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The Presidential Election in Illinois: 2016 Compared to 2012 and 2008.

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The Presidential Election in Illinois: 2016

Compared to 2012 and 2008

By: John S. Jackson

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CARBONDALE **PAUL SIMON
PUBLIC POLICY INSTITUTE**

The Presidential Election in Illinois: 2016

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By: John S. Jackson

Paul Simon Public Policy Institute

Abstract

This paper describes and analyzes the 2016 general election results in Illinois and compares those results to the 2012 and 2008 presidential elections. The primary unit of analysis in this paper is the 102 counties in Illinois and the aggregate vote results at the state and county level. Those aggregate data voting returns are supplemented with statewide survey data taken from the Paul Simon Institute's periodic polls which allows an individual voter level of analysis to add to the aggregate data.

The paper also takes account of modern political science's developing narrative about what is happening geographically inside individual states and nationally in an era of deep partisan and ideological polarization coupled with the long term effects of the realignment of the nation's two major parties and the recurring political map which has evolved over the past three decades. The interaction and tension between the popular vote and the Electoral College vote was the dominant and determining feature of the 2016 election results. No other modern democracy has a national election system comparable to our use of the Electoral College as the final arbiter of who will be elected to the most powerful office in the world. The election of 2016 produced a disparity between the Electoral College and the popular vote and it was the second time this occurred out of the five presidential elections held in the 21st Century. This time, the discrepancy between the two outcomes was the largest in American history. This disparity makes an even more salient and compelling story than what would have already been a dramatic tale of the epic battle between Hillary Clinton and Donald Trump. They were two of the most diametrically different candidates to ever seek the American presidency and archetypes of the life-long political professional versus the totally inexperienced newcomer and outsider both of which are becoming the norm in other battles for governor, senator and mayor across the United States.

Introduction

Hillary Clinton

Hillary Clinton is a native daughter of Illinois and the first woman to gain the presidential nomination of a major American party. She was born in Chicago and raised in Park Ridge a middle class suburb of Chicago, she finished high school before going off to Wellesley for college. She then attended law school at Yale where she met Bill Clinton. After law school she followed Bill Clinton to his native Arkansas where they both taught at the University of Arkansas School of Law in Fayetteville from which he launched his political career and climb to state and then national office. Hillary Clinton's political career was built first in Arkansas for eighteen years and then in Washington, D. C. for eight years as First Lady in Bill Clinton's two administrations (Clinton, 2003).

Clinton then struck out on her own right, moving to New York in 2000 and winning the Senate seat there vacated by Daniel Patrick Moynihan. She won a second term in 2006 by a sixty-seven percent margin. Soon thereafter Clinton launched her own bid to win the Democratic nomination for president in 2008. She lost that nomination race after a long, contentious and protracted struggle with Barack Obama, also from Illinois, who not only bested Clinton in the primary contest but also went on to beat Republican John McCain in the general election of 2008 (See: Jackson, 2006, 2009, 2012, and 2013 and other books on 2008 including, Heilmann and Halperin, 2010, Balz and Johnson, 2009; Ceaser, Busch, and Pitney, 2009; Cohen, Karol, Noel, and Zaller, 2008).

Clinton then took on a larger role on the national stage in 2009 when President Obama offered her the position of Secretary of State in his first administration, one of the four most important cabinet positions in any administration. At the time Obama's offer to Clinton to be his Secretary of State led many observers to draw comparisons with that other famous Illinois president, Abraham Lincoln, when he assembled his first cabinet from "A Team of Rivals" (Kerns Goodman, 2005).

As Secretary of State, Clinton's political reach and her personal image and brand were then burnished, and ultimately bruised, by those four very high profile years as the nation's most senior diplomat and a leading voice especially for women and children on the world stage. When she left that office in 2013

65% of Americans held a favorable image of her (The Economist, October 22, 2016, 22). Her standing with world opinion was similarly high as polls taken in other nations found her to be one of the most admired women in the world.

Two years later she launched another bid to gain the Democratic nomination and the White House. By then several highly publicized and contentious public hearings had been held by the Congress on the Benghazi tragedy where four Americans, including the U. S. Ambassador to Libya, Chris Stevens, had died. Clinton's critics examined the incident in minute detail with probing questions about the State Department and Clinton's personal involvement in that tragedy. As one of the ancillary results of those hearings Clinton's favorable ratings declined precipitously in the wake of the constant drumbeat of negative publicity directed toward her. She began her quest for the Democratic nomination and run for the White House with a long history of public service and accomplishments but also carrying a load of political and personal baggage as well.

This paper will attempt to analyze how Clinton was able to build on the Obama record and coalition in Illinois, a state where they both could claim political roots and a state which has repeatedly been found to be one of the most typical in the nation (Ohlemacher, 2007). It will also show how Clinton's victory in Illinois in 2012, when compared to Obama's wins in 2008 and 2012, illustrates graphically both the strengths and weaknesses of both major parties in Illinois and throughout the United States as the nation contemplates a new era of unified Republican control under the leadership of Donald Trump. A basic contention of this paper is that the Clinton/Trump results in Illinois are a template for what happened in the entire nation in the 2016 presidential election. In addition, the trends which have been underway in Illinois at least since the turn of the 21st Century and the election of 2000 came to full fruition in the 2016 results and indicate quite cogently what is also happening in the nation as a whole. In short, Illinois is a bellwether and its politics an algorithm for understanding the electoral tides which moved the country to elect Trump president with 304 Electoral College votes while Clinton received a popular vote margin of almost 3 million votes (Calfas, December 20, 2016). This paper will explore and attempt to explain how that anomalous result occurred and what it says about the deep divisions which exist in American politics today.

Donald Trump

Donald J. Trump became the Republican Party's nominee after a brutal and hard fought battle which started with seventeen major candidates declared for the Republican nomination. He, of course, also went on to become the 45th president of the United States. One could hardly have scripted a more improbable scenario for Trump's march to the nomination and then the presidency. Trump's competitors included both sitting governors Chris Christie, from New Jersey, John Kasich, of Ohio, and Scott Walker of Wisconsin and former governors Jeb Bush of Florida, Mike Huckabee, of Arkansas, George Pataki of New York, Bobby Jindal of Louisiana, and James Gilmore of Virginia. (Most of this section is taken from an earlier paper I did on the nominations process. See: Jackson, 2015). It also included most prominently, several young and ambitious first term senators, Ted Cruz of Texas, Marco Rubio of Florida and Rand Paul of Kentucky. The only veteran U.S. Senator running was Lindsay Graham whose campaign had a hard time getting started and did not last long. From the private sector there were two newcomers beside Trump, Ben Carson a retired neurosurgeon from Ohio and Carly Fiorina, a business woman from California.

The three candidates who had no prior governmental experience ran on their business and professional achievements. They also pledged to "run government like a business," which is an always popular mantra in American politics no matter how unrealistic and inappropriate the analogy may be (Joyce, December 14, 2016). Of those three, however, two fell by the wayside rather early while Trump rode a wave of alleged voter anger and desire for a change to a most unlikely victory, first in the nominations contest against mostly veteran Republican opposition and then against Clinton, arguably the candidate with the most high level governmental experience in the modern era of presidential politics. This paper tells the story of how Clinton won Illinois, but it also tells the obverse side of the coin, that is how Trump won the country while losing most of the urban areas and many of the big states like Illinois. The big urban Rust Belt states that Trump won, Pennsylvania, Ohio, Michigan, and Wisconsin, were keys to his victory. Those states resemble Illinois in their basic geographic and demographic patterns although the Democrats retained Illinois while failing in those other very similar states.

The perennial narrative of the American people being “fed up” with Washington and longing for an “outsider” not from Washington, was advanced early and often by all of the candidates who were not currently in federal office and repeated faithfully and uncritically by the mass media. No one delivered that message better than Trump who rode to victory on his pledge to “drain the swamp” of Washington if he was elected. Most pundits and those who study presidential campaigns failed to recognize just how virulent this quest for an outsider, or a change agent, would turn out to be first in the nominations race and then in the general election.

The media and all the Republican candidates talked a lot about the desire for a change and the anger of some Americans although just what they were supposed to be angry about was ill-defined. The nest of issues related to globalization of the economy, loss of American jobs because of international trade, and fear of immigrants usually topped the list. Fear of domestic terrorism was also a major issue and that fear was intimately tangled up with the immigration control issue. Trump seized on these themes and developed a motto promising to “Make America Great Again” and a complete narrative around how being tough in general and being smart and aggressive in negotiations with our allies and enemies alike could accomplish that promise.

This narrative about how the nation was weak and falling behind our competitors for a lack of good leadership found a responsive popular audience and carried Trump through the Republican primaries and the general election contest with Clinton all the way to the Oval Office. He was the most unconventional and inexperienced candidate to win the nomination of a major party, let alone the presidency, in American history. This paper explores how Trump won it all nationally while losing to Clinton in Illinois and what this pattern of wins and losses tells us about the shape of the divided electorate and polarized American politics here near the end of the second decade of the 21st Century.

Trump was a real estate entrepreneur who had inherited a small fortune from his father (The remainder of this section taken from Jackson, 2016, 11). He parlayed that inheritance into a much larger real estate empire making his signature “Trump” name a landmark on many high profile trophy properties in New York City, Atlantic City, Miami, Chicago, San Francisco, and Los Angeles. He

often boasted about how rich he was as proof of his business acumen. He variously reported his net worth to be between eight and ten billion dollars although there were questions raised in the media about just how he had calculated those figures and how accurate they were. There was no log cabin to penthouse mythology in Trump's appeal although he claimed the Populist mantle quite successfully in the end. One might think that a billionaire real estate developer who lived in a palatial tower bearing his name in large letters on Fifth Avenue in New York would be an unlikely hero for working class and rural America; however, that is exactly what happened.

Trump also developed the image and persona of being somewhat of a character with his flamboyant orange hair permanently fixed in a painfully obvious comb over that became the butt of endless late night comics' jokes. His stints as a reality television impresario, especially with his show "The Apprentice" made him a familiar figure on American television, which is one of the most important assets all candidates seek. When it comes to a recognizable name brand and a well-developed image, hurdles which are very hard to clear for many candidates, Donald Trump already had those obstacles covered when he officially entered the race on June 16, 2015.

Trump was at the head of the class of "non-politicians" who sought the nomination in 2016, and who often pop up and then fade quickly in presidential and governors races. However Trump did not fade. On the contrary the longer he ran the stronger he got. That was true in the primaries and then became true again in the general election which ended with him being elected on November 8th as the 45th president of the United States. When he won the Republican nomination he had beaten sixteen other candidates, most of whom were well known and experienced political leaders with many years of public service and several high level elected offices on their records. When he won the presidency he beat Hillary Clinton who had been a national figure for twenty five years and a First Lady, Senator from New York, and Secretary of State in the first Obama administration. No more improbable set of accomplishments could have been imagined when this election season began in 2015.

Clinton and Obama in Illinois

One premise of this paper is that a careful comparison of the Clinton and Obama races in Illinois will be instructive in analyzing the prospects of both major parties in Illinois and the nation. The Democrats lost the presidential race and with it any hope of controlling Congress in November of 2016 and ultimately will lose the control of the Supreme Court as well. The Republicans now have the luxury of unified control of the entire federal government and with that virtually complete power over all three branches of American government for the foreseeable future. The Democratic Party's future is now much debated and speculated about as they try to accommodate to the new power equation in Washington and to their status as the loyal opposition.

It is always difficult for a party to attain a third consecutive term and it has only happened four times since the turn of the 20th Century, i.e. in 1908, 1928, 1940, and 1988 (Jennings and Niemi, 2013, 239-241). The barrier against third terms for the same party is so great it constitutes one of the most important variables in the various formulas that political scientists use in constructing statistical models of who will win the presidency and what the most important causal factors are (Abromowitz, 2016). In many respects as Obama acknowledged while campaigning for Clinton in September of 2016, a first Clinton term would help validate Obama's two terms and constitute something of a referendum on his record. As he and First Lady Michelle Obama campaigned enthusiastically for Clinton, it was evident that they considered a victory for her to be an important part of his legacy. At minimum a Clinton victory would provide much more continuity than the dramatic changes which would inevitably come with a Trump presidency.

This study is an extension of two earlier papers I published in The Simon Review series on the Obama victories in Illinois in 2008 and 2012 (Jackson, 2009; 2013). It is also an extension of another longer term research program I have pursued since 1972 covering all the presidential primaries, conventions and general elections since the beginning of the reform era in presidential politics (Jackson, 2015). These papers and that book, which are filled with longitudinal data, attempt to document what has happened in Illinois, one of the most typical states, a microcosm of the nation and a bellwether of the national political trends in an era marked by growing partisan and ideological polarization and the resulting gridlock in our state and national politics.

Hillary Clinton's rise to political fame and power is in many ways very conventional and illustrates the typical path to the White House which has been taken in the past by the many other ambitious politicians who have become major party nominees. She is the kind of experienced and seasoned political leader who frequently seeks the keys to the White House from a power base in the upper reaches of power in national politics.

Of course, she is also quite different in that she is the first woman and the first former First Lady to seek and win a major party nomination in the two hundred and twenty seven years of American presidential history. From that distinction she will always have a firm place in American history as an accomplished Illinois native. In that sense she also resembles Obama who was a pioneer in similar respects as the nation's first African American president. Clinton's and Obama's political odyssey are something of the mirror images of each other. Obama was born in Hawaii and then settled in Illinois after graduation from Columbia University. He built his political career with grassroots community organizing on the south side of Chicago and then service in the Illinois State Senate for eight years (Jackson, 2009).

Clinton's political path is more like that of fellow Illinois native, Ronald Reagan, who was born in Illinois but left the state as a young man to travel, first to Iowa and then to California where he built his political career as a two term governor before winning the presidency in 1980 and 1984. Both Abraham Lincoln and Ulysses S. Grant were elected from Illinois but were born in Kentucky and Ohio respectively. Adlai Stevenson was Governor of Illinois for two terms when he won the Democratic nomination and ran against Dwight Eisenhower in both 1952 and 1956, but he lost both of those elections and even failed to carry Illinois both times. So, Clinton's electoral record is most like Stevenson's although she did manage to carry her native state handily, as did Obama before her (Stanley and Niemi, 2013, 239-241).

In building their political base and attaining the party's nomination and then the presidency, however, Clinton and Obama's victories in Illinois were very similar in ways which illuminate the continuity in Illinois and national politics. Their political support base, and the opposition which they encountered and engendered, are similar and are very indicative of the deeply polarized politics in

both the state and nation which has been the hallmarks of modern American politics, especially since the turn of the Twenty-First Century.

Hillary Clinton and Barack Obama have been at the vanguard of the major demographic and political changes taking place in American politics during the first two decades of the 21st Century, and their candidacies are marked by significant continuity from 2008 to 2016. We will look at the continuity and the change in the voting data from Illinois over those three presidential elections which have seen Illinois presidential candidates running in the eye of the political maelstrom during this turbulent and fascinating era in our nation's politics.

The Data Analysis

The Aggregate Data Analysis

The first thing that seems most notable about the 2016 results in Illinois is how handily Clinton won the statewide vote and electoral vote. If Illinois had been the clear national bellwether we usually are, she would be managing her transition team and organizing her government now. In addition, the Democrats would probably have control of the Senate although the Republicans would have undoubtedly continued to control the House.

Instead, Trump and the Republicans won the Electoral College vote by a seventy-seven vote margin although Clinton won the popular vote. In that respect Illinois followed the national trends, although the Clinton margin in Illinois was significantly larger than it was nationwide. Clinton won 55.8% of the popular vote compared to Trump's 38.8% in Illinois (Illinois State Board of Elections, 2016). However she only won a plurality of roughly 2.8 million popular votes, or 48.2 % to 46.6% of the national total (Calfas, December 20, 2016).

The Democrats picked up one of only two Senate seats they netted nationally when Tammy Duckworth unseated incumbent Republican Mark Kirk by a healthy margin of 55% to 40% (Illinois State Board of Elections, 2016). In addition, the Democrats also added one U.S. House seat when Brad Schneider beat Republican incumbent Robert Dold in the tenth district, a northern suburban seat including parts of Cook and Lake Counties. In spite of the national victory for Trump, the Illinois Republicans did not take away any incumbent Democratic U. S. House seats. This is partially because all the remaining seats in Illinois were pretty

reliably in a red or blue district since the state is so polarized geographically as is the nation based on the partisan gerrymandering which occurred after the 2010 Census. Unlike the gerrymandering in the nation as a whole which strongly favored the Republicans, the new Illinois map drawn after the 2010 census favored the Democrats.

The trend toward statewide victories for the Democrats in Illinois continued with Susana Mendoza taking the Comptroller's office away from Republican Leslie Munger by a 49.4% to 44.4% margin (Illinois State Board of Elections, 2016). Thus, at the presidential level, U.S. Senate level, the Comptroller level, and to a lesser extent the U. S. House level the Democrats did well in Illinois on November 8th.

The night was not a total loss for Illinois Republicans, however, since they gained a net of four Illinois House seats and a net of two Illinois Senate seats. The proxy war between Governor Bruce Rauner and his nemesis, Speaker of the House Michael J. Madigan was close to a toss-up with a small margin going to the Governor. Both sides spent unprecedented amounts of money, but the Governor and the Republicans almost doubled the total spent by the Democrats. While Speaker Madigan, lost his nominal super majority, he still controlled 67 seats and Senate President John Cullerton controlled 37 seats in the Illinois Senate. While the nation was going for Donald Trump over Hillary Clinton by a majority of the Electoral College votes Republicans in Illinois had much to celebrate about their national victory, however the overall results in Illinois must have been something of a disappointment to them after all the money which had been spent on their behalf left the General Assembly in firm control of the Democrats. With the 2018 statewide elections now looming, however, the Republican Party showed real strength in 2016 which they could build on in 2018 especially with Governor Rauner at the head of their ticket and with the amounts of campaign money he has access to.

Next we are going to view the map of Illinois from a more micro perspective. That is, we move from the statewide view to the county as the level of analysis. Illinois has 102 counties and it stretches from the Wisconsin border on the north to Kentucky and Missouri on the south and from Iowa to Indiana on the west and east. It is made up of small towns, small to medium sized cities and

vast rural areas, which constitute northern, central, western, and southern Illinois.

Illinois also encompasses the crowded city of Chicago and the growing suburbs of Cook and the five Collar Counties in the northeast. Cook County alone contains a total of 41% of the population of the state with 21% being inside of the city and 20% being outside in suburban Cook. The five Collar Counties of Lake, McHenry, Kane, DuPage, and Will make up 24% of the total. They are also where the most growth is occurring in Illinois. The five collar counties plus suburban Cook and the City of Chicago are collectively called “Chicagoland,” and together they constitute 65% of the state’s total population. The remaining 96 counties of “Downstate” account for 35% of the Illinois population. Consequently, if a candidate can win the City of Chicago, and a sizeable block of the suburbs, he or she can pretty well count on a statewide victory even without much help from the other ninety-six of the Downstate Counties.

Table 1		
REGION	POPULATION	% OF STATE TOTAL
Chicago: Central City	2,695,598	21%
Suburban Cook	2,499,077	20%
DuPage County	916,924	7%
Lake County	703,462	6%
Will County	677,560	5%
Kane County	515,269	4%
McHenry County	308,760	2%
"Downstate" 96 Counties	4,513,382	35%
Table 2		
Change Between 2000-2010		
Chicago: Central City	-6.9%	
Suburban Cook	0.7%	
DuPage County	1.4%	
Lake County	9.1%	
Will County	34.9%	
Kane County	27.5%	
Mchenry County	18.7%	
"Downstate" 96 Counties	4.3%	

United States Census Bureau 2010 Data
<http://www.census.gov/2010census/data/>

The fact that Clinton won Cook and the suburbs (except for the exurban county of McHenry) so strongly, and added to this total another seven mostly large counties allowed her to score the comfortable victory she enjoyed in her native state. Clinton won the counties which contain nine out of the top ten cities in population size. The only exception to her large county victories was Sangamon County and Springfield, the state capital. Of the seven other counties Clinton won, three, DeKalb, Champaign and Jackson, contain major state

universities. The others are home to small to medium sized cities and urban areas (Winnebago on the Wisconsin border in the far north with Rockford as its center, Rock Island and the Quad Cities, Peoria, the home of Caterpillar and Bradley University and St. Clair in the urban Metro-East area with Belleville as its biggest city).

However, the fact that Trump won 90 total counties, covering a very large percentage of the total geography of the state, is indicative of his much larger victory tallied in the whole United States with sizable majorities in the Outstate regions (See Appendix A; also, Barone, December 15, 2016). As one can see from Appendix B, the total map of Illinois looks like a sea of red with a large blue land mass quite evident in northeastern Illinois and a few islands of blue widely interspersed throughout the rest of the state. It was Trump and his supporters who woke up excited and savoring victory on November 9th and Clinton and her supporters who woke up with a hangover, demoralized and depressed and wondering what just happened.

This paper provides a part of the answer even though it is based on Illinois a blue state where Clinton won handily. The places she won, and the other places and groups that provided the Trump victory are evident in the data from Illinois. They are just magnified throughout the entire map of the nation and Illinois remains a microcosm of the nation as a whole and the trends which are marking our very polarized nation. The 2016 presidential election results in Illinois are a template for the very similar national results and the patterns of support for the two candidates are indicative of where the two major parties stand currently and how they have evolved in the early parts of the 21st Century (Appendix A and B).

As the data provided here indicate, at the aggregate level there is a deep geographical polarization reinforced by ideological, partisan, cultural, racial, religious, class, and ethnic divisions which are pervasive at the individual voter level and which are unlikely to be erased by one presidential election or the first Trump administration. Indeed, the tenor, content and conduct of this past election are likely to have exacerbated the deep polarization of this country and are likely to be projected into the foreseeable future. The Republicans have gained a working majority in the House and Senate, control of the White House, and the ability to dominate the Supreme Court and the federal judiciary for the

next generation. Whether they can use their newly minted unified government to unify the country remains to be seen.

The Individual Level Data Analysis

In the section above we examined the aggregate voting returns for the United States and for Illinois. There are many things that aggregate data can reveal and many advantage to such an analysis. Geography is of basic importance in understanding American politics and aggregate data reveal our geographic divisions in graphic detail. It is particularly important in analyzing presidential election returns because of the unique institution of the Electoral College and the pivotal position it holds in determining who wins the presidency.

The geographic subdivisions, states and counties, also reveal the remarkable continuity in American politics which show that there is great continuity between elections and the changes are usually marginal and incremental (Key, 1949; Key, 1966; Bishop, 2008; Gelman, 2008; Levendusky, 2009). But aggregate data also have their limitations. The analyst cannot use aggregate data effectively to focus on the individual level characteristics of the respondents which can only be indirectly inferred from such data. It takes survey data to provide a more precise micro level look at questions of what kinds of people turned out to vote for which candidates (Kramer, 1983).

Fortunately, we do have survey data which are relevant to answering such questions for Illinois voters. Since 2008 the Paul Simon Public Policy Institute has been conducting statewide polls on government, politics and public policy questions in Illinois. Most of the surveys have relied on a sample of 1,000 registered voters. The institute has completed ten such statewide polls and published their results (Jackson, Leonard, and Deitz, 2016). Taken together these polls provide a rich resource of longitudinal data on this important Midwestern state.

The survey we will rely on here is the one taken statewide from Tuesday, September 27 through Sunday, October 2, 2016. The overall poll included 1,000 registered voters and had a margin of error of 3.1 percentage points.

The timing of the poll was based on our need to start after the first presidential debate which was held on September 26th. This was a debate which

drew an unprecedented audience with an estimate that over eighty million viewers watched it on television or on a mobile device. It was widely considered to be a victory for Hillary Clinton according to most pundits and the scientific polls taken after the debate ended (Saad, October 20-12, 2016). Our survey entered the field the evening after the first debate and took most of that week to complete. It probably caught the upswing toward Clinton which started at that point in the campaign when she began to open up a significant lead in the polls, a lead which only increased and grew after the second and third debates both of which the scientific polls also estimated that she had won.

In some respects it would have been better to have a poll taken closer to the November 8th election since it is well recognized that people can change their minds and some are undecided up until the day they vote. However, in the case of the 2016 presidential election, this is not an insurmountable obstacle to using poll data taken a month before the final vote. For one thing early voting has made it possible for millions to cast their ballot well before the official day of the election. Early voting in Illinois started on September 29th, the week in which our poll was in the field.

In addition this is such a polarized era that the vast majority of Americans made a relatively early decision and knew who they would vote for, based on party identification, ideology and reaction to the candidates' images. In our poll we found less than ten percent who said they were undecided about their choice for president. So, overall there no disqualifying arguments against using data taken from a poll done in late September and early October for the analytical purposes pursued in this paper.

Our question regarding voting intention is the simple one used by all pollsters, i.e. "If the election for president were being held today, would you vote for [Trump, Clinton, Johnson, or Stein, with the order of the candidates rotated randomly]. The results are provided in Table 3.

Table 3

Presidential Vote Intentions

Trump	27.9%
Clinton	52.7
Johnson	5.2
Stein	1.5
Someone else	3.1
Don't Know	9.7

N=950 Note: This question was not asked of those who said they would probably not vote. Undecided Leaners were included in the totals for each candidate.

These results presaged a fairly handy victory for Hillary Clinton in her native state. 52.7% chose Clinton in our poll; 27.9% chose Trump, while Johnson at 5.2% and Stein at 1.5% divided the third party vote with 9.5% remaining undecided at this point. It is interesting to note that this order is the same as the final statewide aggregate vote count although the totals for each candidate increased because of late deciders. As was indicated earlier, the final results showed that Clinton took 55.8%; Trump 38.8% with Johnson at 3.8 % and Stein at 1.4% (Illinois State Board of Elections). Obviously, Trump did better than our poll projected by a margin of 10%, and this is undoubtedly because the undecideds voted disproportionately for Trump and most of the Republican identifiers who had been wavering, ultimately went home and voted for Trump. However, at 38.8% in the final tally of the vote Trump only marginally exceeded what might be considered the core base of the Republican coalition in Illinois. Clinton by contrast achieved 55.8% in the final vote which is only 3% higher than our poll found supporting her at approximately one month out. Our Illinois poll provides some evidence for the proposition that Clinton did not gain the support of a lot of late deciding voters in the last four weeks of the campaign and the late deciders disproportionately went to Trump.

We turn next to an analysis of the three great geographical divisions of Illinois politics, that is, the differences between the City of Chicago, the suburbs

which are composed of Cook County outside the city plus the so called “Collar Counties” of DuPage, Lake, Kane, Will, and McHenry counties. The remaining ninety six counties are lumped together as “Downstate” (Colby and Green, 1986). Table 4 provides these results.

Table 4

Presidential Vote Intentions by Geographical Division

	<u>Chicago City</u>	<u>Suburbs</u>	<u>Downstate</u>
Trump	19%	25%	39%
Clinton	66	56	38
Johnson	6	5	4
Stein	2	1	2
Other/Don't Know	7	13	16

The overall macro geographical analysis of any Illinois election now rests on the well documented generalizations that Central City Chicago is a historic stronghold for the Democratic Party; much of Downstate is a stronghold for the Republican Party, and the balance of power, as well as most population growth in Illinois lies in the suburbs (Ibid). These widely shared expectations about how Illinois votes are borne out and reinforced by the results in Table 4. Nationally it is widely recognized that there are “blue states” and “red states”, i.e. those which historically vote for the Democrats and the Republicans respectively and which can ordinarily be favored to win those states routinely (Bishop, 2008, Gelman, 2008). Illinois has been regarded as a dependably blue state since 1992 when Bill Clinton bested George H. W. Bush in the Prairie State that year. The last time the Republicans won Illinois in a presidential election was when Bush beat Dukakis in 1988.

Inside the states there are also blue counties and regions and red counties and regions which are just as dependable for their parties no matter what the state-wide results are or what the context of the particular campaign is. Some Illinois counties have been voting reliably Republican, or before that Whig, since

Abraham Lincoln was running for office. In Illinois the City of Chicago is deep blue, most of the Downstate counties are red, and the suburbs are purple since they are more diverse and less dependable for either party.

Clearly Clinton ran away with the responses in Chicago with two-thirds of the respondents to our poll saying they planned to vote for her. Downstate was very close, but there the usual expectations held with Trump enjoying a slight lead of 39% to 38% in our poll. The swing counties of the suburbs, however, show where elections are won in Illinois. There Clinton was projected to do very well sporting a 56.5% to 25.5% lead over Trump at that point in the fall campaign.

Comparisons with the final vote tally provided by the Illinois State Board of Elections show that our projections were not far wide of the final mark. There is a widely shared expectation in Illinois politics that a Republican will get beaten in the City of Chicago, and the Democratic candidate will get beaten Downstate. The relevant questions are ordinarily about turnout and about how much each party will win or lose in those two predictable areas. The payoff answer, however, is in suburban Chicago. There we see from these results that Donald Trump at the time of our poll was doing very poorly for a Republican candidate. He lost those Collar Counties and suburban Cook County by a wide margin in our poll and as it turned out he lost Cook and four of the five Collar Counties in the final vote.

It is also true that this level of loss in urban and suburban America is the key to the size and the contours of Trump's deficits (and strengths) nation-wide which resulted in Clinton winning the popular vote by almost three million votes. It is important to note also that Clinton's loss in the rural, small town and small city areas, both in Illinois and nationally, was decisive and this led to her loss of the Electoral College and the presidency.

We are a nation deeply divided by where we live and the economic situation, personal identification and life style implications of those residence choices. Geography may not necessarily be absolute destiny in American politics, but it is a very important part of the explanation for how the American voter sees the world and behaves politically and why our political results are so divided at the aggregate level (Bishop, 2008; Gelman, 2008).

Moving past geography as an explanation for voting behavior, there are some other well-known and widely recognized explanatory variables that have been used consistently for almost seventy years in explaining why Americans vote as they do (Berelson, Lazarsfeld and McPhee, 1954; Campbell, et al., 1966). These are the variables that uniquely depend on survey data to analyze at the individual level.

The most important of these are party identification and ideology. These are the two most important psychological or attitudinal variables identified in the long line of historic studies that have accumulated over seven decades in the extensive voting behavior literature which is the best mined empirical subfield in all of Political Science (Ibid). Those two variables for Illinois voters are covered in Tables 5 and 6 below.

Table 5

Presidential Vote Intentions by Party Identification

	<u>Democrat</u>	<u>Independent</u>	<u>Republican</u>
Trump	3%	34%	69%
Clinton	86	36	9
Johnson	3	8	6
Stein	1	3	2
Other/D/K	8	19	14

Table 6

Presidential Vote Intentions by Political Ideology

	<u>Liberal</u>	<u>Moderate</u>	<u>Conservative</u>
Trump	5%	17%	61%
Clinton	85	55	17
Johnson	3	9	4

Stein	2	1	1
Other/D/K	5	17	16

It is evident from these two tables that the traditional voting behavior explanations were very important in the Trump versus Clinton contest no matter how unorthodox and unconventional their campaigns were. As expected party identification and ideology are quite systematically related to the voting intentions of the Illinois respondents in this poll. As Table 5 shows, fully 86% of the Democratic respondents reported that they intended to vote for Clinton, while 36% of the Independents and 9% of the Republicans said they would vote for Clinton.

This is in comparison with 69% of the Republicans who said they planned to vote for Trump, with 34% of the Independents and 3% of the Democrats who reported the same plans. 36% of the Independents in our poll said they planned to vote for Clinton. These results clearly indicate some of the distance Trump made up nationally in the last four weeks as the exit polls show that Trump ultimately took 90% of the Republican vote and 48% of the Independent vote while Clinton took 89% of the Democratic vote nationally and 42% of the Independents (AEI and Pew Exit polls, November 9, 2016).

The other most important attitudinal variable is self-identified ideology. We have long recognized that the nation is deeply divided on ideological grounds. When this polarization first became evident, the conservatives had an almost two to one advantage with approximately 40% saying they were conservatives, 20% liberals, and the remainder in between as moderates. More recently, the percent identifying as liberal has grown marginally and the conservatives have shrunk a bit (Newport, 2016). That pattern has been even more true in Illinois where over the long term, liberals have increased from 27% in 2010 to 33% in 2016 while conservatives have dropped from 40% to 33% with the moderates only moving from 27% to 28% during the same period (Jackson, Leonard, and Deitz, June, 2016, 40-41).

Self-identified ideology provided an advantage to Clinton in our data from Illinois voters. From Table 6 we can see that 85% of liberals said they would vote for Clinton with 55% of the moderates and 17% of the conservatives saying they would also vote for her. On the Trump side, only 61% of conservatives said they

would vote for him while 17% said they would vote for Clinton. Moderates broke in Clinton’s favor by 55% to 17%. This result from Illinois indicates something about the problems Trump encountered early and up until the later stages of his campaign when Republican identifiers and conservatives essentially went home and voted for Trump nationally by 81% to 15% for Clinton (AEI and Pew Exit polls, November 10, 2016).

The next set of important explanations for the vote are the fundamental demographic variables which we have covered in Tables 7- 12 below. The results fit some recognized patterns from the voting behavior research generally with some interesting twists and variations associated with this particular campaign.

Table 7
 Presidential Vote Intention by Gender

	<u>Male</u>	<u>Female</u>
Trump	34%	22%
Clinton	46	59
Johnson	7	4
Stein	1	2
Other/D/K	12	14

We will examine gender first. Since 1980 and the Reagan vs. Carter race, gender has played an important part in explaining large groups of people who vote differently. Before 1980 women voters gave a modest edge to Republican presidential candidates compared to men. The 1980 election produced the first instance of the “gender gap” which saw men voting disproportionately for the Republican candidate and women voting disproportionately for the Democratic candidate (Flanagan and Zingale, 2008, Chapter 5; Conway, Steuernagel and Ahern, 2005, Chapter 5). In that race women voted for the Democrats by a 12% margin while men voted for the Republicans by a 4% margin (Jennings and Niemi, 2000, 119). Since 1980 the gender gap has ranged up and down from four to twelve percent, but it has constantly appeared.

The candidates of the 2016 campaign produced a firm expectation that the gender gap would continue and probably grow. Hillary Clinton was the first woman to ever run at the top of the ticket for a major party. That alone would have provoked ample expectations for a gender gap. Then Trump made a number of comments deemed to be disrespectful and dismissive of women. Early in the campaign, he publicly attacked a number of high profile women, like Carly Fiorina and Megyn Kelly. Later he was overheard making misogynistic comments in a tape recording taken from an "Access Hollywood" bus trip which was leaked to the press. That revelation then stimulated accusations from a dozen women who came forward and accused Trump of unprovoked and unwanted sexual attacks on them. This controversy continued up until election day and beyond.

Table 7 provides the results in the first column for the gender differences among Illinois voters. As expected, the gender gap was very much in evidence in our poll. Trump was supported by 34% of the male voters and only 22% of female voters. This constitutes a 12% difference for male vs. female Trump voters. Clinton was supported by 46% of male voters and 59% of female voters, for a 13% difference.

Thus, our expectations of a sizeable gender gap were borne out. Nationally, the final exit polls indicated that there was a gender gap of 12% across the entire voting population (Pew and AEI exit polls). This is almost identical to the gender gap we found in Illinois one month before the election. Thus, for the long term the Republicans have a problem appealing to women voters and Democrats, likewise, have a problem appealing to male voters. That is true both nationally and in Illinois and the gap continued in 2016.

This will undoubtedly be an issue that the Democratic National Committee and Democratic leaders in general will debate and puzzle over as they try to construct a narrative about the future of their party in the wake of their stinging and unexpected loss of the presidential election. Since the Republicans won so handily and now control all three branches of the government they are not likely to worry a great deal in the immediate future about appealing more to women voters.

Next, age is ordinarily an important independent variable offering some explanation for the vote. From the early days of the voting behavior research the

expectation has been that young people are more likely to vote for the Democrats and the older people are more likely to vote for the Republicans. This generalization goes back to the roots of the whole voting behavior research enterprise (Berelson, Lazarsfeld, and McPhee, 1954; Campbell, Converse, Miller, and Stokes, 1966). Later research showed that this relationship depended on the generational experiences of the age cohorts. For example, if the oldest cohort came of age during the Great Depression, they were more likely to be Democrats and to retain that identification over time (Flanagan and Zingale, 2008, 92-95).

Table 8

	Presidential Vote Intentions by Age			
	<u><35</u>	<u>35-50</u>	<u>51-65</u>	<u>66+</u>
Trump	15%	22%	30%	37%
Clinton	57	58	49	53
Johnson	13	6	4	2
Stein	4	2	1	0
Other/D/K	11	12	16	8

Our poll results in Table 8 indicate that age did not really discriminate much for Clinton’s planned voters in Illinois. Fifty-seven percent of the under 35 voters said they planned to vote for Clinton; 58% of the middle aged voters indicated Clinton; 49% of the fifty-one to sixty-five age group and 53% of the senior citizens said they would vote for Clinton. This indicates a small four percent advantage for Clinton among the youngest cohort of voters when compared to the oldest Clinton voters.

This compares to only 15% of the youngest category under 35 who planned to vote for Trump; 22% of the 35 to 50 group; 30% of the 51 to 65 group; and 37% of those 65 and above who said they planned to vote for Trump. So, it is evident that the relationship between age and intention to vote for Trump is a linear one and that the older the respondent was the more likely they were to plan to vote for Trump in this poll. But, the paltry 15% of the youngest voter category, those

35 and younger, indicated just how much of a problem the youngest age cohort was for the Trump campaign early on.

Certainly this was true in Illinois and it also appears to be true from all the exit polls for the nation as a whole. Those exit polls showed that the youngest cohort, 18 to 29 year olds voted 55% to 37% for Clinton over Trump while the oldest cohort, 65 and up voted for Trump by 53% to 45% (Pew and AEI exit polls). The problem for the Clinton camp, however, was turnout among the young. They were counting on a heavy turnout from the youngest age cohort, and while Clinton did very well among young voters, their turnout did not quite live up to the early expectations and that loss may have been just enough for the margin of victory to go to Trump instead of Clinton (Pew poll, November 10, 2016).

The other highly important demographic variable for explaining the vote generically is race. It has long been recognized that white voters are much more likely to choose a Republican ballot while minority voters, especially African-American and Hispanic voters are more likely to vote for the Democrats. This racial divide is long standing and has become one of the most important fault lines in American politics. It is mostly the result of the almost complete re-alignment of the white south out of the Democratic Party and into the Republican Party while the black South went the opposite direction in the wake of the Civil Rights Revolution of the 1960s (Key, 1949; Black and Black, 1987, 1992). Today the white South is the most important and most dependable component of the Republican Party coalition and one which gives it a major advantage in congressional elections and a solid base for the presidential elections.

Table 9

Presidential Vote Intentions by Race

	White	Black	Hispanic	Other
Trump	35%	2%	12%	20%
Clinton	45	82	78	62
Johnson	6	3	0	7
Stein	1	1	2	0
Other/D/K	13	12	7	11

Table 9 indicates that this fault line certainly continued to hold true in Illinois when it comes to the minority voters but the picture with white voters is more complicated. Eighty-two percent of Illinois black voters indicated that they intended to vote for Clinton while 78% of Hispanic voters indicated the same. The final exit polls showed that these racial disparities only grew in the final vote. The national exit polls indicate that Clinton received 88% of the African-American vote compared to 8% for Trump and 65% of the Hispanic vote for Clinton to 29% for Trump (AEI and Pew Polls). Clinton’s final tally compares somewhat unfavorably with the 92% of black voters, and 71% of Hispanics who voted for Obama in 2012. (Jennings and Niemi, 2013, 116). Thus, Clinton won handily among both of the nation’s largest minority groups, but their preference for her fell somewhat below the levels achieved by Obama in both 2008 and 2012 and indicates how she could come close but still lose the presidency.

More importantly electorally are the 70% of the voters who are white. Our Illinois poll showed 45% of white voters planned to vote for Clinton while only 35% said they would vote for Trump. The final results indicate that white voters nationwide ultimately decided to vote disproportionately for Trump over Clinton. Although like our Illinois respondents white voters nation-wide may have harbored initial reluctance to vote for Trump, but in the final analysis they were the keys to his national victory.

The final national exit polls showed that Clinton encountered major problems with white voters which proved to be impossible to overcome. Trump won the white vote by a 21% margin, 58% to 37%. This is in contrast to the 59% of white voters who went for Romney in 2012 and 55% who went for McCain in 2008 (Jennings and Niemi, 2013, 116). Trump won among white voters without college degrees by 67% to 28%. This was the largest gap since the exit polls were initiated in 1980 (Tyson, 2016, Pew exit polls). Trump won white voters with a college degree by 49% to 45%. Since there are more white voters without college degrees than any other demographic group in the nation, Trump's strength with this group was the most essential fact in the electoral win for him.

The "Autopsy" of the 2012 campaign done by the Republican National Committee studied how to increase their appeal to the young, minorities and women among other demographic groups (Republican National Committee, March 18, 2013). Many critics pointed out that the Republican base was heavily weighted toward white people and the oldest voters and no party can stake their future on the cohort which is declining most rapidly. This problem will undoubtedly cease to be very compelling for Republicans as they contemplate their future as the masters of a whole new universe ushered in by their victories in congress and the presidency on November 8th.

It will, however, become a bone of contention for the Democrats as they begin the inevitable task of trying to understand what went wrong with their presidential and congressional hopes and expectations. There will undoubtedly be recriminations and debates regarding what to do about the Democrats' losses and how to broaden the appeal of the party at the national, state and local levels. The debate started within one week of the election results being counted when some on the left who had supported Bernie Sanders voiced the opinion that Sanders would have won the presidency, a view Sanders himself seemed to consider likely (Stiglitz, November 18, 2016). They were opposed by other party elements who contended that the Democrats had moved too far to the left and that their long term salvation depended on a tack back toward the middle. Those familiar factions within the Democratic Party had been muted during eight years of the Obama Administration; however, they broke out in full force when Clinton lost the presidency and the Democrats failed to take back the Senate. That

debate is only beginning as this paper is being written, but it will not go away any time soon. It is the inevitable and unenviable fate of the losing party.

Another variable where there was expected to be a wide disparity between Clinton supporters and Trump supporters was religious identification. For several cycles now those who identify with the more fundamentalist churches and those who attend church services the most regularly have been avidly supporting the Republican Party (Jennings and Niemi, 2013, 116). This is a trend that is especially important in the South; however, it is an important national trend as well. On the other side of the coin, those who identify with more mainline Protestant denominations, Jewish people, and those who are secular and claim no religious affiliation have increasingly voted for Democratic presidential candidates. Accordingly, scholars have discovered a “religious gap” which has taken on more and more importance in a deeply polarized America.

Table 10 reports on our question asking the voters whether they consider themselves to be an evangelical or born again Christian. Table 11 provides the results on the question of how often they attend church services.

Table 10

Vote Intentions by Evangelical Christian Identification

	<u>Born Again? Yes</u>	<u>No</u>	<u>Non Christian</u>
Trump	42%	31%	12%
Clinton	38	48	72
Johnson	3	6	4
Stein	1	1	2
Other/D/K	17	13	2

It is evident from this table that there was indeed a religion gap in the 2016 Illinois presidential election. 42% of the evangelical or born again Christians said they would vote for Trump while only 31% of those who did not claim this religious identification said they would vote for Trump. On the other side, 38% of

the evangelical or born again Christians said they would vote for Clinton while 48% of those who did not claim this identification were Clinton voters.

The final results for the nation as a whole showed just how dramatically the evangelical church people finally settled on Trump over Clinton. The exit polls showed that evangelical church goers made up 26%, or slightly over one quarter of the total voting population. They voted for Trump over Clinton by a resounding 83% to 16% (Tyson, 2016; Bowman, 2016, Pew and AEI polls). Whatever early trepidation evangelicals may have felt about Trump's private life and public conduct, they swallowed those misgivings and trooped to the polls for Trump at rates higher than they had supported Mitt Romney over Obama in 2012.

Another closely related category is those who attend church most frequently. Studies have consistently shown that those who attend church weekly or even more often are much more likely to vote for the Republicans. Our results in Table 11 show that this was not the case for the presidential vote in Illinois in 2016 projected at the time our poll was taken. The division between the most devout, those who attend weekly was close but shades in Clinton's favor by 4%. Those who said they attended almost every week or once or twice a month and a few times a year were for Clinton by an even more lopsided margins. Among the most secular, i.e. the never attend, there was a 39% gap, which was in keeping with the final national results according to the exit polls.

Table 11

Vote Intentions by Frequency of Church Attendance

	<u>Every Week</u>	<u>Almost Every week</u>	<u>Once or twice a month</u>	<u>A few times a year</u>	<u>Never</u>	<u>Refused</u>
Trump	40%	20%	27%	26%	20%	30%
Clinton	44	54	55	55	59	45
Johnson	3	9	3	5	7	5
Stein	1	1	1	1	2	5
Other/ D/K	12	16	14	13	11	15

A global economy and multi-national trade deals have pluses and minuses in terms of how many jobs they create and destroy and it is now widely understood that they create winners and losers. Those who lost their jobs because of trade imbalances or jobs moving off shore were also those most often identified as the angry and disaffected people most attracted to Trump.

There is growing understanding that those without much education and without the skills that are important to gaining and holding a job in the modern economy, where the competitive worker may be half a world away, fall disproportionately on the less educated. These voters are often also disproportionately congregated geographically in the old American “Rust Belt” of the upper Midwest and in the rural parts of the South and the Great Plains states. Thus, there is also a geographic overlay to the educational base dynamic.

Our data taken from Illinois, a state which has also experienced significant economic hardship among some industries and in some geographic areas, especially the rural and small cities of Illinois, indicate some support for this hypothesis about the uneven impact of trade and the global economy on the voters.

Table 12

Presidential Vote Intentions by Education

	<u>H. S. or Less</u>	<u>Some College</u>	<u>College +</u>
Trump	29%	30%	26%
Clinton	54	50	55
Johnson	4	5	5
Stein	1	1	2
Other/D/K	11	14	12

Table 12 shows that those with high school or less education and some college were somewhat more likely to be Trump supporters (29% and 30% respectively) while only 26% of those with college degrees said they would support Trump in our Illinois poll.

The Clinton side is murkier in our poll since 54% of those with only a high school education and 55% of those with a college degree said they planned to vote for Clinton. The “some college” category was actually the lowest with 50% of them who claimed plans to support Clinton. They, too, are probably among the voters who have disproportionately suffered from the economic disruptions of a global market and reduced job supplies, but the differences between this group and the lowest and highest educational group are not large in our study. This is the place where our Illinois poll, taken about one month before the election, varied the most markedly from the final results as reflected in the exit polls. This may be partially attributable to there being more undecided voters among those with less education and those who decided late went disproportionately for Trump. It is also possible, also, of course, that Illinois was simply not a bellwether of the final national results when it comes to the impact of education and Illinois did go for Clinton more heavily than the national popular vote did although the difference was not large.

The exit polls showed that those voters without a college degree voted for Trump by a 52% to 44% margin. College graduates voted for Clinton by a 52% to

43% margin (Tyson, Pew exit poll, 2016). However, if the analysis is restricted to just white voters the picture changes. There the exit polls found that 67% of whites without college degrees supported Trump compared to 28% for Clinton- a 39 point advantage to Trump. This is the largest this educational gap has been going back to 1980 (Ibid).

White college graduates voted for Trump over Clinton by a 49% to 45% margin. The white respondents had to have an advanced graduate or professional degree before you find more than a majority for Clinton over Trump. This constituted a massive educational gap which favored Trump when you consider how many voters have not graduated college (72%) versus those who have attained at least a bachelor's degree or a graduate or professional degree (28%) (Galston and Hedrickson, November 18, 2016). This is a problem of some serious magnitude for the Democrats who used to win the less educated vote by a wide margin. At least for this election, the less educated were the Trump base, and they are much more numerous than those with advanced education. Perhaps this is why he famously exclaimed in one of his rallies near the end, "I love the less educated."

Looking Toward the Future: What Does It All Mean?

Donald Trump's victory in winning the presidency was as unexpected as his campaign was unconventional. The last polls before the election had consistently shown that it would be a close race, but almost all of the national polls showed Clinton with a small lead, well within the margin of error for most. Indeed, at the point when the late polls were taken, the Real Clear Politics averages had shown Clinton with a modest lead that she had maintained for approximately ninety days of the general election contest.

While searching for answers analysts and pundits turned toward the explanation that the late deciders had apparently gone disproportionately for Trump. In addition, Republican Party identifiers almost all went back to their partisan home finally since the exit polls showed that 90% of them voted for the party's nominee. Independents split, but voted somewhat more heavily for Trump than had been expected.

Turnout is always important and turnout was down to 55.6 % which is not bad but falls significantly below the 61.6 attained in Obama's first election in 2008

and somewhat below the 58.2 % achieved in Obama's second election in 2012 (Stanley and Niemi, 2015, 5). Just as importantly, the Democratic constituencies that Clinton relied on so heavily, especially African-American and Hispanic voters and the young did vote for her markedly as expected; however, their margins did not quite reach the levels enjoyed by Obama in 2008 or even in 2012. Also, their turnout rates declined just a bit, but enough to make the crucial difference.

It is also worth noting that Clinton won the popular vote, as the polls had accurately predicted by nearly three million votes or a 2 percent margin. In spite of this achievement, she also lost the Electoral College vote by a vote of 304 to 227 (Calfas, December 20, 2016). Trump became the fifth American president selected by the Electoral College even though he lost the popular vote by a significant margin. The election of 2016 also became the second time in the 21st Century to see the popular vote winner denied the presidency, with the contentious 2000 election being the first instance. This constitutes two out of five (40%) presidential elections held in this century and may presage a new trend in this deeply polarized era in American politics.

The major reason Clinton lost the Electoral College vote was that she lost Wisconsin, Michigan, and Pennsylvania, three states that Democrats had routinely won and that she counted on as her "blue wall" of electoral protection against just such a result. She lost those three by a combined total of approximately 100,000 votes. Those were all big industrial states, commonly referred to now as the "Rust Belt" where the globalization of the economy had hurt jobs and manufacturing, and they are all states with a major agricultural sector to their economy. They are also states with large cities and metropolitan areas where the major centers of economic and political power in this country are located and where there is a serious rural versus urban political and cultural divide.

Those big traditionally Democratic states have a lot in common with Illinois which has experienced many of the same economic stresses and where manufacturing jobs losses have been significant as the nation and the world turned increasingly toward the service and high tech economy and away from the basic manufacturing sector where productivity increases, as well as international trade, had eliminated millions of jobs.

The biggest difference, of course, is that Clinton won her native state while also losing the presidency. The contours of that victory, however, are very instructive for what Clinton's and Trump's performances in Illinois can teach us about the future of both major parties, and especially about the challenge which now faces the Democratic Party. Like all parties which lose the presidential contest, the Democrats now face a period of uncertainty, internal conflict and soul-searching as they try to chart their future and plan and hope for a comeback. The Republicans faced the same problem in 2013 when they lost for the second time to Obama.

The blueprint of their comeback was led by Reince Priebus, the Chair of the Republican National Committee, now the Chief of Staff in the Trump White House, which commissioned a thorough study of the Republicans' electoral problems and laid out plans for recapturing the White House and keeping the congress (Republican National Committee, 2013). In due time the Democrats will undoubtedly come forward with a similar document led by the new Chair of the Democratic National Committee as they try to decide who will speak for the party and what course they should take. The challenge for the Democrats is magnified by the fact that they now face a Republican Party in complete control of the two political branches and a period of unified government under the Republicans' control will tax the ability of the Democrats to develop a come-back strategy.

For the Democrats, just understanding and analyzing carefully where they won and lost, both in a geographic and in the individual and group identity levels of analysis is crucial to getting started on finding a cure. In this quest it would be useful to start with geography because this was truly a deeply divided election geographically where the contours of the outcome were etched in the political boundaries of the states and the counties. This was evident in the national results which showed a deep division between the predominantly urban and the rural states and the urban and rural areas within the states with the suburbs acting as something of a bridge and balance of power between the two.

In addition, there were the usual deep regional differences between the northeast and the west coast with a smattering of other western states such as Nevada, New Mexico and Colorado going blue, and Illinois and Minnesota in between as Democratic bastions in the Midwest. The rest of the nation was red.

The Democrats will need to figure out why they suffered such an unexpected defeat so soon after Barack Obama's lopsided victory in 2008 followed by his somewhat closer, but nevertheless comfortable majority vote victory in 2012. If one examines the aggregate results from Obama's almost landslide victory of 2008, to a convincing but more narrow victory in 2012, to Clinton's loss in 2016 there is a clear downward progression which threatens to make the Democrats a distinctly minority party for a political generation.

If one examines carefully the national electoral picture from a county level of analysis, it is clear that the urban rural divide was starkly salient as Appendix A shows graphically. The national electoral map looks like a sea of red broken intermittently by areas of blue almost all of which are the locations of major cities and metropolitan areas. The small blue exceptions in the south are where the black vote is strong in some rural counties which is also the case in the southwest except that the minorities there tend to be Hispanic. Thus, geographic, racial and ethnic divisions marked our electoral results in 2016 even more decisively than in other recent elections. With the election of Trump over Clinton those divisions became even more evident and appeared to be even more hardened by the maturing of the era of polarization which has marked American politics for more than a generation now.

Appendix B for the Illinois results shows graphically just how deep the divisions between the rural versus urban areas were, again with the suburbs providing the balance which in Illinois tilted toward Clinton. Clinton only carried 12 counties and those counties were mostly the big counties and/or the locations of mid-sized cities where the major state universities are located.

The trends which worked against Clinton and for Trump nationally have been underway for a long time and have worked to the advantage of the Republicans although in Illinois the big counties continued to provide a Democratic margin that kept the state blue in 2016.

In an earlier and related Simon Review paper I examined the counties carried by Obama in 2012 and 2008. Appendix C provides those results (See Jackson, 2013). There were 23 of these counties compared to 79 for Mitt Romney. The counties Obama carried were four of the collar counties plus DeKalb in northeastern Illinois, a long line of northern and western Illinois

counties plus Champaign, the only county he carried in central Illinois, St. Clair in the Metro-east area, and Jackson and Alexander counties in southern Illinois. Here again we find Obama's success in Illinois in 2012 depended on the big urban counties, the places with a major state university, and a smattering of agricultural and small city based counties in northwestern Illinois.

Romney won all the predominantly rural and agricultural based counties. If geography were the only consideration, the amount of red on the Appendix C map shows just how broad Romney's support was and how much of the state it covered. While this result is not enough to win the presidency, or even a statewide office, it does give some important clues as to where the Republican Party has traditionally been the strongest in Illinois and where they routinely dominate county level offices, state legislative seats, and congressional districts which are so red that no Democrat has a realistic chance of winning and the incumbent often does not draw a serious challenger.

This safe red and safe blue districts pattern in the rural versus urban areas of Illinois is also endemic to the nation as a whole and is a key to understanding how the Republicans have dominated the U. S. House since 2010 and why the Democrats did so badly in the 2010, 2014, and 2016 congressional races. If the Democrats do not improve their results in the 2018 mid-term elections, they face a bleak future after the 2020 census leads to another reapportionment round whose impact will last until 2030.

From a party building perspective it is important to understand where the changes are taking place. This understanding is particularly important now for the Democrats since it is they who will have to drill down deeply in these results for every state and try to learn where they have failed and how they can correct their problems for the future. Their potential for ever returning to national power quite literally depends on understanding these trends and starting to develop a long term strategy that must clearly take geography and demographics into account. The need for Republicans to do the same strategic analysis is not nearly so immediate or compelling since they won control over all the branches of the federal government in the 2016 elections and controlled 31 of the state governorships and controlled the state legislative bodies by 68 to 31 chambers or a better than two to one margin.

Appendices D and E highlight the tides of change which worked against Clinton in the 2016 results even though she won the state handily in the popular vote. In effect, this is also a template for her national results where she won the popular vote by 2.8 million votes while losing the Electoral College. On the theme of change, it is worth noting that Trump did not lose a single county in Illinois that Romney had carried in 2012. Likewise, Clinton did not carry a county in 2016 that Obama had lost in 2012. In Illinois, as nationally, the best predictor of how a county will likely vote is to look at their prior voting history. In a polarized era that correlation is very high.

From Appendices D and E we can see where Clinton's losses, compared to Obama's victories in 2012 and 2008 lay, and these appendices also show that some of the earlier losses belonged to Obama as his number of counties won was effectively cut in half between 2008 and 2012 (from 46 to 23). Those losses accelerated for Clinton in 2016. The counties that flipped between 2008 and 2012 and then between 2012 and 2016 all moved in a pro Republican direction. The 2016 story is a familiar one by now. Clinton's losses were centered in northern and northwestern and western Illinois with the addition of Alexander, a small rural and agricultural county with a high percentage minority population in deep southern Illinois.

The land area in northwestern Illinois included in the map of Clinton's losses, is represented in the U. S. House by a Democrat, Congresswoman Cheri Bustos from the 17th District. She is based in East Moline/ Rock Island and is the only remaining Democratic member of the U. S. House from Illinois outside the city and its immediate suburbs. This group of outstate Democrats used to include members from the metro-east area, members from central Illinois and deep southern Illinois holding seats continuously going all the way back to World War II. The Democratic Party's Downstate delegation is now reduced to the single seat Bustos holds in the 17th District. Again, this is an indicator for what has happened to House Democrats throughout the country as rural and small town and small city representative districts have been taken over by the Republicans. This also means nationally that the former "Blue Dog Democrats" who constituted a moderate coalition have now almost totally been replaced by Republicans, usually very conservative Republicans. The remaining Democrats tend to be from the

cities and to be more liberal than the moderate Blue Dogs were. This is a part of the realignment which has so polarized American politics in this century.

Appendix E provides a further elaboration on the theme of partisan realignment. Highlighted here are the counties in transition, in this case from voting Democratic in 2012 (and in 2008) but switching to the Republican side in 2016. As we saw earlier from the maps provided in the appendices, this is a story of those places where Obama won his overwhelming Illinois victory in 2008 and his somewhat scaled down victory in 2012. These are counties where swing voters live and counties which also may be in transition from leans Democratic to leans Republican

Some are recent realignments, such as in southern Illinois, where formerly deep dyed blue counties, depending on a mixture of social conservatives who were also progressive on economic issues and union issues have changed over to the Republican Party. These counties, not coincidentally, are the places where manufacturing and mining jobs have dried up or been seriously reduced in number. They are also places where the labor unions, especially the United Mine Workers, the Laborers, and the Steel Workers have been reduced in numbers and in political strength. When the labor unions lost numbers and power, the Democratic Party lost crucial numbers of voters and power in the halls of Congress and reduced control of the Illinois state legislative seats. Thus, the saga of what happened to Clinton in 2016, and what has been happening to Downstate Democrats in Illinois continued to unfold and accelerate in 2016.

In an attempt to understand geographic and demographic continuity and change more thoroughly, Appendices F through I provide a listing and graphic representation of those consistently blue and red counties. They also provide a more in depth analysis of some of the most important demographic variables which I hypothesized would distinguish these counties with quite polar political histories.

Appendix F provides an overview of where the most loyal Democratic counties are in Illinois. These are the counties that were won by the Democrats consistently between 2000 and 2016. This period includes the candidacies of Al Gore, John Kerry, Barack Obama, and Hillary Clinton spanning five presidential elections and sixteen years. Through all the changes in the international,

national, state and local context, and taking into consideration all of the differences between these four candidates and their opponents, these six counties stayed firmly in the Democratic column and provided the loyal base for the Democrats for the first five elections of the 21st Century.

The geographic locations of these counties range from Cook County, the mega-county in northeastern Illinois, Rock Island in western Illinois, Peoria and Champaign in central Illinois, St. Clair in the Metro-East southwestern location adjacent to St. Louis, and Jackson County in southern Illinois. Chicago is, of course, the major population and economic center of the entire state and is dominant in economic terms and which also has a lot of political power because of its size and diversity.

Outside Chicago, the most loyal Democratic counties are all medium sized or large counties except for Jackson which has a long history of supporting Democrats and is the home of Southern Illinois University Carbondale. Champaign is a medium sized county in central Illinois and the home to the University of Illinois Urbana Champaign, the state's flagship and largest university. Peoria is the home of Caterpillar and Bradley University and is a bastion of some strength for organized labor. Rock Island, on the Iowa border and a part of the "Quad Cities" metropolitan complex, is also known for its manufacturing history and for the strength of its labor movement. All of these counties display the kinds of demographic and economic diversity one would expect to be the geographic hallmarks of the Democratic base.

Appendix G graphically highlights those most loyal Republican counties in Illinois. These are the counties where the Republican candidate for president has won every election between 2000 and 2016. The first thing one notices is that the list of super loyal counties is much longer for the Republicans than it is for the Democrats. There are 56 such Republican counties and only 6 of the Democratic strongholds. Of course, the large population of the loyal Democratic counties helps to make up for the much more numerous loyal Republican counties. Nevertheless, as the nation learned in both 2000 and 2016, geography and control of more states and congressional districts does make a difference in gaining control of political power, especially in the White House and the U.S. House of Representative both of which reward a strategic and efficient

geographic distribution of party strength over the popular vote. In 2016 the American public once again learned the basic civics lesson that the Electoral College can negate the popular vote in the selection of the U. S. president.

Keep in mind that this consistent Republican support included the two Barack Obama presidential victories in 2008 and 2012 when he won overwhelming popular and Electoral College victories nationally and statewide in 2008 and strong, but not as dominate victories both nationally and statewide in 2012. Central, western and most parts of southern Illinois have been bastions of dependable Republican strength in the 21st century although this strength is of recent vintage in southern Illinois. Some of this dominance has been in place literally since Lincoln ran for the first time in 1860 for the newly formed Republican Party and many of those counties have been the backbone of the Republican Party in Illinois ever since.

Table 13 was assembled to provide a more in depth and comparative demographic description of the most loyal Republican and the most loyal Democratic counties over the period since the 2000 elections. A deeper perspective is provided by delving into the demographics of these deep red and deep blue Illinois counties. Appendices H and I provide the more in depth county by county democratic description of these same counties.

Table 13

The Most Loyal Republican Counties Compared to the Most Loyal Democratic Counties: 2000-2016 on Demographic								
	2010 Median Population	% White	% Black	% Hispanic	Median Home value	Median Per Capita Income	Median Household Income	% Below Poverty line
Democratic	193,788	74.5	18.4	8.9	143517	25765	46580	18.5
Republican	37,491	95.2	2.9	2.2	91243	22933	46696	12.5

Note: All above data was obtained from the 2010 Census conducted by the US Census Bureau

This analysis reveals that the counties which voted for Trump were much smaller and mostly more rural, and of course much more numerous than those which voted for Clinton. This has been the pattern for all of the election cycles in Illinois since the 2000 election as these appendices show that those counties which have been the consistent base of support for the Republican Party are much more homogeneous racially at 95.5% white compared to 2.9% black and 2.1% Hispanic. By comparison the Democratic base counties are 74.5% white,

18.14% black and 8.9% Hispanic. So, racial diversity versus homogeneity is the most obvious and most notable description of the traditionally red versus traditionally blue counties in Illinois.

As Table 13 indicates, there were some income disparities evident as well. The most notable is that the median per capita income is almost \$3,000 higher in the blue counties compared to the red counties. On the other hand, median household income was essentially the same in the two types of counties and the percent below the poverty line was somewhat higher in the blue counties. This finding illustrates the fact that the Democratic counties are very diverse and often there is a large gap between the well off and the poor in these counties. The fact is that both red and blue counties have the problems and challenges of significant poverty and income inequality, and they have persistent demands for social safety net types of governmental protections for the have nots.

Appendix J is also a complement to Table 13. It provides the demographic characteristics of the swing or battleground counties. These are the ones which Obama carried in 2012 (and in 2008) but which Clinton lost in 2016. These counties could be either the harbingers of a more permanent partisan realignment in favor of the Republican Party, or the home of more voters who are more independent and more open to persuasion by either party. They stuck with Obama when his national and state popularity had declined in 2012 as compared to 2008, but they were not willing to choose Clinton over Trump in 2016.

Appropriately, these swing counties fit between the most loyal Democratic counties and the most loyal Republican counties on the demographics. That is they are much smaller in population than the loyal blue counties and essentially the same population as the loyal red counties. They are more diverse racially than the red counties, but a good deal less diverse than the blue counties. On percent white, percent black and percent Hispanic, the swing counties are more like the red counties than the more diverse blue counties.

Their median home value and per capita income are less than the deep blue counties and somewhat larger than the deep red counties. Their median household income is almost the same as the loyal Democratic base and the loyal Republican base. Their percent below the poverty line fits almost exactly between the two partisan types as the swing counties are at 3.5 percent below the blue

counties and 2.5 percent above the red counties. If the swing counties are candidates ripe for a conversion to the Republican side, their demographic make-up would most resemble the red counties already. But they mostly fit between the two polar types and thus they will probably continue to provide potential movement to either side and help provide the margin of victory in any particular election. The swing counties will continue to provide change in Illinois politics while the partisan base counties will provide the continuity that is so evident when the state's entire map is considered.

The income disparities we found in these Illinois counties are also indicative of some of the economic disparities which were important markers for the national presidential results in 2016 as well. A study done after the election by the Brookings Institution revealed the following about the Trump and Clinton coalitions and the economic base to this deep division:

“The less than 500 counties that Clinton carried nationwide encompassed a massive 64% of America's economic activity as measured by total output in 2015. By contrast the more than 2,000 counties that Donald Trump won generated just 36% of the country's output- just a little more than one-third of the nation's economic activity.... You can see very clearly that with the exceptions of Phoenix and Fort Worth areas and a big chunk of Long Island Clinton won every large-sized county economy in the country. Her base of 493 counties was heavily metropolitan. By contrast, Trumpland consists of hundreds and hundreds of tiny low-output locations that compromise the non-metropolitan hinterland of America, along with some suburban and exurban metro counties...In the end, our data makes plain that while cultural resentments played a huge role in this month's election, so too did a massive economic divide between relatively prosperous high-output counties and struggling lower out{put} rural ones” (Muro and Liu, November 29, 2016; See also: Tankersley, November 22, 2016).

The report further showed that those counties with the higher GDP per capita incomes and those with the most population density were much more likely to vote for Clinton and those at the opposite ends of the income and population continuum were where Trump carried overwhelmingly.

This is not a recent division in American politics and in many respects it is an echo of the ancient divisions which roiled the debate over the ratification of

the constitution, the power of the central government, states' rights and tariff policies in the era of the founders. For example, the Northeast was deeply divided against the South, especially Virginia in the earliest government under George Washington. The northeastern states generally favored a strong central government and high tariffs while the south favored states' rights and low tariffs. The philosophical debates, and practical politics which divided New Yorker, Alexander Hamilton, against Virginians, Thomas Jefferson and James Madison, helped shape the early days of the republic and they drove the fundamental conflicts and compromises embedded in the constitution. These divisions also exacerbated the conflict which led to the Civil War. It is a division which seems to have grown more clearly polarized in recent decades and to have reached an extreme in the 2016 elections.

Urban demographer, Richard Florida provides a further elaboration on the economic base of the Trump victory nationally in the following assessment:

“U. S. metro areas house more than 85 percent of the nation's population and generate 90 percent of its economic output....Donald Trump won many more metros, 259 to 122, than Hillary Clinton. But Clinton captured a greater share of the metro vote, 51 percent compared to 44% for Trump. Metro areas accounted for 85 percent of total votes, 110 million of roughly 130 million total. Clinton captured the largest metros. She bested Trump with 55 percent compared to 40 percent of the vote in metros with more than one million people, and won eight of the ten largest metros. These metros accounted for more than half the vote and generate two-thirds of America's economic output.... The average Clinton metro is home to almost 1.4 million people, more than three times the size of the average Trump metro, which is about 420,000. And outside of metropolitan areas, Trump beat Clinton... by 67 percent compared to 29 percent in rural areas... (Florida, November 29, 2016).

In Illinois, the metropolitan areas are mostly found in northeastern Illinois, in Chicago and the suburbs. Both Cook County and DuPage County were included in the high economic output counties that Muro and Liu wrote about in their study for Brookings. We have already noted the deep divisions in Illinois between the Chicago area and the more rural and small city areas of the state in the Clinton versus Trump race results. In many ways the appeal to regional loyalties

has been the signature urban versus rural division that has marked Illinois for generations and which seem to be increasing in depth and bitterness. It is now a given that Illinois political campaigns outside Chicagoland will be powered by appeals to the pervasive and deep seated suspicion, distrust and dislike of Chicago and its most prominent leaders.

In southern Illinois, for example, office seekers from both parties will routinely and vehemently state their determination to “stand up to Chicago” or “fight the Chicago machine” or some other emphatic declaration indicating their determination to focus their fight on the perceived dominance of the city and to throw off the yoke of having to carry the city’s burdens whether those are budgetary or regulatory. The fact that the last three governors, one Republican and two Democrats, have come from Chicago lends credence to this charge. In addition, the fact that the Speaker of the House, Michael J. Madigan, has held his office for 31 of the past 33 years certainly provides a prominent target for downstate politicians to blame.

In this last election the whole campaign in many legislative districts boiled down to a proxy war between Governor Rauner and Speaker Madigan. Most of the television commercials, and the ubiquitous campaign mailers brought that narrative into the homes of Illinois voters on a daily basis. Those ads were often explicitly directed against Chicago and the political leaders from there and also contained explicit ways in which the opponent had “sold out” to Chicago.

The people in the heartland outside the city are often told by their leaders that Chicago gets “more than their share” of the state budget and other resources. This refrain is certainly deeply embedded in the culture of southern Illinois and it is a staple of campaigns for both parties. It is not particularly relevant whether this charge is fact based, and most budgetary experts do not believe that it is. Such systematic empirical studies that have been done show that Chicago pays more into the state’s coffers than they receive back in state compensation (Legislative Research Unit, 1989; Perlstein, December 4, 2016, 1; Rado, December 4, 2016, 1-A). Those studies show the predictable result, which is that those areas which are more prosperous, and have the highest incomes, pay disproportionately into the state’s coffers on the revenue side. On the expenditure side, those studies also show that many of the state aid formulas are

geared toward those individuals and areas which have low incomes and a greater need. Thus, the formulas work to the advantage of the more rural and low income areas and work also to the advantage of low income areas of the city of Chicago. But the more prosperous areas of the city and the suburbs often pay more than they receive in return.

This picture of rampant regionalism is also a microcosm of the nation as a whole and is one key to what happened nationally in the 2016 presidential campaign. Scholars have long noted that the red states are usually the recipients of a disproportionate share of federal funds while the blue states are often the disproportionate donors (WalletHub, March 27, 2014; Merda, March 26, 2014; Illinois Economic Policy Institute, August 21, 2015). Ironically, the red states are usually the more conservative states where the distrust and suspicion of the federal government is greatest and support for smaller government and less government spending is strongest.

This disparity is because of higher incomes and the more prosperous urban areas pay more income and other taxes and the programmatic distribution formulas usually take need into account. In addition defense department spending is usually higher in the red states than in the blue states. They are home to more defense industries and to more military bases. This is one reason Illinois, for example, is a donor state that pays \$1.36 in federal taxes for each federal dollar it gets back (Progress Illinois, February 10, 2015). This anomaly demands some attempt to understand why the rural areas feel so strongly that they are not getting their “fair share” and why they feel exploited by the urban areas where there are often pockets of poverty, crime and joblessness that rivals anything experienced in the most deprived of our rural areas where the need is also great for some people.

A recent book by political scientist, Katherine J. Cramer, offers some important clues to understanding the anomaly of urban versus rural conflict and pervasive feelings of anxiety and economic threat in the rural areas. She studied her state of Wisconsin trying to understand the phenomenon of Governor Scott Walker and his battles with the state’s civil servants and unions. This included the impeachment vote in 2012, led by the state’s public sector unions whom Walker had targeted for a greatly diminished role in state government with restrictions

on their power passed entirely with the support of a Republican majority in the state legislature and over the very strong objections of the Democrats (Cramer, 2016).

This fight led to a recall election, which Walker won, with the help of campaign funds from the Koch brothers among other out of state sources, the first time an American governor had successfully fended off such a recall challenge. This victory, then made Walker something of a hero in conservative and Republican Party circles and led in turn to his seeking the Republican nomination for president in 2016 although he did not get very far.

Cramer is a Wisconsin native, who has lived most of her life in the state and was educated in the state's schools and now teaches political science at the University of Wisconsin, Madison. Given that background, she was well aware of the state's political culture which included a constant tension between Madison and Milwaukee versus the more rural outstate regions. The rural areas and some of the suburbs of Milwaukee became the bastion of the pro Walker and anti-union battle that took place in the recall election and that division still marks much of Wisconsin's political culture. It is also a key to an understanding of Clinton's unexpected loss of Wisconsin to Trump in 2016 despite the fact that that state had not voted Republican in the presidential races since 1984.

Veteran observers of the political scene in Illinois will be impressed with just how similar that rural versus urban dynamic in Wisconsin is to the major divisions and narratives which move the political tides in Illinois. The rural/urban divide is, if anything, more long standing and deeper in Illinois than in Wisconsin. Cramer undertook a long running series of in depth conversations with the people of the rural areas of her home state to try to understand why they had so much fear and distrust of the two major cities of their state. What she found was a constant refrain of what she called a "rural consciousness" i.e. a strong emphasis on the place where the people live and how much their own identities were wrapped up in their native regions, their home towns, and their sense of who they were personally being defined by the culture of where they live. At the aggregate level, Cramer maintains that this has become a sort of "rural identity politics" which goes to the essence of how people personally identify themselves

and how they think of their place in the world. Anyone who has spent much time listening to country music will immediately recognize this story.

This is a refrain that is also found in other major works which have tried to untangle the dynamics of the profound geographical divisions which have marked recent history in our polarized nation (Bishop, 2008; Frey, December 13, 2016). We tend to live in geographic enclaves that help define who we are politically and how we vote as well. One cannot view the red versus blue maps of recent presidential elections, especially the 2016 results, and not be struck by just how indelibly geography and regionalism have come to mark our electoral fate.

It would be hard to overestimate how much what Cramer terms “the politics of resentment” fueled the Trump surge which carried him to victory in the nation as well as in ninety of the one hundred and two Illinois counties. His rhetoric was stark, unvarnished, and ultimately remarkably effective. In the Trump narrative immigrants or Mexicans or the Chinese were coming to get your job, and some were criminals who could take your life. Urban black people lived in hellish ghettos marred by dysfunctional schools and no economic opportunity, drugs, gangs and violence which constantly threatened to spill over to your more prosperous suburban or rural homes and life. Political and economic elites negotiated trade agreements which flattered away American jobs and prosperity with no gains for Americans in return. International elites lured us into international environmental agreements to reduce carbon dioxide at the expense of carbon based extractive jobs in the coal and oil businesses at home. The media and Hollywood elites controlled television and the movies that purveyed new cultural images and norms which undermined your family values and threatened your freedom of religion. Your free speech rights are constantly threatened by political correctness. Welfare cheats are getting free cell phones compliments of Obama and getting free healthcare thanks to Obamacare.

Finally, the perennial NRA threat that someone, Obama and next Clinton, is coming to get your guns and confiscate them so some nebulous national dictatorship or world government can be established. This story is always being pushed by the NRA and other gun rights groups, even though there is no evidence that Obama took away any guns during the eight years he was president. Clinton repeatedly stressed her support for the Second Amendment during the debates,

although she did consider the possibility of closing the gun show loopholes and restricting gun magazine capacities as small steps toward trying to control gun violence, particularly involving children. Trump often pledged his total allegiance to the 2nd Amendment and promised that no one would tamper with it if he was president. Unrestrained gun rights, rather than Medicare or Social Security, may have become the new “third rail” of American electoral politics especially in the more rural and small town precincts of the country.

None of these narratives have to be true, or to have more than a small kernel of facts to back them up, to nevertheless be remarkably effective from a rhetorical standpoint in convincing the recipients of the message and to reinforce the inchoate attitudes that are already in place for millions of voters. That is why the politics of resentment apparently proved to be such fertile ground with an audience of tens of millions during the 2016 campaign.

When the 2016 race for the White House started this narrative was already out there in the nation deeply engrained and shared widely in private conversations and exploding in the new social media. All Trump had to do initially was to articulate it and spread it directly and immediately especially through his own unprecedented and aggressive use of the social media. He was especially adept at delivering his message through his unmediated and wildly successful use of Twitter- a channel which carried his words without interruption or filter to an audience which numbered twenty million personal followers by his own report and tens of millions more in the larger mainstream media and an internet based audience which heard what he had to say posted directly every day of the campaign. Trump’s clarion call to the politics of resentment struck a mass nerve for many of the more than sixty million people who voted for him on November 8th. As the map has shown, many millions of those voters were in the rural, small town and small city precincts of America.

Digging below the fact of the division that she observed in Wisconsin well before Trump’s arrival on the national scene, Cramer tried to respectfully understand the rural informants she interviewed and to fathom the depths of their mistrust and dislike of their city cousins. In these interviews, she consistently encountered a narrative containing a core of this politics of resentment. It was anchored in an “us versus them” conviction that the two

worlds were greatly different and that the city people were getting more than their share while the rural people were getting the short end of the stick. This made them resent government and to want less government, whether state or national, because the major beneficiaries of government would be the urban areas and the undeserving people who lived in them. The conviction that immigrants and minorities were taking most of whatever there was to get from governmental programs made them want to reduce the size and scope of government at all levels.

Again, never mind that those were not the empirical facts in Wisconsin; the people Cramer interviewed took them as indisputable truths that they understood clearly. Those “facts” are especially reinforced in the public’s minds when some of their leaders are elected on platforms that promise to take care of the forgotten places and people and to reduce the power of the political elites who perpetuate a system which is rigged against the alienated and distrustful voters. Scott Walker himself had been the chief executive of the county Milwaukee is located in before he was elected governor, but he successfully mobilized this mistrust toward and resentment of the urban areas in his two elections for governor and in his recall fight.

Cramer summarizes her major thesis in the following terms:

“This book shows making sense of politics in a way that places resentment toward other citizens at the center. It illuminates this politics of resentment by looking closely at the manner in which many rural residents exhibit an intense resentment against their urban counterparts.... I explain how people make sense of politics when the boundaries they draw between ‘us’ and ‘them’ coincides with real geographic boundaries. I show that although this form of thinking is often criticized as ignorance, these understandings are complex, many layered, and grounded in fundamental identities” (Cramer, 2016, Chapter 1).

One need not be a political expert or even an aficionado or political junkie to be struck by how well Cramer’s thesis fits Illinois politics. The narrative that many of our ills are the fault of Chicago, the “machine,” or the leaders we elect from Chicago is a powerful one in much of Downstate. It has been vividly reinforced by tens of millions of campaign dollars spent on purveying that narrative in the 2016 elections. It is a narrative that has deep roots in southern

Illinois, for example, but also throughout the rest of Downstate. Regionalism, an appeal to the sense of neglect of the locals and of “us versus them” has a powerful appeal as anyone who spent any amount of time viewing the flood of political ads on broadcast or cable television, or even in front of a computer screen or on a smart phone can attest. Indeed, in the southern Illinois media market which covers much of southeast Missouri and western Kentucky, it is a narrative repeated with even more color and vehemence in those neighboring states. The politics of regionalism in Illinois looks strikingly like the contours of politics in Wisconsin described in Cramer’s meticulously researched book.

Conclusion

Which returns the discussion back to the recently concluded national elections. The thesis of this paper is that Illinois is a good microcosm of national tides by virtue of its standing as a bellwether state and one of the most representative of all the states in demographic, economic, and political indicators. The fact that Hillary Clinton won her native state handily while losing the presidency does not diminish this important distinction for Illinois. Our population distribution closely reflects the national distribution; our economy has exhibited and suffered from the same strains and dislocations that have challenged the national economy in a time of globalized competition and our recent demographic changes are a bellwether for the nation. Our political parties and factions and interest group complex are very much like their national counterparts.

The argument of the last section of this paper is that the regionalism and geographic divisions overlay and reinforce the political divisions. In the presidential elections geography is destiny because the Electoral College requires a state coalition based voting majority rather than a majority of the popular votes and emphasizes the power of the Electoral College to overturn the will of a majority or plurality of the people. In short, most Americans have learned in two of the most recent presidential elections that unlike all other elections in this country, the candidate who gets the most votes does not necessarily win the prize.

One cannot view the red and blue national map and not be impressed, or depressed, by the deep geographic and regional divisions which marked the 2016

election results. If the lens is taken out to a wider angle, one cannot view all the presidential results in the modern era without being impressed by how much the realignment of the political parties has congealed and hardened into maturity and the ideological and cultural wars have served to reflect and exacerbate the deep divisions in a now polarized country.

Certainly the divided results of 2016, with Trump winning a handy victory in the Electoral College while Clinton took a substantial popular vote margin, will continue to emphasize and exacerbate those divisions. The divisive rhetoric of that campaign will not go away if and when the tone in Washington softens in service to the need to govern. The divisions are deep and will only be reduced and ameliorated when there are tangible results where the system seems to be more responsive and the economic and social benefits are unmistakably the product of a government which serves the greater good and the interests of the greatest number of the people.

In the wake of the 2016 results there is a developing national dialogue about the Electoral College and whether it is outmoded and ought to be repealed. This dialogue also developed in 2000 when the same divided results put George W. Bush in the White House despite his losing the popular vote by some 537,000 votes. The vagaries of the Electoral College, the Florida recount, and the intervention of the U. S. Supreme Court were more complex than the rather direct and swift settlement of the presidential election in 2016, but the final result was the same. Clinton's popular vote margin was much wider than Gore's, but her Electoral College loss was also much larger. In fact the discrepancy between the popular vote and the electoral vote and the disadvantage to the popular vote winner has never been as great as it was in 2016.

There will be a continued national interest in doing away with the Electoral College, mostly led by the Democrats and liberals who believe that the 18th Century device denies majority rule, one of the bedrock tenants of democracy (Editorial Board, New York Times, December 19, 2016). However, there is virtually no chance that this drive to delete the Electoral College from the constitution will succeed in the foreseeable future. The Electoral College has unfailingly worked to the advantage of the Republican Party in all cases where it chose the president except 1824 when the Republican Party did not exist. The

two modern cases, 2000 and 2016, both produced Republican presidents over Democratic candidates who had won the popular vote as did the elections of 1876 and 1888. Because their votes are distributed so much more efficiently across the states, there is an inherent and long term bias in the Republicans' favor. The Electoral College votes are allotted on population as reflected in the number of House members a state has, but that is supplemented by two votes for each state to represent the Senate numbers. Thus, voters in a small state like Montana, for example, are worth more in the total equation than are the voters in the larger states like California and New York. This advantage to the rural and small states is built in and works to one party's advantage. This advantage is most important and most marked in the U. S. Senate, but it also counts in the Electoral College.

One of the most influential textbooks in the field describes the situation in the following manner:

"...the ten smallest states, with 3 percent of the total voters in the 2012 presidential election, maintain voting weight in the Senate equal to the ten largest states, home to 50 percent of the voters in 2012. The small states' disproportionate share of senators guarantees them slight overrepresentation in the electoral college as well. After the 2010 census, the seven states casting three electoral votes each had a ratio of 331,472 or fewer residents per electoral vote, while every state with thirteen or more electoral votes had a ratio of 607,972 or more residents per electoral vote" (Polsby, Wildavsky, Schier, and Hopkins, 2016, 220).

This book goes on to add, however, that because the small states are mostly one party states, it is the swing states or the most competitive states which get the most campaign attention and the most resources because they can and often do shift the balance of power in a competitive election (See also: Edwards, November 18, 2016). Thus the battleground states get the candidate attention and campaign expenditures that all of the other states would like to have.

Since it takes thirty-eight states to amend the constitution, the Electoral College is certainly safe as a fundamental rule about how we elect American presidents. In addition, philosophically the Republicans and conservatives

contend that the Electoral College helps protect and foster federalism since a candidate must win a coalition of states which produces a majority of electors rather than a majority (or plurality) of the popular votes. The polarization of American politics will continue to be driven in part by the uneven distribution of the national vote results across very urban versus very rural states and regions within the states which the Electoral College magnifies.

Both parties will be challenged by those deep-seated differences as they try to chart their own futures and plan for the future of the nation under a newly unified Republican government. In fact unified Republican control of the government is likely to be a much more important driver of the changes that Trump promised than is his singular election will be. Given their different national power equations now, the challenges to the two major parties will be quite different also. The Democrats have a profound long-term challenge to rebuild across all levels of government and in all the states and regions where they lost ground in 2016 and 2012. They must try to overcome some of those broad based losses and try to expand their appeal to the voters, especially the millions who claimed that they were angry toward their government, and took out that anger on the Democrats generically and Hillary Clinton specifically in 2016. They will also have to greatly improve their appeal to blue collar workers and the growing numbers of people who work in the service industries, whether blue collar or white collar, which increasingly dominate our economy.

The Democrats will have to face the inevitable struggle of the two wings where the left, under the leadership of Bernie Sanders and Elizabeth Warren will try to take the party in a more markedly progressive direction. The liberals will often be opposed by the more pragmatic and middle of the road leaders who once were represented by Bill Clinton and Al Gore's taking the party toward the middle or what was called "the Third Way" and trying to accommodate the seemingly irreconcilable demands of Wall Street and Main Street.

The results of the 2016 election make it clear that the Democrats will have to learn to appeal to more white voters, more male voters, and older voters demographically. Geographically, they will have to find a way to appeal again to the rural areas and to small town America. Clearly the rural areas cannot be ceded to the Republicans permanently without doing real damage to the long

term prospects of the Democratic Party, especially in the House, and ensuring the continued deep polarization of the nation (Jaffey, November 28, 2016; Roarty, November 29, 2016).

The Democrats will also have to refresh and reinforce their message to the traditional blue states like Wisconsin, Michigan, and Pennsylvania, and also to the swing states like Florida and Ohio that they will need for success in future presidential elections. There are a number of “purple states” like Colorado, Nevada, Arizona, New Mexico and Virginia where the Democrats must build on some of their recent state and national successes. They have also recently found a sympathetic audience in many parts of suburban America, and especially among the growing number of better educated and young voters. Those are the Collar Counties in Illinois and almost all states have some version of these vote rich and growing suburban areas which were once Republican bastions, but which are now much more diverse and trending at least purple and sometimes blue in many areas. Those are key components for any plan for a return to majority status and control of any measure of political power for the Democrats.

They must rebuild the party at the state level where their losses are especially widespread and where those losses will have results throughout the decade of 2020-2030 if the Democrats do not start rebuilding at the state and local levels in anticipation of the need to gain control of the redistricting process in a wider number of states than they have had since the 2010 election losses which devastated the Democrats at the grassroots level. To do this they cannot give up on rural, small town and small city America since those areas are so important for the state legislative and congressional seats that are essential for the party’s future-particularly when the 2021 redistricting battles take place.

Somehow the Democrats have to refocus the constant ‘zero sum game’ mentality which has taken control of many voters, the parties, the media and the nation. That is, they have to convince larger numbers of people that when the government works well, and public programs are effective and produce tangible gains everyone prospers. This is an old message about the irreplaceable functions of the government that cannot and will not be supplied by the private sector. Such a message should have particular appeal to the middle class and working class constituencies that the Democrats traditionally served. More importantly,

they have to convince more voters that this message about the importance of government for ordinary people is based in reality and that their interest and the national interest do not have to be in fundamental conflict constantly. This was the message of the Clinton campaign, summarized in her “Stronger Together” motto, but they failed to deliver it in a convincing form for tens of millions of voters who had favored the Democrats as recently as Bill Clinton’s two terms and even through Obama’s terms, but who did not hear a compelling reason to stay the course with Hillary Clinton.

Right now the challenge to the Republicans is much easier to manage and more long range than immediate. Nothing succeeds like success in politics and the GOP enjoyed major successes at both the national level and in many states on November 8th. The Republicans will not be marked by the deep internal divisions that clearly existed before the presidential election because their side and Trump won. Republican leaders who stridently opposed and criticized him before the election are now rushing to make amends and some are being touted as new members of his cabinet.

Trump might have said, “recrimination is for losers,” (but didn’t so far as I know). The Republican leaders, especially Paul Ryan and Mitch McConnell, will go along because they want to get along with their new party leader, Donald Trump. Whether they like it or not, the Chief Executive is also the Chief of the Party. The legislative leaders have a long list of laws and policy demands that they want implemented immediately, starting with the repeal of the Affordable Care Act on the domestic front and repeal of the Iranian nuclear deal and the Paris climate control agreement on the international front. The legislative leaders will help Trump drive the Republican agenda and define the new Republican Party. The proof will be in whether they succeed in governing with a broad constituency in mind and whether Donald Trump will prove to be as capable at governing, and learning the art of compromise and adopting a give and take style as he was in campaigning and defining a new norm for what constitutes presidential politics in 21st Century America. We will see. Time will tell.

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Appendix A

LANDSLIDE: Trump 306 Electoral Votes vs 232 Clinton Electoral Votes


By [Pamela Geller](#) - on November 9, 2016



<http://pamelageller.com/2016/11/landslide-trump-305-electoral-votes-vs-233-clinton-electoral-votes.html/>

Appendix C

2012 Illinois Presidential Election Results by County




	# of Votes	% of Votes	Counties Carried
Romney	2,135,216	40.73%	■ - Romney N=79
Obama	3,019,512	57.60%	■ - Obama N=23


Source: Basic data taken from Illinois State Board of Elections
Official Vote, November 6, 2012, 5.


Appendix D

Illinois Counties Carried by Obama in 2012 and 2008 and lost by Clinton in 2016.




LEGEND

 CLINTON LOST 2016




 OTHER

Appendix E

Illinois Counties Carried by Obama in 2008, lost in 2012 and lost by Clinton in 2016.




LEGEND

-  CLINTON LOST 2016
-  CLINTON WON
-  CARRIED BY OBAMA IN 2008, BUT LOST IN 2012

Appendix F

The Most Loyal Democratic Counties: 2000-2016, Voted Democratic




LEGEND


- REPUBLICAN
- DEMOCRAT

Appendix G

The Most Loyal Republican Counties: 2000-2016, voted GOP



Illinois Presidential Popular Vote by County in 2000, 2004, 2008, 2012, 2016



*Voted Democrat at least one election

** Voted Republican each election, 2000, 2004, 2008, 2012, 2016 (except Franklin and Perry who voted for Gore in 2000 and then consistently for the GOP starting in 2004.)

Appendix H
Demographic Characteristics of the Most Consistently Democratic Counties*

County	2010 Population	% White	% Black	% Hispanic	Median Home Value	Per Capita Income	Median Household Income	% below Poverty
Cook	5,194,675	66.0	25.0	24.4	256,900	29,920	54,598	15.8
Rock Island	147,546	85.9	9.3	11.9	113,100	25,609	46,726	12.4
Peoria	186,494	75.7	17.9	4.0	121,900	28,743	50,689	15.4
Champaign	201,081	74.9	12.7	5.5	147,800	25,226	44,462	21.8
St. Clair	270,056	65.8	30.5	3.4	126,300	25,475	50,109	16.3
Jackson	60,218	78.5	14.7	4.3	95,100	19,619	32,896	29.1
Average	1,010,012	74.5	18.4	8.9	143,517	25,765	46,580	18.5

*Note: These counties voted for the Democratic presidential Candidate 2000-2016

Appendix I
Demographic Characteristics of the Most Loyal Republican Counties

County	2010 Population	% White	% Black	% Hispanic	Median Home Value	Per Capita Income	Median Household Income	% Below Poverty
Adams	67,103	93.9	3.6	1.3	99,900	24,798	45,792	12.7
Bond	17,768	91.3	6.5	3.2	107,300	24,166	50,672	10.5
Brown	6,937	78.6	19.0	5.9	80,000	19,704	42,014	12.1
Christian	34,800	96.7	1.7	1.5	82,000	3,125	43,964	15.8
Clark	16,335	98.2	0.5	1.3	84,700	24,388	47,933	10.2
Clay	13,815	97.9	0.5	1.3	71,500	21,577	38,905	16.9
Clinton	37,762	94.3	3.8	2.9	125,200	26,380	57,246	8.0
Crawford	19,817	93.3	4.9	2.1	70,000	23,387	43,923	16.4
Cumberland	11,048	98.0	0.7	0.9	82,100	21,715	43,255	13.1
Dewitt	16,561	97.5	0.7	2.2	104,400	25,914	48,750	7.9
Douglas	19,900	97.7	0.6	6.4	95,000	22,339	47,921	10.2
Edgar	18,576	98.3	0.6	1.2	72,400	23,897	42,947	14.9
Edwards	6,721	98.0	0.7	1.0	61,500	20,907	39,071	11.5
Effingham	34,242	98.2	0.4	1.9	108,100	25,566	50,938	10.7
Fayetteville	22,140	93.9	4.6	1.5	78,400	22,419	43,081	16.8
Ford	14,081	97.6	0.9	2.4	89,900	25,302	50,332	9.2
*Franklin	39,561	97.7	0.5	1.4	63,200	19,668	36,383	18.5
Greene	13,886	97.8	1.1	0.9	71,800	22,366	42,193	12.8
Hamilton	8,457	98.1	0.6	1.4	74,100	22,471	39,000	10.0
Hancock	19,104	98.0	0.4	1.1	81,700	23,027	43,567	12.8
Hardin	4,320	97.5	0.5	1.4	65,700	18,749	30,875	23.8
Iroquois	29,718	97.2	1.0	5.7	99,400	24,563	48,248	11.5
Jasper	9,698	98.4	0.3	0.9	82,700	22,917	47,731	7.6
Jefferson	38,827	88.7	8.7	2.2	87,000	22,032	42,679	17.2
Jersey	22,985	97.5	0.5	1.1	120,800	24,940	54,469	8.9
Johnson	12,582	89.9	8.5	3.1	93,400	17,328	42,172	11.6
Lawrence	16,833	88.5	10.0	3.5	68,300	17,050	38,326	16.2
Lee	36,031	92.4	5.2	5.1	114,700	25,303	49,451	9.5
Livingston	38,950	92.8	5.2	4.1	105,600	23,530	52,835	10.7
Logan	30,305	89.8	7.9	3.1	95,700	22,136	48,714	11.1
Marion	39,437	93.5	4.1	1.5	71,300	21,418	40,097	16.5
Marshall	12,640	98.0	0.5	2.7	103,200	25,600	51,642	9.3
Massac	15,429	91.5	5.9	2.0	80,500	20,044	40,885	16.7
Menard	12,705	97.6	0.9	1.1	115,200	26,300	56,943	7.9
Monroe	32,957	98.1	0.4	1.4	201,300	31,570	69,291	5.6
Morgan	35,547	91.2	6.3	2.2	93,000	23,598	44,731	15.0
Moultrie	14,846	98.3	0.5	1.0	93,000	24,078	48,982	10.5
Ogle	53,497	89.8	1.1	9.1	153,400	25,803	57,094	10.3
*Perry	22,350	88.9	8.8	2.8	76,600	18,469	41,333	17.0
Piatt	16,729	97.9	0.6	1.2	122,200	27,452	58,837	6.5
Pike	16,430	96.9	1.8	1.1	75,300	20,383	40,668	16.2
Pope	4,470	91.4	6.7	1.5	87,400	20,603	38,651	11.9
Randolph	33,476	88.4	10.0	2.7	88,700	21,442	46,148	12.4
Richland	16,233	97.3	0.7	1.4	7,600	23,922	42,305	13.4
Saline	24,913	93.0	4.3	1.6	69,400	21,626	36,083	17.0
Scott	5,355	98.6	0.2	0.9	83,100	27,955	50,702	8.0
Shelby	22,363	98.5	0.5	1.0	86,500	22,522	44,689	10.5

Appendix J

Illinois Counties Carried by Obama in 2012 and Lost by Clinton in 2016

County	2010				Median Home Value	Per Capita Income	Median Household Income	% Below Poverty
	Population	% White	% Black	% Hispanic				
Alexander	8,238	60.9	35.4	1.9	52,800	14,052	25,495	35.6
Carroll	15,387	96.9	0.8	2.8	97,000	26,918	49,629	12.6
Fulton	37,069	93.4	3.4	2.4	81,300	22,478	45,938	16.5
Henderson	7,331	98.2	0.2	1.1	86,300	27,132	48,438	11.7
Henry	50,486	94.8	1.6	4.8	110,100	26,845	52,518	11.3
Jo Davies	22,678	97.2	0.5	2.7	137,200	29,477	52,065	10.7
Knox	52,919	87.5	7.2	4.8	80,800	22,273	39,800	19.3
Mercer	16,434	98.3	0.3	1.9	93,700	26,739	51,259	9.6
Putnam	6,006	96.6	0.5	4.2	123,800	28,158	55,360	8.9
Warren	17,707	91.3	1.7	8.4	82,000	22,923	43,683	13.5
Whiteside	58,498	92.2	1.3	11.0	99,200	24,815	48,343	12.2
Average	26,614	91.6	4.8	4.2	94,927	24,710	46,593	15.0

Note: Obama carried 23 counties in 2012: Clinton carried 11 in 2016

Note: All above data was obtained from the 2010 Census conducted by the US Census Bureau