



The Paradoxical Nature of State Making: The Violent Creation of Order

Author(s): Youssef Cohen, Brian R. Brown, A. F. K. Organski

Reviewed work(s):

Source: *The American Political Science Review*, Vol. 75, No. 4 (Dec., 1981), pp. 901-910

Published by: [American Political Science Association](#)

Stable URL: <http://www.jstor.org/stable/1962291>

Accessed: 26/03/2012 13:20

Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at

<http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp>

JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.



American Political Science Association is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to *The American Political Science Review*.

<http://www.jstor.org>

The Paradoxical Nature of State Making: The Violent Creation of Order

YOUSSEF COHEN
BRIAN R. BROWN
A. F. K. ORGANSKI
University of Michigan

The central argument of this paper is developed as a criticism of a widely accepted interpretation of collective violence in new states. It is shown that instead of indicating political decay, violence in these states is an integral part of the process of accumulation of power by the national state. To the degree that this power accumulation is necessary for the imposition or maintenance of order, collective violence also indicates movement towards political order on a new scale. Admittedly, our evidence is far from definitive. Nevertheless, it consistently contradicts the interpretation of violence as political decay and supports our interpretation of violence as a usual feature of the process of primitive accumulation of power.

The decisive means for politics is violence. . . .
Anyone who fails to see this is, indeed, a political
infant.

Max Weber

Order or Decay?

It was not all that long ago when writers on political modernization were optimistically postulating the existence of a positive, reinforcing relationship between economic growth and the emergence of stable, orderly polities in the developing world. Soon, however, this optimistic equation gave way before the intractable reality of increasing rather than decreasing levels of collective violence and political instability in the Third World. Theorists of political development began to modify and reorient their arguments. Now, rapid socioeconomic change was seen as a breeding ground of discontent, conflict, violence, and political instability. The obvious reality of violence and instability in Third World countries was taken to indicate that instead of developing, these states were, in fact, experiencing political decay.¹

This reevaluation of the prospects for political development in the Third World shifted the focus of developmental studies away from the dynamics of socioeconomic change and towards questions about the specifically political conditions for order and stability. The argument advanced was that if new states were to develop the capacity to

check the violence and instability inherent in socioeconomic modernization then they had to become differentiated, autonomous, centralized organizations with control over sufficient power resources to enable them to enforce order. That is, the more these states increased their power the less violence and disorder they would experience. In this view, state-making is associated with political order and an incapacity to develop state power with violence and political decay. This argument sounds convincing enough. Actually, it is seriously flawed.

By categorically juxtaposing order and decay and interpreting increases in collective violence as solely indicative of movement toward the latter, the argument seriously misrepresents the historical process of state-making. If political scientists who accepted this theory were to look at sixteenth- and seventeenth-century European history, they would no doubt conclude that the whole continent was caught in the grips of a process of political decay. The conclusion would not, of course, be entirely false, but neither would it be entirely true. For beneath the surface of violence, revolt, rebellion, war, and instability, something quite different from political decay was occurring. These were, after all, the centuries during which the proto-national states of Europe were decisively accumulating, centralizing, and concentrating the power resources necessary for effective territorial domination.²

We are grateful to Charles Tilly for his critical comments, and to Glenn Palmer and Samuel Evans for their technical assistance.

¹For an exhaustive history of the different views on political development see Huntington and Dominquez (1975). The major work indicating the reorientation of the field is Huntington's (1968, 1971).

²For a recent overview of the European experience of state-making see Tilly (1975), especially pp. 3-83, 601-38. Other synthetic works are Bendix (1964, 1968), Organski (1965), Anderson (1974) and Poggi (1978). Also see Carsten (1954), Rosenberg (1958) and Hintze (1975). The French history of state-making has been especially well analyzed. See Goubert (1970), Lublin-

It was a period of primitive central state power accumulation which continued well into the twentieth century. The entire historical process of creating a national state was a long and violent struggle pitting the agents of state centralization against myriad local and regional opponents. Monarchs, princes, lords, bishops, municipal oligarchs, and regional parliaments recurrently and violently confronted one another in a struggle for control over the means of administration and coercion. Peasants and artisans, solidly based in their respective communities, were increasingly mobilized into the fray, sometimes as allies of one or another of the "elite" contenders and sometimes as independent actors resisting the extractions of the proto-states and/or their opponents. As centralizing, war-making state builders increased their resource demands on their populations, the tax, food, and conscription riot often became the harbinger of much larger rebellions pitting nobles and peasants against the monarchical agents of national state centralization. By 1900 there were around 20 times fewer independent polities in Europe than there had been in 1500. They did not disappear peacefully or decay as the national state developed; they were the losers in a protracted war of all against all.

Many of the new states of today are engaged in struggles whose logic is similar to that of the European period of primitive central state power accumulation. The protracted conflicts between centralists and federalists in Mexico, between Java and the Outer Islands in Indonesia, and the linguistic and secessionist struggles of India all evidence antagonisms between central state-makers and subnational collectivities. The theoretical language of "cleavages"—ethnic, religious, tribal—tends to obscure their intimate connections with competitive political conflicts for control over the power resources of the respective territories and populations. Increasing central state claims for resources—for the material means of state-making and domination—intrude into and compete with preexisting structures of rights and obligations which tie those resources to subnational collectivities and/or "polities." Conflict, resistance, and violence are, as they were in Europe, often the result.³

Our argument is not that the specific actors,

patterns and modalities of conflict in new states, or their outcomes, are the same as they were in Europe. The fact that the European national state system did emerge and that the new states now occupy distinct positions within a developed capitalist world economy are enough to insure that such a parallel is unlikely. Nor are we contending that conflict and violence in the Third World can be reduced to struggles over the concentration and centralization of state power. The only point we are stressing is that a significant amount of the political violence in new states is a function of the conflicts inherent in the process of primitive central state power accumulation. But if this is true, how is it possible singularly and unambiguously to interpret collective violence as indicative of political decay?

The fact is that collective political violence, in and of itself, indicates neither order nor decay. To equate increasing violence with increasing political decay is to adopt an undialectical, historically inaccurate conception of the process of national state making. National state making is a historical process characterized by the creation of political order at a new spatial and institutional level. It involves the redistribution of the political control of power resources away from subnational collectivities and polities toward the central state apparatus. Historically, this centralization of power resources is a violent process which, if successful, leads to the creation of "order" at a new, more expanded level. In this case, then, violence can be seen as indicating a progression toward a political order of a qualitatively different kind rather than as political decay. The task is, therefore, one of correctly interpreting the significance of collective violence in the new states. The question we are posing in this article is in what ways and to what extent is the collective violence in new states a reflection or tracer of the process of national state-making and consolidation?

State-Making and Violence in New States

There is no systematic comparative study of state-making in new states. The available relevant information is spread over a multitude of case studies which do not have the process of centralization as their major focus. The little information we have, however, shows that the march toward the centralization of power has continued implacably in a number of the recently independent states. We know that the leaders of independence were deeply committed to the economic growth and political aggrandizement of their countries, and thus sought to expand the power of the state apparatus inherited from the colonizers. We also know that building an administrative apparatus that could penetrate more deeply into the national

skaya (1968), Salmon (1975), Coveney (1977) and Mousnier (1979).

³Good overviews of the connections between ethnic, religious, linguistic, and other primordial conflicts, and between those and state-making are Wolf (1969), Geertz (1973), Part IV, and Lewis (1974), Parts 2 and 3. For further references see the next section.

territory, and the repressive apparatus necessary to back it up, required a continuously expanding extraction of resources from the population. Such extraction, of course, not only perpetuated the old conflicts of the colonial state but also generated new ones.

Newly established states are likely both to exacerbate old conflicts and to create new ones by financing the expansion of the state apparatus through increases in the tax burden on the major producers of agrarian societies: the peasants. It is well known that the major driving force behind peasant involvement in the wars of independence was the peasants' anger at the immense tax burdens imposed by colonial regimes. Peasants expected to rid themselves of taxes as soon as foreign rulers left. Their hopes were, however, cruelly betrayed by the native rulers who replaced colonial despots. The imperatives of national aggrandizement required resources. Javanese peasants who wanted to "kill the Dutch because they impose[d] taxes" (Scott, 1976, p. 91) were soon to realize they had to kill their "liberators" to free themselves from taxes. Peasants fought back in the same way they had fought colonial states, and for much the same reason they had fought state-makers in seventeenth-century Europe. In the same way as European peasant communities resisted the king's officials, often led by the landed aristocracy, the villagers of the new states united against government claims, this time mostly under the guidance and protection of communist parties or other movements engaged in struggles with the central government.

In talking about India in the late fifties, Myron Weiner notes that one of the things uniting villagers was opposition to government orders they perceived as unjust. Weiner's explanation (1962, p. 146) of how the anger of the rural population at the extractive incursions of the state is linked to the national political struggle illustrates the pattern of conflict we have laid out above:

In fact, this capacity to unite in relation to the outside world is increasingly being tapped by political parties during general elections that cut across villages. In elections for state legislative assemblies and for the national Parliament, virtually all parties, including the Communists, emphasize those issues which appeal to villages as villages. Thus the Congress Party stresses the beneficial effect of its community development programs, of local irrigation works, new schools, new roads, and other rural improvements. The opposition parties criticize the government for high taxes, high food prices, for inefficient programs of grain procurement, for administrative corruption, and for lack of adequate credit facilities, irrigation works, or schools. In West Bengal, as elsewhere, rural demands are increasingly directed at the government not against

groups within the rural community. While leftist attacks on *zamindar's*, *jagirdar's*, and other types of landlords were common in the 1952 elections, the legal abolition of the landlord system in most states between the 1952 and 1957 elections eliminated this important class-struggle issue.

There are, of course, critical differences between the collective action of Asian villagers today and that of European peasants in the eighteenth century. But these differences should not be exaggerated. Almost echoing Weiner's remark is Rude's statement about seventeenth- and eighteenth-century European peasants (1980, pp. 54-55):

The more common feature of peasant revolt in the "age of absolutism" was the challenge to state or monarch over the payment of taxes rather than to the seigneur overdues and obligations, or even over personal servitude.

One of the crucial differences between eruptions of peasant resistance in new states and that in early modern Europe is that the former are more integrated into national power struggles. While the European aristocracy often took the lead in peasant resistance against the Crown, such resistance remained predominantly local.⁴ In new states, however, parties and groups competing at the national level integrate local resistance into national conflicts. Thus, while peasant resistance to state expansion is universal, the political and organizational character of the powerful allies of the peasantry changes.⁵ But, whatever the differences in the character of these allies may be, state expansion will always provide sufficient reasons for resistance to a number of local centers of power. As the centralizing and expansionist action of the French Crown of the seventeenth century provoked a violent reaction from the aristocracy, and that of the English Crown from the gentry and the Parliament, the same sort of action unleashes much violence against the central government in new states.

In trying to expand their power, the governments of new states may threaten or displease other centers of power in a number of ways. They may do so simply by failing to retribute favors, thereby having to face retaliation by the offended group. For example, the Moroccan government

⁴For the dispute about the relative importance of aristocratic leadership in peasant rebellions, see Mousnier (1958) and Porshnev (1963).

⁵For studies of peasant resistance against the state in a variety of times and places see Hobsbawm (1965), Moore (1966), Wolf (1969), Mousnier (1972), Lewis (1974), Scott (1976), Blum (1978), Rude (1980).

had to face much hostility from Riffian Berbers when it failed to reciprocate the substantial military help it received from them during the struggle for independence. In a somewhat more drastic vein, the newly formed central government can generate much conflict, and perhaps much violence, by corroding and redefining patterns of control over valuable resources. Such government initiatives typically unleash conflicts around constitutional issues. To the extent that the state apparatus is obviously controlled by a group of different ethnic origin from that of the group who stands to lose from the government's initiatives, these conflicts will also have an ethnic content. By the same token, such issues can also have regional overtones if the group suffering the consequences of government action derives its power from a control over the resources produced in a given region of the political unit. This is precisely what happened in Ghana when Nkrumah attempted to increase state revenues through a new Cocoa Ordinance which fixed cocoa prices for four years in a context of rising world prices. The main opposition to the ordinance came, of course, from the cocoa-growing Ashanti areas. Ashanti cocoa farmers organized a strong political opposition to the central government and its party, the CPP. They pushed for a federal rather than a unitary form of government for Ghana: "Under a federal system, farmers hoped to retain cocoa profits in the region and provide for themselves an economically prosperous, regional basis of power" (Harris, 1975, p. 65; see also Austin, 1964).

The bloody conflict between Java and the Outer Islands of Indonesia is another example of how central governments in new states can promote conflict and violence. In Indonesia, it was in the interests of Sukarno's government to drain resources from the rich Outer Islands to poor Java. Rather than reducing their control, in this case the state was denying the Outer Islands control over the resources they themselves produced. The result was armed revolt (Geertz, 1973; Feith, 1959). Many of these political conflicts can evolve into full-scale wars of secession. For they all in some way involve a potential challenge to the sovereignty of the state. Thus, long-standing political, social and economic grievances of the East Pakistani led them to revolt against the Westerners who controlled the state apparatus (see Merritt, 1969), and the persecution of Ibos by the powerful northerners in Nigeria led to Biafra (see Young, 1976, pp. 460-504).

All of these conflicts are defensive in nature; they are all brought about by the aggressive expansionism of the state. Although they do not necessarily involve violence, in new states they have usually generated a great deal of collective violence. This is so because new states are still in-

involved in the primitive accumulation and centralization of power resources. The result is that these states and their domestic opponents are locked into a vicious circle of increasing violence. Until these states accumulate the amount of power resources that will make the costs of antistate action prohibitive, their opponents will fiercely resist their extractive claims. Since state-makers are unlikely to give up their claims to sovereignty, they will tend to confront their opponents violently to ensure their control over the resources necessary for effective territorial domination. It is only if and when they achieve such domination that the level of violent interactions between the state and its opponents will significantly decline. Only at this point, if the state ever reaches it, will antistate mobilization become extremely costly and ineffective. It will then be much easier for the state to coopt or disregard its opponents' claims. But, of course, this point cannot be reached without the state and its opponents passing through the violent phase of primitive accumulation of power.

Theoretical Specification and Empirical Verification

If our reasoning is correct, we should expect expanding state power in new states to be highly correlated with collective violence: the greater the expansion, the greater the violence. This argument is quite distinct from the dominant theories concerning collective violence in new states. Most theorists have focused on socioeconomic transformations as the major determinants of collective violence in new states (Davies, 1962; Gurr, 1973). In contrast, our theory emphasizes political transformation—especially state-making—as a major cause of collective violence. We are not alone in our emphasis of state formation. Two other writers have done so: Samuel P. Huntington (1968) and Charles Tilly (1973, 1978). But their arguments are very different. While Tilly sees state-making as a violent process, Huntington views it as checking violence. Obviously, on this point, our view is closer to Tilly's. We are not, however, entirely in disagreement with Huntington's argument.

Tilly's argument is based on his investigations into the early phases of state-making in Western Europe, or what we have called the period of primitive accumulation of state power. His conclusion that state-making is a major cause of violence is appropriate for this early phase in the overall process of state formation. As we have already indicated, however, it is unlikely that this relationship will hold beyond the primitive level of state power accumulation. Beyond this level, Huntington's argument that state power operates

to reduce the overall level of collective violence is correct. The problem, however, is that he incorrectly applies this argument to states that are still in the primitive accumulation phase of state-making.⁶

The correct formulation, then, is that the extent to which an expansion of state power will generate collective violence depends on the level of state power prior to that expansion. Our hypothesis can therefore be stated in the following terms: other things being constant, the lower the initial *level* of state power, the stronger the relationship between the *rate* of state expansion and collective violence.⁷ Generally speaking, this hypothesis implies that new states attempting to increase the power resources of the state are likely to display a higher level of collective violence than old ones because they tend to be at much lower initial levels of state power. We shall now test this hypothesis.

We shall use tax revenues to measure state power. Government tax revenues in themselves are not very good indicators of state power because they also reflect, to a large extent, the wealth of nations. To control for differences in wealth, we shall use as a measure of state power the proportion of national wealth extracted by the state in the form of taxes. This proportion will be labeled "tax ratio." Since an increase in tax ratio is an increase in the state's share of the total resources of a nation, it indicates an increase in the power of the state relative to other centers of power—that is, it indicates an increase in the state's control over the power resources available in any given society. Thus, an increase in tax ratio is a manifestation of a restructuring of power relations, of a change in the balance of power of a society in favor of the state.

Given that our argument implies that new states are more violent than old ones because they are undergoing a process of primitive accumulation of power, we must first show that new states are indeed going through such a process. This can be done by showing that these states have in fact expanded their power after independence but that

they are still considerably less powerful than old, consolidated, states. To show this, however, we must first define "new" and "old" states. The term "new states" is usually used in very vague ways. It can be used to denote countries that have achieved independence after World War II or, more broadly, to denote countries which entered their *modern* phase, in all senses of the word *modern*, during the twentieth century. The latter sense is more common. The author of a widely quoted paper on "new states," Clifford Geertz, uses it in this broader sense (1973, p. 234, n. 1):

The term "new states" indeterminate to begin with, becomes even more so as time passes and the states age. Though my main referent is the countries that have gained independence since World War II, I do not hesitate, where it suits my purposes and seems realistic, to extend the term to cover states like those of the Middle East, whose formal independence came earlier, or even those, like Ethiopia, Iran, or Thailand, which in the strict sense were never colonies at all.

We might add that, according to this broader definition, Latin American states can also be defined as "new states."

Now, for both of these senses of the word "new," it can be shown that in fact new states have been, on average, expanding at least as much as old ones, but are considerably less powerful than the latter. To show this we divided the 105 countries for which we have tax series into four categories according to the date at which they became autonomous, if they were colonies at all. The first category contains all nations that became independent after World War II. The second, those who became independent during the nineteenth century or the early twentieth century. The third is reserved to old non-Western kingdoms and empires, like Iran and Afghanistan, who never were colonies in the strict sense of the word. In the fourth category are those European and North American states that were autonomous before the nineteenth century. Table 1 below shows how powerful—that is, how large—was the tax ratio of each of these categories of states both at the date of their independence and in 1975.

The conclusion that "new states" at the time of independence, or in 1950, were at a much lower level of state power than "old Western states" is inescapable. In 1950 almost 70 percent of the latter were very powerful while only 2 percent of those who became independent after World War II were so. None of the old non-Western states was very powerful, and only 22 percent of the states who became independent in the nineteenth and early twentieth century were very powerful. However, the fact that, with the exception of old non-Western states, most new states were of

⁶It should be noted that Huntington is not unaware of the fact that the process of institutionalization can be an extremely violent one. In his discussion of political change in traditional societies he compares China and Japan, Ruanda and Urundi, the Buganda and the Fulani-Hausa, precisely in terms of the violence of their process of political change. Yet in his theoretical formulations, he only speaks of institutionalization as checking collective violence.

⁷This does not mean, of course, that expanding states, or consolidated ones, do not break down, although this is relatively rare and generally related to international conflict. See Skocpol (1979).

Table 1. Power of Autonomous States (Percent)

Power Measured by Tax Ratio	States Independent after WW II		States Independent during 19th and Early 20th Century		Old Non-Western States		Old Western States	
	1950 or Year of Independence	1975	1950 or Year of Independence	1975	1950 or Year of Independence	1975	1950 or Year of Independence	1975
	Low 0-9%	33	9	23	10	71	29	0
Medium 10%-19%	65	66	55	45	29	57	34	25
High 20% or more	2	25	22	45	0	14	66	75
N =	(55)	(55)	(31)	(31)	(7)	(7)	(12)	(12)

Source: The components of our tax ratios come from World Bank and UN publications. The data were compiled by A. F. K. Organski and Jacek Kugler, *The War Ledger* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1980), Appendix 1 and will be available through the Inter-University Consortium for Political Research.

medium power rather than of very low power shows that much of the primitive accumulation of power was undertaken by the colonizers. Table 1 also shows that although in 1975 "old Western states" were still considerably more powerful than "new" ones, the latter had nevertheless become considerably more powerful. This means that new states had undergone considerable expansions in state power between the date of their independence, or 1950, and 1975. The substantial expansion of new states after World War II can be better seen in Table 2, where it is shown that new states almost doubled their state power.⁸

We must now show that it is the combination of low initial state power and high rates of state expansion in new states that makes them more violent than old states, which also had high rates of expansion but started from a much higher initial level of state power. In other words, we must test the hypothesis that, other things being constant, the lower the initial level of state power, the stronger the relationship between the rate of state expansion and collective violence.

The *World Handbook of Political and Social Indicators* provided our measures of collective violence.⁹ We used three indicators. Since we are

⁸A comparison between "new" and "old Western" states should be carried out with extreme caution. Additional extraction is much easier from a lower base. Consequently the 5 percent increase for "old Western" states is probably much more difficult than the 6 percent

increase of "new" states between 1950 and 1975 (see Table 2).

⁹The data were made available by the Inter-University Consortium for Political Research. The data were

Table 2. Average Tax Ratio by Type of State at Year of Independence, or in 1950, and in 1975 (Percent)

Type of State	Tax Ratio at Year of Independence or 1950	Tax Ratio in 1975	N
Independent after World War II	11	17	55
Independent in 19th or early 20th century	14	20	31
Old Non-Western	9	16	7
Old Western	21	26	12


Source: The components of our tax ratios come from World Bank and UN publications. The data were compiled by A. F. K. Organski and Jacek Kugler, *The War Ledger* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1980), Appendix 1, and will be available through the Inter-University Consortium for Political Research.

dealing with *collective* violence we used the only two event variables that involved violent interaction between the state and a sizable group of people: riots and armed attacks. These two variables were added and called "violent contention." The third variable is the number of deaths in conjunction with collective violence. The period covered runs from 1950 to 1965; that is, the variables will be the average number of deaths and collec-

tive contention between 1950 and 1965. The two last years (1966-1967) of the *World Handbook* series were excluded because the series of economic indicators necessary for our analysis stop in 1965. As for the rate of expansion of state power, the indicator used is the annual growth rate of tax ratio between 1950 and 1965.

Unfortunately, we have complete series for only 31 nations. We could have expanded the number of cases by decreasing the number of years involved. But the 16-year period we chose is already a short one for our purposes. We do not know what is the time-lag between state expansion and a violent reaction to it. We can only say that over a relatively long period of time state expansion will generate collective violence. Thus until further

originally collected by Charles L. Taylor and Michael C. Hudson (1976). Neither the original collectors of the data nor the Consortium bear any responsibility for the analyses or interpretations presented here.



Sources: Data on contention are taken from Charles L. Taylor and Michael C. Hudson, *World Handbook of Political and Social Indicators* (Ann Arbor, Mich.: Inter-University Consortium for Political and Social Research, 1976). Tax ratio data from A. F. K. Organski and Jacek Kugler, *The War Ledger* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1980), Appendix 1, and will be available through the Inter-University Consortium for Political Research.

Key: — Weak States (Tax Ratio: 0%–15%)
 Strong States (Tax Ratio: 16% or more)


Figure 1. Mean Average Collective Contention by Rate of State Expansion (1950-1965)

evidence is collected we shall have to content ourselves with a rather limited set of countries.

The relationship between the rate of state expansion and our two indicators of collective violence at different levels of initial state power—state power for autonomous nations in 1950—is shown in the graphs below.¹⁰

¹⁰We had to exclude from our analysis two countries, for which we had complete series, the Philippines and Colombia, because they had an extremely unusual ratio of deaths per contention. However, even if those countries had been included, our results would remain the same where contention is concerned, although they would be considerably weakened in the case of deaths.

Although the limited number of countries raises much doubt as to the conclusiveness of our evidence, the graphs above, together with Tables 1 and 2, clearly indicate that there is good reason to believe that it is the process of primitive accumulation of power that generates much of the violence in new states. In other words, it is the progression toward greater order itself that produces much of the relatively greater violence we find in new states. It could still be argued, of course, that our measure of state expansion is far from pure. After all, economic development involves structural changes, such as major improvements in communication systems, which greatly facilitate the extractive tasks of the state. Thus tax ratios might reflect, to a large extent, the level of



Sources: Data on deaths are taken from Charles L. Taylor and Michael C. Hudson, *World Handbook of Political and Social Indicators* (Ann Arbor, Mich.: Inter-University Consortium for Political and Social Research, 1976). Tax ration data from A. F. K. Organski and Jacek Kugler, *The War Ledger* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1980), Appendix 1, and will be available through the Inter-University Consortium for Political Research.

Key: — Weak States (Tax Ratio: 0%–15%)
 Strong States (Tax Ratio: 16% or more)

Figure 2. Mean Average Deaths by Rate of State Expansion (1950-1965)

economic development and expansions in tax ratios might therefore reflect economic change. This poses a serious problem for our interpretation. For, to the extent that the tax ratio is an alternative measure of economic development, we would merely be repeating the argument that violence is a function of economic modernization. To verify whether this was the case, we reanalyzed our data on expansion and violence for weak states, this time controlling for the annual rate of growth in GNP between 1950 and 1965. The results are presented in Table 3.

For the limited set of countries analyzed, our results indicate that tax ratios are not the same as the usual indicator of economic modernization. Furthermore, the evidence strongly suggests that the rate of economic development is related to both the rate of state expansion and collective violence in a way that runs contrary to the way postulated by the predominant view on such matters.

In the first place, state expansion seems to produce much more violence than economic growth. When we move from low to high state expansion, the "deaths" figure increases from 5 to 106 and from 16 to 46, while the corresponding movement for rates of economic growth is from 5 to 16 and from 106 to 46; the figures for contention show an equivalent pattern. Thus, not only state expansion produces more violence than economic growth, but the latter also seems to act counter to state expansion under conditions of high state expansion. Rather than state expansion being an antidote for the violence produced by economic modernization, our rather limited evidence shows that it is economic modernization which is the antidote to the violence produced by state expansion. This is much in line with common sense, which has it that the government, or any group, for that matter, will have less trouble cutting a greater slice of a growing pie.

Conclusion

The central argument of this article has been developed as a criticism of the standard interpretation of collective violence in new states. We have shown that instead of indicating political decay, violence in these states is an integral part of the process of the accumulation of power by the national state apparatus. To the degree that this power accumulation is necessary for the imposition or maintenance of order, collective violence is also indicative of movement towards political order on a new scale. Admittedly, our evidence is far from definitive. Nevertheless it at least consistently contradicts the interpretation of violence as political decay and supports our interpretation of violence as a usual feature of the process of primitive accumulation of power.

Since we took existing interpretations of violence as our starting point, we have focused our attention exclusively on the problem of political order in relation to violence. This in no way implies that we share the prevailing commitment to political order as the primary value of political life. To be sure, liberty and justice are at least as important as the achievement of political order. In the absence of effective liberty and justice, order will no doubt always be precarious and, perhaps, undesirable. For, as Saint Augustine remarked: "Without justice, what is government but a great robbery?"¹¹

References

- Anderson, Perry (1974). *Lineages of the Absolutist State*. London: New Left Books.
Austin, Dennis (1964). *Politics in Ghana*. London: Oxford University Press.

¹¹Quoted in Lane (1958).

Table 3. Collective Violence by State Expansion and Economic Growth for Weak States (1950-1965)

Rate of Economic Growth	Rate of State Expansion	
	Low (0-1.99)	High (2 or more)
Low (0-1.99)	5, 7	106, 47
High (2 or more)	16, 12	46, 18
N =	(12)	(8)

Sources: Data on violence are taken from Charles L. Taylor and Michael C. Hudson, *World Handbook of Political and Social Indicators* (Ann Arbor, Mich.: Inter-University Consortium for Political and Social Research, 1976). Tax ratio data from A. F. K. Organski and Jacek Kugler, *The War Ledger* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1980), Appendix 1, and will be available through the Inter-University Consortium for Political Research.

Note: Figures represent, respectively, mean average deaths and mean average collective contentions.

- Bendix, Reinhard (1964). *Nation-Building and Citizenship*. New York: Wiley.
- , ed. (1968). *State and Society*. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Blum, Jerome (1978). *The End of the Old Order in Rural Europe*. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press.
- Carsten, F. L. (1954). *The Origins of Prussia*. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
- Coveney, P. J., ed. (1977). *France in Crisis; 1620-1975*. Totowa, N.J.: Rowman and Littlefield.
- Davies, James C. (1962). "Toward a Theory of Revolution." *American Sociological Review* 27: 5-18.
- Feith, H. (1959). "Indonesia." In G. McT. Kahin (ed.), *Government and Politics of Southeast Asia*. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press.
- Geertz, Clifford (1973). *The Interpretation of Cultures*. New York: Basic Books.
- Goubert, Pierre (1970). *Louis XIV and Twenty Million Frenchmen*. New York: Vintage Books.
- Gurr, Ted Robert (1973). "The Revolution-Social Change Nexus." *Comparative Politics* 5: 359-92.
- Harris, Richard, ed. (1975). *The Political Economy of Africa*. New York: Wiley.
- Hobsbawm, Eric J. (1969). *Primitive Rebels*. New York: Norton.
- Huntington, Samuel P. (1968). *Political Order in Changing Societies*. New Haven: Yale University Press.
- (1971). "The Change to Change." *Comparative Politics* 3: 283-322.
- , and J. I. Dominquez (1975). "Political Development." In F. I. Greenstein and Nelson W. Polsby (eds.), *The Handbook of Political Science*, Vol. 3. Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley.
- Hintze, Otto (1975). *The Historical Essays of Otto Hintze*, ed. Felix Gilbert. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Lane, Frederic C. (1958). "Economic Consequences of Organized Violence." *The Journal of Economic History* 18: 401-17.
- Lewis, John W. (1974). *Peasant Rebellion and Communist Revolution in Asia*. Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press.
- Lublinskaya, A. D. (1968). *French Absolutism: The Crucial Phase, 1620-1629*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Merritt, R. L. (1969). "Noncontiguity and Political Integration." In James N. Rosenau (ed.), *Linkage Politics*. New York: Free Press.
- Moore, Barrington, Jr. (1966). *Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy*. Boston: Beacon Press.
- Mousnier, Roland (1958). "Recherches sur les Soulèvements Populaires en France avant la Fronde." *Revue d'Histoire Moderne et Contemporaine* 5: 6-113.
- (1972). *Peasant Uprisings in the Seventeenth Century: France, Russia, and China*. New York: Harper & Row.
- (1979). *The Institutions of France under the Absolute Monarchy 1598-1789*. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press.
- Organski, A. F. K. (1965). *The Stages of Political Development*. New York: Alfred A. Knopf.
- , and Jacek Kugler (1980). *The War Ledger*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Poggi, Gianfranco (1978). *The Development of the Modern State*. Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press.
- Porshnev, Boris F. (1963). *Les soulèvements populaires en France de 1623 à 1648*. Paris: SEVPEN; Ecole pratique des hautes études, 6^e section: Centre de recherches historiques: oeuvres étrangères, 4.
- Rosenberg, Hans (1958). *Bureaucracy, Aristocracy and Autocracy*. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.
- Rude, George (1980). *Ideology and Popular Protest*. New York: Pantheon Books.
- Salmon, J. H. M. (1975). *Society in Crisis: France in the Sixteenth Century*. London.
- Scott, James C. (1976). *The Moral Economy of the Peasant*. New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press.
- Skocpol, Theda (1979). *States and Social Revolutions*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Taylor, Charles L., and Michael C. Hudson (1976). *World Handbook of Political and Social Indicators*. Ann Arbor, Mich.: Inter-University Consortium for Political and Social Research.
- Tilly, Charles (1973). "Does Modernization Breed Revolution?" *Comparative Politics* 5: 425-47.
- , ed. (1975). *The Formation of National States in Western Europe*. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press.
- (1978). *From Mobilization to Revolution*. Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley.
- Weiner, Myron (1962). *The Politics of Scarcity*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Wolf, Eric R. (1969). *Peasant Wars of the Twentieth Century*. New York: Harper & Row.
- Young, Crawford (1976). *The Politics of Cultural Pluralism*. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press.