and McKinney (1987), who themselves distinguish between liberals and moderates, admit that this distinction is arbitrary. By our criteria, this distinction is based more on social attitudes than religious heritage. Distinguishing between the two groups may be useful for descriptive purposes, but when used for inferential analysis it can potentially lead to circular, causal claims that “liberal” Protestants hold liberal attitudes.
9. Others scholars have voiced a similar concern. For instance, see Davis and Robinson (1996:766 n. 7).
10. To make matters worse, in our view, is to place these no-denoms and nondenoms together in the “moderate” category, as the GSS does. Nondenoms typically hold attitudes more similar to those found in evangelical denominations, while no-denoms do not. Rather than “averaging” the attitudes of these two groups, we propose separating them and placing each group in more appropriate categories.

11. Another category of respondents growing in size and significance is nontraditional religious believers. These groups include the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter Day Saints (Mormons), Jehovah's Witnesses, the Church of Christ Scientist, and Unitarian-Universalists. While the GSS attempts to fit these groups into its fundamentalist-moderate-liberal classification, we put these groups into one of two nontraditional categories that can be omitted or aggregated with other categories to suit the needs of the researcher (see the Appendix). Sherkat (1999) discusses the problematic use of the "other" category in the GSS.

12. For instance, while black Baptist and evangelical Baptist denominations were classified together under "Baptist" from 1972 to 1983, starting in 1984 this category was subdivided into more specific denominational groups (e.g., the National Baptist Convention of America and the Southern Baptist Convention) that allow researchers to divide Baptists into black Baptists and evangelical Baptists.

13. A similar scheme that we do not directly evaluate in comparison to ours is based on Roof and McKinney (1987). Based on the logic of the foregoing discussion, we feel our scheme improves upon theirs because it (1) distinguishes between the evangelical and mainline subdivisions of major Protestant groups (e.g., Methodists and Lutherans), (2) categorizes many smaller denominations not included in their scheme, (3) does not make the largely arbitrary distinction between liberal and moderate Protestants, (4) uses a nominal classification rather than an ideological continuum, (5) does not use race and region as a proxy for denominational affiliation, and (6) creates new categories for nondenominational evangelicals (nondenoms) and nonaffiliated Protestants (nondenoms).

14. The number of respondents included in the models varies because we limit respondents to those who are affirmatively coded by each scheme for each dependent variable.

15. The "other" category is residual. For different purposes our scheme further places the remaining Western religious traditions into "liberal nontraditional" (e.g., Unitarians) and "conservative nontraditional" (e.g., Mormons) categories. In this article, we try to approximate the "other" category used in the two other schemes for the sake of our comparative analyses. This category also contains non-Western religious traditions.

16. As an exception to these general criteria, we placed African American Baptists who indicated an American Baptist or Southern Baptist affiliation in the black Protestant category for two reasons: (1) most blacks who belong to these denominations attend predominantly black Baptist churches, and (2) most black Baptist churches in the American and Southern Baptist Conventions have a dual affiliation status with other black Baptist denominations (Lincoln & Mamiya 1990; Roof & McKinney 1987). Therefore, according to our logic, they belong to the black Protestant religious tradition.

17. Thus we created our categories based on a priori distinctions among religious traditions, and placed each group into their respective category according to historical and theological criteria rather than the predictive power of the subsequent statistical models.

18. This percentage would be still larger if the GSS did not misplace a number of nondenominational Christians every year and irretrievably place them in the generic “other” category (Sherkat 1999).

19. In the FUND models, the omitted category is religious “liberal,” and in both the FUND2 and RELTRAD models, it is the religiously unaffiliated. Superscript numerals indicate significant differences between select religious categories.

20. A possible objection to the inclusion of the black Protestant category is that the presence of both a race and a black Protestant variable would result in collinearity. However, because in only one of our eight models does the race variable become insignificant, and because it is usually jointly significant (and in the opposite direction) to black Protestant, we find that collinearity is not a problem, especially in light of the improvement in fit and interpretive clarity.

21. A special “religion module” on the 1998 GSS asked respondents this question.

22. Some of these suggested modifications and additions have recently been made on the National Election Survey, and Green et al. (1996) have shown that using multiple measures improves results in their surveys as well.

APPENDIX

The following list includes all denominations within the classification scheme described above. Catholic^a (RELIG = 2) and Jewish (RELIG = 3) traditions are not listed because there are no further subspecifications available in the General Social Survey for these affiliations. In addition to the denominations listed, "Other Affiliation" includes faith traditions such as Buddhism, Hinduism, Islam, and Eastern Orthodoxy (RELIG = 5-10, 12). Numbers in parentheses refer to the numeric value label for that denomination under the variable listed (DENOM or OTHER).

Black Protestant*Using Variable "DENOM"*

African Methodist Episcopal Church (20)	Methodist, Don't Know Which ^b (28)
African Methodist Episcopal Zion Church (21)	National Baptist Convention of America (12)
American Baptist Association ^b (10)	National Baptist Convention, U.S.A., Inc. (13)
American Baptist Churches in the U.S.A. ^b (11)	Other Baptist Churches ^b (15)
Baptist, Don't Know Which ^b (18)	Other Methodist Churches ^b (23)
	Southern Baptist Convention ^b (14)

Using Variable "OTHER"

African Methodist (15)	Missionary Baptist ^b (93)
Apostolic Faith (14)	Pentecostal Apostolic (103)
Christian Tabernacle (128)	Primitive Baptist (133)
Church of God in Christ (37)	Sanctified, Sanctification (78)
Church of God in Christ Holiness (38)	United Holiness (79)
Church of God, Saint & Christ (7)	Witness Holiness (21)
Disciples of God (88)	Zion Union (85)
Federated Church (98)	Zion Union Apostolic (86)
Holiness; Church of Holiness (56)	Zion Union Apostolic-Reformed (87)
House of Prayer (104)	

Evangelical Protestant*Using Variable "DENOM"*

American Baptist Association ^c (10)	Other Methodist Churches ^c (23)
Baptist, Don't Know Which ^c (18)	Other Presbyterian Churches (42)
Lutheran Church-Missouri Synod (32)	Southern Baptist Convention ^c (14)
Other Baptist Churches ^c (15)	Wisconsin Evangelical Lutheran Synod (33)
Other Lutheran Churches (34)	

APPENDIX

Using Variable "OTHER"

- Advent Christian (10)
 Amish (111)
 Apostolic Christian (107)
 Apostolic Church (138)
 Assembly of God (12)
 Bible Missionary (109)
 Brethren Church, Brethren (20)
 Brethren, Plymouth (22)
 Brother of Christ (132)
 Calvary Bible (110)
 Chapel of Faith (122)
 Charismatic (102)
 Chinese Gospel Church (135)
 Christ Cathedral of Truth (108)
 Christ Church Unity (29)
 Christian and Missionary Alliance (9)
 Christian Calvary Chapel (125)
 Christian Catholic (28)
 Christian; Central Christian (31)
 Christian Reformed (32)
 Christ in Christian Union (26)
 Christ in God (101)
 Churches of God (Except with Christ
 and Holiness) (36)
 Church of Christ (35)
 Church of Christ, Evangelical (34)
 Church of Daniel's Band (127)
 Church of God of Prophecy, The (121)
 Church of Prophecy (5)
 Church of the First Born (116)
 Church of the Living God (39)
 Community Church (41)
 Covenant (42)
 Dutch Reformed (43)
 Evangelical Congregational (2)
 Evangelical Covenant (91)
 Evangelical, Evangelist (45)
 Evangelical Free Church (47)
 Evangelical Methodist (112)
 Evangelical United Brethren (120)
 Faith Christian (139)
 Faith Gospel Tabernacle (124)
 First Christian (51)
 Four Square Gospel (53)
 Free Methodist (13)
 Free Will Baptist (16)
 Full Gospel (52)
 Grace Brethren (100)
 Holiness Church of God (90)
 Holiness (Nazarene) (18)
 Holy Roller (55)
 Independent (24)
 Independent Bible, Bible, Bible
 Fellowship (3)
 Independent Fundamental Church
 of America (134)
 Laotian Christian (146)
 Living Word (129)
 Macedonia (131)
 Mennonite (63)
 Mennonite Brethren (115)
 Missionary Baptist^c (93)
 Missionary Church (117)
 Mission Covenant (92)
 Nazarene (65)
 New Testament Christian (6)
 No Denomination Given or
 Nondenominational^d
 Open Bible (27)
 Other Fundamentalist (97)
 Pentecostal (68)
 Pentecostal Assembly of God (66)
 Pentecostal Church of God (67)
 Pentecostal Holiness, Holiness
 Pentecostal (69)
 People's Church (140)
 Pilgrim Holiness (57)
 Primitive Baptist (133)
 Salvation Army (76)
 Seventh Day Adventist (77)
 Swedish Mission (94)
 Triumph Church of God (106)
 Way Ministry, The (118)
 Wesleyan (83)
 Wesleyan Methodist-Pilgrim (84)

APPENDIX

Mainline Protestant

Using Variable "DENOM"

American Baptist Churches in the U.S.A. ^c (11)	Methodist, Don't Know Which ^c (28)
American Lutheran Church (30)	Presbyterian Church in the U.S.A. (40)
Episcopal Church (50)	Presbyterian, Don't Know Which (48)
Evangelical Lutheran (35)	Presbyterian, Merged (43)
Lutheran Church in America (31)	United Methodist Church (22)
Lutheran, Don't Know Which (38)	United Presbyterian Church in the U.S.A. (41)

Using Variable OTHER

American Reformed (99)	Latvian Lutheran (105)
Baptist (Northern) (19)	Moravian (8)
Christian Disciples (25)	Quaker (70)
Congregationalist, First Congregationalist (40)	Reformed (71)
Disciples of Christ (44)	Reformed Church of Christ (73)
Evangelical Reformed (46)	Reformed United Church of Christ (72)
First Christian Disciples of Christ (49)	Schwenkfelder (148)
First Church (48)	United Brethren, United Brethren in Christ (23)
First Reformed (50)	United Church of Canada (119)
Friends (54)	United Church of Christ (81)
Grace Reformed (89)	United Church of Christianity (96)
Hungarian Reformed (1)	

Other Affiliation

Using Variable OTHER

CONSERVATIVE NONTRADITIONAL

Christadelphians (30)	Jesus LDS (62)
Christian Scientist (33)	LDS (59)
Church of Jesus Christ of the Restoration (145)	LDS-Mormon (60)
Church Universal and Triumphant (114)	LDS-Reorganized (61)
Jehovah's Witnesses (58)	Mormon (64)
	True Light Church of Christ (130)
	Worldwide Church of God (113)

LIBERAL NONTRADITIONAL

Christ Church Unity (29)	Religious Science (74)
Eden Evangelist (17)	Spiritualist (11)
Mind Science (75)	Unitarian, Universalist (80)
New Age Spirituality (136)	United Church, Unity Church (82)
New Birth Christian (141)	Unity (95)

^a Also included within the Catholic tradition are those who belong to the Polish National Church (OTHER = 123).

^b Included only if race of respondent is black

^c Included only if race of respondent is not black

^d Includes only those who responded "no denomination given or nondenominational" (DENOM = 70). From this pool, those who attend church less than "about once a month" (ATTEND < 4) or those who responded "don't know or no answer" (ATTEND = 9) are excluded. This also includes additional respondents who responded with "Christian" or "interdenominational/no denomination" on the 1998 RELIG variable (RELIG = 11 or 13).

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