


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The soft power of migration - a hard task for the European union

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The soft power of migration – a hard task for the European union[†]

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The article studies the range of problems that have emerged due to the growing immigration from Muslim countries into the European Union (EU). While describing the functions of immigrants' communities, the authors focus on their political role in the receiving states. The study of the historical development of government–diaspora relations in three cases (the UK, France, and Germany) shows that Muslim communities' political influence does not reflect their economic and cultural role, which in the future might threaten the EU security, unless these countries develop a new approach to an “acculturation” policy.

Keywords: immigration; Muslim communities; Britain; Germany; France; Turkey; assimilation; acculturation; identities “Euro-Islam”

Introduction

Immigration from Muslim countries into the European Union (EU) is becoming a priority in today's agenda of key European states. After the end of the Second World War, Western Europe became one of the centers of gravity for immigrants from poor countries due to their common colonial past, their geographical closeness, and the demand of European industries for cheap labor. On the one hand, due to the aging of Europeans and depopulation in the region, immigration is now perceived as a vital resource for economic development. On the other, it causes a variety of cultural, political, and socio-economic problems that pose a threat to social stability and national identity.

Burgeoning Muslim communities are being studied more and more by Western scholars. Many see this issue in the context of a “global fight back” by Islam, with it playing the roles of an economic lobby and an ideological doctrine. Moreover, the increase in the number of communities is accompanied by higher economic influence as well as their demographic strengthening and political revitalization.

European politicians have also started to pay special attention to Muslim communities. However, setbacks in assimilation strategies and the lack of an efficient integration policy for immigrants from other cultures – along with inevitable soaring migration flows – pose a serious challenge for the EU's nation-states. According to the practical outcome of immigration policies, attempts to consolidate European societies by means of multiculturalism have often led to their fragmentation without any notable positive effects. These point to the relevance and

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importance of the research. It will help to determine trends and characteristics of Muslim immigration in Western Europe, to assess the impact of Muslim immigration for European states, and to offer ways of solving the existing problems.

There are two main characteristics of diasporas in modern Europe: one deals with their growing economic influence and the other concerns their so-called “preservation” function. First, immigrants who form a community may have specific work skills that the population of the receiving country lacks or does not perform as well. These work skills and economic specialization may stem from certain ethnic and cultural characteristics possessed by immigrants as a result of the fact that every ethnic group follows a certain economic and cultural pattern formed by specific geographic and social conditions; this in turn is reflected in work skills and, hence, in the socio-economic role of a community. Due to two interconnected, yet parallel, processes – cultural and economic integration – traditional skills and products are rarely perceived as belonging to a certain ethnic group. But even in the globalizing world, there are numerous restaurants with ethnic cuisines, souvenir, and antique shops, which as a whole account for a large share of production and service industries.

Second, for a number of reasons, large sums of money and other assets may concentrate in a community, which leads to their domination in various economic spheres and sometimes even to monopolize them. For instance, trade in South-East Asia is traditionally controlled by Chinese, Indian, and Arab communities. In Sub-Saharan Africa, since the Middle Ages, Indian and more importantly Arab (mostly Libyan) trade communities have played a major role. In Europe and the Middle East, Turkish capital is becoming more and more influential, which brings with it a strengthening of that country’s political weight in the world. Moreover, ethnic communities’ economic leadership is underpinned by their socio-demographic structure. Usually, the majority of immigrants are males of working age with a high level of education and professional skills. They are more economically active than their compatriots at home. This makes them more successful than the indigenous population of the receiving country, which is also reflected in their higher living standards.

Finally, an important factor underlying economic prosperity is the corporate culture of communities. Whereas society in a receiving country is largely atomized, members of immigrant communities try to hold on to each other. This is especially relevant for a Muslim culture within a largely Christian or other religious – or even secular – dominant country. There are two types of this so-called “corporativity:” inner and outer. The former is manifested in mutual assistance between a community’s members, which is especially visible in employment policies, economic benefits distribution, or preferences in business contacts. The latter has been gaining momentum lately due to the increasing international integration. A community may have ties with its “motherland,” native ethnic group, and other communities with the same traditions or religious beliefs. Often communities establish contacts with other communities of different ethnicities but which traditionally and culturally are quite similar to them. For example, at the end of the twentieth century, the Russians in Iran had close ties with the Armenian community, the Kalmyks in the USA lean toward Russian and Japanese communities, and the Belarusians in Argentina associate themselves with Russia.

Another important function of communities is “preservation,”¹ which includes the following aspects:

- (1) Preservation of their native language. The mother tongue is one of the factors of maintaining a national culture and supports components such as traditions, customs, and identity. A successful assimilation policy might cause this to atrophy, which in its turn is facilitated by the absence or small amounts of cultural differences between a community and the receiving nation. Such a process may even result in a community’s disintegration.

- (2) Preservation of an ethnic culture. Ethnic culture is most vividly manifested in literature, art, ethnic symbols, traditions, as well as in food or dress. The culture of the receiving nation may cause the erosion of a community's culture (unless a community exists as a separate enclave within a different culture – as in Germany). This is most typical of urbanized areas with their universal standards in everyday life. As a result, a community loses ties with its former culture and “forgets” traditions. This process, however, can be hindered by the inflow of new members from the motherland.
- (3) Preservation of ethnic identity. The external manifestation of ethnic identity takes the form of self-appellation or ethnonym. Its internal meaning deals with the formula: “us vs. them.” A common origin and historical destination, links them to the motherland and their mother tongue.² According to Shkaratan, change of ethnic identity is the last step on the way to the total assimilation of a national community.³
- (4) Preservation of social rights. Community members usually are very sensitive to any deprivation of social rights from the receiving nation, which may take the form of chauvinism or anti-Semitism. They also try to facilitate the adaptation of new members.

Culture plays the most important role in communities' self-identification. Since communities lack such attributes of identity as territory, political institutions, or a specific economic structure, culture becomes their only identification factor. In this event, community members become very cautious about such subjective psychological components as their value system, including strong group national or ethnic consciousness, the creation of a perfect image of their motherland, religious beliefs, national myths, and language. Evidently, the community phenomenon is based on cultural identity and its disengagement from their motherland strengthens the necessity to maintain and sometimes promote its language and culture.

Along with economic and cultural influences communities are beginning to play a political role both in the receiving countries and on the international arena. The former happens via electoral and other political activities. The latter stems from the fact that communities are closely connected to their native countries and try to promote those countries' interests. In this respect, Turkey, which pays special attention to maintaining ties with its former citizens, sets a valuable example. Turks living in Germany have become in a way a political lever for the country's foreign policy. The Turkish government tries to use its citizens to lobby in support of its political and economic interests in Germany. Turkey is interested in becoming a fully fledged EU member, but it faces opposition from the ruling Christian Democrats led by Angela Merkel.

Turkey plans to promote its interests via increasing the number of politicians with a Turkish background. For instance, one of the ardent advocates of full EU membership for Turkey is Cem Özdemir, the Chairman of Alliance '90/The Greens, who support multiculturalism and giving more power to Turkish communities. Another example of Turkey's success in promoting its interests via the Turkish community is to be found in the results of the recent elections in North Rhine Westphalia on 13 May 2012, which were won by the Social Democratic Party. One million Turks live in the region and voted predominantly for the Social Democrats who supported multiculturalism in Germany and advocated both the integration of Turks into German society as well as Turkey's membership of the EU. Thus, the Turkish Muslim community supports the Turkish model of multiculturalism, which implies cohesion of all European peoples with strengthening the Turkish community as a means of Turkey's “soft power.”

Another way of promoting Turkey's interests using “soft power” is its educational policy. Turkey builds schools and universities abroad. Russia, for instance, has repeatedly closed such institutions, blaming them for the promotion of extremism. In fact they are instruments of Turkish “soft power” and are used to appeal to the best specialists and to influence the establishment of lobby groups both in government and in large private companies. To that end, Turkey

tries to exploit a so-called controlled globalization – nowadays almost all Turkish universities conduct studies in English, which attracts more foreign students who after graduation either stay in the country or return home and form pro-Turkish lobby groups.

In the international arena, Turkey is becoming a role model especially for Arab and Turkic countries who mistakenly see in it a successful example of development. A number of politicians in Tunis and Egypt have already stated that they would like to follow the Turkish model. Many political scientists have prematurely concluded that these countries will prefer to stick to the West, and establish secular governments in those countries with a Muslim population. However, the Turkish model implies a moderate Islamic government supported by a majority party in parliament that is slowly restricting secularization and an army that used to be a protector of those Turks with a pro-Western affiliation.

It is necessary to study the mechanisms of cooperation between a community and a receiving state; a community and its native country; and transnational cooperation among communities. The UK, France, and Germany are examples of three different types of government–community cooperation. The differences between them lie both in the “acculturation” policies adopted by the EU governments and in the traditional characteristics of Muslim communities in the three countries.

The UK

Until the end of the 1960s, the UK Muslim community consisted mainly of Sunni Indo-Pakistanis. They formed two main movements: Tablighi Jamaat and Jamaat-e-Islami. The latter in 1962 sponsored the establishment of the UK Islamic Mission, which specialized in culture promotion and publications.

Later, the inflow of immigrants from Iran, Turkey, and Arab countries resulted in the growing number of Muslim organizations: the Muslim Students Association; the Federation of Student Islamic Societies; and the Young Muslims UK are just three among several examples. The main goal of these organizations was to accommodate Muslim youth into the life of the UK, while saving their Muslim identity and conditioning them to preserve their native culture. Strong ties of these organizations with the Muslim Brotherhood and, after 1979, with Shia Iran on the one hand helped their growth; but on the other, they incorporated the Muslim community into global affairs and stimulated the emergence of a formidable Islamic lobby in the country.

The idea of unifying separate Islamic organizations into one consolidated body in order to strengthen the position of Muslim communities *inter alia* as a political force in the country was first implemented in the early 1970s. In 1970–1971, Saudi funds sponsored the establishment of the Union of Muslim Organizations of the UK and Europe (UNO) and Jamiat-Ulama, UK. This was the first attempt to consolidate Muslim societies and promote unified goals and an agenda, notwithstanding nationality. UNO performed political functions and coordinated the majority of Islamic organizations within Great Britain. A similar organization – the Union of Islamic Press – was established in London in 1979 and with the Islamic Cultural Center began to function under the auspices of the Muslim World League, the Headquarters of which are in Saudi Arabia. The Organization, Islamic Charity, was created with purely humanitarian purposes and was allegedly involved in financing organizations known to be involved with terrorists. Consolidation received further impetus after such cases as the matter of halal meat (1983), “The Honeyford Case” (1985), and “The Salman Rushdie Case” (1988).

The first was concerned with the right of the Muslims to have their own abattoirs in order to provide stores with meat that had been killed according to an Islamic ritual. This was severely criticized by the Farm Animal Welfare Council and animal welfare activists. Support from the Commission for Racial Equality and Birmingham, Bradford, London, and Glasgow led to

a favorable outcome for the Muslims, whose victory prompted further cooperation on other issues. The “Honeyford Case” may be considered as another victory of the Muslim community. Honeyford was the Headmaster of one of the Bradford schools and managed to antagonize both the government and Muslims by voicing harsh criticism and terms such as “Pardus mentality” when discussing the matter of Muslim schoolgirls’ wearing a traditional headscarf. In 1985, Ray Honeyford resigned.⁴

In 1988, Salman Rushdie, an English writer of Pakistani origin, published his book, *The Satanic Verses*, which caused an uproar among Muslims. In the book, he mocked the Prophet Muhammad, the Koran, and the Ayatollah Khomeini. Muslim organizations wanted the book prohibited in the UK.⁵ British society was divided between those who criticized Rushdie and his works and those who opposed the ban, referring to the freedom of speech and expression.⁶ The debates about Rushdie’s book, however, became an impetus for the involvement of Muslims into British political life. The government supported the idea as the country lacked any legal mechanism for communication with the Muslim community. Thus, in 1988 the UK *Committee on Islamic Affairs* was established.

The trend was exploited by Kalim Siddiqui, the Director of the Muslim Institute in London. He published the *Muslim Manifesto*, in which he characterized the status of the Muslims in the UK as a unified and well-organized community living within a non-Muslim state and which maintained “special relations with the Islamic Republic of Iran.”⁷ In 1992, however, Siddiqui abandoned these ideas and created a Muslim Parliament. Aimed at dramatically changing the British political landscape, it turned out to be yet another Muslim organization. Siddiqui called for tax resistance, civil disobedience, nonconformity with “unjust” laws and even denounced Western democracy as, “the dictatorship of the majority”. He forced and exaggerated ultra-radical sentiments among the Muslims and supported going to jail, if necessary, in the name of protecting Islam. However, he did not attract many followers.

At the same time, UK Muslims turned out to be very responsive to international developments. The Bosnian and Kosovo conflicts, the destruction in 1992 of the historic sixteenth-century mosque in India, the USA bombing of Iraq in 1993 and 1998, the terrorist attacks of 9/11 on the New York World Trade Center, and the US invasion of Iraq became the necessary impetuses for galvanizing existing Muslim organizations and fostering new ones that engaged in protest campaigns in the streets and in the mass media.

The Conservative, Labour, and Liberal Democrat Parties began competing for Muslim voters as early as the 1980s. Localized and densely populated Muslim communities could potentially alter election results in such constituencies as Sparkbrook, Small Heath, Ladywood (Birmingham), Bradford North, Manningham (Bradford), etc. Muslims during this period traditionally preferred the Labour Party, due to its tolerance of immigrants from the third-world countries at the same time as Prime Minister Thatcher’s tighter policy toward migration. In the 1990s, the major parties’ attitude toward Muslims was ambivalent. On the one hand, they tried to address the problems that were important to the Muslim community. On the other, anticipating a strengthening of the Muslims’ role in decision-making processes, the Labour Party repeatedly denied them Party membership, as in the “Gerald Kaufman case.” It was thought that Muslims’ massive admission to the Party (sometimes whole families applied for membership) might create the situation when they could lobby their candidates’ nomination and look like a result of bribery or nepotism, rather than free choice.

An important step toward strengthening the Muslim community was the establishment of the Muslim Council of Britain (MCB) in 1997. It assembled in one body more than 350 organizations and consolidated funds. The MCB’s principal mission was to co-ordinate the Muslim organizations within the country, promote Islam, and maintain ties with their countries of origin. The MCB also closely cooperated with the government and organized consultations with ministers

and shadow cabinet members on the matters of concern to the Muslim community. The government saw the MCB as an important loyal body that reflected the interests of the majority of the Muslims and one which played a major role in countering islamophobia and extremism within British society.

At the same time, a number of radical Muslim organizations operated in the UK. They were closely associated with the countries of the Middle East, both ideologically and financially. Instead of bridging the gap between ethnic communities and British society, they advocated establishing a state, the role model of which was an idealistic “Rashidun Caliphate” formed in Medina during the time of the Prophet Mohammed and the Righteous Caliphs. Among these organizations were Hizb ut-Tahrir (Party of Liberation), Al-Muhajiroun (The Emigrants), and the UK Muslim Brotherhood. These organizations varied in their methods and social base.

Members of Hizb ut-Tahrir believe that the main method of achieving their goals was continuous intellectual and social activity in order to stimulate political and social debate. They considered that any form of violence or armed resistance was unacceptable and to be in violation of Sharia Law, and thus prohibited them.⁸ The organization became more active (and its members do not conceal that) under the auspices of the Taliban Movement and, personally, Osama bin Laden. Its leaders have reiterated that they act as recruitment centers in Britain that enroll *Mujahidins* (people doing jihad) and send them to crisis zones in Afghanistan, the Balkans, and the North Caucasus. Some English scholars believe that such organizations are denounced by the majority of the Muslim population in Europe.⁹ On the contrary, the leader of Al-Muhajiroun, Omar Bakri, a former member of Hizb, has denied any idea of integration or political dialogue and has supported Islamic extremists in Britain and abroad.¹⁰

The UK Muslim Brotherhood also preferred political methods and has actively engaged Palestinians, Libyans, Somalis, Iraqis, Egyptians, and others. It has gained influence within the MCB and formed alliances with leftist political activists (for instance with George Galloway, the Leader of the Parliamentary Faction, Respect). They also cooperated with the Department of Theology and Religious Studies of Wales, which gave them an opportunity to engage with the education system.

Muslim organizations in Great Britain thus preferred to use legal political methods, even though some of them have advocated sweeping reforms. Their ideological platform was also drastically changed under the influence of the British society. Having become more moderate, they now appeal to a larger social group, which in turn has increased their lobbying ability. As a result of the socio-political development of the Muslim community during recent decades, Muslim representation in governing bodies has increased and the community itself has grown stronger. Four Muslims are Members of the House of Lords, 13 are Members of the House of Commons and, out of 25,000 Local Authority Councilors, 217 are Muslims.¹¹

It is possible to distinguish three forms of Muslims’ political influence. First, some members of the Muslim community are becoming directly involved in the political life of Europe. Second, there is evidence of the rise of a so-called “Political Islam”¹² movement, which has no immediate connection with the immigration problem. According to Oliver Roy, the roots of “Political Islam” go back to leftist radical movements of the 1960s with their idea of a revolution of the “Poor South” against the “Wealthy North.”¹³ Third, the interconnectedness of problems related to Islam and those concerning immigration and naturalization have brought sweeping changes to the political life of Western countries, thereby creating new political identities.

Islam has become an essential part of British social life. Traditional Muslim communities reproduce those socio-religious ideas that Europe generally wants to downplay: condemnation of liberal sexual morals; religious fundamentalism; anti-individualism; the role of women, etc. As a result of clashes with Western Society, Islam is assuming the role of an opponent of European “Modernity” and “Post-Modernity.” The settlement of emerging differences needs active

dialogue between the two parties and has led to Muslims becoming a strong political force on different levels. Nowadays, there are approximately 100 Islamist groups and movements; the major ones are the Indo-Pakistani Sunni Bareilvi movement, the Deobandi movement, supported by fundamentalists of Tablighi Jamaat, and the even more radical Jamaat-e-Islami (“Islamic Party”) founded by Abdul Ala Maududi (1903–1979) in Pakistan. The latter promotes the idea of “Muslim Nation” (*Ummah*), which emphasizes that “Islam is opposed to any kind of nationalism.” For a political form of the union, Maududi suggested a state in which “loyalty to Allah and his Prophet needs a citizen to be ... loyal and subordinate to those who provide Islamists order (*“usul-amr”* in Urdu).”¹⁴

Influential in Great Britain are Sufi *Tariquahs* (spiritual orders), including Hakkaniye, a new branch of the Naqshbandi. In London, Birmingham, and Sheffield, Hakkaniye controls many mosques and Muslim organizations, funds, and unions. Birmingham academics specializing in Islam who have studied Hakkaniye activity in Britain and Lebanon are now interested in its influence in Dagestan and on whole territory of the former Soviet Union. Employees of the Center for the Study of Islam and Christian–Muslim Relations suppose that there might be a “wide network” of this Sufi order in the Caucasus.

Muslims in the UK are well organized. Not only do they concentrate around the nearest mosque and its *Imam*, but they also participate in various non-governmental organizations (NGOs), such as the Islamic Cultural Center; the Islamic Relief Association in London; and the Islamic Help in Birmingham. Such NGOs own mosques that are involved in cultural and educational affairs, provide social security for believers, make sure that they follow traditions and Islamic rules in everyday life (including food restrictions), and promote Islam.

There are specific national characteristics of Muslim disaffection. Though the British government tries to refrain from interfering in specific Muslim problems and implement a cautious and coherent policy toward the Muslim community, the latter is often discontented with its position in society especially concerning any discrimination exercised against it. For instance, soon after the Gulf War (1990–1991), a British company in Sheffield announced that it was not going to employ Muslims any more. The following court appeal, in which the company was accused of violating the Race Relations Act 1968, was not satisfied and found against the company on the grounds that Muslims did not constitute a separate race.

Despite UK Laws applying equally to all the inhabitants of the country, some Muslim groups are persistently trying to introduce a norm, according to which some Sharia Laws on personal status would be applicable to the Muslims. Though the British authorities reject this idea, a compromise was found whereby Muslims were allowed to have their case tried by a Muslim court that took into consideration Sharia Laws, so long as they did not contradict national legislation.

France

Great Britain is one of the examples (along with Belgium and the Netherlands) where a government supports the creation of political Muslim organizations and, therefore, tries to involve Muslims in the socio-political life of the nation and make them a political partner. Another case of community–government cooperation is France. The revolution of 1789 left the French with the earnest conviction that in a true civil society, all citizens are equal under the Law and have equal rights and responsibilities regardless of their personal beliefs and origin. Public life is strictly secular and religion is considered to be a part of a citizen’s personal life. According to French Constitutional Law, public life should be protected from any influence of religious organizations including church and sects. In spite of this provision, there are a substantial number of Arab Muslim organizations that have been established in France since the late 1970s.

In 1984, a Society called “Living Islamic Life in the West” emerged; the next year a group of converted French Muslims founded one of the largest Muslim organizations in the country – the National Federation of Muslims of France. Its leader was Daniel Yusuf Leclercq – a native Frenchman who converted to Islam. At the same time, the government (especially the Ministry of Domestic Affairs) tried to set up a dialogue with the large Muslim community. However, there was little progress as the latter was ethnically, culturally, and ideologically diverse and lacked any unified structure. No organization has ever had powers to represent the whole community (*Umma*), and, hence, perform an intermediary role between it and the government. At the same time, the main goal of French state policy toward “inner” Islam was its integration into French social and cultural life on terms that did not contradict the Republican form of government.

In October 1999, the Minister of Domestic Affairs, *Jean-Pierre Chevènement*, invited various Islamic associations to sign a document that described the main legal framework of cooperation between the government and the Muslim community. This idea had emerged in the mid-90s and was actively discussed throughout the second half of the decade. On 28 January 2000, almost all the members of French Islamic organizations signed the document. On 20 December 2002, the Conference in Paris announced the establishment of a single organization of French Muslims – the French Council of the Muslim Faith (CFCM). Ex-President Nicolas Sarkozy characterized this as an historic event for the French *Umma* that had previously been extremely atomized. The new organization’s Executive Committee consisted of the leaders of the three largest Muslim organizations: the Union of Muslim Organizations; the National Federation of the Muslims of France; and the Paris Mosque. The first Chairman was Dalil Boubakeur, an Algerian Frenchman. The main goal of the organization was to represent French Muslims and to protect their interests in the government.¹⁵

Five out of seven Muslim organizations invited by the government to participate in the CFCM were sponsored by Arab countries. One more organization was sponsored by Turkey and the other by the Muslim Brotherhood. Out of 1100 French mosques of France 1000 are represented in the CFCM.¹⁶ The religious scholar, Caba Sori, a Professor at the Sorbonne, believes the policy of the CFCM to be inadequate as the Council had strengthened the position of foreign Muslims instead of opening in France, for instance, a Faculty of Islamic Theology for French Muslims, bearing in mind that only 9% of the 1000 Imams living in France are French citizens, the others being citizens of Algeria, Morocco, and Turkey. According to the Professor, such a strategy hinders the original idea of creating a new Islamic concept, one that would follow the democratic values and traditions of the French Republic – “Liberté, Égalité, and Fraternité”.¹⁷ The largest and the most expensive mosques in France are usually financed by Arab states (as, for instance, the Mosque in Lyon, the construction of which cost five million dollars). On the contrary, the smallest Mosques situated “in backyards,” belong to local Muslim communities.

Sori’s worries were not completely groundless. In April 2003, the elections to the CFCM were won by radical Islamists. This was followed by a “timely” remark of President Sarkozy that: “Islamic Laws are not universal as they are not the Laws of the French Republic. That is why religious activists whose ideas contradict Republican values will be deported.”¹⁸ On the whole, however, the French President was positive. He noted that the majority of seats in the Council belonged to Moroccan Muslims, who were mostly moderate. “I have absolutely nothing against this organization,” he concluded.¹⁹

In this case, the divide between the Muslims goes not along ethnic lines; instead it is determined partly by political views and partly by their affiliation to a certain movement in Islam. Today, it is evident that the new organization will be unable to unite French Muslims. A new Council will represent only some political and religious Muslim movements. It is of concern that the French government is eager to communicate with the most conservative element of the

Muslim community, while largely ignoring those Muslims who have already adjusted to living in France and have accepted its political culture.

Germany

The third case is that of Germany. Its government first encountered Islam during the First World War, when Turkey was its major ally. Ties between the two countries were not severed after the Turkish revolution, which resulted in a massive inflow of Turkish labor under the official Treaty signed by the two states in 1961. Some Islamic movements may be denounced or even forbidden if they are not mentioned in the official normative list of Turkish Islam elaborated by the German Religion Administration. However, unofficial Turkish Muslim organizations turned out to be popular in Germany. Nowadays, Turkey positions itself on the one hand as a modern secular state and, on the other, a state of Turkish people united by Turkish Islam and supported by the government.

The most important German Muslims' initiative was the establishment of movements and organizations that were prohibited in Turkey or were under government scrutiny. Such organizations, or *tariqas*, included the Islamist *Suleimanly*, the nationalist *Milli Görüş*, the Nazi *Grey Wolves*, as well as the Alawis and Dervish orders, who could freely operate in Germany.²⁰ Besides religious organizations such groups as the Kurds can also create a political party in Germany, which they are not allowed to do in Turkey. As a result, the conflict in Eastern Turkey between the Turkish government and the Kurds has influenced the Muslim community in Germany and, perhaps, domestic politics on issues of concern to Turkish immigrants.²¹

There have been two immigration waves from Turkey into Germany. The first took place in the 1960s. In 1961, the number of unemployed in Germany was 94,856 people with 572,758 job vacancies. These figures made the German government look abroad for labor, especially for the unskilled. On 30 September 1961, Germany signed a Treaty with Turkey to recruit Turkish workers who were believed to help restore the German postwar economy. Turkey also benefited from this agreement: it helped to reduce unemployment; it encouraged a constant inflow of foreign capital via money transfers from Turkish workers in Germany; it allowed them to gain the necessary skills and knowledge that could later be useful in Turkey; and it promoted Turkish interests concerning possible integration into the EEC.

The German authorities believed that the Turks would return back home, but many of them preferred to stay in Germany. In 1975, the German government granted them the right to reunite with their families, which brought about the second wave of immigration. Throughout the last 60 years, many members of the Turkish diaspora have acquired assets, received a good education, become German citizens and, most importantly, started to identify themselves as German. Turkish expatriates have significantly benefited the German economy: today, there are around 70,000 companies founded by Turkish businessmen living in Germany. Approximately 57,000 Turks have their own businesses in 91 economic sectors.

Turkish expatriates are not just active participants in German economic life: they are also involved in the political and cultural life of the country. Every year, the number of German politicians of Turkish origin grows: the Cem Özdemir I, the Leader of the Alliance '90/The Greens; *Vural Öger* is a Member of the Social Democratic Party and a Member of the European Parliament; Aygül Özkan is in the CSDU and Minister of Social Affairs, Women, Families, Health and Integration in the State of Lower Saxony; and Hakki Keskin, Hüseyin Kenan Aydın, Hakan Taş, and Sevim Dağdelen are all members of Germany's Left Party. These politicians protect the right of their compatriots, support Turkish full membership of the EU, and promote the interests of Turkish businessmen.

The Turkish government actively supports the Turkish community in Germany. From the 1970s, a number of projects in both cultural and educational fields have been realized. It sponsors the building of mosques and schools, where teaching is in the Turkish language. Turkey also considered the interests of the emigrants when amending its citizenship law. If the receiving country prohibits dual citizenship, Turkish Law now allows emigrants to have a so-called Blue Card, which grants them almost the same rights as the indigenous Turks have (with some exceptions concerning state service). It also allows exemption from conscription, or some alternatives to it, for those Turks permanently living abroad.

An important role in Germany is played by the Iranian Shia community, whose mosque and cultural centers are in Hamburg and served by several largely Turkish Sufi *tariqas* (orders). Turkish Muslim organizations in Germany are known to be the most disciplined and effective. Not long ago they implemented a series of projects targeting the German population: educating Germans about Islam and holding open days in mosques for school trips.²² The development of Muslim organizations is often spontaneous, which resembles the Turkish concept of “managed chaos.” The German government has no political strategy toward Muslims and maintains a dialogue with those who seek it, i.e. with those Muslim organizations that have emerged on their own without any government interference.

Muslim “acculturation” within the European Union

The case studies of an “acculturation” policy in the above three countries point to the following conclusions: first, traditional Muslim dogma quite strictly specifies the rules of a non-Muslim behavior in a Muslim state as well as Muslim behavior outside the Muslim world. According to these rules, a Muslim should, when possible, leave a non-Muslim state when being there is unacceptable or strongly disapproved. The second half of the twentieth century created a new phenomenon – Muslim migration into the Western countries – which was not provided for in traditional Islamic Law. This allows for speculation among the more modern political and religious Muslim leaders about the essence of migration from the Muslim East to the Christian West. The term “Hegira” involves a new interpretation that describes it as a way of Islam advancement, allegedly provided for by the Prophet.

Second, there are three models of Islamic development that have emerged as an answer to modern challenges: liberal (or modernized); radical (or fundamentalist); and traditional (or conservative). As in the Muslim world, traditional Islam (its rules make the idea of Muslim “acculturation” in Western Europe virtually impossible) is the most popular in European countries, but certain European realities make Muslims search for a new identity. Thus emerges yet another concept, that of “Euro-Islam,” promoted mostly by French and German Muslims. The concept may be considered as a part of the first model – liberal Islam – but in reality, it creates a whole new religion, which is why it is not supported by many Muslims in Europe. Being in a situation where the old identity no longer responds to the needs of modern European Muslims and when a new identity cannot be accepted for reasons identified above, many European Muslims are often marginalized, i.e. they have become a people without a sense of belonging to some bigger ethnic or religious group.

Third, following this logic, the “acculturation” of Muslim immigrants in the EU without their losing their Muslim identity is impossible. The search for a new identity, especially for European Muslims, is unlikely to be a success even in the long run. Muslims’ “acculturation” within the assimilation model may be based solely on European political structures. In other words, it is necessary, first of all, to determine the principles and foundation of a European identity and then decisively promote them among everyone who wants to be an EU citizen. Not all Muslims will be eager to accept a new European identity and become “Europeans.” But in any

case, the problem of “acculturation” of Muslims in the EU countries may help the Europeans realize their own interests and catalyze the development of the EU as a political entity and a superpower in the international arena.

The success of Muslims’ participation in the life of European societies depends on many conditions. The most important of these are: the socio-political climate of a country and specific characteristics of the communities; their ability to establish organizations and groups of influence; and to come to terms with each other settling various ethnic and religious differences. The first step toward Muslims’ political involvement is their naturalization. According to the research of Ali Kettani (Córdoba) around 40% of Muslims living in the EU have received citizenship of a European country.²³ This makes Muslims and their interests a new factor in European politics.

The influence of Muslim organizations should not be overestimated. In many European countries, they often cannot legally exercise influence over the political process. For instance, in Germany, the problem is accentuated by the fact that these organizations are not “a body of public law” (Körperschaft des öffentlichen Rechts). The main problem of Muslims’ participation in politics is their ethnic and religious diversity. There is no European country where Muslims were capable of creating an organization that would represent the whole Muslim community. In 1974, the Belgian government passed a Law that introduced Islam as the fifth official religion in the country (along with Catholic, Protestant, Anglican Churches, and Hinduism). The Law provided for the establishment of a Committee of Muslim Communities in the government that would manage issues associated with the Muslim community in Belgium. Members of the Committee and its Chairman – the Head Imam – would have been on the public payroll. However, local Muslims were unable to form such a Committee and started using it as a representative Muslim body. Called the “Cultural Islamic Centre”, it was created in 1968 along with the opening of the main mosque in Brussels and sponsored by Saudi King Faisal. The candidate for the leader of the Centre was approved by the Muslim World League, which supports the idea of Wahabiism being a state religion (as in Saudi Arabia).²⁴

Muslims do not have much influence on political life in Western Europe. Less than half have EU citizenship. Muslim organizations are disengaged and cannot come up with a single agenda. Some extremist organizations refuse to participate in social life at all. The swelling Muslim diaspora in Europe itself causes political problems: take, for instance, demonstrations in support of co-religionists in European capitals demonstrating in front of US and Israeli Embassies. The EU’s policies toward conflicts that involve Muslims are determined largely by violations of human rights and democratic principles, not by European Muslim communities’ demands. The number of extremist Muslims in Europe is small, but they greatly respond to policies enacted by national governments.

The states of Western Europe may face many more serious problems if they do not work out a coherent policy toward Muslim communities and Islamic organizations. Even radical Islamist organizations that are not very popular among European Muslims are supported by international Islamist organizations. They provide human resources and perform coordinating and financial functions within international criminal organizations. On their own, they do not pose a major threat; but being cells of terrorist networks and as elements of Muslim economic pyramids, they may in the long run have a detrimental influence on future European politics.

Notes

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3. See: *Etnosocialnye problemy goroda*. M. (1986).

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5. M. Anwar, 'Muslims in Western Europe', in *Muslims in Western Europe*, ed. J. Nielsen (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1992), 9.
6. B. Parekh, *Rethinking multiculturalism: Cultural diversity and political theory* (London: Macmillan, 2006), 303.
7. K. Siddiqui, *The Rushdie Affair and the Muslim Manifesto*, <http://www.islamiethouht.org/ks-bio-p4.html>.
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10. D.A. Nechitailo, *Islam, politika, radikalism v Velikobritanii*, Institute of Israel and Middle East Studies, <http://www.iimes.ru/rus/stat/2005/17-07-05.htm>.
11. Muslim Council of Britain, www.mcb.org.uk/library/statistics.php.
12. It is necessary to draw a line between "Islamism" (political Islam) and "Islamic fundamentalism". The latter is a religious movement promoting strict adherence to religious norms and traditions in everyday life. Islamism is rather a political term. It stands for the desire of a part of Muslims to preserve their traditions, religion, culture, i.e. national identity in the globalizing world. At the same time, these two terms are of course interconnected.
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15. P. Chernomorsky, 'Telo Francii priroslo musulmanami', http://www.iicas.org/articles/anv_24_12_02.htm.
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17. *Islamische Zeitung*, February 13, 2003.
18. 'Islamic information web-site with reference to Reuters', http://www.islaminfo.ru/cgi-bin/news/news_d.php?id=771.
19. Ibid.
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