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The Operational Commander's Role
in Planning and Executing a Successful
Campaign

A Monograph
by
Major Thomas M. Jordan
Infantry

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ABSTRACT

The Operational Commander's Role in Planning and Executing a Successful Campaign. By Major Thomas M. Jordan, USA, 63 pages.

The rise of industrialization coupled with the growth of technology have contributed to creating a complexity to modern warfare that far exceeds the primitive conditions of earlier periods. Defined as the creative use of distributed operations for the purposes of strategy, success at the operational level requires that commanders practice operational art. Although current doctrine recognizes that the operational commander must link theater strategy to tactical operations through operational art, it fails to provide an adequate description of the commander role in campaign planning. Thus, this monograph examines the operational commander's role in planning and executing a successful campaign.

The monograph begins by describing how industrialized societies and technology affected the evolution of warfare thus creating a new medium known as operational art. Next it discusses suitable criteria for determining the commander's role in operational campaigns followed by a explanation of the campaign analysis model consisting of the operational operating systems described in TRADOC Pam 11-9. The monograph then analyzes three successful campaigns: Field-Marshal Slim as the 14th Army commander in Burma; General MacArthur in the World War II Cartwheel Operation and General Ridgway as the 8th Army commander in Korea.

The monograph concludes that the operational commander's role in campaign planning is decisive in several ways. He must ensure that the strategic end state is clearly defined and attainable with the means at his disposal. His plans must not exceed the capabilities of his force and any imbalance between his operating systems and the enemy's must be corrected. As a minimum, he must articulate his intent and identify the pre-conditions to achieve success at the tactical level. Moreover, his vision must encompass distributed and sequential operations focused at the enemy center(s) of gravity and integrated throughout his operating systems within the dimensions of space, air, land, sea and subsurface. In execution, the operational commander's ability to learn, anticipate and adapt has a decisive impact on the outcome of the campaign. Furthermore, modern technology has not reduced the requirement for him to command from forward locations. Ultimately, his personal influence, willpower and moral effect significantly outweighs tactical command influence and may well spell the difference between victory and defeat.

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I. Introduction

In his book, Command in War, Martin Van Creveid referred to the period of strategic command that preceded Napoleon as the "stone age of command." Shackled by limited communications systems and poor roads, devoid of a timely, long-range intelligence system and dependent on primitive logistical methods, the stone-age operational commanders, as part of a strategic maneuver, rarely separated their forces.¹ Instead, they followed the classical strategy of a single point: one-dimensional warfare that was characterized by mass and concentration with its centerpiece being the decisive battle of annihilation.²

The apogee of classical strategy is perhaps best illustrated by the Napoleonic campaigns that occurred from 1805-1807. During these campaigns, Napoleon's spectacular victories established a precedent that later military commanders have sought to attain throughout the history of warfare--the decisive battle of annihilation.

In the Danube campaign of 1805, Napoleon swiftly moved seven corps to fix and surround the hapless Austrians commanded by the "unhappy General Mack" at Ulm.³ This triumph was quickly followed by an even more decisive victory over the combined Austrian-Russo forces of the Third Coalition at Austerlitz. The day after the battle the Austrian Emperor sought an armistice while the Russians retreated to Hungary and Poland.⁴ Finally in

1806, in a war that was to last only seven weeks, Napoleon avenged Frederick the Great's victory at Rossbach by destroying the cream of the Prussian-Saxon Armies at Jena-Auerstadt.⁵ Napoleon's immediate and relentless pursuit destroyed the Prussian army while the state itself collapsed.⁶

Napoleon's campaigns of 1805-1807 share several features in common. One is the classical strategy of a single point brought to its fullest potential through Napoleon's use of concentric maneuver to deploy his forces. A second feature is Napoleon's use of maneuver to achieve maximum concentration on the enemy flank and rear.⁷ A third feature was the emphasis on the decisive battle with the destruction of the enemy force being the primary objective.⁸ In Napoleon's view, once the enemy army was decisively beaten, the opponent had little choice but to accept the dictated terms. In short, a favorable decision in a decisive battle meant more than the determination of a clear winner or loser. It could also mean the end of the campaign and of the war.⁹

By 1809-1813, as his opponents reformed their armies and learned to develop working coalitions, Napoleon's victories occurred less frequently and with a greater cost of human life. Failing to recognize that the dynamic conditions of warfare had now reduced his capacity to win decisive battles, Napoleon engaged his forces into bloody, protracted stalemates.¹⁰ For

example, one of the greatest battles fought in the nineteenth century was the battle of Leipzig, fought 16-18 October, 1813. It ended in a stalemate and resulted in 73,000 French casualties while the Allies lost 54,000.¹¹

By the latter half of the nineteenth century, the age of classical strategy with its emphasis on the decisive battle had declined. One reason was the introduction of new technology in warfare such as the telegraph and steam engine. Another reason was industrialization with resulting demographic population shifts.¹² The increased size of armies contributed to wider fronts while technological improvements in weaponry led to a dispersion of forces. As a result, armies developed more resiliency and the ability to deliver strategic checkmate through a single decisive battle began to decline.¹³ "Victory was a product of successive battles and engagements. . . the armies were so big that a battle now took days to fight. . . battles became continuous."¹⁴

Technology also created new conditions for the operational commander.¹⁵ Previously, a commander could often view the entire battlefield. Now, the extended distances caused by large, dispersed formations made this impossible and forced him to rely on devices like the telegraph in addition to the traditional messenger system. In some armies, the inadequacy of communications contributed to the development of decentralized command

and control techniques.¹⁶ Finally, the logistical considerations to support huge armies also became paramount and the commander grew to depend on general staffs to manage many of the new, technical details.

As the nature of warfare changed, the resiliency of armies and large scale operations required operational commanders to visualize a distributed and sequential campaign. Reflecting on an earlier period, but discerning the change, the prescient Clausewitz pointed out that the commander now had to think of "the use of an engagement for the purpose of the war".¹⁷

Unlike classical strategy, battle was now seen merely as part of the whole...before the emergence of operational art, movement of field forces in single dense masses obviated the need to coordinate actions with other forces...the idea of simultaneous and successive operations, thoroughly integrated [author's emphasis], by means of a distributed system of communication, was therefore alien to the Napoleonic style of warfare and its precursors.¹⁸

To Clausewitz, fighting and winning battles was still important, they were the gold and silver of the strategic budget. However, other factors affected the outcome as well and although he [Clausewitz] regarded, "a great battle as a decisive factor in the outcome of a war or campaign [it] was not necessarily the only one."¹⁹

As Clausewitz recognized, under the new paradigm, success in war meant that the commander recognize and practice operational art--the new medium that supplanted classical strategy as the dominant theme in warfare. War

encompassed three levels: tactics, operations and strategy. The key to operational victory was found in structuring broad frontage attacks in conjunction with successive destruction of enemy echelons in depth.²⁰ This was difficult as Clausewitz observed, "for everything in strategy is very simple, but that does not mean that everything is very easy."²¹ To Clausewitz, the strategist must:

Define an aim for the entire operational side of the war that will be in accordance with its purpose...he will draft the plan of the war and the aim will determine the series of actions intended to achieve it: he will, in fact, shape the individual campaigns and, within these, decide on the individual engagements...the strategist, in short, must maintain control throughout.²²

As warfare evolved into the 20th century, the growth of operational art has matured. High technical societies increase the capacity of armies to sustain body blows and recover, thereby placing continued emphasis on sequential and distributed operations. Warfare now encompasses space, air, ground, sea, and sub-surface dimensions. Thus, a continued challenge for the operational commander is to determine how to creatively use distributed operations within these dimensions for the attainment of strategic purposes ²³

Unfortunately, U.S. Army doctrine does not provide an adequate description of the commander's role in campaign planning.²⁴ Both the current FM 100-5 and FM 100-7 contain a limited discussion of key elements of

campaign design such as centers of gravity, decisive points, culminating points and lines of operation. As a result, current doctrine offers limited assistance to a staff or an operational commander charged with planning and conducting campaigns.

Therefore, this study examines the operational commander's role in planning and executing a successful campaign. A successful campaign is one that accomplishes the objectives assigned by the higher commander with minimal casualties and in the least time. By way of previewing the study that follows, the paper begins by discussing suitable criteria for determining the commander's role in operational campaigns. Following this is an explanation of the campaign analysis model which consists of the operational operating systems described in TRADOC Pam 11-9. Next, is a historical and systemic analysis of three successful campaigns. Finally, the study concludes with general findings and recommendations.

II. BACKGROUND

General Crosbie Saint²⁵ wrote, "operational commanders shape the development of operations by planning and stating their intent to their subordinates and by actively commanding operations."²⁶ At the operational level, the end state or commander's intent as LTG Wayne Downing²⁷ explained, "is not the mission - the

specific, immediate task of the unit . . . it is not the concept of the operation . . . commander's intent is a well thought out one or two sentence statement of what the commander wants to accomplish in the long term--the results he wants."²⁸ To Field Marshal William Slim, writing the intent was the one thing the commander must contribute to formulating orders.

The wording of...orders I left to them [his staff] with the exception of one paragraph...the Intention. This gives or should give, exactly what the commander intends to achieve. It is the dominating expression of his will by which, throughout the operation every officer and soldier will be guided. It should, therefore, be worded by the commander himself.²⁹

To be sure, one of the operational commander's greatest contribution to planning is to provide the operational vision³⁰ which represents the intellectual core of the campaign plan. As a minimum, his plan must transform the strategic goals and superior commander's intent into an attainable operational end state.

Clausewitz noted that a "prince or general can best demonstrate his genius by managing a campaign exactly to suit his objectives and resources."³¹ "What we should admire he wrote, . . . is the smooth harmony of the whole activity, which only becomes evident in the final success."³² From this passage Clausewitz indicates how the commander must attain a balance between the ends to be achieved and the allocated resources.³³ He also points out that the operational commander's ability to set

conditions for success to occur at the tactical level is the mark of true genius. Setting the conditions for success requires the commander in the words of Field Marshal Erich von Manstein to "think ahead . . . he, [the commander]

must see through the veil in which the enemy's future actions are always wrapped...the greater one's sphere of command, the further ahead one must think.³⁴

In short, the operational commander through his intent and concept of maneuver shapes the battles to occur at a place and time of his choosing. He must not overshoot the mark for the results could be disastrous.³⁵ Once the forces are committed, he must step back for as Eisenhower observed there is lapse when there is little that one can do.³⁶ Finally, as Clausewitz observed, the commander must ensure that, "no part of the whole force is idle."³⁷

In a recent study that analyzes the causes of military misfortune, authors Eliot Cohen and John Gooch identified three basic kinds of failure: failure to learn, failure to anticipate, and failure to adapt.³⁸ The authors contend that failure to anticipate is the failure to take reasonable precautions against a known hazard.³⁹ It implies the prevention of surprise through a focused intelligence effort and a correct reading of enemy intentions. Learning is to gain knowledge, understanding

or skill by study, instruction, or experience. Adapting is the ability to react, or as the author's state:

identifying and taking full advantage of the opportunities offered by enemy actions or by chance combinations of circumstances to win success or to stave off failure.⁴⁰

As the model captures the dynamic tension inherent in warfare--chance, uncertainty, and friction, it offers great utility when examining the role of a military leader in the execution of a campaign. Thus, this paper evaluates the successful execution of a plan by determining if the commander anticipated, learned and adapted rapidly enough to achieve success.

The other model used in the study is the operational operating systems model described in TRADOC PAM 11-9. It offers an effective methodology to analyze the role of the commander's influence in six specific systems.⁴¹ All of the operating are critically related to the successful outcome of a campaign and it is imperative that the commander integrate each system into his campaign plan. Clausewitz noted:

If a segment of one's force is located where it is not sufficiently busy with the enemy...while the enemy is fighting, then these forces are being managed uneconomically...when the time for action comes, the first requirement should be that all parts must act.⁴²

Thus, the paper determines if the commander's plan and ensuing actions achieved a concentration of effects from all operating systems. The commander must identify

the enemy center(s) of gravity and concentrate his forces against that point at a place and time of his choosing.⁴³

The three campaigns that the study analyzes offer fertile ground to examine the role of operational command. All occur in a modern timeframe and they encompass air, ground and sea operations. The commanders have great latitude in commanding their forces and in making key operational decisions. Thus, they play a prominent role in campaign planning and execution.

IIIa. Campaign Analysis: The 1943-1945 Burma Campaign.

At the conclusion of the Quebec Conference, held in August, 1943, the Allies agreed to form a new South-East Asia Command (S.E.A.C.) with Admiral Lord Louis Mountbatten as the Supreme Allied Commander. Strategically, the Burma theater was secondary to both the European and Pacific theaters. In conjunction with the Chiang Kai Shek-led Chinese, the goal of allied operations in Burma was to deny Japanese forces from reinforcing the Pacific. The effort to keep Chinag in the war came at a high cost. His armies depended entirely on the Americans with British support to provide them with facilities to fly transport aircraft from India into southern China.⁴⁴

The British and Americans differed regarding the strategy for the reconquest of Burma. The American's believed it was only necessary to secure as much of north

Burma as required to reopen the old Burma-China road.⁴⁵ In contrast, largely because of post-war interests in the region, the British argued to reopen the road to China by clearing the whole of Burma in addition to opening the port of Rangoon.⁴⁶ In the end, the British view prevailed. The 11th Army Group of land forces commanded by General George Giffard would retake Burma.⁴⁷

If ever a general was faced with a near insurmountable challenge in the Second World War, it was LTG William Slim when he assumed command of the 14th Army in October, 1943. Having participated the year before as a corps commander in the disastrous withdrawal from Burma, Slim was well aware of the many difficulties that faced his newly-formed army.⁴⁸

Slim confronted one of the world's most forbidding theaters of operation--seven hundred miles of virtually trackless, disease-infected jungle-clad mountains, swamped for half the year by the monsoon rains. The Eastern Army came at the bottom of the priority list for supplies and manpower...few generals can ever have had to bind together a more heterogeneous and less enthusiastic army than the one Slim found himself commanding...Indians, Gurkhas, East and West Africans.⁴⁹

Unperturbed by the daunting tasks given him by the 11th Army Group Commander,⁵⁰ Slim immediately set out to forge 14th Army into an effective combat organization. Emphasizing that men should feel that they belong to an efficient organization, he took steps to remedy deteriorating medical facilities and implemented new

procedures centered around rest camps, forward treatment teams and air evacuation of wounded. He focused engineer efforts to build and maintain critical roads. Addressing the morale problem, he spoke tirelessly to his men and explained to them why the cause was important and how each man's contribution played an important part in the overall result.⁵¹ Finally, to bolster the soldier's confidence, Slim instituted an aggressive policy of training which included extensive patrolling and minor offensive operations.⁵²

Within two months, Slim's remarkable influence had 14th Army ready to resume the offensive. Between December 1943 to early 1944, he busily coordinated actions on three fronts: Stilwell's drive for Myitkyina, the second Arakan and at Imphal.⁵³ At Arakan, despite being surprised by the strength of a fierce Japanese attack, the British achieved what Slim identified as "the turning point of the Burma campaign," when they defeated a strong Japanese effort to destroy the 15 corps and capture Chittagong.⁵⁴ After almost two years of retreat and defeat at the hands of the Japanese, the British were victorious.⁵⁵

The battles of Imphal-Kohima took place around Imphal, a collection of villages in Northeast India and Kohima, another set of villages located further north. The Japanese hoped to capture these two critical pivots of maneuver because from there they could interdict the

line of communications supporting Chinese-American forces in North Burma and control airfields from which supplies were being flown to China.⁵⁶

Anticipating the Japanese offensive, Slim concluded that 15th Army was the enemy center of gravity and to be successful its offensive had to succeed before the coming monsoons. Therefore, Slim elected to fight a defensive-offensive campaign. Relying on his air superiority, he elected to concentrate IV Corps in the Imphal plain with the intent of drawing the enemy in and then fighting a major battle to destroy the 15th Army.⁵⁷

The Japanese launched their attack on 6 March--a full week before Slim had anticipated. By the 29th, IV Corps was isolated as Imphal was cut off by encircling Japanese.⁵⁸ Lightly defended, Kohima was also under heavy enemy pressure with its vital supply base at Dimapur in jeopardy. It was surrounded on 4 April.⁵⁹

Coolly adapting to the developing situation, Slim went forward to help stem the tide.⁶⁰ Quickly forming the 33rd Corps, he then sent it moving towards the decisive point at Kohima. Meanwhile, he persuaded Mountbatten to coax additional airlift needed to fly in reserves. He also made arrangements to airlift supplies to the beleaguered soldiers.⁶¹ Slim's efforts and determination to succeed coupled with poor Japanese tactics eventually paid off. By late June, having failed to break the British positions, the Japanese forces were spent. With

the monsoons upon them and having fallen victim to the swarming British RAF, they were unable to supply their forces. As a result, they reached their logistical culminating point.⁶²

By early July, Mountbatten and Slim were ready to conduct an offensive to recapture Central Burma. Maintaining his focus on the destruction of the Japanese Army, Slim wanted to fight in the open country of the Shebow plain where his air and armor advantages weighed in his favor. Thus, his plan envisioned the 14th Army coming to grips with the enemy north of the vital supply base at Mandalay.⁶³

A confident 14th Army crossed the Chindwin river with IV and 33 Corps in October. However, after observing the initial reports, Slim quickly realized that the retreating Japanese did not intend to fight in the Shebow plain. To be sure, Kimura, the newly appointed commander of Burma Area Army, had no intention of fighting Slim there. Instead, he deployed his main battle divisions in a classic defense anchored along a line linking Lashio, the Mandalay area, and the Irrawaddy south of Mandalay.⁶⁴

Recognizing the flaws in his original concept, Slim unhesitatingly made the difficult decision to halt the two corps offensive and alter his plan. He wrote,

My new plan...had as its intention the destruction of the main Japanese forces in the area Mandalay-Thazi-Chauk-Myingyan. It was based on 33 Corps... forced crossings of the river north and west of Mandalay, thus drawing

towards itself the greatest possible concentration of Kimura's divisions. Meanwhile IV Corps, moving secretly south ...would suddenly appear at Pakokku, seize a crossing and, without pause, strike violently with armoured and airborne forces at Meiktila.⁶⁵

The effect of Slim's daring decision was to produce the master-stroke of the Burma campaign. On 13 February, IV Corps having secretly shifted over 200 miles attacked across the Irrawaddy. By 4 March, Meiktila had fallen. Mandalay fell two weeks later. The result was to scissor Kimura's army in two, and in the end lost him the whole of Burma.⁶⁶ After the breakthrough, Slim offered no respite to the rapidly disintegrating Japanese.⁶⁷ On May 6th, a column from 1/7th Gurkhas, Fourteenth Army, advancing south linked up with the amphibious assault forces from the 15th Corps in Rangoon.⁶⁸ The ignominious retreat of 1942 had been avenged.⁶⁹

To be sure, Slim's introspective analysis of the underlying reasons for the dismal 1942 defeat enabled him to identify and correct imbalances within the six operating systems prior to conducting future campaigns.⁷⁰ He lamented the lack of adequate intelligence, citing "The extreme inefficiency of our whole intelligence system in Burma was probably our greatest single handicap."⁷¹ The RAF seldom provided air cover and time after time the British found their tactical formations isolated, and logistical lines severed by the Japanese ability to maneuver. Observing that the high command was outgeneraled by their opponents, Slim believed the

failure to identify a strategic aim contributed to the tendency to defend useless terrain while the Japanese concentrated to destroy the British center of gravity.

Demonstrating his ability to learn from experience, Slim took steps to remedy past deficiencies. At Imphal-Kohima, the battle of the Irrawaddy and thrust to Rangoon, Slim identified the Japanese army as the center of gravity. He aptly described his strategic tasks into a clear intention for his subordinates. Based on sound principles, his campaign plans⁷² effectively integrated each operating system and resulted in freedom of action for tactical formations.⁷³ Never enjoying overwhelming superiority of forces, Slim relied on deception and maneuver to focus the effects of his combat power at enemy weak points.⁷⁴ Operating from a small headquarters, Slim exercised forward control. Thus, he was able to anticipate and influence threatening crisis points. The lack of priority meant that logistical requirements were an important feature of each plan and Slim continually improvised new techniques to ensure the flow of supplies was not disrupted.⁷⁵ Moreover, Slim believed the commander must have a sense of how far his sustainment base can be stressed before it ceases to function.

Much of 14th Army's success was due to Slim's ability to integrate the RAF into his operational plans. Thoroughly synchronized with an effective intelligence system, the air force provided superior operational

fires, and continually devastated the Japanese capacity to exercise command and control or logistical resupply.⁷⁶ The RAF also assisted with protecting key lines of communication, and sealed off enemy reconnaissance units while at the same time pinpointing enemy formations to Slim. Perhaps the RAF's most significant contribution was in the area of transportation and logistical resupply. The ability to reposition forces and to resupply isolated units prevented a general collapse at Imphal-Kohima. It further provided the impetus to continue the pursuit of battered Japanese formations in the race to Rangoon.⁷⁷

Despite his careful planning which usually kept him one step ahead of the enemy, Slim failed to anticipate enemy intentions and was surprised on at least three occasions. At the Second Arakan he misjudged the weight of the enemy attack and was later criticised for maintaining 6 divisions in the area despite the growing threat to the Imphal area.⁷⁸ He made a similar mistake at Kohima and further misjudged Kimura's intentions to defend the Irrawaddy.

These temporary lapses notwithstanding, Slim brilliantly demonstrated the most critical requirement of operational command--the ability to adapt. Sun Tzu also recognized this quality observing, "If wise, a commander is able to recognize changing circumstances and to act expediently."⁷⁹ The result was that on each occasion

Slim personally displayed great resilience and his timely and correct decisions saved the situation from disaster.

Slim wrote that the hardest test of generalship is to hold a balance between determination and flexibility. Clausewitz noted that for the commander, determination is an expression of courage and reflects strength of character and willpower.⁸⁰ However, he warned, strength of character could degenerate into obstinancy.⁸¹ In Slim's assessment, the Japanese high command displayed great determination but a total lack of flexibility. To Slim, an operational commander had to balance willpower with knowledge, and exercise judgment tempered by flexibility of mind.⁸²

IIIb. The CARTWHEEL Operations 1943-44.

At the Casablanca Conference held in January, 1943, in French Morocco, the allies headed by Roosevelt and Churchill met to discuss upcoming strategy for the war. In the Pacific theater, the twin campaigns of Guadalcanal and the Papuan Peninsula were expected to end within two months. Now, a main concern was the Japanese fortress at Rabaul located on New Britain in the Bismark Archipelago. Threatening the lines of communication from the United States to Australia with aircraft and surface vessels, Rabaul was an effective obstacle blocking any further advance up the coast of New Guinea. The reduction of Rabaul therefore became a primary mission and one of the

results of the conference was to allow General MacArthur and Admiral Halsey to develop plans for its capture.⁸³ In priority, the Combined Chiefs decided that after the seizure of Rabaul, the top priority in the Pacific would be Nimitz's advance across the Central Pacific.⁸⁴

As Commander in Chief of the Southwest Pacific Area, General Douglas MacArthur submitted plans to the Combined Chiefs for the reduction of Rabaul codenamed ELKTON I, and ELKTON II. However, after reviewing the plans and calculating the force requirements, the Washington planners determined that the forces were simply not available to fulfil MacArthur's requests. The attack on Rabaul had to be postponed. As a result on 28 March, 1943,

The Joint Chiefs...ordered MacArthur and Halsey to establish airfields on Woodlark and Kiriwina, to seize the Lae-Salamaua-Finschhafen-Madang area of New Guinea and to occupy western New Britian, and to seize and occupy the Solomon Islands as far as southern Bougainville. The operations were intended to inflict losses on the Japanese, to deny the target areas to the enemy...to prepare for the ultimate seizure of the Bismark Archipelago.⁸⁵

Addressing the matter of command, the directive further declared that MacArthur would command the operations of the Southwest Pacific forces. Halsey's South Pacific forces engaged in the Solomons would also operate under MacArthur's directives. The remainder of Halsey's other forces would operate under Nimitz.

By April MacArthur and Halsey had agreed on a plan. Codenamed CARTWHEEL, the plan designed by MacArthur envisioned two mutually supporting axes of advance converging on Rabaul.⁸⁶ With the intent to destroy Japanese power in the Pacific and adjacent islands, and to clear the way for a drive to the Philippines, CARTWHEEL involved thirteen separate and, sometimes simultaneous, amphibious operations conducted along the eastern and northern New Guinea coast and in a direction northwest up the Solomons.⁸⁷

MacArthur would control operations from a joint headquarters with three component headquarters. Allied Land Forces commanded by an Australian, General Blamey, consisted of the U.S. Sixth Army, and First and Second Australian Armies. Supporting the land forces was the U.S. Seventh Fleet which included Australian and Netherland vessels and the Fifth Air Force commanded by LTG George Kenney. Admiral Barbey commanded the amphibious force, later designated Seventh Amphibious Force. In reality, the only control Blamey exercised was over a small task force called the New Guinea Force consisting of Australians.⁸⁸ MacArthur, in a thinly disguised effort to avoid having Americans serve under a foreign command, created The Alamo Force with LTG Walter Kreuger as the commander reporting directly to him.

The CARTWHEEL plan reflected the lessons MacArthur learned from his previous two years of combatting the

Japanese on the rugged South Pacific terrain. MacArthur knew that his far-flung area of operations which included vast distances, mountainous and jungle terrain, criss-crossed with an under-developed road system would stretch the logistical pipelines to the breaking point.

The solution to this geographical nightmare was found in what MacArthur referred to as the "triphibious concept."⁸⁹ A firm believer in the dominance of naval and land-based airpower⁹⁰, MacArthur placed a premium on air and sea power working in conjunction with land forces.⁹¹

Ever since the opening salvos of the war, where his air force was destroyed on the ground, MacArthur had been displeased with his air support. In June of 1942 the situation was unchanged. Unhappy with George Brett, his air commander, MacArthur appealed to Washington for a replacement. In a move that was to pay great dividends, he accepted LTG George Kenney to command the Allied Air Forces and Fifth Air Force.⁹²

MacArthur and Kenney quickly forged a strong working relationship. Kenney immediately implemented aggressive actions to clean up the maintenance and supply problems that plagued the Fifth Air Force. Furthermore, his wide experience in air operations resulted in developing innovative techniques such as low-level anti-shipping strikes and modifications to the B-25 medium bomber.

Kenney's efforts paid off. In March, 1943, in the Battle of the Bismark Sea, he coordinated air strikes

with signal intercepts and launched a devastating air attack on a Japanese convoy which resulted in the sinking of four destroyers and eight troop transports.⁹³ Kenney also sold MacArthur on airlift and aerial resupply operations--a concept that worked with great success during the struggle for Buna.⁹⁴ The sum of Kenney's actions which contributed to gaining air superiority over New Guinea greatly impressed MacArthur.⁹⁵ As a result, by the end of 1942, MacArthur had gained great confidence in Kenney's strategy, tactics and operations.⁹⁶

To support the CARTWHEEL operations and MacArthur's triphibious concept, Kenney planned to construct new bases from which to gain air superiority and to launch air attacks on enemy formations and shipping. Ground units supported by air and naval forces would avoid the head-on collisions with entrenched Japanese defenders. Instead, they would bypass strong points and neutralize them by cutting off their supply lines. Once intermediate objectives were seized, the whole cycle would be repeated. MacArthur's methods reflect a realistic appraisal of the means available and a great understanding of the Clausewitz concept of economy of force. The scarcity of resources in his theater forced him to adopt these methods as they offered the only chance of success.⁹⁷

As Kenney's relentless bombers continued to pound Rabaul, the CARTWHEEL operation began by conducting

unopposed landings on June 30, 1943, in the Trobriands. General Kreueger's Alamo Force easily captured the islands, Woodlark and Kiriwina. Next, in a move that completely fooled the Japanese, MacArthur executed a feint at Salamaua and subsequently landed a seaborne combined Australian-American force at Lae. A few days later, the American 503rd paratroop regiment attacked and seized an important airstrip at Nadzab eighteen miles away.⁹⁸ Aided by naval radar ships, Kenney supported the landings by conducting daily bombing runs. In one major stroke his aircraft destroyed over 175 Japanese aircraft on the ground at the major air base at Wewak.⁹⁹

By mid-September, unable to halt the Allies push towards their isolated forces at Lae and Salamaua, the Japanese Imperial Headquarters decided to withdraw further up the Huon Peninsula. With two good harbors which allowed it to command the Vitiav Straits, the strategic port at Finschhafen was a key position in the Japanese defense plans.¹⁰⁰ Drawing a main perimeter line from western New Guinea through the Carolinas to the Marianas, the Japanese intended to hold the Allied advance by all available means.

Hoping to capture Finschhafen before the Japanese could provide reinforcements, MacArthur made one of his boldest decisions of the campaign by ordering the seizure of Finschhafen ahead of schedule.¹⁰¹ MacArthur's decision, which turned out to be the correct one as the

Allied forces took Finschhafen by October 2, enabled the Allies to capitalize on the rapid fall of Lae and Salamaua. The Allies now dominated the Huon Peninsula¹⁰² and the road to New Britain and Rabaul was now open.

Coordinating his actions with Halsey's advance in the Central Pacific, MacArthur tightened the noose on Rabaul. He intensified the bombing of Rabaul and used his naval forces to bypass heavily defended strong points by conducting amphibious landings at Arawe, Saidor, and Cape Gloucester. Brushing off the advice of his staff to avoid the landing, MacArthur again made a bold decision¹⁰³ to conduct a rapid seizure of Los Negros--the seizure of which would provide a suitable base with a harbor to launch further attacks west.¹⁰⁴ Again, MacArthur's risky decision paid off. On 29 February, 1944, a light reconnaissance force landed against light opposition. Accompanying the force, MacArthur later went ashore, made an assessment that the force could hold and radioed for the delivery of follow-on forces.¹⁰⁵ By the end of March, the Japanese resistance in the Admiralties was overcome--Rabaul was securely encircled. For all intents and purposes, CARTWHEEL was complete.¹⁰⁶

MacArthur's CARTWHEEL operations aptly illustrate a splendid example of the integration of the six operating systems focused at the enemy center of gravity--the Japanese air and naval forces within the dimensions of air, ground and sea operations. In the area of

intelligence, a significant factor was that MacArthur's staff was able to combine Ultra intercepts with aerial reconnaissance to locate Japanese strongholds and weakpoints.¹⁰⁷ The clear intelligence picture also enabled MacArthur to anticipate the enemy reaction. Thus, MacArthur was able to repeatedly strike the enemy with crippling blows.¹⁰⁸ He was also able to bypass centers of resistance--the taking of which would have cost much more in American and Australian lives.

To be sure, much of MacArthur's success in the South-West Pacific can be attributed to his use of Kenney and the air forces under his command.¹⁰⁹ Through his land-based aircraft, MacArthur was able to detect and later coordinate the actions of surface units to destroy a great quantity of enemy shipping.¹¹⁰ Cut off from resupply, the operational fires provided by Kenney's bombers effectively isolated Japanese strongpoints and softened their capacity to resist. More importantly, MacArthur's forces were able to operate with complete freedom of action. Though the battle for control of the skies was bitterly fought, Kenney's achievement of air superiority enabled naval and land forces to conduct amphibious landings that continually surprised the Japanese forcing them to react to MacArthur's initiatives.

The immense size of the theater dictated that forward operating bases provide the capacity to sustain

the overall effort. To MacArthur, the prerequisites for victory were the seizure and development of airfields, ports and logistics bases.¹¹¹ In this regard, air and naval forces contributed to the logistical effort by aerial resupply and by protecting transports. As a result, MacArthur's bases which were key to projecting combat power were never seriously threatened.

Throughout the campaign MacArthur practiced decentralized command and control. His style was to find the most capable officer available and delegate to him.¹¹² As in the case of his previous air and naval component commanders, if they could not do the job, MacArthur looked elsewhere. Thus, while MacArthur deserves plaudits for assembling an effective team, talented commanders such as George Kenney, Ennis Whitehead, Walter Kreuger, Thomas Kinkaid and Daniel Barbey deserve great credit for CARTWHEEL's success. Despite the risk, in active operations MacArthur insisted on going forward whenever he felt that his presence would make a difference.¹¹³ Having conceived the original plan, his decisions regarding execution were sound and his demonstrated ability to take risk in order to achieve surprise and deception was unquestioned.

MacArthur's concept for the isolation of Rabaul was a masterpiece of planning and presented the Japanese with an unbeatable dilemma. Fixed by converging land and sea forces, dominated through the air, and isolated from

resupplying their beleaguered units, the Japanese were overwhelmed by a masterful plan carried out by great commanders.¹¹⁴ Once CARTWHEEL began, MacArthur never lost the initiative and thus was not forced to adapt to enemy counter-measures that threatened to disrupt his plan. Caught in the grips of MacArthur's plan, the Japanese conducted a stiff resistance but could never regain the initiative or freedom of maneuver.

IIIc. Ridgway in Korea

By September 1950, the North Korean forces stunned by MacArthur's brilliant Inchon landing and subsequent drive north were streaming across the border of South Korea. Receiving JCS authorization to continue the pursuit of the shattered North Koreans beyond the 38th Parallel, in October, MacArthur ordered the combined forces of LTG Walton Walker, commander of Eighth U.S. Army and MG Ned Almond, commander of X Corps, to head north to finish the destruction of the North Koreans.¹¹⁵ Despite initial progress, by early November, the offensive ran out of steam with the surprise entrance of Chinese Communist forces. Forced to fall back under intense pressure to defensive positions along the Imjin River, the plummeting morale of Eighth Army was further worsened by the accidental death of LTG Walker on December 23. Upon learning of Walker's death, MacArthur promptly called General Collins, Army Chief of Staff and

requested LTG Matt Ridgway as his replacement.¹¹⁶ Within 24 hours, Ridgway was on his way to the Far East.¹¹⁷

With the Chinese forces at a temporary lull, Ridgway met with MacArthur in Japan. His mission as explained by MacArthur was to repel the aggression, expel the hostile forces from South Korea and restore peace in the area.¹¹⁸ Promising to back his decisions, MacArthur said, "The Eighth Army is yours Matt. Do what you think is best."¹¹⁹

Ridgway found the Eighth Army wracked with problems.¹²⁰ The men were tired and dispirited and lacked confidence in their leaders. Roadbound infantrymen had lost their desire to fight and were ignoring the basic rules of soldiering. The intelligence picture was deplorable. Units were not aggressively seeking contact with the enemy either by patrolling or through offensive operations. In short, Eighth Army was a basket case, stricken with "bug out" fever and anxiously awaiting an evacuation that would remove them from the frozen hell-hole of Korea.

Ridgway, having learned of the Eighth Army difficulties, was not thinking about evacuation. On the contrary, he was planning to attack. His first priority was to fix the defeatist attitude that permeated the Eighth Army.¹²¹ Using a helicopter or light plane, Ridgway visited all major command posts of Eighth Army and delivered the same message to the soldiers. Eighth Army units were to get off the roads and start using the

terrain. They were to seek and aggressively maintain contact with the enemy. Units were to immediately start intensive training in night fighting and marching. Furthermore, Ridgway insisted, leaders must seek innovative ways to communicate when radios failed. More importantly, they should use all the firepower available. Too often Ridgway found units calling for help before they engaged even a third of their combat power. Stressing increased supply discipline, Ridgway threatened to courtmartial any leader who abandoned precious equipment. He expected the commanders to locate their command posts forward and to be where the crisis was taking place.¹²² Privately concluding that the senior leadership was largely to blame for the dismal state of Eighth Army, Ridgway, with help from General Collins, quickly instituted policies to replace corps and division commanders with proven, hand-picked leaders.¹²³

The Third Chinese offensive resumed New Years Day and by 3 January Ridgway was forced to withdraw his forces from Seoul. Despite his heroic efforts to rally the forces, Eighth Army relinquished 60 miles in seven days finally occupying strong defensive positions south of the Han River. Although the Chinese regained Seoul, the offensive failed because Eighth Army was able to withdraw with its units intact.¹²⁴

As the Chinese offensive ended, Ridgway demonstrated his capacity to learn and anticipate by quickly

initiating measures to correct imbalances within his operating systems.¹²⁵ Dismayed at the lack of operational firepower, he integrated ten additional field artillery battalions into Eighth Army, and called on the Far Eastern Air Force and Navy to provide additional close air support and surface bombardment.¹²⁶ Combat units were strengthened by welcome replacements while field medical and surgical services were improved. Appalled at the lack of cold-weather equipment, Ridgway took steps to have essential items such as gloves, warm clothing, lubricating oil for weapons and hot meals provided for the troops. Frustrated over his G-2's inability to tell him enemy locations and intentions, Ridgway vowed to attack to find out where the enemy was and he personally flew over enemy-held territory looking for tell-tale signs of enemy units.¹²⁷ Concerned over the tactical disposition of forces, and the tendency for ROK units to break under pressure, he ordered I Corps to re-position to avoid having two ROK units adjacent in the defense. Finally, in an effort to motivate and appeal to the common soldier, Ridgway dictated a statement to Eighth Army soldiers entitled, "Why We Are Here? What Are We Fighting For?"¹²⁸

By late January, Ridgway had an inspired Eighth Army on the move. Operation Wolfhound, a two day limited objective attack resulted in 1600 enemy casualties.¹²⁹ This success was followed by Operation Thunderbolt-

Exploitation--a two corps reconnaissance in force backed by close air, overwhelming artillery and naval gunfire. Because of growing concern over the Chinese air threat and large-unit infiltrations, Ridgway stressed that all units observe strict dispersion and camouflage measures, as well as protecting supply lines, key command posts and guarding against rear area threats.¹³⁰

Still unable to pinpoint the presence of major Chinese armies and in anticipation of a major enemy counter-offensive in the X Corps zone, Ridgway ordered General Almond to attack in coordination with Operation Thunderbolt-Exploitation. Labeled Operation Roundup, the purpose of Almond's spoiling attack was to determine and subsequently disrupt enemy forces preparing to assault.

Within a week, X Corps found itself in a major fight. A probe conducted 5 February at Chipyong-ni resulted in the 2nd Division with its attached allies being encircled by regiments from five Chinese divisions.¹³¹ Simultaneously, two Chinese armies and a North Korean Corps smashed into two ROK divisions forcing a withdrawal to a key, decisive point at Wonju.¹³²

Ridgway quickly perceived that the attack was a full-scale offensive designed to smash X Corps. Demonstrating his ability to adapt, Ridgway rushed units to lend assistance while bringing to bear all available artillery support. Meanwhile, he ordered the encircled units to make a stand and told the I and IX Corps

commanders to maintain pressure while seeking ways to cut the Chinese lines of operation that stretched across the Han River.¹³³ Arrangements were also made with the navy to interdict Chinese supply lines from Wonsan.¹³⁴ Aided by intense close air support, supplied by air, the beleaguered defenders at Chipyeong-ni held, inflicting over 4000 casualties on the Chinese.¹³⁵ Ridgway's efforts to provide massive artillery support to frontline units proved decisive at Wonju. On 15 February, 5,000 Chinese troops lay dead on the battlefield with three times that number being wounded. In all, four assault divisions were broken by the determined defenders.¹³⁶ By 18 February, all corps commanders reported that the enemy was withdrawing north across the Han. Nearly half of the Chinese forces--14 divisions--were wrecked.¹³⁷ For the first time in months, and after only 54 days of command, Ridgway and Eighth Army had won an important victory.

Unwilling to give the enemy any respite, Ridgway stunned his staff by insisting that Eighth Army open another offensive within sixty hours. Designed to destroy enemy forces east of the Han River along a line from Yangpyong to Hoengsong, Operation Killer's centerpiece was a main attack by the IX and X Corps while I Corps conducted a feint river crossing of the Han River east of Seoul. The plan also featured other Ridgway trademarks--reliance on deception, overwhelming firepower, massive engineer support and an innovative supply system built

around aerial resupply from newly-constructed, forward-based airfields.¹³⁸

Throughout the counter-offensive, Ridgway's intentions were clearly communicated to his subordinate commanders. A firm believer that orders were best issued face-to face, Ridgway also believed that lower commanders should have input into the formulation of the concept.¹³⁹ His intent, which was to inflict the maximum damage on the enemy with minimum casualties, focused directly at the destruction of the enemy center of gravity--the mass of Chinese armies.

Ridgway also made every effort to integrate naval and air power into his operations.¹⁴⁰ Naval air interdiction repeatedly struck targets in northeast Korea while B-29s of the Fifth Air Force Bomber Command assumed a similar mission for northwest Korea. These efforts slowed enemy resupply, provided valuable intelligence and resulted in the wholesale destruction of enemy units.¹⁴¹ The Fifth Air Force was also vital in supplying Ridgway's units, particularly X Corps, with ammunition, food and medical supplies in the mountainous central corridor and eastern Korea.¹⁴²

Hampered by rain and logistical difficulties, Operation Killer, conducted 21-28 February, achieved marginal success. However, Ridgway quickly followed up by unleashing Operation Ripper--a six corps attack designed to seize or destroy enemy personnel and equipment.¹⁴³ His

objective was to advance to the Idaho line--located just south of the 38th Parallel.¹⁴⁴ Again, the carefully integrated plan reflected Ridgway trademarks: concentration of force, surprise, deception, overwhelming firepower, heavy engineer support and a thorough logistical buildup.¹⁴⁵ By 16 March, the enemy was withdrawing; by the 18th, Seoul was recaptured with all other objectives generally attained.¹⁴⁶

Ridgway's infusion of spirit and turn-around of the demoralized Eighth Army aptly illustrates the influence of an operational commander in campaigning. Rapidly learning the problems of the demoralized Eighth Army, Ridgway aggressively corrected imbalances in the operating systems between his and the enemy force. A visible, front-line leader,¹⁴⁷ he was particularly ruthless with rear-echelon commanders. In his quest for information, intelligence, and logistical support, he was equally demanding and relentless on the staff. In short, Ridgway's integration of the operating systems woven effectively into an operational plan and articulated by a clear intent set his tactical units up to attain success.

Throughout the campaign, Ridgway's frequent presence at the actual or predicted point of crisis enabled him to accurately assess the conditions of battle, anticipate the enemy moves and adapt to the developing conditions by making timely decisions. During the Third Chinese offensive, he was able to execute an orderly withdrawal

with his forces intact. At Chipyeongni and Wonju, Ridgway quickly concentrated artillery and air support while interdicting enemy columns through deep strikes. Despite the overwhelming odds, his insistence to defend tenaciously inspired the defenders to hold their ground. Moreover, his calming presence enabled him to convince the soldiers and leaders that Eighth Army could win.¹⁴⁸ Finally, because of his daily visits and demonstrated willingness to share the dangers and grim reality of combat, Ridgway gained first-hand knowledge of the soldier's plight and actively sought to resolve the difficulties brought on by the harsh conditions.

Because of his accurate perspective and thorough knowledge of the terrain, Ridgway effectively implemented plans that capitalized on his strengths and focused at enemy weakness. As a result, he maintained the initiative and freedom of action which allowed him to select the time and place of battle. His plans, enhanced through deception and surprise, continually kept the enemy off balance and resulted in a successful concentration of combat power at decisive points.

IV. Conclusions

An analysis of the three case studies reveals that the operational commanders faced many similar conditions. All operated with relatively clear strategic guidance and thus experienced little difficulty designing the

operational objectives to meet the required end state. Each commander faced great adversity. Prior to resuming offensive operations, their principal task was to rebuild dispirited coalition forces into an effective fighting army capable of defeating an opponent that was used to winning. The campaigns took place in large theaters that included tough terrain and miserable weather conditions. None of the commanders enjoyed overwhelming superiority, each operated from long lines of communication and all suffered from a lack of logistical resources. In all cases, air superiority at least in a local sense weighed heavily in the final outcome while naval forces played a secondary but vital role. Despite the enemy's past success, each commander proceeded to plan and execute a successful campaign.

A principal conclusion from the three case studies is that the operational commander's role in campaign planning is decisive in several ways. Initially, he must ensure that the strategic end state is clearly defined. More importantly, the end state must be attainable with the means at his disposal. At the operational level, the commander must know what is tactically possible with the available forces. Moreover, he must know the limits of his logistical support. As the case studies indicated, each commander was careful not to overstep the capabilities of his force, particularly in the rebuilding

process. This is of great importance as a error here could result in a defeat with grave consequences.

Second, the operational commander must provide the vision that supports the attainment of the strategic end. As our historical analysis indicates, conventional war between like opponents entails battles fought between large armies over multi-dimensions involving air, land and sea. Equipped with the latest technology and supervised by professional staffs, these large armies often exhibit great resiliency. Even with overwhelming numerical superiority, it is unlikely that the operational commander will win a one-decisive battle campaign. Therefore, he must practice operational art. His vision must encompass a campaign that focuses on the destruction of the enemy center(s) of gravity and features the necessary distributed and sequential operations--from start to finish--that will achieve the desired end state.

The third way that the operational commander's role is decisive is through his personal input to the operational concept. His plan must envision identifying the necessary pre-conditions to achieve success at the tactical level. As the case studies revealed, these pre-conditions might include gaining air superiority, the achievement of surprise, isolating the battlefield through operational fires or deception operations, interdicting lines of communication or acquiring

intelligence that discloses enemy dispositions and intentions. The plan must also result in gaining freedom of action--the ability to dictate the time and place of battle at the tactical level. As we observed in the CARTWHEEL Operations, MacArthur's plan to cut off and bypass fortified strongpoints left the Japanese with little room to maneuver. Ridgway's counter-offensive that featured deep and close operations backed by superior firepower matched his strength against Chinese weakness. During the 4th Chinese offensive, Ridgway, while holding the decisive points at Chipyong-ni and Wonju, had the freedom of action to maneuver forces to interdict Chinese supply lines and attack their flanks. Slim, despite adopting the tactical defense, maintained the initiative and freedom of action at Imphal-Kohima. Relying on air superiority to transport reserves and interdict Japanese supply lines while maintaining his own, he enticed the Japanese to spend themselves in fruitless attacks against strong positions.

The fourth way the commander plays a decisive role is by communicating his intent. Modern combat that involves far-flung, fast-moving, decentralized operations demand that the commander articulate his intent in a clear, simple manner and adjust it as necessary throughout the campaign. Most effective when summarized in a few sentences, the commander's intent must provide the direction for staff planning as well as providing

direction to the entire force. To be of any real use, the intent should not describe the concept of the operation, but should focus on the desired end state or purpose of the campaign.

The final way the commander plays a decisive role in planning is through his operating systems. It is essential as General Colin Powell observed during the recent Persian Gulf War, that the commander bring to combat all the tools in the tool bag.

Prior to a major operation, the commander must assess his operating systems in relation to the enemy and then get personally involved to offset imbalances. As the three case studies point out, one courts disaster when operating with inferior systems. Furthermore, as we observed with MacArthur, the commander must ensure that he selects the right leader to lead and manage his operating systems. A central feature in operational planning is the fundamental requirement to focus the effects of all available combat power at the desired point in distributed and sequential operations. Thus, the commander must provide the staff with enough guidance to integrate the operating systems into the overall plan. The purpose is to attain what General George S. Patton referred to as "harmony". Each instrument in an orchestra supports the others. To get "harmony" in battle Patton wrote, each weapon must support the other.¹⁴⁹

As war involves the realm of uncertainty, chance, danger and friction, the commander's ability to learn, anticipate and adapt plays a decisive role in the execution of a plan. The examples of Ridgway and Slim tell us that to rebuild a defeated army, the commander must first learn and understand the scope and depth of past failure. Then, he must breathe into the army a new spirit--that quality that Clausewitz indicates as "one of the most important moral elements in war".¹⁵⁰ To accomplish this feat, and to acquire the necessary information to make the critical decision on which the final outcome rests, the commander must operate from a forward location.

An operational commander's personal influence and moral effect significantly outweighs tactical command influence. To be sure, he has the potential to turn a defeated army around, to inspire exhausted troops to aggressively pursue a broken enemy, or to hold a vital position. Operating forward, he will escape the tyranny of the staff, see the terrain and can then draw his own conclusions. If he chooses to remain absent from the battlefield and operates from a distant command post located far from the sights and sounds of battle, he will lose the capacity to inspire soldiers. Inevitably, he will misread the situation. The end result will be something less than effective command influence.¹⁵¹

Thus, as the forces execute his plan to achieve the full effect of his moral influence, an operational commander must also anticipate and be present at the expected point of crisis. This enables him the opportunity to weigh the risks of altering plans and to act quickly enough to adapt to a changing situation.

The case studies also reflect that the experience, judgment and personal attributes of the commander weigh most heavily at the operational level. Having served in various positions at all levels, Slim, MacArthur and Ridgway brought to the battlefield a lifetime of command and staff experience. Moreover, they epitomize many of General Sir Archibald Wavell's essential qualities of generalship namely: robustness, physical and moral courage, health, the character and determination to get what is desired and fighting spirit.¹⁵² Significantly, each possessed Wavell's most important quality of all: the common sense and knowledge to know what is and what is not possible. It is this quality as Clausewitz writes that requires "first, an intellect that even in the darkest hour, retains some glimmerings of the inner light which leads to truth; and second, the courage to follow this faint light wherever it may lead."¹⁵³

Finally, the performance of Ridgway, Slim and MacArthur as they faced great adversity indicates the importance of willpower. Having determined his course of action, the operational commander must not only know that

his chosen path will bring the victory he seeks, he must have the willpower to persuade others to seek it as well.

As Clausewitz notes,

Once conditions become difficult, as they must when much is at stake, things no longer run like a well-oiled machine. The machine itself begins to resist, and the commander needs tremendous willpower to overcome this resistance...The ardor of his spirit must rekindle the flame of purpose in all others...the burdens increase with the number of men in his command...the higher his position, the greater the strength of character he needs.¹⁵⁴

In all probability, these three commanders spelled the difference between victory and defeat or prolonged stalemate. To be sure, their capacity to take dispirited, loosely-formed coalitions and mold them into effective, fighting forces and then to lead them from the brink of defeat to final victory represents true greatness.

- ¹ Martin Van Creveld, Command in War, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1985, 25-26.
- ² James J. Schneider, "Vulcan's Anvil: The American Civil War and the Emergence of Operational Art," (Monograph, School of Advanced Military Studies, 1991), 3. The author states, "under classical conditions armies concentrated their physical force at a single point like a fulcrum."
- ³ Gunther E. Rothenberg, The Art of Warfare in the Age of Napoleon, Indiana University Press, Bloomington, 1978, 46.
- ⁴ David G. Chandler, The Campaigns of Napoleon, Macmillan Publishing Company, New York, 1966, 432.
- ⁵ Ibid., 502. See also, Russell F. Weigley, The Age of Battles: The Quest for Decisive Warfare from Breitenfeld to Waterloo, Indiana University Press, 1991, 398.
- ⁶ Rothenberg, 47.
- ⁷ Ibid., 162.
- ⁸ See Chandler, 179. "At the very base of his [Napoleon's] thinking lay certain fundamental ideas; among the most important of these was the concept of the offensive battle--based on the all-out attack--which aims to end the war at one blow."
- ⁹ James J. Schneider, "Theoretical Paper No. 3: The Theory of Operational Art," (Monograph, School of Advanced Military Studies, 1988), 9.
- ¹⁰ Robert A. Epstein, "Patterns of Change and Continuity in Nineteenth Century Warfare," School of Advanced Military Studies, Ft. Leavenworth, 1991, 22-23.
- ¹¹ Ibid., 16.

- 12 For a discussion of the influence of the industrial revolution on civilization see J.F.C. Fuller, The Conduct of War, 1791-1961, Rutgers University Press, 1968, 77-94.
- 13 Schneider, Theoretical Paper No. 3, 9.
- 14 Robert M. Epstein, "Patterns of Change and Continuity In Nineteenth Century Warfare," 10.
- 15 See General Sir Archibald Wavell, "Generals and Generalship," Lecture delivered at Trinity College, Cambridge, US Army Military Institute, Carlisle Barracks, PA, 1941, 44.
- 16 See Martin Van Creveld, Technology and War, The Free Press, Collier Macmillan Publishers, London, 1989, 174. See also Creveld's Command in War, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass. 1985, 271.
- 17 Carl von Clausewitz, On War, translated by Michael Howard and Peter Paret, Princeton University Press, 1984, 177.
- 18 Schneider, "Vulcan's Anvil," 31.
- 19 Clausewitz, On War, 244, 260. See also John Gooch, Decisive Campaigns of the Second World War, Frank Cass and Company, London, England, 1990, 2. He states, "the outcome of the Second World War was not determined by any single decisive battle." See also, Crosbie E. Saint, "A Cinc's View of Operational Art," Military Review, Sept 1990, 65-78. He states, "I believe modern warfare has moved past the days of a single, climatic battle into a series of violent pockets of conflict."
- 20 Mikhail Tukhachevskiy, New Problems In Warfare, Art of War Colloquium, Department of the Army: US Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, PA. 1983 17.
- 21 Clausewitz, On War, 178. Clausewitz uses the term "strategy" to refer to the operational level.

22 Ibid., 177.

23 This definition of operational art is attributed to James Schneider.

24 Other authors reached a similar conclusion. See Major Gregory Gardner, Generalship in War: The Principles of Operational Command, School of Advanced Military Studies, Ft. Leavenworth, 1987, 1. See also John Vermillion, "The Pillars of Generalship," Parameters, Summer, 1987, 2-17. See FM 100-7, 1990, 2-2, The Army in Theater Operations, (draft), It indicates that the operational commander's role in campaign planning is to link theater strategy and tactical operations through the practice of operational art.

25 At the time of publication, General Saint is commander in chief of U.S. Army, Europe, Seventh Army and NATO's Central Army Group.

26 Crosbie E. Saint, "Commanders Still Must Go See," Army, June, 1991, 18-26.

27 LTG Downing has commanded the Ranger Regiment at Ft. Benning, and served in various command and staff positions in Special Operations Command.

28 Wayne A. Downing, "Training to Fight," Military Review, May, 1986, 18-26. See also, Joint Pub 1, Joint Warfare of the US Armed Forces, Wasington, D.C. 1991, 47.

29 William Slim, Defeat Into Victory, Cassell and Company, London, England, 1956, 210-211.

30 See William W. Hamilton, Operational Vision - An Essential Trait For Army Operational Commanders, School of Advanced Military Studies, 1990, 2. He states, "Operational vision is the trait that allows an operational commander to see the desired operational end in the form of a military condition and then synthesize a plan that gets to that end."

31 Clausewitz, 178.

32 Ibid., 178.

33 See Clausewitz, 572. He states, "Only the man who can achieve great results with limited means has really hit the mark."

34 Erich von Manstein, Lost Victories, Edited and Translated by Anthony G. Powell, Presidio Press, Novato, CA, 1982, 409. See also Crosbie Saint, "A Cinc's View of Operational Art," 67. He indicates that "the army group commander lives in future time...his decision cycle normally covers 72-96 hours out."

35 Clausewitz, 571-572.

36 See Dwight D. Eisenhower, Crusade in Europe, Doubleday and Co, Garden City, New York, 1948, 251. This was Eisenhower's observation shortly after making the decision to launch the invasion of Normandy. See also Manstein, op.cit., 409. See also E.K.G. Sixsmith, Eisenhower As Military Commander, Stein and Day, New York, 1973, 142.

37 Clausewitz, 213.

38 Eliot A. Cohen and John Gooch, Military Misfortunes, The Free Press, New York, 1990, 26. At the time of writing, Cohen and Gooch were visiting faculty members in the Strategy Department of the U.S. Naval War College, Newport, Rhode Island.

39 Ibid., 121.

40 Ibid., 161.

41 TRADOC PAM 11-9, Department of the Army: Headquarters, US Army Training and Doctrine Command, Ft. Monroe, Va, 1990, 12-13. The operating systems are the following: maneuver, protection, intelligence, fires, command and control, and support.

42 Clausewitz, 213.

43 See Clausewitz, 619. He states there are two tasks in planning: first, to identify the enemy centers of gravity and if possible to trace them back to a single one; second, to ensure that the forces to be used against that point are concentrated for a main offensive.

44 John Keegan, The Second World War, Viking Press, New York, 1989, 547.

45 M.R. Roberts, "The Campaign in Burma, 1943-45," RUSI Journal, May 1956, 236.

46 Ibid., 236.

47 Ibid., 241. Under an unusual command arrangement, all Allied ground forces operating in Burma were placed under General Slim. This included General Stilwell's Northern Combat Area Command. In effect, General Stilwell as the Deputy to Mountbatten was under Slim's operational control.

48 William Slim, Defeat Into Victory, (London: Cassell and Company, 1956), 169. Slim writes that immediately on taking over 14th Army he was confronted by three major anxieties--supply, health and morale.

49 Duncan Anderson, "Slim", in Churchill's Generals, ed. John Keegan, Grove Weidenfeld, New York, 1991, 312-313.

50 See Campaign Plan of the Fourteenth Army 1943-44, Combined Arms Research Library, Ft. Leavenworth, 1. Slim's tasks were as follows: secure all frontiers of Bengal and Assam; occupy north Burma up to the Mogaung-Myitkyina area; advance in the Arakan up to and inclusive of the road Buthidaung-Maungdaw.

51 Slim, 183-184.

52 Ibid., 189.

53 Keegan, Churchill's Generals, 315.

54 See campaign plan 14th Army, 3; See also Slim, Defeat into Victory, 235, 246-247.

55 Louis Allen, Burma: The Longest War, St Martin's Press, New York, 1984, 193.

56 Roberts, "The Campaign in Burma," RUSI, 245.

57 Slim, 291-292.

58 Slim, 301.

59 Keegan, The Second World War, 550.

60 See Slim 308-310. To the defenders of Dimapur he gave three tasks: prepare for defense and hold; reinforce Kohima and hold it to the last; prepare to receive reinforcements.

61 See Geoffrey Evans, Slim, William Clowes and Sons LTD, London, 1969, 152. The author states, "it was Slim's resilience and his determination to wrest the initiative from his opponent and having done so to take relentless advantage of it that eventually wore the Japanese down." See also Slim, 306.

62 See Evans, 176. He states that the Japanese lost 53,000 casualties. See also, Keegan, Churchill's Generals, 317. See Slim, 366. He called Imphal-Kohima "the greatest defeat in Japanese history." Slim and his three corps commanders, Christison, Scones and Stopford were later knighted after the battle. Both forces made changes at the top after the battle. See Allen, Burma: The Longest War, 391. After the debacle at Imphal-Kohima, the Japanese replaced all of their top commanders in Burma. The impact of the changes was significant. See Defeat into Victory, 390-391, as Slim eventually realized he was dealing with a new commander. See Evans, Slim, 185. Under a reorganization, Headquarters 11 Army Group disappeared and a new Headquarters Allied Land Forces South-East Asia under the command of LTG Sir Oliver Leese was formed to command all land operations against the Japanese in Burma.

63 See Slim, 382. See also Ronald Lewin, Slim: The Standardbearer, Leo Cooper, London, 1976, 192.

64 Allen, Burma: The Longest War, 392. See also 391. LTG Kimura commanded three armies: 33 Army (18 and 56 divisions); 15th Army, (15, 31 and 33 divisions); 28 Army (54 and 55 divisions).

65 Slim, op.cit., 393. See also, Lewin, Slim, 210-213. He states that Slim did not develop the new concept all by himself. It came about from a series of discussions with the staff. The importance of Meiktila cannot be overstated as a decisive point. Lewin calls it, "the ganglion or never-centre of Japanese operations in Central and Northern Burma." With that critical area secured, all enemy resistance along the upper Irrawaddy must crumble and 14th Army would be poised...for the race to the sea to capture a port in Southern Burma or Rangoon. See Slim, 393. His intention was as follows: In conjunction with N.C.A.C (Stilwell) destroy the enemy forces in Burma; to advance to the line Henzada-Nyaunglebin; to seize any opportunity to advance from that line and capture a South Burma Port.

66 Allen, Burma: The Longest War, 394. See also, Evans, Slim, 187.

67 See Slim, 485. He states, "I gave as my main intention the capture of Rangoon at all costs and as soon as possible before the monsoon."

68 Lewin, Slim, 234.

69 See M.R. Roberts, "The Campaign in Burma," RUSI. All that was left of the 250,000 strong Burma Area Army of May, 1944, was by May, 1945, assessed at just over 50,000.

70 Slim, op. cit., 115-121.

71 Ibid., 120.

72 Slim, 209. The principles were: The ultimate intention must be an offensive one; the main idea on which the plan was based must be simple; that idea must be held in view throughout and everything else must give way to it; the plan must have an element of surprise.

73 Slim, 368, 541.

74 For example, after the breakthrough towards Meiktila, Kimura did not know which way to reinforce, Meiktila or Mandalay.

- 75 See Charles F. Romanus and Riley Sunderland, The History of the China-Burma-India Theater: Time Runs Out in CBI, Department of the Army, Office of the Chief of Military History, Washington, D.C. 1958, 217-219. See also Lewin, 217-219, 228. See also, Evans, 213-214. See Slim, 397-400.
- 76 Slim, 474, See also Lewin, 226.
- 77 Slim, 293. See Combat Studies Institute Battlebook, "Imphal-Kohima," 28. See also, 14th Army Campaign Plan, 13.
- 78 Lewin, 157-159. See Evans 177.
- 79 Sun Tzu, The Art of War, Translated by Samuel Griffith, Oxford University Press, London, England, 1963, 65.
- 80 Clausewitz, 102-107.
- 81 Ibid., 108.
- 82 See Field Marshal William Slim, "Higher Command In War," Transcript of a lecture delivered before Command and General Staff College, Ft Leavenworth, 1952, I-47-157.
- 83 John Miller, The War in the Pacific, Cartwheel: The Reduction of Rabaul, Office of the Chief of Military History, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 1984, 1, 8. See also, Ronald H. Spector, Eagle Against The Sun, Random House, New York, 1985, 223.
- 84 D. Clayton James, The Years of MacArthur, Vol II, 1941-1945, Houghton Mifflin Company, Boston, Mass, 1975, 305.
- 85 Miller, 18.
- 86 Douglas MacArthur, Reminiscences, Mcgraw-Hill Publishers, New York, 1964, 191.
- 87 Miller, 26-27, See also, Spector, 226. See MacArthur, 182.

- 88 James, 312.
- 89 MacArthur, Reminiscences, 178.
- 90 Ibid., 170.
- 91 Ibid., 178. See also, Miller, 26.
- 92 George C. Kenney, General Kenney Reports, reprinted by Office of Air Force History, U.S. Air Force, Washington, D.C., 1987, 9-10, 27-28. See also D. Clayton James, 197-198.
- 93 Leary, 101. See also, James, 293-294.
- 94 Kenney, 102.
- 95 See James, 199. MacArthur said of Kenney, "Of all the brilliant air commanders of the war, none surpassed him."
- 96 Herman S. Wolk, "George C. Kenney," in We Shall Return, ed. William M. Leary, University Press of Kentucky, Lexington, Kentucky, 1988, 100.
- 97 See MacArthur, 178.
- 98 See James, op.cit., 327. The first major paratroop jump of the Pacific war, MacArthur accompanied the paratroopers and watched their performance from a B-17. See also, Miller, 194, 207-208. The seizure of Nadzab would have a three fold effect: it would provide an important air base, a base for the attack on Lae; it would help block any attempt by the Japanese to reinforce Lae from Wewak or through the Markham valley.
- 99 Kenney, 278-279.
- 100 Miller, op.cit., 213.
- 101 D. Clayton James, 329.
- 102 See Charles A. Willoughby, MacArthur, 1941-1951, McGraw-Hill, New York, 1954, 131.

- 103 See Eric Larrabee, Commander in Chief, Simon and Schuster, New York, 1987, 341. The author states, "MacArthur's decision to land there on February 29, 1944...displays him at his best: bold, resourceful, effective."
- 104 James, 381. See also, MacArthur, 204.
- 105 MacArthur, 204-205. James, 383-384.
- 106 Miller, 351.
- 107 Stanley L. Falk, "MacArthur and Japan," We Shall Return, op. cit., 14. See also Edward J. Drea, MacArthur's Ultra Codebreaking and the War against Japan, 1942-1945, University Press of Kansas, 1991, 78-81.
- 108 See MacArthur, 184. He states, "I anticipated a major effort by the Japanese to reinforce their garrisons at Lae and Salamaua...this was substantiated by numerous intelligence reports...I accordingly alerted our forces to be ready for a large-scale effort...to transport troops through the Bismark Sea."
- 109 Spector, 228.
- 110 MacArthur, 213.
- 111 Chris Rockwell, Operational Sustainment, Lines of Communication and the Conduct of Operations, School of Advanced Military Studies, Command and General Staff College, Ft. Leavenworth, 1987, 7.
- 112 Paolo E. Coletta, "Daniel E. Barbey: Amphibious Warfare Expert," We Shall Return, op. cit., 212-213.
- 113 For a masterful account of MacArthur's landing at Los Negros see William Manchester, American Caesar: Douglas MacArthur 1880-1964, Dell Publishing Company, New York, 1978, 394-396.
- 114 See Miller, 382.
- 115 See Roy Appleman, Disaster in Korea, Texas A&M University Press, College Station, Texas, 1989, 3. See also James F. Schnabel, United States Army in The Korean War, Policy and Direction: The First Year, Office of the Chief of Military History, Washington, D.C. 1972, 195-196. See also John Toland, In Mortal Combat, William Morrow and Company, New York, 1991, 233.

- 116 See D. Clayton James, Triumph and Disaster, 1945-1964, Houghton-Mifflin Company, Boston, 1985, 545.
- 117 James F. Schnabel, "Ridgway in Korea," Military Review, March, 1984, 3-13.
- 118 Frederick A. Hetzel and Harold L. Hitchen, "An Interview With General Matthew Ridgway," Western Pennsylvania Historical Magazine, October, 1982, 280-307. See also, Matthew Ridgway, The Korean War, Doubleday and Company, Garden City, New York, 1967, 82-83. See also Clay Blair, The Forgotten War: America in Korea 1950-1953, Doubleday, New York, 1987, 568-569.
- 119 D. Clayton James, op. cit., 546. See also Blair, op. cit., 569. Ridgway commanded a force of 350,000 consisting of three American corps comprised of seven divisions plus the 187th Airborne RCT; A ROK Army of three corps with nine divisions along with units from several countries. All in all, 163 infantry battalions. See also Ridgway, The Korean War, 101. MacArthur was largely content to sit in Japan and let Ridgway do the fighting. He had very little to do with the formulation of tactical plans.
- 120 See Matthew B. Ridgway, Soldier: The Memoirs of Matthew B. Ridgway, Harper and Brothers, New York, 1956, 204-205. See also, Joseph C. Goulden, Korea: The Untold Story, McGraw-Hill, New York, 1982, 433-434. See also, Robert C. Alberts, "Profile of a Soldier," American Heritage, February, 1976, 77.
- 121 See Ridgway, The Korean War, 87, 101. Ridgway states, "Every command post I visited gave me the same sense of lost confidence and lack of spirit." See also, Roy E. Appleman, Ridgway Duels For Korea, Texas A&M University Press, College Station, Texas, 1990, 145. See also Blair, op. cit., 586-587.
- 122 See Ridgway, Memoirs, 206-207. See also, Ridgway, The Korean War, 88-90. Ridgway moved the 8th Army staff out of permanent buildings into tents closer to the front.
- 123 See Clay Blair, op. cit., 572-573. See also Ridgway, The Korean War, 90-91. See also Goulden, 435-436.

- 124 Toland, 389.
- 125 See Ridgway, The Korean War, 102. He states, "The larger the command the more time must go into planning...by proper foresight and correct preliminary action, he, [the commander] knows he can conserve the most precious element he controls, the lives of his men...so he thinks ahead as far as he can."
- 126 Blair, 577.
- 127 Ridgway, Memoirs, 215-216. See also Schnabel, Policy and Direction, op. cit., 308. See also, Ridgway, The Korean War, 105.
- 128 See Ridgway, Memoirs, 207.
- 129 Appleman, Ridgway Duels For Korea, 152.
- 130 Blair, 653. See also Ridgway, The Korean War, 119. See also Appleman, 318. With an estimated 15-18,000 guerrillas operating in his rear area, Ridgway was continually forced to divert troops to reducing guerrilla activity.
- 131 Blair, 698.
- 132 Schnabel, Policy and Direction, 340.
- 133 Blair, 692. See also Ridgway, The Korean War, 106-107. See also, Toland, 402. See T.R.Fehrenbach, This Kind of War, Bantam Books edition, 1963, 370.
- 134 See Appleman, 304. This proved to be quite successful. On 15 February, in less than eight minutes, the gunfire of a light cruiser and three destroyers obliterated 8,000 Chinese troops.
- 135 Goulden, 450. See also, Blair, 704.
- 136 Blair, 695. Fehrenbach, 376.
- 137 Blair, 711.
- 138 See Ridgway, The Korean War, 111. Schnabel, 341.

- 139 See Matthew B. Ridgway, Generalship Study Questionnaire, Combined Arms Research Library, Ft. Leavenworth, 15 Nov, 1966, 3-6.
- 140 See Ridgway, The Korean War, 103.
- 141 See Appleman, 326. He states, "the aerial attacks were most feared by the enemy forces and they went to endless trouble to avoid their worst effect."
- 142 Appleman, Ridgway Duels For Korea, 316-317.
- 143 Ridgway, The Korean War, 113.
- 144 Appleman, 334.
- 145 Appleman, 334-335. Reflecting his ability to anticipate, Ridgway had engineer units concentrate near the Han River crossing sites ready to start repair work on the bridges and highways.
- 146 Schnabel 354.
- 147 See Toland, 420-421. Ridgway and his pilot were the first to arrive in the important communications center of Chunchon. Designated an Army objective to be taken by a combined airborne assault and armor linkup, Ridgway had to decide to continue with the scheduled drop or not. If the town was defended, the drop would go, if not, the drop would be cancelled. With the Cav approaching, Ridgway landed in the town to determine the extent of enemy opposition.
- 148 See Appleman 148. The author talked in Korea with hundreds of officers and men of all ranks about Ridgway's influence...almost without exception...all said that Ridgway made the difference in the war-that he prevented the Eighth Army from marching out of Korea, that he had singlehandedly given it new spirit in two months after he assumed command and had turned it around to face the enemy and then driven that enemy north out of South Korea. See also, T.R. Fehrenbach, 421-423.

149 Martin Blumenson, The Patton Papers 1940-1945, Houghton-Mifflin Company, Boston, 1974, 39.

150 Clausewitz, On War, 189.

151 See Tom Donnelly, "The General's War," Army Times, 2 March, 1992, 8, 12-18. See Blumenson, 133. Patton criticises the location of Eisenhower's headquarters in North Africa as, "100 miles from the front...too far by 95 miles." See page 138. Patton describes the effect later by stating, "Ike and Clark were in conference as to what to do...neither had been to the front, so showed great lack of decision." For a discussion of the effects of rearward command in war, see also J.F.C. Fuller, Generalship: Its Diseases and Their Cure, Military Service Publishing Company, Harrisburg, Pa., 18-22.

152 Wavell, op. cit., 41-43.

153 Clausewitz, 102.

154 Clausewitz 104-105.

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

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
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
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






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
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 90 DIVISION TO CHINA 16 DEC 1944
 92 DIVISION TO CHINA 16 DEC 1944
 94 DIVISION TO CHINA 16 DEC 1944
 96 DIVISION TO CHINA 16 DEC 1944
 98 DIVISION TO CHINA 16 DEC 1944
 100 DIVISION TO CHINA 16 DEC 1944

South and Southwest Pacific Actions January - October, 1943






**UN ATTACK
 REPULSE OF CHINESE 4TH PHASE OFFENSIVE
 ATTACK 25 Jan. - 22 Apr. 1951**



**CHINESE-NORTH KOREAN INTERVENTION
ATTACK**
FIRST AND SECOND PHASE OFFENSIVES
ATTACK THIRD PHASE OFFENSIVE
26 OCT. 1950 - 25 JAN. 1951



The Third Chinese Offensive

