The Revival of School Administration: Alasdair MacIntyre in the Aftermath of the Common School

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Alasdair MacIntyre's philosophy, based on Aristotle and the Judaeo-Christian tradition, argues for the objective virtues of truth, courage, justice, friendship, and humility. The aesthete, the therapist, and the manager are, in consequence of MacIntyre's ideas, found to be removed from daily life and from virtue. Their role play further removes them from the good. Because public schools appealing to a lowest common denominator of values are academically and socially unsuccessful as compared with those teaching a shared doctrine within a community, his ideas are particularly relevant. The future educational system will see schools of choice based on traditional virtue becoming popular among parents.

La philosophie d'Alasdair McIntyre, qui repose sur Aristote et la tradition judéo-chrétienne, prône les vertus objectives de la vérité, du courage, de la justice, de l'amitié et de l'humilité. Dans l'esprit de MacIntyre, l'esthète, le thérapeute et le gestionnaire sont loin de la vie quotidienne et de la vertu. Leur rôle les éloigne davantage du bien. Comme les écoles publiques qui visent le plus petit dénominateur commun en matière de vertus échouent sur le plan scolaire et social en comparaison de celles qui enseignent une doctrine partagée par la communauté, les idées de MacIntyre sont particulièrement pertinentes. Le système d'éducation de l'avenir verra des écoles de choix fondées sur les vertus traditionnelles de plus en plus valorisées par les parents.

INTRODUCTION

Alasdair MacIntyre, a neo-Aristotelian, places his ideas about administration in the context of traditional thought. A growing intellectual movement, exemplified by Bloom (1987) and Lasch (1991), sees modernism, expressed in contemporary liberal thought and policy, as having failed and as requiring replacement by ideas and policies rooted directly in western traditions and values. Even Charles Taylor (1989), who seeks to defend the core of modern thought, expressed as the centrality of personal human authenticity, recognizes the modernist dangers of nihilism, materialism, and excessive concern with self.

MacIntyre, whose final views may be not too distant from Taylor's (we must await Taylor's next book to see exactly how he reconciles the importance of authenticity with external values and codes, for which he clearly

sees a need), rejects post-Nietzschean modernism in its entirety, developing in its place a synthesis of Aristotelian and Judaeo-Christian thought applied to contemporary times. His ideas are founded in the objective value of the central virtues of truth, justice, courage, friendship, and humility. He deplores the deracinated and vicarious "characters" that connote modernity— the aesthete, the therapist and, of particular interest here, the manager (a term synonymous with "administrator" as usually found in education). These characters are unrooted because they claim no founding virtue to give value to their moral, aesthetic, and pragmatic judgments; and vicarious because they live off the substance of everyday life (whether it be artistic creativity, medicine, industrial production, or schooling) rather than within it.

I here develop MacIntyre's ideas for application to education.

The Predictability of Human Behaviour

MacIntyre provides four reasons why it is useless to try to predict human behaviour: invention is unpredictable because to predict it would be to invent it—yet some inventions have radical (but unpredictable) influence; contingency is a major factor in human affairs; so-called game theory has little predictive value—people constantly act out of role, for the simple reason that the other aspects of life (such as principle, nepotism, envy, or greed) intervene; and finally, the simple, intrinsic unpredictability of every human being—each of us is frequently undecided or we change our minds (1981, pp. 89–96).

Now it will be argued that most of us are creatures of habit. We follow routines. Moreover, have not social scientists and pollsters shown how predictable are people's voting patterns and other, daily behaviours?

Those points MacIntyre would readily concede. It is the so-called science of human behaviour he denies. Of course, many individuals' behaviour can be predicted from behaviour in prior similar circumstances. What is denied is that one can usefully predict how a group or an individual will react to a particular proposal in a generalized context. Consider the following example.

In the educational literature, there is considerable discussion about "empowerment" and "giving people" (usually subordinates) "a sense of ownership." The underlying, sometimes concealed, hypothesis goes something like this: "Subordinates will adopt the behaviour desired by the superordinate if the superordinate successfully gets them to believe that the behaviours or the ideas related to the behaviours are their own." The apparent science is spurious, because the proposition is impossible to test. If a principal is unsuccessful with some innovation, it will be explained that the principal must have implemented the plan badly, because, of course, had the plan been implemented properly the teachers would have gained a sense of ownership. It is apparent that one (covert) way in which "empowerment" and "sense of ownership" are being defined is as synonyms for commitment. Obviously, if people are committed to something, they are more likely to act

accordingly than if they are not (that is what commitment means). So what at first appears to be a scientific pronouncement turns out to be a circular and misleading argument.

This is not benignly unscientific or openly normative, however; it is crassly manipulative. The benign words conceal a licence to manipulate people into believing that the ideas they are implementing are their own, in order that they will follow the superordinate's bidding more willingly and efficiently. Note what would happen were the principal to use the word commitment in the first place. If it were clearly stated that the new project required commitment, would not some teachers ask themselves if this was indeed an idea worthy of their commitment? Would they not wonder if the project's principles were consistent with their own? Whether it were likely to work? So, no mention is made of commitment, or values, or principles. Rather, "This is a fine new project and we've been chosen to pilot it. We should really give it a try. I know many of you will feel uncomfortable with it to begin with, because it is new and different. We're all a bit afraid of change and don't feel comfortable with strange and threatening things at first. Now I'd like you to implement this using your own ideas. I really value your input. So, Mary, would you chair the committee of junior teachers? Oh, I'm sure you'll all want to be involved, and I've arranged for the junior consultant to come in on Friday—it's a P.D. day—to help you get started. O.K.? The meeting will be from 9:00 until 11:00" (compare Holmes, 1991a).

Beneath this shabby surface, there are important philosophical assumptions (Lasch, 1991). For many years, change was a key word in school administration. Perhaps because so many changes turned out to be self-evidently unsuccessful, the word has gradually been replaced by "improvement." Who can be opposed to improvement, or to progress? The change that does not work may be abandoned, or reversed. But lack of complete success in an improvement project (devoted to progress) cannot, according to implementors, be attributed to the idea itself; how can progress and improvement be bad?

Lasch argues that belief in progress is one of the major causes of distress in modern society. Associated with belief in progress is the assumed virtue of optimism. The manipulative administrators who empower teachers are not evil or malicious. They believe what they are doing is for the best, not only for the students who will benefit from the new improvement (how could one be harmed by improvement?), but for teachers, empowered by their sense of "ownership" over the new project. Indeed, the teachers may become innovators themselves, enthusiastically carrying the new idea to another school at the next P.D. day. But optimism is *not* a virtue. The idea that somehow good intentions are enough and that all will turn out for the best as things get better and better is dangerous. It draws one away from the fundamental virtues and rests unjustified faith in good intentions. Optimism is no substitute for hope.

Hope is essential to the human condition. It is sensible to hope that events over which we have no control, as well as those over which we do have influence, will turn out for the best. One hopes one's family will live to old age and one hopes that friends and relatives will turn away from ill-advised or immoral ventures. The alternatives to optimism are not pessimism and cynicism, but hope and realism. Realism should not be identified with resignation. Some classical and eastern philosophies may appear to or may in fact advocate resignation, the acceptance of adversity with stoic calm. The Christian tradition, from which MacIntyre draws, advocates an openness to life (an idea developed particularly by Jacques Maritain), the importance of taking opportunities, of accepting the chance vagaries of life—not in blind optimism, but with courage, faith (in God), and hope.

In time, the innovative administrator's naive optimism turns to hypocrisy. When things do not turn out well, perhaps the test results worsen, then, "The tests do not test what we are now teaching; we must stop using them because they give parents the wrong impression." If some teachers revolt, it is because they are afraid of change and want things the same as when they were in school, because they don't understand how things have changed and how much better they are now than they used to be. From hypocrisy, it is a small step to dishonesty. The believer in progress, the optimist, often cannot accept that what has been done may actually be harmful, that things may be getting worse. Denial leads to dissimulation. An enthusiastic, optimistic belief in progress based on human expertise cannot accept evidence of deterioration and human corruption, for that would negate the core belief. The optimistic belief that children are born good, only to be corrupted by adults, is attributable to Rousseau; it contrasts with the Christian belief that we are all sinners, and that children have dispositions to both good and evil.

Are students being attacked in the halls? Well, they always were, but we hear about it now because they have enough self-esteem to report it. Do parents complain about the new programs? That shows how open we are to parents, not as principals used to be. Is there increasing sexual activity among adolescents and even preadolescents? That is because we are more open about sexuality and have freed ourselves of the old-fashioned inhibitions. Why, in the old days, pregnant girls just dropped out of sight, so nobody knew about them. (Apparently they did not even warrant mention in Statistics Canada's records of live births and abortions.) Are some teachers poor models for their students? Well, we would not want to go back to firing female teachers as soon as they marry. If the schools and modern society are getting better and better, any apparently negative indicator must, by necessity, be either false, misleading, or irrelevant.

It is widely accepted that school change projects are very often unsuccessful. Thus, even by the standards of pseudo-scientific science, it makes little sense to continue to make over teachers in the progressive image, or for that matter, in the technocratic image (Holmes, 1991a). More fundamentally, these efforts should cease because they are generally, and not incidentally,

unethical and immoral; not incidentally, because the corruption stems directly from the dishonest use of such terms as empowerment, peer collaboration, and participatory administration. Even if they are successful, and one should not completely discount the power of intense propaganda, peer pressure, and coercive management to bring about superficial change, they should be first judged in the light of traditional values of truth and integrity.

The Administrator as a Contemporary Character

As already noted, MacIntyre (1981) lists three characters as symbols of modern times (pp. 71–74). The behaviour of the aesthete, the therapist, and the administrator is characterized by emotivism. MacIntyre sees emotivism as a malignant cancer in modern discourse on moral philosophy. Emotivists identify a non-natural property which they call "good," but there is no such property; it is in fact no more than a reflection of their feelings and attitudes. What they propose as "good" is in reality a sketch for empirical, hypothetical propositions rather than an outcome of a theory of meaning (pp. 16–17). So the contemporary characters base their behaviour on ideas of the good that are at best sketches of empirical hypotheses.

The characters' roles are peripheral to moral and productive life. The aesthete depends on but does not produce art; artistic judgments are made but there is no founding meaning of good upholding the judgment. It is not surprising that experts, even more than the public, are so readily hoaxed by pretentious art, which may be judged legitimately only by those experts whose standards are both inaccessible and inexplicable to the general public. The therapist exists to make people "better," but there is no agreed moral standard by which "better" can be defined. Indeed, many therapists claim they must be non-judgmental to be effective; it remains unclear how their effectiveness can be determined. The administrator is primarily charged with innovation and improvement. Yet, in education, improvement is often used to describe a set of vague and unsupported quasi-hypothetical propositions about the advance of progressivism, whose processes are seen as valuable in themselves, and sometimes merely to refer to any change the administrators consider favourable (Holmes, 1991a).

MacIntyre sees a particular danger in the tendency for role and person to become confused in these modern characters. It is important to understand the precise nature of this danger, as MacIntyre's notion of the fusion of role and personality in a character appears inconsistent with his negative view of role play, an idea considered later. He opposes both fusion of personality and role, and the participation in a role.

The danger with the fusion of role and person, in the case of the administrator, is that the administrator may become the person he or she is, expected to be at work. The administrator may thus lack or lose the moral foundation upon which all judgments should be made. For instance, two Ontario directors of education, interviewed as part of a larger study of the

role and philosophy of the director, whose philosophies were clearly non-progressive in nature, agreed that progressive ideas were being imposed in their elementary schools—and would continue to be even in the face of hypothetically consensual opposition from the parents, teachers, and principal in a particular school (Holmes, 1991b).

It may be argued that separation of administrative behaviours from personal beliefs contradicts MacIntyre's thesis. MacIntyre would probably point out that the administrators' previous (or underlying) beliefs were marginalized; one director, for example, volunteered as an analogy that he would consider it quite inappropriate to impose any of his personal religious beliefs within his work. If one's religion, central to one's sense of meaning in modern life, is inapplicable in one's work, one may speculate about the centrality of that religious belief. The role has taken over the person.

The same study found that "strong" religions (followed by Baptists, Orthodox Jews, traditional Muslims, Seventh Day Adventists, Jehovah's Witnesses, and Pentecostals, among others) were entirely unrepresented among Ontario's directors. From MacIntyre one would infer that administrators are essentially those whose religious and moral beliefs are either derived from emotivism, or are so weak as to be fused or marginalized by the administrative role, or both.

Consider next the fascination of contemporary school administration with decision making. Leithwood and Montgomery (1986) claim the ideal principal is primarily a high-level decision maker. Most standard texts on educational administration (for instance, Hoy & Miskel, 1987) emphasize "theory" in decision making. A crucial received truth is that administrators should consult those with stake and expertise before making important decisions (those lying outside the "zone of acceptance"). It is difficult to tell whether this belief is emotivism become theory or theory become emotivism. Certainly, such consultation is considered good by almost all North American school administrators (whether or not they actually do it—teachers typically see less true consultation than administrators). The rationale provided by the texts and by administrators themselves is that effective decision making *requires* such consultation. This intellectually weak mix of positivism and emotivisim is particularly unhelpful for good administration.

The argument here is not that consultation should not take place. Rather, it is that the loose combination of weak empiricism and emotivism confuses instead of sharpening the real issues. Empirically, it certainly makes sense to consult those who have the clout to block the decision (but clout is sometimes unrelated to stake and expertise and not always predictable). There is an empirical issue in decision making; those with expertise may indeed improve the decision. Those with clout may block it.

But there is also an ethical issue. Under which circumstances ought one to consult those involved? Because emotivists vaguely see consultation as good, they need not examine its ethical foundations to determine good. Once

the good (the very word being leached of moral substance) of consultation is reduced to the "process" of consulting, it is no wonder that teachers everywhere complain about empty, manipulative, and insincere consultation. The process is valued rather than people. In the MacIntyre perspective, moral commitment to values surrounding the decision is irrelevant—except insofar as the decision maker believes sincerely in whatever emotivist principle, be it consultation or cooperative learning, happens to be current. The administrator accused of insincerity will understandably feel falsely accused; the administrator does believe sincerely in consultation—and there is nothing deeper to be sincere about; if there is some vestigial stirring, it is put aside for Sunday morning.

Role Play

Jane Austen unites Christian and Aristotelian themes and is the "last great effective imaginative voice of the tradition of thought about, and practice of, the virtues which I have tried to identify" (MacIntyre, 1981, p. 223). It is no coincidence that Jane Austen is particularly unpopular with high school English departments, who embrace more eagerly the modernist emotivism of a Margaret Lawrence or J.D. Salinger.

Fanny, heroine of *Mansfield Park,* best represents the traditional virtues, particularly because she lacks the charm of Emma and therefore must stand by her virtue alone. Patience, constancy, and a refusal to dissimulate are among her identifying virtues. Central to the novel's theme is preparation for a play that takes place in the absence of the household patriarch.

Everything about the play portends disharmony . . . the players squabble selfishly . . . the house itself is physically disrupted. . . . The actual play . . . turns on unnatural or dangerous relationships . . . suppressed and dubious desire start to emerge. . . . Only Fanny stays apart. . . . The others are lost in their roles; blind behind their masks. (Tanner, 1966, pp. 28–29)

The acceptance or expectation of role play is problematic in the educational administrator, whose training often includes role-playing sessions. (The word "training" itself denotes the false claims that empirically justifiable generalizations can be made and that the job requires skills more than wisdom, education, and moral judgment.) The administrator is seen to play a part, and parts are interchangeable in life as in class or on the stage. This assumption was nicely illustrated by an administrator in one of my graduate classes. I began the class by eliciting views on the kinds of changes in schools wanted by parents and by educators. When the two different lists were complete, he commented that he accepted both. As a parent he demanded the parental things from his children's schools; as an administrator, he tried to convince other parents of the desirability of the other (expert) list. I have heard analogous comments on several occasions, sometimes to

the effect that one understands what is being done in the name of ninth-grade destreaming, but one would not want it for one's own child. (What is being done, as the next mandatory change in Ontario, is that grade 9 is being re-created in the image of an activity-centred grade 1, with the difference that adolescents are much less likely than young children to choose to participate in the hard and disciplined task of learning when alternatives are provided.)

There is no contradiction between MacIntyre's view that role playing undermines virtue, and his idea that the contemporary characters (of aesthete, therapist, and manager) fuse themselves with their role. MacIntyre is not arguing that there is some value in the total separation of work from the rest of life. Quite the contrary: he is a critic of life "after virtue" because there is no transcendent truth integrating our entire lives. He poses the choice between Aristotle (and the subsequent Christian tradition) and Nietzsche, between a core of ethics and a dependence on human will (in the form of emotivism). The role of the aesthete, the therapist, and the manager, as typically expressed in contemporary times, is without a substantive moral core. This relativism (my term) within the role suffuses the individual's life, because it is difficult to live an important part of one's life, involving the making of significant moral and ethical decisions, while holding the truth (or good) in abeyance. To hold truth and good in abeyance is to deny their centrality. It is generally easier to abandon one's outworn virtue and to replace it with something more flexible and less inhibiting.

Educational administrators in Ontario, unrepresentative of the total population as they are, are not clones. They claim different educational "philosophies," adhere to various religions, and vote for different political parties. Yet, when it comes to implementing policy, they nearly all follow the line laid down by the educational establishment. They work for the integration of curricula, for inventive spelling, for personal diaries, for whole language, for the elimination of direct instruction, and for the substitution of high self-concept (sometimes involving false praise, and the removal of standards, both moral and intellectual) for the traditional, Christian virtues of humility, constancy, personal responsibility, diligence, and patience.

Teachers are similarly deprofessionalized. They no longer control their own methodology, although such control distinguishes a professional from a technician. They, too, must play the game and adopt a role in which many do not believe. In the long run, it is easier to become a believer. Role play and the fusion of person and role are complementary, not opposed. By playing the role of progressive educator and promoting its emotivist beliefs, those administrators who were not already true believers in the religion of progressivism corrupt the religious and other values developed before their appointment. The virtues, if not entirely abandoned, become tentative, set aside, certainly not to be imposed on teachers or children; only the "true and only heaven" of progress is important enough for mandatory imposition.

Virtue

I have examined three crucial aspects of MacIntyre's work in application to school administration: the possibility of a generalizable science of management; the administrator as one whose role as administrator, vicarious in nature, overtakes any other moral foundation; and the importance of role play in the removal of moral inhibition. Missing from the modernist school administrator is a grounded belief in virtue.

The immediate response from educational administrators, even those sympathetic to the argument so far, will be that it is absurd to imagine that the public school in pluralist, multicultural Canada could possibly contemplate an education predicated on virtue. Even MacIntyre would agree. Such critics fail to comprehend fundamental changes in public school systems of the western, pluralist world.

THE COMMON SCHOOL IN WESTERN, PLURALIST DEMOCRACIES

I have described elsewhere the overwhelming evidence that the common school is under attack and may well be obsolete (Holmes, 1988, 1990). An important distinction is made here between the common school, a genuine community school representing a microcosm of the larger society, and the public school, publicly funded and administered.

Briefly, the common school is gradually losing favour in Canada, the United States, and Britain. The loss of favour has several symptoms— important among them being the expansion of independent schools, the expansion of choice within the public sector, and the public's increasingly negative attitudes toward public schools. At the same time, necessarily, the common school is becoming obsolete, not only in Britain, where the ideal was never firmly entrenched, but in Canada, Australia, and even in the United States, where its tradition is strongest. It should be redundant to point out that as variations in program proliferate, the common program of schooling declines. Unfortunately, defenders of the public school and its monopolistic control over most education in much of Canada frequently use the rhetoric of the value of the common school to defend the monopoly's control over schools that no longer have even a common program.

The reasons for the fall into disfavour of the public school in general and the decline of the common school in particular are interwoven and complex. I shall not attempt detailed analysis. Some forces that lead to, or coexist with the two trends include:

  (i)   increasing social, political, philosophical, ethnic, racial, linguistic diversity, and the associated decline of educational consensus;
  (ii)   the secularization of public schools, making them less hospitable to those with strongly held religious beliefs;
  (iii) the suspicion, not always founded, and the reality of declining social order within schools, particularly in urban and suburban settings;

(iv)   the growth of single-interest groups, some successful in changing one or several schools, thereby alienating other people, others unsuccessful, with members themselves alienated;

(v)   the contest for educational control between educational experts, wanting child centred education, activity centred classrooms, whole language, and the elimination of competition, external tests, and common standards; and the general public, wanting emphasis on the basic skills, improved discipline, more testing, and more emphasis on preparation for work or post-secondary education;

(vi)   increasing economic segregation of settlement, particularly in urban, suburban, and exurban areas dominated by subdivisions, and deliberately isolated and sometimes self-sufficient housing complexes and geographical subcommunities;

(vii) the gradual replacement of family and community by the individual as the unit of societal analysis in educational policy development.

The result of all this is the death of the common school (if death can come to a body many of whose organs never lived) in the populous regions of Canada, and its replacement by an assortment of public schools representing a variety of interests—many related to the social class origin of parents. Public schools vary by language of instruction, religion, orientation (to the arts or skilled trades, for example). The approved options vary greatly by province, but in all provinces there are important exclusions. In Ontario, as an extreme example, French immersion, schools for gifted children, and francophone schools and programs proliferate, and the Roman Catholic system rivals in size the public system in many areas. Yet any teaching of Protestant Christianity (let alone Judaism or Islam) is prohibited, even on a voluntary basis over lunch, in any school receiving public funding.

The upshot is that however unlikely a candidate the MacIntyre school is as a future common school, it is not alone in its inappropriateness; in a time of pluralism and dissent, there can be no common school, and there is not.

THE SUCCESSFULLY FUNCTIONING SCHOOL

Over the last twenty-five years, as the common school has sunk into oblivion (except in rural areas relatively unaffected by modernity), research on school effectiveness has shown what produces better academic and social outcomes (Purkey & Smith, 1983). The concept of school climate is central to this research, usually operationalized as expectations on the part of both teachers and fellow-students of hard work and good results.

More recently, research has emphasized two related aspects of effectiveness. First, there is evidence that the imposition or implementation of effective school correlates is far from easy, even when the schools involved volunteer and receive special funding and other assistance (Holmes, 1991c). Stringfield and Teddlie (1989) claim that "naturally occurring" school improvement efforts are more likely to succeed than planned improvement.

Second, Coleman and Hoffer's (1987) idea of community explains why some schools are more able than others to develop the correlates of effectiveness. Coleman and Hoffer argue the effectiveness of Catholic schools in the United States, the lesser effectiveness of elite private schools, and the comparative ineffectiveness of public schools is due to differences in community. The Catholic schools are functional communities in that teachers, students, and parents not only share common values, but live and work in the same community. In comparison, the values community of the elite private school represents shared values alone; private-school parents have little contact with one another outside the school setting. And the stereotypical large, comprehensive public high school is not a community. What few binding ties there are, are mechanical (based on role, hierarchy, policy, collective agreement, and functional division of labour) rather than organic (based on family, tradition, and segmented division of labour).

Johnson's findings in the Bahamas (1988) support and add to Coleman's thesis. She found that private and Family Island public schools were more effective than the large urban high schools of Nassau and Grand Bahama. Within those broad groupings, she discovered distinctions consistent with the idea that academic achievement is sensitive to the intensity of the doctrine within the school climate, and to its congruence with the outcomes being measured. Recent national testing of mathematics in the United States (Why the Heartland Has Math Smarts, 1992) shows that the most successful states are such plains states as North Dakota, Montana, and Iowa. Although it is always dangerous to describe a cause for a complex phenomenon, these states are least affected by modernity—and are still characterized by community, social homogeneity, and a strong work ethic. They are also among the lowest spenders on education.

From the emerging research, I reach three generalizations:

(i)   successfully functioning schools (that is, those successfully achieving legitimate educational goals) are characterized by a climate that expresses, concretely and symbolically, the significance of those goals;

(ii)   the more intensely the schools represent their doctrine, the more successful they are;

(iii)   the more closely the measures of outcome are related to the school's sense of central mission, the better the school will be on those measures.

Burgeoning research on instructional effectiveness (O'Neill, 1988) shows that the dominant progressivism (the language of child-centred schools, collaborative learning, language process, and learning opportunities prevails in most public Canadian schools) is less effective in teaching basic skills than are other methods more closely related to traditional values (of truth, diligence, and personal responsibility). Similarly, Canada's poor record in the movement from school to work (an area neglected or disdained by progressive educators) is underlined by our comparatively high rate of youth

unemployment—typically twice that of adults, in comparison with Germany, whose rate of youth unemployment falls well below the adult levels. Claus (1990) shows how the American segregated vocational centre, part college, part school, can be vocationally successful and at the same time build at least what Coleman would call a values community.

There is also general concern in Canada, as in other western, English-speaking countries, about the discipline and values of young people. Crime, violence, and pregnancy are important symptoms. There is evidence of a positive association between a strong, religious family background and uninvolvement with activities suggesting declining values (Bibby & Poster-ski, 1983). Yet "functional community" schools (such as the Christian fundamentalist school described by Peshkin [1987]) are either entirely unsupported (as in most provinces) or partially funded (in Manitoba, British Columbia, and Alberta).

The idea of developing MacIntyre-like schools appears less ridiculous here. MacIntyre's ideas are rooted in our western cultural, ideological, and religious inheritance. They stand firmly opposed to the individualism and the therapeutics characterizing Canada's dominant progressive education. Research is beginning to demonstrate their empirical as well as their philo-sophical value. Finally, his ideas are relevant to the most pressing concerns of education today—to the lack of purpose and values in so many public schools, to instructional ineffectiveness, to the value of work and its rel-evance to education, and to the importance of the religious or spiritual life of the school.

IMPLICATIONS: THE MACINTYRE SCHOOL AND ITS ADMINISTRATION

The school implied by MacIntyre's philosophy emphasizes content, sub-stance, virtue, as distinct from self, the learning environment, and learning process. It cannot, in a pluralist society, be a common school. Clearly not everyone shares these values; if they did, progressive extremism would never have attained the influence that it has. If people had retained adher-ence to virtue, it would have been impossible for an educational establish-ment to impose its relativist world view. That is only possible in a society where maelstrom and vacuum seem equally applicable metaphors for the state of societal values; schools are in a state of confusion and flux and competition, but underneath the surface emotivism inevitably lies the spirit of nihilism. But then, I have argued, there cannot be common schools—and, in much of Canada, they are few and far between.

The MacIntyre school, then, will be one of choice—but it could turn out to be the single most popular. It will be criticized for being unicultural—indeed some MacIntyre schools may be explicitly Judaeo-Christian or Protestant or Presbyterian; but one should not be surprised if the school that stands for something more than the doctrine of tolerance, consideration for others, and non-violence (the lowest common denominator of the stereotyp-

ical public school) appeals to many of Asian background, who will like its rigour and emphasis on instruction and discipline; to many of Islamic background, who will like its emphasis on virtue and its opposition to self and immediate gratification from play and pleasure; and to many from traditionally disadvantaged groups, who will be pleased that standards are not lowered for their children, thereby ensuring their continuing inferiority. Some schools may be academic, others vocational or technical—but all will be built on the premise of shared values and purpose—among teachers, students, parents, and administrators.

The implications for school administrators, and their education and preparation, are important. Their adherence to, and their ability to model, the fundamental values will become crucially important. The role they play will be secondary to what they are. Their being will not be merged into the player on the stage, playing one part after the other at the bidding of administrative superiors; rather will their role become more an integral part of their being. The virtue of truth will replace therapeutics; courage will replace public relations; justice will replace equal rights; humility, patience, and integrity will replace self-concept; friendship will replace group interaction; and effective and professional teaching (based on personal responsibility for changes brought about in children) will replace providing opportunities for active learning.

Principals will not be trained in the latest futuristic management skills, but will be selected on the basis of proven wise judgment, education, and moral integrity. Consultation will not be a charade to get people involved, or to empower teachers, or to give them ownership, but will be a genuine and open device to obtain advice and opinion. Change will not be considered inherently better than stability. There will be no optimism about the inevitability of progress; good intentions will be little excuse for poor performance. Improvement will be measured against consensual goals. Administrators, teachers, and students will be encouraged to be themselves, and to accept themselves, as persons equal in dignity, but different in aptitudes, interests, personality, background, and family. Truth will be the pervasive ethic. Students will not be exhorted to fulfil themselves, but they will be stimulated to be open to life and its possibilities, to live full and responsible lives. The principal will be responsible for a school of high but realistic expectations for all and for a trusting environment based on shared fundamental values.

Clearly, this school will not be acceptable to all, but neither is the public school of today. It will reflect the wishes of many parents, not all either Christian or traditionalist. There is no obvious justification for the imposition of secular emotivism on unwilling parents. The MacIntyre school would be one of choice; there is no reason to believe it would be less popular than the progressive school believed in by educational experts—despite the latter's demonstrable lack of success (or interest) in academics and character.

Although the MacIntyre school would serve genuine functional or values communities and would have a clear doctrine, it would by no means entail the loss of individuality. One of the glories of the western cultural tradition has been its ability to combine a strong sense of community with respect for individual integrity; this combination is expressed in the Christian tenet that it is not enough to be good, but that one must choose the good. Personal responsibility and individual uniqueness in a consensual community would be stressed as integral parts of the classical and Judaeo-Christian, western tradition.

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