



The Song of the Nonaligned World: Transnational Identities and the Reinscription of Space in Late Capitalism

Akhil Gupta

Cultural Anthropology, Vol. 7, No. 1, Space, Identity, and the Politics of Difference. (Feb., 1992), pp. 63-79.

Stable URL:

<http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0886-7356%28199202%297%3A1%3C63%3ATSOTNW%3E2.0.CO%3B2-B>

Cultural Anthropology is currently published by American Anthropological Association.

Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use, available at <http://www.jstor.org/about/terms.html>. JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use provides, in part, that unless you have obtained prior permission, you may not download an entire issue of a journal or multiple copies of articles, and you may use content in the JSTOR archive only for your personal, non-commercial use.

Please contact the publisher regarding any further use of this work. Publisher contact information may be obtained at <http://www.jstor.org/journals/anthro.html>.

Each copy of any part of a JSTOR transmission must contain the same copyright notice that appears on the screen or printed page of such transmission.

JSTOR is an independent not-for-profit organization dedicated to and preserving a digital archive of scholarly journals. For more information regarding JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.

The Song of the Nonaligned World: Transnational Identities and the Reinscription of Space in Late Capitalism

Akhil Gupta

*Department of Anthropology
Stanford University*

Introduction

The nation is so deeply implicated in the texture of everyday life and so thoroughly presupposed in academic discourses on “culture” and “society” that it becomes difficult to remember that it is only one, relatively recent, historically contingent form of organizing space in the world. National identity appears to be firmly spatialized and seemingly immutable, becoming almost a “natural” marker of cultural and social difference. This article problematizes nationalism by juxtaposing it and other forms of spatial commitment and identity, particularly transnational ones. In so doing, it seeks to illuminate the specificity of nationalism in the postcolonial world. Beginning with the premise that the structures of feeling (R. Williams 1961:48–71) that produce a location called “the nation” are not identical in differently situated places, I wish to conceptualize the vastly dissimilar structural positions occupied by First and Third World¹ nationalisms by locating them with respect to late capitalism and to the postcolonial world order. Connecting such global phenomena with questions of place and identity is consonant with recent moves in anthropological theory that urge us to go beyond “the field” to see how transnationalism refracts and shapes “the local.”²

The changing global configuration of postcoloniality and late capitalism have resulted in the repartitioning and reinscription of space. These developments have had profound implications for the imagining of national homelands and for the discursive construction of nationalism. To grasp the nature of these changes, we need to be bifocal in our analytical vision. On the one side, we need to investigate processes of place making, of how feelings of belonging to an imagined community bind identity to spatial location such that differences between communities and places are created. At the same time, we also need to situate these processes within systemic developments that reinscribe and reterritorialize space in the global political economy.

To spell out the argument, I make extensive use of two examples of nonnational collectivities: the Nonaligned Movement (NAM) and the European Community (EC). The examination of imagined communities that transgress the spa-

tial order of nation-states offers some important insights into nationalism. The section of this article that immediately follows offers an historical narrative of the Nonaligned Movement. After that, in a more comparative vein, I look at the differences between NAM, the EC, and nationalism. The third section pursues the question of nationalism in greater depth. Finally, the concluding section draws out some of the theoretical connections between space, place, identity, and the problematic of nationalism.

“Song of the Non-Aligned World”

In 1987, a little-noticed long-playing album was released in Belgrade. The cover has a photograph of the leaders of 25 nations in full national regalia at the first Nonaligned Summit held in Belgrade in 1961. Above and below the borders of the photograph is the album’s title, “Song of the Non-Aligned World,” repeated in Slavic, Hindi, Arabic, Spanish, and French. The back sleeve has a more recent color photograph of smiling children from what appears to be a veritable United Nations. Inside are photographs of the meeting sites of various Nonaligned Conferences and the words of the (only) song on the album, repeated in all the languages mentioned above. The lyrics of the song are as follows (Višekruna 1987):

Song of the Non-Aligned World

From Brioni³ hope has come to mankind
 Hope and justice for all men as one kind
 Tito, Nehru, Nasser gave us peace of mind
 When they built the movement of the Non-Aligned

In making us believe in the right things
 They gave us a song which the world sings
 Wisdom listens, violence is blind
 The only promise is that of the Non-Aligned

The creators of the Non-Aligned world
 Will be hailed forever by the whole world
 In the world of justice all men will be free
 Everyone will live in peace and harmony.

In its form, this song resembles those other songs that we call national anthems. Yet the type of community that is being invoked here is clearly not a national one. In this article, I propose that it is only by examining such nonnational spatial configurations that the “naturalness” of the nation can be radically called into question. Therefore, the study of nationalism must necessarily refer to phenomena that transgress “the national order of things.”⁴ In other words, we need to pay attention to the structures of feeling that bind people to geographical units larger or smaller than nations or that crosscut national boundaries.

The Nonaligned Movement serves as a good example of such a transnational imagined community. Whereas an analysis that centers on late capitalism alone fails to explain the *political* impetus for a transnational organization of third world nations,⁵ an analysis that centers exclusively on the political changes resulting

from decolonization cannot explain why the Nonaligned Movement has been less successful than expected in forging third world unity, and why the European Community has already made impressive, albeit incipient, moves in that direction.⁶ The powerful structural forces acting differently in these two cases can only be grasped by paying attention to their differential locations within a postcolonial world and to the reinscription of space in late capitalism (Harvey 1989; Jameson 1984). Spatial identities have been powerfully shaped by the accompanying processes of deterritorialization and displacement (Kaplan 1987; Martin and Mohanty 1986). Yet, as the Nonaligned Movement demonstrates, parallel to this are equally important, although less noted, processes that are involved in the reparationing and *reterritorialization* of space. It is in this changing relationship of space and identity that the problematic of nationalism needs to be situated.

The genesis of the Nonaligned Movement is usually traced to a meeting of 29 countries in the Indonesian resort city of Bandung in 1955. The conference was the first, groping expression of the idea of Afro-Asian unity, bringing together the leaders of independent states in the two continents. Many who were to become the most important statesmen on the world stage attended this meeting, including Nehru, Chou En-Lai, Nasser, and Sukarno. Although Bandung resulted in no concrete institutional changes, the presence of almost half the member states of the United Nations laid the framework for third world unity in the interstate system. The "spirit of Bandung" was to be evoked in all subsequent efforts to create a new "third bloc" in the postcolonial world.⁷

The pace of efforts to forge unity among third world countries accelerated after Bandung, particularly following a meeting between Nehru, Tito, and Nasser in Brioni, Yugoslavia, in 1956, culminating in the summit that formally launched the Nonaligned Movement in September 1961 in Belgrade. To understand the particular conjuncture that led the 25 participant states and the three "observers" to come together, one has to look at those eventful six years that separate Bandung from Belgrade. This period witnessed the Suez Canal crisis and the Soviet invasion of Hungary in 1956, the admission of 16 newly independent African countries to the United Nations in 1960, the escalation of Cold War tensions following the downing of an American U2 spy plane over Soviet air space in 1959, and growing U.S. military involvement in places as diverse as Cuba, Vietnam, the Congo, and Laos. For third world nation-states, especially newly independent ones, these actions only highlighted the fragility of their sovereignty. Superpower conflict and direct military intervention were grave external threats to the nationalistic goal of preserving and consolidating their independence.

The principles of nonalignment enunciated at the Belgrade Summit emphasized a commitment to nuclear disarmament, a reduction of Great Power tensions, and noninvolvement in the Cold War. Nonalignment was differentiated from "neutrality," which implies a passive, isolationist policy of noninvolvement in all conflicts. Indeed, it was an assertion of *agency* on the part of third world nation-states that defined what it meant to be "sovereign" and "independent." For this reason, nations whose sovereignty was sullied by their participation in multilateral or bilateral military agreements with the superpowers were barred from

membership. Hence, it would be a mistake to see the Nonaligned Movement entirely in the context of political conflicts among the superpowers. From the beginning, some of its most important themes have been the opposition to colonialism, neo-colonialism, imperialism, and racism.⁸ Nonalignment was thus based upon nationalism at the same time that it helped consolidate it.

A particularly controversial position maintained by the nonaligned states has been their consistent criticism of the "cultural imperialism" of the West.⁹ Here the United States' control of communication systems, news and information services, and mass-media based cultural production has received particular condemnation. In calling for a New World Information and Communications Order, the nonaligned world has earned the undying hostility of the corporations that control these services in the West. Dissatisfaction with the present information order led to the innovation of a Nonaligned News Agency Pool that takes reports from various third world countries and distributes them horizontally instead of going through the Western-controlled wire services (Mankekar 1978a, 1978b, 1978c, 1981). Asserting the power to control the distribution of news flow and cultural products in this way, the Nonaligned Movement is attempting to "bind" space in a new manner.

The News Agency Pool is one of a small body of formal institutions run by the Nonaligned Movement. Other organizations include a permanent executive committee that plans the summits held every three years, a United Nations caucus group, and a series of economic working groups such as the International Centre for Public Enterprises in Yugoslavia, a Centre for Science and Technology in Peru, and an International Centre on Transnational Corporations in Cuba. Nevertheless, the Nonaligned Movement, true to its self-designated status as a movement, has maintained a diffuse and decentered profile. Its strength lies as much in its *interstitial* location between the superpowers as in its ability to resist the metanarratives that they attempt to impose on it. This proves annoying even to sympathetic first world scholars.

The itinerant nature of intra-Third World diplomatic process has been an obstacle to a well-informed understanding of the role of the developing countries in international politics. The process appears to lack continuity in the absence of a central vantage point from which to view it. [Mortimer 1984:4, emphasis added]

Conventional explanations of the formation of the Nonaligned Movement emphasize the pressure of contingent events in world politics. Although such events were undoubtedly important, they have to be contextualized with respect to the structural shifts accompanying decolonization. Among the most important of such shifts was that which occurred with the end of direct rule: the new global political economy moved to exploitation through division of labor and unequal exchange. This significantly altered the spatial and political contours of resistance by colonized groups. The postcolonial context of sovereign, independent nation-states created a space for lateral political connections between formerly colonized nations, where previously such relations had been mediated by the colonial powers. In the Nonaligned Movement, we therefore have a recognition of the political

significance of the formation of independent nations in the third world and at the same time an acknowledgment of the heavily overdetermined and tenuous nature of that independence. The next section explores this contradictory position by comparing the Nonaligned Movement both with nationalism and with the European Community.

Nonalignment, the European Community, and Transnationalism

As a form of imagined community, the Nonaligned Movement shares a great deal with nationalism. However, it is instructive to examine the ways in which it is different. Much of the impetus for the movement came from the *nationalist* desire on the part of weak third world nation-states to preserve some measure of independence for themselves. There is something paradoxical about the fact that nationalism should need *transnationalism* to protect itself. This paradox cannot be explored by staying within the problematic of nationalism—the ideological claims it makes both about historic possibilities and the practical forms in which they can be realized (Chatterjee 1986:36–53). Why nations come to be such potent forms of imagining community can only be understood by contrasting them with other forms of imagined community, both supranational and subnational. Although one can debate the efficacy of the Nonaligned Movement in creating a supranational imagined community, far more important for the purposes of my argument are the challenges that such an organization poses for the analysis of nationalism. How does the Nonaligned Movement (as an organization that includes most nations of the world) contrast with other forms of imagined community such as nations or ethnic groups? How are these differences to be characterized? What is it that distinguishes and privileges nations as a form of imagined community, that makes them so compelling to the hearts and minds of their citizens?

Like nationalism with respect to regionalism or ethnic movements, nonalignment is itself a metanarrative that incorporates the particular struggles of its member states within the “general” struggle of the third world. “The Song of the Non-Aligned World” is a variant of the national anthem, one that seeks (quite literally) to create a poetics of a new kind of transnational, “third world” identity. The effort to create a nonaligned identity and to give the notion of “third world” a positive valence can be interpreted, analogously to nationalism, as a move to create new, homogenizing narratives of resistance to domination by the core countries. But the Nonaligned Movement, too, has to be located within yet another overarching narrative of world community, that provided by the United Nations. The self-understanding of themselves as a “third bloc” constitutes an important unifying strategy for these nations and enables a degree of resistance to the UN’s master narrative of the world as a body of equal but different nation-states. In this context, nonalignment plays a role analogous to that played by the subnational vis-à-vis nationalism. In seeking an alternative identity, it rejects as fact the homogenizing premises of the UN—separate but equal. At the same time, it uses those premises as an ideal to assert another kind of identity, pointing to the dis-

crepancy between the formal recognition of equality and actual practice. We can think of the Nonaligned Movement as representing a "rainbow coalition" of dispossessed nations: united by their common exploitation vis-à-vis the superpowers, and demanding their constitutional rights as citizens of the world of nation-states. The Nonaligned Movement's efforts at imagining collectivity are thus caught between multiple levels of spatial commitment and organization.

It is for this reason quite revealing to compare attempts at building transnational imagined communities like the Nonaligned Movement and the European Community with the system of practices that constitute nationalism. In addition to practices oriented externally, that is, toward other states, some of the most important features that enable the nation to be realized are flags, anthems, constitutions and courts, a system of political representation, a state bureaucracy, schools, public works, a military and police force, and newspapers, television, and other mass media. The Nonaligned Movement possesses some of these features, such as an anthem, a founding charter, a bureaucracy, a spokesperson who represents the movement to the "world" media, and so on. Similarly, if one considers Europe 1992, the line between a "national" and some kind of larger unit becomes even more fuzzy. Internal travel without visas, a European parliament, a European bureaucracy, common schools, the relaxation of trade barriers, tariffs, and taxation, the free movement of labor, perhaps a common currency—these features resemble the practices of nationalism so much that it could be argued that what is being proposed is the dissolution of old national boundaries and the creation of a new, united nation of Europe. Yet, it is unlikely that the nations that constitute Europe today will just disappear. What may be happening is the creation of a hybrid form that lies somewhere between federal nations like India and the United States and a singular European nation. Europe 1992 will result not just in the redivision and repartition of space but in its reinscription—something new that shares many, but not all, of the practices that constitute a nation.¹⁰

Some of the problems arising in the integration of Europe bear a striking resemblance to dilemmas of nation building that continue to be experienced in a multiethnic, multilingual, religiously pluralistic, administratively divided federal political system such as India's. (Let me immediately add that I do not want to equate the integration of Europe with nation building, but merely to point to their similarities.) Take, for example, the schools that have been set up for the 15,000 children of the employees of the European Community to "create a whole new layer of identity in these kids" (Mapes 1990:A1). "Graduates emerge [from these schools] superbly educated, usually trilingual, with their *nationalism muted—and very, very European*" (1990:A1, emphasis added). The schools strive to educate students "not as products of a motherland or fatherland but as Europeans" (1990:A1). However, administrators find that the education ministries of the 12 EC countries are not "fighting for the European view in education . . . maybe they *think European* in the finance and trade ministries, but not in education. It will be the last thing to be harmonized" (1990:A16). History textbooks, usually published for students in one nation, pose further problems. "They tend to be blinkered histories of the great powers" (Mapes 1990:A16). Schools are one of

the crucial sites where the nation comes to be imagined in the minds of generations of future citizens. It is for this reason that so much attention is given to the curricula in newly independent nation-states, especially the constructed "national" traditions embodied in history texts.

The European Community schools are creating new sets of relationships between peoples and spaces, forging a different type of identity in their students. The relationship they find between space, time, and historical memory in existing textbooks may be "blinkerred," but what will be the blinkers on the new sense of community produced? Will this alternative production of Europe as "home" be one that, although not national, is still built on violence and the exclusion of others (Martin and Mohanty 1986)? Who will now be classified as the "other" of a "European" student? What the schools are attempting to do is to redescribe cultural differences, embedded so naturally in national traditions, so that the new kinds of cultural differences they produce no longer coincide with old boundaries. The European Community schools are thus actively involved in producing the reterritorialization of space.

According to Anderson (1983), one of the most important mechanisms for imagining the "deep horizontal comradeship" that a citizen feels for a fellow national is the mass media. In his view, the ability to imagine the nation is closely tied to print capitalism. Newspapers enable the nation to be represented by the juxtaposition under one date of stories from different "parts"; similarly, the nation is differentiated from others by the presentation of "international" and "foreign" news. In this regard, transnational organizations such as the Nonaligned Movement and the European Community contrast with nation-states in that they have no widely circulating newspapers or widely watched televisual programs that enable them to be represented to "their" citizens.¹¹ This is perhaps one of the reasons why such transnational communities have been less successfully imagined than have nations.

Although less successful overall, there are nevertheless clear differences in the degree to which distinct nonnational communities have been realized. What makes the Nonaligned Movement and the European Community so different as federations are their respective locations in the postcolonial world system of late capitalism. Despite its longer history, the Nonaligned Movement has not managed to create the same bonds of solidarity linking peoples, locations, and spaces that the European Community has managed to do in a relatively short time span. This is in part because of the long historical project in which many European nations were, if not united, at least in cohort: colonialism. European unity in the postcolonial world, therefore, is based upon an entirely different structural position than unity among nonaligned nations.

A convincing argument could also be made linking the reinscription of space in Europe and the third world with the nature of late capitalism (Harvey 1989; Mandel 1975). Mandel predicted almost 20 years ago that the growing centralization and concentration of capital was likely to lead to the reterritorialization of space as ever-larger capitalist conglomerates ran up against the limits of specially protected but spatially segmented national markets (see also Harvey 1985). He

visualized several scenarios, the most likely of which foresaw the creation of three regionally based capitals, one centered in Japan, the second in the United States, and the third in a united Europe. His uncanny foresight is borne out by the statement (quoted in full earlier) that administrators in the European Community already “think European” in the finance and trade ministries. This is not to argue that the move toward a united Europe follows in some direct fashion from the changing “requirements” of late capitalism, or even that it depends on it “in the last instance,” but to emphasize that transformations in the global political economy are a central component in any explanation of the reterritorialization of space.

In contrast to the European Community, the Nonaligned Movement has had a much more difficult time in forging a common identity for its member nations, because building unity from the fragmenting experience of subjugation and displacement under colonialism is an inherently more difficult task. It is also because the rapid geographical expansion of the largest capitalist combines of the world system have put third world countries, who are producers of raw material and sellers of inexpensive labor power, under greater and greater competitive pressure vis-à-vis each other. Where third world countries have attempted to band together and promote regional economic cooperation to preserve their sovereignty, multilateral “development” aid has seduced them into a pattern of debt and dependence that has pried open their economies to multinational capital (see Ferguson 1990). The debt crisis that currently afflicts most of the developing world, leaving it completely vulnerable to control by the most powerful capitalist nation-states (and their proxies, the IMF and the World Bank), reinforces the vertical links characteristic of colonialism rather than horizontal cooperation and unity. Powerful structural forces such as these work against intra-third world unity; hence, building an identity based on nonalignment is more challenging than building one based on European-ness. The contrast between the Nonaligned Movement and the European Community illustrates the different ways in which postcoloniality articulates with late capitalism in the production of transnational imagined communities.

Nationalism in a Transnational World

If we examine the nature of the “independence” won by formerly colonized peoples and places (in most cases, it would be anachronistic to call them nations), three features stand out: the modernist form taken by the nation; the formal equality enjoyed by newly independent countries in a postcolonial global discourse about the “family of nations”; and the ambiguity of sovereignty in an unequal world.

What emerged from decolonization was a distinctively modernist institutional and ideological formation: the nation-state. One of the first things that new nation-states do is to write the history of the “nation” (itself an entity consolidated during or after colonial rule) stretching into the distant past (Dirks 1990). Such modernist practices have led two of the most influential recent theorists of

nationalism, Partha Chatterjee (1986) and Benedict Anderson (1983), to emphasize the “secondary” character of 20th-century nationalist discourse. Whereas Chatterjee sees third world nationalism as a derivative discourse that inevitably, perhaps reluctantly, participates in the “thematic” of the Enlightenment, Anderson sees it as a modular form that draws on “more than a century and a half of human experience and three earlier models of nationalism” (1983:123). It is possible to attain a somewhat different understanding of anticolonial national struggles by placing them within a more macro-perspective. One could fight the colonial power to “liberate” the nation only because the nation was already recognized as something that was waiting to be born. In other words, the discursive availability of the imagined geography of the nation allowed it to exist as a potential entity and made it a form of organizing space that had political legitimacy. The significance of this fact can be judged by comparing the relative success of nationalist movements with the relative failure of international working-class movements; as generations of Marxists after Marx found out, it is one thing to liberate a nation, quite another to liberate the workers of the world.

Second, just as the formal equality of citizens in the nation-state is often constitutionally enshrined (Anderson’s “deep horizontal comradeship”), so the equality of nation-states in the world system is given concrete expression in the charter and functioning of international organizations such as the United Nations. The independence of third world countries, dependent as it is on the international order of the United Nations, thus redirects spatial identity from the nation at the same time that it produces it.

Last, independence from colonial rule made it imperative for postcolonial third world nation-states to examine the nature and meaning of sovereignty. They soon realized that the independence they had fought so hard to obtain could not be sustained under the pressure exerted by the superpowers to incorporate them into clientistic relationships. The only way to resist this pressure was to band together and form a common front and to use this union strategically to prevent absorption into either bloc. Sovereignty not only depends on the protection of spatial borders, but it is above all the ability of state elites to regulate activities that flow across those borders, such as the crossing of commodities and surpluses, the passage of people in the form of labor, tourists, et cetera, and the movement of cultural products and ideas. It is significant that the agenda of successive meetings of nonaligned nations moved from an initial emphasis on the Cold War and colonialism to questions of imperialism, unequal trading relationships, and the new information order. It was realized that economic dependence, indebtedness, and cultural imperialism were as great, if not greater, dangers to sovereignty as was military invasion. The Nonaligned Movement thus represented an effort on the part of economically and militarily weaker nations to use the interstate system to consolidate the nation-state.

The other way in which newly independent states attempted to protect their fragile sovereignty was by aggressively employing nationalist discourses and practices *within* the country. Nationalism as a distinctively modern cultural form attempts to create a new kind of spatial and mythopoetic metanarrative, one that

simultaneously homogenizes the varying narratives of community while, paradoxically, accentuating their difference (B. Williams 1990). Taking an implicitly omniscient perspective, “a national narrative seeks to define the nation, to construct its (typically continuous and uninterrupted) narrative past in an assertion of legitimacy and precedent for the practices of the narrative present—its own relation of the national ‘story’ most especially” (Layoun 1990:7). The national narrative incorporates the local as one element in the “larger” spatial and temporal story of nationalism. In the Indian case, for example, rulers of small kingdoms who fought the British to preserve their own power are now considered nationalist heroes whose struggle contributed to the demise of colonialism. It is in this way that local struggles waged for local reasons are “written into” the nationalist narrative, either as a geographically limited instance of the whole or as a moment (perhaps an originary moment) in the gradual unfolding of the master narrative. Nationalism, therefore, gathers into its fold the dispersed historical narratives of diverse, and often unrelated, communities.

On the other hand, nationalist narratives also acknowledge, and sometimes celebrate, difference. It needs to be emphasized that shaping union through difference is also a mode of creating subject positions for subordinated narratives. As a reinscription of narratives of community, nationalism does not so much erase existing narratives as *recast* their difference. The recognition that different ethnic groups, different locales, different communities and religions each have their own role to play in the national project underlines their difference at the same time that it homogenizes and incorporates them. The Indian national anthem, for example, sequentially names the different regions (hence languages, cultures, religions, histories) that are all distinctive parts of the united Indian nation. Such an incorporation of difference hierarchically organizes subject positions for diverse groups of citizens. Pratt (1990) notes the fundamentally androcentric bias of nationalist longings: “Women inhabitants of nations were neither imagined as, or invited to imagine themselves as part of the horizontal brotherhood.” Women are generally recognized only in their role as the producer of citizens and are thus precariously positioned as subjects of the nation.

To the extent that nationalism attempts to rewrite already existing narratives of community (mistakenly analyzed as “primordial”), resistance to it takes the form of a renewed emphasis on oppositional ethnic, subnational, or religious identities. Any emancipatory movement that tries to fashion a new, coherent identity (as nationalism attempts to do) carries with it its own repressive agenda (Radhakrishnan 1987:208). The containment that nationalist narratives seek to impose on their constituent elements—actors, actions, histories, and, most pertinent to this article, spaces—are predictably, but with varying degrees of success, resisted by those so confined. However, to the extent that it is successful in incorporating the recognition of difference, nationalism serves to negate in advance, to anticipate and thereby to diffuse, reshape, and contain particular forms of resistance.

Whether a hegemonic master narrative of the nation succeeds in establishing itself or not depends a great deal on the *practices* of the state. The nation is continually represented in state institutions such as courts, schools, bureaucracies,

and museums, which employ the icons and symbols of the nation—flags, currency, seals, et cetera.¹² But, very important, the nation is also constituted by a state's external dealings with other states who recognize these practices as belonging to an entity of the same kind as themselves, thereby validating the ideology of nationalism. Such "externally oriented" practices, which constitute what it is to be a nation, include such things as marking borders (by erecting fences, maintaining troops to guard it, checking and stamping passports, issuing visas, levying duties, et cetera [Mitchell 1989]), maintaining embassies in each other's countries, keeping or breaking off diplomatic relations, signing treaties, declaring war, recognizing regimes, gaining admission to the United Nations, participating in the Olympics, the World Cup, and other international sport events, and so on. Those are some of the practices through which the "nation" is represented to *other* nation-states.

A consideration of these practices makes it clear that the potential forms that states can take in the modern world are severely circumscribed. It is for this reason that movements *against* the nation-states themselves aspire to the status of autonomous nationhood. The pervasiveness of nationalism as a system of practices and as a form of ideology cannot therefore be adequately explained simply by referring to the appeal that it has for those nationalist elites who clearly stand to gain the most from it. Instead, to understand why the nation comes to be such a privileged form of statehood, we need to locate the question of nationalism *centrally* within the context of the postcolonial interstate system. It is difficult to imagine what a state that is not a nation would look like and how it would operate in the contemporary world. By reflecting on the larger historical context, it is possible to mark the circumstances that have led to the emergence of the nation-state as a dominant organizational form. This also enables us to speculate about the conditions that may lead to its demise and the eventual development of an alternative hegemonic spatial formation. The reinscription of space in the context of late capitalism, by destabilizing the complacent equilibrium of the contemporary world system of nation-states, may very well be tending in that direction.

One conclusion that follows directly from this is that the processes that position people as citizens of nations *and* as members of larger, smaller, or dispersed units of agglomeration need to be conceptualized together. Citizenship ought to be theorized as one of the multiple subject positions occupied by people as members of diversely spatialized, partially overlapping or non-overlapping collectivities. The structures of feeling that constitute nationalism need to be set in the context of other forms of imagining community, other means of endowing significance to space in the production of location and "home."

A powerful mechanism for imagining the national community in most nations has traditionally been the mass media. However, efforts to employ the mass media to that end are persistently undercut by the transnational character of those media. In fact, representing the nation in an age where the public sphere is thoroughly transnational is a major challenge facing state elites. The control exerted by multinational corporations in particular sets severe limits on both the extent and form of nationalism practiced in different parts of the world today. The dom-

inant social blocs of third world nations find that the power of nationalism as a unifying metanarrative is thus inherently compromised. In the transnational public sphere, people's identities as citizens of a nation are multiply refracted by their inventive appropriation of goods, images, and ideas distributed by multinational corporations.¹³ There are thus processes at work that bind space and construct communities of people in a manner that dilutes the power of the nationalist project.

Such a challenge is not only being raised by transnational cultural and commodity flows. It also arises because loyalty to oppositional identities, especially subnational ones, dominate feelings of nationalism. Three examples could be given here: subnationalism, identities that crosscut the boundaries of contiguous nations, and transnationalism. Considering subnationalism first, in South Asia alone, one could point to the examples of Bengalis in the former East Pakistan (Bangladesh), Sikhs in India, and Tamils in Sri Lanka. Then there are ethnic loyalties that cut across national boundaries without, however, being transnational in the same sense as the Nonaligned Movement. Here, one could point to Kashmiris in India and Pakistan, Tamils in India and Sri Lanka, Gorkhas in Nepal and India, and Kurds in Turkey, Iran, Iraq, and the Soviet Union. Finally, one could point to a few genuinely transnational identities like that forged on the lines of Islamic community. Hence, any effort to understand how identity and location become tied through nationalism must examine those situations where the imagined community does *not* map out a national terrain. The displacement of identity and culture from "the nation" not only forces us to reevaluate our ideas about culture and identity but also enables us to denaturalize the nation as the hegemonic form of organizing space. To place nationalism within a transnational context therefore enables one to pose new questions about spatial identities and commitments.

Structures of Feeling and the Reinscription of Space

Efforts to create identities based on transnational imagined communities, epitomized by the NAM and the EC, throw into sharp relief the structures of feeling that go under the name of nationalism. It becomes clear that any attempt to understand nationalism must set it in the context of other forms of imagining community, other mechanisms for positioning subjects, other bases of identity. Some of these loyalties refer to units of space larger than the nation, some smaller, and yet others to spaces that intersect nations or are dispersed. The analytical challenge is to explain why certain forms of organizing space, specific boundaries, particular places, attain the singular importance that they do in a given historical context. Why the hegemonic representation of spatial identity in the world has become that of the naturalized borders of nation-states cannot be understood by just studying the processes within a nation that enable it to be imagined. One of the ways of stepping "outside" the nation (and the problematic of nationalism) is to see how nations are created and reproduced as a consequence of the global interstate system. By doing this, we can fathom what effects specific patterns of

the reinscription of space in the postcolonial, late-capitalist world have on the nation-state. Will nations as we know them today continue to be the hegemonic form of spatial organization in an increasingly postmodern world? And if not, in what ways will the structures of feeling that characterize nationalism be transformed? It seems to me that any answer to these questions of identity, location, and nationalism must begin with the redefinition of space in the context of post-coloniality and late capitalism.

In addition to the theoretical limitations of studies that ignore these transnational factors, the burgeoning scholarship on the "national" question in recent years runs into a problem similar to that faced by those attempting to understand the state. Just as analyzing "the state" may involve the scholar in an unwitting collusion with state elites in their efforts to represent a naturalized, unified entity called "the state," so may the studies of nationalism unknowingly contribute to its privileging as *the* most important form of imagining community and shaping identity.

Another direction from which the discourse of nationalism receives unexpected, if dubious, support is what may be termed "third worldism." Jameson (1986:69), for example, argues that all third world texts are necessarily *national* allegories. His reasoning is that what is particular to literary production in the third world is that it is always shaped by the experience of colonialism and imperialism. The binary opposition between a first and a third world embedded in the Three Worlds Theory leads to the over-valorization of nationalist ideology; indeed, since the third world is constituted through the singular experience of colonialism and imperialism, there is nothing else to narrate but the "national" experience (Ahmad 1987:5-8). The problem with employing a monologic ideology such as "third worldism" is that it encapsulates all narratives of identity within the master narratives of imperialism and nationalism. It thus serves to foreclose a richer understanding of location and identity that would account for the relationships of subjects to multiple collectivities.

In this article, I have argued that nationalism, as a model of imagining community, articulates with, rewrites, and often displaces other narratives of community. The production of a location called "nation" thus involves the creation of a new order of difference, a new alignment of "self" in relation to "other." Yet, the positioning of subjects as citizens of nation-states is multiply refracted by their identities as members of other collectivities. It then becomes pertinent to inquire why the hegemonic representation of spatial identity in the world continues to be that of the naturalized border of nation-states. For to call the nation a hegemonic spatial form is to foreground the fact that the identity it gathers in and encloses is often contested and unstable (Hall 1986).

This becomes especially evident when one examines the character of contemporary third world nationalism. The unitary nature of analyses and critiques of nationalism make it impossible for one to appreciate the depth of the differences in the construction of the nation between, say, Canada and Sri Lanka (both countries with "ethnic" minority problems). A more contextualized understanding of third world nationalism would begin by accounting for its specific location

within two macrologies. On the one hand, it has to be located within the postcolonial world order, since everything from territorial boundaries, administrative and judicial systems, and international alliances is tied to the political changes surrounding decolonization. On the other hand, it cannot be understood without paying attention to the global system of production and distribution within late capitalism.

But what is the relationship between these two contexts? The central objective of this article has been to discuss attempts to forge transnational forms of community such as the NAM and the EC with the aim of demonstrating the manner in which late capitalism and postcoloniality converge to simultaneously produce and problematize the nation. Hence, I argue that the multiple spatial grids through which identity is mapped need to be conceptualized in such a way as to de-essentialize and denaturalize nationalist discourses of authenticity. Processes of migration, displacement, and deterritorialization are, increasingly, sundering the fixed association between identity, culture, and place. In this context, nationalist narratives are being brought under increasing critical scrutiny by those marginalized or excluded from them. It is perhaps not surprising, therefore, that there is a renewed scholarly interest in nationalism.

To understand these phenomena, we need to pay bifocalized attention to two processes. On the one hand, we need to study structures of feeling that bind space, time, and memory in the production of location. By this I mean processes by which certain spaces become enshrined as "homelands," by which ideas of "us" and "them" come to be deeply felt and mapped onto places such as nations. On the other hand, we need to pay attention to those processes that redivide, reterritorialize, and reinscribe space in the global political economy. Only then can we understand why the naturalized divisions and spaces that we have always taken for granted become problematic in certain circumstances, and only then can the "problem" of nationalism be posed adequately.

Notes

Acknowledgments. I would like to thank Purnima Mankekar, Lisa Rofel, Roger Rouse, and C. Rajamohan for their critical comments and Arun Kumar for bringing some important material to my attention. I would also like to thank participants of the Faculty Seminar on Cultural Nationalism at Stanford where an earlier version was presented on 2 May 1990.

¹Although I am aware that the notion "Third World" is often employed in "the West" to homogenize what are in fact quite distinctive histories and places (to construct in effect a space of "otherness") (Mohanty 1988), it has become a positive tool of solidarity in the postcolonial world system. Self-identification as "third world" has served a central constructive purpose in movements such as the NAM. For this reason, I have chosen not to put the phrase in capital letters, quotes, or italics in the rest of this article.

²I have been especially influenced by the work of Arjun Appadurai in this regard. See Appadurai (1986), Appadurai and Breckenridge (1988), their journal, *Public Culture*, Marcus (1986), and Hannerz (1987).

³Brioni, Yugoslavia, was the site of the first tripartite summit between Nehru, Tito, and Nasser, which first led to speculation in the world press that a new third world bloc was in the process of formation.

⁴The phrase is Liisa Malkki's (this issue).

⁵It also fails to appreciate the genuinely *popular* aspects of an admittedly largely elite-based, postcolonial nationalism.

⁶I want to emphasize here that in what follows I do not mean to imply that the European Community is already an accomplished fact rather than a contested, conflictual entity in the process of formation.

Roger Rouse (private communication) has suggested that a distinction be made between these three terms such that "transnational" refer to phenomena that crosscut or intersect national boundaries, "international" be used to denote that which occurs between and among nations, and "supranational" denote spatial configurations that stand above and incorporate nations. The Nonaligned Movement displays all three of these features.

⁷Not all scholars of the Nonaligned Movement accept that Bandung marked the beginning. For example, Peter Willetts (1978:3) says: "In the states that attended, in the tone of the debates and in the resulting decisions, Bandung was not a forerunner of the Non-Aligned conferences."

⁸The last theme was particularly prominent in the third summit at Lusaka, Zambia, in 1970, where the issue of continuing first world support of South Africa occupied center stage. The increasing importance of concerns dealing with problems of economic development and structural dependence on the superpowers is reflected in the call for a New International Economic Order (NIEO) at the fourth summit in Algiers in 1973.

⁹Despite ritual invocations acknowledging the power of the ethnographer, the full implications of this fact for anthropological theory have not been realized (for an exception, see Talal Asad's essay [1986] on the inequality of languages).

¹⁰It should be clear that I am by no means implying that Europe 1992 be seen as some kind of forerunner to developments in the rest of the world.

¹¹However, it must be noted that one of the more successful programs of the Nonaligned Movement has been its wire service, which feeds stories horizontally to other nonaligned nations. This has the advantage of creating stronger links among the third world, but it does not necessarily create a new form of identity analogous to national identity.

¹²In some cases, institutions like Britain's National Theatre serve as a medium of national representation (Kruger 1987).

¹³See Appadurai (1990) for an effort to map theoretically these different transnational flows.

References Cited

- Ahmad, Aijaz
1987 Jameson's Rhetoric of Otherness and the "National Allegory." *Social Text* 17:3-25.
- Anderson, Benedict
1983 *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism*. London: Verso.

Appadurai, Arjun

1986 Theory in Anthropology: Center and Periphery. *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 28(1):356–361.

1990 Disjuncture and Difference in the Global Political Economy. *Public Culture* 2(2):1–24.

Appadurai, Arjun, and Carol A. Breckenridge

1988 Why Public Culture? *Public Culture* 1(1):5–9.

Asad, Talal

1986 The Concept of Cultural Translation in British Social Anthropology. *In Writing Culture: The Poetics and Politics of Ethnography*. James Clifford and George E. Marcus, eds. Pp. 141–164. Berkeley: University of California Press.

Chatterjee, Partha

1986 *Nationalist Thought and the Colonial World: A Derivative Discourse?* London: Zed Press.

Dirks, Nicholas

1990 History as a Sign of the Modern. *Public Culture* 2(2):25–32.

Ferguson, James

1990 The Anti-Politics Machine: “Development,” Depoliticization, and Bureaucratic Power in Lesotho. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Hall, Stuart

1986 Gramsci’s Relevance for the Study of Race and Ethnicity. *Journal of Communication Inquiry* 10(2):5–27.

Hannerz, Ulf

1987 The World in Creolization. *Africa* 57(4):546–559.

Harvey, David

1985 The Geopolitics of Capitalism. *In Social Relations and Spatial Structures*. Derek Gregory and John Urry, eds. Pp. 128–163. New York: St. Martin’s Press.

1989 The Condition of Postmodernity: An Enquiry Into the Origins of Cultural Change. New York: Blackwell.

Jameson, Frederic

1984 Postmodernism, or the Cultural Logic of Late Capitalism. *New Left Review* 146:53–92.

1986 Third-World Literature in the Era of Multinational Capitalism. *Social Text* 15:65–88.

Kaplan, Caren

1987 Deterritorializations: The Rewriting of Home and Exile in Western Feminist Discourse. *Cultural Critique* 6:187–198.

Kruger, Loren

1987 Our National House: The Ideology of the National Theatre of Great Britain. *Theatre Journal* 39(1):35–50.

Layoun, Mary

1990 Narrating Nationalism: Who Speaks and How? Who Listens and How? Or, Whose Story is this Anyway? Unpublished MS.

Mandel, Ernest

1975 *Late Capitalism*. Joris De Bres, trans. New York: Verso.

Mankekar, D. R.

1978a Three Kinds of Gaps. *In Proceedings of the Seminar on Non-Aligned News Pool*. Jag Parvesh Chandra, ed. Pp. 12–21. New Delhi: All-India Newspaper Editors’ Conference.

- 1978b Why News Pool. *In Proceedings of the Seminar on Non-Aligned News Pool*. Jag Parvesh Chandra, ed. Pp. 85–93. New Delhi: All-India Newspaper Editors' Conference.
- 1978c One-Way Free Flow: Neo-Colonialism via News Media. New Delhi: Clarion Books.
- 1981 Whose Freedom? Whose Order? New Delhi: Clarion Books.
- Mapes, Glynn
- 1990 Polyglot Students Are Weaned Early Off Mother Tongue. *Wall Street Journal*, March 6:A1, A16.
- Marcus, George E.
- 1986 Contemporary Problems of Ethnography in the Modern World System. *In Writing Culture: The Poetics and Politics of Ethnography*. James Clifford and George E. Marcus, eds. Pp. 165–193. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Martin, Biddy, and Chandra Talpade Mohanty
- 1986 Feminist Politics: What's Home Got to Do With It? *In Feminist Studies/Critical Studies*. Teresa de Lauretis, ed. Pp. 191–212. Bloomington: Indiana University Press.
- Mitchell, Timothy
- 1989 The Effect of the State. Department of Politics, New York University, unpublished MS.
- Mohanty, Chandra
- 1988 Under Western Eyes: Feminist Scholarship and Colonial Discourses. *Feminist Review* 30:61–88.
- Mortimer, Robert A.
- 1984 The Third World Coalition in International Politics. 2d edition. Boulder, Colo.: Westview.
- Pratt, Mary Louise
- 1990 Women, Literature, and National Brotherhood. *In Women Culture and Politics in Latin America*. Emile Bergmann, ed. Pp. 48–73. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Radhakrishnan, R.
- 1987 Ethnic Identity and Post-Structuralist Différance. *Cultural Critique* 6:199–220.
- Višekruna, Dušan
- 1987 Song of the Non-Aligned World. Belgrade: Radio-Television Belgrade (RTB).
- Willetts, Peter
- 1978 The Non-Aligned Movement: The Origins of Third World Alliance. New York: Nichols.
- Williams, Brackette F.
- 1990 Nationalism, Traditionalism, and the Problem of Cultural Inauthenticity. *In Nationalist Ideologies and the Production of National Cultures*. American Ethnological Society Monograph Series, 2. Richard G. Fox, ed. Pp. 112–129. Washington, D.C.: American Anthropological Association.
- Williams, Raymond
- 1961 The Long Revolution. New York: Columbia University Press.