THE PURSUIT OF HAPPINESS IN THE CITY: CHANGING OPPORTUNITIES AND OPTIONS IN AMERICA
The Prothero Lecture

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If everything occurred at the same time there would be no *development*. If everything existed in the same place there could be no *particularity*. Only space makes possible the particular, which then unfolds in time. Only because we are not equally near to everything; only because everything does not rush in upon us at once; only because our world is restricted, for every individual, for his people, and for mankind as a whole, can we, in our finiteness, endure at all. The extent of this horizon differs, of course, from man to man. But in economic affairs, as in all other affairs, our ken is limited for acting intelligently and for finding our way through the complexities of life. And even within this little world, we are familiar with not more than its innermost circle. Depth must be bought with narrowness. Space creates and protects us in this limitation. Particularity is the price of our existence.
To let this space-conditioned particularity grow without letting the whole run wild—that is political art.

AUGUST LÖSCH, Autumn, 1939
(*Die räumliche Ordnung der Wirtschaft*)[1]

IN 1790 a population numbering less than four millions was said, according to a later census calculation, to be almost 95 per cent rural in residence and, by implication, proportionately agricultural in occupation. By 1970 a population well in excess of 204 millions was almost 75 per cent urbanized and, in terms of labour force, less than 5 per cent involved in agricultural pursuits.

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[1] Transl. by W. H. Wogrom as *The Economics of Location* (New Haven, 1958), p. 508 (quoted by permission of Yale University Press). I would like to acknowledge the helpful comments of Maldwyn Jones, Peter Mathias, and J. R. Pole, among others, when this lecture was given.

It is a commonplace of American literature and historiography that the United States was born in the country, that its characteristic values and institutions were bred in a rustic mould of life. Even before the Republic, American principles of religion, government and political economy, of family and community, even of work and recreation are said to have been rooted in, and nourished by, rural ways of life and livelihood. The wilderness, the farm, Nature, the western 'frontier', were all invoked at one time or another as the decisive, if not unique, influence on the development of an exemplary national culture. Similarly, the pioneer, the frontiersman, the yeoman cultivator, the family farmer, and their near neighbours, the independent craftsman, mechanic, or enterpriser have been the idealized type of American rôle, and in behavioural terms, the original and most authentic representative of republican spirit and virtue. Other moulds of life and different social rôles, while adding perhaps to the variety of American life and accomplishments, were for long suspect as deviant or factious and, until rendered molten and malleable according to the older pattern, potentially un-American.

In propagating so much of this pastoral imagery, *littérateurs* and historians not only struck a cherished chord in the folk-memory, they have embellished a literal and statistical fact. In 1790 the population was overwhelmingly rural in residence and in terms of measurable product largely agricultural. Not before 1840, when population already exceeded 17 millions, did fewer than nine out of every ten Americans live in census rural areas, although only four in every five members of the work force (10 years old and over) could by this date be classified as husbandmen. Nevertheless, 72 per cent of real value added to materials by commodity production was contributed by agriculture and the bulk of value added by manufacture arose from the primary processing of farm-grown foods and fibres or forest products.

At midcentury, independence still provided the cement of an increasingly interdependent social order. Only 30 per cent of the working population of town and country were yet hired hands; the rest were either self-employed or legally enslaved. By 1860, when the expansive Republic could no longer contain its diverse and deviant sections within the old political frame of Union, one in every five of its 31 million inhabitants was some sort of a city dweller and almost half the work force was employed outside husbandry. Still, farming contributed almost 60 per cent of value added by commodity production, while King Cotton alone was regularly earning from 55 to 60 per cent of the nation's export value, compared with only 10 or 12 per cent from manufactures of all kinds.

But in important respects, the statistical preponderance of rural

life obscured the already declining share of agricultural production. If Lincoln had allowed the wayward sisters to go in peace, the remaining United States of 1870 would have been among the most urbanized populations of the globe and the Confederacy might have applied for a charter membership in the underdeveloped fraternity of the Third World. While this is not advanced as a contrafactual conditional hypothesis, it is noteworthy that in 1870 the unredeemed South, including Texas, contained well over 30 per cent of the nation's population but scarcely more than 10 per cent of its assorted city dwellers. The detail of the South's industrial structure, moreover, now departed from its antebellum trend. Every postbellum census but one has revealed that the *absolute* size of the nation's incremental urban population was larger than corresponding increments to rural population. When, in 1890, the census reported the disappearance of a continuous 'frontier' line of unsettled land in the West, more than one-third of the Republic's 63 million population was classified as 'urban' by residence; cultivators comprised less than 43 per cent of the work force, barely a third of commodity value added originated directly in agriculture.[2] It was at this point in the nation's development that the Wisconsin historian, Frederick Jackson Turner, advanced his *mal du siècle* frontier interpretation of American history amidst the celebrations of the World's Columbian Exposition in Burnham's 'White City' at Chicago. Meanwhile, of course, the lofty agrarian myth of the Republic had for several decades been hardening into the narrower sectoral ideology of the agrarian crusade.

If the closing of the frontier, in Turner's phrase, sealed 'the first period of American history', it did not close off opportunity to the nation's farmers in the second period.[3] Far more final land entries under the terms of the Homestead Act were made in the 27 years after 1890 than in the preceding 27 since the Act first went into effect. The absolute number of farm operators and workers did not, in fact, peak until around 1910 when the farm sector was enjoying the

[2] Sources of concepts and data are given in E. E. Lampard, 'The Evolving System of Cities in the United States: Urbanization and Economic Development', *Issues in Urban Economics*, ed. H. S. Perloff and L. Wingo, Jr. (Baltimore, 1968), pp. 81–139. The classic analysis of agrarian sentiment is P. H. Johnstone, 'Old Ideals versus New Ideas in Farm Life', *Yearbook of Agriculture 1940* (Washington D.C., 1940), pp. 111–67.

[3] F. J. Turner, 'The Significance of the Frontier in American History', American Historical Association *Annual Report for 1893* (Washington, D.C., 1894), pp. 199–227. On antebellum 'space' and 'time' dilemmas: M. L. Wilson, 'The Controversy Over Slavery Expansion and the Concept of the Safety Valve: Ideological Confusion in the 1850s', *Mississippi Quarterly*, xxiv (1971).

longest and most prosperous period, *vis-à-vis* the rest of the economy, in American economic history. Of course, its relative contribution to commodity value added had continued to decline. The absolute size of the manufacturing labour force had also increased but, whereas manufacturing's share of all commodity value added continued to grow absolutely and relatively, the share of manufacturing in the non-agricultural work force had also been declining—falling behind the combined share of the mining, construction, and service sectors—since around 1880. By 1920, when the Republic's numbers surpassed 105 millions, every other American was living out his or her life in cities. Only one in every four occupied persons over 10 years of age remained on the farms, while the other three were almost always to be found, employed or otherwise, in the manufacturing, construction, and service industries.

No urban historian stepped forward in 1920 to explain the emblematic significance of this latest artifact of census enumeration. But in 1910 Turner himself had already made, as it were, a 'half-minded' concession to the 'revolution in the social and economic structure of this country during the past two decades' and he expressed 'the shock' with which 'the people of the United States are coming to realize that the fundamental forces which have shaped their society up to the present are disappearing'.[4] The familiar chord struck repeatedly in the folk memory by *littérateurs* and historians up to that day had, under the force of the urban impact, apparently become the Lost Chord.[5]

Turner, to be sure, was well aware of the gathering controversy over industrialism and the problems of cities, real or imagined, that had gone on in American public life in one form or another since shortly after the Revolution. Yet for one who had always thought of his work as 'dealing with the processes of American history rather than with a geographic section', and who had often wanted 'to start

[4] Turner, 'Social Forces in American History', *American Historical Review*, xvi (1911), pp. 217–33. Earlier historians such as W. H. Prescott, George Bancroft, Francis Parkman, and Henry Adams had all expressed misgiving or hostility to large cities and elements in their populations.

[5] The long and influential 'booster' tradition has had little impact on literature or historiography. But Frank Freidel, 'Boosters, Intellectuals, and the American City', *The Historian and The City*, ed. O. Handlin and J. Burchard (Cambridge, Mass., 1963), pp. 115–20, offers an illuminating synopsis of its possibilities in response to M. White, 'Two Stages in the Critique of the American City', *ibid.*, pp. 84–94. An early urban booster was Jesup W. Scott of Toledo, Ohio: see *Hunt's Merchants' Magazine*, xix (1848), pp. 383–86, and xxv (1851), pp. 559–65. W. B. Hesseltine, 'Four American Traditions', *Journal of Southern History*, xxvii (1961), pp. 3–32, suggests a wider range of public rôles.

something in agricultural history', Turner came late to his awareness of the process of urbanization and its intimate relation to the entire Westward Movement since late colonial times.[6] Although 'the city problem' had long exercised reform-minded social scientists, critics, and authors of realistic fiction, neither the problems nor the processes of urbanization excited much concern among professional historians until well after World War I.

The young Hoosier, Charles A. Beard, had been conscious—since his early connexion with Ruskin Hall—of 'the social question' as it affected the working classes of London and the great manufacturing centres of the provinces. He was well acquainted with the researches of Booth and Rowntree; yet he appreciated 'the marvellous mechanical and scientific progress' that had made material abundance possible for all the crowded classes of men in the industrial cities.[7] Beard later became a rather harsh critic of Turner's romantic individualism and Turner clearly had Beard in mind when he complained to the young but senior Arthur M. Schlesinger in 1925 of recent 'attempts to minimize' the broad frontier theme. He attributed the tendency to:

> 'the pessimistic reaction against the old America that [has] followed the World War—the reaction against pioneer ideals, against distinctively American things historically in favor of the Old World solutions of 'the promise of American life'—to write in terms of European experience, and of the class struggle incident to industrialism. There seems likely to be an urban reinterpretation of our history. But we cannot altogether get away from the facts of

[6] Turner, letter to Merle Curti, 11 June 1927, in *The Historical World of F. J. Turner: With Selections from His Correspondence*, narrative by W. R. Jacobs (New Haven, 1968), pp. 238–39. In his introduction to *Frontier and Section: Selected Essays of Frederick Jackson Turner* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J., 1961), pp. 8–9, R. A. Billington suggests that, shortly before his death in 1932, Turner had planned an essay on 'The Significance of the City in American Civilization'.

[7] C. A. Beard, *The Industrial Revolution* (London, 1901), *passim*. Beard became too preoccupied with the political problem of democratizing the capitalist system to make any enduring contribution to economic or urban history. His 1912 text *American City Government* is scarcely a footnote today. In his 'The City's Place in Civilization', *The Survey*, lxi (1928), pp. 213–15, Beard accepts Jefferson's strictures on eighteenth-century cities in Europe but reaffirms the rôles of science and the machine in fulfilling the promise of city civilization. He concludes, *pace* Lord Bryce, that: 'County, not city, government is the most conspicuous failure of American democracy'. An early example of faith in education and knowledge as the mutually beneficial solvents of town and country relations is Roberts Vaux, 'Importance of Education', address to the Philadelphia Society for Promoting Agriculture, *The Agricultural Almanack for 1827* (Philadelphia, 1827).

American history, however far we go in the way of adopting the Old World!'[8]

There was no 'urban reinterpretation' of American history, not much urban history of any kind, in the immediate postwar decade. It remained for essentially political historians to accommodate the diverse processes reshaping America: industrialization, westward migration, immigration to the farms and cities, and the ensuing era of 'Progressive' reform. Not before the publication in 1933 of A. M. Schlesinger, Sr.'s *The Rise of the City, 1878–1898*, was there much scholarly interest in a general field of urban history. Schlesinger then offered a building-block topical narrative of the industrial-urban transformation which seemed to fit in very conveniently between Allan Nevins' buoyant *Emergence of Modern America, 1865–1878*, and Harold U. Faulkner's sombre *Quest for Social Justice, 1898–1914*. Meanwhile, the rather aimless debate over Turner's frontier hypothesis was part of the adaptation to these same industrial themes and, if it shed little light on the process of industrial-urban transformation at any time, it nonetheless served to undermine conventional wisdom concerning the exclusively rural-agrarian matrix of American institutions and identity. Curiously enough, it invoked English precept and wider European tradition not, to be sure, in terms of class struggle, but rather to stress an original consensus and agreement on civic fundamentals underlying strong differences on immediate issues.[9] But in registering their various dissents from Turner's grand theme of 'westward process', most of the new interpretations made indirect obeisance to the old. Notwithstanding their express concern with social and economic trends, historiographical issues were usually couched in broad political terms and the currents of change were too readily absorbed into mainstream clashes of sections and interests, partisan electoral strife, social problems and reform movements.

Even when historians, like Turner himself, recognized the social strains incident to industrialism, big business, and the flood of 'new' immigration, their resort to metaphors of urban 'impact'—with their connotations of collision with something from outside—underlined the provincial rurality of American republicanism. Rural life outside the Old South was usually depicted in Arcadian terms down to some

[8] Turner, letter to A. M. Schlesinger, Sr., 25 May 1925, in *Historical World of F. J. Turner*, pp. 163–64. On American usage of the word 'frontier' see J. T. Jurick in American Philosophical Society *Proceedings*, cx (1966), pp. 10–34.

[9] G. M. Gressley, 'The Turner Thesis—A Problem in Historiography', *Agricultural History*, xxxii (1958), pp. 227–49. Also, B. F. Wright, Jr., *Consensus and Continuity, 1776–1787* (Northampton, Mass., 1958).

suitably critical date between, say, the Tariff Acts of 1862–64 and McKinley's defeat of Bryan in the presidential campaign of 1896. The urban impact historians—especially contributors to college textbooks of the 1940s and 1950s—appear to have been profoundly impressed by the polemical writings of late nineteenth-century social critics and the prescriptive formulations of early social scientists. They compressed the industrial-urban transformation into a few decades and stigmatized it as an unequal struggle between opposing ways of life, between urban and rural 'cultures'.

While shunning social science jargon historians, nevertheless, adapted many of the same lines of inquiry, asked broadly similar questions of like kinds of data, and came up with much the same findings as their earlier counterparts in economics, sociology, or political science. Transposed into the letristic key of metaphor, the conflict was one of polarized cultures, one in which the old American values and institutions—equality, independence, conscience, the family, the community, and local democracy—had been at stake. Out of the industrial-urban impact arose the need for order and efficiency in business, politics, administration, religion, philanthropy, education, and social relations.[10] Thanks largely to the Progressive movement, the original 'promise of American life' was upheld and eventually consummated in the New Deal achievement. Indeed, in recognizing the South as 'the nation's economic problem No. 1' and through his programmes to give the farmer 'economic parity' with industry, Roosevelt II went far to restore the agricultural remnant to that larger parity in the Great American Welfare Coalition promised by Roosevelt I's appointment of the Commission on Country Life at the height of the first Progressive surge in 1908.

Before the 1950s the leading historiographical ideas on inter-war society were again very much like those of contemporaries who had endured the transformation. Now that society was almost wholly industrialized, however, conflict of any sort between town and country could no longer be regarded as the mainspring of social change. With the disillusionment that followed the frustration of Woodrow Wilson's crusade to impress American values on a wayward and benighted world, and after the collapse of the 'New Economic Era' of prosperity into the interminable Depression, faith in 'Old Stock' American ideals and potencies was badly shaken. The plain people of town and country were alike the victims of business

[10] E. E. Lampard, 'American Historians and the Study of Urbanization', *American Historical Review*, lxvii (1961), pp. 49–61, and in a broader context, *idem*, 'Urbanization and Social Change', *The Historian and The City*, ed. Handlin and Burchard, pp. 225–47.

cupidity and waste. Present-minded historians found the Beardian political interpretation of class interests and social conflict much more to their taste. Beard's liberal-progressive critique of American institutions made a much broader appeal than Morris Hillquit's liberal Marxism or Father John A. Ryan's liberalized corporativism. It is not surprising that Beard's, as he believed, Madisonian view of American capitalism *throughout* its history now coloured the dominant interpretation of the American past in both its agrarian and industrial periods.[11]

It is historiographically significant, again, that scholars have devoted far more attention to Roosevelt I's National Conservation Commission than to his Commission on Country Life, both of which were appointed in 1908.[12] The latter commission, while catering to the agrarian narcissism of rural America and its small towns, had announced the urgent need to reform country attitudes and ameliorate country-life conditions. In the country, no less than in the city, health, housing, education, social relations and even religion were found to be in a deplorable state. Judged by the findings of both early rural and urban sociologists, much was rotten in both 'types' of American community and the Republic no longer had an equilibrium to which it might return—unless it be the 'small town' on whose model proportions most social critics, except Thorstein Veblen, seemed to agree.[13]

The country-life movement was not just another sentimental journey back to the land, nor a romantic village renovation programme. Liberty Hyde Bailey, its chief protagonist, described its motivation as 'the working out of a desire to make rural civilization as

[11] C. A. Beard, *The Economic Basis of Politics* (New York, 1922), went through many printings and was re-issued in 1945, when Beard added his reflections on the recent politicization of economics.

[12] R. H. Wiebe's influential study *The Search For Order, 1877–1920* (New York, 1967), for example, makes full reference to the conservation movement and agricultural interest groups but not to the country-life movement.

[13] Veblen's sour comments appear in *Absentee Ownership and Business Enterprise in Recent Times: The Case of America* (New York, 1923), chap. 7, on the 'independent farmer' and the 'small town'. Also, W. L. Anderson, *Country Town, A Study of Rural Evolution* (New York, 1906); C. J. Galpin, 'The Social Anatomy of an Agricultural Community', *Research Bulletin 34*, (Wisconsin Agricultural Experiment Station, Madison, May, 1915). The predicament of the small Midwestern town is presented by L. Atherton, *Main Street on the Middle Border* (Bloomington, Ind., 1954). The decline of the small town has long been deplored: H. J. Fletcher, 'The Doom of the Small Town', *Forum*, xix (1895), pp. 214–23, and *The Christian Science Monitor*, Aug. 30, 1972, p. 7. But see L. F. Schnore, 'The Rural-Urban Variable: An Urbanite's Perspective', *Rural Sociology*, xxxi (1966), pp. 131–55. But the small town lives in the ideal of the city 'neighbourhood'.

effective and satisfying as other civilization'. In G. Walter Fiske's words, the movement sought 'to make country life as satisfying as city life and country forces as effective as city forces'. The pursuit of happiness in the city had evidently acquired a relevance, if only as a measuring rod, for the conservation of happiness in the countryside. Bailey found the 'general absence of . . . common feeling' among rural people to be as critical as the divorce between town and country and the resultant bondage of the cultivator. The recommendations of the Commission, which needless to add were never implemented, sought not only to accomplish an economic parity between agriculture and 'industry' as the necessary condition for ensuring an urban nation its food supply, but also the achievement of those wholesome conditions of social life which urban critics had often attributed to rural communities and which the rural critics now thought were available to city people.[14] It was unfortunate that both types of social doctor focused so narrowly on the pathologies of their respective laboratories. It was regrettable from the standpoint of historiography, at least, that 'urban' and 'rural' phenomena should have been thus compartmentalized and then rather abruptly dropped from consideration, since it proved impossible for historians to determine the differential effects of social change without first understanding its secular processes.

When A. M. Schlesinger, Sr., sketched his interpretative essay 'The City in American History' in 1940 he had available to him a much larger array of historical and sociological monographs than any previous commentator. In the amplified version, published in 1949, he had the benefit of an even richer monographic fund. Yet for all the intellectual capital accumulated by years of research, Schlesinger had not yet found a frame of reference appropriate to the study of social change. American urban history now extended from the first colonial days down into the troubled years of the New and Fair Deals. The spread of cities was placed in a context of westward movement from the Atlantic to the Pacific's shores: 'a true understanding of America's past demands this balanced view—an appreciation of the significance of both frontier and city'. Economic opportunity had been everywhere, culture and complexity particularly, almost generically, in the city, but the whole interpretation was rendered in a rather optimistic Hegelian dialectic of urban–rural conflict, the outcome of which was

[14] U.S. *Senate Document* No. 705, 60 Cong., 2 Sess. L. H. Bailey, The *Country Life Movement in the United States* (New York, 1911), pp. 1–30, 97; G. W. Fiske, *The Challenge of the Country: A Study of Country Life Opportunities* (New York, 1913), pp. 1–58, and H. Paul Douglass, *The Little Town, Especially in Its Rural Relationship* (New York, 1919), which postulated the need for a 'half-way' house between town and country.

always the greater dominion of the city—with a continually post-dated synthesis for 'community.' But, Schlesinger went on:

> 'the twentieth century has been spinning a web in which city and country, no longer separate entities, have been brought even closer together. When the city encroaches sufficiently on the country and the country on the city, America may hope to arrive at a way of life which will blend the best features of both the traditional ways.'

Did he mean the suburbs? But, he concluded, whereas in Europe:

> 'the modern urban community emerged by gradual steps out of the simple town economy of the Middle Ages . . . the American city leaped into being with breath-taking speed. At first servant to an agricultural order, then a zealous contestant, then an oppressor, it now gives evidence of being a comrade and a cooperator in a new national synthesis. Its economic function has hardly been more important than its cultural mission or its tranforming influence upon rural conceptions of democracy. The city, no less than the frontier has been a major factor in American civilization. Without an appreciation of the role of both, the story is only half told.'[15]

In historiography, at last, the city had achieved parity with the country. Urban America need no longer choose between Hamilton and Jefferson-worship, Benjamin Franklin, the pioneer of conglomerate business in America, was restored to the pantheon. Historiography was moving beyond Beard and its interpretative options were enlarged. Schlesinger's essay is a landmark.

Certainly the New Deal was a new national 'synthetic'. It was a belated and, on the whole, unsuccessful effort to improvise a public institutional structure in which the largely private, and still potentially corporate, interests of town and country could renew the quest for happiness in an industrial-urban society. It attempted to incorporate a nationwide structure in which America's highly differentiated and comparatively specialized populations—individuals, voluntary groups, business associations, trade unions, localities, and whole regions—could function and prosper under a federally erected bureaucratic arch. Even the Southern Negro could begin to participate *via* federally tolerated forms of social segregation.

[15] 'The City in American Civilization', in Schlesinger, *Paths To The Present*, pp. 210–33, 297–99. The original essay in the *Mississippi Valley Historical Review*, xxvii (1940), p. 43–66, was criticized by W. A. Diamond, 'On the Dangers of an Urban Interpretation of History', *History and Urbanization*, ed. E. F. Goldman (Baltimore, 1914), pp. 67–108, for loose use of terms and neglect of economic and class conflicts. Schlesinger did not feel that 'the urban and class interpretations' were 'mutually exclusive'.

But the New Deal erected its institutional scaffolding not so much out of the processes of social change in America as upon the shaky foundations inherited from the Progressive era and the exhilarating memory of alphabetical agencies and expedients that had served to defeat the Kaiser in 1916–18. It never really worked, but the gentleman farmer from Dutchess County, N.Y., held the urban Republic together long enough until the combined impacts of Hitler and Tojo imparted a dynamism and consensus in Washington to restore the nation's momentum onward and *outward*. The Employment Act of 1946, federal keystone for an American pluralistic consensus in peacetime, could probably not have held the rickety structure together without the renewed momentum of the Cold War and Sputnik.

There was little effective concern for cities as such under the New Deal, although they figured quite largely in the purposeful projects of the National Resources Planning Board, aborted by the Congress, once the economy had experienced the tonic effect of Europe's latest war between the states.[16] Most of the interpretative historical writing of the 1940s was enlisted for the duration and urban history was likewise adjourned. When peace broke out many historians almost immediately re-enlisted in the Cold War to preserve embattled democracy from Red malefactors at home and abroad. Professionally-conscious, more local-minded, urban historians resumed their modest diggings, enjoyed annual lunches together, and eventually consoled each other in the mimeographed pages of Blake McKelvey's *Urban History Group Newsletter*, one of the few historiographical landmarks of private cooperative enterprise during the first Eisenhower term.

The New Deal had supposedly tamed the excesses of American 'Business' and the country might have expected to enjoy, what would come to be called, a period of 'political stability and economic growth'. There was nervousness all round, but the progressive-minded historian, Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., called upon citizens to be vigilant against 'business' and conservative of republican democracy, which alone among 'modes of organizing society' could by bargaining

[16] R. Lubove, 'New Cities for Old: the Urban Reconstruction Program of the 1930s', *Social Studies*, liii (1962), pp. 203–13; J. A. Arnold, *The New Deal in the Suburbs: a History of the Greenbelt Town Program* (Columbus, Ohio, 1971). V. L. Perkins, *Crisis in Agriculture: The AAA and the New Deal, 1933* (Berkeley, 1969), attempts a realistic defence of the early farm policy, but see L. J. Arrington, 'Western Agriculture and the New Deal', *Agricultural History*, xliv (1970), pp. 337–53, which shows that per capita loans and expenditures by federal farm agencies, 1933–39, were directed towards *richer* rather than poorer farm states, to those which had experienced the greatest *drop* in per capita farm incomes, 1929–32. Also, D. Holley, 'The Negro and the New Deal Resettlement Program', *ibid.*, xlv (1971), pp. 179–93.

and compromise keep 'alive enough hope among discontented minorities to deter them from taking up the option of revolution'. It was still not clear in 1944 what difficult tests would be imposed upon the Republic after victory but its survival would 'bear a vital relation to its attacks on similar (if less intense) crises of its past'. Schlesinger, Jr.'s *The Age of Jackson*, published in 1945, had originated in a series of lectures delivered, somewhat ironically, at the Lowell Institute in Boston in the months before the bombs at Pearl Harbor finally terminated the social crisis of the 1930s. The book was an interpretation in the spirit, to say the least, of the New Deal although 'the actual issues, political and economic, of Jackson's day have now an almost Arcadian simplicity'. Its author had little to say about town and country other than conflict but, like the New Deal, Schlesinger was taken up with the industrial order and the predicaments of 'humble people' regardless of where they lived. *The Age of Jackson* was perhaps the last truly Progressive historical tract, an example of the higher journalism in the service of the Republic.[17]

But history and historiography were to manifestly, in Schlesinger Jr.'s words, 'thrust a world destiny on the United States' to which, however reluctantly, the Republic must accede. Early in 1949, he was still persuaded that 'the restoration of business to political power in this country would have calamitous results' as in the past. He expected the Republic to remain 'a New Deal country' but, if business got power, 'this time we might be delivered through the incompetence of the right into the hands of the totalitarians of the left'. The anti-communist purges were already public policy during the first Truman administration but 1948 had been a bitter-sweet year. The incompetent right under Thomas E. Dewey had only just been fended off and the Democracy itself had barely survived its own internal 'totalitarian' threat from Henry A. Wallace on the left and Strom Thurmond on the right. The bass black Paul Robeson was not yet a non-Person and was still singing a Pied Piper's black and red tune.

Schlesinger Jr.'s expectation that the Republic would remain 'a New Deal country' was borne out by Truman's second administration and even by the business-venerating General Eisenhower. History, as Schlesinger, Jr., affirmed, had 'equipped modern American liberalism with the ideas and the knowledge to construct a society where men will be both free and happy'.[18] Whatever Clio had taught liberals about 'happiness', she had obviously taught them little about cities or social change. The Federal Housing Act of 1949 and the Federal

[17] A. M. Schlesinger, Jr., *The Age of Jackson* (Boston, 1945), foreword.

[18] A. M. Schlesinger, Jr., *The Vital Center: The Politics of Freedom* (Boston, 1949), pp. vii–x, 219–42.

Highways Act of 1956 were designed, among other things to furnish 'decent housing' for all Americans, to renew the run-down cities and to circulate more of their urbane blessings by automobile and motor truck through the bucolic countrysides. In the event, they bull-dozed many 'humble people' out of their slum-sweet homes into more expensive sub-standard housing, accelerated the century-old peripheral sprawl of cities into the God-given greenbelts of metropolitan areas, and facilitated the removal of a dwindling rural remnant into the central city's core or to the bulging satellite centres of the metropolitan outer rings. Federal legislation provided an urban 'frontier' bonanza for real-estate speculators, construction industry mafia, corruptible politicians and civil servants, and not least the newly-growing planning profession.[19]

The improvised structures of the New Deal were already being undermined by their own obsolescence even before the situation deteriorated into what the mass media dubbed 'the urban crisis' of the 1960s. Even as federal pacification programmes multipled, the Blacks rebelled, the students rose up, the ethnic minorities revolted, and strident regiments of anguished middle-class women marched from the cities and suburbs in search of a human identity. No doubt, as Micawber-like consensus historians will remind us, all this will pass, even the vain pursuit of victory in Vietnam which stretches its bloody mindless strand across the third-quarter of the waning American century from 1949 to 1973. Modern liberal America seemed

[19] Almost 90 per cent of federal outlays on urban problems down to 1970 had been devoted to highways and subsidies to the largely middle class and segregated home-mortgage industry. Notwithstanding the promise of 'a decent home and a suitable living environment for every American family' in the 1949 Act, only one-fifth of housing built on renewal sites was required to be for 'low and moderate-income families'. Between 1937 and 1970 only 900,000 units of federally subsidized low cost housing units were built, although an array of other federal programmes contributed to the sale of a majority of new housing units. By 1970 more than 77 per cent of the 70 million housing units in the country were subject to the terms of Title VIII of the Fair Housing Act of 1968. Urban renewal programmes were originally designed to raise the tax base of local authorities and to make private real estate development more profitable. Such programmes also created jobs, especially for planners, whose expertise is mandatory since 1949. Membership in the American Institute of Planners rose from 240 in 1945 to 3,800 in 1965. Federal employment in housing agencies had climbed to *c.* 14,000 by 1965, when the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development was finally established. Proposals for such a federal department go back to the Roosevelt and Taft days before World War I. According to the *Housing Census of 1960*, nearly 12 million units were dilapidated or deteriorating. On 'abandonment' of federal housing, see *New York Times*, 13 Jan. 1972, pp. 1, 28; on widespread corruption in administration of some federal programmes, see admission by Secretary George Romney, *New York Times*, 28 March, 1972.

to have more ideas and knowledge about landing its children upon the Moon than about building them a home in the city.

'Come Home America', called the minister's son from Mitchell, S.D. But where indeed can Americans come home to? Where does America reside in that vast land that belongs to you and me? Where every fourth or fifth American now shifts his residence each year, perhaps they are all destined to go on dwelling in the quagmire of their collective importunity? What boots the capital gain? And where is elusive Happiness? Perhaps it has already moved on to that promised 'nonplace Urban Realm' where planners tell us technological progress now permits the spatial separation of people in 'community without propinquity'? Surely that must be *the* City upon a Hill for which the American heart has so long prepared.

II

Clearly our present discontents belie Schlesinger optimism whether of the father or the son. But whatever else the 'urban crisis' of the 1960s has revealed, it has made urban historiography unexpectedly relevant. Whether he chooses to regard America's huge cup of happiness as half-full or half-empty—and that has for long been the measure of our historiographical differences, at least once chattel slavery has been put down—the urban historian can now feel *engagé*. The instant urban history that we are trying so industriously to write can at last put the city in the foreground where it has always really been, if we include London, Bristol, and Plymouth and all the latter-day ports and hinterlands of emigrating Saints, Slaves, and Strangers.

In the balance of my time and space, I would like to sketch a broad outline of the urbanization process which I call *the changing structure of opportunities*. Then I would like to indicate how tenderfooted Americans have followed an urban path along narrow lanes, broad boulevards, and dead ends since they first entered the maze of the Promised Land in the seventeenth century. This I call *the appropriation of the options*. Throughout it all there runs an implicit model of system and adaptive behaviour.

The English planted their first settlements along the wilderness of the trans-Atlantic seaboard throughout the seventeenth century. Of course, wilderness is in the mind's eye of the beholder, and it was not really a wilderness but the red man's home. Yet the English were certain they had more to offer than their baubles and their bibles and, besides, there was plenty of room; a man who did not know where he was going in the new country might easily lose himself. And if *they* had not seized the opportunity, there were the others, lesser breeds without the imperial law: the French, the Spaniards, the Dutch.

Between them they would turn the blue Caribbean into a hell on earth.

Unless a settler population clustered around some natural harbour or nestled along some navigable stream below the fall line, it was unlikely to grow beyond a mere village structure. Almost from the outset some villages and towns began serving the organized settlements that filled out the back country behind them as, what geographers call, 'a hierarchy of central places'. It was for long an unpretentious, minimal, and often interrupted hierarchy but it provided a focus. As the populations grew from their own natural increase or were irregularly supplemented by the 'excess' of other countries, when access to land improved and settlements became more secure, as the wilderness was turned into a garden, so the settlers tightened their grips upon particular physical environments, explored the natural properties, and commenced turning their God-given environments—physical and human—into productive resources. The new colonies grew in population and/or material wealth as they could severally participate in larger systems of trafficking that evolved around the Atlantic's shores.

The necessary lines of transport and communications crossed in the villages, towns, and the seaports cities. From this provenance came the system and the structure rather than from the laws of Parliament or instructions to Governors. Under conditions prevailing down into the early nineteenth century, in fact, interactions were closely circumscribed by what geographers term 'spatial biases' in the inter-local flows of commodities, persons, and information which gave some villages and towns—especially those at the existent terminals of main-travelled ocean, river, or coastal routes—a *positional* advantage over others of their kind. Sometimes this positional advantage proved transient and the geographer, Allan Pred, has argued that the different time-requirements for physical movement by water and land, together with the disparate volumes and frequencies of contact, among centres largely governed which places would grow in size and influence.[20] North America rapidly recapitulated the urban ontogeny of the city in European civilization: the stockade village, the agrarian town, the market city, and finally the industrial city. But because America unfolded in space as well as time, these characteristic phases, often misconceived as 'stages', were usually contemporary situations.

This is consistent with what one would 'expect' to happen in a pre-

[20] A. R. Pred, 'Large-City Interdependence and the Pre-Telegraphic Diffusion of Innovations in the U.S.', *The New Urban History: Quantitative Exploration*, ed. L. F. Schnore (forthcoming). Also J. T. Lemon, 'Urbanization and the Development of 18th-Century Southeastern Pennsylvania and Adjacent Delaware', *Williams & Mary Quarterly*, xxiv (1967), pp. 501–42.

industrial market system in which frictions of distance, except over water, impose an almost insurmountable burden of 'costs'. Given market potential, with capital scarce, labour comparatively short, and other resources latently abundant, so much turned on the qualities and capacities of the human resources involved. Since there were few modes of enterprise which entailed much more than a man's skills, tools, and the energy with which he, his family, and his servants could employ them, the enterpriser needed only the favour of an alien and extreme Nature to get his dependents some sort of living. Every household was in varying degree a self-sufficient farmstead, manufactory, market place, and oasis. Savings could eventually be tied up in stocks of goods, in buildings and boats, in slaves, in financing indentures, and occasional manufactories, although almost any more ambitious and innovative venture, even in husbandry, would involve an acceptance of credit for variable intervals of time. In such communities there was little left over for 'infra-structure' or public goods and services but society, even a settler society, is always more than a market place and a life more than the livelihood. Localities collectively requisitioned the labour time for public goods in the traditional fashion, established a few mostly part-time public offices, or put the matter off until next season or never. There were lotteries, fees, and user charges; but taxes were correspondingly low.

Except for enthusiastic Saints, perhaps, many individuals—especially among the womenfolk—must have wondered at times whether the eventual gains in substance or status altogether outweighed the loss of other riches left forfeit in the villages, towns and seaports on the other side. But there were often neighbours from the old haunts; there were always the children, the future. How they must have cherished the intangibles lugged over in the cultural baggage, overprized them perhaps, discounted what they had abandoned, perhaps garbled the meanings of both. Within a few generations they were Americanized with material objects and treasured ways of their own; still recognizably English, or 'Dutch', or 'Scotch' to others, but with common intangibles no Englishman, German, Scot, or Ulsterman would ever have. *This* was home until opportunity beckoned on.

Colonial American development made an enormous impression on those who had grown up with it, whether native or foreign born. If some returned to the Old Country, they would not forget America, even though they distorted the reality of the New Found Land. 'Some few towns excepted,' wrote the repatriate Crèvecoeur in the third of his *Letters From an American Farmer*, published in France in 1782:

'we are all tillers of the earth, from Nova Scotia to West Florida. We are a people of cultivators scattered over an immense territory,

communicating with each other by means of good roads and navigable rivers, united by the silken bands of mild government, all respecting the laws without dreading their power, because they are equitable. We are all animated with the spirit of industry, which is unfettered, and unrestrained, because each person works for himself . . . A pleasing uniformity of decent competence appears throughout our habitations . . . Lawyer or merchant are the fairest titles our towns afford; that of a farmer is the only appellation of the rural inhabitants of our country.'[21]

Here was a rural-agrarian model of settlement offered more as a parable of opportunity than as a paradigm for social change. This, and more, underlay the Jeffersonian heritage.

It was in the seaport cities which grew irregularly through the eighteenth century that the social and cultural nexus became more ramiform in their structures than Crèvecoeur had allowed. They were the cross routes and the crossroads. The great ports and their surrounds from Boston to Charles Town were the principal trading linkages with the outside world and transmitted the goods, persons, and intelligences to lesser places in between and up the valleys into the interiors. They were in time and due proportion the foci for innovation and diffusion of institutional and mechanical novelties, foreign and domestic, throughout their respective hinterlands. Their interaction with each other and the outside world controlled the locus and thrust of development, if not altogether of settlement. But here men and women could also live more readily by taking in each other's differentiated washing as long as wagons rolled, pack horses moved, and ships put to sea. Areas which had less to offer the larger systems by way or regional specialities—tobacco, rice, lumber, grain, furs, fish, or animal products—provided ships, ship services, mercantile connexions, and the crude or exquisite artifacts of their town and country crafts. Eventually debts were paid off, litigated over, gathered interest, or were written down.

The rhythms and regularities of such daily and seasonal rounds imparted a structure of opportunities within an inherited frame of law and local custom. As Adam Smith well knew, the division of labour and, in the aggregate the wealth of provinces and nations, depended on the extent of the market; the latter may be regarded as the spatial structure of opportunities. But opportunity occurs in time as well as space. Merchants and mechanics had known it long before the professor, but the risks were great and competition from near or far could only heighten uncertainties and anxiety. Hence the

[21] *Letters From An American Farmer* (Dutton Paperback, New York, 1957), p. 36.

attempts—and not alone by Parliaments, Governors, or assemblies—to warn off strangers, keep out encroachers and corrupters, and to exclude as much as possible from the outside world. The corollary of corporate barriers was that freemen of the boroughs, towns, parishes, or districts should not take advantage of their co-inhabitants, but both pressures from without as well as differences and tensions within, would make it difficult to sustain the practices of restriction.[22] Opportunity was with the system long before industrialization and the price of functional independence or isolation was a loss of momentum: stasis or stagnation. Not surprisingly, interrelations among localities as well as individuals and families repeatedly strained the frameworks of law and custom and contributed to the transformation of the increasingly differentiated parts of the wider whole.

Thus the process of social change in America, *pace* Crèvecoeur, was not simply a repetition and enlargement of existing ways of life and livelihood. Departures from prevailing patterns might also be reinforced by gain, amplified and confirmed by more *positive* feedbacks. At other times the feedbacks were negative, the initiatives were counteracted and activities returned within their prior restraints. But as the scale of interactions among the systems' differentiated parts shifted in volume or frequency, so varying degrees and levels of structuring arose, persisted, dissolved, and were altered over again. If social change in North America often appeared to be no more than enlargement and growth along the existing parameters of westward movement, it also involved a social learning process over time which led to development, ultimately and unevenly to social transformation. Whereas frontier development merely repeated itself with local adaptations across the continent, the city's unfolding communicated a dynamism and a shape to the whole of society.

But how does such a process occur? How do people serve it? Here I must revert to my economist's categories, since I want to get to the structure and motivation of collective behaviour beneath the integumentary detail.[23]

[22] E. S. Griffith, *History of American City Government: The Colonial Period* (New York, 1938); C. Bridenbaugh, *Cities in the Wilderness: The First Century of Urban Life in America, 1625–1742* (New York, 1938); J. A. Fairlie, *Essays in Municipal Administration* (New York, 1908), contains an excellent study of colonial municipalities. On growth, see *The Growth of Seaport Cities 1790–1825*, ed. D. T. Gilchrist (Charlottesville, Va., 1967).

[23] I apologize for my jargon but not for my models, who are the Scottish moral philosopher, Adam Smith, the English political economist, Alfred Marshall, and a necessary French sociologist, Emile Dürkheim. I also need a Canadian, Harold A. Innis, and his *The Bias of Communication* (Toronto, 1951), to complete my *entente intellectuelle*.

Urbanization, like any other patterned process of human settlement, may be adumbrated in terms of division of labour. If what we have described above accounts for the growth of a few major cities in the low productivity societies of North America, urbanization may be regarded as a societal process in which, among other things, factors of production, households and enterprises in town and country, and hence localities, become increasingly specialized and interdependent with respect to growing market areas and to each other. It involves the ways and means by which men have instituted and appropriated the economies and 'externalities' of scale.

With industrialization, and the greater accumulation of fixed capital goods and pertinent social infra-structures, the sequences of production become more prolongated and 'round about' in that a growing volume and share of specialized outputs represent, not final products for consumption, but the more or less specialized inputs for further processing or fabricating by others. Manufactories prefer to purchase, say, milling machines or textile machinery rather than to go on producing them on their own accounts. A similar option opens up for warehousing or haulage services, for borrowing rather than merely saving. The profitable reinforcement of such *transitive* connexions over time imparts a regular structure and integral character to continuing reorganizations of the division of labour in space: the changing structure of opportunities unfolds.

Erstwhile jacks-of-all-trades, sufficient households, or general merchants can begin to specialize the ***full-use*** of their time and means, if they can be assured of a sufficiently large and continuing market. Eventually they may become wholly specialized undertakings and rôles: jacks-of-one-trade, homes and factories, wholesalers, retailers, bankers, shippers, insurance men, etc. This progressive division and specialization of rôles and activities can thus yield higher returns (lower unit output costs) than were previously available to individuals, firms, localities, or to the system at large. The necessary scale shifts can be accomplished ***either*** by relocation of the new specialist in some particular environment that provides a large enough market for his more uniform product or service, *or*, through access to larger markets gained by innovations in transport and communications, he may, with consequent reductions in his unit market information and freight costs, preserve his existing location. Whether such returns to scale accrue internally to the enterprise or externally to the locality or industry, they provide a behavioural explanation for the growth of cities.[24]

[24] Lampard, 'Evolving System of Cities', *Issues in Urban Economics*, pp. 99–106. Already in the second quarter of the century, the system pivoted around three axes of transport and communication—the North-east coast

Early industrialization often involved a vertical reintegration of hitherto un-integrated or decentralized work processes into some more intensive scale of organization. The factories and similar installations, epitomized in American economic history by 'the Waltham System', illustrate the point. Water-powered cotton manufactories were instituted by Boston capitalists at several New England localities during the decade 1813–23. Many other examples might be given where mechanization or other special process consideration prompted similar integration and exploitation of scarce skills, expensive machines, or costly materials. The older, less integrated modes of comparatively unspecialized activities can no longer compete with the newer modes which enjoy higher returns to scale. Under the technical and organizational conditions of the early nineteenth century, the newer modes tended to concentrate around water-power sites. As fuel-burning machines became the more typical form of energy conversion, production was localized around coal sites as well.

The industrial revolution in the North-east tended to concentrate the newer and more productive jobs in the mill towns of New England and New York and the coke towns of Pennsylvania; they were often new foundations. In the older and larger seaport cities, the processing of regional raw materials and the fabricating of articles to meet the growing demands of commerce and local populations went on much as before; the accretion of newer modes and scales of organization developed more slowly and usually away from the central business districts. In the early Wests, barriers of mountains and distance protected the growth of local materials processing and even allowed some specialization along the main axes of communication but, with the transportation revolution during the second quarter of the century, small town activities tended to dwindle and the larger centres often contained the major part of their regions' more productive industries. By the postbellum decades, the bulk of manufactures in the Great Plains region was concentrated in the four or five largest cities.[25]

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from Boston to Baltimore; the Ohio–Mississippi valleys from Pittsburgh to New Orleans; and the Great Lakes from Buffalo, N.Y., to Chicago. Southern ports from Norfolk to Mobile linked themselves more or less individually to the North-east coast rather than with each other. All regional sub-systems hinged on New York, R. G. Albion, *The Rise of New York Port* (New York, 1939); S. Buck, *The Development of the Organization of Anglo-American Trade, 1800–1850* (New Haven, 1925).

[25] Lampard, 'Evolving System of Cities', *Issues in Urban Economics*, pp. 116–24; H. A. Wooster, 'Manufacturer and Artisan', *Journal of Political Economy*, xxxiv (1926), pp. 61–72; P. Temin, 'Steam and Water Power in the Early 19th Century', *Journal of Economic History*, xxvi (1966), pp. 187–205; J. G. Williamson, 'Ante Bellum Urbanization in the American North-

One unfortunate consequence of the convenient textile stereotype of industrial revolution was to focus scholarly attention on the technical and fixed capital conditions of quantity production. The conditions for large-scale wholesale, financial, communications and other specialized types of intermediary rôle have been neglected, yet these were the functions that made the expanding systems work. Perhaps only transportation developments have yet received their due.[26] In any event, such intermediary rôles were usually located in the larger centres or their functions were organized from such points.

Just as increasing returns and its structural concomitant, integration of interdependent work processes, begot the factory as the *first level* of economic reorganization, so the greater enticements and menaces of the market later in the century gave rise to a *second level*: the vertically integrated business organization. Under the competitive conditions of the late nineteenth century, vast accumulations of capital were at stake. Businessmen—'Robber Barons' to the Progressives—sought to ensure control over their various inputs and/or the marketing of their outputs. Beginning on a regional level with consumer goods, the tendency had spread to certain raw materials production and to heavy manufactures on an interregional and continental scale. Some permissive state governments in the 1880s allowed virtually unrestricted business incorporation and the federal government joined in the 1890s with its anti-trust laws, which were designed, among other things, to eliminate the more radical and 'unfair' means of competition which threatened the capital accumulated and deployed by large organizations. Henceforth, the latter hoped not only to enhance their earnings' capacity but to preserve control over their investments under a legal umbrella of 'due process'.

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east', *ibid.*, xxv (1965), pp. 592–608; R. B. Zevin, 'The Growth of Cotton Textile Production after 1815', *The Reinterpretation of American Economic History*, ed. R. W. Fogel and S. L. Engerman (New York, 1971), pp. 122–147; M. Walsh, *The Manufacturing Frontier: Pioneer Industry in Antebellum Wisconsin, 1830–1860* (Madison, Wis., 1972); H. S. Perloff *et al.*, *Regions, Resources, and Economic Growth* (Baltimore, 1960), pp. 122–221.

[26] G. R. Taylor, *The Transportation Revolution, 1815–1860* (New York, 1951); E. F. Haites and J. Mak, 'Ohio and Mississippi River Transportation, 1810–1860', *Exploration in Economic History*, viii (1970–71); H. N. Scheiber, *The Ohio Canal Era, 1820–1861* (Athens, Ohio, 1969); A. Fishlow, *Railroads and the Transformation of the Ante-bellum Economy* (Cambridge, Mass., 1965); A. R. Pred, *The Spatial Dynamics of U.S. Urban-Industrial Growth, 1800–1914* (Cambridge, Mass., 1966), pp. 12–83; C. Goodrich, 'Internal Improvements Reconsidered', *Journal of Economic History*, xxx (1970), pp. 289–311.

Their strategies to control their business and financial environments appeared to work quite well until the collapse in 1929.[27]

Thereafter big business learned that the federal government was to be not merely a compliant partner, a crutch to firms engaged in interstate commerce, but the captain of the New Industrial State. Business, agriculture, and other sectors of society came to depend on government to furnish an environment of economic growth and stability. By the 1950s almost every articulate segment of society was potentially a client of Washington.

But the American system evolved in space as well as time. Through all these transformations of economic structures, there had been parallel and related transformations of social structures across the continent. These alterations reflected and fostered a reorganization of the territorial division of labour. Thus a *third level* of economic reorganization had emerged as the evolving system of cities which determined the spatial structure of opportunities. Territorial division of labour heightened the functional interdependence among towns, cities, and larger metropolitan areas up through a 'hierarchical' system with New York, so to speak, as the head office and Washington, D.C., as the long absentee, but increasingly interfering, 'boss'. The 1900 Census of Manufactures revealed the extent to which the coordinating activities of vertically integrated business organizations were already headquartered in New York City and, to a much lesser degree, in Chicago, while the rest of their interdependent members, the plants, packing houses, mills, mines—not to mention the chain stores and retail outlets—were scattered across the continent closer to the resource inputs and populations of consumers. Certainly all three levels of structural integration appear to be bound up with market forces, the exigencies of communications, and the contingencies of maintaining organizational coherence in the midst of rapid change.[28]

[27] A. D. Chandler, Jr., 'The Beginnings of "Big Business" in American Industry', *Business History Review*, xxxiii (1959), pp. 1–31; L. Herbert, 'A Perspective of Accounting', *Accounting Review*, xlvi (1971), pp. 433–40; E. B. Metcalf, 'Business Planning and Employment Stabilization, 1915–1960' (unpublished MA Thesis, University of Wisconsin, 1969). More generally, M. E. and G. O. Dimock, *Public Administration* (4th edn., New York, 1969), pt. iv.

[28] Of 185 industrial combinations, reported by 12th U.S. *Census*, 1900, vii, pt. i, p. lxxxvi, *et seq.*, no less than 70 headquarters were located in New York, 18 in Chicago, 16 in Pittsburgh, 6 in Cleveland, and 5 each in Philadelphia and San Francisco. No other city had more than four. Lampard, 'Evolving System of Cities', *Issues in Urban Economics*, 125–33. Also, B. Duncan and S. Lieberson, *Metropolis and Region in Transition* (Beverly Hills, Cal., 1970), which treats the changing metropolitan organization of manufactures and banking services. More generally, F. Lukermann, 'Empirical

Under industrialism, cities generate differential opportunities at a faster rate than the non-cities, even while the frontier process is still under way. The differential growth of cities, in turn, manifests the positional advantages which accrue to the most *accessible* places. The larger the number of business undertakings at any positionally-advantaged site, the larger its work force is likely to become, and hence the greater its population of households, whether from net migration or natural increase.

An innovating entrepreneur needs to know about the market access potentials of alternative locations and he has to anticipate how those possibilities are likely to change. Hence the growth structures of businesses and industries are intimately related to the differential growth structures of the city regions. Only when technical and organizational conditions for optimizing alter somewhat from those which obtained earlier in the industrial revolution do centripetal forces relax. With the adaptation of electrical energy and greater facility in its transmission, with rapid transit, telephonic means of communication and, auto-mobile means of transportation, the secular tendency for interest rates to decline with capital abundance, and with the explosive force of modern city problems and related tax burdens, the cities begin to disgorge their opportunities back to the countrysides—not back to rural America but to the outer rings of the metropolitan regions. During this century the urbanization of the countryside has gathered momentum on the perimeters of urban sprawl and the spatial structure of the classical industrial city has been radically re-formed.[29]

The evolving system of cities is an organized structure but, in behavioural terms, it is also an organized system of restraints. All three levels of structural integration discussed above are alike susceptible to diseconomies of scale, rising unit costs, and diminishing returns. Similarly, all integral constraints on scale are themselves subject to relaxation. Given incentives for innovation, the high profits and other gains which accrue to innovators in the short run—whether in knowledge, rôle playing, or other critical input in temporarily inelastic supply—will, assuming 'free' conditions of entry, entice

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Expressions of Nodality and Hierarchy in a Circulation Manifold', *East Lakes Geographer*, ii (1966), pp. 17–43.

[29] J. A. Swanson and J. G. Williamson, 'Firm Location and Optimal City Size in American History', *The New Urban History*, ed. Schnore (forthcoming); R. Vernon, *The Changing Economic Function of the Central City* (New York, 1959); *City and Suburbs: The Economics of Metropolitan Growth*, ed. B. Chinitz (Englewood Cliffs, N.J., 1964). More generally, J. Wolpert, 'The Decision Process in a Spatial Context', American Association of Geographers, *Annals*, liv (1964), pp. 537–58.

others to follow suit. The emulators will undertake similar productions or play comparable rôles at more 'normal' rates of profit either at the same site in competition with the innovator or at newer sites beyond the immediate range of effective competition from the locus of innovation. Somewhat paradoxically, therefore, the contagious effect of novel specialization is territorial diffusion throughout the system, which tends to make factory, business, and city-regional structures of the same approximate size functionally and structurally more like each other. Innovative behaviour which proves exceptionally profitable in the making leads first to differentiation within existing structures of opportunity, then to varying rates of diffusion and generalization as the novelty wears off at more 'normal' equilibrium rates of profit, and ultimately to varying degrees of convergence in behaviour, social, and spatial structures. As novelties catch on and eventually transform the structures which engendered them, social change occurs and new structures are formed. Consequently, places and people, however diverse and removed at their origins, are made more alike, if only on the surface, in their ultimate destinations.

Over time, minimum scales for innovation and rates of subsequent convergence become respectively lower and faster than in earlier phases of industrial revolution. Owing to the speed and spread of information networks, the entire system experiences *convergence* in space and time. Vertical integration still exists as an organizational brake, however temporary, on the dysfunctional acceleration of change. It is still a strategy for survival if those who control the structures can anticipate the vectors and absorb the magnitudes of change over time. Modern businesses develop their own research departments, diversify their holdings, take some of their capital eggs out of one line and incorporate a variety of investments in their new conglomerate baskets. Medium-sized cities grow more like large cities in their structures and surfaces; both one-product companies and one-industry towns are most vulnerable to the currents of social change.[30] Paradoxically again, the intelligent course of specialization seems to be diversification as many farmers found over a century ago.

Yet the cities have remained different, scarcely less so than their citizens, notwithstanding their comparable traits. Not before 1820 did New Orleans displace Charleston among the five great Atlantic ports and in the century of transformation after 1860 only 15 other cities moved ahead of New Orleans in point of size. Philadelphia,

[30] W. R. Thompson, 'The Future of the Detroit Metropolitan Area', *Michigan in the 1970's*, ed. W. Haber *et al.* (Ann Arbor, 1965), pp. 203–40. Also, M. L. Greenhut, *Plant Location in Theory and Practice: the Economics of Space* (Chapel Hill, N.C., 1956).

the second ranking city from 1790 to 1890, was not New York; Chicago, the second city between 1890 and 1970, was neither Philadelphia nor New York; Los Angeles the second city by 1970 is not Philadelphia, Chicago, or New York. Neither is Dallas like St Louis or Boston, Atlanta is not New Orleans, and all the world never was and never will be like Philadelphia. 'Each urban collective,' says Sartre, 'has its own physiognomy.'

III

Jefferson was right in 1809 to insist that merchants should not try 'to convert this great agricultural country into a city of Amsterdam'.[31] But a New Amsterdam had been planted in 1625 and the 'opportunity cost'—what was foregone and irretrievably relinquished—of allowing merchants and mechanics to build America's diverse metropolitan structures out of the incorporated micro-spaces of early nineteenth-century cities was the transformation of this potentially vast agricultural landscape many times over even before the 100th generation. What made this unmistakable collective choice so confusing to most contemporaries and so complex in its detail to all subsequent generations of agrarian sympathizers, whether on the farm or in the library, was the fact that America unfolded in its space as well as in its time. The work force on farms continued to grow in numbers across the country until around 1910, while it had continually declined in relative size after about 1810. It grew in absolute size right up to the very decade of the 1910s in which the national population—in the misleading terms of census enumeration—finally tilted towards the cities. Yet since 1810 the trend was to the city and both collectively and as an 'ideal type' the man with the hoe was grubbing his own grave.

[31] Jefferson, letter to Thomas Leiper, Jan. 21, 1809, *The Writings of Thomas Jefferson*, ed. A. A. Lipscomb and A. E. Bergh (Washington, D.C., 1904–5), xii, pp. 236–38. He refers to 1785 when he had published his *Notes on Virginia* in Paris; he went on, 'But who in 1785 could foresee the rapid depravity which was to render the close of that century the disgrace of the history of man? . . . We must now place the manufacturer by the side of the agriculturist . . . experience has taught me that manufactures are now as necessary to our independence as to our comfort'. He, nevertheless, thought that immigration would be 'as a drop in a bucket' compared to natural increase; he welcomed foreign settlers for the West, especially colonies of English farmers but he thought Germans should distribute themselves sparsely among the natives for 'quicker amalgamation': letter to George Flower, Sept. 12, 1817. In 1805, Jan. 4, his letter to J. Lithgow, rejects the idea of allowing 'dissolute and demoralized handicraftsmen' to enter and he wondered whether even 'good' craftsmen should not go to the culture of the earth: *The Writings*, ed. Lipscomb and Bergh, xv, pp. 139–42; xi, pp. 55–56.

At the Louisiana Purchase Centennial Exposition in the City of St Louis in 1904 Max Weber, no less, pronounced the American farmer to be an entrepreneur like any other. But he was almost always, even in the Old South, a small-scale enterpriser: there were no great scale advantages in most of nineteenth-century agriculture. This was at once a blessing and a curse since, unlike many small entrepreneurs located in the towns, the farmer was able to operate a family-sized business even under conditions of industrialization. Indeed, industrialization ought to have been a bonanza. The opportunity to supply a growing urban population at home and abroad prompted the farmer to enlarge his output at lower unit cost. After the Civil War, this course imposed increasing capital burdens in a period of secularly falling prices, only moderately rising land values, in a local milieu in which credit was comparatively expensive for his scale of operations. Even if his terms of trade with the non-agricultural sectors were seldom really adverse, this most 'independent' of American entrepreneurial types was almost entirely dependent upon transportation, marketing, and credit institutions over which he had little or no effective clout. He felt not only exploited but victimized, he saw himself as little better off than the slave made over into share-cropper in the contemporary New South.[32] The one thing cultivators had in common with the upstanding yeoman of the Jeffersonian heritage was their utter dependence upon the caprice of nature. They no longer had much sympathy for the declassed mechanics and small enterprisers in the cities who had been confronted with many of the same 'choices' and who had failed at the Hamiltonian game.

If indeed the farmer was an entrepreneur like any other, he was a very different one from the cultivator of Jefferson's or even Jackson's day. For one thing his average family had tended to get smaller in size since before the Civil War and was not much greater than that of the average townsman in the late nineteenth century. Not surprisingly, many of his sons and daughters went streaming down the roads to the cities, where they joined the sons and daughters of the displaced artisans and mixed in the city centres, at least, with the swarms of foreigners who had been inundating the towns even more than the countrysides since before mid-century. Even the opportunities that still opened up on the farms had long been subject to the city's sway. It was the higher productivity of city jobs on average—the

[32] Not all farmers were pathetic or polemical Populists. For the bumptious faith in science and economic progress of dairy leaders in the Upper Mississippi Valley, see E. E. Lampard, *The Rise of the Dairy Industry in Wisconsin: a Study of Agricultural Change, 1820–1920* (Madison, Wis., 1963), pp. 333–51. Also, A. G. Bogue, *From Prairie to Corn Belt* (Chicago, 1963). See M. P. Conzen, *Frontier Farming in an Urban Shadow* (Madison, Wis., 1971), for the influence of local urban growth on farming.

consequence of technical progress and improvements in the quality of institutional management and human resources—that made the economy so much richer, wages better, and kept people coming to the city.[33] But this was a *long-run* change and if the farm boy or immigrant happened to hit the city in the bad years around 1838, 1858, 1876–77, 1885, 1893–96, 1908, 1913, or 1930–34, he might wish that he had never left home. He might move on to another town, and there was always a great 'churning' and turnover of urban populations, but if he stuck it out and eventually joined the swim, he would not only earn a livelihood, but many of his children and grandchildren, if they survived infancy, might expect to better themselves.[34] In real income terms many of them would do better than their parents, particularly if they kept their families small, some would jump to petty properties in retailing or service industries, others might get into the professions, politics, or the civil service, a few would become an Andrew Carnegie, a John D. Rockefeller, or a Henry Ford. All this is part of the dream and, from the late nineteenth century, individual chances for career mobility are increasingly tied to formal educational attainment. The realities of family and schooling come to determine the level at which a person first enters the labour force structure and, since most career mobility is over comparatively short ranges, the level of entry closely determines a person's ultimate occupational destiny.

How did people come to exercise the options which the city's structures opened up? In oversimplified terms, of course, according to the demand for labour in the urban economy. But much always turned on the time and the place and we are deficient in our historical knowledge of the ways and whys of native American city dwellers. Many were born there, no doubt, and more probably came from the neighbouring towns and countrysides. Around 1850 in the larger cities

[33] E. E. Lampard, 'Historical Contours of Contemporary Urban Society', *Journal of Contemporary History*, iv (1969), pp. 3–25, for conditions of nineteenth-century rural-to-urban migration and problems in the analysis of 'occupational status' change. The use of national occupational 'prestige' ratings as a measure of individual status in diverse *local* contexts is further criticized in Lampard, 'Two Cheers for Quantitative History', *The New Urban History*, ed. Schnore (forthcoming), note 25.

[34] S. Thernstrom and P. R. Knights, 'Men in Motion: Some Data and Speculations about Urban Population Mobility in 19th-Century America', *Journal of Interdisciplinary History*, i (1970), pp. 7–35; L. E. Galloway and R. K. Vedder, 'Mobility of Native Americans', *Journal of Economic History*, xxxi (1971), pp. 613–49; J. E. Eblen, 'An Analysis of 19th-Century Frontier Populations', *Demography*, ii (1965), pp. 399–413. The fate of different cohorts of urban migrants needs to be interpreted in light of R. A. Easterlin, *Population, Labor Force and Long Swings in Economic Growth: the American Experience* (New York, 1968).

perhaps as many as half the citizens were native born of native parentage but less than half of the native parents would be native to the city. Immigrants and their children made up the balance of the large city populations and, if the children are classified by parentage rather than by place of birth, then the census takers' 'foreign white stock' probably made up a half to two-thirds of the large city residents.[35]

Boston or New York in the 1850s was probably not typical. But by 1880 seven or eight of the largest cities had more than a third of their census residents foreign born and only two, New York and Jersey City, were on the North-east coast. San Francisco on the West coast, with almost 45 per cent, was the most 'foreign' of cities in this sense, but Chicago, Milwaukee, Detroit, Cleveland, and Buffalo, N.Y., filled in the other ranks with New York itself in fourth place. In all of the top 20 cities, the largest foreign-born groups in 1880 were Irish and/or German born. The largest foreign contingent in any one city was the 27 per cent German-born population of Milwaukee, which Henry Villard called 'the German Athens'. By 1910 the cities were even more foreign than they had been in 1880 or 1850. Thirteen of the 20 largest places had more than a quarter of their inhabitants foreign-born, ranging up from Philadelphia with 25 per cent to New York with more than 40 per cent. If we include the children of immigrants and array the big cities by the proportions of their foreign white stock, then the alien contribution stands out in starker relief. All of the top twenty in 1910, with the exception of Washington, D.C. (21 per cent), had more than 30 per cent of such 'foreign' elements, ranging up from New Orleans (30 per cent) to Milwaukee and New York with more than 78 per cent and Chicago, Cleveland, Boston, and Detroit with around 75 per cent close behind.[36]

Meanwhile, since the mid–1890s a majority of the immigrants had been coming from regions in southern and eastern Europe. The term 'new' immigration had acquired a rather ugly connotation of 'unmeltable' and inferior, whereas immigrants stemming from 'old' northern and western Europe or Canada now seemed comparatively agreeable, even when the newcomer was a Roman Catholic or a German Jew. Among the largest cities, populations from the Russian Empire (chiefly Polish or 'Russian' Jewish) formed one of the three largest foreign groups in New York, Chicago, Milwaukee, Pittsburgh, and St Louis. Peoples from Austria-Hungary (also including Poles and Jews) comprised one of the three largest foreign groups in Chicago,

[35] P. R. Knights, *The Plain People of Boston, 1830–1860: a Study in City Growth* (New York, 1971), pp. 19–47. Only Milwaukee, Chicago, and St Louis had foreign-born majorities.

[36] 10th U.S. *Census*, 1880, *Population*, pp. 471, 538–41; 13th U.S. *Census*, 1910, *Populations*, i, pp. 178, 826–28, 1007.

Milwaukee, and Pittsburgh; Italians were already one of the three major foreign groups in New York while Orientals, the only groups barred or limited in entry before World War I, formed one of the three major groups in San Francisco and Los Angeles. Only St Louis among the major cities had 'old' immigrants, German and Irish, comprising two of the three major foreign-born groups. Moreover, whereas Protestants of one sect or another had made up about 40 per cent of the immigration before 1870, they formed less than a quarter of those entering between 1870 and 1920; before 1870 only about one per cent of immigrant flows had been Jews but, from 1870 to 1920, perhaps as large a share as 20 per cent had been Jewish in their religious heritage.[37]

Up until 1910 most of the Negro urban movement had been towards cities of 'the New South'. Before the Civil War around 5 or 6 per cent of the slave labour force had lived in towns where they were usually far outnumbered by 'free' Negroes. In the 1850s Baltimore and New Orleans had contained the largest numbers of black urban residents, more than twice the size of New York's black population and almost half as many again as in Philadelphia in 1854. Male slave numbers had been falling in many Southern cities during the 1850s, possibly because it had become more profitable to sell off the unskilled to the countrysides, where slave prices were rising more rapidly with the fortunes of King Cotton. As late as 1880 large Negro populations in big cities comprised 26 per cent of the inhabitants of New Orleans, 13 per cent of Baltimore, 7 per cent of St Louis, less than 4 per cent of Philadelphia, and but 1·6 per cent of New York City. Whether from migration or annexation, black people were increasing their urban numbers faster than white people only in some of the Southern states before 1900.[38]

Thereafter black migration shifted to the North. During the dacade of World War I, the already quite large Negro population of New York (92,000) increased by more than a third; Chicago (44,000) far more than doubled, Cleveland (8,000) more than quadrupled, while Detroit (6,000) increased its black numbers by more than 600 per cent. Since 1940 the Negro migration has again gathered momentum and in the decade 1960–70 blacks increased their shares of total popu-

[37] *Ibid.* The estimates of religious affiliation are based on unpublished data provided by S. B. Warner, Jr. More generally, C. S. Rosenberg, *Religion and the Rise of the American City* (Ithaca, N.Y., 1971), on the religious roots of mid-nineteenth-century Urban reform movements.

[38] *Statistical View of the United States: A Compendium of the Seventh Census*, 1850, pp. 192–93, 395–98; *Compendium of the Tenth Census*, 1880, pt. I, pp. 380–405, 453–63. C. D. Goldin, 'An Economic Model to Explain the Relative Decline of Slavery in Cities, 1820–1860', *The New Urban History*, ed. Schnore (forthcoming). As late as 1850 only Charleston, S.C., and Wilmington, N.C., had black majorities.

lation in Detroit, Washington, D.C., Wilmington, Del., and Newark, N.J., by from 15 to 20 percentage points. By 1970 the nation's capital was 71 per cent black; Atlanta, Gary, and Newark more than 50 per cent black; Memphis, St Louis, Richmond, Birmingham, Wilmington, Detroit, New Orleans, and Baltimore ranged from 39 to 46 per cent black. Whereas the black proportion of the central cities in the nation's 67 largest metropolitan areas rose by nearly 6 percentage points, the black share in the same areas as a whole rose by less than a third of *one* percentage point. Thus the outward movement of blacks into the metropolitan 'suburban' rings during the ten-year span was no more than a trickle.[39]

Since World War II the black contribution to the city populations in many parts of the country has reached the proportions of the foreign stock in the years before World War I. The transformation of the immigrants into hyphenated Americans is commonly thought to provide a model for the native-born blacks, Tejidos, Chicanos, Indians and other 'Third World' elements. Although urban black and brown Americans comprise only a minority of those classified as below the federal 'poverty line', their absolute numbers are large while their age, sex and family structures diverge from the white majority of the poverty population. We know much less in detail about the foreign born at a comparable stage of their jumping on to the escalator of American urban mobility; and even if we knew more it would have to be recognized that labour market conditions are dramatically altered from even a quarter century ago. Nevertheless, the implication of the model is that they too mostly came in at the bottom and by dint of their own efforts climbed out of their 'ghettos' into the avenues of the industrial-urban structure. Their children now live in the 'suburbs' along with the 'old stock' Americans.[40] So confident are today's white majority populations that this was the way 'it really happened' for their kind that, insofar as the model now needs governmental assistance to make its processes work, the themes of this lecture have

[39] L. V. Kennedy, *The Negro Peasant Turns Cityward* (New York, 1930), pp. 23–40. Data from 19th U.S. *Census*, 1970, reported *New York Times*, 11, Feb. 1972, pp. 1, 24.

[40] Non-white families comprised only 10 per cent of all families in the 100 great metropolitan areas of 1960 but they contributed 72 per cent of families resident in census-demarcated 'poverty areas'; 28·5 per cent of families in such environmentally inferior areas were classified as below the federal 'poverty level'. The poverty areas covered almost a quarter of the surface area of the metropolitan central cities: U.S. Bureau of the Census, *Poverty Areas in the 100 Largest Metropolitan Areas*, Report PC(S1)–54, Nov. 1967. On housing conditions in 'poverty areas', see National Commission on Urban Problems, *Research Report*, no. 9 (Washington D.C., 1968). Also, D. P. Moynihan, 'Poverty in Cities', *The Metropolitan Enigma*, ed. J. Q. Wilson (Cambridge, Mass., 1968).

reached the heart of the current domestic policy debate. Indeed, the model of rural-to-urban-to-suburban mobility is held up to the world.

During the early nineteenth century America's young cities conformed to a fairly common spatial pattern of pre-industrial social-structural relations. The centres were pre-empted by the more well-to-do classes with the poorer and hence lower orders of the population, including many of the newcomers, living out towards the not yet distant perimeters. There was otherwise no marked spatial separation of residences or work along socio-economic lines. As numbers increased many of the back alleys of the hitherto 'garden' cities were converted into cheap dwellings. Artisans and labourers thus lived and worked in close contact and even comity with wealthier merchants and the few professionals, while even the very poor moved easily about their appointed lowly tasks.[41]

Foreign elements had been present in American cities from the beginning. Sometimes they had grouped in small residential clusters and at others had been dispersed among the general population. Even when floods of Irish and Germans moved in from the famines and political upheavals of Europe just prior to the mid-century, they too were well distributed among the natives, although our available measure—the index of residential separation, using political wards as the areal unit—is not refined enough to indicate whether, on a block or neighbourhood basis, the different national and religious elements enjoyed social as well as physical proximity in their everyday lives. The Negro was, likewise, no stranger and small numbers of 'free colored' were always to be found. When legal and social barriers in a few Northern cities were reduced somewhat in the antebellum decades, the blacks remained closely confined in residential pockets.[42]

[41] A. Kulikoff, 'The Progress of Inequality in Revolutionary Boston', *William & Mary Quarterly*, xxviii (1971), pp. 375–412; S. B. Warner, Jr., *The Private City: Philadelphia in Three Periods of Its Growth* (Philadelphia, 1968), pp. 49–62; E. Pessen, 'A Social and Economic Portrait of Jacksonian Brooklyn', *New York Historical Society Quarterly*, lv (1971); S. M. Blumin, 'Mobility and Change in Ante Bellum Philadelphia', *Nineteenth-Century Cities*, ed. S. Thernstrom and R. Sennett (New Haven, 1969), pp. 165–208; and Knights, *Plain People of Boston*, pp. 48–102. Also, R. A. Mohl, *Poverty in New York, 1783–1825* (New York, 1971), and E. Smolensky, 'The Past and Present Poor', *Reinterpretation of American Economic History*, pp. 84–96.

[42] 'A prejudice has existed in the community . . . against them on account of their color, and on account of their being descendents of slaves. They cannot obtain employment on equal terms with whites, and wherever they go a sneer is passed upon them, as if this sportive inhumanity were an act of merit . . . Thus, though their legal rights are the same as those of whites, their condition is one of degradation and dependence': Jesse Chickering, *A Statistical View of the Population of Massachusetts from 1765 to 1840* (Boston, 1846), p. 156. Chickering's sympathy did not extend to the Irish immigrants later in the decade.

Numbers of personal and domestic servants among them were spread out, particularly if they lived in with their employers.

During the latter half of the century the cities took on a more variegated residential structure with the trend set toward the socio-economic elevation of the periphery and deterioration of the core. The concurrent expansion of the central business districts also pressed harder on the crowded living spaces of the poor. With the development of horse-drawn streetcar lines, steam railroad commuter service, and more complex economic structures, the spread of cities accelerated locally as well as across the continent. The different national and sectarian elements began to separate out along socio-economic as well as transit lines. In the last third of the century, the different nationalities appear to have been congregating more together as they accommodated to American economic opportunities but chose to keep to their own kind in respect of residence and private affiliations.[43]

The so-called ethnic group was formed in America and not brought ready-made in the cultural baggage from Europe. The groups were 'a decompression chamber in which newcomers could, at their own pace, make a reasonable adjustment to the new forces of a society vastly different from that which they had known in the Old World'. Their newly found ethnic, even more than their inherited religious, organizations furnished 'the warmth, familiar ways, and sense of acceptance that prevented the saga of "uprooting" from becoming a dislocating horror'.[44] The ethnic sub-communities and their innumerable associations were the American-born institutional response which enabled families and individuals to survive the cold-heat of the melting pot. The advent of the polyglot populations and the forming of their sub-cultures and residential turfs allowed some class-mixing within the groups although, except on days of organized marches and

[43] S. B. Warner, Jr., *Streetcar Suburbs: The Process of Growth in Boston 1870–1900* (Cambridge, Mass., 1962). S. B. Warner, Jr., and C. Burke, 'Cultural Change and the Ghetto', *Journal of Contemporary History*, iv (1969), pp. 173–87, sharply modifies the traditional view of early immigrant 'ghetto' experience which D. P. Moynihan, among others, considers analogous to present-day Negro experience. See *Hearings*, Senate Committee on Government Operations on S–843, July 27, 1967, 90th Cong. I Sess. The classic source on the 'ghetto' process is O. Handlin, *The Uprooted: the Epic Story of the Great Migration that Made The American People* (New York, 1951), pp. 144–69. But see R. A. Easterlin, 'Influences in European Overseas Emigration Before World War I', *Reinterpretation of American Economic History*, pp. 384–95.

[44] M. M. Gordon, *Assimilation in American Life* (New York, 1965), *passim*. Also, B. McKelvey, 'Cities as Nurseries of Self-conscious Minorities', *Pacific Historical Review*, xxxix (1970), pp. 367–81. McKelvey seems to accept D. P. Moynihan's notion that Negroes are only *now* beginning to form ethnic separatist allegiances after the pattern of earlier 'minorities': Moynihan, *Maximum Feasible Misunderstanding: Community Action in the War on Poverty* (New York, 1969), p. 161.

processions, the practices of pluralism tended to emphasize real differences rather than emerging identities between different elements and classes of the city populations.

At no point were the city's municipal structures successfully adapted to the tasks of coping collectively with the newer 'urban' problems which affected all segments of the population in varying degree. The public streets, health, fire and police protection, schools, and eventually law and order, were the principal areas of civic concern.[45] During the second quarter of the century, new and more specialized 'professional' politicians were beginning to displace the 'amateur' mercantile city fathers who had hitherto mediated the interests and factions. But their party-politicization of ethnic and religious tensions—which had threatened to make some American cities like present-day Belfast or Derry—did little to ameliorate, let alone solve, the problems of the physical environment or to develop new, and increasingly necessary, municipal services.[46]

[45] The 20 colonial boroughs had lost their virtual 'home rule' after the Revolution and had become creatures of the states under their respective constitutional provisions; such large centres as Boston, Newport, R.I., and Charleston had never achieved municipal status. The development of administrative competence was subsequently frustrated by the incorporation of 'division of powers' and 'checks and balances' notions into new charter provisions. State legislatures continually intervened throughout the 19th-Century, variously redistributing authority among mayors, bicameral councils, and other branches, occasionally superseding local authority altogether. By the 1830s, moreover, local restrictions on white male voting were being removed in order to make local franchises more congruent with state provisions. State courts, meanwhile, generally denied that municipal corporations had retained any 'inherent' powers and most initiatives were made conditional on powers granted or implied in ordinary state legislation: J. F. Dillon, *The Law of Municipal Corporations* (5 vols, Boston, 1911, i, pp. 448–449. Spaulding *v.* Lowell, 23 *Pickering* (Mass.), 71, in J. H. Beale, *Selection of Cases on Municipal Corporations* (Cambridge, Mass., 1911), p. 240. Also, F. J. Goodnow, *Municipal Government* (New York, 1906), chapter on 'legal powers of municipalities'.

[46] F. Parkman, 'The Failure of Universal Suffrage', *North American Review*, cxxvii (1878), pp. 1–20, condemned the 'barbarism' that had overwhelmed the cities and made them 'a prey'. The barbarism was, of course, almost exclusively white adult male, native and foreign-born. On professionalization and ethno-religious electoral politics, see Warner, *The Private City*, pp. 79–157; S. J. Mandelbaum, *Boss Tweed's New York* (New York, 1965), pp. 1–58. On services, N. Blake, *Water for The Cities* (Syracuse, N.Y., 1956); R. Lane, *Policing the City, Boston, 1822–1885* (Cambridge, Mass., 1967); J. Richardson, *The New York Police: Colonial Times to 1901* (New York, 1970); M. Katz, *The Irony of Early School Reform* (Cambridge, Mass., 1967); C. Greer, *The Great School Legend* (New York, 1971); C. Rosenberg, *The Cholera Years* (Chicago, 1962); A Deutsch, *The Mentally Ill in America* (2nd edn, New York, 1949); W. G. Smillie, *Public Health: Its Promise For the Future, 1603–1914* (New York, 1955).

The ethno-political dealing of the professional politicians and their city-wide organization of the wards may well have diverted the social, if not the racial, antagonisms and conflicts into the routinized channels of partisan loyalties and voting blocs, but only at the price of institutionalizing 'the shame of the cities'. Settlement houses and neighbourhood missions may later have helped bring some sense of civility and possibility into the lives of some of the city's poor. To the extent that they fostered an ethnic self-consciousness and mutual awareness, and channelled these emotions into a richer flowering of pluralism, they also served the urban-mobility process. When they treated immigrants like children and warped them into joining the majority way, they may have exacerbated conditions and aggravated feelings. In either case, the settlements with their increasingly professionalized leadership would tend to lose their clientèles either by upward and outward mobility from the poorer neighbourhoods or backward into their exclusive sub-cultures and parochial separateness, mitigated only by the cohesive indoctrination which passed for public education. Since this avenue did not preclude eventual upward and outward mobility for some, the same end of assimilation to the functional structures of society was served, although acculturation to native outlook and behaviour may well have been slowed. The melting pot worked exceedingly slowly, if at all. What came to be called 'Anglo-Saxon' modes of family life, outlook, and behaviour remained distinctively foreign to a majority of immigrants almost without regard to their origins, socio-economic status, and achievements.[47]

It is sometimes forgotten that the native-American inheritance was also transformed by the industrial city and was in certain respects subject to prolonged and comparable strains. Native elements had to learn the new ways without benefit of the ethnic warmth. The foreigner, the Catholic, and the Negro were often convenient targets for their frustrations and animus; they were competitors for jobs and housing. Even when they worked alongside each other, the larger ethnic groups, as well as the smaller ones, tended to live further apart from each other and from the old American stock. By the early 1900's, the immigrants and their children had achieved much greater assimilation to the educational, economic and political structures of urban and rural America but, with improvements in rapid transit and the resulting space-time convergence on the local scene, the larger cities

[47] M. K. Simkhovich, *Neighborhood: My Story of Greenwich House* (New York, 1938). On the perceptions and approaches of voluntary associations, see National Conference of Charities and Correction, 17th Annual *Proceedings* 1890 (Boston, 1890), *passim*. Also, D. Levine, *Jane Addams and The Liberal Tradition* (Madison, Wis., 1971); A. F. Davis, *Spearheads for Reform, 1890–1914* (New York, 1967); N. I. Huggins, *Protestants Against Poverty: Boston's Charities, 1870–1900* (Westport, Conn., 1970).

were characterized by residential stratification along more well-defined socio-economic lines.

The wages of the foreign born were not notably lower than those earned by natives in corresponding types of work. If newcomers were literate in their native languages, let alone competent in English, the remaining labour market differentials were rapidly eroded. The women lagged, of course, regardless of their origin or capability.[48] While it is true that native males were, on average, more represented in managerial, supervisory, and better white-collar jobs, and were contributing less to the heavy mining and manufacturing tasks, and little or nothing to the 'sweated' loft industries, many of foreign stock were moving up faster and further than some of the regionally-stranded native elements—white, brown, and black—who had not yet joined in the system. The socio-economic class polarization of the city's spaces had, in any case, begun long before the blacks and other native minorities had come to town in significant numbers to further pluralize the social landscape.

When considering the comparative entry conditions of yesterday's immigrants and today's old American coloured stocks, it should be remembered that the majority of foreign born never did pass through the teeming slums or grinding poverty that were, to be sure, the lot of many of their brethren. Not forgetting the social discrimination of local pecking-orders and legal disbarments at some places in earlier days, the vast majority of immigrants never experienced the 'ghetto' restrictions and bitter frustrations to which Negroes, 'Mexican', Orientals, and Indians were exposed long after they were the express beneficiaries of constitutional amendments and, in the case of freedmen, the *de jure* civil rights of 1866. They too had their subcultures but, not only were the inhabitants of the 'nigger towns' and 'mex-towns' denied their *de facto* claims across the country, the whole apparatus of disenfranchisement and segregation in the reconstructed Southern states was established, and endorsed by federal courts, in

[48] I. A. Hourwich, *Immigration and Labor* (New York, 1912), is a useful corrective to contemporary and later stereotypes. See also R. Higgs, 'Race, Skills, and Earnings: American Immigrants in 1909', *Journal of Economic History*, xxxi (1971), pp. 420–28; S. Kuznets, 'Contribution of Immigration to the Growth of the Labor Force', *Reinterpretation of American Economic History*, pp. 396–401. On women's work, U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, *Bulletin 175*, (Washington D.C., 1915); E. Abbott and S. P. Breckinridge, 'Employment of Women in Industries', *Journal of Political Economy*, xiv (1906), pp. 14–40; R. W. Smuts, *Women and Work in America* (New York, 1959); E. F. Baker, *Technology and Woman's Work* (New York, 1964). On the greater contribution of women to incremental labour force growth after the end of unrestricted immigration and the lesser rôle of Negro migration, see A. R. Miller, 'Components of Labor Force Growth', *Journal of Economic History*, xxii (1962), pp. 47–58.

the last decades of the nineteenth century. The federal government allowed local segregation to be extended to its civil service as late as World War I. Yet regardless of their relative deprivation blacks, as Cable and Du Bois had contended at the time, still did better in the cities whether South or North.[49]

The social environments of the newer Western cities had also been easier on the foreign born than the older environments in the East. The early population of Milwaukee, for example, had been as much foreign as 'Yankee' from the outset. Foreigners had settled there at roughly the same time and in similar proportion to the native-born; they were alike migrants. In the 1850s the city of almost 50,000 residents was still a 'new town' with few established neighbourhoods and no older stock of housing to pass down to newcomers. The high degree of residential clustering that had developed among Germans, Irish, and natives (as well as a mixed dwelling area near the centre) was largely 'voluntary', except as the options of the poor were always limited by their incomes. The German and Polish 'sides' of town which were built later in the century were likewise new residential districts involving a high degree of home ownership and environmental self-determination. Poles often took in lodgers from among the new arrivals and the extra money was used for purchasing a 'working class' cottage. By the end of the century Milwaukee was no longer a 'new town' and the southern Italians inherited the eastern half of the old Third Ward from the Irish; their slums were reported to be worse than those of the 'Russian' Jews whose small enclave overlapped the edges of three wards. After World War I Milwaukee blacks also bought some hand-me-down housing but by 1960 the 66,000 of them were not living in a 'Black Athens' but in cramping 'ghettos' under daily assault from the bulldozers. Black migrants to Washington, D.C., and other cities also attempted the 'lodger' method of

[49] Carroll D. Wright's study of slum conditions was greatly restricted by reduced appropriations; he only developed data on four major cities. Some 360,000 people were classified as 'slum dwellers' in New York; 162,000 in Chicago, 35,000 in Philadelphia, and 25,000 in Baltimore, where 530 families were found domiciled each in one room. In New York 44·6 per cent of families lived in two rooms or less; 27·9 per cent in Baltimore, 19·4 per cent in Philadelphia, and 19·1 per cent in Chicago: U.S. Commissioner of Labor, *Special Report* no. 7 (Washington D. C., 1894). Also A. F. Weber, *The Growth of Cities in the Nineteenth Century* (New York, 1899), pp. 460–62. For contemporary concepts of housing reform, see R. Lubove, *The Progressives and the Slums, 1890–1917* (Pittsburgh, 1962). In Jones *v.* Meyer, 1968, the U.S. Supreme Court finally determined that the Civil Rights Act of 1866 had prohibited 'all racial discrimination, private as well as public, in the sale or rental of property'. *The Negro American Family*, W. E. B. DuBois, ed. (Atlanta, 1908), pp. 64–65. Also P. M. Gaston, *The New South Creed: a Study in Southern Mythmaking* (New York, 1970).

home-buying after the first World War and by 1930 a third of Los Angeles blacks owned their own homes.[50] For the blacks this last West was a much more hostile environment than for any European immigrants but, for all the deterioration which came with numbers, Watts was never like present-day Harlem, Bedford-Stuyvesant, Hough, or Roxbury-Dorchester.

By the kinds of measures we have, neither ethnic nor racial separation was much reduced with the passage of time. Indeed, economic betterment and the hardening of residential class differences may even have sustained the process. For all the intermingling in certain sectors of society, the major foreign-born elements of 1950 appeared to have been as separated residentially as they were in 1910 or 1880. Part of the change was, no doubt, a consequence of the fewer numbers of immigrants in the general population. The smaller a group's numbers, the more they seemed to need one another in order to cope with pressures of a fragmented city life. Since the 1940s optimists have been claiming that the white American Babel has been melting into a trinity of sectarian pots: Catholic, Protestant, and Jewish, an integrative process mediated by intra-faith marriage.[51] This view met

[50] K. N. Conzen, '"The German Athens": Milwaukee and the Accommodation of its Immigrants, 1836–1860' (unpublished Ph.D. Dissertation, University of Wisconsin, 1972); and R. D. Simon, 'The Expansion of An Industrial City: Milwaukee, 1880–1910' (unpublished Ph.D. Dissertation, University of Wisconsin, 1971). Also, Z. L. Miller, 'Urban Blacks in the South, 1865–1920', *The New Urban History*, ed. Schnore (forthcoming). L. B. De Graaf, 'The City of Black Angels: Emergence of the Los Angeles Ghetto, 1890–1930', *Pacific Historical Review*, xxxix (1970), pp. 323–52. In contrast to the high level of black Angeleno home ownership in 1930, the figure for Detroit was 15 per cent, 10·5 per cent in Chicago, and 5·6 per cent in New York. Only six cities, 100,000 and over, exceeded the Los Angeles level of black ownership and none had a large Negro population. In 1930 the ratio of blacks to black-owned homes in L.A. was 10, compared with 8 whites per white-owned home. Ratios for Detroit were 31:10, Chicago 44:12, New York 77:15: U.S. Bureau of the Census, *Negroes in the U.S., 1920–1930* (Washington D.C., 1935), pp. 277–79. The 13th U.S. *Census*, 1910, reported the ratio of all home-owning families to be 33·7 per cent in Baltimore, 26·2 per cent in Chicago, 17·1 per cent in Boston, and 11·7 per cent in New York (13·1 per cent the Bronx, only 2·9 per cent Manhattan); 63 per cent of farm families owned their own farm homes.

[51] S. Lieberson, *Ethnic Patterns in American Cities* (New York, 1963), pp. 49–91, demonstrates the persistence of ethnic separation and shows the diffusion of groups to the 'suburbs'. Also, J. M. Beshers *et al.*, 'Ethnic Congregation-Segregation, Assimilation, and Stratification', *Social Forces*, May 1964; R. J. R. Kennedy, 'Single or Triple Melting Pot? Inter-marriage in New Haven 1870–1940', *American Journal of Sociology*, xlix (1944), pp. 331–339; W. Herberg, *Protestant, Catholic, Jew* (New York, 1955); G. Lenski, *The Religious Factor: A Sociological Study of Religion's Impact on Politics, Economics, and Family Life* (New York, 1964). The *Yearbook of Churches*

the needs of the 1950s for demonstrative religiosity and was a reassurance to religious professionals of a brake on inter-faith first marriage, frowned on by pastors and psycho-therapists alike. But in expressing their options for home ownership, automobiles, less congested surroundings, and 'the church of their choice', system-oriented Americans in cities and suburbs are still 'sifting and sorting' themselves in terms of three structural-spatial attributes: (1) socio-economic class (2) ethnicity and colour, and (3) type of family (particularly in regard to early married years of heaviest child-bearing).

But Black America has always been in a segregated pot. In *Negroes in Cities*, published in 1965, the Taeubers showed that more than 60 per cent of the blacks in 207 cities would have to be *relocated* in order to achieve an unsegregated spatial distribution. Moreover, black disadvantages in schooling, in occupational achievement, and in incomes accounted for only a small part of their measurable segregation in urban space. The web of discrimination is the principal factor bringing about their inequitable exclusion, but the outmigration of whites also reinforces the position of blacks in their squalid isolation almost like the embattled farmers of the western wheat belts in the late nineteenth century. Blacks have very few options in choosing a home; quite apart from their inadequate resources, they get separated by the others. The Taeubers ended on a pessimistic note: 'Improving the economic status of Negroes is unlikely by itself to alter prevailing patterns of racial residential segregation.'[52]

1967 indicates that Jews comprised 4·5 per cent, Roman Catholics 37·0 per cent, and Protestants, 54·6 per cent of all church membership. Church members were said to constitute 64·3 per cent of the estimated population. In 1960 well over 20 million residents of the U.S. had a mother tongue other than English. Spanish and French were the other major 'colonial tongues' but 'maintenance prospects' for 21 other languages are discussed in *Language Loyalty in the United States*, ed. J. A. Fishman (The Hague, 1966).

[52] K. E. and A. F. Taeuber, *Negroes in Cities* (Chicago, 1965), pp. 52–5, 94–5. The Taeubers also give a critical discussion of the 'Index of Dissimilarity' technique for measuring group separation, pp. 43–62, 197–242. T. J. Woofter *et al.*, *The Problems of Negroes in Cities* (Garden City, N.Y., 1928). National Academy of Sciences, *Freedom of Choice in Housing: Opportunities and Constraints* (Washington D.C., 1972). Also, W. K. Tabb, *The Political Economy of the Black Ghetto* (New York, 1970). Small wonder that some poor young blacks are attracted to narcotics, like some of their better-off white counterparts. But American whites were hooked long before the blacks. See Dr D. Musto and A. Trachtenberg, 'As American As Apple Pie', *Yale Alumni Magazine*, Jan. 1972, pp. 17–21. Narcotic addiction was widespread in the U.S. before World War I; per capita consumption of opiates was about 18 times that of Germany or France and neither blacks nor Chinese could afford the habit. Musto attributes the source to pharmaceutical advertising and incompetent medical prescription.

Whatever may be the advantages and comforts of 'cultural pluralism', the territorial scale of modern metropolitan organization means that, outside the daytime districts of the central cities or on college campuses, the major part of inter-group stimulation must be taking place *via* commercial television and the glossy media. Most of the intercession is left to professional and political brokers. Americans remain spread out psychologically and physically even though more than 70 per cent are now jammed on to 2 per cent of the continental land area. America remains, as Henry James remarked of an earlier day and age, a very 'thin society'. In hyphenated subcultures, the living and society are doubtless thicker, if sometimes claustrophobic. But now there is no longer a recognizable and affirmative American without his hyphen. Now that the Sears Roebuck catalogue has scarcely more talismanic power than a McGuffey *Reader*; now that 'textbook Americanism,' the 'catalogue of Accepted Values and Favored Maxims', is no longer read, whence comes this American, this new urban man?[53] Clearly, the play of social forces in the city was creating opportunities and defining options. In the cities the older search for equality of opportunity developed its obverse, though no less seductive, face: the opportunity to become *unequal* and to express the greater option in social and residential separateness. The cities did not create all of their problems but, now that they are disintegrating, some pragmatic civilians regard them as the Republic's last best hope.

Mayor John V. Lindsay of New York recently proclaimed a vision of urban development which contrasts with Crèvecoeur's vision of rural settlement expressed nearly two centuries ago:

> 'It is the city that transforms displaced rural populations and immigrant populations. When immigrants need education and jobs and housing they have always come to the city. When the economy failed in the rural South, its victims came North to the city. It is

[53] P. Schrag, *The Decline of the Wasp* (New York, 1971), p. 14, and M. Novak, *The Rise of the Unmeltable Ethnics* (New York, 1971) are typical and symmetrical examples of the mutual disregard in which hyphenated Americans, especially sophisticated ones, have come to hold each other. The acronym 'Wasp' (from White Anglo-Saxon Protestant) is applied to more or less anything and anybody who is not obviously 'Catholic', 'Jewish', 'ethnic' or 'Third World'; it hyphenates the America that is descended from the 'old stock' and, while it allows for the settling of old scores and the projection of personal insecurities, it does not seem to make non-Wasps more amenable to each other. A more stinging social criticism is given by A. Hacker, *The End of The American Era* (New York, 1970), who locates his targets with greater precision. See also A. E. Parr, 'City and Psyche', *Yale Review*, lx (1965), pp. 71–85.

> the city that gives human beings the education and skills and expectations that are the goals of the great urban working class and middle class.
>
> 'And when some of the successful graduates of the urban process move on to the suburbs they are inevitably . . . and properly replaced by the victims of whatever social ill plagues the nation—the failure of small farmers to compete, the mechanization of agriculture, unemployment among mine workers and discrimination against black people, or brown people, or ethnics, or women.
>
> 'The process of transformation is a costly one. It requires immense amounts of energy, and money, and faith. We have been denying our cities all three of these vital resources to carry on with the work of social progress. And when the big-city process breaks down, when the machine of social transformation no longer works, that burden is inevitably dispersed. And so our suburbs and our small towns now face the problems the big cities used to solve for them. This is the truth we can't avoid. This is the reality that can bring this country to its knees if we try to hide from it.'[54]

Notwithstanding the 'failures' of the Kennedy–Johnson 'War on Poverty' and the three or four hundred urban-related programmes initiated in recent decades, this is the Mayor's model and, one suspects, that of most concerned Americans. In so far as money is involved, this means federal money and here America begins to come apart at the seams of its consensus. The issue is not a partisan issue, since American party politics is about office and place, not policy. The policy question is whether to go on putting money, energy, and faith into the cities, by trying in Daniel P. Moynihan's phrase to 'gild the ghetto', or whether to put them where 'the solutions are'—in the suburban and satellite rings. This is where most of the new jobs are being generated, this is where most of the better schools are situated, this is where much of the private sector investment is located, and this is what the federal government has been subsidizing for decades, while it also gilded the central business areas. If Americans will not let 'the Urban Crisis' ride, will not endorse Moynihan's recommendation to relax the federal pressure and leave it to 'benign neglect', then the most salutary course is to disperse the 'ghettos', break up the hard cores of poverty and anti-social behaviour and parcel the poor out into suburban pockets where the honours' graduates of the urban process reside. An environment of the successful, although no longer silent, majority is more likely to lick the derelicts and the drop-outs

[54] From J. V. Lindsay, 'Cities Solve Problems', an address at Colorado College, *New York Times*, 14 Aug. 1972.

into shape than ever the rhetoric of Black Nationalists in the cores and on the campuses. Anyway, things are getting better.[55]

Lindsay and the other mayors disagree. Give us adequate financial tools, cooperate in programmes of our devising, end the murderous drain of Vietnam, and we can finish the job of the cities. No, say the policy scientists, the cities have had their chance, they are usually incompetent, if not always corrupt, the most they can do is cooperate more efficiently with state and federal agencies who will do what they can to revitalize the churning industrial-urban model. They have the constitutional powers and the fiscal resources to finish the job.[56]

By 1970 the populations of the outer rings outnumbered the central city populations of the nation's metropolitan areas. By census measures, the rings have been growing relatively faster than the central cities since 1920. Metropolitanites outside the central cities are more likely to agree with the mayors than with the technocrats, if the question were put. They do not want city problems dispersed to the suburbs; they have been *zoning* them out for half a century.[57] In

[55] A celebrated recommendation is Moynihan's 'Memorandum for the President' published by the *New York Times*, 1 March 1970, p. 69. Moynihan confirmed the document and expressed a hope that its content would be considered as a whole. It is remembered, however, for its advocacy of 'benign neglect' toward 'the issue of race'. Moynihan attributed the term to the Earl of Durham in 1839 but he apparently did not realize that 'Radical Jack' did not become a culture hero of *les Canadiens*. He recently confirmed his optimistic posture on the basis of proposed legislation to place a minimum $2,400 annual income floor under every family of four and to share the huge federal revenue deficit with state and local government: *New York Times*, 27 Sept. 1972, p. 47. See also W. Lilley III, 'Housing Report', Center for Political Research, *National Journal*, Oct. 17, 1970, pp. 2251–62. On dispersion, see A. Downs, *Opening Up The Suburbs* (New Haven, 1971); on revenue sharing, *Revenue Sharing and the City*, ed. H. S. Perloff and R. P. Nathan (Baltimore, 1968).

[56] Remarks of Mayor K. Gibson of Newark, N.J., Mayor F. W. Burke of Louisville, Ky, and Mayor T. A. Luken of Cincinnati, Ohio, cited by W. V. Shannon, *New York Times*, 25 June 1972. But there were also 14 million impoverished people left in rural America in the 1960s whose situation had not been improved by agricultural policies of the Kennedy–Johnson years: *The People Left Behind*, Report of the President's National Advisory Commission on Rural Poverty (Washington, D.C., 1967), p. ix.

[57] Statement of Housing and Urban Development Secretary George Romney to officials of Warren, Mich., 27 July 1970, on 'fair housing' as distinct from 'forced integration': HUD *News*, released 27 July 1970. With the Warren uprising, the 'suburbs' departed from the hard-won compliance indicated by suburban Dayton, Ohio, 1970: *New York Times*, 21 Dec. 1970, pp. 1, 42, Romney's earlier encounter with Mayor Ted Bates and Warren city council members is given in *The Detroit News*, 24 July 1970. On zoning and annexation, see S. I. Toll, *Zoned American* (New York, 1969), and M. Scott, *American City Planning since 1890* (Berkeley, 1969). In 1940 the suburban and satellite rings outside the central cities contained 27 million residents, or

an election year President Nixon has obviously got their message and so has the Congress. They have moved quickly against 'court-ordered bussing' as one of the strategems for better schooling, although it is not clear that they will immediately raise the money to commence re-gilding 'ghetto' education, even if they knew how.

Cities were, and perhaps as Mayor Lindsay affirms, still are great resources for social change. But it is easy for a city mayor in a college commencement address, or for a 'Fourth of July' orator, to reduce history to a formula, to compress the long drawn-out urbanization process into a teleological system. More ominous, perhaps, is the tough-talk of the policy scientist. It is distressing to hear that process so modelled and condensed as to be altogether too purposeful and exact. There is no slack left in the interstices of life, neither time nor place for what Randall Jarrell once called 'the dailiness' of living. There must be more than going on vacation or relaxing with a cold beer in front of the box. And is this how the American pursues happiness in the city? Either by leaving it or by isolating himself from it? Some critics suggest that he has already done both by decamping to the suburbs. Some planners say we do not really need the city any more or, at least, not in the recognizable shape we inherited from the late nineteenth century. Perhaps what Mayor Lindsay said was not the truth, not the reality any more, but only the nostalgia of someone who once wanted to be the Mayor, a brick-and-mortar Bryan who thought that politics was a way to keep memories alive.

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2 out of every 10 Americans. By 1970 their 76 millions represented 4 out of every 10; their total *exceeded* the aggregate of central city dwellers by 12 millions. From 40 to 60 per cent of their working populations were employed in the rings. Two-thirds of all U.S. new residential construction value is located in the rings. These massive and, on the whole, focus-less 'free way' settlements are becoming the dominant ecological pattern. Some recent evidence from the 'outer-urbs' of Baltimore, Cleveland, Los Angeles, Houston, and Atlanta suggests that such settlements already have 'grave problems' of their own-making: *New York Times*, 30 May 1971, and four subsequent issues. A Los Angeles 'urbanologist', E. Contini, asserted that the 'suburban house' is 'the idealization of every immigrant's dream—the vassal's dream of his own castle'. Apparently, it was not the realization of the dream! Meanwhile, 'quiet decay erodes Downtown Areas of Small Cities', *New York Times*, 8 Feb. 1972. Many of these problems were foreshadowed and foreseen, with less urgency, in the 1920s, see R. D. McKenzie, 'The Rise of Metropolitan Communities', Report of the President's Research Committee, *Recent Social Trends in the U.S.* (New York, 1933), i, pp. 443–96. The cruel irony is that, according to the polls of the National Opinion Research Center, University of Chicago, white willingness to accept a high degree of integration in everything except mixed marriages and residential neighbourhoods has risen steadily since the 1940s: *New York Times*, 8 Dec. 1971.

But an enduring historiography is not to be written out of nostalgic memories and this holds for the up-rooted as it did for the up-raised. '*Ubi Panis, Ibi Patria* is the motto of all emigrants,' said Crèvecoeur, the now discredited author of the agrarian melting-pot model. The melting pot was to produce 'a new race of men', the western pilgrims. Men from all over Europe—Crèvecoeur omitted the Africans and those who were here before the first Pilgrims—'are incorporated into one of the finest systems of population which has even appeared'. The result of its process which 'tended to regenerate them: new laws, a new mode of living, a new social system', has turned out differently, at least in terms of self-identification, than the Frenchman had predicted; and Mayor Lindsay's urban pressure cooker has also developed a faulty gasket.[58]

The melting pot has not been the historical consensus for some time, and consensus historiography has, like the city, itself become controversial and abandoned by many. The most brilliant and generous of the consensus historians, Richard Hofstadter, shifted his ground, or perhaps only his focus, somewhat just prior to his untimely death. Hofstadter had found problems in American history which consensus historiography had not yet explained. One such problem was 'one of the most significant facts of American social life—the racial, ethnic, and religious conflict with which our country is saturated'. He agreed with the English historian, J. R. Pole, that: 'The idea of consensus was useful as a direction-finder.' It was not an explanation. Hofstadter suggested that the idea of consensus was useful when it helped pose 'a whole set of new questions about the extent to which agreement prevails in a society, who takes part in it and how it is arrived at'. He instanced the constitutional consensus where 'the overwhelming majority of the politically active public accepts the legitimacy of the legal-constitutional order'. He also wrote of the 'policy consensus' which exists 'when an issue moves out of the area of significant controversy'. He cited the eventual acceptance of the New Deal Social Security system as 'an established consensual position'. Hofstadter may, as J.R. Pole also remarked, have assumed 'a primarily urban standpoint when he wrote history'. One may doubt whether he was the first to do this. My candidate for such dubious distinction would be the elder Schlesinger, if not the now-disavowed Charles A. Beard. Hofstadter was no urban historian but he was, in the best sense, urbane and certainly had the urban dimension of the current crisis in mind when he indicated the need for 'a kind of moral consensus I would call comity'. 'Comity exists in a society,' he went

[58] Crèvecoeur, *Letters From An American Farmer*, pp. 39–40. For an optimistic appraisal, J. Burchard, 'The Culture of Urban America', *Environment and Change*, ed. W. Ewald, Jr. (Bloomington, Ind., 1968).

on, 'to the degree that those enlisted in its contending interests have a basic minimum regard for each other . . . civility is not abandoned' and even the most bitter opponents recognize each other's humanity and remember 'that a community life must be carried on after the ascerbic issues of the moment have been fought over and won'.[59]

Hofstadter concluded that 'the waxing and waning phases of comity shed considerable light on American history'. Yet they had not enlightened him as to the provenance of a comity adequate to America's current crisis. Nor did he recognize that the small 'politically active public' had often intensified the agonies of cities even when it lacked the first notions of an urban 'policy consensus'. It was still too easy for a crisis-managing 'technical elite' of lawyers and part-time professors to dismiss the illiberal ranting and rage of human underclasses as so much 'populist' noise and an earlier Hofstadter had unwittingly contributed to that ease. Certainly America's urbanized society had been coming apart before the 1960s and may even now be re-integrating itself in some, as yet, imperceptible form. Most Americans no longer find much happiness in the city, if they ever did, and many still pursue it vainly among the parking lots and crabgrass of the suburbs. A few have trekked even further out to locate it in some, as yet, undiscovered transcendental community, lost since the seventeenth century, perhaps never even 'Half-way' covenanted at all.

Community is both a method and a goal. Consensus implies agreement about something and, more loosely, it means a convergence of opinions. Comity is a means by which people find a way of diverging on goals but, in agreeing to differ, without their mutual destruction. There is little of comity or consensus on the American urban scene; there has always been much compromise, however, and usually at the expense of third and fourth weaker parties who are not fully represented in the discussion or the deal. If happiness is to be pursued in a fragmented community, it is still a long way off and the time is run-

[59] R. Hofstadter, *The Progressive Historians: Turner, Beard and Parrington* (New York, 1968), pp. 437–66. J. R. Pole, 'The American Past: is it Still Useable?', *Journal of American Studies*, i (1967), pp. 63–78; *idem* in *The Times*, London, a notice reprinted in *Columbia Forum*, xiii (1970), p. 8. As far back as 1963, however, Hofstadter, while arguing that 'a technical elite of lawyers and economists' had removed anti-trust policy out of the area of significant controversy, was gravely concerned that the economy seemed unable to free the 'urban mass society' from 'widespread poverty' and a deep 'malaise': *The Paranoid Style in American Politics and Other Essays* (New York, 1965), pp. 235–37. See also the perceptive review of Hofstadter's *Progressive Historians* by M. White in *American Historical Review*, lxxv (1969), pp. 601–3. But White continues to regard criticism of urban conditions as reflecting an 'anti-urban' bias and surely misses the mark on Charles Beard.

ning out. America has lost what Burke called 'the pleasing illusions, which made power gentle and obedience liberal'. The power of confident technocrats falls heavily on muddled human heads; their modern mace throttles the dissenting charm, they want compliant, if not passive, obedience.

There is neither the deference due to others nor a proper condescension in return. This eighteenth-century language is not altogether out of place even in a twentieth-century republic, however, for it envisages a not wholly vertical structure in human relationships that is more fixed, understood, and agreed upon than any consensus or comity that now obtains in the megacities of America. Their scale is too large and the disutilities and diseconomies of space-time convergence only too evident. Things are in the driving seat and movement is governed more by centrifugal forces than by centripetal ones. The city system is intact but its structures must bend. Another decade of American history may still work more than a cycle of Cathay. Liberal America characteristically leaves today's problems unsolved as it goes on to make tomorrow's; pragmatic America never really confronts itself and there is always new space at home, if only dwindling time.

Meanwhile, urban historians above all must not confront history or earlier historiography with what E. P. Thompson called 'the enormous condescension of posterity'. For regardless of whether one is an optimist or a pessimist about past and present outcomes, the industrial-urban transformation is to be understood and evaluated in terms of what it does to the quality of brief human lives.[60] Men and women still cry out for justice and the only enduring comity is justice done—not to 'groups' or 'quotas' but to persons. Justice done and seen to be done. That is perfect political art. And ultimately, wherever men and women pursue happiness, they will not find it anywhere until they first discover its meanings within themselves and among those

[60] 'In the long last, the probabilities are that, instead of adjusting automobiles to the city as it is, the city will be adjusted to the automobiles as they are, either by increasing the number of streets or by providing special thoroughfares for them. That would be in line with what took place when the automobiles proved destructive to the macadamed roads that once were so highly regarded. It was not the cars that were banished, but the paving that was changed': *New York Times*, 23 March 1923. 'Not long ago, a home meant something. It was the location of our birth . . . and where we held our family functions. Today . . . there is no tie to home and fireside . . . There is no neighborhood standard of conduct . . . Parents do not understand children, as they once did, however little that was; for the children react to changed life-conditions. There is need of inner control in the family, as against so much outside influence. It is all a question of adjustment and the right choice of "technique". Mr Damrosch hopes that the radio, by keeping people at home, will save family life from disruption by the automobile': *New York Times*, 13 June 1930.

with whom they are immediately and intimately inter-dependent. For of such is the pursuit of happiness in the countryside, in the city, the suburb, and in the wilderness without.

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