



The Road to Explainability is Paved with Bias: Measuring the Fairness of Explanations

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ABSTRACT

Machine learning models in safety-critical settings like healthcare are often “blackboxes”: they contain a large number of parameters which are not transparent to users. Post-hoc explainability methods where a simple, human-interpretable model imitates the behavior of these blackbox models are often proposed to help users trust model predictions. In this work, we audit the quality of such explanations for different protected subgroups using real data from four settings in finance, healthcare, college admissions, and the US justice system. Across two different blackbox model architectures and four popular explainability methods, we find that the approximation quality of explanation models, also known as the *fidelity*, differs significantly between subgroups. We also demonstrate that pairing explainability methods with recent advances in robust machine learning can improve explanation fairness in some settings. However, we highlight the importance of communicating details of non-zero fidelity gaps to users, since a single solution might not exist across all settings. Finally, we discuss the implications of unfair explanation models as a challenging and understudied problem facing the machine learning community.

CCS CONCEPTS

• **Computing methodologies** → **Machine learning**; • **Human-centred computing** → **explanations**; **fairness**.

KEYWORDS

explainability, machine learning, fairness

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1 INTRODUCTION

Machine learning (ML) models are increasingly used in safety-critical settings like healthcare [23, 104, 107], college admissions [55], and law [6]. Several studies have shown that human decisions can become more accurate when assisted by such ML models [16, 106, 111]. However, many ML models are “blackboxes”—they might have too many parameters or be proprietary—and cannot explain their predictions in ways humans understand [99]. In such scenarios, users may struggle to understand a model’s outputs enough to trust and use its predictions [34, 36, 65].

Post-hoc explainability methods have recently begun helping users better understand why blackbox models make certain predictions [62, 93, 94]. A popular post-hoc approach is to train simple, human-interpretable models to *imitate* a blackbox model’s behaviour [92] by maximizing the congruity between simple approximations and blackbox model predictions. Such approximation quality is known as *fidelity* [30]. Then, the simpler model can be used either as a new stand-alone model or to explain one prediction at a time [92, 105]. By highlighting important inputs, these explainability methods provide a path towards helping users trust machine learning models in high-impact settings [93].

However, it remains unknown when and if these models approximate behavior *fairly*. If fidelity differs between different pre-defined groups (e.g., demographics) in a dataset, explainability methods may perpetuate machine bias by encouraging users to trust model predictions for some people but not others. In this work, we study *to what degree do gaps in fidelity exist between subgroups?*

To answer this question, we measure group-wise fidelity for different post-hoc explanation methods on real tabular datasets that include group membership. Intuitively, an explanation model is *fair* if it has equally high fidelity for all protected groups. This definition is similar to common group fairness definitions which seek to eliminate gaps in predictive performance across groups [48, 83, 119]. We introduce two definitions of *fidelity gaps*, or disparities in fidelity across different subgroups. Using these measures, we




Figure 1: An example of an unfair global explanation model. Orange and Blue circles indicate predicted classes, *healthy* or *unhealthy*, respectively. \square and \triangle denote group membership. The red dashed line is a linear explainability model fit to approximate the black blackbox decision boundary. The two figures on the right show that the linear approximate is worse for the \square group.

benchmark two popular families of post-hoc explanation models: local methods, which imitate the boundary of a blackbox around one instance [71, 92, 94], and global methods, which imitate the blackbox across all instances [62, 98]. We also motivate fidelity gap measurements by showing mathematically that measuring fidelity gaps across subgroups directly connects with prior work on fairness preservation for explainability [32]. With a comprehensive audit of explanation fairness, we find that significant fidelity gaps exist between subgroups.

A popular way to train fairer models is through robust optimization [66, 89, 100]. To see how robust training impacts large fidelity gaps, we also study a simple technique for retraining explainability methods to improve their fairness. We also study potential causes for these fidelity gaps, and highlight mechanisms by which group information can indirectly be used in post-hoc explanations as an important contributing factor. Lastly, we assess the impact of the observed fidelity gaps on real-world decision-making accuracy with a carefully designed simulation study. The major findings of our evaluation are as follows:

Explanation fidelity varies significantly between subgroups: We find that fidelity gaps grow up to 7% between subgroups in our experiments using four popular datasets. In comparison to average fidelity across all data points, the fidelity of explanations for disadvantaged groups is often significantly lower (up to 21%). These findings indicate that judging the quality of explanations by their *average* fidelity alone—a common approach—overestimates explanation quality for some subgroups, potentially leading to worse downstream decision making. This effect is illustrated in Fig. 1.

Balanced and robust training can reduce but not eliminate fidelity gaps: We use robust training by adaptively reweighting or balancing groups in training data while training explanation models. This turns out to be a promising direction: fidelity gaps improve across subgroups, though this depends on both the dataset and exact method utilized.

Fidelity gaps have an impact on decision-making in the real-world: Using a simulation study, we observe that larger fidelity gaps may lead to disparities in decision making accuracy for different subgroups. This implies that ignoring fidelity gaps between subgroups can have detrimental effects to decisions made for members of protected groups.

Finally, we categorize and discuss promising directions for evaluating and improving post-hoc explainability methods. In summary, our work is a step towards training fair and reliable explanations.

2 RELATED WORK

2.1 Explainable Machine Learning

While ML models achieve outstanding performance, users often find them too complex to trust in practice [34]. To make such *blackbox* models more useful, users require that they be understandable, often due to laws [13] or preference [12, 51, 95]. To fill this gap, recent approaches “explain” a blackbox model’s behavior after it is trained [18, 37]. These *post-hoc* explainability methods are now used in safety-critical settings like healthcare [3] and finance [19].

Several explainability methods are increasingly-popular because they make no assumptions about a blackbox model’s architecture [93], also known as model-agnostic. In contrast, some methods are designed exclusively for deep learning, requiring their internal structure and gradients [8, 57, 63, 103, 103]. We consider model-agnostic methods, which can be used for a wider family of blackbox models, including deep learning.

Model-agnostic explainability methods are primarily either *local* or *global* [39]. *Local* methods justify one model prediction at a time, typically by approximating the decision boundary around one data point [14, 71, 84, 91, 92, 94]. Then, the weights learned by the local models are used to rationalize the blackbox model’s prediction. Some of the best-known local methods are LIME [92], which learns a sparse linear classifier on a dataset of perturbed samples, and SHAP [71], which uses feature-wise Shapley values [97]. *Global* methods, on the other hand, train interpretable surrogate models

of the blackbox model’s behavior on an entire dataset, which is then used in lieu of the blackbox. These methods primarily use tree-based models [70], rule lists [62, 88], sparse linear models [108, 120], and generalized additive models [69] as surrogates.

2.1.1 Explainable ML in Safety-critical Settings. The need for explainability in safety-critical applications is a nebulous and contested topic for several reasons:

Interpretability vs Explainability. Some prior works advocate for interpretability over explainability [43, 77, 99]. An explanation model without perfect fidelity is by definition incorrect for some data points [99]. Our work extends this point; these errors can occur for some groups more than others. Since explanations influence trust [16], it is important to conduct user studies on the impacts of explanations on algorithmic aversion [68] and over-reliance on algorithmic advice [35].

Anchoring Effects. Explanations can fool people into trusting incorrect models [9, 85]. For example, Poursabzi-Sangdeh et al. [85] find that when people are shown explanations from a bad model, they become more likely to trust the model, even when it is clearly wrong. In cases like this, people use the explanations while judging the quality of the blackbox models, even though the explanations themselves can be misleading [10].

Mismatched end-user and model-designer goals. Many explainability methods aim to assist model debugging, while non-engineer users only choose when to accept a blackbox’s decisions [59, 86, 93]. This mismatch can have downfalls. For instance, Bućinca et al. [17] find that the explanations people find most useful are also the ones they trust *incorrectly*. Resolving this mismatch requires goal-aware explainability methods along with education to ensure end-users are properly trained in using these methods.

2.1.2 Desiderata for Post-hoc Explanations. Most post-hoc explainability methods have three goals:

Reliability. Explanations must be accurate for the right reasons. People often trust explained models [85, 96], so ensuring that explanations are faithful to the original model and not simply easy-to-rationalize is essential [43].

Robustness. Explanation models should not overfit to spurious patterns in the data [44, 60] and must be robust in the presence of small distribution shifts at test time [60].

Simplicity. Models should be sparse, and leave little room for effects for human cognitive biases such as the anchoring effect [85]. Ideal explanations will highlight only the key information needed to understand a model’s behavior, encouraging users to engage with explanations in predictable ways [17]. However, there is often a trade-off between an explanation’s faithfulness and its simplicity [61]. Recent work on cognitive forcing—where users explicitly interact and understand explanations—appears to be a promising direction to address this trade-off [17].

Along with other recent efforts [10, 44, 60, 85], we promote a fourth goal: **Fairness**. Explanation quality should not depend on group membership. We find that this requirement is not yet satisfied by popular explainability methods.

2.2 Algorithmic Fairness

Formalizing fairness is a flourishing research area [11, 22, 26, 27, 41, 48, 67, 75, 116, 117]. Recent works define fairness at either the *individual*- or *group*-level. Individual fairness [41] requires similar predictions for similar individuals; group fairness requires similar predictions for different groups (sex or race, for example). We consider group-level fairness for binary classification, which we quantify using demographic parity (DP) gap [48, 83], a standard group-fairness metric. We describe this metric probabilistically, allowing calculation of gaps across groups: $DP = E[\hat{Y}|A = a] - E[\hat{Y}|A = b] \quad \forall a, b \in A$, where \hat{Y} is a predictor and its DP gap is measured with respect to attribute A .

There are three main strategies for encouraging group fairness [20]: pre-processing data to find less-biased representations [81]; enforcing fairness while training a model, typically through regularization [72, 118]; and altering a model’s predictions to satisfy fairness constraints after it is trained [2, 24, 48, 83]. In this paper, we utilize the inprocessing method proposed by Zhang et al. [118] for training fair blackbox models. Further, recent work has demonstrated that group-robust training can increase fairness by improving the worst-group accuracy [101].

2.3 Bias in Model Compression and Risks of Fairwashing

Several recent works study the effects of model and data compression on fairness [52, 102]. For example, Samadi et al. [102] observe that reconstruction error associated with data dimensionality reduction via principal component analysis is higher for some populations. Hooker et al. [52] show that average accuracy after ML model compression hides disproportionately high errors on a small subset of examples. In a similar vein, we study post-hoc explanation models, which are often compressed blackbox models, and assess how they transmit bias. Another related topic is “fairwashing”: the act of overlooking a model’s unfair behavior by rationalizing its predictions via explanations [4]. Our paper instead considers fairness in how well explanation models imitate blackbox models (rather than the ground-truth), regardless of blackbox model fairness. In concurrent work, Dai et al. [31] showed that explanation quality may differ between subgroups, further validating our findings. However, the metrics and methodological focus in their work is on feature-based variations to fidelity. We encourage readers to review their work for an alternate approach to measuring the fairness of explanations.

3 MEASURING THE FAIRNESS OF EXPLANATIONS

Here, we introduce metrics for measuring *fairness of explanation models* or fidelity gaps across subgroups.

3.1 Notation

Consider a dataset $\mathcal{D} = \{(\mathbf{x}_i, y_i)\}_{i=1}^n$ that contains n training data points. $\mathbf{x}_i \in \mathbb{R}^d$ is the d -dimensional feature vector of the i -th data point in \mathcal{D} and $y_i \in \{0, 1\}$ is its associated binary label. We assume binary classification for simplicity. Let $g_i \in \{1, \dots, G\}$ be a variable defining group membership with respect to the protected attribute

for every data point for a total of G subgroups. In all cases, g_i serves as auxiliary information and is not used during any model training, unless specified otherwise. A blackbox classifier $B : \mathbb{R}^d \rightarrow \{0, 1\}$ predicts one binary label per input x . Given classifier B , we wish to explain its prediction given some query point \mathbf{x}^* . To achieve this, an explanation model E is chosen from a set of interpretable models (e.g., linear models or decision trees). Then, E is trained to *imitate* B either locally (for the feature space near \mathbf{x}^*) or globally (for all data points in \mathcal{D}).

3.2 Fidelity of Explanations

Given a blackbox B and explainability model E , we seek to describe how well E approximates B 's behavior. Fidelity, as detailed in Definition 3.1 below, is a powerful measure for this approximation error [5, 61, 62], though it disregards group information.

Definition 3.1 (Explanation Fidelity [30]). Given blackbox model B and explanation model E , the *explanation fidelity* on data points $(x_i, y_i)_{i=1}^N$ is $\frac{1}{N} \sum_{i=1}^N L(B(x_i), E(x_i))$, where L is a performance metric.

For L , we use accuracy, AUROC¹, and mean error, denoted as $Fidelity^{Acc}$, $Fidelity^{AUROC}$, $Fidelity^{Err}$, respectively.

In the following sections, we build up to a definition of explanation fidelity that considers group information. First, we motivate the need for a metric that measures fidelity across groups (Section 3.3), then define two new notions for measuring the fairness of explanations (Section 3.4).

3.3 Fidelity Gaps are Critical to Fairness Preservation

Dai et al. [32] recently introduced *fairness preservation* in surrogate explanation models. Fairness is *preserved* when the fairness properties of the blackbox model and explanation model are identical. For example, consider Figure 1. A linear explanation E is a high-fidelity approximation of the blackbox B 's decisions for one group (Δ), but not the other (\square). Here, B seems unfair in predicting the “unhealthy” class for the two groups. Meanwhile, E appears fairer. In this example, B 's degree of (un)fairness—the demographic parity gap—is not *preserved* by the explanation model. For demographic parity, fairness preservation in explanations implies that B and E should have similar DP Gaps (Section 2.2).

To reliably judge a blackbox's fairness using only its post-hoc explanations, preserving fairness is essential. If fairness is preserved, then when an explanation seems unfair, we can be confident that the blackbox model is likely similarly unfair as well. Next, we prove that fairness preservation is directly linked to fidelity gaps across subgroups. While Dai et al. [32] briefly intuit that fairness preservation impacts explanation fidelity via an illustrative example, only a group-conditional blackbox model's decision boundary under imbalanced group sizes is considered. In contrast, we do not make any assumptions about the relative sizes of groups or group-dependence of blackbox model and instead show that fairness preservation is related to fidelity gaps (more so than overall explanation fidelity).

¹AUROC cannot be written directly as a sum but we slightly abuse notation for readability.

3.3.1 Fidelity Gaps are related to Fairness Preservation.

THEOREM 3.2. *Let E be a post-hoc explanation model trained to imitate predictions of blackbox model B , and mean residual error for a set of N data points in dataset \mathcal{D} is $\frac{1}{N} \sum_{x \in \mathcal{D}} (E(x) - B(x))$. Then, the difference between the Demographic Parity Gaps of E and B , both with respect to binary valued-protected attribute g , is equal to the difference in mean residual error of data points with $g = 1$ and $g = 0$.*

The full proof of this theorem is in Appendix A.1; the key idea is to expand $E(x_i) = B(x_i) + \epsilon_i$ where ϵ_i is a residual for each point x_i . This is valid when E is trained to imitate B with high fidelity (e.g., minimizing mean squared error or cross-entropy loss). We also empirically validate this theorem on explanation models in Appendix A.2.

From Theorem 3.2, a *sufficient* condition for DP gap preservation, as computed over instances x_i and their local linear classifiers $E_i(x_i)$ or a global model E (where $E_i = EV_i$) is ensuring that the mean residual errors for each group is comparable. This is the same as low fidelity gaps across subgroups where L is the mean error. Note that this does not correspond to mean absolute difference between predictions of E and B , but instead their mean difference. Theorems of similar form could be derived for other group fairness definitions, but the ϵ values and data points considered would depend on the ground truth as well (e.g., for equal-opportunity, the ϵ difference would only contain terms for data points with positive-class ground truth). With this motivation in mind, we next introduce two new metrics that measure fidelity gaps across subgroups.

3.4 Measuring the Fairness of Explainability Methods

Building on the definition of average fidelity across groups (Defn. 3.1), we introduce two new measurements for the fairness of explanation models by evaluating their fidelity gaps between subgroups. The first metric (Definition 3.3) addresses the question: by what degree would relying on the average fidelity alone be detrimental to subgroups of data? The second metric estimates the mean difference in fidelity of explanations between subgroups of data (Definition 3.4).

Inspired by past work [30, 66], the *maximum fidelity gap from average* (Definition 3.3) computes the difference between the overall, average fidelity and the worst-case subgroup fidelity. This way, we quantify the maximum degree to which an explanation model's fidelity is lower for disadvantaged groups compared to the average across all subgroups.

Definition 3.3 (Maximum Fidelity Gap from Average: Δ_L). Let the maximum fidelity gap from average be

$$\Delta_L = \max_j \left[\frac{1}{N} \sum_{i=1}^N L(B(x_i), E(x_i)) - \frac{1}{N_j} \sum_{i: g_i^j=1} L(B(x_i), E(x_i)) \right],$$

where $g_i^j = 1$ denotes that point x_i belongs to the j th subgroup defined by a specific protected attribute g (e.g., data points from females), and N_j is the number of data points with $g^j = 1$.

Next, the mean fidelity gap amongst subgroups (Definition 3.4) computes how much an explanation model's fidelity differs over

subgroups. Here, we only consider groups defined by the same sensitive attribute (e.g., g^k is male, g^j is female).

Definition 3.4 (Mean Fidelity Gap Amongst Subgroups: Δ_L^{group}). Let the mean fidelity gap amongst subgroups be

$$\Delta_L^{group} = \frac{2}{G(G-1)} \sum_{k=1}^G \sum_{j=k+1}^G |L_k - L_j|,$$

where

$$L_k = \frac{1}{N_k} \sum_{i:g_i^k=1} L(B(x_i), E(x_i))$$

where g^j denotes the j^{th} subgroup defined by a specific sensitive attribute (e.g., datapoints from females), and N_j is the number of datapoints in g^j .

Similar to average fidelity, we choose L to be Accuracy, AUROC, and Mean Error for both fidelity gap measurements (e.g., Δ_{AUROC} and Δ_{AUROC}^{group}). In all cases, we do not consider intersectional groups due to sample size concerns.

3.5 Experiments Overview

Since fidelity gaps across subgroups are closely linked to fairness preservation and risks of fairwashing, we design experiments to audit this quantity. We conduct the following experiments in the sections below²:

Measuring Fidelity Gaps Between Subgroups: We measure fidelity gaps using metrics defined in 3.3 and 3.4 for four different post-hoc explanation models, and two different blackbox model classes. The aim of this experiment is to study the presence and degree of fidelity gaps in standard explainability methods (Section 4).

Assessing the Impact of Robust Training: We use robust training strategies to train explanation models, and repeat the fidelity gap audits to study if robust training can provide reduced fidelity gaps (Section 5).

Studying Possible Causes for Fidelity Gaps: We analyze the impact of blackbox fairness and presence of protected attribute information in feature representations on the fidelity gap (Section 6).

Simulation Showing Impact of Fidelity Gaps: We conduct a simulation and study the quality of decisions made for groups to examine the impacts of unfair explanation models on real-world decision making (Section 7).

4 EXPLANATION FIDELITY VARIES SIGNIFICANTLY BETWEEN SUBGROUPS

Experimentally, we find that fidelity gaps indeed vary by group in many settings. To show this, we train four post-hoc explainability methods (two local, two global) to explain two different blackbox models trained on the four standard fairness benchmark tabular datasets described in Table 1. Following Aivodji et al. [5], we randomly split each dataset into four subsets: a training set for blackbox models (50%), a training set for explanation models (30%), a validation set for explanation models (10%), and a held-out test set for evaluating both blackbox and explanation models (10%). For each dataset, we train both a Neural Network (NN) and a Logistic

Regression (LR) model to serve as blackboxes. See Section B.3 in the Appendix for details on the training regimes, hyperparameter settings, and evaluation metrics for each. In the following sections, we describe the explainability models and fidelity gaps observed.

4.1 Local Explanation Models

Local explanation models explain individual predictions from classifiers by learning an interpretable model locally around each prediction. In our experiments, we consider LIME [92, 93] and SHAP [71], which are popular methods that use linear models to elicit each feature’s contribution to the blackbox model’s prediction. More details are in Appendix B.1.

Experiment Setup. We measure fidelity gaps between subgroups using the two key metrics introduced in Section 3.4 (see Definitions 3.3 and 3.4). For each, we select three performance measures: Accuracy (Δ_{Acc}^{group}) following prior work [4], mean residual error (Δ_{Err}^{group}), and also include AUROC (Δ_{AUROC}^{group}) as a threshold-independent metric. A full table with all metrics can also be found in the Appendix. For accuracy, we use a threshold of 0.5. Since the four datasets are imbalanced, we use AUROC for model selection while tuning all hyperparameters. Non-zero fidelity gaps indicate disparities across groups in the explanation models.

Results. First, we find that LIME disproportionately favors different groups, as shown in Table 2, where the maximum accuracy gap ranges from 0.1-21.4%. This confirms that explanation quality can dramatically differ by subgroup, even without access to group-membership data. Furthermore, the AUROC/Accuracy between protected groups also ranges significantly (0-6.6%/0.3-20.6%), indicating that some members of protected groups are disadvantaged in terms of explanations. Hence, when explanations are judged to be “high quality” based on average fidelity, it might be misleading and lead to errors in decision-making. Bolded non-zero fidelity gaps are also significantly greater than 0 with a one-sided Wilcoxon signed-rank test at $p < 0.05$.

Second, as expected, SHAP’s gaps are consistently zero. This is because the blackbox and explanation models are trained using identical features, in which case consistency is guaranteed [71]. However, using a subset of features to train the explanation model often leads to more useful explanations [115]. This increases the gaps significantly, as shown in Figure 2, indicating that SHAP may also suffer from significant gaps in fidelity when used in practice. Since LIME considers sparsity as well, we also run this same experiment for LIME and find that fewer features are indeed associated with larger fidelity gaps (Fig.2). Increasing sparsity is a common approach in training explanation models and these experiments indicate that this technique alone may contribute to substantially worse fidelity gaps.

Third, we observe that the fidelity gaps in AUROC tend to be lower for the logistic regression blackbox, possibly because the linearity of the local surrogate models matches logistic regression better than the neural network. Note that the overall fidelity of all models are greater than 84% (see Table 6 in the Appendix).

4.2 Global Explanation Models

Global explanation methods train one new surrogate model that approximates the behavior of a blackbox model. This surrogate model

²Code: <https://github.com/MLforHealth/ExplanationsSubpopulations>

Dataset	Outcome Variable	n	d	d'	Protected Attribute (g)
adult [40]	Income > 50K	48,842	9	33	Sex (2 groups)
lsac [114]	Student passes the bar	20,427	8	14	Race (5 groups)
mimic [49]	Patient dies in ICU	21,139	49	49	Sex (2 groups)
recidivism [87]	Defendant re-offends	6,150	6	7	Race (2 groups)

Table 1: Binary classification datasets used in our experiments. n is the number of samples, d is the number of variables in the original dataset, and d' is the number of features after one-hot encoding categorical variables.

Dataset	Blackbox Classifier	$\Delta_{Acc.}$	Δ_{AUROC}^{group}	$\Delta_{Acc.}^{group}$	$\Delta_{Err.}^{group}$
adult	Logistic Regression	0.8% \pm 0.0%	0.1% \pm 0.0%	2.4% \pm 0.1%	1.9% \pm 0.0%
	Neural Network	6.9% \pm 0.7%	3.0% \pm 1.2%	20.6% \pm 2.0%	0.8% \pm 0.5%
lsac	Logistic Regression	2.0% \pm 1.0%	0.0% \pm 0.0%	1.5% \pm 0.5%	1.5% \pm 0.1%
	Neural Network	21.4% \pm 4.4%	6.6% \pm 1.2%	12.2% \pm 2.2%	3.8% \pm 1.2%
mimic	Logistic Regression	0.4% \pm 0.6%	3.0% \pm 1.8%	1.1% \pm 0.3%	2.0% \pm 0.1%
	Neural Network	0.8% \pm 0.4%	1.7% \pm 1.5%	1.4% \pm 0.7%	1.7% \pm 0.5%
recidivism	Logistic Regression	0.1% \pm 0.1%	0.0% \pm 0.0%	0.3% \pm 0.2%	0.3% \pm 0.0%
	Neural Network	0.9% \pm 0.3%	0.7% \pm 0.3%	2.4% \pm 0.7%	1.1% \pm 0.1%

Table 2: Performance fidelity gaps across subgroups for LIME local explanations using all available features. \pm denotes standard deviation computed over 5 replications. Fidelity gaps are significant (one-sided Wilcoxon signed-rank tests at $p < 0.05$; marked in bold) between all five groups in the lsac dataset, and between two sensitive groups in other three datasets. $\Delta_{Acc.}$ denotes the maximum fidelity gap of subgroups from average (in terms of accuracy at 0.5 threshold), and Δ_m^{group} is the mean fidelity gap between subgroups using metric m .

should itself be easily understood, and can then be used instead of the blackbox at test time (more background in Appendix B.1).

Experiment Setup. In this experiment, we generate global explanations using two popular choices of interpretable surrogate models: Generalized Additive Model (GAM) [50] and a sparse decision tree (Tree) [82]. GAM combines linear models of different variables during explanation [105], while Tree uses a low-depth, sparse, decision tree. We evaluate the fidelity of each global method with the original blackbox and compare across subgroups. As with the local methods, we use both Accuracy and AUROC to evaluate fidelity gaps.

Results. First, we find that the fidelity gap between subgroups differs substantially from the average for the global explanation models, as shown in Table 3 where the accuracy gap ranges from 0-13.5%. We again observe that AUROC and accuracy vary substantially between protected subgroups (0-8.1% and 0.1-7.4% for protected groups such as sex and race groups in each dataset). This is especially true for more imbalanced subgroup proportions: having more subgroup categories leads to more disadvantage in protected groups, particularly when the classes are imbalanced themselves (e.g., lsac).

Second, we find that using fewer features (e.g., 15 in Fig. 2) may lead to larger gaps in performance between subgroups in sparse decision trees (Trees), bolstering prior findings on training trustworthy models [21]. Hence, the gaps shown in Tables 2 and 3 are likely underestimates when using fewer dimensions in explanation models, which is common. Interestingly, the subgroup with the

lowest-quality explanations is not always the minority subgroup—which may be the most disadvantaged—in the datasets for fair ML. We expand this finding in Table 12 in the Appendix. Additionally, we see that subgroup gaps occur even after training blackbox models with a balanced number of data points from each subgroup for both global and local explanation models (see Table 10).

5 BALANCED AND ROBUST TRAINING REDUCES FIDELITY GAPS

Balanced and robust training methods could provide a path towards improving fidelity gaps, thereby learning fairer explanations [1, 47]. We showcase two such robust training methods, one for local methods and one for global methods. For both cases, we choose hyperparameters that maximize the worst-case fidelity across all groups.³ Ultimately, our experiments indicate that while robust training improves fidelity gaps sometimes, they remain pervasive.

5.1 Robust Local Explanation Models

Experiment Setup. We train a more-robust version of LIME, using Just Train Twice (JTT) [66], a two-stage training paradigm for training robust ML Models. First, we train an identification model via empirical risk minimization. Then, we extract its set of misclassified training examples. A final model is then trained by upsampling these misclassified examples, scaled by a hyperparameter λ . This reweighted loss is designed to make the second model more robust.

³The overall fidelity is not significantly affected by either training approach.

Dataset	Blackbox Classifier	Expl. Model	$\Delta_{Acc.}$	Δ_{AUC}^{group}	$\Delta_{Acc.}^{group}$	$\Delta_{Err.}^{group}$
adult	Logistic Regression	GAM	0.1% \pm 0.0%	0.0% \pm 0.0%	0.3% \pm 0.0%	0.1% \pm 0.0%
	Logistic Regression	Tree	1.5% \pm 0.1%	2.9% \pm 0.4%	4.5% \pm 0.2%	1.1% \pm 0.1%
	Neural Network	GAM	0.8% \pm 0.2%	0.5% \pm 0.3%	2.4% \pm 0.5%	0.3% \pm 0.2%
	Neural Network	Tree	1.1% \pm 0.1%	0.6% \pm 0.4%	3.4% \pm 0.2%	0.5% \pm 0.4%
lsac	Logistic Regression	GAM	0.9% \pm 0.9%	0.0% \pm 0.0%	0.6% \pm 0.4%	0.7% \pm 0.3%
	Logistic Regression	Tree	3.7% \pm 3.1%	1.1% \pm 0.4%	2.8% \pm 0.7%	1.8% \pm 0.5%
	Neural Network	GAM	13.5% \pm 0.9%	5.2% \pm 1.2%	7.3% \pm 1.0%	3.9% \pm 2.6%
	Neural Network	Tree	11.5% \pm 2.7%	5.8% \pm 2.1%	7.4% \pm 1.2%	4.9% \pm 2.0%
mimic	Logistic Regression	GAM	0.5% \pm 0.1%	0.4% \pm 0.1%	0.9% \pm 0.1%	0.4% \pm 0.2%
	Logistic Regression	Tree	0.6% \pm 0.0%	8.1% \pm 0.8%	1.2% \pm 0.1%	1.9% \pm 0.0%
	Neural Network	GAM	1.2% \pm 0.3%	1.8% \pm 1.2%	2.2% \pm 0.6%	0.9% \pm 0.3%
	Neural Network	Tree	1.1% \pm 0.5%	3.0% \pm 1.5%	2.0% \pm 0.9%	1.9% \pm 0.9%
recidivism	Logistic Regression	GAM	0.1% \pm 0.0%	0.1% \pm 0.0%	0.3% \pm 0.0%	0.5% \pm 0.0%
	Logistic Regression	Tree	0.0% \pm 0.0%	0.4% \pm 0.0%	0.1% \pm 0.0%	1.2% \pm 0.0%
	Neural Network	GAM	0.2% \pm 0.2%	0.4% \pm 0.2%	0.6% \pm 0.6%	1.1% \pm 0.4%
	Neural Network	Tree	0.9% \pm 0.3%	1.0% \pm 0.9%	2.3% \pm 0.7%	1.4% \pm 0.3%

Table 3: Fidelity gaps across subgroups for *global* explanation models GAM and Tree. \pm denotes standard deviation computed over 5 replications. Fidelity gaps are significant (one-sided Wilcoxon signed-rank tests at $p < 0.05$; marked in bold) for all five groups in the lsac dataset, and between two sensitive groups in the other three datasets with both global explanation models. $\Delta_{Acc.}$ denotes the maximum fidelity gap of subgroups from average (in terms of accuracy at 0.5 threshold), and Δ_m^{group} is the mean fidelity gap between subgroups using metric m .

We use JTT to train LIME’s local linear approximations, using linear models for both the identification and final models.

Results. JTT successfully reduces gaps on three datasets with a NN blackbox model, as shown in Figure 3. Interestingly, this is not the case for the *recidivism* dataset, where JTT does not reduce the gap and performs the same as standard training. With LR blackboxes (Figure 10 in Appendix), the fidelity gaps are already small, so JTT is less impactful. However, non-zero gaps between 1-2% still persist (e.g., NN blackbox on the *adult* dataset), indicating that the error-prone regions did not generalize to the test setting. Measuring fidelity gaps is therefore still critical, even if an explanation model is trained to be robust.

5.2 Robust Global Explanation Models

Experiment Setup. We next study balanced training for the global explanation method Tree. We rebalance the explainability training sets for each dataset by randomly oversampling minority groups, a common approach for improving test error on minority subpopulations [47, 112]. This way, the training set in each case consists of an equal number of examples from each protected group. Then, we train a Tree model to explain each blackbox model using these balanced datasets.

Results. As shown in Figure 3, we find that this common rebalancing approach to does not reduce gaps significantly across the board. Still, some cases look more promising than others. For example, *mimic* with NN which indicates this may be a fruitful direction for learning fairer explanations. This is especially true for cases like *mimic* with LR, where rebalancing the training set increases the fidelity gap substantially (see Figure 10 in Appendix).

6 ON POSSIBLE CAUSES FOR FIDELITY GAPS

In our fidelity gap audits in prior sections, we noticed that the fidelity gaps are largest for the least-fair blackboxes (*adult* and *lsac* datasets; Tables 3 and 2). This indicates a potential relationship between the fairness of the blackbox and explainability models. To explore this further, we study the associations between blackbox fairness and fidelity gaps across subgroups in this section. First, we train fair models, and observe that significant non-zero fidelity gaps still persist. Second, we study if protected group information – e.g., if a data point belongs to a Male or Female individual – can be predicted from the *feature representations* alone, following prior work in fair representation learning [72, 118]. We find that mechanisms by which protected group information can be indirectly predicted could be contributing factors to the fidelity gaps observed.

6.1 Training Fair Blackbox Models

Our experiments in previous sections (see Tables 2 and 3) indicate that fidelity gaps across subgroups occur regardless of the blackbox model’s fairness with respect to groundtruth label predictions. For example, a logistic regression model trained on the *mimic* dataset is fair with respect to the sex (Table 4 in Appendix; DP gap of 1%). However, fidelity gaps are non-zero across sex subgroups with a sparse decision tree global explanation (8.1%). Strikingly, the gaps in fidelity AUROC often exceed the gaps in AUROC of the blackbox models themselves (e.g., *mimic* dataset with the Tree model, the difference in classification performance of the blackbox between Male and Female individuals is 3.6%, while the fidelity gap between subgroups is 8.1%). However, we do observe larger fidelity gaps




Figure 2: The effect of varying the number of features on fidelity gaps using the mimic dataset with a neural network blackbox model. For (a) local explanation models, using fewer features leads to worse fidelity gaps. We observe larger fidelity gaps across subgroups with sparser models, i.e., fewer features in (a) local explanation models. For (b) global explanation models, the gap varies with number of features. We also observe similar trends on other datasets (Appendix F).

in datasets where blackbox models are more accurate but less fair (e.g., `adul t` with an absolute DP gap of 16-17%).

Experiment Setup. To investigate this further, we train debiased neural network blackbox models for `lsac` and `mimic`: both highly-imbalanced by class label, and characterized by the largest and smallest gaps in blackbox model AUROC respectively. Adversarial debiasing following methodology proposed by Zhang et al. [118]⁴ is utilized, wherein an adversary tries to predict the protected group information from classification predictions and labels, while the main classification model (our blackbox model) jointly predicts the primary classification outcome. We use demographic parity as the desired fairness definition. Our results are shown in

⁴With open-sourced implementation: <https://github.com/Trusted-AI/AIF360>

Table 13, which reports the performance of the fair(er) blackbox classifiers.

Results. We debias neural network blackbox models to be fairer, where a model is deemed to be fair if it has an absolute DP gap close to 1% (9% and 0.6% after debiasing for `lsac` and `mimic` respectively; improved from 14% and 2%). We find that despite fair training, fidelity gaps remain (Table 4, though they are significantly reduced in most cases: the fidelity gap in accuracy decreases from 2% to 1% for `mimic` and 7.4% to 0.8% for `lsac` (Tree)). Note that these results are dependent on our choice of fairness criterion: particularly, for the `lsac` dataset we find that overall performance is reduced to achieve parity (Table 13 in Appendix; for absolute DP gap close to 1%, over 99% of the blackbox predictions are that the student passes the bar). This indicates that while fair blackboxes could potentially reduce fidelity gaps across subgroups, there might be trade-offs and more potential causes for such gaps. We explore this in Section 6.2.

6.2 Performance of Predicting Protected Attributes from Feature Representations Alone

Experiment Setup. One way to achieve group fairness is by removing group information from or debiasing the representations (e.g., with the use of an adversary [72, 109]). Here, we quantify the amount of group information that is present in the data. This is relevant as the absence of group information is a sufficient condition to achieving fairness parity according to standard metrics in fair machine learning. For example, consider equality of opportunity for the positive class, which can be written as $\hat{Y} \perp G | Y = 1$, where G denotes the protected group and Y is the binary groundtruth label. If we have $X \perp G | Y = 1$, then equality of opportunity is achieved for any form of the classifier $\hat{Y} = f(X)$, including E the explanation model and B the blackbox model. Therefore, if no protected group information is present in the positive examples, then the explanation fidelity would not differ between protected groups for positive examples [72]. In this experiment, we first compute the accuracy of detecting the protected group information from all datasets (with a cross-validated model). Then, we select features that have zero mutual information with respect to the protected attribute, and only use these in training the blackbox and explanation model. We expect that the performance of predicting group information from these features will be low. Then, we compute the fidelity gaps – this allows us to answer the question: do fidelity gaps exist when there is low group information in the data?

Results: First, we observe that in all cases the prediction AUROC is significantly greater than 0.5 (see Table 4) in identifying the minority group. This indicates that the protected group information – e.g., if the datapoint belongs to a Male/Female individual – can be predicted with good performance from the feature representations alone⁵. Since past work has shown that group information might be indirectly constructed and used by explanations [60], this is important to consider. Second, we only use features that have zero mutual information with respect to protected group labels in the `lsac` dataset for training blackbox and explanation models. We see that all models output a single-class prediction which limits our ability to make meaningful conclusions about the impact of group

⁵This was also observed when conditioned on only positive or negative label classes




Figure 3: AUROC Fidelity gaps across subgroups with and without robust training for (a) LIME and (b) Tree-based Models. Improvements are significant with robust training for adult dataset in (a) with a Wilcoxon-signed rank test at $p < 0.1$ level. However, balanced training does not help for most datasets in (b). Error bars indicate 95% confidence intervals.

information on this dataset – note the fidelity gaps are technically zero, though the explanations are trivial. We repeat the same procedure with the mimic dataset by selecting 10 features. The AUROC of predicting protected attribute (sex) from these features is low (0.54; also less than 0.57 for features from positive and negative class). With this representation, we train both NN and LR blackbox models, and GAM/Tree global explanation models. We observe that accuracy-based fidelity gaps ($\Delta_{Acc.}, \Delta_{Acc.}^{group}$) decrease to low values not much higher than zero (to 0-0.6% with GAM and Tree; full table in Appendix M while blackbox model’s AUROC is greater than 0.7). This indicates that fidelity gaps decrease when there is less group information in data representations. However, non-zero fidelity gaps in AUROC still persist for Tree-based models (up to 6.6%). This is due to low prevalence of positive class predictions with the blackbox model on using the reduced data representation ($\approx 3\%$ positive class at 0.5 threshold), which has a large impact on AUROC (since it is a ranking-based metric, and sensitive to degree of imbalance). We highlight that more experiments using interpretable, completely group-independent representations (i.e., an AUROC of 0.5 in predicting protected attribute labels) that still have high groundtruth predictive capability are required to accurately quantify the impact of group information on AUROC-based fidelity gaps. We also note that class imbalance – and varying degrees of class imbalance for data subgroups – may be an important factor. Our findings indicate that fidelity gaps persist across a range of class-imbalance ratios, but we leave the estimation of the effect of varying degrees of class imbalance (or positive-class prevalence) across subgroups on explanation fairness for future work.


7 SIMULATING THE REAL-WORLD IMPACT OF BIASED EXPLANATIONS

Unfair explanation models can have negative effects on real-world decision making. To demonstrate this, we conduct a simulation study of ML-assisted law school admissions using the lsac dataset [114]. Such systems are already being used in many cases [74, 79]. Our results clearly show that worse decisions are made for members of disadvantaged groups when explanations are less fair.

Experiment Setup. To set up our simulation study, we consider an admissions officer that uses a blackbox model that predicts whether a student will pass the bar, though this prediction may be incorrect. The admissions officer also has an explanation of the model’s prediction, which may have low fidelity. The blackbox model’s performance and the explanation fidelity can vary between protected groups—we vary these parameters in this experiment. We assume that the admissions officer then admits students solely based on their perceived likelihood of the applicant passing the bar, without any knowledge of the applicant’s demographics. We assume parameters for the probability that the officer ultimately makes the correct decision. We obtain these parameters from prior user studies assessing the impact of explanations on human+AI decision making accuracy for a different task [10], but believe they serve as reasonable estimates to display the anchoring effect of decisions with explanations observed across a variety of decision-making settings [10, 80, 85]. For further details, please see Appendix K.

To simulate the effect of fidelity gaps on decision-making accuracy, we vary the maximum fidelity gaps between the two groups (males and females) and the average from 0% to 15%, assuming an average fidelity of $\approx 85\%$ across groups. We then compute the admissions officer’s resulting decision-making accuracy for males and females. We use sex as the protected attribute of interest for the simulation as both groups pass the bar equally in the dataset, so decision-making accuracy is a fair performance metric.

Results. As shown in Figure 5, we find that larger fidelity gaps lead to larger decision accuracy gap between groups. So when explanations are less fair, disadvantaged groups may be targeted by worse decisions. With over 60,000 law school applicants in the U.S. in a typical year [29], over 200 applications would be wrongly admitted/rejected based solely on the fairness of the explanation model, according to this simulation. Fidelity gaps should therefore be used as fairness metrics for explanation methods: minimizing these gaps leads to fairer decisions. However, we emphasize that the findings of this simulation are based on some strong assumptions (e.g., reliance on parameters extracted, anchoring effect existence in this admission setting, etc.). Real-world user studies are required to validate these expected findings rigorously across a variety of decision-making setups.



(a) AUROC in detecting minoritized protected group

Dataset	Expl	Fidelity ^{Acc.}	$\Delta_{AUROC}^{\text{group}}$	$\Delta_{Acc.}^{\text{group}}$
lsac	GAM	96.6	1.4	1.5
	Tree	96.9	7.0	0.8
mimic	GAM	96.2	0.6	1.0
	Tree	94.9	4.1	1.6

(b) Fidelity gaps with fair blackbox models

Figure 4: We find minoritized protected groups can be detected with high AUROC from feature representations alone in (a). As a result, non-zero fidelity gaps persist even when underlying blackboxes are fair as seen in (b).




Figure 5: Effect of fidelity gap size on a simulated admissions officer's decision accuracy between males and females using a neural network blackbox. Note that larger fidelity gaps lead to larger decision accuracy gaps between males and females; fidelity gaps could disadvantage different groups in practice. Each line is paired with 95% confidence intervals across 20 simulations.

8 DISCUSSION

8.1 Takeaways for ML Practitioners

Analyze subgroup fidelities. Our results suggest that ML practitioners using post-hoc explainable models to interpret blackbox models should carefully analyse the fidelity of commonly-used explanations for different groups separately. Especially if there is a target subgroup of interest. If a fidelity gap exists, practitioners should carefully consider its source [113], and, where possible, take measures to minimize the impacts on downstream decision-making [90]. We also highlight the importance of carefully choosing the metric for measuring fidelity (e.g., accuracy, AUROC, precision, etc.): different metrics may be affected by properties of the dataset and hence predictions from a blackbox/explanation model (e.g., class imbalance, calibration [15]) differently.

Consider the explanation model. Overall, our findings indicate the existence of fidelity gaps between subgroups is both a

model and a *data* issue. From Section 4, we find that fidelity gaps can vary greatly for the same dataset depending on the explanation model used, and our results in Section 5 show that algorithms that seek to improve worst-case group performance may be a promising direction in reducing fidelity gaps. As such, we recommend careful selection and testing of various explanation models in order to select an equitable model with high overall fidelity.

In addition, model hyperparameters should also be carefully tuned. For example, in models like LIME, there are several hyperparameters that can affect fidelity gaps, such as the sampling variance (Figure 9 in Appendix), the number of perturbations, or number of features in the explanation. Exploring the effect of these hyperparameters on explanation quality and fairness is a promising direction of future work. Lastly, extending prior work on methods for fair supervised ML models [20, 66, 72, 81, 118], we call for similar approaches to training fair and explainable local and global explanation models which have reduced fidelity gap in addition to high overall fidelity.

Consider the data. Our results in Section 6 indicate that fidelity gaps also depend on data representations. Because some feature representations cause smaller fidelity gaps, practitioners should carefully consider the features used to learn both the blackbox and explanation models [46]. As machine learning models can encode historical biases present in the training corpora [38], it is crucial to consider the source of such potential biases, and, if possible, take actions to correct them by collecting additional data in a fairness-aware way [7, 56].

8.2 Implications of Fidelity Gaps

Algorithmic Modifications to Train Fair Explanation Models with Low Fidelity Gaps. While we benchmark robust training as an attempt to mediate the fidelity gaps across subgroups, we posit that data distribution-aware methods could lead to lower, less significant fidelity gaps. For example, recent work in causal bootstrapping [54] shows the potential to reduce confounding biases in ML model training given causal knowledge [45]. Similar strategies relying on partial or complete knowledge of the data generation

graph [42] could prove effective in selecting features and training examples to train fair explanation models.

Post-processing solutions to standard explanation model training could also prove effective, similar to recent work in the space of improving worst-case generalization [76]. However, such solutions need to be appraised carefully to ensure that the resulting models are both *fair* and remain *interpretable* to users [110].

An interesting follow-up question is whether it is possible to have zero fidelity gaps—perfect worst-case generalization—while retaining good average fidelity under standard training settings. Zero fidelity gaps are possible, of course, when the blackbox and explanation models are identical. However in more-realistic scenarios, fidelity gaps may simply depend on the data distributions [76]. For example, rare subgroups may be more difficult to approximate, and will naturally have lower fidelity than others [52, 102].

Fidelity Gaps as an Evaluation Metric. We focus mainly on evaluating the fairness of explanation models using the *fidelity gap* as a metric, assuming that models with smaller fidelity gaps are more desirable. However, recent work in group fairness has found that trying to achieve equal performance for all subgroups tends to worsen welfare for all [28, 53, 119]. Such a fairness/accuracy trade-off is well-documented in the algorithmic fairness literature [58, 121]. We posit that there is likely a similar trade-off between the fidelity gap and the overall fidelity of an explanation model. In such cases, motivated by definitions such as minimax Pareto fairness [33, 73], it may be more appropriate to select explanation models that maximize the fidelity of the worst-case group.

Human Implications of Fidelity Gaps. Explainable ML models form an integral part of sociotechnical systems, given their user-facing nature [16]. Several works have studied the utility of explanations in human–AI joint decision-making [10]. However, the potential failure modes we identify—fidelity gaps leading to worse explanations for some groups—need to be studied further in the context of real human decision-making (in addition to the simulations we conduct). For accurate decision-making in practice, like learning to defer decisions to an expert [78], it is important to communicate clearly and provide end-users with details of performance caveats [64]. This requires collaboration between computer scientists and scholars working in the space of computer-mediated communication. A more design-centric approach is required to bridge the gap between researchers and consumers of these models [25].

9 CONCLUSION

In this work, we investigate fairness properties of post-hoc explainability methods. We ultimately find that significant gaps in performance exist between groups, indicating that some groups receive better explanations than others. First, we demonstrate experimentally that significant gaps occur in the two main branches of explanation methods using four explainability methods on four common datasets and two blackbox model architectures. Second, we present a study of robust and balanced training methods for improving these gaps. We find that these methods can improve the fairness of explanation models in some cases. Third, using a simulation study, we demonstrate that improving explanation fairness could substantially improve decision making accuracy for

underserved groups. Finally, we pose promising directions enhancing post-hoc explainability methods; future work should focus on ensuring explanation quality does not suffer according to group membership while remaining reliable and accurate.

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