

as they can for the modern mind; but, for the sake of the ethical aims which we and they have in common, let them not daub it with the untempered mortar of falsehood and evasion of solemn obligations.

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THE MORAL ASPECTS OF SOCIALISM.

THE following considerations upon modern Socialism are suggested by the book entitled "Some Aspects of the Social Problem." * Justice has already been done to its remarkable merits in the pages of this JOURNAL: it is certainly a noteworthy and impressive contribution to the philosophy of Social Reform, and, from the authority of the writers, commands the greatest respect. But I cannot help thinking that, in spite of explicit declarations to the contrary, its tendency is one-sided, and to a certain extent misleading,—more particularly, it seems to me to misrepresent both the aims and methods of modern Socialism or Collectivism. It does recognize a theoretical distinction between a higher and lower conception of Socialism, but the idea of Socialism it habitually uses is generalized from the lower. It may be granted that a philosophical interpretation of Socialism was not within the scope of the essayists, and that they were within their rights in taking Socialism "as it is spoke," and sometimes written: that the "idolon" rather than the "idea" of Socialism was sufficient for their purposes. Still, the power of discrimination has generally been held to be a note of philosophy; and it surely could not have been the bias of philosophy which has led Mr. Bosanquet and Miss Dendy to group together under a common denomination such heterogeneous tendencies as "the organization of industry" and the extension of out-

* "Aspects of the Social Problem." Edited by Bernard Bosanquet. Macmillan & Co., 1895. (Noticed in October number, 1895.)

door relief. It is true that Mr. Bosanquet guards himself against the position that the charity organization point of view is final or complete; but he is content with "saving clauses;" and the total impression of the book is that the social reformer who will not enter in by the narrow gate of the Charity Organization Society is destined to perish by the way. That Socialism should begin at home, that social reform can only proceed by action on character, that philanthropists should look at least a day ahead, these, and many other "moments" of truth, are at all times seasonable, and they may often have much more than a merely corrective value. But "forgotten truths" cannot be permitted to pass for exclusive truths without further examination. Certainly, some of the essayists regard their aspects of the social problem as the whole of it; and the book as a whole tends to a want of proportion and perspective, an excess of emphasis which is at the same time an excess of indifference, or antagonism, to "other" aspects. In some of the contributions the "twist" is unmistakable, and results in a doctrine which is not only "hard" (in itself, not a bad thing), but self-defeating. Without committing myself to the position either that "the Fabian Society" contains the whole of the truth, or that the Charity Organization Society contains none of it, I shall endeavor to show that the essayists have ignored not only what is most significant in modern Socialism, but what is the most significant defect in the philosophy of the charitable movement; and that of the two "truths" the Socialist truth is the more inclusive, and even the more seasonable: that, in short, it has superior claims as a "regulative idea" of social reform.

The principle which these "studies" illustrate in observation, in criticism, and theory is stated to be "that in social reform character is the condition of conditions." As interpreted and qualified by Mr. Bosanquet, this position can hardly be gainsaid: though it may be remarked in passing that the form of the principle which Mr. Bosanquet rules out (in the Preface), namely, that some undefined miracle of moral agency is loftier and better than any intelligible causation, is the one that is more obviously suggested by some of the reasonings which

are intended to apply it. It is nowhere suggested, except in the Preface (which is in order of time and of thought the last thing in a book), "that it should be definitely recognized as the extreme of folly to despise the material conditions of life." Certainly, they are reduced, in the course of the book, to a minimum, if not to a negligible quantity. And even Mr. Bosanquet's powers of explanation, baffling as they are to the critic, can hardly avail against the substantive argument which follows. What, however, I am immediately concerned with is the undertone of hostility towards the Socialist propaganda that runs through the essays, and the constant suggestion that modern Socialism, or Collectivism, is a typical expression of the neglect, or even the denial, of the principle that social reform must be regarded from the stand-point of character. At first sight, it seems true that character has not been put in the foreground of Socialist discussion: its emphasis appears to be laid almost exclusively on machinery, on a reconstruction of the material conditions and organization of life. But machinery is a means to an end, as much to a Socialist as to any one else; and the end, at any rate as conceived by the Socialist, is the development of human nature in scope and power and happiness,—in a word, of character, including powers of life and enjoyment. The quarrel with Socialists cannot be, then, that they mistake the means for the end, but either that they take a low or narrow view of human character, or that the means they suggest will lower rather than raise the scale of life.

Now it seems to me of the utmost importance to realize the nature of the evolution which has been going on in the conception of Socialism. Mr. Sidgwick, among others, seems to think that Socialism repeats itself, and deteriorates in the process. Bacon has said much the same about speculative philosophy. But if either impulse has anything in it at all, represents an inherent tendency of human thinking, it will always repeat itself with a difference, and that difference represents the amount of experience that society has gone through in the interval. The "Critique of Pure Reason" advances upon the "Posterior Analytics" just by the amount of experience it embodies. The same is true of Socialism: if we

fairly compare the Socialism of the earlier with that of the latter part of the century, we shall find that, however much they have in common, the interval of time in which the human race has had new experience—in the widest of sense—is fairly represented in the latter; the context is different, and the ideas have taken on the complexion of their surroundings; and even when the language is the same, the meaning is changed. The claim of modern Socialism to be “scientific” may be just or not, but it means by “scientific” such an economy as shall be on a line with the modern scientific treatment and conception of life. Its dominating idea is that of conscious “selection” in social life, or of the expression of practical economics in terms of quality of life. From the point of view of its alleged indifference to character, the aims of modern Socialism may be described as an endeavor to readjust the machinery of industry in such a way that it can at once depend upon and issue in a higher kind of character and social type than is encouraged by the conditions of ordinary competitive enterprise. If it does, in a sense, want to make things easier, it is only for the worker, and not for the idler; and the problem with which it is concerned is not primarily a more or less of enjoyment, but a more or less of opportunity for development of character. Its criterion of economic machinery is simply, Does it or does it not make for a greater amount and quality of character?

The older Socialism rested upon such ideas as “the right to live,” “the right to work,” “payment according to needs,” the denial of “the rent of ability,” “expropriation without compensation,” “minimizing” or “materializing” of wants,—all ideas of retrogressive rather than of progressive “selection.” But it would not be too much to say that all these ideas are either silently ignored or expressly repudiated by the “scientific” Socialism, of which “Fabianism,” now that it has for the most part sown its wild oats, is the most thoughtful expression. The “ideology” of the older socialists has given way to a deliberately, and in some ways rigidly, scientific treatment of life. Modern Socialism recognizes the laws

of social growth and development in setting itself against "catastrophic impossibilism" and the manufacture of mechanical Utopias; it recognizes the moral continuity of society in its consideration for "vested interests;" it does not base industrial organization on "the right to work" so much as on the right of the worker, not on "payment according to needs" so much as "payment according to services;" it recognizes the remuneration of ability, provided that the ability does not merely represent a monopoly of privileged and non-competitive advantage; it is aware of the utility of capital, without making the individualist's confusion between the employment of capital and the ownership of it, between the productive and proprietary classes; it is not concerned about the inequality of property, except so far as it conflicts with "equality of opportunity" or "equality of consideration" for all social workers; it does not desire so much to minimize as to rationalize wants, and attaches the utmost importance to the qualitative development of consumption; and, finally, not to enumerate more distinctly economic developments, it recognizes "the abiding necessity for contest, competition, and selection," as means of development, when it presses for such an organization of industry as shall make selection according to ability and character the determining factor in the remuneration of labor. So far from attempting to eliminate "competition" from life, it endeavors to raise its plane, to make it a competition of character and positive social quality. The competition which takes the form not of "doing one's own work" as well as possible, but of preventing any one else from doing it,—the form of competition, that is, in which the gain of one man is the loss of another,—is of no social value. The only competition that can advance individual or social life is simply a corollary of co-operation; it implies the recognition of a common good and a common interest which gives to our own particular work its meaning, its quality, and its value. The competition to get as much as possible for one's self is incompatible with the competition to be as much or do as well as possible, and it is this kind of socially selective rivalry that Socialism is concerned to main-

tain; and the two kinds of competition belong, as Plato might have said, to two distinct "arts." This is the meaning, for instance, of a "standard" as opposed to a "market" wage. The "Collectivist" policy of a minimum wage for unskilled labor is a deliberate preference of a form of competition which promotes efficiency over a form of competition which aims at (apparent) cheapness.

Which is the most desirable method of selection? The Individualist policy results in the degradation of labor and the increase of burdens upon the State; the Socialist policy, so far from favoring the weak, favors the strong, if weakness and strength are interpreted as relevant to social value; it is a process of conscious social selection by which the industrial residuum is naturally sifted and made manageable for some kind of restorative, disciplinary, or, it may be, surgical treatment. The organization of dock laborers and the extension of factory inspection to sweated industries follow the same lines. Any such form of collective interference, as the freeing of education or the weakening of protected and non-competitive privilege, is in favor of the competition which is not simply a struggle for (unqualified) individual existence, but for existence in a society which rests upon the distribution of "rights" according to character and capacity. In this way it not only favors the growth of the fittest within the group, but also of the fittest group in the world-competition of societies. The whole point of Collectivism is the recognition by society of its interest as a society in a certain type of character and quality of existence. "Can there be anything better for the interests of a state," as Plato puts it, "than that its men and women should be as good as possible?" It is just this social reference that explains the demand which Socialists make upon the organization of industry. Their whole quarrel with private competitive enterprise is that it does not give a qualitative form to the "struggle for existence," and does not—or rather cannot—concern itself with the maintenance of a standard of life.

To speak, therefore, of "the principle of Collectivism" as "lying at the root of a compulsory poor rate" (*Charity Organ*

Rev., p. 386) reveals an astonishing incapacity for grasping the distinction between the organization of industry (upon selective lines) and the distribution of relief,—a rôle which Socialists would contend the individualistic system and method of industry has forced upon “the state.” The Poor Law system, so far from being a concession to Socialism, is a device of Individualism, which, indeed, could not “work,” unless its logical consequences were intercepted by the work-house and the infirmary. The Poor Law ministers to a system which Socialists consider makes for deterioration,—a system which lends itself with fatal facility to partial and discontinuous employment, starvation wages, cheap and nasty production, wasteful, useless, and characterless competition. Collectivism is nothing if not constructive, and constructive on lines of social selection; the Poor Law, as it now exists, serves the purpose of a waste-receiver of private enterprise. Collectivism would not, indeed, dispense with the necessity of a poor law; only it would be a branch of its criminal department. It is no doubt true that this kind of selection is forcing itself upon the system of private commercial enterprise in the interests of economic production, and Professor Loria has based upon this fact his view of the gradual evolution of capitalistic industry into some form of associated labor. But “the economy of high wages,” of regular and organized labor, and of genuine production is discounted by the “active competition” of low wages, casual labor, cheap and adulterated product. And we find, in fact, that the competition of “quality” is only made possible by the cessation of “the competition” of the market. This is the significance of the “trust,” or the “combine,” or “syndicate,” conceived not as a temporary speculation, but as a permanent organization of a certain industry, based upon the extinction of wasteful rivalry between competitive firms. Whatever may be the abuse of the trust, it is clearly a higher type of industrial organization, and its abuse is just the occasion of Collectivism, towards which it is (in form) a distinct step. It certainly makes a standard of work and a standard of industrial conditions possible; and also it renders the particular industry much more

amenable to public opinion and, if need be, public control. And the interest of the "Trust" organization is that it is not an artificial creation, but a normal development of modern business. It has become, in fact, no longer a question between "competition" and Collectivism, but between public and private monopoly, between monopolies controlled by private capitalists and monopolies controlled by the community. Monopolies of local service, again, are still higher in the industrial scale, so far as they represent the organization of production by the consumers (that is, on the basis of rational and persistent wants), and are under direct public control. And the policy of "practical Collectivism" lies in exacting from such monopolies the full measure of their capacity, and making them object-lessons in co-operative industry.

It is, after all, only by selection that the collective organization of industry can itself prevail, and this is one argument, if any were needed, against any "catastrophic" closure of the present system. This is the significance of the demand that government and public bodies should proceed upon a more scientific method than is possible to private competitive enterprise in the direction of better organization of employment, standard wages for standard work, shorter hours, and other "model" conditions of industry. In Glasgow, at the present moment, there is actually a competition between municipal tramways and private means of transit, and the whole history of the municipalization of tramways is full of interest and instruction. It is in every way a higher type of industry, and represents a competition of quality. It might be objected that this argument points to a mixed system of public and private industry, and does not meet the difficulty that a monopoly once established is liable to deterioration. It does point to the means by which public will supersede private administration of certain industries; that is, by proved superiority of type. But it also assumes that the inferior type must give way. Still, the standard remains; it has been to a certain extent set, and to a greater extent recognized and approved, by the community. It could only fall back with a falling back in the community itself in its standard of satisfac-

tion, material and moral. The higher type at once makes and depends upon its "environment." It may, indeed, have become an object of local pride and civic self-consciousness; a competition may be set up between one municipality and another, and that again would be a competition of quality. Readers of "Unto This Last" will remember a suggestion of the same kind; and it has always seemed to me not the least fruitful idea of the economist who has best understood the real significance of the pre-established harmony between ethics and economics. In the same way it may be said that the real evil of the "drink traffic" is that it is a private, instead of a public, enterprise.

Collectivism will, in fact, proceed by selective experiments of the kind I have indicated, granting the moral and intellectual conditions required by a higher type of administration; and where it does not take the form of social ownership, the principle may be just as effective in the form of social control,—control, that is, in the direction of a higher type of industrial character. Mining, railway, and factory legislation is, from this point of view, simply the application of "standard" ideas to competitive industry.

If, then, this general account of the drift of Collectivism and of its real "inwardness" be at all true, what becomes of the underground polemic against "Collectivist ideals" that runs through the writings of Miss Dendy and Mr. Bosanquet? All the tendencies they attack Collectivists attack, but while they are content with ascribing them generally to (abstract) moral and intellectual causes, Collectivists, rightly or wrongly, find that they are moral and intellectual causes which are logically connected with the whole principle and practice of "individualistic" or private competitive industry. I propose to deal in detail with the references of these writers to Collectivism, mainly with a view to exhibiting in a clearer light the logical idea and consequences of that position. For I will readily admit that this task is necessary, in view of the language that has been, and to a certain extent still is, used by responsible Socialists. I admit that there is some excuse for the perversion, or rather the construction, of Collectivist

teaching as to "the unemployed," the family, and property that I seem to find in this book. For in some cases the teaching is ambiguous, in others it is evasive, and in certain cases it is demonstrably illogical. The philosophy of Collectivism is still in the making, and reasonable Collectivists themselves are perfectly aware of the hiatuses in their social doctrine. But if we can once disengage the root idea, we can, at any rate, say what are logical consequences and what are not; and I hope to show that neither "free meals," nor "relief works," nor "pensions without services," nor "the breaking up of the family idea," nor "the abolition of private property" are logical deductions from the Collectivist principle; they are, in fact, the denial of it, and could not be part of a strictly "Socialist" economy.

What, then, is the "idea" of modern Socialism, or Collectivism? I take it, Socialism implies, first and foremost, the improvement of society by society. Mr. Bosanquet says that this is going on every day; yes, but not with any clear consciousness of what it is about, or of an ideal. Moreover, empirical social reform does not go beyond improvements within the existing system, or consider the effects of that system as a whole. As a rule, it means the modification of the system by an idea which does not belong to it, with the result that it is either ineffective or that it hampers the working of the system itself. When a prominent statesman can say that "We are all socialists now," he has reduced the idea of "socializing" individualistic commerce to its logical absurdity; it only means that we are endeavoring to rearrange the handicap between "laborer," "capitalist," "employer," and "landlord," according as either becomes the "predominating partner" in legislation. It is impossible to get out of the confused aims of social reformers anything like a point of view, or an idea of social progress; it is a question of evils rather than ideals. Collectivism, as I have said, implies the consciousness by society of a social ideal, of a better form of itself, and its distinction lies in its clearer consciousness of the end to be attained and its conception of the means of attaining it. The means, as we know, are the collective control or collective

administration of certain branches of industry.* (The ordinary formula of the "nationalization of the means of production" is unnecessarily prophetic, and is rather a hindrance than a help to the understanding of the ideal; by itself, it does not give the point of Socialism, and belongs to the picture-book method of social philosophy.) But, clearly, "control," "organization," "administration," are merely forms, the body without the soul; we want to know—organization in what direction, control to what end? And the answer in quite general and formal terms is (as already suggested) a certain kind of existence and a certain standard of life to be maintained in and through the industrial organization of social needs. Mere nationalization, or mere "municipalization," of any industry is not Socialism or Collectivism; it may be only the substitution of corporate for private administration; the social idea and purpose with which Collectivism is concerned may be completely absent. The presence of the idea is recognized by the extent to which the public machinery is made the conscious and visible embodiment of an ideal type of industry, taking form in certain standard conditions of production as also certain standard requirements of consumption. It is agreed that there are certain things which society is so concerned in getting done in a certain way and after a certain type, that it cannot leave them to private enterprise. We may recall Aristotle's arguments in favor of public as against private education; the important consideration being that education involves principles affecting the kind of social type and character which a particular society is interested in maintaining. The modern industrial state is beginning to realize that it is as deeply concerned in the conditions of industry that determine for better or worse the type and character of its citizens and the standard of its social life. This recognition implies the action of the general or collective will and purpose (which is, of course, also the will and purpose of individuals), represented by the social regulation of

* I am not now concerned with any further specification of these expressions, as this belongs to a more strictly economic inquiry. Mr. Hobson's "Evolution of Modern Capitalism" deals with some of the aspects.

industry on behalf of a standard of industrial character and production—a standard of life—which society as society is concerned in maintaining. The Collectivist calls upon society to face the logical requirements of the situation; rightly or wrongly, he conceives that a requirement of this kind is incompatible with the existence, and the *raison d'être* of private competitive enterprise. He is trying to familiarize the community with the incompatibility by “example and practice,” and at the same time to show that it is not with business, but with modern competitive business that the requirement is incompatible. What is good in ethics cannot be bad in economics, and *vice versa*, is an axiom of Socialism. A standard wage, for instance, is from the point of view of modern commerce a “non-competitive” wage, for it is not regulated by the supply and demand of the market; but from the point of view of good business and also good ethics, it is “competitive;” men are selected for their efficiency, and not for their “cheapness.” The attempt to enforce this method of remuneration upon government and public bodies, as also to abolish the contractor, is described and resented by the rate-payer as “Collectivist;” he is right in his description, not in his resentment. The school-board, again, adapts its scale of salaries not to the supply of the market, but to the service required. It is only an individualist who can talk of “high” wages and “high” salaries in this connection; a high wage is simply a wage that is adequate to a certain kind of work done at its best; the wage is high according as the conception of the conditions required for the highest performance of the work is high. The “Socialism” of the school-board is, in the last resort, nothing else than a high standard of education, and therefore of the educator and his conditions of life. It is well to put it in this way, because it is often supposed that “Collectivism” or “Socialism” is simply a policy of securing better conditions of life for the worker, which gives the impression that it is a ‘class’ and not a “social” point of view. The starting-point of social economics is, after all, consumption, and again its qualitative, not merely its quantitative development, rather than the conditions of work and worker as such; they are, of

course, really aspects of the same thing, as readers of Ruskin are in no danger of forgetting. Accordingly, we find that the economic problem is not approached by the modern Socialist primarily from the side of "distribution," except so far as it affects the character of "production" or "consumption." Anyhow, the great thing is that the point of view is qualitative; or, the regulative idea of Socialism is the maintenance of a certain standard of life, whether it is looked at from the point of view of the condition of the producer or his product. The whole point of factory legislation, again, lies in its attempt to exercise such social control over the conditions of industry as will prevent them from lowering the standard of life which society as society is interested in maintaining; it is becoming less sentimental, and more scientific in its scope; and, again, it is now called "Collectivist."

From the stand-point of such an interpretation of the "idea" and the "phenomena" of Collectivism (which is, I think, justified by the language of its opponents), the suggestion that it is theoretically careless of the type, indifferent to any standard of life, or to the claims of character, is somewhat wide of the mark. So long as Socialism remains true to its scientific conception and treatment of life, it is not likely to commit itself to means of improvement at the cost of the type. Its animating idea is neither pity nor benevolence,—at least, not as usually understood,—but the freest and fullest development of human quality and power. It is characteristic of modern Socialism or Collectivism that its typical representatives are men who have been profoundly influenced by the positive and scientific conception of social life; while its popular propagandists have derived their inspiration from Ruskin, who is, in economics at least, a profound humanist: he is, at any rate, much nearer to "scientific" than to "Christian" Socialism. What is common to Ruskin, Morris, Wagner, "Merrie England," "Fabian Tracts," the writings of Mr. Karl Pearson, and others in their indictment of the individualistic organization of industry is their sense of the frightful and quite incalculable waste and loss of "quality" (in producer and product) that it seems to involve. Whether this criticism is just or not, Socialism is a

principle which stands or falls by a qualitative conception of progress. It is bound up with ideas of qualitative selection and competition, and with the endeavor to raise in the scale the whole machinery, the whole conception and purpose, of industrial activity, so as to give the fullest scope to the needs and means of human development. Increase of human power over circumstance, increase of humanizing wants, increase of powers of social enjoyment,—these are the ends of state or municipal activity, whether it take the form of model conditions of employment and model standards of consumption, or the provision of parks and libraries and all such things as are means not of mere but of high existence. And, in all these directions, it would be true to say that the State or municipality operates through character and through ideas, and that, as the organized power of community, it helps the individual not to be less but more of an individual, and because more of an individual, therefore more of a definite social person.

State activity, as thus conceived, is not the substitution of machinery for the mainspring of character, but a process of training and adaptation, or it may be of restriction and elimination,—the human analogues of “natural selection” in the physical world. In this way the State, while it endeavors to give the personal struggle for existence a distinctively human and qualitative form, gains a clearer consciousness of the meaning of its own struggle for existence in the social world as a whole. And, just as it raises the plane of competition within its own social group, so it raises it in relation to other groups in the wider social organism. Even now, when we study great social experiments in Germany, it is suggested that there may be a more valuable kind of rivalry between nations than that of mere power, mere trade, or mere territory,—a rivalry of social type and efficiency, within the limits of the specific part each is most fitted to discharge in the whole. The law of national self-preservation, upon such a view, assumes a moral form, for it is not a mere exclusive, but a specific and inclusive “self.” Anyhow, one effect of Collectivism would be to increase the self-consciousness of a State as organized for the attainment of a common good and a certain kind

of social existence; and this consciousness is, from the Socialist's point of view, an increasingly determinate factor in social evolution, just as it is the worst effect of competitive industry that the idea of the State and the conception of a social ideal either disappears or becomes vulgarized and materialized. To depreciate the stress which Collectivists lay upon "organization" is really to depreciate the value of the moral atmosphere any particular manifestation of Collectivism may generate in familiarizing the members of the community with the idea of the social reference and destiny of industry, and of the State as the expression of the nation's conscience. Whatever else, then, Socialism may be, it certainly implies organized action for a social purpose, and this purpose may always be reduced to the conception of a certain standard of life other than mere animal existence.

I am aware that this representation of Socialism, as concerned with the maintenance of "natural selection" under rational human conditions, does not cover all the visible "phenomena" of Socialism. But the philosophic student is justified in limiting his view to the conception of Socialism as a reasoned idea of social progress; and it is its shortcomings in this respect that these essays, by implication at any rate, criticise and condemn. Their criticisms may, perhaps, be roughly indicated as follows: Socialism, it is suggested, aims at the substitution of machinery for character, in the sense that it fails to recognize that the individual is above all things a character and a will, and that society, as a whole, is a structure in which will and character "are the blocks with which we build;" it attaches, therefore, undue, if not exclusive, importance to material conditions and organization; and, further, it is fatal to the conditions of the formation of character, these conditions being private property, the family and "competition" (of character). In all these points they seem to me to compound the *Erscheinung* of Socialism with the *Begriff*.

Socialism and Machinery.—No doubt, at first sight, it seems to be the common idea of all Socialists that, by some reconstruction of the machinery, the actual material organization of life, certain evils incidental to human life, of which that

organization is regarded as the stronghold, can be greatly mitigated, if not wholly removed. The theory of modern Socialism gives no countenance to this conception of the matter. It suggests neither utopias nor "revolutions" in human nature or modern business: it does suggest a method of business which makes rather larger demands upon human nature, but which, at the same time and for the same reason, is "better" business. Even if that were not so, it is clear that Collectivism is, as I have said, not machinery, but machinery with a purpose; what it is concerned with is the machinery appropriate to a certain spirit and conception of industry. It implies therefore emphatically ideas, and can only operate through "will and character." If, for instance, the machinery of public industry is not directed to keeping this idea before its employés from the highest to the lowest, then they stand in just as much a material and mechanical relation to their work as the employé of a private person or company; and, on the other hand, in proportion as the employé, through want of will or character or intelligence, fails to enter into that social purpose, his work would be as inferior in itself and in its relation to his character as it might be under any individualistic administration. As a practical corollary, the machinery of public industry must be organized in such a way that the workman can feel its interest and purpose as his interest and purpose. The mere substitution of public for private administration is the shadow and not the substance. The forces required to work collectivist machinery are nothing if not moral; and so we also hear the complaint that Socialists are too ideal, that they make too great a demand upon human nature and upon the social will and imagination. Of the two complaints, this is certainly the most pertinent. A conception, however, which is liable to be dismissed, now as mere mechanism, now as mere morality, may possibly be working towards a higher synthesis. May it not be the truth that Socialism is emphatically a moral idea which must have the machinery fitted to maintain and exercise such an idea—for a moral idea which is not a working idea is not moral at all—and this machinery is, formally speaking, the public control

and administration of industry. Every advance in ethics must be secured by a step taken in politics or economics. Socialism implies both a superior moral idea and a superior method of business, and neither could work without the other. The superiority of the moral idea can only show itself by its works, by its business capacity, so to speak; and the superiority of a method of business lies in what it can do with and for human nature. It follows, therefore, that, just as Democracy is the most difficult form of government, Socialism is the most difficult form of industry, because, like Democracy, it requires the operation of ideas; and the test of the perfection of Socialist machinery is just its capacity to give to the routine industries of the community that spirit and temper which are the note of the freest and highest work. Apart from this atmosphere of interest and purpose, the State and municipality are distinctly inferior as employers of labor, and the history of the co-operative movement itself provides a series of object-lessons in the divorce of machinery from ideas. In its complete form as the organization of production by the consumers, Socialism presupposes a responsiveness in producer and consumer, and Trades-Unions of producers would be as much a part of Socialist as of individualistic organization, as witness the rational union of elementary teachers. On the other hand, if it has sufficient ground-work in moral and intellectual conditions, then the material organization itself helps to create the character it presupposes, and it will be educative in proportion as the employé of the community feels his social recognition, in a raised standard of life all round—shorter hours, dignity and continuity of status, direct responsibility. It cannot be said that Socialists are insensible to the amount of education—in ideas and character—that is required before any sensible advance can be made in the direction of co-operative industry. On the other hand, they do not believe that grapes can grow upon thorns: they believe that things make their own morality. The idea of industry is what institutions make it: it is impossible to put the social idea into institutions which make for the artificial preservation and encouragement of an antagonistic idea,—the

plutocratic ideal; and it is impossible to get it out of them. It is not enough to modify the bias of the individualistic organization of society: that organization itself makes the whole idea of the organization of society on the basis of service or labor "the baseless fabric of a vision." Mr. Bosanquet demands, and rightly (in theory) demands, that the workingman should realize that he exists only on the terms of recognizing and discharging a definite social function. But what is there in the economic arrangements under which he finds himself to suggest such an idea—the idea on which Socialism rests—either to the propertied or the propertyless man? How is a man who depends for his employment upon a mechanism he can in no wise control or count upon, and upon the ability of a particular employer to maintain himself against rivals, enabled to realize a definite position in the social structure? What he does feel, for the most part, is that he is dependent on a system in which the element of chance is incalculable, and it is just this feeling that makes for a materialistic and hand-to-mouth conception of life. Or what is there in the economic structure of society which suggests to the employer or the capitalist, that their *raison d'être* is not so much to make a fortune as to fulfil a function? In what way, in a word, does the individualistic organization of industry make for the extension of the sense of duty which a man owes to society at large? Moral ideas must at least have a basis in the concrete relations of life. In the same way, we are told, and rightly told, that the value of property lies in its relation to the needs of personality. But how can a man who cannot count on more than ten shillings a week, or at any rate the man who depends upon casual employment or fluctuating trades, regard property as "the unity of his material life"? "A man must know what he can count on and judge what to do with,"—this is stated to be a requirement of morality (as it is certainly of Socialism). But how is this condition realized under a system which not only lends itself to the most violent contrasts between careless ease and careworn want, between lavish indulgence and narrow penury, but makes it the (apparent) interest of the employing classes

that the employed should not have property,—a situation which Trades-Unions were meant to meet. Moral ideas are, after all, relevant to a particular working organization of life. Mr. Bosanquet seems to require a Socialist ethics of property and employment from an economic system which is worked upon an individualistic ethics of property and employment. He disclaims, indeed, a policy of quietism; but he certainly gives the impression that a social reformer should not permit himself to dwell very much upon schemes of industrial organization. But the moralist who insists on the fulfilment by society of ideas for which its actual institutions and every-day life give no warrant seems to suggest that ethics are not relative, that (to use his own language in another connection) moral conceptions are not ideas *of* life, but ideas *about* life. To this abstract moral idealism and transcendentalism, of which “the Sermon on the Mount” is the most remarkable expression, Socialism, at any rate, furnishes a needful corrective. Is there anything, the Socialist asks, in men’s ordinary industrial life which suggests the ideas they are to have about it? And I conceive that the Socialist who criticises the economic arrangements of society from the standpoint of these ideas is the more helpful moralist of the two. He has done well, if he has simply called attention to the antinomy; and, in a sense, that is the only remedy, for, unless it is felt and recognized, there is nothing from which anything better can grow up. If institutions depend on character, character depends on institutions: it is upon their necessary interaction that the Socialist insists. The greatness of Ruskin as a moralist lies in his relevance, and in his recognition of the inseparability of the moral and the material, of ethics and economics. But the practical man calls him a moral rhetorician and an insane economist.

But apart from the general value of economic organization or of the consideration of it, the writers certainly tend (in theory) to minimize, if not to discount, the influence of material conditions on the betterment of life. Mr. Bosanquet finds that “even in sanitary work and in the work of trained nurses among the poor, the great gain is the individual educa-

tion to the importance of sanitary matters, and not the mere momentary unstopping of a drain or cleaning out of a room." Nothing could be more characteristic of what I may call the idealist bias. For what is the value of the education in the idea of a thing, if the thing itself has not a greater value? The importance of sanitary education is the best proof of the importance of sanitary conditions; and when one reflects that the presence or absence of sanitary conditions may depend upon the education of other people than the sufferers, the remark seems curiously exacting, especially if it is taken in connection with the following observations by Miss Dendy:

"For the worst cases of neglect of sanitary arrangements, and the consequent effect upon the workers, we refer readers to the chapter on the Cotton Industry in Cheshire and Lancashire,—they will not bear quoting. As an example of the way in which employers accept their responsibilities, we may, however, cite Mill No. 289," etc.

But what does Miss Dendy go on to say?

"Of course, the only radical cure for these evils is a wider interpretation of their duty by the employers, upon whom the well-being of so many depends."

Why is it, one may ask, that a system which Miss Dendy considers it superficial, or indeed immoral, to criticise* lends itself to this divorce between the conscience of the employer and his conception of his economic interest? The Socialist suggests a system of industry in which self-interest does not require to be "checked," and is it quite reasonable for Miss Dendy to complain, on the one hand, that Socialism does not provide the economic motive of private profit, and, on the other hand, to look for the improvement of the conditions of the laborer to the moralization or socialization of the motives of the employer? The evils which Miss Dendy describes are just those for which a "radical cure" can only be found in the popular control of industry. In another study, Miss Dendy, perhaps inadvertently, recognizes the dependence of character upon circumstances. Speaking of an aged spinster, she writes:

* Article on Socialist Propaganda, *Nat. Rev.*, August, 1895.

"At one time, when far advanced in years, she had temporarily given way to drink, because she used to come home at night too worn out with work to be able to light the fire and make a cup of tea. A kindly neighbor saved her from the fatal habit by the simple expedient of boiling her kettle for her, and since then her faltering steps have kept the strait path."

I can imagine Mr. Bosanquet's comment upon this: "Characters or dispositions react altogether differently to conditions which are quantitatively and materially the same, according to the means by which they come," and so the fact that neighborly kindness went to the making of the circumstances made all the difference to its effect. Only the exigencies of theory could go so far as this; and, anyhow, the "circumstance" itself was made necessary by the other "circumstance" of the long walk and the long hours, which "an adequate wage," a little "inspection," and cheap means of transit might have considerably modified. The intimate connection between circumstances of this kind and drinking, the degrading effect of material uncertainty (which the writers seem to regard as an unmixed moral benefit), are, at any rate, as normal phenomena as the powerlessness of a "degenerate" to cope with such conditions at all. A good deal more investigation is surely needed of the condition under which "character and ideas" operate before we can so easily assume their spontaneous generation and their indefinite possibilities.

"It should be definitely recognized as extreme folly to despise the material conditions of life. The point is simply that all conditions practically mean human action, and all human action comes from the *whole* disposition of human minds. Therefore the disposition of the mind as a whole is the determining condition of conditions, and, though men may suffer through the character of others, they can gain and retain no permanent advantage excepting through their own."

If, then, this is, after all, what the writers mean, namely, that there is action and reaction, it is more evident than the application. It should be at least consistently held, and then it might be found that "uncertainty of employment" may be the making of a rich man's son and the marring of a poor man's.

"I desiderate for every one" (Mr. Bosanquet says, in his rigorous way) "for their own sake, some possibility of falling

into distress by lack of wisdom and exertion." One might think Mr. Bosanquet is for a moment among the Socialists; but in the next essay he seems to defend "the transference of property to those who have not earned it." There seems to be just a tendency on the part of the Charity Organization Society to treat the working-classes as if they had peculiar opportunities for independent life, just because their circumstances are so difficult; the eye of the moral disciplinarian should surely also be turned upon the many people who are as much pensioners of society as if they were maintained in a work-house. The poor man's poverty (it would seem) is his moral opportunity. But this kind of beatitude for the poor would have more point, if it was always their own lack of wisdom and exertion which occasions their "falling into distress." It must be admitted that the existence of an unemployed rich is as great a source of danger and deterioration to society as that of an unemployed poor, and to a great extent the one is an aggravating cause of the other. Much of the casual employment of the employed classes directly ministers to the unproductive and exclusive consumption of the rich; and one great difficulty in the way of the organization of production on the basis of rational and persistent wants, and the provision of a true industrial basis to the life of the worker, lies in the irregular, capricious, and characterless expenditure of superfluous incomes.

All that the writers have to say about the policy of "relief works," "shelters," and relaxation of the Poor Law is undeniable; but the corollary that "in refraining from action" we are helping on a better time seems hardly adequate, however graphically it can be illustrated from the history of unwise philanthropy. So long as the Charity Organization Society contents itself with the demonstration that devices of this kind only drive the evil further in, it is really helpful; but in refusing to look for any source of the evils except foolish benevolence on the one side and reckless improvidence on the other, it seems to be unduly simplifying the conditions of the problem. It is, at any rate, scarcely justified in deprecating the inquiry as to whether the absence of any rational organization

of industry may not be a part of the situation. The writers are so much concerned for the moral independence of the worker that his actual economic dependence hardly enters into their consideration. The circumstances beyond the control of great masses of workers engaged in machine industries are much larger than those that their own action goes to make up, and here again Collectivism endeavors to bring these circumstances much more within their control. Lack of employment means to some of these writers lack of character; but where, after all, does character come from? The contention of Socialists is that the absence of any permanent organization of industry, by setting a premium upon partial and discontinuous employment, is itself a contributory cause of shiftless character; and where the character is hopeless, the best way of dealing with it is such an organization as would really sift out and eliminate the industrial residuum.

“The net result of organization at the Docks was in the direction of confining to about six thousand people the work which had previously been partial employment for between twelve thousand and twenty thousand; . . . all permanent organization seems to mean the withdrawal of partial and inadequate employment from a certain class.”

Surely in this case system and character act and react: discourage intermittent employment, and you save the “marginal” cases from social wreckage, as Mr. Bosanquet himself points out: while it becomes possible to deal with the industrial residuum in some restorative or restrictive way. But is not this the point of Collectivism? The Fabian Society has repudiated the false economics of “relief works” with quite as much energy as the Charity Organization Society. But the real objection to relief works, as also to “Old Age Pensions,” is that they have no logical connection with the system they are designed to palliate. “Continuity of employment” and “superannuation pensions” would be a logical part of a Socialist state; but the idea of “the State” as a relief society to the employé of private industry can only be satisfactory to the employer, whose irresponsibility it would effectually sanction. Under a system of individualistic industry, “State relief” and “State pensions” can only mean an allowance in aid of reckless spec-

ulation and low wages; and these devices only serve to distract reform from the true line of deliverance,—the best possible organization of industry and the improvement of the conditions of labor. It is not the Socialist who contemplates the “ransom” of the capitalistic system by relief works and old age pensions. I do not think that even the most impatient Socialist has ever suggested that “out-door relief” in any shape was Socialism; while the more scientific Socialist has never regarded these so-called “Socialistic” proposals as other than the herring across the track. Socialism means the organization not of charity, nor of relief, but of industry, and in such a way that the problem of finding work which is not apparently wanted, and of devising pensions for no apparent service, would not be “normal.”

The real danger of Collectivism, indeed, is not that it would take the form of the charity that fosters a degraded class, but that it would be as ruthless as Plato in the direction of “social surgery.” It may take a hard and narrow view of the “industrial organism” and the conditions of its efficiency. For the progress of civilization gives a social value to other qualities, other kinds of efficiency, than merely industrial or economic capacity. “Invalidism” may be said to develop valuable states of mind; and to strengthen the conception of human sympathy and solidarity. It is possible to apply the conception of an industrial organism in two ways: the State is an organism, and therefore it should get rid of its weak; the State is an organism, and therefore it should carry its weak with it. Perhaps, it might be said that the modern problem is not so much to get the weak out of the way, as to help them to be useful. As Mr. Alexander pointed out in his essay upon “Natural Selection in Morals,” “there is no reason in the process of natural selection, as such, why every member of society, provided he be not criminal, should not be preserved and helped to live as effectively as possible.” But this would depend upon the possibility of such a readjustment of the economic system that would enable all members to maintain an efficient existence under it, and, conversely, upon the condition that each person should do the work for which he

is best fitted. "Weakness" and "unfitness" are, after all, relative, and in any more systematic organization of society what is now a man's weakness might become his strength. One advantage of the organization of industry would be the increased possibility of "grading" work, as also of estimating desert. "The problem is no other than that of finding a distribution of work which would allow the weak to render a service proportioned to their ability in the same ratio as the service is required of the strong." The present system makes too little use of the weak and too much of the strong; instead of helping the growth of all after their kind, it fosters an overgrowth of an exclusive and imperfect kind. And, lastly, if it be said that any form of Socialism would be immoral if it denied the necessity for individual responsibility, it may also be urged that the compulsory elevation by municipal and State activity of the most degraded classes is a necessary preliminary to their further elevation by individual effort and voluntary association. But none of these considerations seem germane to private competitive enterprise, which can hardly afford to "treat life as a whole." From all these points of view, therefore, I venture to think that the question of morality is largely a question of machinery, and that the consideration of morality apart from machinery reduces ethics to the level of a merely "formal" science.

Socialism and Property.—Socialism recognizes the value of property by demanding its wider distribution. The social situation is, upon its showing (rightly or wrongly), largely created by the divorce of the worker from property, which means that the arrangement and disposition of his life is outside his own control. Mr. Bosanquet, who seems to be contrasting the principle of private property (as a need of moral realization) with "Collectivist ideals," allows that wages and salaries on which society is largely, and under Collectivism would be wholly based, fulfil the principle of private property so far as they are in some degree permanent and calculable; otherwise, there is a discontinuity in the life of the individual; he cannot look before and after, cannot organize his life as a whole. Here, again, Socialists not only

accept the idea, but demand some opportunity for its realization. One point of the organization of industry is that it should admit of more permanency, stability, and continuity in the life of the worker than is provided by the precariousness of modern competition. His life, it is contended, is much more exposed than it need be to the worst of material evils—uncertainty. The "Trust" organization of industry, as also the organization of dock labor, are so far upon the line of Socialist advance; and it is well known that this constitutes the attraction of the civil service, which not only provides an industrial basis to the employed,—enables him to look beyond the satisfaction of the momentary or daily want,—but "leaves a margin for the private duties on the one hand, and the public or semi-public on the other, which lie round its margin," allows for the organization of interests as well as duties. Or, again, we are told that the social need is to make the possession of property very responsive to the character and capacity of the owner. Could the endeavor of Socialism be better expressed? Socialism does not, like Communism (with which it is here confounded), rest upon the idea that no man should have anything of his own; it is concerned with such an organization of industry as shall enable a man to acquire property in proportion to his character and capacity, but will make the mere accumulation of property less and less a motive force of industry. Just to the extent that property serves the needs of individuality, Socialism would encourage its acquisition: the idea of hand to mouth existence, the ideal of the slave or the child, is probably much more encouraged by the fluctuations of competitive industry than by the routine but regular and calculable vocation of the public servant.

It may be further considered that it is the object of Collectivism not merely to give a true industrial and calculable basis to the life of the worker, but to give to the possession of property character and propriety. There is a justifiable pleasure in surrounding one's self with things which really express and respond to one's own character and choice of interest, and in the feeling that they are one's own is a

peculiar and intimate sense. But the number of books, pictures, and the like, which one "desires for one's own," is comparatively small, and would be much smaller, if one had within reach a museum, a library, and a picture-gallery. The property that is revolting is that which is expressive not of character, but of money; the house, for instance, of a successful man made beautiful "by contract." Emerson's exhortation to put our private pictures into public galleries is perhaps extreme, and not altogether practical or reasonable. But the public provision of libraries and galleries, and of things that can be best enjoyed in common, not only enlarges the background of the citizen's life and adds to his possessions, but suggests a reasonable limit to the accumulation of property; as it would most certainly give a social direction to art, when it could minister to the needs of a nation rather than the ostentation of the few. And the same may be said of public parks, means of transit, and the like,—all in the direction of levelling those inequalities of property which serve no social purpose. Whether, then, property be regarded as a "means of self-expression," or as "materials for enjoyment," the Collectivist ideal may be said to lie in the direction not of denying but of affirming and satisfying the need; and the Socialists criticise the distribution of property under individualistic institutions just from the point of view of its failure to satisfy a need of man's nature. Mr. Bosanquet, therefore, really expresses the Socialist's position when he says:

"The real cause of complaint to-day, I take it, is not the presence but the absence of property, together with the suggestion that its presence may be the cause of its absence."

He admits that this raises a practical problem, but seems to suggest that "Collectivism" solves the problem by ignoring the need of property. But when he adds:

"All our work towards permanent organization and improvement of conditions is to the good, as assisting the treatment of life as a whole, so long as we do not artificially introduce the ideal of the child or slave,—of a life forbidden to organize its future, and restricted to receiving what is deemed necessary from day to day,"

he is really expressing the distinction between Collectivism and Communism. He points out, indeed, that the principle of unearned private property and the principle of Communism really meet in the common rejection of the idea of *earning*, of some quasi-competitive relation of salary to value or energy of service,—in fact, of the organization of society upon a basis of labor, which *is* the ideal of Socialism. Similarly, he puts himself at the point of view of the Socialist when he says :

“The true principle of State interference with acquisition—an alienation—would refer to their tendency, if any, to prevent acquisition of property on the part of other members of society,”

a principle which omits nothing in Collectivist requirements.

Mr. Bosanquet, however, finds a difficulty in the idea of “apportionment to services,” which seems to reconcile him to “the transference of unearned property.”

“The same sort of chance which transfers property to persons who have not earned it asserts itself now strongly in salaried work, and would probably do so much more intensely if all work were salaried.”

He cites the case of Burns as exciseman, and suggests that in a completely salaried scheme of society places would have to be found for good men, and would not always represent their true services to society. This is a somewhat nice point, but it would seem to be an incident of any salaried position, and is a point of distinction between “salaries” and wages by “time” or “piece.” Mr. Bosanquet suggests that in the case of men of letters who are also civil servants a man receives a salary he has not earned, with the possibility of his justifying it by some other work, and that in such a case a salary takes on the character of private property obtained by chance: “He is paid not for what he does, but because he has the good luck to be there.” This is surely a little straining of facts as well as of theory. Presumably, in any case, and in a complete system still more so, a man would have to justify his salary by the minimum of service and efficiency required.

Socialism and the Family.—Just as Socialism does not logically involve any denial of the principle of property (and

if anything presupposes it), in the same way it does not necessarily conflict with the idea of the family. In both cases, however, the responsibilities and social utilities that arise out of these institutions would be the measure of their rights. If Socialism would restrict some kinds of property, it would only help to emphasize the moral and social idea of property as such. The conversion of land into deer forests might, for instance, be said to conflict with the idea of property as an element of social and individual well-being. In the same way the very fact that the family is the most formative of moral agencies renders the conditions of its "rights" more exacting; and it has been clear to all consistent Socialists that the family in an individualistic society has an anti-social bias. At the same time, the Socialist, if he builds on human nature at all, must recognize that the institutions of the family and property have their roots deep in human nature, and they are facts which have to be utilized, not suppressed. It is just their close relation to human nature that accounts for their use and abuse. The inherent selfishness of human nature expresses itself more in relation to family and property than to anything else: as they are the most intimate and distinctive institutions of man, human nature finds its intensest expression in them. But it is equally true that the unselfishness of mankind also finds its intensest expression in these institutions. If they make selfishness possible, they also make unselfishness, and by removing the occasions of vice, we should also remove the occasions of virtue. This is obvious, but the practical consequence is that, as we cannot develop unselfishness out of selfishness, we must endeavor to give both to property and the family the shape which is appropriate to them as moral and social institutions. This implies some interference with the exercise of the "right" of property, as also with the "right" of bringing children into the world. It is this right which the Poor Law seems to countenance by guaranteeing the right to relief, though it is true that it does not guarantee the right to a full or complete existence; and as things are, there is no way by which the responsibilities of this right can be brought home to the individual. The suggestion that

Socialism may mean "the collective guarantee of support to all children, and still worse, to all adults," cannot be derived from its logical idea, though it may be suggested by the *obiter dicta* of Socialist writers. A theory of the organization of society on the basis of labor is hardly compatible with the recognition of a right to be supported at the public expense. It is a main cause of the Socialist's dissatisfaction with an individualistic organization of society that such a right is countenanced at all. The danger is that Collectivism would be inclined to let the idea of State policy override the idea of individual responsibility, and to trust to State regulation rather than to an increased sense of social responsibility, as also of social liability. That "the free maintenance of necessitous children" (without further qualification) should appear as an item in an attempt at a "joint Socialist manifesto" is an incident in the Socialist propaganda to which a Socialist is not inclined to attach too much importance; but Mr. Bosanquet is certainly justified in making the most of it as an indication that there is a kind of Socialism which would suppress the personal struggle for social existence. "Free maintenance" would certainly destroy the moral idea of the family: the same cannot be said of free education (and possibly not of maintenance in connection with education), which tends to heighten the idea of responsibility involved in adding children to a community which sets before itself the maintenance of a conscious standard of life: as also it "breaks up" the family life far less than the public school or college system, while it keeps it in touch with the idea of citizenship and social standards. "Free maintenance of necessitous children" is by itself an individualist, not a socialist, point of view. If for "free maintenance" we were to read "compulsory standard maintenance," and for "necessitous" read "impoverished," the proposition would fall within the lines of "scientific" Socialism, and the criticisms of Mr. Bosanquet would have to take a new direction. However, I must confess that Socialists sound an "uncertain"—in some cases, too certain—note on the position of the family in a Socialist state. They are certainly not ideal enough when they regard the family as an incident of "a

capitalistic régime." the economic arrangements of society certainly give a bias to its individualistic perversion: but its particular mode of action under a particular set of conditions suggests not the abolition of the family, but of the conditions. "We begin our particular affections in our families," and the anti-family Socialist would pull up our social life by the root, thinking in this way to preserve the branches: it is really a question of soil and atmosphere.

Socialism and Competition.—I have already endeavored to show that Socialism is a method of social selection according to social worth (in the widest sense); that it desires to extend the possibilities of usefulness to as many as possible, and would measure reward by the efficiency of socially valuable work. The differences in reward would, however, be of less account in proportion as social consideration and recognition, in the form of various social privileges and opportunities, are extended to any kind of worker, and as the motives to personal accumulation are reduced within social limits. Socialism, therefore, aims at the development of human nature along the line of its highest bent.

It is not to be denied that competitive private enterprise does develop character and performs social services; but the character and the services are of a partial and inferior type. It is partial because a few grow out of proportion to the rest, and therefore in a narrow and anti-social direction; it is inferior, because the character of the economically strong is not of the highest type; if it is of a type fittest to survive in a commercial and non-social world, it is not the fittest to survive in a moral and social order. And what can one say about the quality of products and standard of consumption? Is it as such directed to evolve and elevate life? Matthew Arnold's description of an upper class materialized, a middle class vulgarized, and a lower class brutalized, is a fairly accurate description of modern commercial types.

But not only is commercial competition inferior in form, but it is directly responsible for an increase in quantity over quality of population. The idea that unchecked competition makes for the natural selection of the fittest population

is singularly optimistic. It is just that part of the population which has nothing to lose that is most reckless in propagating itself. The fear of falling below the standard of comfort at one end of the social scale, and the hopelessness of ever reaching it at the other, combine to increase the quantity of population at the cost of its quality. And what is a loss to society is a gain to the "sweater;" he is directly interested in the lowering of the standard of life, and in the competition of "cheap" labor; and the "sweater" is a normal product of commercial competition. Collectivism deliberately aims at the maintenance and elevation of the standard of life, and at such an organization of industry which would not enable one class of the community to be interested in the over-production of another. To Socialism, "the population," as other "questions," becomes a problem of quality.

There are, of course, many other aspects of Socialism than its adequacy to the requirements of a moral and social idea; that is, of the principle of a progressive social life. It may be thought that Socialism is essentially a movement from below, a class movement; but it is characteristic of modern Socialism that its protagonists, in this country at any rate, approach the problem from the scientific rather than the popular view; they are "middle class" theorists. And the future of the movement will depend upon the extent to which it will be recognized that Socialism is not simply a workingman's, or an unemployed, or a poor man's question. There are, indeed, signs of a distinct rupture between the Socialism of the street and the Socialism of the chair; the last can afford to be patient, and to deprecate hasty and unscientific remedies. It may be that the two sides may drift farther and farther apart, and that scientific Socialism may come to enjoy the unpopularity of the Charity Organization Society. All that I am, however, concerned to maintain is that there is a scientific Socialism which does attempt to "treat life as a whole," and has no less care for character than the most rigorous idealist; and I believe I am also right in thinking that this is the characteristic and dominant type of Socialism at the present day. It may not be its dominant idea in the future, but it is

the idea that is wanted for the time, the idea that is relevant, and it is with relevant ideas that the social moralist is concerned.

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THE CONFLICT BETWEEN THE OLD AND THE NEW : A RETROSPECT AND A PROSPECT.*

HOMER calls a man a being who looks forward and backward. These two ways of looking cannot well be separated. The thoughts and feelings with which we look to the future are necessarily—though perhaps unconsciously to ourselves—determined by the manner in which we regard the past.

The closing of a century is a fitting time for a retrospect. The marking off of time by centuries is, it is true, a purely arbitrary, civil arrangement, to which neither the events of the inner nor those of the outer life can be made to correspond. I shall undertake to show that the present century began before the year 1800. Perhaps the same may be said of the next. We do not realize that a new century may already have begun, because we are living in the midst of the process, and hence cannot see the gradual rise of the new from the old out of which it springs. Nevertheless, taking advantage of the closing of a century of civil history, let us look back at the process of mental evolution during this period. Such a retrospect suggested itself to me in concluding a work on the history of philosophy of the last century. The views I shall present in this paper are based on the results of that work. Before attempting to show what history has to say with reference to some of the chief problems of thought, let us consider the point of view and standard of mental evolution.

I.

If it is acknowledged that there has been a mental evolution, not only in the individual but also in the race, the ques-

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