

life, and the high drama of the invasions, emerge vividly from Salas's account.

The reader seeking analysis and interpretation of the events described, however, will not find them here. Indeed, readers who have not previously read Tulio Halperín-Donghi's *Revolución y guerra* or Susan Socolow's *The Merchants of Colonial Buenos Aires* may find themselves feeling rather adrift in a flow of episodes whose historical causes and long-term significance are not altogether clear. The experience of the British invasions set the stage for the independence movement that erupted three years later, but those later events take place in a "future that remains veiled in these pages," as Salas states in the introduction, "but that the reader will be able to reconstruct" (p. 12). Those readers who know enough of Argentine history to "reconstruct" that future will find the *Diario* a fascinating excursion into Buenos Aires's colonial past; those less familiar with that past may wish to begin their acquaintance elsewhere.

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NATIONAL PERIOD

The Secret War in Mexico: Europe, the United States, and the Mexican Revolution. By FREDRICH KATZ. Portions translated by LOREN GOLDNER. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1981. Notes. Bibliographical essay. Index. Pp. xii, 659. Cloth. \$30.00.

This fine volume, an outgrowth of *Deutschland, Díaz und die mexikanische Revolution* (1964), will fascinate all students of the Mexican Revolution. As a synthesis, it has no equal. As original research, it pushes understanding into new areas. Katz, the first to view the subject from an international perspective, explains the nature of Great Power rivalry and the effects upon Mexico. He also examines the relationship of economic interests to national policies and finds a close congruence. For Katz, "the secret war," an attempt by outsiders to install friendly governments, signified a shift away from the methods of "classical" imperialism toward more "modern" techniques.

None of them fully succeeded. For Katz, class differences, regional distinctions, and nationalism functioned as prime determinants. The Mexican Revolution, seen as a middle-class movement in an autocratic country, took on larger dimensions because of the land question, particular conditions along the border, and the competition among Europeans

and Americans for influence. In many ways, it consisted of four separate revolutions in Morelos, Sonora, Chihuahua, and Coahuila. Madero and Carranza represented dissident elements among the ruling elites, but, as nationalists, offended foreign interests. Madero, according to Katz, was probably murdered on Huerta's recommendation with Henry Lane Wilson's acquiescence. Carranza, much as Díaz, cultivated hacendados and actually returned land to them, but steadfastly upheld the sovereignty of his country.

A rich, provocative narrative details international maneuvers. Unlike some historians, Katz takes seriously Woodrow Wilson's fears of British imperialism, claiming, indeed, that the Mobile Address affirmed an accurate diagnosis. The British consistently opposed revolutionary factions and supported counterrevolution, in part, out of regard for petroleum companies. As evidence, Katz cites the dispatches of Paul von Hintze, the German minister in Mexico, who reported information not contained in the British records.

The Germans also tried to govern events, but they shifted tactics, ceasing their opposition to revolutionary factions while seeking to woo Carranza. The gambit failed. As Katz shows, the First Chief had an interest in using Germany as a counterbalance against the United States but not in a formal alliance. He rejected the terms of the Zimmermann telegram on two occasions—a subject upon which Katz has the last word. As he notes, ironically, although the Germans conceived their policy in “cold blooded *realpolitik*,” it lacked a fundamental sense of realism. The Germans misjudged both Mexico and the United States.

The United States developed “the most contradictory” policies among the Great Powers. As Katz puts it, “Every victorious faction in Mexico between 1910–1919 enjoyed the sympathy and in most cases the direct support of U.S. authorities,” in the end, only to have the Americans turn vehemently against them. It happened in the cases of Madero, Huerta, and Carranza. Katz attributes this “consistent American inconsistency” to “one common denominator: the fact that every Mexican faction once it assumed power carried out policies considered detrimental by both the administration in Washington and U.S. business interests” (p. 564). The differences separating Wilson from the oil companies were tactical, not fundamental. The president would tolerate Carranza until the Great War ended.

The arguments and analyses are persuasive and compelling. Though sometimes ready to engage in conjecture, Katz presents an array of evidence in support of his views. He has worked through the archives of ten countries; German documents figure most prominently. Some readers will challenge his reliance on “the rational man” model of explana-

tion—Katz's actors usually behave purposefully with a keen sense of self-interest. Others will wonder about the connections between businesses and governments. Everyone, however, will have to concede that Katz has sound reasons for his claims.

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Growth against Development: The Economic Impact of Railroads in Porfirian Mexico. By JOHN H. COATSWORTH. DeKalb: Northern Illinois University Press, 1981. Notes. Tables. Maps. Illustrations. Appendixes. Bibliography. Index. Pp. 249. Cloth. \$20.00.

This new volume in the *Origins of Modern Mexico* series is a slightly augmented version of the author's *Crecimiento contra desarrollo: El impacto económico de los ferrocarriles en el porfiriato* (2 vols.; Mexico City: SepSetentas, 1976). *Growth Against Development* is based upon thorough research in government publications of the Porfirian period and in previously little used railroad company reports preserved in the Historical Archive of the Secretary of Communications and Transports. The first to employ econometric techniques and counterfactual propositions extensively in the study of Latin American railroads, John Coatsworth has succeeded in producing a work readily readable even for those who normally balk at decyphering econometrics. This English-language edition should be of interest to students of comparative social and economic history.

Coatsworth's measurements of the railroads' contribution to Mexican national income during the Porfiriato confirm the indispensability of the railroad. No alternative road system could have allowed equivalent economic growth. Coatsworth suggests that as much as one-half of the increase in national per capita income between 1880 and 1910 may have derived from the benefits of freight transport by rail. Such results, he notes, are far above the proportional savings yielded by the railroad in other countries for which social-savings estimates exist, such as the United States, England, or Russia. While Coatsworth considers Mexico's social savings from rail passenger transport almost negligible, he underscores the importance of the railroads' contribution to population migration to new centers of economic activity during the Porfiriato.

How were the benefits of the railroads' contribution to Mexico's economic growth distributed? Mexico's economy during the Porfiriato was externally oriented. Coatsworth finds that exports, particularly mineral exports, were the most important category of rail freight. Domestic goods