The rise and fall of international organization as a field of study J. Martin Rochester

In June of 1985, the United Nations turned forty. In the halls of the UN, it has become customary to mark every tenth anniversary with appropriate fanfare, speeches, and other forms of commemoration. In the halls of academe, it has likewise become something of a ritual to mark such an event with a retrospective look at the UN.[1] It has been an occasion, also, to reexamine past scholarship in the field and assess the current state of the field. Following in the latter tradition, this article reflects on four decades of scholarly research dealing not only with the United Nations but also with international organizations generally. The purpose here is not to engage in ritual—that is, to commemorate the UN's fortieth birthday with yet another review of the literature or another problems-and-prospects piece—but rather to take stock of international organization as a field of study. Countless books, monographs, journals, and professional meetings have been devoted to the subject of "international organization" in the years since World War II. It is reasonable to ask what the fruits of all this scholarly labor have been, a question that begs an answer particularly at a time when much of the international institutional infrastructure created in the immediate postwar period is seemingly in disarray, along with the field that grew up around it.

   1. For example, see Shabtai Rossenne, "The International Court of Justice and The United Nations: Reflections on the Period 1946–1954," *International Organization* 9 (May 1955), pp. 244–56; Clark Eichelberger, *The UN: The First Ten Years* (New York: Harper & Row, 1955); Norman J. Padelford and Leland M. Goodrich, eds., "The United Nations: Accomplishments and Prospects," special edition of *International Organization* 19 (Summer 1965); Benjamin V. Cohen, "The United Nations in Its Twentieth Year," *International Organization* 20 (Spring 1966), pp. 185–207; and Edward C. Luck, "The UN at 40: A Supporter's Lament," *Foreign Policy* 57 (Winter 1984–85), pp. 143–59.

Have scholars properly understood, anticipated, predicted, and in any way helped to shape international organization developments since 1945? Or—like journalists—have they merely reported on events as they unfolded, shifting their attention and research foci from one momentary concern to another in response to the ebb and flow of conditions in the world around them? There is in the international relations scholarly community generally, and in the international organization field particularly, a kind of herd instinct ("pack scholarship") at work not unlike the "pack journalism" phenomenon found among newspeople. In academia, this phenomenon often takes the form of the "paradigm shift," where droves of scholars almost in lockstep abandon established intellectual frameworks and accepted truths (e.g., realism) for newer formulations (e.g., modernism), only to return to the original approaches, which, because scholars feel a need to be on the cutting edge of the discipline, are freshly repackaged and relabeled (e.g., neorealism). Or scholars may flit from one island of theory to another (e.g., from regional integration to interdependence to regime formation), in keeping with the latest "fads" that ultimately prove short-lived. We seem to be forever spinning our wheels, or reinventing the wheel, rather than advancing knowledge forward in any steady, cumulative fashion. The seeming inability of the scholarly community to advance knowledge is matched by its seemingly inconsequential impact on the world about which it professes to be expert.

The discussion below seeks to trace the rise and fall of international organization as a field of study, first describing the origins of the field and its evolution over the past forty years, then analyzing the failure of international organization scholars generally to anticipate or shape international organization developments, and concluding with some thoughts on reviving the field and, ultimately, the institutions themselves which are its raison d'être. As one author noted on the occasion of the twentieth anniversary of the UN: " 'If we could first know where we are and whither we are tending, we could better judge what to do and how to do it.' "[2] Twenty years later, we can still benefit from such a perspective.

The origins of the field

As conventionally defined, the term *international organization* generally refers to "a formal arrangement transcending national boundaries that provides for the establishment of institutional machinery to facilitate cooperation among members in the security, economic, social, or related fields."[3]

2. Cohen, "The United Nations in Its Twentieth Year," p. 185. The author was quoting Abraham Lincoln.
3. Jack C. Plano and Roy Olton, *The International Relations Dictionary*, 2d ed. (Kalamazoo, Mich.: New Issues, 1979), p. 288.

Clearly, international organization has been, and continues to be, widely viewed as a distinct subfield within the international relations discipline. International relations curricula at most colleges and universities in the United States offer courses under that rubric, in addition to courses on "foreign policy," "international law," and other subjects. One major scholarly journal, conceived to deal exclusively with international organization phenomena, takes its name from the term. A section of the International Studies Association is so designated. And a group of writers, from Inis Claude to Norman Padelford to Ernst Haas and Harold Jacobson and others, have made their reputations as international organization scholars.

Clearly, also, the study of international organization predates the UN. The study of international organization can be traced at least as far back as the 14th-century writings of Dante, who wrote of the "universality of man" and envisioned a unified world-state, and Pierre Dubois, who advanced a plan for the organization of "Christian states" in Europe. In the context of the modern state system, its roots can be found in the 18th- and 19th-century writings of such philosophers as Henri de Saint-Simon, whose call for a "European parliament" presaged the regionalism phenomenon that was to follow later; Jeremy Bentham, whose proposal for a "Common Court of Judicature" and a "Common Legislature" among all states offered an early model of supranational institution building; and Immanuel Kant,[4] whose proposal for a "league of peace" among "free states" was to be echoed by certain 20th-century advocates of collective security.[5] In the early 20th century a smattering of works examined the "public international unions" that had begun to emerge in the mid-19th century, including writings by Paul Reinsch and Francis Sayre.[6] The Union of International Associations was founded in 1907 in Brussels to act as a center for compiling information on international organizations. However, international organization did not become an identifiable, systematic area of inquiry until the creation of the League of Nations in 1920, following World War I, at a time when the international relations field itself emerged as a distinct academic discipline.[7]

4. Dante Alighieri, *On World Government*, trans. Herbert W. Schneider, 2d rev. ed. (New York: Liberal Arts, 1957); Pierre Dubois, *The Recovery of the Holy Land*, trans. Walter I. Brandt (New York: Columbia University Press, 1956); Henri de Saint-Simon, *Social Organization: The Science of Man and Other Writings* (New York: Harper & Row, 1964), pp. 46–50; Jeremy Bentham, *Plan for a Universal and Perpetual Peace* (London: Grotius Society, 1927), pp. 26–32; Immanuel Kant, *Eternal Peace and Other International Essays*, trans. W. Hastie (Boston: World Peace Foundation, 1914).

5. For a discussion of early "world order" writers prior to the 20th century, see F. H. Hinsley, *Power and the Pursuit of Peace* (London: Cambridge University Press, 1963); Sylvester J. Hemleben, *Plans for World Peace through Six Centuries* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1943); and Louis Rene Beres and Harry L. Targ, *Reordering the Planet: Constructing Alternative World Futures* (Boston: Allyn & Bacon, 1974).

6. Paul Reinsch, *Public International Unions* (Boston: Ginn, 1911); Francis B. Sayre, *Experiments in International Administration* (New York: Harper, 1919).

7. For a concise overview of the evolution of the international relations field as a whole, see Norman D. Palmer, "The Study of International Relations in the United States: Perspectives of

Indeed, the international relations field in the interwar period tended to be dominated by the focus on international institution building to an extent that international organization was viewed not so much as a subfield as practically the core of the discipline. The international organization literature in this period tended to be heavily descriptive—narrative accounts tracing the creation of the League and other institutions, or texts delineating the formal-legal characteristics of the institutions—and normative—evaluating studies calling for various improvements in institution building, ranging from collective security to proposals for a world government, aimed at promoting world peace.[8] Because of their seeming preoccupation with international institutions "on paper" rather than "in practice," and with hoped-for rather than actual effects of international institutions, international organization scholars in the interwar period came to be characterized as "idealists." As Ronald Yalem notes in his summary of the study of international organization between 1920 and 1940:

> The majority of books published during this period reflected an excessive optimism in the ability of international organization to control international conflict. Most scholarly studies concentrated on the legal and organizational structures of the League and the Permanent Court. Though technically competent, they largely neglected the influence of political factors such as power politics on international cooperation.[9]

The international organization literature during World War II continued to be largely descriptive and normative in nature, represented by such works as Egon Ranshoffen-Wertheimer's *The International Secretariat,* the definitive treatment of the League Secretariat, and David Mitrany's *A Working Peace System,* which became the bible of those urging a "functionalist" path to peace.[10] As an alternative to the "federalist" assumptions that informed much League scholarship in the interwar period, functionalism suggested that the path to world order was to be found not in a direct assault on

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Half a Century," *International Studies Quarterly* 24 (September 1980), pp. 343–63; and W. C. Olson, "The Growth of a Discipline," in B. Porter, ed., *The Aberysthwyth Papers: International Politics, 1919–1969* (London: Oxford University Press, 1972), pp. 3–29.

8. Typical of this literature was C. K. Webster, *The League of Nations in Theory and Practice* (London: Allen & Unwin, 1933); Pitman B. Potter, *An Introduction to the Study of International Organization* (New York: Century, 1922); David H. Miller, *The Drafting of the Covenant,* 2 vols. (New York: Putnam, 1928); T. P. Conwell-Evans, *The League Council in Action* (London: Oxford University Press, 1929); Manley O. Hudson, *The Permanent Court of International Justice* (New York: Macmillan, 1925); and C. A. W. Manning, ed., *Peaceful Change: An International Problem* (New York: Macmillan, 1937). For a discussion of international organization literature in the interwar period, see Ronald J. Yalem, "The Study of International Organization, 1920–1965; A Survey of the Literature," *Background* 10 (May 1966), pp. 2–5.

9. Yalem, "The Study of International Organization, 1920–1965," p. 1.

10. Egon F. Ranshoffen-Wertheimer, *The International Secretariat* (Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1945); David Mitrany, *A Working Peace System* (London: Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1943).

national sovereignty but in a more subtle and gradual development of inter-national cooperation in technical spheres. The functionalist argument was nonetheless based on universalist and institutionalist conceptions of world order.

Following World War II, with the creation of the UN in 1945, new impetus was given to the study of international organization. However, if the "ideal-ist" school and the focus on institution building had been at the center of the international relations field prior to World War II, they were removed some-what to the periphery of the field after the war as the "realist" school—with its focus on state sovereignty, the elements of national power, military strat-egy, diplomacy and other instruments of statecraft, and the nature of na-tional interests—came to dominate the discipline. Realism posed as the basis for a new science of international relations, although its intellectual roots could be traced to Thucydides' accounts of the Delian League and the city-state politics of Ancient Greece as well as to Machiavelli's analyses of 16th-century Italian city-state relations.[11] To the extent that realists had an interest in international organization, it was limited essentially to those institutions associated with managing "balance of power" or "concert of power" politics, not institutions associated with maintaining "collective se-curity," carrying out economic-social welfare functions, or building larger political communities beyond the nation-state.

It was E. H. Carr's classic treatise, *The Twenty Years' Crisis,* which launched the "idealist-realist" debate that was to color much postwar think-ing about the role of international organization in world politics.[12] The labels were unfortunate since they implied that international organization scholars and others identified with the former school were concerned only with moral imperatives ("ought" questions) and were oblivious to empirical realities ("is" questions), whereas Hans Morgenthau and others who came to be identified with the latter school were content merely to observe reality rather than to alter it.[13] In fact, what distinguished the two schools of thought was neither their purpose of inquiry nor their methodology but, rather, their different readings of history and, based on the latter, their different assump-tions about what reality might look like in the future. Both schools started with similar views about the nature of the state system. Both sides took as the central concern of the international relations discipline the problem of

11. Thucydides, *The Peloponnesian War,* ed. J. H. Finley, Jr. (Crawley translation) (New York: Modern Library, 1951); Machiavelli, *The Prince,* trans. Luigi Ricci (New York: Oxford University Press, 1935).

12. E. H. Carr, *The Twenty Years' Crisis, 1919–1939* (London: Macmillan, 1939). For a discussion of this debate, see F. Parkinson, *The Philosophy of International Relations: A Study in the History of Thought* (London: Sage, 1977), chap. 10; John H. Herz, *Political Realism and Political Idealism* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1951); and the series of essays in *International Studies Quarterly* 25 (June 1981), pp. 179–241.

13. Hans J. Morgenthau, *Politics among Nations* (New York: Knopf, 1948).

minimizing conflict and maximizing cooperation among states in a decentralized system—the problematique of world order—and both recognized not only the possibility for changing the existing conduct of international affairs but also the need to do so if humanity was to survive. Both could agree with Karl Deutsch's definition of the discipline of international relations as "the art and science of the survival of mankind."[14]

As Claude has commented, "the major difference between realism and idealism pertains not to what is or what should be but to what is possible."[15] Morgenthau and other realists in 1945 saw the solution for world order in states and statesmen relearning and refining old ways of interacting through the enlightened use of diplomacy and force that they regretted had been forgotten in the 20th century.[16] In contrast, the tradition of scholarship inherited by international organization scholars in 1945 saw the solution for world order in states and statesmen learning new ways of interacting through international institutions that had yet to be fully developed. Scholars on both sides of the divide felt that the world that had emerged out of the ashes of World War II could be changed for the better and that the scholarly community could be an engine of change by pointing policy makers in the right direction. Over the next forty years of the postwar era, this vision was to fade along with the distinctions between idealists and realists, and between international organization scholars and other international relationists, as the international organization field itself lost its sense of direction and identity.

The evolution of the field since 1945

One can examine the evolution of the international organization field since 1945 from several different perspectives, including changes in substantive foci (e.g., globalism versus regionalism), methodological orientation (e.g., traditionalist versus quantitative research techniques), and modes of analysis (e.g., descriptive versus theoretical). Yalem, surveying the international organization literature during the first twenty years of the postwar period,

14. Karl W. Deutsch, *The Analysis of International Relations* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1968), p. v. One can argue, as Arend Lijphart does, that realism and idealism did not represent two distinct paradigms but, rather, that "the conflict between realism and idealism was a disagreement within the traditional paradigm." Lijphart, "The Structure of the Theoretical Revolution in International Relations," *International Studies Quarterly* 18 (March 1974), p. 54.

15. Inis L. Claude, Jr., "Comment," *International Studies Quarterly* 25 (June 1981), p. 199.

16. Hans Morgenthau's concern with "ought" questions is commented on by John Herz, a fellow realist, in Herz, "Political Realism Revisited," *International Studies Quarterly* 25 (June 1981), p. 184. Morgenthau himself insisted that theory should be not merely a "guide to understanding" but an "ideal for action." Morgenthau, "The Nature and Limits of a Theory of International Relations," in William T. R. Fox, ed., *Theoretical Aspects of International Relations* (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1959), p. 18.

identified three "phases of scholarly development" in that time. In the first phase, 1945–50, "most scholarly work was devoted to analysis of the new organization [the UN] from the traditional legal and constitutional viewpoints as well as the continuation of studies on the League of Nations. The influence of League of Nations scholars on the field was still dominant." Yalem noted that the next phase, 1950–60, "was marked by a striking growth of books and articles in which the incipient political [realist] orientation discernible after 1948 gathered momentum though it did not replace the traditional institutional focus." In the last phase he examined, 1960–65, "evaluations of the United Nations . . . renewed interest in regionalism, and theoretical probings of regional integration were the most prominent developments. The most significant innovation was in the use of sophisticated techniques for the analysis of bloc politics in the General Assembly."[17]

Francis Hoole, surveying the entire forty-year period since World War II, has noted three "intellectual eras" of international organization scholarship, roughly demarcated as follows: 1945–60, "characterized by studies focusing on the United Nations"; the decade of the 1960s, "the era of regional integration studies"; and the decade of the 1970s, "the era of transnational politics, networks of interdependence, and international regimes"; in the 1980s "the international organization studies movement" is in a "state of flux."[18]

As Yalem and Hoole suggest, the evolution of the international organization field has been marked not by one distinct era of scholarship giving way to a completely different era over successive decades but, rather, by certain research traditions being sustained from one decade to the next, gradually supplemented by and ultimately deemphasized in favor of newer approaches that have their day, leading to still newer lines of inquiry. As the postwar era progressed, scholars increasingly reacted against and tried to avoid two indictments that had been leveled at interwar scholars—the tendencies, on the one hand, to engage in vague speculations and musings about world order and, on the other hand, to become immersed in the nitty-gritty details of formal-legal machinery. International organization scholars became more interested in process than in structure and more inclined toward policy science than normative philosophy. These trends reflected currents of change in the international relations field generally as well as in political science as a whole. One pattern that can be discerned throughout the maturation of the international organization field in the postwar era has been the steady disengagement of international organization scholars from the study

17. Yalem, "The Study of International Organization, 1920–1965," pp. 6, 8, 24.
18. Francis W. Hoole, "Changing Scholarship on the United Nations" (Paper prepared for the annual meeting of the International Studies Association, Atlanta, 27–31 March 1984, pp. 2–5).

of organizations, to the point that today one must question whether such a field even exists any longer except in name only.

1945–60

Not surprisingly, in the years immediately following World War II international organization scholars became almost wholly preoccupied with the UN and the effort at global institution building which it represented. A notable development was the publication in 1947 of the first volume of *International Organization,* which became the preeminent journal in the field. The literature in the forties tended to follow in the tradition of League of Nations scholarship, with a heavy institutional focus as typified by *The Charter of the United Nations: Commentary and Documents,* edited by Leland Goodrich and Edward Hambro. Research on the League itself was slow to die, with such works as F. P. Walters's two-volume *A History of the League of Nations* appearing in the early 1950s.[19]

Throughout the 1950s, there was a proliferation of writings examining various rules, procedures, and organs of the UN, including such works as Stephen Schwebel's *The Secretary-General of the United Nations;* H. Field Haviland's *The Political Role of the General Assembly;* Oliver Lissitzyn's *The International Court of Justice;* and the numerous articles that filled the pages of *International Organization.*[20] Many works focused on institutional characteristics of the UN; others examined the activities of the UN in the areas of dispute settlement, collective security, and economic-social cooperation.[21] The explicitly normative, "utopian" strand of international organization scholarship found expression in several books on world government, particularly *World Peace through World Law* by Grenville Clark and Louis Sohn.[22]

Although students of international organization in the early postwar period did not stray too far from their pre-World War II "idealist" roots, the

19. Leland M. Goodrich and Edward Hambro, eds., *The Charter of the United Nations: Commentary and Documents* (Boston: World Peace Foundation, 1949); F. P. Walters, *A History of the League of Nations,* 2 vols. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1952).

20. Stephen M. Schwebel, *The Secretary-General of the United Nations* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1952); H. Field Haviland, *The Political Role of the General Assembly* (New York: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1951); Oliver Lissitzyn, *The International Court of Justice* (New York: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1951). For a survey of articles examining various institutional aspects of the UN, see Yalem, "The Study of International Organization, 1920–1965," pp. 10–15.

21. For example, Leland M. Goodrich and Anne P. Simons, *The United Nations and the Maintenance of International Peace and Security* (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1955); William Frye, *A United Nations Peace Force* (New York: Oceana, 1957); and Robert Asher et al., *The United Nations and Promotion of the General Welfare* (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1957).

22. Grenville Clark and Louis B. Sohn, *World Peace through World Law* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1958). See also Gerard J. Mangone, *The Idea and Practice of World Government* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1951).

realist paradigm that came to dominate the international relations field began to infect the study of international organizations, for scholars could not ignore the increasingly hostile cold war environment in which the UN had to operate. As one author notes, "students of international organization, reacting to the troubled world in which they found themselves, developed a new and frankly political perspective."[23] The increased attention to the dynamics of international organization politics could be seen in C. E. Rothwell's piece on "International Organization and World Politics," Padelford's study on "The Use of the Veto," and similar articles appearing in *International Organization* in the late 1940s,[24] as well as the spate of studies that started to appear in the 1950s dealing with bloc voting in the UN General Assembly.[25] The latter studies also reflected a seminal movement away from interpretive analysis toward more rigorous empirical research utilizing quantitative techniques. When Claude's *Swords into Plowshares* was published in 1956, it became widely recognized as a work that managed to blend hope and skepticism and to combine normative and empirical analysis in a manner that bridged several international organization perspectives and defied easy labeling as idealist or realist.[26] Although international organization scholars were becoming more critical and sophisticated observers, what they were still observing was primarily the phenomenon of international organization.

With the Treaty of Rome and the creation of the European Common Market in 1957, following the establishment of the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) in 1952, a heightened interest in regional organizations and regionalism developed. Although some attention had been paid to regionalism prior to the mid-1950s,[27] it had been an understandably difficult topic to study, given the few relatively autonomous regional subsystems that existed prior to the acceleration of the decolonialization process in the second decade after World War II. Still, regional (or "limited membership") intergovernmental organizations predated universal organizations and had

23. Yalem, "The Study of International Organization, 1920–1965," p. 6.

24. C. E. Rothwell, "International Organization and World Politics," *International Organization* 3 (November 1949), pp. 605–19; Norman J. Padelford, "The Use of the Veto," *International Organization* 2 (June 1948), pp. 227–46.

25. See, for example, Robert Riggs, *Politics in the United Nations: A Study of United States Influence in the General Assembly* (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1958); M. Margaret Ball, "Bloc Voting in the General Assembly," *International Organization* 5 (February 1951), pp. 3–31.

26. Inis L. Claude, Jr., *Swords into Plowshares: The Problems and Progress of International Organization* (New York: Random, 1956).

27. Pitman B. Potter, "Universalism vs. Regionalism in International Organization," *American Political Science Review* 37 (October 1943), pp. 850–62; M. Margaret Ball, *The Problem of Inter-American Organization* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1944). For other early writings on regional organization, see Norman J. Padelford, "A Selected Bibliography on Regionalism and Regional Arrangements," *International Organization* 10 (November 1956), pp. 575–603.

always exceeded the latter in number.[28] It took the intriguing, highly visible experiments in European economic cooperation in the 1950s to spark scholarly interest in the regional phenomenon. Aside from the numerous historical accounts and descriptive studies of the Common Market, ECSC, and other European institutions,[29] scholars paid scattered attention to institution building in other regions of the world, particularly Latin America.[30] "Regional security organizations" designed to facilitate general cooperation and peaceful settlement of disputes among their members—such as the Organization of American States and the Arab League—had to compete for the attention of international organization scholars not only with the "low-politics," "functionalist" organizations that started to proliferate at the regional level but also with the "high-politics" regional alliance organizations such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, the Warsaw Pact, and the Central Treaty Organization (CENTO).[31]

During the 1950s some scholars attempted to go beyond essentially descriptive discussions of regional and global institutions and to engage in more theoretical pursuits. Claude, Richard van Wagenen, Haas, Harold Guetzkow, and others raised theoretical concerns. With such works as Haas's *Uniting of Europe*, and *Political Community and the North Atlantic Area* by Deutsch and his associates, the concept of "regional integration" was born and with it the attempt to fit legal-formal institutions into a larger context of political community building.[32] More conscious of their theoreti-

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28. Harold Jacobson has noted that "the relative number of universal membership, specific purpose organizations was substantially greater in the interwar period than it was in the years before World War I or after World War II" and concludes that "the interwar period was clearly the high tide of universalism." See Harold K. Jacobson, *Networks on Interdependence*, 2d ed. (New York: Knopf, 1979), pp. 51–53.

29. For example, see Arnold J. Zurcher, *The Struggle to Unite Europe: 1940–1958* (New York: New York University Press, 1958); Harry L. Mason, *The European Coal and Steel Community* (The Hague: Nijhoff, 1955); A. H. Robertson, *The Council of Europe* (New York: Praeger, 1957); and Serge Hurtig, "The European Common Market," *International Conciliation* 517 (March 1958), pp. 321–81.

30. For example, see Charles G. Fenwick, "The Inter-American Regional System: Fifty Years of Progress," *American Journal of International Law* 50 (January 1956), pp. 18–31; Norman J. Padelford, "Cooperation in the Central American Region: The Organization of Central American States," *International Organization* 11 (Winter 1957), pp. 41–54; and Jorge Castaneda, "Pan Americanism and Regionalism," *International Organization* 10 (August 1956), pp. 373–89.

31. There were, of course, numerous studies of alliances in the early postwar era. See Yalem, "The Study of International Organization, 1920–1965," pp. 19–20.

32. Claude, *Swords into Plowshares*; Richard W. Van Wagenen, *Research in the International Organization Field* (Princeton: Center for Research on World Political Institutions, 1952); Ernst B. Haas, "Types of Collective Security: An Examination of Operational Concepts," *American Political Science Review* 49 (March 1955), pp. 40–62; and Harold Guetzkow, *Multiple Loyalties: Theoretical Approach to a Problem in International Organization* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1955); Haas, *Uniting of Europe* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1958); Karl W. Deutsch et al., *Political Community and the North Atlantic Area* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1957). Although Deutsch was concerned with "political integration" rather than "regional integration" per se, his work was clearly relevant to regional integration theory.

cal orientations, and more substantively concerned about political realities in international affairs, international organization scholars began to move away from the study of formal organizations and toward viewing international organization "as part of a dynamic interplay of institutional, military-political, and social-economic factors and pressures."[33]

As the 1950s ended, the international organization field was still marked primarily by studies of the UN. One could still find traces of optimism in the writings of UN observers, buoyed by the "preventive diplomacy" role that the UN played during the tenure of Dag Hammarskjold as secretary general. However, the growing fascination with regional integration as a subject of scholarly inquiry augured the subsequent declining interest in the UN and the retreat of international organization scholars from the more grandiose global world view that had informed the field since its inception.[34]

1960–70

Despite the irrelevance of the UN to the Vietnam War, which dominated American foreign policy through much of the 1960s, UN studies continued to occupy a prominent place in the international organization field in the United States and elsewhere during the decade. UN studies included traditional descriptive and evaluative analyses, such as those found in the 1965 volume of *International Organization* dedicated to the twentieth anniversary of the UN, as well as Sydney Bailey's discussions of the UN General Assembly and Secretariat; theoretical writings, such as Haas's attempt to apply functionalist theory to the International Labour Organisation; and quantitative analyses of voting and other processes in the UN, as reflected in the work of Thomas Hovet and Hayward Alker.[35]

As the decade progressed, however, regional integration studies tended to lure scholarly attention away from global phenomena; the European Com-

33. George Liska, *International Equilibrium* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1957), p. 15. Liska's work attempted to synthesize idealist and realist thought.

34. Writings that attempted to analyze how regionalism related to the UN and universalism included G. Bebr, "Regional Organizations: A United Nations Problem," *American Journal of International Law* 49 (April 1955), pp. 166–84; Norman J. Padelford, "Regional Organization and the United Nations," *International Organization* 8 (May 1954), pp. 203–16; and Ernst B. Haas, "Regionalism, Functionalism, and Universal Organization," *World Politics* 8 (January 1956), pp. 238–63.

35. Padelford and Goodrich, "The United Nations: Accomplishments and Prospects"; Sydney Bailey, *The General Assembly of the United Nations* (New York: Praeger, 1960), and Bailey, *The Secretariat of the United Nations* (New York: Praeger, 1962); Ernst B. Haas, *Beyond the Nation-State: Functionalism and International Organization* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1964); Thomas Hovet, *Bloc Politics in the United Nations* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1960); Hayward R. Alker, "Dimensions of Conflict in the General Assembly," *American Political Science Review* 58 (September 1964), pp. 142–57; and Alker and Bruce M. Russett, *World Politics in the General Assembly* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1965).

munity (EC) seemed to promise a more fertile field for studying international institution building than did the faltering UN, which was burdened not only externally by the Vietnam War but also by the organization's financial crisis following the Congo episode. The *Journal of Common Market Studies* appeared in 1962 as a new scholarly outlet. Although regional integration studies tended to focus primarily on Western Europe, an increasing number of studies sought to relate the European experience to Latin America and other regions.[36] Although the various schools of integration theory that developed—federalist, neofunctionalist, transactionalist—debated the role of institutions as both independent and dependent variables in the integration process, all included institutions in one way or another as a key element in their formulations.

The federalists viewed integration in almost wholly institutional terms, postulating that the dismantling of national governmental institutions and their replacement by supranational institutions was a necessary condition for the integration process to produce a new, expanded political community among the participant units.[37] Influenced by Mitrany's functionalist thought—which called for supranational institution building by first promoting international cooperation in relatively technical, "apolitical" areas, later spilling over into more controversial areas ("federalism by installments")— Haas and so-called neofunctionalist theorists accepted the functionalist premise that cooperation had to be learned rather than imposed but argued that politics had to be restored to the equation if learning was to eventuate in a larger political union.[38] Deutsch and other members of the transactionalist school distinguished between "amalgamated security-communities" (which involved the development of common governmental institutions among formerly independent political units) and "pluralistic security-communities" (which involved the development of a sense of community among political units that retained their formal independence and separate institutions).[39] Transactionalists placed less emphasis on institutions than other theorists,

36. For a bibliography of regional integration studies examining Western Europe and other regions in the 1960s, see Yalem, "The Study of International Organization, 1920–1965," pp. 30–35; and Leon N. Lindberg and Stuart A. Scheingold, eds., "Regional Integration: Theory and Research," special issue of *International Organization* 24 (Autumn 1970). In the latter volume Ernst Haas provides an overview of fifteen years of regional integration scholarship in "The Study of Regional Integration: Reflections on the Joy and Anguish of Pretheorizing," pp. 607–46.

37. As examples of federalist thought, see Altiero Spinelli, *The Eurocrats* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1966); and Peter Hay, *Federalism and Supranational Organizations: Patterns for New Legal Structures* (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1966).

38. See Ernst B. Haas and Philippe C. Schmitter, "Economics and Differential Patterns of Political Integration: Projections about Unity in Latin America," *International Political Communities* (New York: Doubleday, 1966), pp. 259–99; and Ernst B. Haas, "The Uniting of Europe and the Uniting of Latin America," *Journal of Common Market Studies* 5 (June 1967), pp. 315–43.

39. For an example of transactionalist thought, see Karl W. Deutsch et al., *France, Germany, and the Western Alliance* (New York: Scribner's, 1967).

measuring integration primarily by the growth of communications, trade, and other transaction flows among peoples resulting in attitudinal changes. However, even Deutsch and his associates acknowledged that "both types of integration [amalgamated and pluralistic] require, at the international level, some kind of organization, even though it may be very loose. We put no credence in the old aphorism that among friends a constitution is not necessary and among enemies it is of no avail."[40]

Regional integration scholarship perhaps reached its high point with the publication in 1970 of a special issue of *International Organization*, devoted entirely to an assessment of regional integration theory and research and having among its goals "the acceleration of comparative regional integration analysis."[41] As Haas stated in his contribution to the latter volume, the burgeoning integration literature was "stimulated by two otherwise unrelated trends: the flowering in the United States of systematic social science and the blooming in Europe of political efforts to build a united continent." Although Haas suggested that both the European experiment and the regional integration field were still alive and well as the 1960s ended, he did hint at problems that regionalism posed for both scholars and policy makers which were to materialize in the 1970s and were to lead to Haas's own critical reassessment of regional phenomena.[42] Whereas at one time Haas had cautioned that "regional integration . . . may eventually slow down universal integration altogether,"[43] he recognized also that extraregional, global forces could in turn undermine regionalism for better or worse.

The "flowering in the United States of systematic social science" in the 1960s was closely associated with the "behavioral revolution" that sought to make political science and international relations more scientific. As K. J. Holsti summed up the international relations field in the 1960s, "the major preoccupations of theorists during the past decade have been to explore specific problems, to form hypotheses or generalizations explaining limited ranges of phenomena, and, particularly, to obtain data to test those hypotheses."[44] Although Haas and others argued that rigorous empirical analysis could be the handmaiden rather than the antithesis of normative analysis, the increasing emphasis on quantitative measurement, replication, and "value-free" inquiry seemed to represent for international relationists not only a "retreat from utopia" but a movement away from normative theory altogether.

40. Karl W. Deutsch et al., "Political Community and the North Atlantic Area," in *International Political Communities* (New York: Doubleday, 1966), p. 3.

41. Lindberg and Scheingold, "Regional Integration: Theory and Research," p. v.

42. Haas, "The Study of Regional Integration," pp. 607, 620.

43. Ernst B. Haas, "International Integration: The European and the Universal Process," in *International Political Communities* (New York: Doubleday, 1966), p. 129.

44. K. J. Holsti, "Retreat from Utopia: International Relations Theory, 1945–1970," *Canadian Journal of Political Science* 4 (1971), p. 171.

As applied to the international organization field, the behavioral movement called for the "scientific study of international organization," as distinguished from the earlier tradition of the field which was characterized by "a high degree of moral commitment to the idea of international organization as a basis for world order."[45] Chadwick Alger, surveying "a decade of quantitative and field research on international organizations," found a considerable body of research but nonetheless lamented that "in light of phenomenal growth in the number of international organizations, the lack of an increase in attention paid to international organizations by the journals surveyed raises questions about the responsiveness of research to this domain of human behavior."[46]

The relative dearth of attention paid to international organizations in the scholarly literature reflected the continued dominance of the realist paradigm in framing the research agenda for behavioralists and traditionalists alike in the international relations field.[47] Realism permeated the study of international organization. It may have been true that international organization scholars in the 1960s continued "to be preoccupied with . . . analyses of international institutions" and that "most of their work . . . reflected a practical concern to understand more adequately the structure, functions, and operations of international organizations."[48] It was also no doubt true that a full understanding of international organization phenomena required a grasp of power realities. However, by the 1970s many observers of international organizations were becoming more interested in studying the politics surrounding international organizations than in studying the organizations themselves.[49]

In 1970 Stanley Hoffmann wrote:

45. Robert W. Cox, ed., *The Politics of International Organizations: Studies in Multilateral Social and Economic Agencies* (New York: Praeger, 1970), p. 15.

46. Chadwick F. Alger, "Research on Research: A Decade of Quantitative and Field Research on International Organizations," *International Organization* 24 (Summer 1970), p. 443. For an examination of the impact of behavioralism on the international organization field in the 1960s, see also Robert E. Riggs et al., "Behavioralism in the Study of the United Nations," *World Politics* 22 (January 1970), pp. 197–237.

47. The impact of the realist paradigm on quantitative research was demonstrated by John Handelman et al., "Color It Morgenthau: A Data-Based Assessment of Quantitative International Relations" (Paper presented to the International Studies Association, New York City, 1973). For the contrasting view that behavioralism resisted the realism paradigm and offered an alternative paradigm, see Lijphart, "The Structure of the Theoretical Revolution in International Relations," pp. 60–68.

48. Yalem, "The Study of International Organization, 1920–1965," p. 39.

49. The increased interest of international organization scholars in the larger international system converged somewhat with the increased interest of international politics generalists in international organizations. See Wolfram F. Hanrieder, "International Organizations and International Systems," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 10 (September 1966), pp. 297–313; Oran R. Young, "The United Nations and the International System," *International Organization* 22 (Autumn 1968), pp. 90–122; and Stanley Hoffmann, "International Organization and the International System," *International Organization* 24 (Summer 1970), pp. 389–413.

Specialists in the field of international organization have noted with some alarm a decline of interest among students and foundations in the study of the United Nations system. There has been a shift toward the study of regionalism and the theory of integration. The former shift reflects one reality of postwar world politics—the division of a huge and heterogeneous international system into subsystems in which patterns of cooperation and ways of controlling conflicts are either more intense or less elusive than in the global system.

In also alluding to an emergent "world political system" and "transnational society,"[50] Hoffmann was hinting at the rise of a new "globalist" paradigm, as globalism was to make a comeback in the next decade even while the United Nations continued its slide as a subject of scholarly inquiry.

1970–80

Two events that clearly had an important impact on the international organization field in the 1970s were the publication of *The Limits to Growth,* a report issued by the Club of Rome in 1972, and the oil embargo of 1973. The former, identifying a series of problems (including pollution and overpopulation) that were judged to be planetary in scope, raised the consciousness of international relationists generally, including international organization scholars, to the global level and away from more narrow national and regional perspectives. The second, coming one year later, reinforced the new "limits to growth" thinking and popularized the notion that the world had become increasingly and more intricately interdependent.[51] The Arab oil embargo and the quadrupling of the price of oil by a few ostensibly weak states acting through the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries— combined with the defeat of the United States in Vietnam—also caused some rethinking of conventional assumptions about the nature of power and order in international affairs.

One result of all these developments was the increased acceptance of a new, "globalist" paradigm in the international relations field which challenged the prevailing realist paradigm. Most globalists did not reject entirely the realist paradigm but sought to refine it, contending that the latter had never fully corresponded with reality and was especially inadequate for comprehending contemporary events in an age of "complex interdepen-

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50. Hoffmann, "International Organization and the International System," pp. 389, 400–401.
    51. Donella H. Meadows et al., *The Limits to Growth* (New York: Universe, 1972). The planetary perspective was also represented by other works published around the same time, such as Richard A. Falk, *This Endangered Planet* (New York: Random, 1972), and Lester R. Brown, *World without Borders* (New York: Random, 1972). A book that suggested how the Arab oil embargo reflected the growing complexity of world politics, particularly as regards the relationship between state and nonstate actors was Raymond Vernon, ed., *The Oil Crisis* (New York: Norton, 1976).

dence." Whereas realists viewed world politics in state-centric terms as essentially the struggle for power among sovereign nation-state units ("billiard balls") preoccupied with a concern about national security—defined militarily and strategically—globalists stressed a more complex set of relationships between national governments as well as transnational and other nonstate actors, all of which were entangled not only in issues of war and peace but also in economic and other issues that did not lend themselves to resolution through the use of armed force (a "cobweb").[52] The paradigm debate between globalists and realists attracted much attention in the international relations field in the 1970s and continued into the next decade.[53]

The globalist paradigm affected the study of international organization in a number of ways. First, it clearly contributed to a declining interest among scholars in regional integration, even though the globalist view resembled some elements of neofunctionalist thought (especially the attention given subnational and cross-national elite networks in various issue-areas). Although works on regional integration continued to appear,[54] and notwithstanding the expansion of the EC to nine members in 1973, by the mid-1970s one of the most prolific writers on regional integration declared the phenomenon an unworthy subject of scholarly inquiry. Haas wrote that "theorizing about regional integration as such is no longer profitable as a distinct . . . intellectual pursuit. In that sense . . . regional integration theory is obsolescent."[55] The obsolescence of regional integration theories owed much to the fact that they were "not designed to address the most pressing and important problems on the global agenda of policy and research." Haas argued

52. Realist and globalist positions were more complicated than this brief summation suggests, and were characterized by many variations. Perhaps the best statement of the globalist position (alternatively labeled modernist or transnationalist) was Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, *Power and Interdependence* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1977); they acknowledged that "sometimes realist assumptions will be accurate . . . but frequently complex interdependence will provide a better portrayal of reality" (p. 24). Keohane and Nye were among the first to draw attention to the growing importance of transnational relations and nonstate actors in world politics in their edited volume *Transnational Relations and World Politics* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1971). Other works typifying the globalist paradigm in the 1970s included Dennis Pirages, *Global Ecopolitics* (Belmont, Calif.: Wadsworth, 1978); Richard W. Mansbach, Yale G. Ferguson, and Donald E. Lampert, *The Web of World Politics: Nonstate Actors in the Global System* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1976); and Edward L. Morse, *Modernization and the Transformation of International Relations* (New York: Free, 1976). A variation of the globalist paradigm was the "world society" approach, as represented by John W. Burton, *World Society* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1972).

53. For a discussion of this debate, see Ray Maghroori and Bennett Ramberg, eds., *Globalism vs. Realism: International Relations' Third Debate* (Boulder: Westview, 1982).

54. For example, Leon N. Lindberg and Stuart A. Scheingold, *Europe's Would-Be Polity* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1970); and Joseph S. Nye, *Peace in Parts* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1971).

55. Ernst B. Haas, "Turbulent Fields and the Theory of Regional Integration," *International Organization* 30 (Spring 1976), p. 174. These views had been developed earlier in his *Obsolescence of Regional Integration Theory*. Research Series #25 (Berkeley: Institute of International Studies, University of California, 1975).

that the global system had become a "turbulent field," marked by a confusing array of actors and issues having the characteristics of complex interdependence articulated in the globalist paradigm, with extraregional forces impinging on regions in a manner that made it harder for states to sustain institution building at the regional level.[56]

Haas did qualify his remarks by noting that it was not regionalism that was dead, but regional integration—particularly the model of integration represented by the EC.[57] In other words, regional cooperation and problem solving, regional organizations, regional subsystems, and the like would continue to exist; but regional integration, in the sense of a learning process whereby national sovereignties and loyalties gradually and incrementally give way to a supranational community, would be stymied. Following Haas's lead, many international organization scholars quietly shifted their attention to the global level or, to the extent they were still interested in regional phenomena, examined regional organizations with more modest expectations about regional integration. The study of regional organizations was no longer the study of regional institution building so much as the study of regional interactions among interdependent societies:[58] "Regionalism today is rather a collection of procedures and techniques . . . by which governments and peoples maximize mutual positive payoffs by exploiting their interdependence."[59] In short, the globalist paradigm not only redirected scholarly interest toward globalism but also injected a new "realism" into the study of regional organization.

A second, related effect of the globalist paradigm on the international organization field was the broadening of the concept of "international organization." The term had historically been primarily associated with— indeed, had been almost synonymous with—intergovernmental organization. For all their disagreements, the interwar idealists and postwar realists shared an essentially state-centric view of the world which assumed that the dominant feature of international relations was the decentralized Westphalian system of territorially based sovereign states; both schools identified the same problem, although they arrived at different solutions. International organizations in the form of intergovernmental institutions could be accommodated fairly easily in the Westphalian model. In contrast, the globalist paradigm suggested that nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) could be at

56. Haas, "Turbulent Fields and the Theory of Regional Integration," pp. 178, 179.
57. Ibid., p. 177.
58. Haas discusses the relationship between *integration* and *interdependence* and the extent to which the terms referred to similar or compatible phenomena in ibid., pp. 208–11; see also Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, "Interdependence and Integration," in Fred I. Greenstein and Nelson W. Polsby, eds., *Handbook of Political Science*, vol. 1 (Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley, 1975), pp. 363–415.
59. Donald J. Puchala and Stuart I. Fagan, "International Politics in the 1970's: The Search for a Perspective," *International Organization* 28 (Spring 1974), p. 259.

least as important as, if not more important than, intergovernmental organizations (IGOs) as international organization actors in world politics.[60]

Although the globalist paradigm in certain respects seemed to enhance the status of international organizations as actors competing with national governments to produce outcomes in the global arena, globalists pointed out that international organizations were only one among several types of non-state actors—subnational, transnational, transgovernmental, and multinational in nature—influencing world politics. In fact, in many globalist writings international organizations tended to blend imperceptibly with other sorts of actors, to the point where the entities being described seemed neither "international" nor "organizations" in character. Accepting the globalist paradigm, the editors of a volume that reminisced about a quarter-century of *International Organization* scholarship, stated that "the overwhelming evidence points to the conclusion that we are entering into a basically new arrangement of international political issues, policy, and actors," and urged that in the future more attention be given to "a sharply growing volume of transnational policy making involving subnational political units, national political units, nonstate actors, such as multinational corporations and transnational elite groups, and officials of regional and global international organizations."[61]

International organization, in the conventional sense, seemed to be considered almost an afterthought in discussions of the "new international politics" and was threatened with becoming lost amidst the morass of concepts and verbiage that the globalist paradigm spawned. Robert Keohane argued for "questioning traditional conceptions of international organizations as highly institutionalized entities with explicitly developed formal structures."[62] With Joseph Nye, he suggested instead that one "think of international institutions less as institutions than as clusters of intergovernmental and transgovernmental networks associated with the formal institutions."[63] With this downplaying of the organizational aspects of international organization, the international organization field had almost completely distanced itself from the legal-formal tradition that had once dominated the field.

Stripped of its "institutional" trappings, the UN became just another

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60. The acronyms IGO and NGO did not become fashionable until the 1970s, when the globalist paradigm suggested the importance of this typology of international organizations. Earlier international organization texts, for example, rarely used this terminology. Although nongovernmental organizations had long been recognized by observers of international organization, the phenomenon had not attracted much study.

61. Leland M. Goodrich and David A. Kay, eds., *International Organization: Politics and Process* (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1973), p. xxi.

62. Robert O. Keohane, "*International Organization* and the Crisis of Interdependence," *International Organization* 29 (Spring 1975), p. 361. Keohane cited similar arguments made by John G. Ruggie in "The Structure of International Organization: Contingency, Complexity, and Post-Modern Form," *Peace Research Society Papers* 18 (1971), pp. 73–91.

63. Keohane and Nye, *Power and Interdependence*, p. 240.

"cluster of networks." One might have thought that the globalist paradigm would receive interest in the UN. Although the UN was kept relatively busy in the 1970s—playing a significant role in the 1973 Middle East War, serving as a main forum for the New International Economic Order debate, and sponsoring a myriad of global conferences dealing with food, population, the environment, and other issues—the UN never quite regained the core position it once occupied in the international organization field. There were a few major works that focused on UN decision making and the role of the UN in global problem solving.[64] However, despite "Spaceship Earth" imagery and calls for greater "central guidance" mechanisms, there was little noticeable upsurge of scholarly attention paid to the United Nations as an institution. Until 1970, a regular feature of the journal *International Organization* had been a lengthy section summarizing recent activities in the United Nations and other IGOs. This practice was discontinued in 1970, with the explanation that "other sources of information about the activities of these institutions have gradually become available, rendering feasible the elimination of this section . . . to free space . . . for publication of more critical, analytical, and interpretive material."[65] Although this change reflected mainly a downgrading of descriptive discussions in favor of more theoretical concerns, it was also another manifestation of the devaluing of the institutional aspects of international organization.

Regarding methodology, the use of quantitative analysis techniques that behavioralism had contributed to the study of international organization in the 1960s continued to flourish in the 1970s. However, in one survey of quantitative and field research published between 1970 and 1975, the author found a decline in the relative number of scholarly articles devoted to studying international organizations generally and the United Nations in particular.[66] The promise of a "science of international organization" had failed to materialize. As Keohane noted near the beginning of the decade, the international organization field was "notorious for its lack of systematic and testable theory." Likewise, Philippe Schmitter noted that "inquiry into the nature and role of international organizations has not been a noticeably cumulative enterprise."[67] The failure to build cumulative knowledge about

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64. For example, Robert W. Cox et al., *The Anatomy of Influence: Decision Making in International Organization* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1973); and Jacobson, *Networks of Interdependence,* which examined international organizations in general terms but focused mostly on the UN system.

65. Editor's note in *International Organization* 24 (Winter 1970), p. v.

66. William J. Dixon, "Research on Research Revisited: Another Half Decade of Quantitative and Field Research on International Organizations," *International Organization* 31 (Winter 1977), pp. 65–82.

67. Robert O. Keohane, "Institutionalization in the United Nations General Assembly," *International Organization* 23 (Autumn 1969), p. 859; Philippe Schmitter, "The 'Organizational Development' of International Organizations," *International Organization* 25 (Autumn 1971), p. 917.

international organizations was blamed on the field's late start in theory development and empirical research. Symptomatic of the problem, however, was the fact that, by the end of the decade, the one area of the field which Keohane and Schmitter exempted from their criticism—regional integration theory—was on the brink of being dismissed as a subject of scholarly inquiry.

Although many scholars remained committed to the pursuit of cumulative knowledge through rigorous scientific techniques of analysis, the 1970s witnessed a "post-behavioral" reaction against some of the excesses of the behavioral revolution. In particular, it became generally acknowledged that fact-value distinctions were not easily achieved, that one's values necessarily intruded to some extent upon one's observation and interpretation of reality, and that, in any case, attempts to maintain strict boundaries between empirical and normative inquiry or basic and applied research were untenable in the face of increasing cries for "relevance" after Vietnam.[68] Scholars were urged to deal more squarely and directly with values, or at the very least make more explicit the normative or prescriptive implications of their research.[69] The postbehavioral call to relate knowledge to action led in the international organization field to an increased policy science perspective.[70] As exemplified by the World Order Models Project (WOMP), there was renewed interest in explicit normative and prescriptive analysis among international organization scholars, although the strategies prescribed in such world order studies tended to be dismissed as "globaloney"—policy without science, or overly futuristic analyses inadequately grounded in current reality.[71]

As the 1970s ended, globalists and realists continued to disagree over what constituted "reality" in international affairs. Globalists were open to

68. A. A. Said discussed the "crisis of relevance" experienced by the international relations field in "Recent Theories of International Relations: An Overview," in Said, ed., *Theory of International Relations: The Crisis of Relevance* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1968); see also Fred Warner Neal and Bruce D. Hamlett, "The Never-Never Land of International Relations," *International Studies Quarterly* 13 (September 1969), pp. 281–305.

69. David Easton trumpeted the postbehavioral revolution in 1969, arguing that "research about and constructive development of values" were "indistinguishable parts of the study of politics." Easton, "The New Revolution in Political Science," *American Political Science Review* 63 (December 1969), p. 1052.

70. The theme of the 1977 annual meeting of the International Studies Association, World-Wide Appraisal of Institutions: Toward Realizing Human Dignity, reflected the postbehavioral mood of the international relations discipline. The application of a policy science perspective to the study of "world order values" was exemplified by Richard C. Snyder, Charles F. Hermann, and Harold D. Lasswell, "A Global Monitoring System: Appraising the Effects of Government on Human Dignity," *International Studies Quarterly* 20 (June 1976), pp. 221–60; and Herbert C. Kelman, "The Conditions, Criteria, and Dialectics of Human Dignity: A Transnational Perspective," *International Studies Quarterly* 21 (September 1977), pp. 529–52.

71. WOMP studies included such works as Saul H. Mendlovitz, *On the Creation of a Just World Order: Preferred Worlds for the 1990s* (New York: Free, 1975); and Rajni Kothari, *Footsteps into the Future: Diagnosis of the Present World and a Design for an Alternative* (New York: Free, 1974).

charges of being either reborn idealists who, having become restless looking for the growth of world order in legal-institutional terms, sought to expand the concept of international organization in order to uncover it in more informal terms, or pure behavioralists who, having tired of collecting data on nation-states which did not yield high correlations, discovered a whole new lode to mine. However, even some inveterate realists such as Morgenthau had reached the conclusion that "the technological revolutions of our age have rendered the Nation-State's principle of political organization as obsolete as the first modern industrial revolution . . . did feudalism."[72] In deemphasizing the state and relaxing the distinction between domestic and international politics, the globalists struck at the heart of the realist paradigm.[73] However, in moving the international organization field still further away from the study of formal organizations, globalists were far from resurrecting the idealist tradition.

Indeed, in some respects, globalists and realists showed signs of convergence, as did the international organization subfield and the rest of the international relations discipline. J. David Singer noted in the late 1970s that "the extraordinary gap of the 1960's" between "students of international organization and students of international politics" was "beginning to close." He saw "an increasing convergence between the two fields, largely accounted for by changes among the international politics specialists, and hardly at all by those in the international organization field. Substantively, the politics people are noting the importance of problems other than war and security. Conceptually, the politics people are beginning to pay more attention to institutional factors."[74] Singer was correct to point to a convergence of sorts. However, such a convergence seemed more a case of international organization scholars meeting international politics scholars at least halfway—converging around the concept of "regime." "Neorealism" would be on the rise in the next decade, and with it the revival of the state and relative decline of "transnationalism," "limits to growth" concerns, and the "new agenda of issues" which had been the bywords of the 1970s.

The contemporary study of international organization

To the casual observer, it is evident that the UN and international organizations in general have fallen upon hard times in the 1980s. Their decline has

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72. Hans J. Morgenthau, "The New Diplomacy of Movement," *Encounter* 43 (August 1974), p. 57.

73. Globalists went beyond the earlier work of Graham Allison and others who, in questioning the traditional "billiard ball" view of nation-states, had confined their analyses largely to foreign-policy decision making.

74. J. David Singer, "War and Other Problems in the Global System," *International Organization* 31 (Summer 1977), pp. 565, 568.

not been a precipitous one but an extension of a long-term trend. Similarly, the international organization field itself in the 1980s has seemed on the brink of collapse, as the steady erosion of scholarly interest in the study of organizations over the past forty years has culminated in the virtual loss of identity of the field. The current identity crisis of the international organization field must be understood in the context of larger developments affecting the international relations discipline as a whole.

Among the events ushering in the current decade in the United States was the issuance of the *Global 2000* report, one of the last official acts of the Carter administration prior to the Reagan presidency. Since that time, the 1980s have been marked more by elements of déjà vu than by futurism. In policy-making circles, we have witnessed a return to the cold war climate in East-West relations. In the scholarly community intellectual interest in the state and in the exercise of national power has been revived.[75] In the words of the editor of a recent special issue of *International Political Science Review,* "the role of the state is larger both in internal relationships existing in today's societies and in international relations."[76]

What has come to be known as "neorealism" was a reaction against forecasts of the demise of the nation-state which were associated with the globalist paradigm in the 1970s, predictions that did seem rather naive and premature in light of the national chauvinism and militarism that displaced liberal internationalism in the United States and elsewhere during the Reagan era. Neorealists did not claim to be offering a new paradigm but, rather, were continuing and embellishing a realist tradition that went back to Thucydides.[77] They were attacked by some as having abandoned the classical ("real") realism of Morgenthau—particularly given their somewhat fatalistic views about the prospects for progressive change in international relations.[78] Neorealists, however, contended that their emphasis on the "essentially conflictual nature of international affairs" and "the primacy in all political life of power and security in human motivation,"[79] made them true to the realist tradition, even if they were perhaps methodologically more

75. See Stephen D. Krasner, "Approaches to the State: Alternative Conceptions and Historical Dynamics," *Comparative Politics* 16, no. 2 (1984), pp. 223–46.

76. Karl-Heinz Roder, ed., "The Future of the State," special issue of *International Political Science Review* 6, no. 1 (1985), p. 9.

77. Among those scholars most prominently labeled "neorealists" were Kenneth Waltz and Robert Gilpin. See Kenneth N. Waltz, *Theory of International Politics* (Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley, 1979); and Robert G. Gilpin, *War and Change in World Politics* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981). Although both Waltz and Gilpin had made their views known much earlier, it was not until the 1980s that neorealism became an established school of thought. As with globalists, neorealists came in many varieties.

78. Richard K. Ashley, "The Poverty of Neorealism," *International Organization* 38 (Spring 1984), pp. 225–86.

79. Robert G. Gilpin, "The Richness of the Tradition of Political Realism," response to Ashley, in *International Organization* 38 (Spring 1984), p. 290.

scientific and substantively more concerned about economics than were their predecessors.

Globalists had noted in the 1970s a pervasive inability of national governments to carry out basic security and other functions. Neorealists also acknowledged a "loss of control." However, where globalists had attributed "loss of control" to complex interdependence and the proliferation of relevant actors and issues, the neorealists offered a more familiar explanation—the existence of a power vacuum that resulted mainly from the American defeat in Vietnam, ending the "Pax Americana" that arguably had governed world politics in the postwar era. Although some globalists in the 1980s have reaffirmed the globalist paradigm as a clear-cut alternative to realism and have sought to expand upon it.[80] others have been more hospitable to neorealist thought, especially to the neorealist focus on "hegemony" as a source of world order.[81]

The international organization field has been buffeted by all of these crosscurrents of thought in recent years. The field, to the extent it can be said to still exist, has come to rest at the moment upon a rather flimsy foundation it shares with neorealism, that is, based mostly upon the concept of "regime." Regimes have been defined as "recognized patterns of practice around which expectations converge," which "may or may not be accompanied by explicit organizational arrangements."[82] In other words, regimes constitute widely accepted norms, rules, procedures, or institutions—"governing arrangements"[83]—that allow the international community to function and cope with various concerns in the absence of a world government. As Haas has noted, the "concept of 'international regime' is almost as old as international law itself."[84] Nonetheless, it was not until the 1970s and, particularly, the current decade that the term became widely utilized and the concept widely developed, as reflected in the recent publication of a special issue of *International Organization* devoted entirely to regimes.[85] For globalists, the

80. For example, see Richard W. Mansbach and John A. Vasquez, *In Search of Theory: A New Paradigm for Global Politics* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1981).

81. For example, Keohane, building on earlier theorizing in *Power and Interdependence*, accepted some elements of the "theory of hegemonic stability" but sought to refine it using "complex interdependence" constructs drawn from the globalist paradigm. See Robert O. Keohane, "The Theory of Hegemonic Stability and Changes in International Economic Regimes, 1967–1977," in Ole R. Holsti et al., eds., *Change in the International System* (Boulder: Westview, 1980), pp. 131–62. In his critique of neorealism, Ashley identifies Keohane as a "structural realist" in the same category as Gilpin; see Ashley, "The Poverty of Neorealism," p. 227.

82. Oran R. Young, "International Regimes: Problems of Concept Formation," *World Politics* 32 (April 1980), pp. 332–33.

83. Keohane and Nye, *Power and Interdependence*, p. 5.

84. Ernst B. Haas, "Why Collaborate? Issue-Linkage and International Regimes," *World Politics* 32 (April 1980), p. 396.

85. Stephen D. Krasner, ed., "International Regimes," *International Organization* 36 (Spring 1982).

concept of regime fit nicely into a framework that stressed the nonfungibility of power across various issue-areas. For neorealists, it provided a handy vehicle for exploring the limits of cooperation in an inherently conflictual world.

For the international organization field, the concept of regime has meant almost intellectual chaos. The problem is that the term has been stretched to embrace everything from a patterned set of interactions (an international system), to any form of multilateral coordination, cooperation, or collaboration (provision of collective goods), to formal rules (international law), to formal machinery (international organization). Some writers go so far as to characterize the balance of power, colonialism, imperialism, and detente as regimes, albeit "diffuse" or "informal" in nature.[86] As one observer comments, "grappling with the problem of trying to describe and explain patterns of order in the anarchic world of international politics, scholars have fallen into using the term 'regime' so disparately . . . that it ranges from an umbrella for all international relations to little more than a synonym for international organizations."[87] Despite attempts to clarify the concept, confusion reigns. What used to be simple, commonly understood distinctions between order and disorder, cooperation and conflict, and international institutions and international behaviors have become blurred from prolonged exposure to deep scholarly rumination.

The "hegemonic stability theory" of regime change which presently enjoys considerable popularity marks the completion of the postwar odyssey of scholars away from interwar idealism.[88] International order and stability—in the form of regimes—are now identified with the distribution of power in the system. In particular, it is a concentration or preponderance of power in the hands of one country which is deemed the optimal condition for the preservation of order in economic and other issue-areas. Neither collective security (i.e., a balance of power institutionalized through a central mechanism) nor an equilibrium (i.e., a balance of power operating through an invisible hand) is considered to promote world order. Order is forged by a hegemon achieving multilateral "cooperation" through a combination of coercive threats and positive inducements. Hegemony contains the seeds of its own destruction as the hegemon is inevitably inclined to carry an excessive demand load in sacrificing itself for "the common good."

To be sure, not all regime analysts have endorsed the theory of hegemonic

86. Donald J. Puchala and Raymond F. Hopkins, "International Regimes: Lessons from Inductive Analysis," *International Organization* 36 (Spring 1982), pp. 248–49.

87. Arthur A. Stein, "Coordination and Collaboration: Regimes in an Anarchic World," *International Organization* 36 (Spring 1982), p. 299. Definitional problems are discussed and some clarifications offered in Robert O. Keohane, *After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984), pp. 57–60.

88. For a summary of the theory, see Keohane, "The Theory of Hegemonic Stability and Changes in International Economic Regimes, 1967–1977," pp. 136–37. Also see Robert Gilpin, *U.S. Power and the Multinational Corporation* (New York: Basic, 1975).

stability.[89] And, of course, not all international organization scholars endorse the concept of regime or spend their time studying regimes. At least one critic dismisses the study of regimes as "a fad, one of those shifts of fashion not too difficult to explain as a temporary reaction to events in the real world."[90] Obviously, one can still find numerous writings on the UN, although more often than not they are couched in the context of regimes. There is, in fact, a considerable amount of diversity, of "flux," in the field. The point is that the study of international organization has become broadly defined as the study of patterns of international cooperation and conflict, rendering it indistinguishable from the study of international politics.

This is perhaps manifested most plainly by the shift in the editorial policy and content of *International Organization*, the premier journal in the field over the last forty years. As noted previously, the journal had been gradually shifting its focus until in 1979 the editor announced that "we have completed a transition from a journal devoted to the study of international organizations, particularly the United Nations, to an international journal of 'political and economic affairs.' "[91] Actually, the transition was not completed until 1983 when the current editorial regime gave the new subtitle "Journal of Political and Economic Affairs" what amounted to top billing by reducing the title *International Organization* to *IO*. Although the editor reminded readers that "you can't judge a book by its cover,"[92] he apparently felt otherwise. The journal seemed to be seeking to dissociate itself from its intellectual roots and from a field of study that had fallen into discredit. Indeed, since 1980 only ten or so articles in the journal have dealt explicitly with global IGOs; a similar number have focused on regional IGOs.

It can be argued that the international organization field has undergone a healthy maturation in its progression from a sterile preoccupation with legal-formal aspects of international relations to a more sophisticated approach toward world politics phenomena. However, in heeding Keohane's call to avoid the "Mt. Everest syndrome"—that is, studying international organizations for their own sake, "because they are there"—scholars may have gone too far. That "they are there," and in increasing numbers, indicates an empirical reality that cannot be discounted. That they represent institution building which is mankind's best hope is a normative belief that one can question but not disprove. With a few exceptions, the current generation of scholars, compared to earlier generations, has been so concerned about accurately and soberly observing reality that they have lost a sense of vision. Current approaches, regime analysis in particular, can be faulted not for

89. See footnote 81. Also, see Haas, "Why Collaborate? Issue-Linkage and International Regimes," pp. 359–61.

90. Susan Strange, "*Cave! Hic Dragones:* A Critique of Regime Analysis," *International Organization* 36 (Spring 1982), p. 479.

91. Robert O. Keohane, "Editor's Note," *International Organization* 33 (Summer 1979).

92. Peter J. Katzenstein, "Editor's Note," *International Organization* 35 (Spring 1981).

being value-free but for having an implicit bias against any major changes in the fabric of world politics.[93] Empirically, such transformation is viewed as unlikely; normatively, it is viewed as unwelcome. The fall of international organization as a field of study reflects not only the crisis of confidence experienced by international institutions but also a crisis of confidence experienced by the scholarly community in its ability to develop and disseminate useful knowledge for improving the human condition.[94]

The failure of scholars to move the world

The essentially status quo orientation of most contemporary international organization scholarship defies the commonplace observation that "the international system has undergone profound changes since World War II."[95] To what extent have scholars understood, anticipated, predicted, and in any way helped to shape developments since 1945, particularly in regard to international organization? A retrospective look at the evolution of the international organization field over the past forty years points up the tendency of scholarship to follow rather than anticipate events. To the extent that the capacity to anticipate or predict important occurrences—not specific incidents but "which way the wind is blowing"[96]—is a measure of our understanding of such phenomena, international organization scholars seem to have demonstrated only a limited understanding of their subject matter. Although some individual scholars have been more perspicacious than others, this indictment stands for the field as a whole.

On the heels of the creation of the UN, a plethora of works appeared that were devoted to discussions of the world organization. With the onset of the cold war, international organization scholarship started to take a somewhat different turn. The creation of the EC in the 1950s spawned a scholarly

93. The normative biases and implications of regime analysis are commented upon in Strange, "*Cave! Hic Dragones*," pp. 486–93; and Ashley, "The Poverty of Neorealism," pp. 259–61. Haas argues that different "political values" underlie different views of regimes; see Ernst B. Haas, "Words Can Hurt You; or, Who Said What to Whom about Regimes," *International Organization* 36 (Spring 1982), pp. 207–43. For a dissenting view on the static bias of regime analysis, see Keohane, *After Hegemony*.

94. David Easton has made a similar observation about political science generally, noting that "political science seems to have lost its purpose," in his "Political Science in the United States: Past and Present," in Karl-Heinz Roder, ed., special issue of *International Political Science Review* 6, no. 1 (1985), pp. 133–52.

95. Ole R. Holsti et al., eds., *Change in the International System* (Boulder: Westview, 1980), p. xvii. Likewise, James Caporaso begins a monograph by noting that "since the end of World War II there have been some profound changes in the structure of the international system." Caporaso, *Functionalism and Regional Integration: A Logical and Empirical Assessment* (Beverly Hills: Sage, 1972), p. 5. Numerous similar pronouncements can be cited.

96. Charles A. McClelland, "International Relations: Wisdom or Science?" in James N. Rosenau, ed., *International Politics and Foreign Policy*, rev. ed. (New York: Free, 1969), p. 4.

fascination with regional integration. The oil embargo, coupled with detente and related developments, fueled the literature on global interdependence and limits to growth. The tenure of Ronald Reagan has coincided with the revival of the state as an object of study and the retrenchment of "ecopolitics" on the research and teaching agendas at many universities.[97] It is hard to escape the conclusion that students of international organization for the most part have behaved more like journalists than scholars, reacting to and reporting on the latest happenings rather than paying attention to long-term trends or possibilities.

It has been said about the international relations field generally that "we probably do not understand contemporary international politics as well as we should, since theoretical development in our discipline is presently lagging behind the evolving reality of day-to-day practice in international affairs."[98] However, one could argue that international organization scholars have at times overreacted to events of the moment, consequently abandoning existing theoretical frameworks prematurely. The inclination of scholars to relate their ideas to new developments on the world scene is understandable; it is part of reality testing. However, it is one thing to adjust one's theories to accommodate new phenomena; it is something else to lurch from one research agenda to another in response to the ebb and flow of current events. If "the world has let many of us down" in that "it simply has not conformed to our expectations,"[99] we need to sharpen our analytical tools. Instead, with regime analysis, we have learned merely to soften our "expectations." One of the reasons, perhaps, why the regime literature is so attractive today is that, after "being let down" frequently in the past, scholars have resorted to the regime framework as a fairly safe one to bet one's scholarly credentials on insofar as it is sufficiently amorphous to apprehend any number of eventualities within the parameters of the state system. Unfortunately, like the term *national interest,* the concept of regime is highly ambiguous both as an explanatory variable for scholars seeking to account for international phenomena and as a guide to action for practitioners seeking to prescribe policies.

There are those—neorealists (or "structural realists") in particular—who would claim that they have avoided indulging in the latest scholarly fads in response to the latest happenings and that they have rarely been let down in

97. As a recent article notes, "the main impetus for research on 'global interdependence' " has "largely disappeared for the . . . reason that such thinking does not fit the more aggressively capitalist rhetoric and practice of the Reagan era." Hayward R. Alker, Jr., and Thomas J. Biersteker, "The Dialectics of World Order: Notes for a Future Archeologist of International Savoir Faire," *International Studies Quarterly* 28 (June 1984), p. 138.

98. Puchala and Fagan, "International Politics in the 1970's: The Search for a Perspective," p. 247.

99. James N. Rosenau, "A Pre-Theory Revisited: World Politics in an Era of Cascading Interdependence," *International Studies Quarterly* 28 (September 1984), p. 248.

their expectations, that is, that the failures of the UN, the fragility of the EC, and the decline of ecopolitics could all have been anticipated by a deeper understanding of the systemic forces structuring world politics. To the neorealists, the more things change the more they stay the same. Not only have there not been profound changes in the international system since 1945, there have not been profound changes for centuries. In the words of Kenneth Waltz, "the texture of international politics remains highly constant, patterns recur, and events repeat themselves endlessly."[100] If many scholars can be criticized for rushing to judgment about the revolution in world politics portended by certain developments, neorealists can be criticized for being too quick to dismiss new developments as totally superficial and for being ill-equipped to recognize major change if it were to occur.[101] Whereas the former are guilty of ahistorical thinking, attaching excessive significance to events of the moment, the latter are guilty of historicism, attaching an excessively deterministic quality to the reading of the past. Both tendencies are myopic toward the future.

If scholars have demonstrated only a limited capacity to anticipate international organization developments since World War II, it is even harder to see how they have had a hand in actually shaping developments. Of course, the future is difficult to anticipate or predict precisely because, notwithstanding the many constraints that seem to limit the menu of choices open to policy makers, humanity has the general ability to shape what happens, to continue or alter the existing course. Hence, our understanding of international relations cannot hope to be perfect or final, in the form of eternal truths. Indeed, the main purpose of producing knowledge is presumably to utilize it ultimately to change—improve—some dimension of human existence, even if in the process our knowledge of the existing order of things is then rendered obsolete to some extent. The production and application of knowledge are complicated by frequent disagreement over what constitutes knowledge as well as what constitutes improvement in the human condition. The more disagreements there are, the less influence scholars are likely to have. Few areas of human endeavor occasion as many disagreements as does international relations.

Despite the problems scholars have experienced in accumulating and applying knowledge about the world, the twofold assumption remains that cumulative (if not eternal) knowledge is possible and that such knowledge can have an impact on policy. Witness the program theme of the 1986 International Studies Association annual meeting: "The UN Year of Peace: Cu-

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100. Waltz, *Theory of International Politics*, p. 66.
101. As John Ruggie argues, Waltz's thesis "provides no means by which to account for, or even to describe, the most important contextual change in international politics in this *millenium:* the shift from the medieval to the modern international system." See Ruggie, "Continuity and Transformation in the World Polity: Toward a Neorealist Synthesis," *World Politics* 35 (January 1983), p. 273.

mulative Knowledge for Prudent Policies." Witness the comments of neorealist Robert Gilpin:

> Embedded in most social sciences and in the study of international relations is the belief that through science and reason the human race can gain control over its destiny. Through the advancement of knowledge, humanity can learn to master the blind forces and construct a science of peace. Through an understanding of the sources of our actions and the consequences of our acts, human rationality should be able to guide statesmen through the crisis of a decaying world order to a renovated and stable world order. . . . Political realism is, of course, the embodiment of this faith in reason and science. An offspring of modern science and the Enlightenment, realism holds that through calculations of power and national interest statesmen can create order out of anarchy and thereby moderate the inevitable conflicts of autonomous, self-centered, and competitive states.[102]

Witness as well the statements of James Rosenau, whose notion of "cascading interdependence" is the antithesis of neorealist thought: The fact that scholars "interact" with the world "suggests not only that our conduct as scholars may be responsive to the course of events . . . but also that what we do as observers may have an effect on the conduct of world affairs." As for the possibility of translating knowledge into action specifically in the international organization field, witness Hoole's plea for "a transnational policy approach to the study of the United Nations" which "has the virtue of emphasizing both theory development and practical relevance." Hoole's suggestion is similar to Keohane's earlier call for "a set of normatively infused organizational strategies: ideas about how to design international organizations and associated elite networks in such a way that our basic values . . . will tend to be served. These strategies will not show us how to 'design a new world' . . . but they may give us some idea how to nudge events somewhat in preferred directions."[103]

There remains guarded optimism, then, over the ability of scholars at least to "nudge events in preferred directions." Is it naive to think the scholarly community can nudge the world forward, or is it possible an even more substantial impact can be achieved? There are several ways in which scholars can have an impact upon policy—national, transnational, or otherwise. One is their direct participation in official policy-making circles (á la Kissinger and Brzezinski), which occurs relatively rarely, or in policy analysis positions in the lower reaches of the bureaucracy and extensions of the bureaucracy (contract research agencies); Joseph Nye, Richard Gardner,

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102. Gilpin, *War and Change in World Politics*, p. 226.
103. Rosenau, "A Pre-Theory Revisited: World Politics in an Era of Cascading Interdependence," p. 298; Hoole, "Changing Scholarship on the United Nations," p. 10; Keohane, "*International Organization* and the Crisis of Interdependence," p. 360.

and Lincoln Bloomfield are among the few international organization schol-
ars in the postwar period who, as occupants of significant governmental
posts, have been in a position to put their research into practice. Another,
less visible avenue of influence is through an intellectual osmosis that
occurs between scholars and practitioners; as Keynes put it, "practical
men who believe themselves to be quite exempt from any intellectual in-
fluences," whether they realize it or not, often act on the basis of theories
developed by "some academic scribbler of a few years back."[104] Between
these two lies a third possible mode of influence, namely, the regular, sys-
tematic utilization by policy makers of specific research findings reported in
the scholarly literature. It is the latter that Gilpin, Rosenau, Hoole,
Keohane, and most members of the scholarly community who aspire to a
science of international relations seemingly have in mind when envisioning
the proper role of scholars as purveyors of knowledge that is relevant to
policy.

Unfortunately, unlike findings reported in, say, the *New England Journal
of Medicine,* the findings of international relationists have not rated atten-
tion even from the media much less from policy makers.[105] (One would
be truly shocked to hear on a morning news report that "scholars at Harvard
University have isolated the variables related to the cause of regime col-
lapse, as noted in the latest issue of *International Studies Quarterly.*") Much
has been written in recent years about the relationship between policy mak-
ers and scholars and the problems they encounter in seeking to improve this
linkage in the social sciences generally and the international relations field
particularly.[106] Let us examine a few problems that specifically relate to the
ability of international organization scholars to help shape developments in
world politics.

104. John Maynard Keynes, *The General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money* (Lon-
don: Macmillan, 1957), p. 383.
105. The general infrequency with which policy makers are able to point to a particular
scholarly research finding in the social sciences as substantially influencing their decisions is
noted by Michael Q. Patton et al., "In Search of Impact," in Carol H. Weiss, *Using Social
Research for Public Policy Making* (Lexington, Mass.: Heath, 1977).
106. For a discussion of problems encountered in the social sciences generally, see ibid.; and
Charles E. Lindblom and David K. Cohen, *Usable Knowledge: Social Science and Social
Problem Solving* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1979). For problems specifically in inter-
national relations, see Alexander L. George, "Theory for Policy in International Relations,"
Policy Sciences 4 (December 1973), pp. 387–413; Michael K. O'Leary et al., "The Quest for
Relevance: Quantitative International Relations Research and Government Foreign Affairs
Analysis," *International Studies Quarterly* 18 (June 1974), pp. 211–37; Warren R. Phillips and
Richard E. Hayes, "Utilization of Computer Technology and Formal Social Science in Foreign
Policy Decision-Making," pp. 241–60 in *Report of the Commission on the Organization of the
Government for the Conduct of Foreign Policy,* vol. 2 (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1975), Appen-
dix G; Robert L. Rothstein, *Planning, Prediction and Policy-Making in Foreign Affairs* (Bos-
ton: Little, Brown, 1972); and Allen S. Whiting, "The Scholar and the Policy-Maker," in
Raymond Tanter and Richard H. Ullman, eds., *Theory and Policy and International Relations*
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1972), pp. 229–47.

One such problem has already been alluded to, namely the lack of cumulative knowledge in the field. Given the inconclusive and even contradictory nature of research findings reported in the scholarly literature, it is hard for knowledge consumers to have confidence in the authoritativeness of the knowledge producers. It is true that the failure to build a cumulative body of knowledge is not unique to the international relations field but is common to the social sciences generally: "Standing in sharp contrast to the customary belief in the tendency of scientific investigation to converge on increasingly correct representations of reality is the phenomenon of divergence that marks much of social science. . . . The usual effect of [social science inquiry] . . . is to raise new issues, stimulate new debate, and multiply the complexities of the social problem at hand."[107] In recent years, doubts have been raised about whether any discipline can be truly scientific, that is, produce a body of verified generalizations about a reality that exists apart from observers, incrementally developed through systematic formulation and testing of hypotheses.[108] It is now widely accepted that all scientific concepts are value-laden to some extent. It is also understood that, even if "objective" truths can be ascertained, the notion of "final" truths—a "permanent consensus" among scholars—is "inconsistent with the process of scientific investigation itself."[109] Humbling as these caveats are, the search for knowledge nonetheless continues.[110] As noted earlier, the more scholarly consensus that exists in a field at a given moment, the more likely the knowledge disseminated will be viewed as authoritative, and the harder it will be for practitioners to ignore or dismiss it.

Although the problem of cumulative knowledge is found across many disciplines, it seems unusually severe in the international relations field. Not only is there wide disagreement over the validity of specific hypotheses, there is huge discord over even so basic a question as the general degree to which knowledge in the field has been advanced. What kind of field is it in which one leading theorist remarks that "our collective efforts have been marked by such an extraordinary maturation in the way international phenomena are probed and analyzed that it might well require a multi-authored, multi-volume encyclopedia to document and fully evaluate the expansion of our field,"[111] while another leading theorist says that, "in honesty, one must question whether or not twentieth-century students of international relations

107. Lindblom and Cohen, *Usable Knowledge*, pp. 47–48.

108. Thomas S. Kuhn, *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1962); Karl K. Popper, *Conjectures and Refutations: The Growth of Scientific Knowledge* (New York: Harper & Row, 1963); and Michael Polanyi, *The Tacit Dimension* (New York: Anchor, 1967).

109. Haas, "Why Collaborate? Issue-Linkage and International Regimes," p. 370.

110. See Imre Lakatos and Alan Musgrave, eds., *Criticism and the Growth of Knowledge* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1970).

111. Rosenau, "A Pre-Theory Revisited: World Politics in an Era of Cascading Interdependence," p. 246.

know anything that Thucydides and his fifth-century compatriots did not know about the behavior of states"?[112]

Typifying the state of the field is the seemingly endless, tortuous debate over the relationship between the power distribution in the international system (among countries and alliances) and the incidence of international conflict and war, a debate that touches international organization concerns among others. There has been disagreement over even basic description of the international system. Whereas Waltz, Morton Kaplan, and most observers have viewed the configuration of global power in the immediate post–World War II era as "bipolar," Gilpin and others have retrospectively characterized the period as "Pax Americana." As for analysis of cause and effect, traditionally a *balance* of power was thought to be conducive to peace;[113] in fact, this was one of the first "truths" that the field had uncovered. A. F. K. Organski and others challenged and overturned this conventional wisdom on the basis of evidence suggesting that a *preponderance* of power rather than power parity reduced the likelihood of war.[114] More recently, the latter view has been questioned and the balance of power hypothesis has regained some support.[115] As often happens in the international relations field, one day's prevailing orthodoxy becomes the next day's revisionist scholarship; popular theses (once profound observations that have become mundane) are reexamined and refuted by one set of scholars only to be in turn reconfirmed by another. Although replication is supposed to allow us to move toward some degree of closure on theoretical questions—at least indicating where the dead ends in certain lines of inquiry are—this has not been the case in international relations.

The tendency toward excessive replication and rehashing of the work of fellow scholars is perhaps more pardonable than the tendency of scholars working in one area to be completely oblivious to the work of scholars in another area and to talk past each other, even though they are dealing in essentially the same phenomena and could possibly benefit from one another's insights. For example, how does the theory of hegemonic stability, as an explanation for regime maintenance and change, relate to earlier theoretical work by Organski on "power transitions" and by Kaplan and Nicholas Katzenbach on "the political foundations of international law"?[116]

112. Gilpin, *War and Change in World Politics*, p. 227.
113. Edward V. Gulick, *Europe's Classical Balance of Power* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1955).
114. This view is expressed in A. F. K. Organski and Jacek Kugler, *The War Ledger* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1980).
115. Randolph M. Siverson and Michael R. Tennefoss, "Power, Alliance, and the Escalation of International Conflict, 1815–1965," *American Political Science Review* 78 (December 1984), pp. 1057–69.
116. A. F. K. Organski, *World Politics*, 2d ed. (New York: Knopf, 1968); Morton A. Kaplan and Nicholas DeB. Katzenbach, *The Political Foundations of International Law* (New York: Wiley, 1961).

Few connections are made between these islands of theory, yet all contain somewhat similar or compatible ideas about the sources of world order. There is also the tendency to invent new jargon to describe phenomena that are already adequately represented by existing terminology. In recent years, for example, there has been a proliferation of concepts—complex interdependence, entropy, turbulence, fragmegration, cascading interdependence, and so on—that refer generally to the same condition, namely an international environment characterized by increased complexity. Although there are some nuances among these terms, they are still another manifestation of the problems in building cumulative knowledge about phenomena related to international organization.

Some might criticize me for harboring a misguided view of how much cumulative knowledge exists or can be expected to exist in a field such as international relations. It could be argued that the cumulation problem has been exaggerated and that what might seem to be a lack of cumulation is not only natural and understandable—given the great variety of epistemological approaches, perspectives, and purposes of inquiry which inform international relations scholarship—but also healthy insofar as, in Keohane's words, some "confusion and contradiction" are "costs worth bearing for the sake of intellectual innovation and policy insight." In other words, I could be accused of trying to fit knowledge in the international relations field into an excessively Procrustean bed of straw. However, I am calling for nothing more than better delivery of what is advertised by the numerous knowledge claims that can be found throughout the scholarly literature.

It has frequently been said that, even if the international relations field were more successful at developing cumulative knowledge, such expertise would remain unutilized by practitioners not only because it tends to be shrouded in esoteric jargon but also because it tends to be highly abstract. The scholar and practitioner supposedly live in two different cultures, one interested mostly in hypothetical relationships and general patterns at the system level and the other preoccupied with specific cases and immediate concerns. Although two different cultures do exist, both want to understand how the world works. The problem with much of the theoretical work in the international relations field, including international organization scholarship, is not that it is overly theoretical but that the theories do not have clear practical implications since they rarely contain variables that are readily manipulable. What advice, for example, does the theory of hegemonic stability offer policy makers concerned about the requirements of world order—allow a single state to become and remain a hegemon? What lessons can policy makers draw from regime analysis generally and apply in constructive ways?

The potential audience for scholarly research findings consists not only of policy makers in government but also elites—civic leaders and the "informed public"—outside government. Imagine for a moment, being asked

by a group of civic leaders at a local World Affairs Council or United Nations Association gathering to explain what the latest scholarly research has to tell them about improving international organizations. How could one meaningfully and intelligibly respond? It would be difficult to translate most current research on international organization into terms that the layperson can understand. It is difficult enough to communicate much of this research to the one captive audience we have, our students, who it is hoped will assume societal leadership positions in the future. Although international organization scholars have striven in the postwar period to take a more sober and realistic view of international institutions, the field is in danger of becoming aloof from the real world and taking on a reality of its own. (In a discussion of the international relations discipline as a whole, one writer goes so far as to speak of "hegemony and challenge in international theory"!)[117]

Having cited the many barriers that stand between scholars and practitioners, it must be acknowledged that even if the scholarly community could command confidence in a cumulative body of knowledge and speak in a unified, clear voice that succinctly spelled out the policy implications of their research, such advice might well still fall upon deaf ears. Clearly, there is an additional barrier at the policy maker's end—the tendency to "kill the messenger" rather than to learn and accept new knowledge that has implications contrary to one's values. Although it has been suggested that "white coats would help" to give social scientists the air of authoritativeness that physical scientists enjoy, this would not alleviate the "kill-the-messenger" syndrome that afflicts peace researchers more than, say, medical researchers. As Herbert Simon has noted, the expertise reflected in knowledge consensus may be less important to the expert's potential impact than the value consensus surrounding the knowledge: "The forest ranger's autonomy [influence on and freedom from governmental authorities] rests not [only on his specialized knowledge] . . . but on being a reliable instrument whose values are pretty well known and widely accepted."[118]

Few areas of inquiry are capable of engendering more controversial challenges to deeply embedded, widely held values than the international organization field, where such values as national sovereignty come under scrutiny. Haas has noted the problems of translating knowledge into action in various

117. K. J. Holsti, *The Dividing Discipline: Hegemony and Diversity in International Theory* (London: Allen & Unwin, 1985), chap. 1.

118. Herbert A. Simon, "The Changing Theory and Changing Practice of Public Administration," in Ithiel de Sola Pool, ed., *Contemporary Political Science: Toward Empirical Theory* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1967), p. 98. The reluctance of policy makers to accept new knowledge in the social sciences is discussed in Lindblom and Cohen, *Usable Knowledge;* and Robert F. Rich, "Uses of Social Science Information by Federal Bureaucrats: Knowledge for Action versus Knowledge for Understanding," in Weiss, *Using Social Research for Public Policy Making*, pp. 199–211.

areas of international collaboration. He has also suggested how such problems can possibly be overcome—through the proper learning and application of "consensual knowledge," defined as "the sum of technical information and of theories .about that information which commands sufficient consensus at a given time among interested actors to serve as a guide to public policy designed to achieve some social goal."[119] The expansion of knowledge in conjunction with adjustment in national goals (redefinition of national interests) is viewed as the key to increased international collaboration. How much of a role international organization scholars will play in this knowledge production and consumption process will depend on the ability of the scholarly community to improve upon its record of the last forty years.

The future of international organization as a field of study

Claude wrote several years ago:

> it is perhaps necessary to stress . . . the distinction between international *organizations* and international *organization*. Particular organizations may be nothing more than playthings of power politics and handmaidens of national ambitions. But international organization, considered as an historical process, represents a secular trend toward the systematic development of an enterprising quest for political means of making the world safe for human habitation.[120]

It is hard to envision a future for humanity without international organization. One can debate whether international organization is best conceived of as clusters of intergovernmental and transgovernmental networks, or regimes, or structural machinery. One can debate, also, whether the dominant trend in world order today is integration (evidenced by the continued proliferation of international organizations, treaties, and transactions) or disintegration (evidenced by the continued breakup of colonial empires, the increased number of "microstates," and the growth of separatist movements). However, such theoretical and empirical debates seem rather trivial in the face of the larger realities that confront us in the atomic age, which happened to be born one month after the UN was established. Such debates also skirt larger normative issues. Over the past forty years, international organization scholars have come to view international organization more as an abstract phenomenon to be studied and understood than as a goal to be

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119. Haas, "Why Collaborate? Issue-Linkage and International Regimes," pp. 367–68. See also Robert L. Rothstein, "Consensual Knowledge and International Collaboration: Some Lessons from the Commodity Negotiations," *International Organization* 38 (Autumn 1984), pp. 733–62.
    120. Claude, *Swords into Plowshares*, p. 405.

promoted. Rather than international organization standing today for global institution building in the historic sense that Claude implied, it represents little more than an exercise in multilateral bargaining, judging from the way it is commonly treated in the scholarly literature.

It is perhaps unfair to criticize postwar international organization scholars for being driven primarily by empirical rather than normative concerns. One can argue that it has been precisely their obsession with "relevance" that has led scholars increasingly to deal with the "real" world. One can also argue that the drift from UN-focused studies to regional integration to global interdependence has reflected a kind of wishful thinking, not unlike that in the interwar period, on the part of a scholarly community hoping to find from moment to moment some semblance of world order in an anarchy-prone system. However, if the purpose of international organization scholarship in the postwar era has been to enhance our knowledge of the realities surrounding international organization so that we might be in a wiser position to effect improvements in world order, judging from the state of our knowledge and the state of the world this effort has fallen short.

It is easier to diagnose the failure of the international organization field than to offer a prognosis for the future which suggests new directions the field ought to take. Retrospective examinations, such as the one undertaken here, are supposed to end dutifully with recommendations regarding potentially fruitful lines of research worthy of scholarly attention—more comparative studies, more case studies, and the like. I propose a modest first step, namely returning to a conception of international organization which distinguishes it clearly from other international relations phenomena. In the contemporary lexicon, international organization can be viewed as the set of instruments for making and implementing "transnational policy" or "international public policy" rather than merely as a patterned set of international interactions. Conceiving of international organization in this fashion does not seem to violate any scientific canons; it might even add conceptual clarity and facilitate expansion of knowledge about the dynamics of international institution building. It also might permit a more expansive vision of world order in the minds of not only scholars but also practitioners.

This proposal is not a plea for adopting a particular ideology or world view, not does it urge a more bullish view of international organizations; it asks only for a more focused examination of the structures and processes associated with these institutions—warts and all. Such examination may well reveal at least as many problems as possibilities. A commitment to the study of international organizations does not necessitate a Pollyannish disposition and a willingness to ignore the defects or invidious effects of some institutions. Such commitment can take the form of, for example, thoughtful criticism of certain voting procedures and other organizational arrangements based on systematic analysis and leading to creative prescriptive recommendations.

At least one prominent scholar has dared to suggest that there may now be an opportunity to merge scientific and consensual knowledge in a way that can provide a stronger basis for "idealism" than existed in an earlier era:

> First, there is a much broader consensus than there ever has been on the normative goals of international public policy and on the characteristics of a desirable world order. This consensus extends to goals with respect to the status of individuals and includes agreement on the essential elements of human dignity and justice. Second, because of the increasing availability and reliability of data concerning political, economic, and social phenomena, and because of our ability through the use of statistical techniques and computers to identify trends and assess the strength of associations, there are ample tools available to check any tendency that we might have to engage in wishful thinking.[121]

There is every reason to believe that eventually, at some point in the future, international organization as traditionally conceived will be among the dominant subjects of political inquiry on the planet. One can only hope that we make it through the interim.

121. Harold K. Jacobson, "The Global System and the Realization of Human Dignity and Justice," *International Studies Quarterly* 26 (September 1982), p. 320.